Chapter5.
Metaontology:Existence
Brentano’stheoryofjudgmentservesasaspringboardforhisconceptionofreality,
indeedforhisontology.Itdoesso,indirectly,byinspiringaveryspecific
metaontology.Toafirstapproximation,ontologyisconcernedwithwhatexists,
metaontologywithwhatitmeanstosaythatsomethingexists.Sounderstood,
metaontologyhasbeendominatedbythreeviews:(i)existenceasasubstantive
first-orderpropertythatsomethingshaveandsomedonot,(ii)existenceasa
formalfirst-orderpropertythateverythinghas,and(iii)existenceasasecond-order
propertyofexistents’distinctiveproperties.Brentanooffersafourthand
completelydifferentapproachtoexistencetalk,however,onewhichfallsnaturally
outofhistheoryofjudgment.Thepurposeofthischapteristopresentandmotivate
Brentano’sapproach.
1. Introduction:MetaontologyandExistenceTalk
Moralphilosophyisusefullydividedintoethicsandmetaethics.Oversimplifying
considerably,thedistinctionisthis:ethicsisconcernedwithwhatisgood,
metaethicswithwhatitmeanstosaythatsomethingisgood.Thegoalofethicsisto
produceacomprehensivelistofgoods.Metaethicsconcernsamorefundamental
question:whenwesaythatxisgood,whatexactlyarewesaying?Inaway,ethicsis
concernedwiththeextensionoftheconceptGOOD,metaethicswithitsintension.
Thisisanoversimplificationinatleasttwoways.First,ethicsandmetaethics
areconcernedwithothernormativeconcepts,suchasRIGHT,VIRTUE,andREASONS.
Secondly,metaethicsdealswithotherissues,suchasmoralepistemology–howwe
cancometoknowwhichthingsaregood.Still,thereisaclearsenseinwhich
answeringthequestionofwhatexactlywearedoingwhenwesaythatsomethingis
goodliesattheheartofmetaethics.
Asimilardivisionoflabormaybeappliedtoontologyandmetaontology.
Againoversimplifying,ontologyisconcernedwithwhatexists,metaontologywith
whatitmeanstosaythatsomethingexists.Thegoalofontologyistoproducea
comprehensivelistofexistents;thatofmetaontologyistoanswerthequestionof
whatexactlywearesayingwhenwesaythatxexists.Tothatextent,ontologyis
concernedwiththeextensionoftheconceptEXISTENCE,metaontologywithits
intension.
Onewayinwhichthisoversimplifiesisthatontologymaywellbeconcerned
withotherconcepts,suchasGROUNDING,FUNDAMENTALITY,orESSENCE.1Anotheristhat
metaontologyisalsoconcernedwithotherissues,notablythemethodologyof
ontology.2Nonetheless,thereisasenseinwhichattheheartofmetaontologylies
thequestion‘whenwesaythatxexists,whatexactlyarewesaying?’Wemaythink
ofthisastheorganizingquestionofmetaontology.
Tothisquestion,therearethreeprominentanswersintheextantliterature.
Accordingtothefirst,tosaythatxexistsistoattributetoxasubstantive,
discriminatingfirst-orderpropertythatsomethingshaveandsomedonot
(Meinong1904,Parsons1980).Accordingtothesecond,itistoattributeasecondorderpropertyofexistents’distinctivepropertiesoroftheconceptdesignedtopick
themout(Frege1884,Russell1905b).Accordingtothethird,morepopularin
recentdiscussions,tosaythatxexistsistoattributetoxaformal,undiscriminating
first-orderpropertythateverythinghas(Williamson2002,vanInwagen2003).
Eachofthesehasmetwithstrongresistanceandfacesextraordinaryobjections,but
eachhasalsobeenadmirablydefended.Justbywayofmotivatingthesearchforan
2
alternativeapproachsuchasBrentano’s,Inowpresentabriefsurveyofthethree
familiarviewsandsomeoftheirimmediatedifficulties.
ge
Thesimplestviewisthattosaythatxexistsistoattributeasubstantivepropertyto
x.WhenIsaythatLeoMessiisbrilliant,IattributetoMessiacertainproperty,the
propertyofbeingbrilliant.Someplayershavethatpropertyandsomedonot.In
exactlythesamemanner,whenIsaythatMessiexists,Iattributetohimaproperty,
thistimethepropertyofexisting.Brilliant,existent,short,Argentinean–thoseare
allMessi-esqueattributesonapar.Accordingly,existentialclaimsareatbottomofa
kindwithpredicativeclaims:‘ducksarecute’and‘thereareducks’lookdifferent,
butthelatterisjustanunhelpfulrenderingof‘ducksareexistent.’
Dissatisfactionwiththisapproachisrife.Therearetechnicalproblemstodo
withnegativeexistentialsandexistentialgeneralization.From‘Jimmyisnot
Argentinean’Icaninfer‘Thereisanon-Argentinean.’Ifexistentialclaimsworkjust
likepredicativeones,from‘Shrekdoesnotexist’Ishouldbeabletoinfer‘Thereisa
nonexistent.’Butthisrequiresadistinctionbetween‘thereis’and‘exists’thatmany
findodious(Quine1948),includingBrentano(1930:127-8[112],1933:29-31[323]).Proponentsoftheviewareofcoursewellawarethattheirpositionrequiresa
distinctionbetween‘thereis’and‘exists’andembraceitunflinchingly.Itremains
thatnaturallanguagedoesnotseemtodrawsuchadistinction–‘Thereareghosts’
and‘Ghostsexist’seemtosaythesamething–sothisviewofexistencetalkcannot
quiteberightforexistencetalkinnaturallanguage.Therearealsonontechnical
problems:asHume(1739I,II,vi)noted,theideaofexistenceaddsnothingtothe
ideaofanobject.Theideaofacuteduckisdifferentfromtheideaofaduck,which
meansthattheideaofcutenesscontributessomethingtotheideaofacuteduck.But
theideaofanexistingduckisnowisedifferentfromtheideaofaduck;soitis
unclearwhattheideaofexistenceissupposedtocontribute.
Perhapsthemostdominantviewintwentieth-centuryphilosophyhasbeen
that,insayingthatxexists,weareattributingapropertynottox,buteither(i)tox’s
3
distinctive,individuatingpropertiesor(ii)totheconceptofx.Inthefirstcase,we
attributethepropertyofbeing(co-)instantiated;inthesecond,thatof(successfully)
referring.Inbothversions,existenceisconstruedasasecond-orderproperty,since
itisnotapropertyofxitselfbutofsomepropertiesofxortheconceptofx.Thus,
whenIsaythatMessiexists,whatIamdoingisattributingtothepropertiesthat
individuateMessi(whatevertheyare)thepropertyofbeing(co-)instantiated,or
elseattributingtotheconceptMESSIthepropertyof(successfully)referring.
Likewise,whenIsaythatdragonsdonotexist,Iamsayingthatnothingcoinstantiatesallthepropertiesdefinitiveofdragons,orelsethattheconceptDRAGON
isempty.
Thisapproachraisesitsownsetofdifficulties.Somearetechnicaland
pertaintoitsapplicationtosingularexistentials.Theapproachseemstosuggest
thatthepropername‘Messi’issemanticallyassociatedwithcertainproperties.For
example,ifthetruthof'Messiexists'requiresthatthepropertyofbeingtheonly
five-timeBallond'Orwinnerbeinstantiated,thenitseemsthat‘Messi’referspartly
viathedescription‘theonlyfive-timeBallond’Orwinner.’Likewise,ifthetruthof
‘Messiexists’requiresthattheconceptofMessirefer,thenitseemsthat‘Messi’
referspartlyinvirtueofexpressingthatconcept.Butmanyphilosophersdenythat
‘Messi’isassociatedwithanyproperties,descriptions,orconcepts;theymaintain
thatitrefersdirectlytotheindividualhimself,withoutanysuchmediators(Kripke
1972).Therearealsonontechnicalproblemswiththeapproach:itimpliesthatin
sayingthatMessiexists,wearenotsayinganythingaboutMessi;infact,wearenot
speakingofMessiatall,butofsomedifferent(thoughassociated)entity.Whatwe
arespeakingofisnotevenaconcreteparticular,butapropertyclusteroraconcept.
Thisfeelswrong:sayingthatxexistsfeelslikeacommentonx,notonsomething
elsesuitablyrelatedtox.3WhenweexclaimexcitedlythattheHiggsbosonexists,it
isthediscoveryofthebosonitselfthatexcitesus.Perhapsmostproblematically,
‘Messiexists’canbetrueeveniftherearenosuchthingsaspropertiesandconcepts,
assomenominalistsmaintain,whereas‘TheMessirificpropertiesarecoinstantiated’and‘TheconceptMESSIrefers’cannot.4Theproblemhereisnotthat
4
suchnominalismissoplausiblethatitsrejectionisanunwelcomecommitmentof
thesecond-orderpropertyview;rather,itisthatmetaontologicalviewsshouldnot
haveanyfirst-orderontologicalcommitments–theyshouldnotprejudge,orbe
beholdento,first-orderquestions.(Comapreametaethicaltheorywhoseaccountof
whatwedowhenwesaythatsomethingisgoodhasanychanceofworkingonlyif
consequentialismisfalse!)
Aviewgatheringmomentuminrecentmetaontologyisthatexistenceisa
first-orderpropertyofthings,butnotasubstantive,discriminatingonethatdivides
entitiesintotwosubsets,thosewhichhavethepropertyandthosewhichdonot.
Rather,itisaformalor‘pleonastic’propertythateverythinghas.Otherlogicalor
formalpropertiesarelikethataswell:thepropertyofbeingself-identicaldoesnot
divideentitiesintotwosubsetseither.
Oneproblemforthisviewconcernsintuitivelytruesingularnegative
existentials,suchas‘RobinHooddidnotexist.’Onsome(popular!)views,proper
namessuchas‘RobinHood,’atleastiftheywerenotexplicitlyintroducedas
shorthandforcertaindescriptions,aredirectlyreferential.Thismeansthattheir
referentistheonlycontributiontheymaketothemeaningofsentencesinwhich
theyappear.Onthisview,‘SantaClausiscomingtotown’ismeaninglessratherthan
false,becausethereisnopropositionitexpresses.Ifweacceptthisview,asmany
do,thenitisunclearhowsomeonewhoholdsthateverythingexitscanobtainthe
resultthat‘RobinHooddoesnotexist’istrue.IfRobinHoodispartofthis
‘everything,’then‘RobinHoodexists’istrue,andso(onmostlogics)‘RobinHood
doesnotexist’isfalse.If,ontheotherhand,RobinHoodisnotpartofeverything,
then‘RobinHooddoesnotexist’isasmeaninglessas‘SantaClausiscomingto
town.’Thispresentstheproponentoftheviewthatexistenceisapropertythat
everythinghaswithsometoughchoices:eithersheadoptsadescriptivistviewof
propernames,orsheembracestheconsequencethat‘RobinHooddoesnotexist’is
untrue.
5
Tobesure,proponentsofeachviewhaveofferedvariousresponsestothese
andotherproblems.Idonotwishtodwellonthesemattershere.Myprincipalaim
hereistoarticulateandmotivateBrentano’salternativeapproach.Brentano
workedonthisintwomainperiodsofhislife.Hisdoctoraldissertationwasonthe
notionofexistenceinAristotle(Brentano1862),buthereturnedtothetopicforty
yearslater,composinganddictatinganumberofimportantessaysandnotes(see
Brentano1930,1933).Thebasicideaisquiteoriginal,andflowsnicelyfromhis
accountofjudgment.However,theresultingviewhasreceivedessentiallyno
attentionoutsidethecirclesofBrentanoscholarship.Mygoalhereistomotivateit
toawideraudienceandshowthatitmeritsseriousconsideration.
2. MentalExistence-Commitment:Brentano’sAttitudinalAccount
Tosaythatxexistsistoperformacertainlinguisticact.Theperformanceofthisact
commitstheperformertox’sexistence.Tothatextent,wemaythinkoftheactof
sayingthatxexistsaslinguisticexistence-commitment.Saying‘xexists’isofcourse
onlyoneformoflinguisticexistence-commitment.Othersincludeasserting‘thereis
anx,’‘thereexistxs,’‘xis,’‘thexsareexistent,’andsoon.
Itis,ofcourse,possibletocommitoneselftotheexistenceofxwithoutsaying
anything.Imaythinktomyselfthatxexistsandkeepthethoughttomyself.This
wouldalsobeaformofexistence-commitment,butnotlinguisticexistencecommitment.Rather,wouldbementalexistence-commitment.Mentalexistencecommitmentiscommitmenttosomething’sexistenceinthought,whereaslinguistic
existence-commitmentiscommitmenttosomething’sexistenceinlanguage.Like
manymodernphilosophersofmind,Brentanopresupposesthepriorityofthe
mentaloverthelinguistic,takinglinguisticrepresentationtoderivefrommental
representation(seeesp.Brentano1956).Accordingly,hestartsfromanaccountof
mentalexistence-commitment,anddeviseshisaccountoflinguisticexistencecommitmentonitsbasis.
6
WhenIthinktomyselfthatMessiexists,Imentallycommittotheexistence
ofMessi.Thethreefamiliarviewssharetheassumptionthatindoingso,Iattributea
propertytosomething.(Theydifferonwhatpropertyisattributedandwhatitis
attributedto,buttheyagreethatsomepropertyisattributedtosomething.)
Underlyingthisisanevendeeperassumption:thatthecommitmenttoMessi’s
existenceisanaspectoftherelevantthought’scontent.Thepropertyattributedisa
constituentofthecontentofmythought.Onthefirst-orderviews,thecontentmay
berepresentedas<Existence,Messi>;onthesecond-orderone,as
<Instantiatedness,Messirificproperties>or<Referentiality,MESSI>.Eitherway,
someexistence-relatedpropertyfiguresinthecontentofexistence-committing
mentalacts.
Brentanorejectsthis,aswesawinChap.4.Forhim,mentalcommitmentto
something’sexistenceisnotanaspectoftherelevantmentalstate’scontent,butof
itsattitude.WhenyoumentallycommittoMessi’sexistence,yourmentalstateis
thatofbeliefinMessi,notthatofbeliefinMessi’sexistence.Messibyhimself
exhauststhecontentofyourbeliefinMessi–nopropertyisinvokedinthecontent.
(Thatiswhybelief-inisanobjectualattitude.)Theexistentialcommitmentis
encodedintheveryattitudeofbelieving-in,andneitherneedsnorcanbereplicated
withinthecontent.InthisBrentano’sapproachtomentalexistence-commitmentis
fundamentallydifferentfromthethreemorefamiliarviews.
Obviously,notallattitudesareexistence-committal.Amongattitudesthatdo
notincorporatecommitmenttox’sexistence,someexpresslyinvolvetheopposite
commitment,namelytox’snonexistence;othersare‘existentiallysilent.’Iwould
lovetohaveagold-coatedprivatejet;mydesireforsuchajet,andmy
contemplationofit,commitmeneithertothejet’sexistencenortoitsnonexistence.
Theyarenoncommittalonthequestionofthegold-coatedjet’sexistence.By
contrast,mydisbeliefinShrekisnotneutralinthisway.IttakesastandonShrek’s
existence–anegativestand.Itencodesmentalnonexistence-commitment.
7
Brentano’sattitudinalaccountofmentalexistence-commitmentdoesraisea
problem.Ifmentalexistence-commitmentisanaspectofexistence-committingacts’
content,thenlinguisticexistence-commitmentcanbeconstruedintermsof
linguisticactswiththeverysamecontent.Butthiscannotworkifmentalexistencecommitmentisanaspectofmentalacts’attitude.Astructurallysimilaraccountof
linguisticexistence-commitmentwouldstillbepossibleiftherewereanexistencecommittingforceinlanguagetoparalleltheexistence-committingattitudein
thought.Butnosuchforceappearstoexist.Perhapstheforcecharacteristicof
assertioncouldbethoughtofasakindoflinguisticrepresenting-as-true.Butthatis
notquiteyetrepresenting-as-existent.Iftherewereaspecialtoneofvoice,suchthat
uttering‘Messi’initwouldconveytheutterer’scommitmenttoMessi’sexistence,or
aspecialpunctuationsymbol,akindof‘existencestroke’akintoFrege’s‘judgment
stroke,’suchthatprefacinganounphrasewithitconveyedtheauthor’s
commitmenttotheexistenceoftheobjectdenotedbythephrase,thenthattoneor
symbolcouldunderpinanaccountoflinguisticexistence-commitmentstructurally
similartoBrentano’saccountofmentallinguistic-commitment.Butinfactthereare
nosuchlinguisticdevices,anditisinstructivethatatthelinguisticlevelexistencecommitmentappearsalwaystobeachievedthroughanaspectofcontent,withthe
aidofpreciselysuchwordsas‘exists.’Sowhatexactlyarewedoingwhenweadd
theword‘exists’after‘Messi,’asthoughwehaveaddedaverblike‘kicks’or‘scores,’
ifinrealitythereisnoactivityorstatedenotedby‘exists’(asBrentanomaintains)?
AnsweringthisquestioniscrucialforprovidingananswertowhatIdescribed
aboveastheorganizingquestionofmetaontology:whenwesaythatxexists,what
exactlyarewesaying?Thatisafterallaquestionaboutsaying,soitconcerns
linguisticexistence-commitment,existence-commitmentintherepresentational
mediuminwhichthecommunityofontologistsconductsitsinquiry.
3. LinguisticExistence-Commitment:Brentano’sFittingBelief-inAccount
8
ForBrentano,inasserting‘xexists,’wearenotsayingthatxhasthepropertyof
existing,northatsomex-distinctivepropertiesareinstantiated.Whatwearesaying
isthis:thatxisasuitableobjectofacceptance,thatis,anappropriateintentional
objectofbelief-in.Wearesayingthatbelief-inwouldbethecorrectattitudetotake
towardx–thattherightattitudetotaketowardxisthatofbelievinginit.Ifxistobe
anintentionalobjectofbelief-inordisbelief-in,itoughttobetheobjectofbelief-in.
Bythesametoken,whenwesaythatydoesnotexist,whatwearesayingis
thatifyistobeanintentionalobjectofbelief-inordisbelief-in,itoughttobethe
objectofdisbelief-in.Thecorrectattitudetotaketowardyisthatofdisbelievingin
it.Inthatsense,yisasuitable(intentional)objectofrejectionordisbelief-in.
Disbeliefisappropriatetoit.Thegeneralpicture,then,isthis:
Letuscalltheareaforwhichaffirmativejudgmentisfitting/appropriate(passende)thearea
oftheexistent(Existierenden)…andtheareaforwhichthenegativejudgmentis
fitting/appropriatetheareaofthenonexistent.(Brentano1930:24[21])
Thispassage,froman1889lecturetotheViennaPhilosophicalSociety,statesthe
viewintermsoffittingness.Fifteenyearslater,ina1904essay,Brentanoputsthe
viewintermsofcorrectness:
‘Theexistent’(Existerendes),inthepropersense,isnotanamethatnamessomething,but
ratheramountsto‘somethingcorrectlyaffirmativelythought-of’(richtigpositivGedachtes),
‘somethingcorrectlyaccepted’(richtigAnerkanntes).(Brentano1930:79[68])
Ingeneral,richtig(‘correct’)isBrentano’sfavoriteterminthesecontexts.However,
inatleastoneplaceheexplicitlyoffersassynonymskonvenient,passend,and
entsprechend–moreorlessinterchangeablytranslatableas‘appropriate,’‘suitable,’
or‘fitting’(Brentano1889:76[74]).
Thisaccountofexistencetalkmaybesummarized,orsloganized,withwhatI
willcallBrentano’sDictum:
(BD)Tobeistobeafittingobjectofbelief-in.
9
AlthoughIformulateBrentano’sDictuminthematerialmodeofspeech,itis
intendedinthefirstinstancenotanaccountofwhatexistenceitselfconsistsin,but
asanaccountofexistencetalkcomesdownto.Itcannotbeanaccountofthenature
ofthepropertyofexisting,ofcourse,sinceBrentanodisbelievesinsuchaproperty.
Moregenerally,thereisnowaytogenerateanaccountofthenatureofexistence
itself,orofwhatexistenceconsistsin.Thereisnowayto‘getunderneathexistence,’
asJonathanSchafferonceputittome.Allwecandoisexplicatewhatwedowhen
weengageinlinguisticexistence-commitment.ThatiswhatBDisreallytryingto
do.5Notewell:inBD,‘object’meansintentionalobject,notentityorconcrete
particular.Inthissenseof‘object,’theEiffelTowerisanobjectofmyacceptancein
thesamesensemywifeistheobjectofmyaffection.
ThewayIunderstandBD,itisonlyanaccountofwhatwedowhenwemake
anexistenceclaim.Ontheonehand,itisnotintendedtohelpusgoaboutactually
discoveringwhatexists.Thatis,itisnotaguidetoontologicalcommitment.(More
onthisin§5.2.)Inaddition,BDisnotintendedasasubstantiveaccountofexistence.
Itisnotanattempttocapturetheintrinsicnatureofapropertyofexistence.Thatis,
theideaisnotthatexistenceisthepropertywhosenatureisbeing-fittinglyacceptable.Indeed,thereisnosuchpropertyasexistence–thoughthereareofcourse
existents.FollowingKant,Brentanoputsthispointbysayingthatexistenceisnota
‘realpredicate’:
Incallinganobjectgood,wedonottherebygiveitamaterial/real(sachliches)predicate,
somewhataswedowhenwecallsomethingredorroundorwarmorthinking.The
expressionsgoodandbadworkinthisrespectlikeexistentandnonexistent.Wedonotseek
withthesetoaddafurtherdeterminationtotherelevantthing;rather,wewanttosaythat
whoeveraccepts[believesin]acertainthing,andrejects[disbelievesin]another,judges
truly.(Brentano1952:144[90])
Thereisnomaterialpredicateofexistence,thatis,anonformal,discriminating
predicatethatseparatesobjectsintotwogroups,thosethatsatisfyitandthosethat
donot.Thisispreciselywhyexistence-commitmentcannotbepartofthecontentof
amentalstate.Thereisnotsomeaspectoftheworld,orofthingsinit,thatweare
10
tryingtocapturewithourconceptEXISTENT.Andyetexistencetalkisperfectly
meaningful,andexistenceclaimsareoftentrue.Itistruethatducksexist.Theonly
waytomakesenseofthenotionthatitistruethatducksexist,withoutsayingwhat
makesittrueisthefactthatduckshavethepropertyofexisting,istosaythatwhat
istrueisthefactthatbeliefinducksisfitting.
Toseethis,supposethatmentalcommitmenttotheexistenceofxwerea
contentfeature,sayamatterofthebeliefthatxexists.Thenitwouldbenaturalto
holdthatlinguisticexistence-commitmentisamatterofassertingthekindof
sentencethatexpressedthatbeliefandthussharedthesamecontentasit.Butif
mentalcommitmenttotheexistenceofxisattitudinallyencodedintheexistencecommittalstate,thenutteringasentencewiththesamecontentasthatstate
accomplishesnothing.Toreplicatetheintentionalstructureoftherelevantmental
stateinalinguisticutterance,therewouldhavetoexistanexistence-committal
force,sothatonecouldsimplyutter‘x’withthatforce.Sincenosuchforceexists,
committinglinguisticallytox’sexistencemustrathertaketheformofcommenting
onthekindofmentalattitudeitwouldbeappropriateorcorrecttotaketowardx.
Itisuseful,inthiscontext,todistinguishtwoexplicitlycontrastivereadings
ofBD:
(BD1)Tobeistobeafittingratherthanunfittingobjectofbelief-in.
(BD2)Tobeistobeafittingobjectofbelief-inratherthandisbelief-in(or
contemplation).
BD1istrue,insofarasallexistentsarefittingratherthanunfittingobjectsofbeliefin.ButBD1doesnotexplainexistencetalk.Itdoesnotaccountforwhatitmeansto
saythatsomethingexists.WhatexplainsthatisBD2,thethoughtthattosaythatx
existsistotakeastandonwhichattitudeitwouldbecorrecttotaketowardx,which
attitudeisappropriateforx.
Tothatextent,Brentano’saccountofexistencetalkcanbethoughtofasa
sortoffitting-attitudeaccount.Suchaccountshaverecentlyproliferatedinthe
11
metaethicalliterature(Jacobson2011).Thebasicideaisthatforxtobegoodisforit
tobeafittingobjectofapprovalorthelikeproattitude;forxtobebadisforittobe
afittingobjectofdisapprovalorthelikeconattitude.AswewillseeinChap.8,
Brentanoisquiteclearlyafitting-attitudetheoristofvalue,indeedmaywellbethe
firstsuch.AndaswewillseeinChap.8and10,hisaccountsoftheexistentandof
thegoodaresupposedtobestructurallysymmetrical,somethingheisquiteexplicit
oninseveralplaces(seeSeron2008).Accordingly,wewouldbequitejustifiedto
considerBrentano’sapproach,ascapturedinBD2,afitting-attitudeaccountof
linguisticexistence-commitment.6
Brentano’saccountfacesanimmediatechallenge:whatdoesitmeanfor
belief-intobefittingorcorrect?Themostnaturalanswerisofcourseunavailableto
Brentano.Themostnaturalansweristhatitisfittingorcorrecttobelieveinxjust
whenxreallyexists.(Compare:itisappropriateforustobelievethatpjustwhenp
istrue.)Adoptingthisanswerwouldresultinimmediatecircularity,however:what
itisforabeliefinxtobefittingisjustforxtoexist,butwhatitisforxtoexistisfor
ittobefittingtobelieveinx.Upshot:Brentanomusthavesomeother,lessobvious
accountofbelieffittingness.
4. FurtherDevelopments:WhatIsBeliefFittingness?
Brentano’saccountofbelieffittingnessproceedsintwosteps.Thefirstisananalysis
ofbelieffittingnessintermsofself-evidence(Evidenz).Thesecondisaprimitivist
accountofself-evidence.Itaketheseupinreverseorder.Iwillthenraisealeftover
circularityconcernandaddressitonBrentano’sbehalf.
4.1.TheNatureofSelf-Evidence
Brentano’sapproachtoself-evidenceremainedmoreorlessconstantthroughout
hiscareer.FromthefirstextendeddiscussioninPsychologyII(Chap.3,§§2-4)toa
seriesofdictationsonthetopicinthesecondweekofJuly1915(twentymonths
12
beforehedied),Brentano’sviewsbothonwhatisself-evidentandwhatitistobe
self-evidentchangedlittle.RecallfromChap.1thatinnerperceptionisself-evident.
Sinceperceptionisforhimaspeciesofjudgment,wecansaythatinner-perceptual
statesconstituteonekindofself-evidentjudgment.Theonlyotherkindis
constitutedbycertainapriorijudgments,notablylogicalandmathematical(see,
e.g.,Brentano1930:148[130]).Thesejudgments’statusasself-evidententrainsa
numberofenviablefeatures:infallibility,certainty,immediacy,andsoon.Butthese
featuresarenotwhatself-evidenceamountsto.Onthecontrary,self-evidenceis
morebasicthanthemandunderliesthem:
Whatisself-evidentcannotbeinerror.Andwheresomethingisself-evidenttherecannotbe
doubt.Butneitherfreedomfromerrornorfreedomfromdoubtmakesajudgmentaselfevidentjudgment…(1930:144[126])
Innerperceptionisinfalliblebecauseitisself-evident.Beliefinthelawof
contradictioniscertainbecauseitisself-evident.Buttheirbeingself-evidentgoes
deeperthantheirinfallibilityandcertainty.
Ifself-evidenceisnotjustinfallibility,certainty,immediacy,andsoon,but
somethingdeeperthatunderliesandexplainsthese,thenwhatisit?Accordingto
Brentano,thenotionofself-evidenceisprimitiveandunanalyzable.Inconsequence,
wecannotcometograspwhatself-evidenceisbydigestingtherightphilosophical
theoryofit.Nonetheless,therearecertainintellectualexerciseswecanperformthat
enableustograspdirectlythenatureofself-evidence.7
Toseehowthisworks,considerthe‘revelationtheory’ofcolor(Johnston
1992).Accordingtoit,itisamistaketotrytoappreciatethenatureofcolorsby
articulatingtherightphilosophicaltheory(whetherintermsofobjective
reflection/refractionproperties,dispositionstoelicitcolorexperiences,categorical
basesofsuchdispositions,oranythingelse).Toappreciatethenatureofgreen,says
therevelationtheorist,wejustneedtolook.Whenwelookataparadigmatically
greenapple,thenatureofgreennessrevealsitselftous.Regardlessofwhetherwe
ultimatelywishtosubscribetoarevelationtheory,thenotionthatapropertymay
13
besuchthatitsnaturecanbeappreciatedthroughdirectawareness,ratherthan
throughaphilosophicaltheory,isratherplausible.Brentano’sviewisthatthisis
exactlythecasewiththepropertyofself-evidence–andalso,asithappens,withthe
propertyofgreenness.
Now,thereadermightbeforgivenifs/hefeelsthatthereisacertain
disanalogybetweenthecasesofgreennessandself-evidence.Intheformer,when
wearetoldthatwewillgraspdirectlythenatureofgreennessjustbylooking,we
knowimmediatelywhattodo,andwhetherwehavesucceededincapturingthat
whichwewerepromisedwewouldgraspsimplybylooking.Inthecaseofselfevidence,however,itisnotimmediatelyobviouswhatwearesupposedtodoand
whatwouldcountashavingsuccessfullydonethat.Thismayraiseasuspicionabout
arevelationtheoryofself-evidence:ifself-evidencerevealsitsnature,shoulditnot
beimmediatelyobviousthat–andhow–itdoes?
Brentanoisawareofthisobjectionandresponds,somewhat
underwhelmingly,thatself-evidencerevealeditselfinanimmediatelyobviousway
tocertainphilosophers,notablyAristotle(Brentano1952:157[98]).Butthereisa
deeperpointtobemadehere.Arguably,theimmediateplausibilityofthenotion
thatcolors‘reveal’theirnatureisnotdueentirelytoourvisuallywitnessingthe
intrinsicnatureofthecolors.Rather,itisdueinparttotherifeandsharpcontrasts
thatwewitnessamongdifferentcolorsinourenvironment.Imagineaplanet–callit
Green-Earth–muchlikeoursbutfortwodifferences:(i)allobjectsthereareshades
ofblackandwhiteand(ii)allarenaturallyilluminatedbygreenlight(perhaps
becauseofthespecialpropertiesofGreen-Earth’ssun),insteadofthestandard
whitesunlightweareusedtohereonEarth(so-calledD65).8Importantly,thevisual
apparatusofGreen-Earthlings,fromsensorytransducerstohighvisualcortex,is
identicaltoours.WecancomparenormalvisualexperiencesofobjectsonEarthand
onGreen-EarthbyconsideringthescenesportrayedinFigure5.1.9
14
Figure5.1a.EarthlyObjects Figure5.1b.Green-EarthlyObjects
ConsidernowpairsofGreen-EarthlyandgreenEarthlyobjectsthatreflect
exactlythesamelight(and,exhypothesi,areprocessedbytheexactsame
apparatus).WemaystipulatethatthefrontitemsinFigures5.1aand5.1banswerto
thisdescription.ItseemstomethatalthoughEarthlingsmaywellgraspdirectlythe
natureofgreenjustbylookingattherelevantgreenEarthlyobjects,GreenEarthlingsareillpositionedtograspthenatureofgreenjustbylookingatthe
relevantGreen-Earthlyobjects(despitetheidentityofphysicalreflectionand
refractionpropertiesandof‘opponentprocessing’apparatus).10Moreprecisely,
perhaps,Green-Earthlingscannotgraspthenatureofgreenassuch,thatis,the
determinableofwhichallspecificgreenshadesaredeterminates.Whatismissing
onGreen-Earth,itwouldseem,isthepropercontrast:sinceeverythingisgreentinged,therearenoobjects(surfaces,volumes,films)completely‘freeofgreen.’11
Ifthisisright,thendirectgraspofF’snaturerequirestherightkindof
contrast.Sometimestheworldissetupsothatthecontrastoccursnaturally(asis
thecasewithcolorsonEarth),butsometimesitisthephilosopher’stasktoadduce
thecontrast.Thisisdonebydwellingoncertainexamplesofpairsofphenomena,
whetherrealorthought-experimental,withthegoalof‘helping’one’sinterlocutor
tograspthenatureofFforherself.Theresultisakindof‘assistedrevelation’
accountofthenatureofF.
15
Brentano’sapproachtothedirectgraspofself-evidenceispreciselyofthis
‘assistedrevelation’variety:
Thecorrectmethodisonethatweuseinmanyothercaseswhereweareconcernedwitha
simplemarkorcharacteristic.Wewillhavetosolvetheproblembyconsideringa
multiplicityofjudgmentswhichareself-evidentandthenjuxtaposingandcontrasting
(vergleichendgegenüberstellen)themwithotherjudgmentswhichlackthisdistinguishing
characteristic.Thisiswhatwedo,afterall,whenwemakecleartoourselveswhatisredor
notred…(Brentano1930:143[125],myitalics;seealso1928:3[4])
‘Simple’hereismeantastheantonymof‘composite’:asimplecharacteristicisone
thatcannotbeaccountedforintermsofmoreelementalconstituents.Brentano’s
contentionisthatself-evidence–likeotherincomposite,primitivefeatures–can
onlybeappreciatedthroughsuitablecontrasts(Brentano1956:111).Inparticular,
althoughself-evidentbeliefsinvolveafeelingofstrongconfidence,indeedofbeing
compelledtobelieve,thatfeelingcanattachtootherbeliefsasaresultofhabit,
indoctrination,wishfulthinking,orprejudice.Whenweholdinmemoryor
imaginationaself-evidentconfidentbeliefandanon-self-evidentconfidentbelief,and
contrastthetwo,wecandirectlygraspthefeaturepresentonlyintheformer:
Descartes’exampleof[self-evidence]istheknowledgewepossesswhenweareawareof
thinking,seeing,hearing,wantingorfeelingsomething.NomatterhowfarIgowithmy
doubt,hesaid,IstillcannotdoubtthatIdoubt.AndhedidnotmeanbythisthatIjusthave
anincontrovertibleurge(unüberwindlichenDrang)tobelieveinmythinking,butratherthat
Iperceivewithcompletecertaintythefactofmythinking.Acomparisonwithadeep-rooted
prejudicebringsoutthecharacteristicthatcontrasts[theinner-perceptualjudgment]witha
caseofblindurgetobelieve;betheurgeaspowerfulasyoulike,somethingisstillmissing
herethatshowsupthere[intheinner-perceptualjudgment],andthatissimplywhatwe
labelself-evidence.(Brentano1928:3[4])
Acollegestudentmayfeelequalconfidencein‘Ithink,thereforeIam,’whichhe
learnedyesterday,asin‘Shavingmakesthehairgrowbackthicker,’whichhisfather
impartedonhimuponhissixteenthbirthday.Nonetheless,whenweas
theoreticiansconsiderthesetwobeliefssidebyside,asitwere,we‘see’that
althoughtheyaresimilarinsofarastheybothexhibitanacutefeelingofcertainty,
16
theyarealsocruciallydifferent.Moreprecisely,injuxtaposingthetwointhought
webecomesdirectlyacquaintedwithadimensionalongwhichtheydiffer.That
dimensionwelabel‘self-evidence.’Astheoreticians,wefocusourmindontheright
incompositefeaturebyimaginingourselvesthinking‘Ithink,thereforeIam,’
imaginingourselvesthinking‘Shavingmakesthehairgrowbackthicker,’and
comparingandcontrastingthesetwoimaginedjudgments.Thereisnootherwayfor
ustotrulygraspwhatself-evidenceis.
4.2.Self-EvidenceandBeliefFittingness
Somuch,then,forBrentano’sprimitivistaccountofself-evidence.ForBrentano,the
fittingnessorcorrectnessofabeliefcanbeanalyzedintermsofself-evidence:
Truthbelongstothejudgmentsofthecorrect/fittingjudger–tothejudgments,therefore,of
someonewhojudgesinthewayhewhomadehisjudgmentsonthematterwithselfevidencewould.(Brentano1930:139[122])
Thispassagecombinestwoideas.Thefirst,whichdoesnotdirectlyconcernus,is
thatajudgment’struthcomesdowntoitscorrectness/fittingness.Theother,which
doesconcernus,isthatatokenjudgment’scorrectness/fittingnessisamatterofits
conformingtoatype-identicaljudgmentthatisself-evident.
Moreprecisely,theviewisthis.Apersonmaymakeajudgmentregardingx’s
existence–thatis,decidetobelieveordisbelieveinx–inoneoftwoways:withor
withoutself-evidence.Ifshemakesthejudgmentwithself-evidence,thenwhatever
sheendsupdeciding,herjudgmentisfitting.Forexample,ifshedecidestobelieve
inx,thensinceshejudgedthematterwithself-evidence,herbeliefinxisselfevidentandafortiorifitting.Now,ifthepersonmakesthejudgmentwithoutselfevidence,thenforherresultingjudgmenttobefitting,acertaincounterfactualmust
hold:namely,thatifshejudgedwithself-evidence,shewouldendupmakingthe
samejudgment–ormoreexactly,thatifanyonejudgedwithself-evidence,s/he
wouldendupmakingthatjudgment.Forexample,ifshedecidestobelieveinx,then
17
herbeliefisfittingiffwereanysubjectStojudgeonx’sexistencewithself-evidence,
Swouldcometobelieveinx.
SupposeIbelievethatmywifeissadnow(orratherbelieveinmywife’s
currentsadness).Mywifeherselfmayknowwithself-evidencethatsheissad,since
shecaninner-perceivehersadness,andinnerperceptionisself-evident.Myown
beliefinhersadness,however,isnotself-evident,sinceIcannotinner-perceiveher
sadness.Still,thefollowingcounterfactualisstilltrue:ifmywifeweretojudgeon
whethersheissadornot,shewouldcometoself-evidentlybelieveinhersadness.It
isbecausethiscounterfactualistrue,claimsBrentano,thatmybeliefinmywife’s
sadnessisfitting.
Itisaconsequenceofthisaccountthatonecannottrulyappreciatethe
natureofbelieffittingnesswithoutgraspingthenatureofself-evidence,since
fittingnessisanalyzedintermsofself-evidence.Therefore,itisalsoaconsequence
thatonecannotappreciatethenatureofbelieffittingnesswithoutencounteringin
innerperceptionthecontrastbetweenself-evidentandnon-self-evidentbeliefs-in
(Brentano1952:141-2[88]).
Thisaccountofbelieffittingnessfacesanimmediatedifficulty,raisedby
Chisholm(1986:39),butapparentlyairedalreadybyEhrenfels(Bacigalupo2015:
56).Itisthatinsomecasesitmaybeimpossibleforanyonetomakeajudgmenton
whetherxexistswithself-evidence.Indeed,giventhatforBrentanoself-evidence
extendsonlytoinnerperceptionandcertainaprioribeliefs,thereseemtobelarge
tractsofouraposterioriknowledgeforwhichself-evidenceissimplynotinthe
cards.Beliefinducks,forexample,seemseminentlyfitting,yetnobodycanhopeto
havethisbeliefwithself-evidence.12
ChisholmhimselfdeemsthatBrentano’sonlyoptionhereistoresorttoGod’s
aprioriinsightintoallthings(Ibid.).Thereasonmybeliefinducksisfitting,onthis
view,isthatGodself-evidentlybelievesinducks.Insofarasthisresponsemakes
Brentano’sanalysisbeholdentotheism,however,itisnotparticularlysatisfactory–
thoughonemightsuggestthattheanalysisdoesnotquitecommittoGod’s
18
existence,butonlytoherconceivability.Now,Brentanohimselfwasofcoursea
theist(seeBrentano1929),butingeneralheseemsnottoappreciatethemoveof
parachutingGodintothedialectictosolveotherwiseinsurmountablephilosophical
problems.AndaswewillseeinChap.8,heexplicitlyopposestheappealtoGodina
paralleldialecticalsettingtodowiththenatureofgoodness.
ItmightbesuggestedthatappealtoGodisnotBrentano’sonlyoptionhere.
Anotheroptionistoappealtocounterpossibles,thatis,counterfactualswhose
antecedentsarenecessarilyratherthancontingentlyfalse.Considertheclaimthatif,
perimpossibile,Iformedajudgmentonthematterofducks’existencewithselfevidence,thejudgmentIwouldformisthatofbelievinginducks.ForallBrentano
mightcare,onemightsuggest,theanalysisofbelieffittingnesscouldinvokesuch
counterpossibles.Theideawouldbethatwhenwesaythatbeliefinxisfitting,what
wearesayingisthatif,perhapsperimpossibile,someonejudgedwithself-evidence
onx’sexistence,s/hewouldbelieveinx.13
Themainproblemwiththisisthatitisunclearhowwearesupposedto
evaluatetheplausibilityofsuchcounterpossibles.Whenweplugtheemergingview
ofbelieffittingnessintothefittingbelief-inaccount,weobtainthefollowing:tosay
thatxexistsistosaythatbelief-inistheattitudethatwouldbeadoptedtowardxby
someonewho,perhapsperimpossibile,judgedthematterofx’sexistencewithselfevidence.Thus,tosaythatducksexististosaythatif,perimpossibile,anyonecould
makeajudgmentontheexistenceofduckswithself-evidence,thentheattitudeshe
wouldtaketowardducksisthatofbelief-in(ratherthandisbelief-in).Toevaluate
theclaimthatducksexist,then,itwouldseemthatwemustfirstevaluatetheclaim
thattherelevantimpossiblesubjectwouldhaveaself-evidentbeliefinducks.But
howarewesupposedtoknowwhatattitudethisimpossiblesubjectwouldtake
towardducks?Ifwesupposethatshewouldbelieveinducksonthegroundsthatit
istruethatthereareducks,thenwefallintocircularityagain.
ItmightbesuggestedthatBrentanowouldhavedonebettertoaccountfor
fittingnesswithoutreferencetoself-evidence,appealinginsteadtoobligation,the
19
‘epistemicought,’evidence,orrelatedepistemicnotions(seeSosa2009and
McHugh2014).Theideamightbe,say,thatitisfittingtobelieveinducksbecause
theweightofevidencerecommendssuchabelief.Theobviousproblemhere,
however,isthatnothingprevents(i)theexistenceofthingswehaveinsufficient
evidencetobelievein,nor(ii)ourhavingsubstantialevidencefortheexistenceof
thingswhichdonotinfactexist.Ifabelief’sfittingnesswereamatterofitsbeing
supportedbyevidence,then(i)wouldinvolveexistentsinwhichitisnotfittingto
believeand(ii)wouldinvolvefittingbeliefsinnonexistent.Itisperhapsnaturalto
embracesuchpossibilities,butnotifonealsowantstoholdthattobeistobea
fittingobjectofbelief-in.
Consideranexample.Itisperfectlypossiblethattheworlddoubledinsize
instantaneouslylastnightatmidnight.Ifthiseventofinstantaneouscosmic
doublingdidoccur,andexistenceistobeaccountedforintermsoffittingbelief-in,
thenBrentanowouldhavetosaythatitisfittingtobelieveinthatevent.However,
giventhattheeventwouldentailtheinstantaneousdoublingofourmeasuring
instruments,themeterinParis,andsoon,itisinprincipleimpossibletoproduce
anyevidenceforitsoccurrence.Inthatscenario,then,itwouldbefittingtobelieve
inaneventforwhichnoevidenceispossible.Itisprobablybecauseofsuch
limitationsontheappealtoevidenceandsimilarepistemicnotionsthatBrentano
insteadappealedtoself-evidence,which,recall,ensuresinfallibility.Aswehave
seen,however,analyzingfittingnessintermsofself-evidencecreatesaproblemin
caseswhereself-evidenceisnotinthecardsforus,asinthebeliefinducks.
Whattodo?Inmyopinion,Brentano’sbestmovehereistogoprimitivist
aboutbelief-fittingnessdirectlyandconstrueself-evidenceasjustaparticularly
acuteormanifestinstanceoffittingness.Onthisview,theonlywaytograspthe
natureofbelieffittingnessistocontemplatesidebysidefittingandunfittingbeliefs
inthings,andthisiseasiesttodowiththemoststarklyfittingbeliefs,namely,the
self-evidentones.Tobeclear,fittingnessitselfdoesnotcomeindegrees–abeliefin
xiseitherfittingorunfitting.Buthowmanifestabelief’sfittingnessisdoescomein
degrees.Themostmanifestlyfittingbeliefsaretheself-evidentones.Ourcollege
20
student’sbeliefinhisownexistenceisfittinginaninner-perceptiblymanifestway
inwhichhisbeliefinhairgrowingbackthickeraftershavingisnot.By
contemplatingthecontrastbetweenthesetwobeliefs,andotherbeliefpairslike
them,wegraspdirectlythenatureofmanifestlyfittingbelief.Wethenunderstanda
fittingbeliefasonewhichislikethemanifestlyfittingonesintherelevantrespect
butisnotmanifestlysuch(orbetter:asonewhichislikeahighlymanifestlyfitting
beliefintherelevantrespectbutislessmanifest).
Thiskindoffittingnessprimitivismisnotideal,insofarasitleavesthe
extrapolationfrommanifestlyfitting(i.e.,self-evident)judgmentstomerelyfitting
onessomewhatopaque.Theresultingaccountofexistencetalkwouldcertainly
benefitfromanelaborationonthenatureofthisextrapolation.Itdoesseemtome,
however,amorepromisingroutethanappealtoeitherGodorcounterpossibles.In
anycase,Brentanowouldprofitherefromstatingthathisisnotanaccountofhow
wecometoknowthatsomethingexists,butofwhatwearesayingwhenwesaythat
somethingexists.Inreality,mysenseisthatBrentano’saccountofexistencetalkis
actuallyintendedtopavethewaytoakindofclassicalfoundationalismabout
existentialknowledge(seeBrentano1928).14Allthesame,theaccountofexistence
talkmanywellbemoreplausiblethanthecorrespondingaccountofexistential
knowledge.
4.3.ExistenceandtheNatureofBelief-in
IhaveattemptedtoshowthatBrentano’saccountofexistencetalkintermsoffitting
belief-inneednotfallpreytocircularity.Sofar,however,allIhaveshownis(at
most!)thatthereisnocircularityhiddenintherequirementthatbeliefs-inbefitting.
Theremightstillbesomecircularityhiddenintherequirementthatthefittingstate
betheobjectualattitudeofbelief-in.Afterall,inChap.3-4wehavecharacterized
belief-inasthestatewhosedistinctive,essentialfeatureistheattitudinalproperty
ofpresenting-as-existent.IfweplugthisintowhatIhavecalledBrentano’sDictum,
weobtain:tobeistobeafittingobjectofpresentation-as-existent.Brentano’s
21
fittingbelief-inaccount,then,mightbecircularafterall.Foritsanswertothe
organizingquestionofmetaontologyseemstobethis:whenwesaythatxexists,
whatwearesayingisthatthecorrectattitudetotaketowardxisthatattitudewhich
presents-as-existentx.
Theresponsemustbethat‘existent’isnotreallyaconstituentof‘presenting-
as-existent.’AsinChap.2,wemustreadthislocutionassyntacticallysimple,with
‘existent’appearinginitasamorphologicalbutnotsyntacticpart.Theexpression
‘presenting-as-existent’isusefulasa‘philosophicalwink’ofsort,togiveasenseof
thepropertywearetryingtopointat.Butstrictlyspeaking,‘presenting-as-existent’
isjustalabel,pickingouttherelevantpropertydirectly,notbymediationofa
descriptionsuchas(thenon-hyphenated!)‘presentingasexistent.’
Thisresponsemaywork,butonlyifthecompositionalunderstandingof
‘presenting-as-existent’isnottheonlywaywehaveofunderstandingwhich
propertyismeant.Theremustbesomeotherwayforustounderstand‘presentingas-existent.’Andindeed,Brentanodoesofferussuchaway.Infact,Brentano
himselfnevercharacterizestheattitudinalpropertyessentialtojudgmentinterms
ofpresenting-as-existent–orforthatmatter,inanyotherterms.Forhim,that
propertyisanotherprimitivewecanonlygraspdirectly,usingthesamecontrastive
methodweusetograspthenatureofself-evidence:
…judgmentisanirreducible(irreduzibler)act,directedatanobject,thatcannotbefurther
analyzed.Inotherwords,ajudgmentconsistsinaspecificrelationtotheobjectwhose
naturecanbeelucidatedonlybyexamplesandwhichcanbeexpressedby‘accepting’and
‘rejecting.’(Brentano1956:100)
Itisbyinner-perceivingjudgmentsandother(nonjudicative)consciousstates,then
‘recreating’bothtypesofstateinepisodicmemoryandattendingtothedifference
betweenthem,thatwecometograspthedistinctivenatureofjudgment.Someone
whohasneverjudgedcannotgraspthenatureofjudgment–notbyunderstanding
theexpression‘present-as-existent’andnototherwise.15
22
Inconclusion,Brentano’sgambitistoaccountforexistencetalkintermsof
fittingbelief-in,andthenclaimthatboththenotionoffittingnessandthenotionof
belief-incanbeunderstoodwithoutpriorunderstandingofwhatexistenceis.The
notionoffittingnesscanbeunderstoodintermsofself-evidence,whichisgrasped
directly,andthenotionofbelief-inisgraspeddirectlyaswell.Bothself-evidence
andbelief-inareprimitivenotionswecanunderstand,ultimately,onlythanksto
inner-perceptualencounter.ThisiswhyalreadyinthePsychologyBrentano
promises,somewhatcryptically,thatanempiricisttreatmentoftheconcept
EXISTENCEasultimatelyacquiredbyperception,albeitinner,isworkable:
Somehaveheldthatthisconcept[EXISTENCE]cannotbederivedfromexperience…[But]we
willfindthatthisconceptundoubtedlyisderivedfromexperience,butfrominner
experience,andweacquireitwithregardtojudgment.(Brentano1874:II,52[210];my
italics;seealsoBrentano1952§40)
BrentanodoesnotdeveloptheideaanyfurtherinthePsychology.Againstthe
backgroundofthissection’sdiscussion,whathehasinmindshouldbeclearthough:
innerperceptionofjudgments,especiallyself-evidentones,istheultimatebasison
whichweacquireourconceptofexistence.
Ifweuseboldfacetomarkprimitivenotions,graspableonlyviadirect
encounter(againstappropriatecontrasts),Brentano’sfullyexplicitaccountof
existencetalkcanbeputasfollows:tosaythatxexistsistosaythatbelief-inisthe
attitudethatwouldbeadoptedtowardxbysomeonewhojudgedthematterwith
self-evidence.Ihaverecommended,however,thatBrentanoretreattothethesis
thattosaythatxexistsistosaythatbelief-inistheattitudeitwouldbefittingto
adopttowardx,withself-evidenceenteringthepictureonlyheuristically,asa
particularlystarkinstanceofinner-perceptiblefittingness.
5. AdvantagesandDisadvantagesoftheFittingBelief-inAccount
23
Brentano’saccountisverydifferentfromthethreemorestandardapproachesto
existence.Foronething,atleasttwoofthosestandardapproachesoffertheoriesof
thenatureofexistenceitself,whereasBrentano’sfitting-attitudeaccountisprimarily
atheoryofexistencetalk.Whatitsaysaboutexistenceitselfis,first,thatthereisno
propertyofexistence,andsecond,thatalthoughthereareexistents,thereisnothing
thatmakesthemexistents–theyjustexist.Accordingly,thereisnowayto‘get
underneath’existence,andallwecanhopetoobtaininthisareaisilluminationof
existencethoughtanddiscourse–thatis,ofthenatureofmentalandlinguistic
commitmenttoexistence.Furthermore,Brentano’saccountdifferssubstantially
fromthethreestandardapproachesalsospecificallyonthenatureofsuch
existence-commitment.Mostnotably,forBrentanomentalexistence-commitment
doesnotinvolveattributionofapropertytoanything.Thereisasenseinwhich
linguisticexistence-commitmentdoes:whenweassertthatxexists,weimplicitly
attributethepropertyoffittingnesstothebeliefinx;indeed,xitselfisattributedthe
propertyofbeingasuitableobjectforbelief-in.Atthesametime,thisisvery
differentfromtheproperty-attributioninvolvedinthemorestandardaccountsof
existencetalk,insofarasthepropertyattributedisnotostensiblyontological(itis
notapropertysuchasexistingorbeinginstantiated).Inthissection,Iconsiderthe
potentialadvantages(§5.1)anddisadvantages(§5.2)ofBrentano’saccount.
5.1.AvoidingtheProblemsofTraditionalAccounts
Brentano’sunusualapproachavoidsmanyofthecentralproblemsbedevilingthe
threebetter-knownapproachesdiscussedin§1.Tobesure,theremaybeother
solutionstotheseproblems–theliteratureonthisisenormous.Butitisremarkable
thatmanyoftheseproblemsdonotevenarisewithinBrentano’sfittingbelief-in
framework.
Twoissueswereraisedin§1withthefirstview,existenceasasubstantive
first-orderproperty.Thefirstconcernedthetreatmentofnegativeexistentials,such
as‘Therearenodragons.’Theviewunderconsiderationinterpretsthistomean
24
somethinglike‘Dragonshavethepropertyofnotexisting.’Thelatter,however,
entails,bysimpleexistentialgeneralization,theincoherent-sounding‘Thereisanx,
suchthatxhasthepropertyofnotexisting.’Theremaybewaysaroundthis,notably
bydevisingformalsystemsinwhichexistentialgeneralizationisnotan
automaticallyvalidinference.Itisnoteworthy,though,thattheproblemdoesnot
evenariseintheBrentanianframework.ForBrentanointerprets‘Thereareno
dragons’asmeaningsomethinglike‘Itisappropriatetodisbelieveindragons.’The
latterdoesnotentail‘Thereisanx,suchthatitisappropriatetodisbelieveinx.’For
theexpression‘appropriatetodisbelievein’createsanintensionalcontext,certainly
acontextwhereexistentialgeneralizationisnotsupported.16Accordingly,negative
existentialsdonotyieldtheaforementionedincoherent-soundingresult.17
Thesecondproblemforthe‘substantivefirst-orderpredicateview’was
Hume’sobservationthattheideaofexistence‘addsnothing’:askedtocontemplate
notjustaduck,butanexistentduck,weendupcontemplatingthesamethingwe
didbefore–aduck.ThismilitatesagainstthenotionthatEXISTENCEpicksout
anythingsubstantive.ItisclearthatBrentano’sfittingbelief-inaccountrespects
Hume’sobservation.Indeed,thenotionthatexistenceisnotacontentfeatureof
existence-committalmentalstatescanexplainthefactthatthereisnocontent
differencebetweentheideasofaduckandofanexistentduck.
Thesecondviewmentionedin§1,existenceasasecond-orderproperty,
raisedtwoissuesaswell.Thefirstconcerneditscompatibilitywithdirect-reference
accountsofpropernames.Wenoted,forexample,thatif‘Messiexists’simplymeans
‘Thepropertyofbeingtheonlyfive-timeBallond’Orwinnerisinstantiated,’then
‘Messi’wouldseemtoreferpartlyviathedescription‘theonlyfive-timeBallond’Or
winner’–contrarytothemostpopularviewofnominalreference.(If‘Messiexists’
meansratherthesameasamuchmorecomplicatedstatementoftheform‘The
propertiesofbeingF1,…,Fnareco-instantiated,’thiswouldsuggestthat‘Messi’
refersthroughthecorrespondingmuchmorecomplexdescription.)Incontrast,
thereisnothingaboutthefittingbelief-inaccountthatrequiresonetotakeany
positiononhow‘Messi’refers.Suppose‘Messi’refersthankstoacausalchain
25
leadingtoabaptismaleventtakingplacein1987inRosario.Then‘Messiexists’can
stillmeanthesameas‘ItisfittingtobelieveinMessi.’
Thesecondproblemwiththesecond-orderviewwasthatitcast‘Messi
exists’asnotaboutMessi,butabouthisMessirificpropertiesortheconceptMESSI.
HereitislessimmediatelyclearthatBrentano’saccountfaresmeaningfullybetter.
Forinconstruing‘Messiexists’asmeaning‘ItisfittingtobelieveinMessi,’itcasts
theformerasprimarilyaboutacertainbelief,notacertainfootballer.Onemighttry
todefendBrentanobynotingthat‘Messi’stillappearsin‘Itisfittingtobelievein
Messi’(whereasitdoesnotin‘TheMessirificpropertiesareco-instantiated’).To
thatextent,wemaysaythatthestatementisstillsecondarilyaboutMessi(Brentano
wouldsaythatitis‘obliquely’aboutMessi),whichisperhapsanadvantageoverthe
second-orderpropertyview.18Amoreimportantadvantage,arguably,isthatallthis
concernsonlylinguisticexistence-commitment.Asfarasmentalexistencecommitmentisconcerned,itisclearthatthebeliefinMessiinvolvesmental
referencetoMessihimself,nottoanyassociatedentities.Sincelinguisticexistencecommitmentderivesfrommentalexistence-commitment,thismeansthatthe
fundamental,nonderivativeformofexistence-commitmentdoesrefertoMessi
himself;theproponentofthesecond-orderpropertyviewcannotboastthesame.
Asforthethirdviewmentionedin§1,existenceasaformalfirst-order
property,Ihavearguedthatitishardtoseehowitcouldexplaintheacquisitionof
theconceptofexistence.Themodelofdifferentialperceptualinteractionwith
existentsandnonexistentsisanonstarter,whilethegenus-et-differentiamodel
cannotdesignateanyrelevantgenus(thatis,anygenusofwhichexistence,
construedasaformalpropertythateverythinghas,isaspecies).Aswehaveseenin
§4,however,BrentanocanofferacompositionalstoryaboutEXISTENCEintermsof
genusetdifferentia:thegenusis(potential)belief-in,the‘differentium’issimply
fittingness.Ultimately,alltherelevantnotionsareunderstoodintermsoflogical
vocabularyplustwoprimitiveconcepts,belief-inandself-evidence,whichare
acquiredbydifferentialperceptualinteraction,namely,inner-perceptualinteraction
26
with(i)beliefs-inandothermentalstates(fortheconceptBELIEF-IN)and(ii)selfevident(dis)beliefsandnon-self-evidentones(forSELF-EVIDENCE).
5.2.ObjectionsandReplies
Atbottom,though,whatmotivatesthefittingbelief-inaccountoflinguistic
existence-commitmentisnotjusttheproblemsfacingotherviewsinthearea.Itis
alsotheattitudinalaccountofmentalexistence-commitment.Asnotedin§3,if
mentalcommitmenttotheexistenceofxisattitudinallyencoded,thenlinguistic
commitmenttox’sexistencemusttaketheformofcommentingonthekindof
mentalattitudeitwouldbefittingtotaketowardx.
Brentano’saccountdoesfacecertaindifficultiesofitsown,however.
Parallelingthethoughtthat‘Messiexists’shouldbeaboutMessiandnotsome
associatedentities,forexample,isthethoughtthat‘Messiexists’shouldbe
construedasadescriptiveratherthannormativestatement.Itcommentsonhow
thingsare,nothowtheyoughttobe.Construingitasaclaimaboutthekindof
attitudesweoughttotake–plainlyanormativestatement–seemstothatextent
falsetothephenomenologyofmakingexistentialpronouncements.
ItakethistobeagenuineliabilityfortheBrentanianaccount.Itsforceis
somewhatbluntedbythefactthatthefundamentalformofexistence-commitment
inBrentano’saccountismentalexistence-commitment,andthelatterisstillentirely
descriptive.Belief-inhasamind-to-worldratherthanworld-to-minddirectionoffit.
Still,itwouldclearlybepreferable,allthingsconsidered,tohaveanaccountof
existencetalkthatcastitasdescriptivetalk.
AnotherpotentialworryisthatBrentano’sDictumisarathershallow
precept,nowiseilluminatingorfacilitatingtheconductofontologicalinquiry.
ConsiderQuine’sDictum:tobeistobethevalueofavariable(Quine1948).Its
formulationhasbeenextraordinarilyusefulforthefieldofontologyinthesecond
halfofthetwentiethcentury,asitallowedtractableformulationsofmanydebates
27
whichwerepreviouslyhardtopindown.Thequestionofwhetherthereare
numbers,forexample,becamegreatlysharpenedwhenrecastasthequestionof
whetherquantificationovernumberswouldbeindispensableinourfinaltheoryof
theworld.Thelatterquestionisamoreconcretelytractablequestionthathasgiven
risetotechnicallysophisticateddebates.Itisaquestiononwhichprogresscanmore
straightforwardlybeclaimed.19ItisunclearhowBrentano’sDictumcouldbe
similarlyhelpful.Toldthattobeistobeasuitableobjectofbelief-in,wecanrecast
thequestionofnumbersasthequestionofwhetheritwouldbefittingtoadoptthe
attitudeofbelievinginnumbers.Butthismovesusforwardnotoneinchfromthe
initialquestion.Indeed,whenweconsiderwhetheritwouldbefittingforusto
believeinnumbers,wesimplyconsidertheargumentsforandagainsttheexistence
ofnumbers!Tothatextent,Brentano’sDictumprovidesuswithnomethodological
guidanceintheconductofontologicalinquiry.
Therearetwopossibleandsomewhatconflictingresponsestothisobjection.
ThefirstrejectsthenotionthatmethodologicalfecundityofthesortQuine’sDictum
boastsisadesirablefeatureofametaontologicalposition,insistingthatwhatwe
reallywantfromourmetaontologyistotalneutrality:wewantourmetaontologyto
avoidprejudginganyfirst-orderontologicalquestions.Thesetwodesiderataseem
tobeintension.ConsiderthatQuine(1948)himselftookhisquantificational
approachtopavethewayforanargumentthatnumbersmustinfactbeincludedin
ourontology.Granted,Quine’sDictumdoesnotquitedeliverapro-numeric
ontology.Butnorisitexactlyneutralonthequestion,asitreshapesthedialecticina
waythatturnsouttofavornumbers.Brentano’sDictumonitsown,incontrast,does
notaffectthedialecticinanyway.Thedialecticallandscaperemainspristinely
untouchedafterweadoptthefittingbelief-inaccountofexistencetalk,andthismay
beseenasaplus.
Thesecondpossibleresponsetotheworryunderdiscussionisthat
Brentano’smetaontologyisinfactfarfromneutral,andpavesthewaytoitsown
first-orderontologicalgains,thoughonesdifferentfromQuine’s.Inparticular,the
factthatthefundamentalformofexistence-commitmentinvolvesanobjectual
28
ratherthanpropositionalattitudepavestheway,withinBrentano’sframework,toa
nominalistontologyinwhichonlyindividualobjectsareadmitted.Propositionsand
statesofaffairs,almostautomaticallyneededtoaccountforpropositionalattitudes
andtheirtruth,areperemptorilyavoidedwhentheonlyattitudesweneedto
accountforareobjectual.Wehaveencounteredsomeoftheseconsiderationsin
Chap.4,andwilldeveloptheminmoredetailinChap.6.
ge
Perhapsmoredeeplythanthesespecificobjections,whatmightgivepausetosome
isthefactthatthefittingbelief-inaccountisdirectlyinspired,andmotivated,by
Brentano’sthoroughlyheterodoxtheoryofjudgment.Thenotionsthatallbeliefsare
existential,andthatnobeliefshavepropositionalcontent,are,allsaidanddone,
quitehardtoswallow.If,allsaidanddone,onechoosestostickwithamore
traditionalconceptionofcognition,howattractivedoesthefittingbelief-inaccount
ofexistencetalklook?
Theanswer,itseemstome,is‘veryattractive.’Itistruethatthefittingbelief-
inaccountisinspiredby,andmeshesverynicelywith,thepeculiaritiesof
Brentano’stheoryofjudgment.Butinnowaydoestheformerlogicallydependupon
thelatter.Theonlythingitdependsonistheclaimthatbelief-inisirreducibleto
existentialbelief-that.Foraslongasbelief-inisarealanddistinctivekindofstatein
ourpsychologicalrepertoire,onecanstillmaintainthattosaythatxexistsistosay
thattherightattitudetotaketowardxisthatofbelievinginit.Thatis,theviewis
stillavailabletoone,andstillexhibitsalltheaforementionedadvantages,evenif
onehasnotruckwith(therestof)Brentano’stheoryofjudgment.Thefittingbeliefinaccountsimplydoesnotneedtheclaimthatallbeliefsarebeliefs-in,aslongas
somebeliefsare.Interestingly,somephilosophershaveindeedarguedthatbelief-in
doesnotreducetoexistentialbelief-thatwithoutmakinganyclaimaboutconverse
reduction(Szabó2003).20
ThereisanothercommitmentofBrentano’sthatseemsentirelysuperfluous
tohisfundamentalapproach–somuchsothatuptillnowIsawnoneedtomention
29
it.Brentanotakestenseatfacevalue:forhim,itisinappropriatetobelievethat
therearedinosaurs,thoughitisperfectlyappropriatetobelievethattherewere
dinosaurs.AswesawinChap.3,temporalmodalityisforBrentanoanattitudinal
affairjustasmuchasontologicalstatus:
…wemustdesignatetemporaldifferencesasmodesof[intentionality].Anyonewho
consideredpast,present,andfutureasdifferencesinobjectswouldbejustasmistakenas
someonewholookeduponexistenceandnonexistenceasrealattributes.(Brentano1911:
143[279];seealso1976:128[107])
Justasmentalexistence-commitmentandnonexistence-commitmentareamatterof
distinctmentalstatespresenting-as-existentandpresenting-as-nonexistenttheir
objects,sotemporalorientationmustbeamatterofdistinctmentalstates
presenting-as-past,presenting-as-present,orpresenting-as-futuretheirs.Fromthis
perspective,thereisnodifferenceinwhatonebelieveswhenonebelievesthatthere
aredinosaursoronebelievesthatthereweredinosaurs.Thedifferenceisnotthat
betweenbelievinginpresent-dinosaursandbelievinginpast-dinosaurs.Rather,itis
anentirelyattitudinaldifference(Brentano1933:9[18]),amatterofpresenting-aspresently-existingadinosaurversuspresenting-as-pastly-existingadinosaur.As
Brentanoputsit,theformerisa‘judgmentinthemoduspraesens’whereasthelatter
isajudgmentinthepreteritemode.
IbelaborthispointbecauseBrentano’srealdictumisactuallythis:tobeisto
beafittingobjectofmodus-praesensbelief-in.Thuswefindthefollowingina1914
dictation:
Ifweask,‘What,then,isthereinthestrictsenseoftheword?,’theanswermustbe:‘That
whichiscorrectly(mitRecht)acceptedinthemoduspraesens.’(Brentano1933:18[24])
Brentano’sfullanswertothe‘organizingquestion’ofmetaontology,then,isthis:to
saythatxexistsistosaythatitwouldbefittingtobelieveinxinthemodus
praesens.21Thisexcludesattitudinallypast-directedandfuture-directedbeliefs-in
fromthescopeofattitudesthefittingnessoftakingwhichcapturesexistence.
30
ThistwistonBrentano’sDictumseemstopavethewaytopresentism,the
thesisthatonlypresentbeingsshouldbeincludedinourontology.Andeternalists,
whomaintainthatpastandfutureobjectscanhavetheexactsameontological
statusaspresentones,mayobjecttoit.However,thisiswhyIintroducedthetopic
ofBrentano’spresentisttwistasanothercompletelysuperfluouscommitmentofhis
metaontology,somethingwhichBrentanohappenedtobeattractedtobutwhich
doesnotgotothecoreofthegeneralapproachofunderstandingexistencetalkin
termsoffittingbelief-in.Aneternalistcouldreadilyadoptthefittingbelief-in
approachtoexistencetalk,andsimplyresistthepresentisttwistinBrentano’sown
versionoftheview.
Conclusion
OnceweridBrentano’smetaontologyofsomeinessentialbaggage–thepresentist
twistandthethesisthatalljudgmentsarebeliefs-in–weobtainaviewofexistence
talkthatoughttobeattractivetoanyfair-mindedobserver.Twomainliabilitiesstill
attachtoit,tomymind.Thefirstisthatitcastswhatseemlikeexistentialassertions
asdisguisednormativeclaims,claimsaboutwhatattitudesweoughttohave;thisis
counterintuitiveandcontrarytothephenomenologyofengaginginexistencetalk.
Thesecondisitsaccountoffittingbelief-inintermsofwhatapersonwhojudged
withself-evidencewouldbelieve,whichisproblematicincontextswhereselfevidenceisimpossibleforus.
Nonetheless,themorefamiliartheoriesinthisareaarenotwithouttheir
problemsandliabilities.Asinmostphilosophicalareas,thelogicalspaceseems
exhaustedbypositionswhichcontainatleastonehard-to-swallowcomponent.So
theseproblemsattendingBrentano’sfittingbelief-inaccountshouldnotbetakenas
disqualifying.AstheoldFrenchadagesays:whenyouanalyzeit’supsetting,when
youcompareit’sconsoling.
31
WhatismoststrikingtomeinBrentano’smetaontologyis,again,how
extraordinarilyoriginalitis.Likehismereologyandhistheoryofjudgment,itseems
tocomeoutofnowhere–itis,asfarasIcantell,presagedbynothinginthehistory
ofphilosophy.Andyetuponcloseexaminationthecaseforitisnoweakerthan
standardfareinthearea.Theviewisnolessbelievablethanitsmorefamiliar
competitors.
ge
Inpreviouschapters,wehaveseenseveralrecurringphilosophicaldevicesin
Brentano’stheorizing,notablytheappealtomereologicalnotionstoelucidate
intricatestructuresandtheuseofresourcesprovidedbyattitudinalpropertiesto
illuminatethenatureoffundamentalmentalphenomena.Inthischaptercametothe
foreanotherrecurringBrentaniantheme,namely,thatthemostfundamental
notionsofaphilosophicalsystemcannotbegraspedthroughappreciationofthe
rightphilosophicaltheory;instead,theymustbetreatedasprimitiveswhichcan
onlybegraspedthroughdirectencounter.Inpractice,thismeanstheymustbe
experiencedbyoneselfandbroughtintosharperreliefthroughappropriate
contrasts.
InChap.2,wesawaremarktothiseffectbyBrentanoregardingthenotionof
intentionality(recall–orreconsult–thequotefromBrentano1966:339).Inthis
chapter,wesawevenmoredevelopedprimitivistaccountsofself-evidenceandof
judgment.Wewillseefurtherinstancesofthisinlaterchapters.Thegeneralideais
expressedclearlybyBrentanoalreadyinhis1889lectureontruth.Heclosesthe
lecturewiththreegeneralmorals,thefinalofwhichisthis:
Manybelievethat…elucidation(Verdeutlichung)[ofaconcept]alwaysrequiressome
generaldetermination[i.e.,definitionbygenusetdifferentia],andtheyforgetthatthe
ultimateandmosteffectivemeansofelucidationmustalwaysconsistinappealtothe
individual’sintuition…Whatwouldbetheuseoftryingtoelucidatetheconceptsofredand
blueifIcouldnotpresentonewithsomethingredorwithsomethingblue?(Brentano1930:
29[24-5])
32
Twenty-sevenyearslater,justayearbeforehisdeath,Brentanodistillsthebasic
pointasfollows:
Thebasisforunderstandinganydiscourseconsistsnotinexplication(Erklärung)through
wordsbutinexplicationthroughtheobjectsthemselves,providedtheseobjectsare
presentedforcomparisonandthusforgraspingacommongeneralconcept.(Brentano1933:
205[150])
Thebasicpointisthatgraspingthingsthemselves,ratherthanwordsorconcepts
forthem,mustultimatelygroundourconceptualscheme,hencebethefoundation
foranygenuineunderstandingofreality.Asithappens,forBrentanoitisonly
throughinnerperceptionthatwecangraspthingsthemselves–becauseofthe
constitutiveconnectionbetweeninnerperceptionanditsobjectsthatwe
encounteredinChap.1.Accordingly,genuineunderstandingoftruth,goodness,and
beautymustallbetracedback,ultimately,tosomeinner-perceptualencounterwith
correspondingphenomena.Inthecaseoftruth,wecantheorizetruthintermsof
existence,existenceintermsoffittingbelief-in,andthefittingnessofabeliefin
termsofself-evidence;butforthewholetheoreticaledificetobeintelligible,we
mustalsograspdirectlythenaturesofself-evidenceandofbelieving-in.22
1SeeSchaffer2009foraviewofontologyasconcernedprimarily(perhapsevenexclusively)with
groundingandfundamentalityratherthanexistence,andLowe2008fortheviewthatessenceisa
centralpartofwhatontologyisabout.
2Thus,debatesoverQuine’s(1948)quantificationalmethodvs.Armstrong’s(2004)truthmaker
methodbelongwithinthesphereofmetaontology.
3SeeFrege1884:67fortheexplicitclaimthat‘xexists’isnotaboutx,andThomasson2015Chap.2
forcriticismofit.
4ThankstoKevinMulliganforpointingoutthisparticulardifficulty.
5Iusethematerialmodetoparallel‘Quine’sDictum’(tobeistobethevalueofavariable)and
‘Alexander’sDictum’(tobeistobecausallyefficacious)(moreonthatin§5).
6ItmightbesuggestedthatBrentano’saccountisratheraformof‘metaontologicalexpressivism,’
sinceitcastslinguisticexistence-commitmentasamatterofexpressinganattituderatherthan
describingastateofaffairs.However,thiswouldbeverydifferentfromexpressivismasstandardly
33
conceived(inmetaethicsandelsewhere),sincetheattitudeexpressed,believing-in,iscognitive
ratherthanconativeoremotive.
7Inmodernanalyticphilosophy,thereisanotherphilosophicaltechniquecommonlythoughttobe
capableofilluminatingprimitivenotions.Thisistofullyspecifyitstheoreticalrolewithinourtheory
oftherelevantphenomena.Thisisthetechniqueregimentedthroughso-calledRamseysentences
(seeLewis1972).Brentanohimselfdoesnotconsiderthisoption,butalthoughIdonothavethe
spacetoproperlydelveintothisissuehere,thereareargumentsintheextantliteraturethat
characterizationviatheoreticalrolecannotbetheonlytechniqueforcharacterizingprimitives,and
directgrasporacquaintancemustalwaysbeappealedtoatsomepoint(seeNewman1928).Tothat
extent,itisanadvantageofBrentano’sprimitivismthatitappealstothislattertechnique.
8InsayingthatallobjectsonGreenEarthareblackandwhite,Iampresupposinganobjectivist
conceptionofcolor.Ifonerejectssuchaconception,thecorrectwaytodescribeGreenEarthwould
betosaythattheobjectstherewouldbeblackandwhiteonEarth,orsomethingofthatsort.
9Itmightbethatourvisualsystemissodesignedthatitwouldquickly‘editout’allgreennessfrom
theawarenessofGreen-Earthlyobjects.Ifso,thethoughtexperimentwouldhavetoincludethe
furtherconditionthatGreen-Earthlings’visualsystemisunlikeoursinthatrespect.Moredirectly,
wemightjuststipulatethatGreen-Earthlings’visualexperienceissuffusedwithagreentinge–
exactlyasportrayedinFigure5b.WhetherGreen-Earthlings,soconceived,arenomologically
possibleisimmaterialtothethoughtexperiment.
10Observethedistributionofhyphensinthissentence!
11ThuswecanmoreeasilyimaginehowGreen-Earthlingsmaydirectlygraspthenatureofthe
darker-thanandlighter-thancolorrelationsthantoimaginehowtheydirectlygraspthenatureof
colorpropertygreen.
12Furthermore,asfarasassertoricasopposedtoapodicticjudgmentisconcerned,self-evidence
showsuponlyininnerperception,andinnerperceptionproducesonlypositivejudgments(you
cannotinner-perceivewhatisnottakingplaceinyourmind).Accordingly,self-evidenceisnotinthe
cardsforanyassertoricnegativejudgment!(ThankstoGéraldineCarrananteforpointingthisoutto
me.)
13Lessdramatically,onemightsuggestappealingtologicalasopposedtonomiccounterfactuals,
claimingthateventhoughitisnomicallyimpossibleforustojudgeontheexistenceofduckswith
self-evidence,itislogicallypossible(thisseemstobesuggestedbyBacigalupo2015:56-7).Recall
fromChap.1,however,that,accordingtoBrentano,theonlyreasoninnerperceptionisself-evidentis
thatthereisaconstitutiveconnectionbetweentheperceivingandtheperceived.Ifso,thelawsof
naturehavelittletodowiththepossibilityofself-evidentaposterioribelief.Whatmakesthat
possibleisratherametaphysicalrelationbetweenbeliefandbelievedincertaincases.Forustohave
self-evidentbeliefsinducks,then,thesamemetaphysicalrelationwouldhavetohold.Thatis,we
wouldhavetoundergoperceptualexperiencesofwhichducksaremerelydistinguishableparts.
Settingasidephenomenalexternalism(e.g.,Dretske1996),whichisverycontrarytothespiritof
Brentano’sphilosophyofmind,itisanopenquestionwhetheritislogicallypossibleforustohave
ducksasconstituentsofourconsciousstates.
arecommittedpreciselytothisview.Butfirst,inphenomenalexternalismtheducksappeartobe
ratherseparablepartsoftheconsciousstates,notdistinctionalparts.Andsecondly,eveninthismore
modestreading,phenomenalexternalismiscompletelycontraryto.
34
14Brentano’sfoundationalismisnotexplicitlybilledasfoundationalismaboutspecificallyexistential
knowledge,butsinceforBrentanoalljudgmentisexistentialandknowledgeisakindofjudgment,it
followsthatforhimallknowledgeisexistentialanyway.
15Perhapsmoreaccurately:someonecouldunderstandthenotionofjudgmentasthenotionofa
mentalstatewhichiseitherabelief-in(acceptance)oradisbelief-in(rejection).Butthenotionsof
belief-inanddisbelief-incanbeunderstoodonlythanksto‘assistedrevelation.’
16Itisnotimmediatelycleartomewhetheritalsofailstosupportsalvaveritatesubstitution.
Considerthefollowinginference:itisappropriatetodisbelieveinShrek;Shrek=Jimmy’sfavorite
animatedcharacter;therefore,itisappropriatetodisbelieveinJimmy’sfavoriteanimatedcharacter.
Atfirstglance,thisseemslikeavalidinference.Certainlyits‘positive’counterpartis.Thus,the
followinginferenceseemsvalid:itisappropriatetobelieveinPhosphorus;Phosphorus=Hesperus;
therefore,itisappropriatetobelieveinHesperus.Itremainsthat,atleastinthe‘negative’case,
existentialgeneralizationsisclearlyfailed.
17Notethat,interestingly,‘appropriatetobelievein’isextensional,andcertainlydoessupport
existentialgeneralization.From‘ItisappropriatetobelieveinSantaClaus’itseemsintuitively
permissibletoinfer‘Thereisanx,suchthatitisappropriatetobelieveinx.’
18Relatedly,‘ItisfittingtobelieveinMessi’hasacloseneighborwhichisprimarilyaboutMessi,
namely,‘Messiisafittingobjectofbelief-in.’Itwouldprobablybeunwise,though,toconstrue‘Messi
exists’asmeaningthesameas‘Messiisafittingobjectofbelief-in.’Forthen‘Shrekdoesnotexist’
wouldhavetomeanthesameas‘Shrekisafittingobjectofdisbelief-in,’whichseemstoquantify
overShrek,thusyieldingagaintheresultsentrainedbythefirst-ordersubstantiveviewthatwetried
toavoid.
19Similarremarksapplyto‘Alexander’sDictum’:tobeistobecausallyefficacious(Kim1992).This
principlehasallowedprogressinparticularintheontologyofproperties,buthasbeeninvoked
(sometimesunderthename‘theeleaticprinciple’)alsoindiscussionsofindividuals,events,andso
on.
20Ifbelief-inreducestoexistentialbelief-that,thensayingthatxexistsiffitisfittingofbelieveinx
justmeansthatxexistsiffitisfittingtobelieveintheexistenceofx,whichseemstoappealtothe
notionofexistenceinelucidatingthatverynotion.
21Ifweuse,forthesakeofconvenience,theeternalist’s‘exists,’wemaysaythatfirstpresents-aspresently-nonexistentadinosaur,whereasthesecondpresents-as-pastly-existentadinosaur.Of
course,Brentanowouldrejectthiswayofdescribingtheattitudinalpropertiesinquestion,sincehe
thinksthat‘pastly-existent’isnonsense.
22Forcommentsonpreviousdrafts,IamgratefultoDavidChalmers,AnnaGiustina,Vincent
Grandjean,JonathanSchaffer,JackSpencer,AmieThomasson,andAlbertoVoltolini.Ihavealso
benefitedfrompresentingthispaperatÉcoleNormaleSupérieure,theJeanNicodInstitute,the
UniversityofRennes-1,theUniversityofLiège,andLOGOSinBarcelona.Iwouldliketothank
audiencesthere,inparticularGéraldineCarranante,SamueleChilovi,ArnaudDewalque,Filipe
Drapeau-Vieira-Contim,ManuelGarcía-Carpintero,BaptisteLeBihan,ValentinLewandowski,Mikaël
Quesseveur,SvenRosenkranz,DenisSeron,andMarkTextor.
35