Global Policy
Matthew Bolton and Katelyn E. James
Pace University
Abstract
Does the 2013 United Nations (UN) Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) represent what Costa Rica’s UN Ambassador called a nascent ‘Spirit of New York’ – a change in the rules of the arms control game in favor of humanitarianism and human
rights? Or does it represent business as usual – the ghost of Arms Control past? We are convinced by neither the messianic claims of the ATT’s most overheated boosters nor the doom-saying of its most ardent detractors. Rather we
argue here that in both the ATT negotiation process and the treaty text, ‘norm entrepreneurs’ like NGOs, Middle Powers and small states have created space for global policy making based on humanitarian and human rights considerations. However, the negotiation and treaty also represent a melding of this ‘maximalist’ human security–civil society
approach with UN General Assembly concerns about small arms proliferation and the ‘minimalist’ strategic and commercial interests of the major arms exporters. This hybrid pathway to the treaty’s adoption offers possibilities for future
global policy making on disarmament and arms control as well as other humanitarian issues.
Policy Implications
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The ATT strengthens nascent human security norms, offering new legal-binding provisions requiring states to take
into account human rights and humanitarian law in assessing approval of arms transfers.
The ATT is the first international treaty recognizing the term Gender-Based Violence – essentially recognizing it as a
security concern.
The ATT negotiation process – a hybrid of traditional consensus-based arms control decision making, openness to
NGOs and final approval by UN General Assembly majority vote – offers a possible precedent for breaking deadlocked disarmament processes.
Speaking in the United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA) First Committee on Disarmament and International Security in October 2013, Ambassador Eduardo Ulibarri of Costa Rica hailed the ‘healthy Spirit of New York’
that inspired the UNGA’s adoption of the Arms Trade
Treaty (ATT) – the first comprehensive global instrument
regulating transfers of conventional weapons – earlier
that year. He said the treaty, negotiated at UN headquarters in New York City, had ‘generated. . .a renewed optimism of our capacity to confront humanity’s greatest
challenges’ (Bolton, 2013a, p. 9). Indeed, the impetus for
the ATT came largely from the humanitarian and human
rights community (see Green et al., 2013, as well as Whall
and Pytlak’s article in this special section), which coalesced into the Control Arms campaign. Their influence is
reflected in the treaty’s Article 1, which establishes
Global Policy (2014) doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12174
‘Reducing human suffering’ (UNGA, 2013) as one of the
agreement’s primary purposes (see Valenti et al., 2014;
Geneva Academy, 2013; or the introductory essay in this
special section for an overview of the treaty’s provisions).
This new ‘Spirit of New York’ would seem a major normative innovation in global policy making on both trade
and arms control – a recognition that states must protect
human beings from the depredations of violence and
unscrupulous commerce. This was the tone of self-congratulation as diplomats gathered to toast each other in
the Grand Hyatt hotel following the treaty signing ceremony on 3 June 2013. UN Secretary General Ban
Ki-moon told the gathered celebrants: ‘You have set a
new global standard . . . that is robust and specific’ and
will ‘build a better and safer world for all’ (Ban Ki-moon,
2013). The International Committee of the Red Cross
© 2014 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Special Section Article
Nascent Spirit of New York or Ghost of Arms
Control Past?: The Normative Implications of
the Arms Trade Treaty for Global
Policymaking
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Matthew Bolton and Katelyn E. James
(ICRC) also welcomed the document as a ‘historic step’.
Praising the ATT, ICRC president Peter Maurer called on
‘all States to join the treaty and further its humanitarian
purpose’ (Maurer, 2013). A further indication of the ATT’s
progressive potential was the unrelenting tone of panic
from American and Canadian right-wing ‘gun rights’
groups and conservative think tanks. The ATT was
the ‘creation’ of the ‘incessant campaigning’ of the
‘Blame-America-First Crowd’ of liberal NGOs, wrote Dr Ted
R. Bromund on the Heritage Foundation blog (2014).
However, despite contentious negotiations, the lack of
significant state opposition to the final treaty text must
give us pause. While there were some notable abstentions when the text was presented before the UNGA,
only three states voted against – North Korea, Iran and
Syria. By December 2013, all three had dropped their
opposition, abstaining on A/RES/68/31, which called on
UN member states to ‘sign. . .ratify, accept or approve
the Treaty at the earliest possible date’. US Secretary of
State John Kerry welcomed the ATT, saying that it
would ‘not undermine the legitimate international trade
in conventional weapons’ or ‘interfere with national
sovereignty’ (2013). Indeed, the treaty recognizes the
‘legitimate political, security, economic and commercial
interests of States in the international trade in conventional arms’ (Preamble). Following the UNGA vote, one of
the authors found a downcast campaigner drinking alone
in the corner of a nearby pub, surrounded by overjoyed
colleagues. ‘I think we did a good thing, but what if. . .’
he mused, trailing off for a moment, before continuing:
‘What if we missed an opportunity to make it better?
What if we’ve actually unintentionally legitimized the
arms trade?’ Such are the objections of the Campaign
Against Arms Trade (CAAT), which has distanced itself
from the Control Arms coalition, claiming the treaty process catered too much to weapons manufacturers and
exporters. ‘The ATT,’ said one CAAT activist, ‘was a historic and momentous failure,’ which could ‘do more
harm than good’ and ‘actually benefit the arms industry’
(Jackson, 2013).
Does the ATT represent a nascent ‘Spirit of New York’
– a change in the rules of the arms control game in favor
of humanitarianism and human rights? Or does it represent business as usual – the ghost of Arms Control past?
We are convinced by neither the messianic claims of the
ATT’s most overheated boosters nor the doom-saying of
its most ardent detractors. Rather we argue here that in
both the ATT negotiation process and the treaty text,
‘norm entrepreneurs’ like NGOs, middle powers and small
states have created space for global policy making based
on humanitarian and human rights considerations. However, the negotiation and treaty also represent a melding
of this ‘maximalist’ human security–civil society approach
with concerns of developing countries and the ‘minimalist’ strategic and commercial interests of the major arms
© 2014 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
exporters. As such, the ATT is a kind of ‘tamed normative
innovation’. It has created new global humanitarian and
human rights norms around conventional weapons, but
it also channeled them through established channels,
reducing the threat of norm innovation to the status
quo. Out of the bitter and highly contested negotiations,
the ATT process resulted in a text that, not without discomfort, triangulates the values of the international NGO
community with the security interests of states and commercial motivations of multinational arms companies
(Bromley et al., 2013, p. 1038). The ATT thus represents a
compromise, perhaps a concession to the principle of
humanity and the needs of Middle Powers, small states
and developing countries, while maintaining the hegemony of the major arms exporters. As Bromley et al.
observe, ‘Arms trade agreements do not have to be
grand moral projects. . .but when they are. . .they are
more likely to succeed when the security subjectivities of
policymakers and ethical ideals of campaigners are complementary’ (p. 1034).
The following section provides background on three
specific ways disarmament and arms control norms have
developed – a ‘Great Power’ tradition, upstart ‘Middle
Power–NGO coalitions’ and a less examined route
through the UN General Assembly (UNGA). After this, we
provide an analysis of the normative implications of the
ATT process, which represented a kind of hybrid
between these three approaches. We then consider the
ways in which the ATT text innovated humanitarian
norms while simultaneously channeling them into a
framework to which major arms exporters could adapt.
We conclude with reflections on the potential impact of
the ATT on emerging disarmament and arms control processes.
Our research is rooted largely in an analysis of the
grey literature, policy reports and media commentary on
the ATT, though it is informed and influenced by our
involvement in the Control Arms campaign. One of us
served as an intern with Control Arms and the other as
adviser to the coalition’s information and analysis team.
Both authors monitored the diplomatic conferences and
UNGA deliberations on the ATT in New York and participated in campaign meetings and events.
Three traditions of global policy making and
normbuilding on weapons
The 1945 UN Charter recognizes the right of states to
defend themselves (Article 51) and this has been conventionally interpreted to mean that they may legitimately
manufacture and trade in weapons. However, the Charter
also mandates ‘disarmament and regulation of armaments’ to ‘promote . . . international peace and security’
and avoid ‘diversion. . .of the world’s human and economic resources’ into military spending (Articles 11, 26
Global Policy (2014)
Nascent Spirit of New York or Ghost of Arms Control Past?
and 47). During the Cold War, international discussions
of weapons were dominated by the two superpowers’
security elite, which framed the agenda around state
strategic interests, rather than humanitarian concerns.
Efforts were directed at ‘limitation’ and ‘control’ of largescale weapons systems (like nuclear missiles) to maintain
stability and balance of power, rather than prohibition or
reduction (Sears, 2012, pp. 37–38; Tannenwald, 2013).
The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I and SALT II)
on nuclear weapons between the US and Soviet Union
from 1969 to 1986 were emblematic of this approach
(Karp, 2006, pp. 12–13; Myrdal, 1977). This was reminiscent of earlier, problematic compacts between rival Great
Powers, such as the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty (the
‘Five Power Treaty’ between the UK, US, Japan, France
and Italy) and 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement,
which aimed to maintain balance in the growth of naval
armaments to specific ratios (Marriott, 2005). Also indicative is the 1890 Brussels Act, in which the primary colonial powers attempted to control arms transfers to
‘indigenous populations and the Arab slave traders’
(Bromley et al., 2012, pp. 1032–1033). As Tim Caughley
(2013, p. 22), former Director of the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs, put it:
Traditional multilateral approaches to security,
especially in arms control, were generally geared
to addressing state concerns on weapons. . .rather than on preventing or ameliorating
their potential impact on individuals or communities.
In 1979, this ‘Great Power’ approach to global weapons
policy was institutionalized in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), intended to be the world’s primary forum for
disarmament negotiations. Discussions in the CD have
resulted in the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
and the Chemical Weapons Convention (Rissanen, 2002, p.
31). The CD operates according to constraining rules of
consensus – used by states as a de facto veto – resulting in
a decade-long gridlock over what the body’s agenda for
discussion should be (Borrie, 2006; Meyer, 2009). Contributing to the CD’s lack of urgency is its marginalization of
civil society. NGOs often have to sit in the public gallery
and have to depend on formal documents and the relationships they have formed with state representatives to
gain information (Rissanen, 2002, p. 32). This also limits the
CD’s openness to humanitarian voices.
With the CD stuck in an almost absurd, ‘infantilized’
procedural morass (Borrie, 2006, p. 92), in the post Cold
War era, Great Powers have relied on the UN Security
Council (UNSC) – or their own politico-military capacity –
to achieve their arms control objectives. Since 1990, the
UNSC has imposed 28 new mandatory or nonmandatory
arms embargoes, compared with three before the end of
the Cold War (SIPRI, 2014). The US justified its 2003 invaGlobal Policy (2014)
sion of Iraq on the basis of ‘disarming Saddam’ and
diplomacy between Russia and the US resulted in the
effort to eradicate Syria’s chemical weapons stocks. Seeing the CD, UNSC and more unilateral Great Power initiatives as a comprehensive arms control system reveals an
approach to global weapons policy focused on strategic
weapons and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in
which action occurs only when Great Powers see a direct
threat to their security interests or global stability.
There is, however, an alternative tradition, rooted in
the humanitarian community, that more explicitly
addresses the impact of weapons on people. At the
prompting of the ICRC, the 1899 Hague Conventions
banned expanding ‘dum-dum’ bullets, chemical weapons
and munitions dropped from air balloons on the basis
that they caused unacceptable humanitarian harm (Rutherford, 1999). The 1949 Geneva Conventions further circumscribed the global rules on the use of weapons,
proscribing their use against noncombatant targets. Dissatisfied with the superpower-dominated arms control
focus on strategic weapons, in the early 1970s a group
of Middle Powers (small or medium-sized, usually
wealthy, states with no nuclear weapons and limited
armed forces) led by Sweden began exploring the possibility of disarmament policy making driven by humanitarian concerns. They argued that focusing arms control
discussions on strategic weapons neglected consideration of tactical weapons that were causing the most
suffering, including napalm, automatic rifles, cluster
munitions and landmines. At ICRC-hosted conferences in
Lucerne in 1974 and Lugano in 1976 though, this caucus
met stonewalling from military ‘technical experts’ from
the major powers, who framed weapons policy making
as a technocratic national security exercise, rather than a
humanitarian one (Prokosch, 1995). These discussions culminated in the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to
Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW). The name of the
treaty maintained the vision of an arms control instrument founded on the aim of reducing human suffering.
The first three annexed protocols (adopted at the same
time as the original Convention) restricted the use of
nondetectable fragmentation in munitions, landmines
and incendiary weapons. However, the CCW’s decisionmaking process maintained the consensus rule – giving
states a veto over strong provisions – resulting in loophole-ridden protocols that were easily ignored. For example, the following decade actually saw a proliferation in
the use of landmines – including by the Soviet Union, a
CCW member, in Afghanistan (Bolton and Nash, 2010).
The end of the Cold War created new space for the
humanitarian approach. International NGOs, increasingly
playing a pivotal role in managing the social disruption
in the developing world, were empowered by sympa© 2014 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Matthew Bolton and Katelyn E. James
thetic publics and a globalizing news media to challenge
the state-centric structures of global policy making
(Kaldor, 2003; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Price, 2003). These
NGOs found willing allies in Middle Powers that had
tended to defer to their superpower protectors but were
beginning to assert themselves with calls for a world
governed by predictable international rules (Bolton and
Nash, 2010; Cooper, 2005; Price, 1998; Rutherford et al.,
2003; Williams, 2008; Garcia, 2006 and 2011). Such Middle Power–NGO coalitions pushed successfully for new
global instruments on child soldiers (Rosen, 2008; Stohl,
2003), disability rights (Kayess and French, 2008), conflict
diamonds (Grant and Taylor, 2004), the International
Criminal Court (Glasius, 2006) and small arms (Garcia,
2006). This coincided with the emergence of a growing
academic literature in the field of international relations
that called attention to the flawed assumptions of traditional realist and liberal theory, which had overlooked
the roles of norms and identity in shaping state behavior
(Checkel 1998; Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001; Keck and
Sikkink, 1998; Wendt, 1999). These factors coalesced into
an emerging ‘human security agenda’ that aimed to refocus the concept of security on the risks faced by individuals and their communities rather than on the interests
of the state (UNDP, 1994; Kaldor, 2007; Beebe and Kaldor,
2010; Chandler and Hynek, 2010; Garcia, 2011; Bromley
et al., 2013).
When the CCW failed to rise to the challenge of growing public pressure to ban antipersonnel landmines, the
International Campaign to Ban Landmines, a global civil
society coalition, joined forces with the ICRC and Middle
Powers like Canada, Austria, Norway and New Zealand to
establish a new process. In 1996, Lloyd Axworthy, Canadian Foreign Minister, called for states to negotiate a
complete prohibition within the unprecedented timeframe of a year. The ‘Ottawa Process’, as it was called,
took place outside the UN and other established disarmament institutions, operated according to majority rule
(rather than consensus), maintained a strict deadline and
allowed NGOs to intervene directly in discussions
(Rutherford, 1999). The negotiations privileged humanitarian, rather than national security discourse and marginalized the objections of Great Powers. These
characteristics combined to create strong incentives for a
‘race-to-the-top’ rather than the tendency of traditional
disarmament approaches to adopt the ‘lowest common
denominator’ (Bolton, 2010; Hubert, 2000; Price, 1998;
Rutherford, 2011; Sears, 2012). Advocates have not managed to persuade the major and emerging military powers like the US, China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Israel and
Iran to join the resultant 1997 Ottawa Convention. Nevertheless, the treaty has prompted the near halt of mass
production of victim-activated antipersonnel landmines
and the allocation of billions of dollars for clearance, victim assistance and risk education (Bolton, 2010).
© 2014 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
As a result, the Ottawa Process has been held up as
an alternative model to the Great Power model of disarmament. Disciplined, multinational NGO coalitions, tightly
coordinated with sympathetic states could develop new
international regimes focused on ‘marginal’ weapons that
nonetheless did significant humanitarian damage. When
global attention turned to the humanitarian impact of
cluster munitions in 2006, following their extensive use
by Israel in Lebanon, states embarked on an effort to
regulate cluster bombs in the CCW. However, negotiations collapsed and Norway invited states to establish a
free-standing treaty outside the traditional fora. The ‘Oslo
Process’ on cluster munitions mirrored the humanitariancentered, Middle Power–NGO driven process on landmines and resulted in a comprehensive ban in 2008. The
new Cluster Munition Convention drew the support of
the majority of states, but was again unable to persuade
several major and emerging military powers – the US,
Russia, China, India and Pakistan – to join (Bolton and
Nash, 2010; Borrie 2009).
The ‘humanitarian disarmament’ agenda was given
intellectual coherence in a series of UN Institute of Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) publications on Disarmament
as Humanitarian Action that sought to reframe global
weapons policy as a ‘human security’ concern (Borrie and
Randin, 2005 and 2006). Further reflections on strategies
for achieving such a realignment of disarmament and
arms control were consolidated in a handbook on global
coalitions, authored by civil society activists in the cluster
munitions campaign. The handbook outlined strategies,
tactics and organizational methods for building ‘campaigning coalitions that are working for some distinct
change in international policy or law’ (Global Coalitions,
2011, p. 1). In 2012, civil society actors from a wide variety
of weapons campaigns met in New York for a ‘Humanitarian Disarmament Campaigns Summit’, issuing a communique calling for ‘strong disarmament initiatives driven by
humanitarian imperatives to strengthen international law
and protect civilians.’ Such efforts, they declared, ‘are
rarely the product of consensus decision-making, but
rather created by the solid will of an overwhelming
majority’, with civil society playing a ‘critical role’ (Humanitarian Disarmament Campaigns Summit, 2012).
Much of the academic literature on approaches to disarmament and arms control policy over the last couple
of decades has focused on the differences between the
Great Power-dominated ‘traditional’ model with that of
‘Middle Power–NGO coalitions’ (e.g. Bolton and Nash,
2010; Rutherford, 2011). However, the successful conclusion of the ATT negotiations calls attention to a third tradition of or ‘pathway’ to global weapons policy: the
UNGA. While the UNGA is mandated by the UN Charter
to ‘consider. . .the principles governing disarmament and
the regulation of armaments’ (Article 11), its specific role
remains underexamined by arms control scholars.
Global Policy (2014)
Nascent Spirit of New York or Ghost of Arms Control Past?
Deliberations on disarmament and arms control in the
UNGA context occur primarily in the First Committee on
Disarmament and International Security (DISEC). UNGA is
dominated by small and medium-sized states, many of
them developing and/or recently decolonized (the G77).
Though UNGA resolutions are nonbinding recommendations, it has nonetheless provided a forum for dissent
against the hegemony of the Great Powers (though this
has been criticized for amplifying the voice of authoritarian and undemocratic states) (Mazower, 2013, p. 271).
Resulting largely from its special sessions devoted to disarmament, UNGA has established many of the multilateral institutions that make up the UN’s ‘disarmament
machinery’. These include the UN Office for Disarmament
Affairs, UNIDIR, the Secretary General’s Advisory Board on
Disarmament Matters and the Disarmament Commission.
While these institutions do not issue binding instruments,
they often shape the framing and evidence base of global weapons policy discussions. As a result, UNGA has
played a role in shaping alternative international discourse on disarmament and arms control. For example,
in its groundbreaking 1961 session, UNGA challenged
the legitimacy of Great Powers’ nuclear weapons by
declaring that the ‘use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear
weapons is contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the
United Nations’ (A/RES/16/53). Every year since 1996,
UNGA has passed resolutions calling on states to negotiate a nuclear weapons convention, over the objections
of most nuclear weapons states (Ritchie, 2013, p. 60).
Besides providing a forum for conversations and
research, however, UNGA has also created some key policy
instruments. In 1996, when negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) collapsed in the Conference on Disarmament following India blocking consensus,
Australia submitted the treaty text as an attachment to a
resolution adopting the treaty and calling on states to sign
it (A/RES/50/65). Though this pointed to the possibility of
a ‘backdoor route’ to adoption of international legal norms
when consensus failed, it was not used again until the
end game of the ATT negotiations in 2013. Instead, UNGA
efforts have focused on political and policy initiatives. For
example, in 1991, UNGA established the UN Register of
Conventional Arms to encourage transparent reporting on
the trade in major conventional weapons systems. According to a report by the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute, the Register ‘has played a crucial role in
promoting the norm of transparency in international arms
transfers since the end of the cold war’ (Holtom et al.,
2011, p. 1). However, states have failed to report comprehensively on their arms transfers. Several states – in West
Africa particularly – have criticized the Register for its
focus on large-scale weapons systems, when ‘for them,
the real problem of possible destabilization lies not with
transfers of the major weapons . . . but in the flow of small
arms and light weapons (SALW)’ (Wezeman, 2003).
Global Policy (2014)
Recognition that existing arms control instruments
were failing to stem the trafficking in SALW, which
caused the ‘overwhelming majority’ of casualties in postSecond World War conflicts (Krause, 2001, p. 8),
prompted the development of a ‘growing network of
states, businesses and civil society organizations campaigning to create new international norms, treaties and
institutions to regulate, control and alleviate the impact
of SALW’ (Bolton et al., 2012). UNGA-mandated discussions led to the adoption in 2001 of both the Firearms
Protocol – the first international binding instrument on
SALW – and the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and
Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA), an effort to coordinate global, regional and national policies on SALW
control (Price, 2001; Karp, 2002; Krause, 2002; Garcia,
2006). The PoA and Firearms Protocol had many weaknesses – most notably, their exclusive focus on the illicit
trade, limited inclusion of civil society and lack of clear
enforcement provisions (Krause, 2002, p. 249; also Karp,
2002, p. 183; Marsh, 2002; Garcia, 2006; Sears, 2012).
However, they established SALW as a legitimate focus for
international disarmament and arms control efforts.
Within the framework of the PoA, UNGA adopted the
2005 International Tracing Instrument on tracking illicit
SALW and in 2006, UNGA called on states to report
SALW transfers to the UN Register.
The UNGA approach to disarmament and arms control
has thus been characterized by an openness to the concerns of developing countries and small states. It has cultivated norms on nuclear weapons and SALW and
established new disarmament institutions. However, due
to the UNGA’s history of carefully guarding state sovereignty, it has been less open to the participation of civil
society and has tended to generate political declarations
and policy coordination initiatives rather than maximalist
and legally binding treaties (Mazower, 2013, pp. 254–
272). By privileging the voice of less powerful states, it
has struggled to make decisions that have a significant
impact upon the ‘high politics’ of the international arena.
According to Mazower’s history of global governance,
‘Far from becoming a greater check to the ambitions of
the world’s great powers, the General Assembly was
[after decolonization] increasingly written off as nothing
more than a talking shop’ (p. 272). The ATT process, however, challenges this perception.
Normative implications of the ATT process
A recognition of both the potential of the new norms on
SALW and the inadequacy of the Firearms Protocol and
PoA prompted a group of international NGOs in 2003 to
call for a new ATT and establish a civil society campaign
called Control Arms (Control Arms, 2003). In outlining
their suggested provisions of such a treaty, they drew
© 2014 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Matthew Bolton and Katelyn E. James
upon a 1997 call by a meeting of Nobel Peace Laureates
in New York City for an International Code of Conduct
on the Transfer of Arms (Arias, 2013; Valenti et al., 2014,
pp. 14–15; Garcia, 2011, pp. 43–53).
When the 2006 review conference of the PoA failed to
reach consensus, Control Arms successfully lobbied the
UNGA to pass a resolution titled ‘Towards an arms trade
treaty: establishing common international standards for
the import, export and transfer of conventional arms’
(A/RES/61/89). The resolution was sponsored by 73 states,
mostly developing countries in Africa, Latin America, Asia
and the Caribbean; Middle Powers and small states (from
both the former Eastern and Western blocs). The major
and emerging military powers were split – Britain and
France were among the sponsors; China, Russia, Egypt,
Israel, India, Iran and Pakistan abstained and the US was
the only vote against.
US opposition was in part shaped by the Bush
administration’s hostility to multilateral treaties (Boese,
2006), as well as the influence of the US antigun control lobby (Erikson, 2007, pp. 8–9). The US position
shifted under the Obama White House, with then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton endorsing the effort to
negotiate the ATT (Abramson, 2009). US support came
with a concession, though: a provision in the 2009
UNGA ATT resolution that the 2012 negotiating conference would operate ‘on the basis of consensus’ (A/RES/
64/48, clause 5) (Bromley et al., 2013, p. 1041). That
said, the resolution also called for the negotiations to
be ‘undertaken in an open and transparent manner’
(Bromley et al., 2013, p. 1041).
In these early efforts to establish the ATT negotiations,
one can discern the outlines of what became a hybrid
arms control process – drawing on elements of the Great
Power, Middle Power–NGO and UNGA traditions. The
idea and case for the ATT was incubated in the NGO
community, championed in the UNGA by Middle Powers,
developing countries and small states but was negotiated under rules of consensus (Bromley et al., 2012) (for
overviews of early history of the ATT process, see: Erickson, 2007 and 2012; Garcia, 2011, pp. 43–53).
During the first diplomatic conference in July 2012, the
chair, Ambassador Roberto Garcia Moritan of Argentina,
actively sought to ensure the inclusion of the major military powers and skeptical states’ concerns (Mtonga et al.,
2012). Over the objections of NGOs, he supplemented
the public negotiations with closed sessions in the conference chamber and lengthy backroom conversations,
generally in English, in the ‘Indonesia Lounge’, adjacent
to the UNGA room. Only NGO personnel included in
state delegations had access to this area, which was
described by delegates as crowded (making it difficult
for all delegations to participate) and with limited translation. According to Elizabeth Kirkham, small arms and
transfer controls adviser for the Saferworld:
© 2014 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
‘The negotiations. . .were often complex and
unpredictable and, at times, opaque.’ She
observed that ‘Contrary to the agreed Rules of
Procedure’ many meetings were 'designated
“closed,” meaning that civil society was
excluded from important sections of the debate’
(2012, p. 2).
Moreover, negotiations were hampered by the lack of
adequate translation of working documents, marginalizing non-Anglophone diplomats. For example, on 16 July
2012, the delegate of Mali accused the conference of ‘linguistic unilateralism’, arguing that the lack of translation
was contrary to the ‘values and principles’ of multilateralism and an indication of ‘why this treaty is needed.’ He
continued, saying, ‘we would demand, in a friendly manner’ the translation of all working documents into all official UN languages (author’s conference notes, 16 July
2012).
The rule of consensus privileged states intent on
watering down the treaty text, such as the major military
powers and authoritarian regimes aiming to protect their
sovereignty (Calixtus, 2013, p. 106). At the end of the July
2012 conference, the draft text included many ‘compromises. . .that in many eyes, served to weaken the potential Treaty’ (Kirkham, 2012, p. 1). There was no provision
for ammunition, as well as parts, components and technologies – a concession to the US (Kirkham, 2012, p. 1).
The treaty required states to cancel transfers only when
there was ‘overriding risk’ of human rights and humanitarian law violations, instead of the stronger language of
‘substantial risk’ (UNGA, 2012, Article 4.5). Once the treaty
entered into force, amendments would be ‘adopted by
consensus’ (Article 20.3). Most disturbing was draft Article
5.2, which stated that the ATT ‘shall not be cited as
grounds for voiding contractual obligations under
defence cooperation agreements concluded by States
Parties. . .’ This ‘escape clause that basically rendered the
Treaty meaningless’ (McDonald, 2013) was ‘inserted at
India’s request’ (Bromund, 2013).
Nevertheless, smaller states and developing countries
were not entirely marginalized from the negotiating process and could leverage their status as the majority
(Calixtus, 2013). Joint statements from ‘the Africa Group’,
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),
the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the EU and many
Latin American states demonstrated widespread support
for a strong ATT, centered on humanitarian considerations. The Control Arms coalition of NGOs maintained a
constant presence at the back of the negotiating room,
taking detailed notes on proceedings and reacting to
them instantly through a steady stream of Twitter commentary, media articles and buttonholing of delegates
(see Green et al., 2013, as well as Whall and Pytlak’s article in this special section).
Global Policy (2014)
Nascent Spirit of New York or Ghost of Arms Control Past?
The active participation of NGOs, developing countries
and small states was uncomfortable to some who were
used to more exclusive arms control negotiation processes. An American delegate reportedly complained to
conservative commentator Ted Bromund, ‘that fewer
than 10 of the nations at the conference possessed the
technical capacity to negotiate seriously and. . .that the
US delegation was wasting an enormous amount of time
explaining basic facts to everyone else’ (2013). Bromund
also objected that, according to his calculations, ‘at least
20 national delegations were staffed by western NGOs’
(Bromund, 2012. See also: Calixtus, 2013, pp. 105–106).
He reported that a US diplomat ‘described the experience of negotiating a treaty with delegates who were
simultaneously commenting via Twitter as “bizarre”’ (Bromund, 2012).
NGOs and Middle Powers amplified those developing
country voices they agreed with and stigmatized those
they did not. Australia reported that it was ‘sponsoring
nearly 50 delegates from some 35 developing countries
to participate in this Conference’ (Carr, 2012, p. 3). A significant proportion of these states were from CARICOM,
which, despite having a combined population of 16.4
million, represent 14 votes in the UNGA and, facing widespread problems with SALW control, were strong backers
of a maximalist ATT (Callixtus, 2013). Similarly, workshops
funded by Australia and aided by the regional NGO coalition Pacific Small Arms Action Group (PSAAG), ‘played a
key role’ in the development of the maximalist ‘Pacific
Islands Forum Common Position on the Arms Trade
Treaty’, supported by 16 Pacific Island nations (Pacific
Islands Forum Secretariat, 2012; Australian Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, n.d.; Pacific Small Arms Action
Group, 2013).
Through effective lobbying, media campaigning and
public pressure, the civil society coalition and maximalist
states were able to reshape many states’ positions. For
example, during the Preparatory Committee sessions, the
‘Africa Group’ – the negotiating bloc of most sub-Saharan
African states – focused narrowly on state security interests: inclusion of SALW, controlling the illicit trade, keeping arms from nonstate actors and protecting the ‘special
rights of arms importing states’ (Adejola, 2011 and 2012;
Bolton, 2013b). However, lobbying from African civil
society and churches, Control Arms and other maximalist
states, persuaded the Africa Group to shift their ‘tone
and position’ to reflect the human security concerns –
such as human rights and preventing gender-based
violence (GBV) – of civil society (Bolton, 2013b). A video
address by President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (2012) of Liberia at the beginning of the July 2012 diplomatic conference highlighting the humanitarian and development
costs of armed violence was both an indication of the
shift and influence in calling other African states to be
‘bold in our work’ towards a ‘robust ATT’.
Global Policy (2014)
Stavrianakis (2013) argues that western NGOs framed
the ATT process as a narrative of a ‘progressive, benevolent
European world working in partnership with conflict- and
crime- affected parts of the South, battling the awkward
sceptics and troublesome pariahs.’ NGOs divided the
world into ‘like-minded states’ in favor of strong provisions (McDonald, 2013) and what an Amnesty International spokesperson described as ‘deeply cynical
countries’ that were opposed to the treaty (in Al Jazeera,
2013). NGOs amplified the voices of the African, Latin
American, Caribbean and Pacific countries that shared
their views while condemning those of Russia, China,
India, Pakistan, as well as the Arab, leftist Latin American
‘skeptical’ states. As such, some have argued that the
ATT process reveals that ‘the ‘humanitarian arms control’
agenda actually represents an accommodation with militarism’ (Bromley et al., 2013, p. 1037. See also: Cooper,
2011).
Stavrianakis (2013) argues this functioned to marginalize ‘other, less comfortable “voices of the South”’ that call
attention to the way western states use international law
‘as a cover for political decisions’ and to entrench the
‘asymmetry in the world military order.’ For example, an
unsuccessful attempt by Palestine to be credentialed as a
state delayed the start of the first ATT Diplomatic Conference. Hassan Soleimani, Deputy Secretary-General of the
Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization (an intergovernmental organization associated with the NonAligned Movement) objected to the fact that the treaty
does not prohibit transfers in cases of ‘aggression’. He
also argues that the ATT gives too much discretion to
arms exporting states, allowing them to deny transfer to
importing states for ‘political reasons’, which he says violates their ‘right to acquire arms for self-defense’ (2013,
pp. 20–23). This was a common concern raised by many
developing countries (Bromley et al., 2013, p. 1043) –
including many of the maximalist states – and was cited
by some of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas
(ALBA) states (Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua) as the reason for their abstention on the final
UNGA ATT vote (Ramsey, 2013).
As a result of their ability to shape the discursive landscape of the negotiations, the maximalist states and civil
society won important normative provisions in the July
2012 draft treaty text (see Whall and Pytlak’s article in
this special section for more details). SALW were included
in the draft scope of the treaty (United Nations General
Assembly (UNGA), 2012, Article 2A.1h). Article 4 required
states not to export weapons to situations where there
was an ‘overriding risk’ of them being used ‘to commit
or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law’ and ‘human rights law’. States were also to ‘consider taking feasible measures’ to prevent weapons being
‘diverted’, used to ‘commit or facilitate gender-based
violence or violence against children’ or that risked
© 2014 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Matthew Bolton and Katelyn E. James
‘adversely impacting the development of the importing
State’ (Article 4.6).
However, ‘Towards the end of the negotiations, high
politics prevailed’ (DePauw, 2012, p. 14). Consensus was
scuttled on the last day of the conference by a small
group of arms exporting states and skeptics. China stated
that it could not accept the demand by EU, East African
Community and ECOWAS states that ‘regional economic
integration organizations’ be allowed to accede to the
treaty. ‘Don’t underestimate China’s political will,’ warned
the delegate of China, in what Bromund (2012) called a
‘Godfather-style offer’; China had ‘no room for flexibility’
on this issue unless the EU would lift its arms embargo
on China by the end of the day. This was followed by
the US delegate stating that ‘my capital does not have
the time that is needed’ to review the draft text and
could not yet support its adoption. (US and China delegation quotations in Bolton, 2012). Many campaigners
and commentators believe this was less about US intransigence than ‘electoral pressures within the US and concerns that agreeing to an ATT at this time could lose
President Obama votes in the upcoming president elections (Kirkham 2012, p. 1). Nevertheless, ‘the US statement had. . .torn a hole through the pretense that
everyone in the room was aiming for the same outcome’
(Bolton, 2012) and it was followed by statements from
Russia, Venezuela, North Korea and Cuba that the text
was unsatisfactory and required further negotiation.
Nevertheless, the civil society campaign and maximalist states had succeeded in getting an official draft text
that was ‘undoubtedly stronger than many had expected,
given the complexity of the issues and, crucially, the constraints of consensus decision-making’ (Kirkham, 2012,
p. 1). At the end of the conference, 90 states backed a
statement by Mexico, saying that they ‘had expected to
adopt’ the draft ATT and that ‘We are disappointed, but
we are not discouraged.’ They looked forward to the
opportunity to ‘finalize our work’, remaining ‘determined
to secure an Arms Trade Treaty as soon as possible. One
that would bring about a safer world for the sake of all
humanity’ (Mexico, 2012). Campaigners pointed out that
the negotiations had clearly demonstrated ‘an important
emerging norm’ that it was not acceptable to transfer
‘weapons to those who would abuse human rights [and]
violate international humanitarian law’ (Nash and Bolton,
2012).
The strength of these norms was demonstrated when
states gathered again to meet for a second and final
UNGA-mandated diplomatic conference on the ATT in
March 2013. Ambassador Moritan had stepped down as
chair of the ATT process, replaced by Ambassador Peter
Woolcott of Australia, perceived by many campaigners
and maximalist states as more sympathetic to their concerns (see Whall and Pytlak’s article in this special section). These progressive states mobilized to produce one
© 2014 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
joint statement after another to demonstrate broad support for progressive treaty provisions on GBV, SALW,
ammunition, development, transparency, illicit trafficking
and international criminal, humanitarian and human
rights law. Civil society also sought to draw unprecedented public attention to the negotiations (see Whall
and Pytlak in this special section for more details on this
strategy).
As we will analyze in more depth in the next section,
Woolcott’s final draft was a much stronger text than that
of the July 2012 text – with fewer concessions to the
major exporting and skeptical states (Green et al., 2013).
‘Take it, or leave it,’ he told delegates on the final day (in
‘Ministry for Disarmament’ blog, 2013). Unsurprisingly,
this drew the ire of Iran, North Korea and Syria, which
blocked consensus in the final hours of the conference.
Pointing to the fact that there is ‘no definition of what
consensus is in the United Nations’, Ambassador Juan
Manuel Gomez Robeldo of Mexico called on Woolcott ‘to
proceed to the adoption of the text . . .without a vote’
(Robledo, 2013). However, Mexico’s proposal met strong
condemnation from the delegations of Iran and Russia,
which said ‘we should never ignore the views of the
minority’ (in ‘Ministry for Disarmament’ blog, 2013).
The way out of the lack of consensus impasse – what
Woolcott called the ‘off-ramp’ (2013, p. 6) – had been
established through carefully finessed language in the
2012 UNGA resolution mandating the second ATT diplomatic conference (A/RES/67/234). This allowed the conference to operate according to the same ‘basis of
consensus’ rule as the first conference. But, as a result of
‘intense lobbying by civil society’ there was subtly
worded provision that would keep the treaty on the
UNGA 67th Session agenda even if the conference failed
to reach consensus. This meant that once the conference
was over, the consensus rule would be eclipsed by
UNGA’s usual majority-voting rules of procedure (Oxfam
International, 2012). As a result, in the conference’s endgame Kenya took the floor to announce that along with
Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan, Mexico,
New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, the UK and the US, it
would be introducing a UNGA resolution adopting the
treaty text and calling on states to sign and ratify it. On
2 April 2013, UNGA held a special meeting and passed
this resolution (A/RES/67/234B) with 154 votes in favor,
23 abstentions and three (Iran, North Korea and Syria)
against. Of the top ten arms exporters (SIPRI, 2013), the
US and the UK were co-sponsors and Germany, France,
Spain, Italy, Ukraine and Israel voted in favor. However,
most other major and emerging military powers
abstained, including China, Russia, India, Egypt and Saudi
Arabia.
But the nascent normative power of the UNGA majority could be discerned in the statements of the skeptical
states that ended up voting for the treaty. Pakistan’s
Global Policy (2014)
Nascent Spirit of New York or Ghost of Arms Control Past?
delegate explained his country’s surprise ‘Yes’ vote (they
had been expected to abstain), saying it was intended to
express ‘solidarity’ with those suffering the humanitarian
effects of conflict in ‘Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean
and Europe.’ Angola’s delegate, Antonio Coelho Ramos
Da Cruz, stated that his government ‘had some reservations at first because the document had not been
adopted by consensus.’ But Angola changed its vote to
a ‘Yes’ because they saw the treaty could be ‘an important tool to prevent proliferation of conflict in Africa.’
(quotations in UN Department of Public Information,
2013).
Possible further evidence of the new norm’s strength
could be observed during discussions of the treaty at
the UNGA first committee in late 2013, as abstaining
states that had previously expressed skepticism during
the negotiating conferences softened their positions.
Ambassador Wu Haitao (2013) of China stated that his
country would ‘remain engaged with all parties on the
follow-up work of this Treaty and make joint efforts to
build a regulated and reasonable international arms
trade order.’ Cuba acknowledged in the 2013 first committee session that the ATT could contribute to ‘an effective response’ to ‘the illicit and nonregulated arms trade’
(in Bolton, 2013a, p. 9). On a renewed resolution welcoming the ATT (A/RES/68/31, passed 9 December 2013),
Iran, North Korea and Syria changed their votes to
abstentions and China voted ‘Yes.’ There were no states
opposed.
What then was Ambassador Ulibarri’s ‘Spirit of New
York’ that ushered into reality a new ATT? It was a hybrid
process that incorporated the backroom deals and consensus rule of traditional Great Power arms control, the
public accessibility and tight maximalist state–civil society
coordination of the Ottawa and Oslo Conventions and
the small state/developing country majority rule of the
UNGA. As Woolcott put it, ‘No delegation left the Final
Conference getting everything they wanted, but no one
walked away empty-handed . . . It is my view that the
text could not have been any stronger while still holding
the disparate interests in the room together’ (p. 4). The
specific normative implications of this new arms control
‘pathway’ for developing global human security policy
remain to be seen. Some NGO campaigners confided to
us worries that the ATT process may have eroded UNGA
majority-voting rules of procedure, by creating a
precedent for mandating special conferences that negotiate ‘on the basis of consensus.’ It is perhaps likely that
since the US won this concession in the 2006 ATT resolution, it – or other major and emerging military powers –
may call for it again in future UNGA-mandated disarmament
and arms control deliberations (Sears, 2012, p. 45).
However, many NGO campaigners and maximalist
states are more hopeful, seeing the hybrid process as a
way of ‘Busting consensus while staying in the UN’ (‘MinGlobal Policy (2014)
istry for Disarmament’ blog, 2013). ‘Striving for consensus
is, of course, sensible. The problem is that it can lead to
a lowest-common-denominator approach,’ wrote Anna
Macdonald, then Head of Arms Control at Oxfam. ‘A clever plan B was needed.’ This alternative route through
UNGA ‘showed that things can get done’ and ‘should
give hope to those working on other seemingly intractable issues that you can change the rules of the game
and make progress’ (2013). Echoing a sentiment
expressed by many states during the UNGA first committee in late 2013, Woolcott called the ATT ‘a success for
the United Nations’ and ‘a clear victory for multilateralism’ (2013, p. 1).
Normative implications of the ATT text
The hybrid process that created the ATT is reflected in its
text – simultaneously an arms control regime, a trade
treaty and a new instrument of international humanitarian and human rights law (for an overview of the treaty
provisions see Valenti et al., 2014 as well as the introductory essay to this special section). The treaty also reflects
a compromise between the many interests in the room.
As Glenn McDonald (2013) of Small Arms Survey
observed:
The ‘tensions’ between the interests of arms
trading states (which ‘pushed to keep the Treaty
as weak as possible’) and civil society groups
(which ‘insisted on a strong and comprehensive
instrument’) are ‘are inevitably reflected in the
final text and could influence future implementation.’
There are many critics who have argued that the ATT
legitimizes and entrenches the arms trade. Certainly,
analysis of the weaknesses of the ATT provides plenty of
arrows for the quiver of its critics on the left (e.g. Jackson, 2013). It recognizes the right of states to trade and
transfer conventional weapons (Preamble). By relying on
national implementation, it establishes little supranational
control over the arms trade, leaving considerable discretion to states. The onus of enforcement lies with the
exporting states, which may entrench the unequal military balance between the major powers and the rest of
the world (Stavrianakis, 2013). Many large multinational
arms companies based in North America and Europe welcomed the ATT negotiations as a way to reduce the
inter-jurisdictional complexities of the global arms trade
and prevent them being undercut by firms in more permissive legal environments (Bolton et al., 2012; Sears,
2012).
The use of the UN Register categories (expanded only
with SALW), while covering most types of conventional
weapons, is less comprehensive than the extensive
export control lists of the Wassenaar Arrangement (a
© 2014 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Matthew Bolton and Katelyn E. James
voluntary arms and dual-use technology control regime,
including many major arms exporters) (Bromley et al.,
2013, p. 1043). They do not include landmines, hand grenades or many ‘less-lethal’ weapons. Anticircumvention
enforcement will be difficult when weapons are transferred in a disassembled form, particularly since ‘Parts
and Components’ are relegated to a less stringent part
of the treaty (Article 4) and transfers of technology (blueprints, designs, etc.) are not mentioned. By contrast,
states are only prevented from transferring weapons
when there is an ‘overriding risk’ that they will be used
to violate international humanitarian and human rights
law (Article 7). Provisions in the July 2012 draft treaty for
denial of transfer on grounds that it would negatively
impact the importing state’s socioeconomic development
were dropped from the final text. Unlike the strong recognition of the need for assistance to victims of armed
violence in the landmine and cluster munition ban treaties (Docherty, 2009), this was relegated to the ATT’s
nonbinding preamble. The ATT is thus clearly a text that
gives considerable discretion to states – it is a product of
a state system that privileges their sovereignty, security
and economic interests.
However, a purely negative reading of the ATT’s implications for human security is unfair and inaccurate.
Indeed, it includes most of the provisions outlined in the
1997 Nobel Peace Laureates proposal (Valenti et al.,
2014, p. 15). ‘The final ATT text closed the major loopholes’ in the July 2012 draft treaty ‘and tightened the
language overall’ (McDonald, 2013). Achieving the recognition that regulation of the arms trade must be centered in ‘reducing human suffering’ (Article 1) is a major
normative reorientation, given that until adoption of the
ATT, it was one of the least regulated global marketplaces. As Valenti et al. point out, the ATT is ‘the first
international treaty explicitly recognizing the “social, economic and humanitarian consequences of the illicit and
unregulated trade in conventional arms”’ (2014, p. 17).
Enabling states to halt transfers based on international
humanitarian and human rights law is an important normative innovation (Acheson, 2013). Even absent legal
action, it will increase the political costs of those states
and companies that attempt to sell weapons to human
rights abusers. Notably, the final draft of the ‘India
Clause’ on defense cooperation agreements (Article 5.2
in the July 2012 draft, Article 26.2 in the final treaty) is
much more watertight and less likely to undermine the
treaty’s provisions.
The treaty’s provision on GBV (Article 7.4) has received
the most notice from the academic community so far,
given its implications for human security. As ‘the first reference to the term GBV within the main body of a global, legally binding Treaty,’ Green et al. argue the GBV
provision ‘represents a major step forward in ensuring
security debates in international fora address real and
© 2014 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
prevalent drivers of insecurity’ (2013, p. 553; see Acheson, 2013 for a similar argument).
The inclusion of SALW in the ATT scope as well as the
admittedly weaker provisions on ammunition and parts
and components, contribute to a growing global recognition that to contribute to peace and human security,
arms control cannot be limited to large-scale weapons
systems. It also represents an openness to the concerns
of developing countries, which managed to win the
inclusion of these provisions over the objections of the
US and other skeptical states (Sears, 2012, p. 44). Demonstrating the normative shift around SALW aided by the
ATT, in late 2013 the UN Security Council passed a resolution (SCR2117) expressing ‘grave concern’ about the
threat of SALW to peace and security, as well as their
‘negative human rights, humanitarian, development and
socioeconomic consequences’, including GBV. The resolution was the UNSC’s first on SALW, passed without opposition (only Russia abstained). It specifically cited the
ATT’s ‘important contribution’ and ‘Urges States to consider signing and ratifying’ it.
Finally, the final text establishes a process for future
amendments to the treaty by majority vote (Article 20).
This offers the possibility of using the ATT framework as
a vehicle for ongoing progressive development of arms
trade control norms that will not be held hostage to narrow definitions of consensus.
Conclusions
As we write this article, just over a year since the ATT
was adopted, it is still too early to determine just how
much of an effect the treaty will have on the global
norms on human security, disarmament and arms control. There are some unsettling indicators. Iraq – which
voted in favor of the UNGA ATT resolution – has reportedly signed an arms deal with Iran that breaks the UN
embargo and would be prohibited by the ATT (Rasheed,
2014). Despite Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, in early
March 2014 President Francois Holland stated that
France – an ATT signatory – was pressing ahead with
the sale of two French high-tech warships to Russia
(Fund, 2014). Meanwhile, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has
been trying to relax Japan’s ban on arms exports (Mie,
2014) – some campaigners worry Japan’s signature of
the ATT may provide multilateral ‘bluewashing’ legitimation for such a move.
However, violations of a norm are not necessarily clear
evidence of its weakness. The norm against murder
remains strong after centuries of it being flouted. Indeed,
the ATT’s adoption may turn the spotlight on the hypocrisy of those who try to ignore its letter and spirit. And
there are also positive signs. Germany, one of the top six
arms exporters, announced in January 2014 that it would
begin following the ATT’s provisions, even before it had
Global Policy (2014)
Nascent Spirit of New York or Ghost of Arms Control Past?
ratified the treaty (Morley, 2014a). In April, it announced
that it would be canceling a contract to sell as many as
800 tanks to Saudi Arabia, citing human rights concerns
(AFP, 2014). While in the last year, the Obama administration relaxed regulation of US arms exports (Morley,
2013), it has also put in place a policy of ‘restraint’ in
‘ensuring that arms transfers do not contribute to human
rights violations or violations of international humanitarian law’ – mirroring ATT language (Morley, 2014b). In a
detailed analysis of the new US policy, Rachel Stohl
(2014) of the Stimson Center argues that it ‘demonstrates global norm building’ and ‘should help the development of the growing international consensus that
arms transfers should not put innocent civilians at risk.’
As Glenn McDonald (2013) of Small Arms Survey has
noted, ‘At the end of the day, the ATT will make it more
difficult for any country, whether State Party or not, to
send conventional arms to countries that systematically
violate international humanitarian law or international
human rights law, or that divert arms to terrorists or
organized criminal groups.’
Ultimately the strength of the ATT will come from its
interpretation and implementation. This is something civil
society and maximalist states can influence, through
monitoring, discursive framing and naming and shaming.
Woolcott himself said, ‘I remain mindful that the Treaty is
ultimately only a framework – we have to keep working
and building to ensure that it really does reduce human
suffering, as we all hope it will.’ (2013, p. 9). The treaty
allows individual states to develop National Control Lists
of weapons to be subject to ATT provisions. By making
these lists comprehensive and interpreting the term
‘overriding risk’ liberally, early adopter states that ratify
quickly can establish precedents for the interpretation of
the treaty. They should then promote these lists and
modes of operation as ‘best practices’ through bilateral,
regional and multilateral organizations (Bolton and Zwijnenberg, 2013).
As the delegation of Norway told the UNGA first committee in late 2013, to achieve the ATT’s ‘humanitarian
potential’, it will have to ‘be a dynamic and living instrument’ (Bolton, 2013a). The ATT’s hybridity, while a concession to the ghosts of traditional arms control, also
means NGOs and maximalist states can breathe into it
life – the Spirit of New York – and make it a genuine global human security instrument. Its example offers a possible precedent for ongoing and future global policy
making efforts on disarmament and arms control, such
as on nuclear weapons, ‘killer robots’ and the use of
explosive weapons in populated areas.
Note
This research was funded by a Faculty Fellow grant from the Helene
and Grant Wilson Center for Social Entrepreneurship.
Global Policy (2014)
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Author Information
Matthew Bolton, PhD (LSE), Assistant Professor, Department of
Political Science, Pace University, New York City. He is author of Foreign Aid and Landmine Clearance (I. B. Tauris, 2010) and co-editor of
Occupying Political Science (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). His research
is on disarmament, mine action and humanitarianism in conflict.
Katelyn James, recent graduate Pace University, studying Political
Science, History and Peace and Justice. She is currently a guest writer for the Women Under Siege project, focusing on women with
disabilities in conflict.
Global Policy (2014)