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10
The Multipolar Nature of the
International System in Asia
Chinese rulers saw the whole world as coming under their jurisdiction. “Under the wide heaven,” one Chinese saying goes, “all is the
King’s land. Within the sea-boundaries of the land, all are the King’s servants.” 1 This world was unipolar, with China at the center and the neighboring countries at the peripheries. When they wanted to contact China,
they did so by entering the tributary system of the Middle Kingdom.
The Tributary System Reassessed
Originating during the Western Zhou dynasty (eleventh century–771
b.c.), the tributary system institutionalized relations between the Zhou
king and his Chinese and foreign subjects. Geographic distance between
a subject and the Zhou king defined the relations between them. A subject was put in one of five classes in a graded system of “five submissions”
(wufu),2 in which each classification stipulated the appropriate symbolic
actions he had to perform in order to acknowledge his political subordination to the crown and to fulfill economic obligations to the Zhou
court. He or his ambassador was required to visit the court on a regular
basis at specified time intervals.3 He was to offer local products in a
given amount and of certain types as tribute to the Zhou king. Through
the bestowal by the Zhou and acceptance on his part of Chinese civil
and military titles and royal seals, a sovereign-vassal relationship was
established between the involved parties, which required the vassal to
respond promptly to instructions from the Zhou court. The court in
return would grant the vassal moral and military support at his request.4
Many traditional Chinese scholars regarded foreign countries as negligible to China. They paid attention to these countries only when their
rulers or ambassadors glorified China by “paying tribute” to the Son of
Heaven. In their works, the centrality of China in the tributary system
was axiomatic. A court visit by a foreign ruler or his ambassador was
perceived as a token of conformity to the Chinese world order and a
THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM IN A SIA
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public acknowledgment of subordination to the Son of Heaven. The
Chinese wishfully and universally described the purpose of many foreign missions as “coming to pay tribute” (laichao),5 “asking to become
(China’s) subject” (qingli),6 or “returning to tribute-offering status”
(guixian).7
The Chinese primary sources compiled by these scholars are the basis
on which a rich body of modern scholarship on the diplomatic history of
China has developed.8 Among them, works by Japanese scholars deserve
attention. Some examine the relations among China, Japan, Koguryô,
Silla, and Paekche in terms of an “oriental history.” 9 They treat these
“oriental” countries and the relations among them as one entity because
they shared similarities in political institutions, culture, and economy.
They consider the history of China’s external relations as a process in
which Chinese culture spread to the world outside China, and China’s
neighbors responded to that cultural expansion. They compare this
process to the formation of a concentric circle, with China proper at the
center, annexing its neighbors or bringing them to varying degrees into
the Chinese political orbit through tributary arrangements.
As a theoretical framework, “oriental history” is both credible and
helpful in terms of its treatment of the aforementioned guiding principles of China’s diplomacy. This framework is also a welcome departure
from the Europe-centered research methods popular with many latenineteenth-century Japanese historians.10
Other Japanese historians use the “investiture system” (sakuhò taisei) to
study the diplomatic history of East Asian countries. Similar to the “oriental history” approach, the investiture theory emphasizes the homogeneity of East Asian countries. This homogeneity is evident in that they
shared a culture based on the Chinese written language, they patronized Buddhism and Confucianism, they built economic ties with each
other through tributary arrangements, and they all had a Chinese-style
statute and code system. They thus formed a “historical civilization
zone” or an “East Asian world.” 11
Countries in the “East Asian world” used the “investiture system” as a
general medium for conducting diplomacy. Through the bestowal and
acceptance of Chinese titles, this system created a political hierarchy
between China and its neighbors12 that was an extension of the Chinese
domestic social order, known as the “status system.” 13
Focusing on the bestowal and acceptance of Chinese titles, the
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investiture theory is more specific than the “oriental history” approach
in its treatment of China’s official relations with East Asian countries.14
The theory emphasizes change in the investiture system, thus distinguishing itself from the method of those scholars who use the Roman
Empire as a model for their perception of East Asian history and who
study China and its diplomacy during the Qin-Han period in terms of
the development of an “empire.” 15
The tributary system was based on an assumption of China’s centrality in world affairs. It was a “schematic design” for China’s foreign relations.16 Political submission brought about by military conquest or by
cultural influence was the cornerstone of the system.17 Indeed, China at
times did beat some neighbors into submission. The degree of submission, however, could not be properly defined merely by a country’s
geographic distance from China. In theory, the tributary system was
centered on China with neighboring countries as its vassals. But in reality, participants in the system were not homogeneous, and the system
was open to countries of dubious political inclinations. Moreover, for the
Middle Kingdom, which was not always militarily superior to its neighbors, military conquest was not a routine way of handling external
affairs. Even when an advanced Chinese culture attracted a foreign
ambassador to “pay tribute” to China, the contact did not always result
in a formal sovereign-vassal relation. There were times as well when
China refused to play the role of a suzerain in order to avoid being
burdened by obligations to a vassal state. China deliberately rejected
requests by some foreign rulers to become “outer subjects” in order to
leave them out of the Chinese world. In short, the creation of actual
“tributary relations” was a consequence of historical circumstances and
not necessarily the norm for all of China’s external relations.
Nor was China always the centrally dominant party in relations with
other countries.18 This had been the case since the Zhou court lost control of the regional Chinese lords in the Spring and Autumn period.
These lords waged wars against one another and allied themselves with
“barbarian” groups for hegemony or survival.19 Alliance with “barbarians” had since become a strategy for Chinese rulers.
Han Wudi (r. 140–187 b.c.) adopted the policy of “allying with one
barbarian group to check the other” (lianyi yi zhiyi). He befriended the
Yuezhi (in the Amu Darya River Valley) in order to check the Xiongnu.20
In this relationship, Han China in fact played the role of a tribute-pay-
THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM IN A SIA
: 219
ing country to the Xiongnu.21 Li Yuan, founding father of the Tang,
turned to the Eastern Turks for support before revolting against the
Sui. He became a nominal vassal of the Turkic ruler and received from
his master soldiers and horses.22 Later, the Uighurs became indispensable partners of the Tang court in the court’s campaigns to subdue internal rebels and fend off Tibetan attacks.23 In these cases, China treated
these neighbors as peers or even as superiors. Traditional Chinese historians, however, were often too proud openly to admit that such situations had obtained. In consequence, little about them has survived in
Chinese records.24
Nevertheless, some traditional Chinese scholars acknowledged that
there was a gap between the publicly preferred “tributary relations” and
the extent to which such relations actually existed in China’s external
relations. They realized that diplomatic matters could not be viewed
merely through the lens of China’s centrality.
Sima Qian (145–186 b.c.), the great Han dynasty historian, disagreed
with the idea that the best policy to follow with respect to the Xiongnu
was that they should “become China’s subject or face war.” Ban Gu
(39–62), another famous Han dynasty scholar, argued for a stable pattern for China’s external relations but did not reassert the doctrine of
“tributary relations.” Fan Ye (398–446) and Shen Yue (441–513) both
openly doubted the usefulness of the tributary system.25
In many respects, the tributary system was not a static structure centered on China but a delicate equilibrium, sensitive to needs and changes
in conditions of all involved parties.26 As time passed, “tributary relations” between China and some neighbors would degenerate into a mere
form of official contact, which preserved the centrality of China only at
the ceremonial level. The Chinese court sometimes acted to reimpose
the tributary pattern on its neighbors, thus destabilizing them. With a
few exceptions, however, the pattern in question could be sustained
only spasmodically.27 “Tributary relations” came to embrace a wide spectrum of China’s external affairs, ranging from “total subjugation to virtual de facto equality.” 28 The great variety of China’s power relations
with its neighbors therefore cannot be portrayed simply as “tributary
relations.”
The neighbors of China were not passive objects of China’s foreign
policy. The ruler of a vassal state was often a dynamic player of international politics. He decided the timing for establishing or stopping
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contacts with China.29 He sought Chinese military and civil titles to
strengthen his position at home and support his claims abroad. Even
when he followed a directive from China, he did so not so much to fulfill his political obligation to China as a vassal as to use the Chinese
directive to his advantage.30 He would often ignore any instruction from
China deemed unfavorable to the interests of his country. He could and
would stop paying tribute to or even clash with China when substantial
conflicts of interest occurred in the bilateral relations.31 Generally, his
country was neither a political nor a military satellite of China.32 If we
must identify a general “medium” for international relations among
Asian countries, it would be “official contacts” of heterogenous natures.
And these relations must be examined in the light of the individual
motives of the involved countries.33
Self-Interest and Mutual Self-Interest
in International Politics
Self-interest was the foundation for each country’s external behavior.
It motivated a country to secure its existence and development in international society by trying to create an international environment conducive to its own domestic development and external expansion. The
self-interest, the strength, and the international position of a country
configured its international relations and determined whether a country’s external relations took the form of peaceful contacts with its neighbors, of war against other countries, of mutually beneficial economic
exchange, or of carefully calculated political maneuvers.34
An understanding of the role of national self-interest in international
politics had always been a part of the political wisdom of Chinese rulers,
and the Chinese policy of luring foreign rulers with valuables and satisfying their needs for Chinese goods was based on such an understanding. The perception of the value and the use of this policy started
during the Xin dynasty (9–25)35 and continued throughout the Eastern
Han dynasty.36 The Sui court also adopted this policy. In 607, Emperor
Yang displayed a great quantity of valuables during a gala held for
foreign rulers from the Western Region. Impressed, the Turkic ruler
expressed his wish to become a subject of the Sui emperor. During the
same year, Sui ambassadors visited other countries in the region, persuading their rulers by generous Chinese gifts to offer loyalty to China.37
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The Tang emperor also demonstrated a good understanding of selfinterest as the driving force in diplomacy. Emperor Gaozu once observed,
“In my view, the Turks, both ruler and subjects, are intent on nothing
but money and valuables.” 38 The Turks, and the Qidan as well, “would
act [to invade China] whenever they see some benefit [in doing so].” 39
It was believed to be the greedy and ferocious nature of the “barbarians”
that motivated them to wage war against China.40 On occasion they
sought peace and accorded the Chinese court political eulogies. These
actions, however, were often due not to the moral influence of any Tang
emperor but to a fear of Chinese military action against them when pervasive natural disasters and pestilence had ravaged their countries. They
needed breathing space for recuperation in times of difficulty.41
Considerations of self-interest quite obviously conditioned the stance
of a country toward others. The ruler of Nanzhao had once allied himself with the Turks. In the mid-eighth century, however, he decided to
switch loyalty to Tang China. “The Chinese court,” he explained, “acts on
rites and righteousness, and seldom makes demands on its neighbors.
Unlike the Chinese, the Turks are insatiably avaricious. We shall now
give up the alliance with the Turks and offer loyalty again to Tang. This
action will free us from the duty of sending soldiers far away to defend
the Turks. Nothing will benefit Nanzhao more than this decision.” 42
When chieftains of various Wo tribes contacted authorities at Lelang,
a Chinese commandery established in northern Korea in 108 b.c. by
the Western Han court, they sought to benefit themselves by initiating
contact.43 In a.d. 57, the first Wo ambassador arrived at the capital of the
Eastern Han court (25–220);44 the second came in 107.45
Wo diplomats, however, never called on China on a regular basis. A
chronology of Japan-China relations from the first to the ninth centuries reveals this irregularity in the visits of Japanese ambassadors to
China. There were periods of frequent contacts as well as of lengthy
intervals between contacts. This irregularity clearly indicated that, in its
diplomacy with China, Japan set its own agenda and acted on selfinterest to satisfy its own needs.
No Wo ambassador, for example, came to China during the second
century. This interval continued well past the third century. Then within
merely nine years, the female Wo ruler Himiko sent four ambassadors
to the Wei court (220–265) in 238, 243, 245, and 247 respectively.46
After the death of Himiko, diplomatic contacts with China slowed. Iyo,
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the female successor to Himiko, contacted the Wei court only once.47
The fourth century was another quiet period in China-Wo relations
except for the Wo delegation dispatched to the Western Jin court
(265–316) in 306.48 With the arrival of a Wo ambassador at the Eastern
Jin court (317–420) in 413, a new age of frequent diplomatic contacts
with China began.49 Over the next sixty years, ten Wo ambassadors
called on the Southern Song court (420–479),50 and a Wo delegation
also visited the Southern Qi court (479–502) in 479.51 The sixth century, however, saw only one Wo ambassador pay respect to the Southern
Liang court (502–557) in 502.52 When these ambassadors arrived in
China, they acquired official titles, bronze mirrors, and military banners, which their masters could use to bolster their claims to political
supremacy, to build a military system, and to exert influence on southern Korea.
Starting from the seventh century, a profound change occurred in
Japan-China relations. Five Japanese ambassadors called on the Sui
court within the short period of fourteen years from 600 to 614.53 None
of them, however, requested Chinese titles from the court. These titles
were now useless since Japan had achieved political unity in the sixth
century and no longer needed Chinese titles as a ploy in establishing
superiority in domestic politics. Japanese ambassadors to the Sui and
later on to the Tang were mainly diplomats seeking cultural and economic benefits from China for their country.
During the Tang dynasty, sixteen Japanese ambassadors visited the
capital, Changan.54 The ambassadors took advantage of their official
relations with China to acquire knowledge of Chinese institutions and
culture as well as to obtain fine Chinese products. Japan needed the
information and used such items to consolidate its political order and
to nourish its own culture. After the first ambassador visited the Tang
in 630, an interlude of more than twenty years followed that lasted
until 653. From 653 to 701, however, as many as seven Japanese delegations contacted Tang central and local authorities. During the eighth
century, the interval between the various Japanese delegations sent to
China averaged about ten years. In the ninth century, however, the interval between visits lengthened to thirty years. These changes in the length
of the interval between missions seem to suggest that the Japanese court
was determining the timing for its ambassadors to call on China according to its own needs.
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: 223
Ma Duanlin (1254–1323), a Southern Song scholar, seems to have
well surmised the motive foreign rulers had in contacting China in his
comments “Barbarians from various islands come to pay tribute. Is it not
true that they merely wish to benefit themselves from trade and gifts
[from the Chinese court] rather than that they truly admire the righteousness [of the Chinese emperor]?” 55
Not only was self-interest the guiding principle of the nations that
had relationships with China, it also guided Chinese diplomacy. China’s
public endorsement of virtue (de) and righteousness (yi) as the basis for
state conduct56 meant in actuality that these moral principles were the
means and justifications China used to realize its own self-interest.57 This
is obvious in Chinese political thinking since benefit to the country
and its people was considered the yardstick of all moral principles.58
The character de did not only represent an abstract moral concept; it
also stood for the concrete way by which a specific issue was handled
appropriately according to the circumstances.59 De is therefore also translated as “efficacy.” 60 “What de means,” a Han dynasty etymological work
explains, “is achieving proper arrangements for things.” 61 A capable
ruler should “order his affairs so that they express righteousness” 62 and
“handle things and make decisions in accordance with the very nature
of the related matters.” 63 In this definition of “virtue” and “righteousness,” the “appropriateness” of an action to be taken depends on its production of results desirable to the parties involved.64
Appropriate actions based on righteousness and virtue thus would
produce benefits. This explains why strategists and thinkers of the Warring States period advocated “righteousness.” “Beneficialness is the
consequence of all righteousness,” one observed.65 “Righteousness contributes to the advantage of the state,” another concluded.66 Since “righteousness is the root of gain,” yet another suggested, “a nation should
consider righteousness, not self-interest, as that which is to its advantage.”67 Some strategists compared “righteousness” and “virtue” to
“weapons to gain benefit for the state,” making the utilitarian nature of
these moral principles quite explicit.68 Self-interest thus was apparently
the fundamental motive of both China and its neighbors in establishing
relations with each other.
When a country initiates contact with another country, it raises
demands on its counterpart to take certain actions. Thus, the initiating
country is a “demander.” If the other country acts according to the
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: T H E INTERNATIO NAL S YS TEM IN AS IA
demander’s requests, the responding country then becomes a “supplier.” However, for a supplier to act in a way that allows the demander to
fulfill its own self-interest, the supplier must believe that its action would
first benefit itself. Under no circumstances would a supplier act as a passive, altruistic provider of services to a selfish demander. The supplier
also acts from self-interest and sees its deeds as a way of actively seeking
its own national interests. For countries to enter a bilateral relationship,
therefore, there must be some overlap of their respective interests, even
though the national interest of one might not be identical with that of
the other. Were this not the case, a relationship would not be established in the first place. The concept of “mutual self-interest” is thus
necessary for understanding a functional bilateral relationship. “Mutual
self-interest” refers to a win-win situation for the parties involved in a
bilateral relationship that enables each to realize its own self-interest by
interacting with the other according to a set of mutually accepted rules.69
Mozi (470–391 b.c.?), a philosopher of the Warring States period,
was the first to use the term “mutual self-interest” (jiao xiang li).70 Courtiers of the Jin (eleventh to fourth centuries b.c.), a regional Chinese
state (located in southern Shanxi province), elaborated why a harmonious relationship with the Rong and the Di (nomads in western and
northern China respectively) would work for both parties.
The Rong and the Di are continually changing their residence, and
are fond of exchanging land for goods. Their lands can be purchased;
this is the first advantage. Our borders will not be kept in apprehension. The people can labor on their fields, and the husbandmen complete their toils; this is the second. When the Rong and the Di serve
Jin, our neighbors all round will be terrified, and the states will be
awed and cherish our friendship; this is the third. Tranquilizing the
Rong by our goodness, our armies will not be toiled, and weapons will
not be broken; this is the fourth. Using only measures of virtue, the
remote will come to us, and the near will be at rest; this is the fifth.71
Living at peace with barbarians was a nonmilitary approach to external affairs. It developed into a “loose rein” (jimi) policy during the Han
dynasty expressed in a simile to the effect that China should handle
“barbarians” like a farmer trying to control his horse with a halter (ji)
and his ox by a bridle (mi).72
The “loose rein” policy was a low-key foreign policy that required a
THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM IN A SIA
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minimum use of force for control in bilateral relations. It stressed the
importance of keeping in touch with foreign countries without establishing substantive political relationships with them. And the gist of this
policy was that “all courtesies must be returned” (jimi zhi yi li wu buda) if
foreign ambassadors complied with the court ceremonial when visiting
China.73
Tang courtiers demonstrated that they understood this policy well.
Although they supported repulsing military assaults on Chinese borders
and keeping Chinese troops on alert so as to provide justifiable responses
to threats, they opposed attempts to conquer neighboring countries.74
As far as they were concerned, China would gain nothing from using
force to annex neighboring countries, nor would China sustain any loss
by losing control of them.75 This was because most foreign lands were as
barren as “stony fields,” and their people were unlikely to be reformed
in the light of Chinese customs.76 The best way of dealing with these
countries was to live at peace with them, providing they did not raid
Chinese borders.77 Nor did the court believe that China should accept
them as vassal states.78 They were convinced that keeping at a political
distance from them freed China from the obligations that a suzerain
owed to its subjects.
China’s neighbors benefited from the “loose rein” policy as well. This
policy allowed foreign ambassadors access to both Chinese culture and
the exquisite commodities China produced without burdening them
with the obligations expected of a vassal state.
China-Japan relations before the eleventh century also embodied the
spirit of mutual self-interest. The sovereign-vassal relations between the
two countries from the third to the sixth centuries were instrumental in
strengthening the position of various Wo rulers at home and in extending their influence over southern Korea. Chinese regional states welcomed these relations since they created the image of a suzerain for the
rulers of these states and enhanced their claim to be the legitimate sovereign of China. The ruler of the Song was so eager to take advantage
of the system that he announced in 420 the bestowal of titles on a Wo
ruler without a Wo ambassador being present at his court.79
During the Sui-Tang period, official ties with China were the channel
through which Japan kept up with cultural and political developments
in China. Japanese ambassadors managed to return home “loaded with
Chinese gifts” without offering political submission to China.80 They did
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: T H E INTERNATIO NAL S YS TEM IN AS IA
so by paying lip service to the China-centered world order.81 Observing
Tang court protocol, they presented state letters and gifts to Tang emperors and accepted Chinese honorific titles that they had never requested.
Japan’s political allegiance to China thus seemed to have continued
undisturbed on the ceremonial level.
The Tang court was aware of the changes in its relations with Japan.
But it chose not to reimpose the sovereign-vassal pattern on the country since Japan was marginal to the geopolitics of Tang China in East
Asia. Except for the military confrontation at the Hakusonkò River in
663, Japan was neither an ally nor a foe of China. Maintaining loose
official ties with Japan was in China’s interest. Regarding the visits by
Japanese ambassadors as reflecting the far-reaching moral influence of
Tang emperors in foreign countries, the Tang court happily received
them.
The Multipolar International
System in Asia
No country played a fixed role in Asian international politics. A
country could be a “demander” on one occasion but a “supplier” on
another. The international system in Asia operated by means of several
poles and was multipolar in nature.82
China had long been the leading player in the system owing to its
political, economic, and cultural advantages over neighboring peoples.
These peoples, although mostly nomadic and illiterate, tried to use the
system to their best advantage by deciding on the time and the terms for
contacting China and on which elements of Chinese culture they
wished to adopt. They too were active players.
From the mid-third century onward, “barbarians” north of the Great
Wall became formidable forces in international politics. They established regional regimes and waged wars against China. Eventually, in
316, they destroyed the unified China that had existed under the
Western Jin court to become masters of the vast area north of the Yangzi
River during the next two centuries.
The Sui court managed to bring areas south of the Great Wall back
under Chinese control but was unable to reassert the centrality of China
vis-à-vis neighboring countries. China faced a new international environment, which would continue to evolve despite China’s wishes.
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During the Tang dynasty, China’s neighbors to the northeast (Parhae, Koguryô, Paekche, Silla, and Japan) and to the southwest (Tibet
and Nanzhao) became stable agrarian or semi-agrarian states one after
another. Their societies became better organized. A literary culture
developed in these countries as well. In the meantime, the countries
north and northwest of the Great Wall (the Turks and the Uighurs)
became militarily stronger than China.83 Inspired by China’s political
cosmology, many Asian rulers also developed a political ideology of
their own. They claimed the existence of a hierarchy in which they
themselves were the center. They thus challenged the unipolar assumption of Chinese foreign policy that viewed China as the Asian epicenter.
Asian rulers practiced this new political ideology in different manners. Chieftains of the Turks, the Uighurs, and the Tibetans requested
privileged treatment by the Tang court, and the court was compelled to
deal with them as peers. Rulers of Koguryô, Silla and Paekche, in
contrast, maintained their sovereign-vassal relations with China. They
wanted to gain Chinese support for their individual ambitions to unify
the Korean peninsula, a goal none of them could achieve by their own
strength.84 They did, however, reject instructions from China that they
deemed contradictory to their self-interest.85 As a group, they ignored,
even if they did not overtly repudiate, China’s supremacy.
The Japanese sovereigns, too, quietly disengaged themselves from
sovereign-vassal relations with China. They instructed their courtiers to
phrase state letters to China in such a way that these letters rejected, but
did not openly challenge, China’s suzerainty. In 648, the court also initiated an indirect official contact with China in order to dilute the political overtones of their bilateral relations by entrusting the ambassador
of Silla with a memorial to be delivered to the Tang emperor.86 And, in
654, Japan turned a deaf ear to a Tang instruction to attack Paekche,
Japan’s ally in Korea.87 Thus Japan maintained official relations with
China in order to achieve economic and cultural gains without compromising its independent political stance.
The multipolar nature of the international system in Asia became
apparent when Asian countries made it clear that relations with China
were only one aspect of their diplomacy. Many of them had equally
important relations with other neighboring peoples.88 In the ninth century, for example, Silla, Parhae, and Japan maintained regular diplomatic contacts among themselves. Some continued to send embassies to
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Changan, while they were in a formal vassal relationship to another
powerful patron state.89
By its utilitarian and flexible character, the multipolar international
system in Asia allowed its participants to relate to and benefit one
another through their official contacts. However, the multipolar nature
of the system and the unitary means of official contact by which the system functioned resulted in a tension. This tension did not manifest
itself as long as China’s neighbors sought to use Chinese court audiences as occasions to indicate their respective international standing, to
confirm or adjust their mutual relationships, and to reap cultural and
economic benefits from the Middle Kingdom. Asian rulers, however,
would change their minds when overland and maritime trading activities of private merchants replaced official contacts to become a major
medium for cultural and economic exchanges with China. The first
Tang merchant, for example, arrived in Japan in 819. From then until
the collapse of the Tang in 907, every two to three years, on average, a
Tang ship sailed to or returned from Japan. Altogether there were thirtynine of these trading voyages.90
With this development of commercial ventures in international relations, the importance of official contact with China as a means for economic and cultural exchange diminished. Official contact became an
embodiment mainly of the power relations between China and a group
of peer states. In the meantime, private trade facilitated the economic
and cultural ties among them. The multipolar nature of the international system in Asia could now properly manifest itself in the various
ways in which the system functioned.