Nuclear Energy and the Legacy of Harry S. Truman
The Truman Legacy Series, Volume 12
Based on the Twelfth Truman Legacy Symposium
The Atomic Energy Legacy of Harry S. Truman
May 2014
Key West, Florida
Edited by
J. Samuel Walker
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 2
12/18/15 12:43 PM
Edited by
J. Samuel Walker
logo here
Volume 12
Truman State University Press
Kirksville, Missouri
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 3
12/18/15 12:43 PM
Copyright © 2016 Truman State University Press, Kirksville, Missouri 63501
All rights reserved
tsup.truman.edu
Cover art: President Truman signs atomic energy bill, August 1, 1946. Courtesy
Department of Energy.
Cover design: Katie Best
Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-­Publication Data
Names: Walker, J. Samuel, editor.
Title: Nuclear energy and the legacy of Harry S. Truman / edited by J. Samuel
Walker.
Description: Kirksville, Missouri : Truman State University Press, 2016. |
Series: Truman legacy series ; volume 12 | Includes bibliographical
references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2015042881 (print) | LCCN 2015047876 (ebook) | ISBN
9781612481593 (alk. paper) | ISBN 9781612481609 ()
Subjects: LCSH: Truman, Harry S., 1884-1972--Political and social views. |
Nuclear energy—Government policy—United States—History—20th century. |
Nuclear weapons--United States--History--20th century. | Nuclear
warfare—History—20th century. | United States—Politics and
government—1945-1953. | Truman, Harry S., 1884-1972—Influence.
Classification: LCC E814 .N83 2016 (print) | LCC E814 (ebook) | DDC
973.918092—dc23
LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015042881
No part of this work may be reproduced or transmitted in any format by any
means without written permission from the publisher.
The paper in this publication meets or exceeds the minimum requirements of the
American National Standard for Information Sciences—­Permanence of Paper for
Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48–­1992.
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 4
12/18/15 12:43 PM
Contents
Illustrations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
General Editor’s Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Michael J. Devine
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
J. Samuel Walker
Ending the War with Japan: The Agony of 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Richard B. Frank
Truman, Hiroshima, and the Morality of the
Atomic Bomb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Wilson D. Miscamble
On President Truman’s Use of the Atomic Bomb:
Momentum, Timing, and General Groves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Robert S. Norris
Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the Nuclear
Arms Race . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Martin V. Melosi
Radioisotopes as Political Instruments from Truman
to Eisenhower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Angela N. H. Creager
Triumph and Trouble in the First Temple of the Atom:
The Atomic Energy Commission and the Raleigh
Research Reactor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
Thomas R. Wellock
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 5
12/18/15 12:43 PM
vi
Contents
The Decision to Drop the Bomb and Truman’s
Nuclear Legacy: Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
William Lanouette
Nuclear Energy and the Legacy of Harry S. Truman:
A Graphic Essay. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
Randy Sowell
Contributors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 6
12/18/15 12:43 PM
Illustrations
President Truman’s Diary Entry, July 25, 1945. . . . . . . . . . 194
Message from President Truman to Secretary of
War Henry Stimson, ca. July 30, 1945. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
Atomic Explosion at Nagasaki, August 9, 1945 . . . . . . . . . . 196
J. Robert Oppenheimer to President Truman,
May 3, 1946. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
Memorandum from President Truman to
Dean Acheson, May 7, 1946. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
Signing Ceremony for Atomic Energy Act,
August 1, 1946. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
Atomic Explosion at Eniwetok, 1948 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
Sale of Radioisotope, August 2, 1946. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
Map of Radioisotope Shipments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
Designed for Safety: The Reactor Building at
North Carolina State College. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
Demystifying the Atom: The Control Room at
North Caroliina State College . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
Letter and Memorandum from Lewis L. Strauss
to President Truman, November 25, 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 7
1/4/16 11:18 AM
viii
Illustrations and Tables
President Truman to David Lilienthal,
January 31, 1950. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
Gordon Dean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 8
12/18/15 12:43 PM
General Editor’s Preface
Nothing in the Truman presidency remains as controversial as his decision to use nuclear weapons in August 1945 to bring about the surrender
of Japan and the end of World War II. To present current scholarship on
Truman’s action and explore the lasting impact of the world’s entry into
the nuclear age, the twelfth, and final, Truman Legacy Symposium called
on a range of scholars to reexamine Truman’s fateful authorization of the
use of atomic weapons and assess the evolution of the military and domestic uses of atomic energy since Hiroshima. In addition, two survivors of
the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki attended the Key West program
as guests of Clifton Truman Daniel, President Truman’s eldest grandson.
Setsuko Thurlow and Yasuaki Yamashita shared their personal reminiscences (Hibakusha Stories) of survival and living with the aftermath of the
nuclear bombings.
For twelve years, the Truman Library has worked closely with the
Truman Little White House in Key West, Florida, to review the most
recent scholarship on various aspects of the Truman administration
and the enduring legacy of one of the most significant presidencies in
American history. The Truman era continues to be a rich field for scholars
throughout the United States and abroad, and our current policy makers are clearly influenced by the critical decisions Truman made and the
ambitious domestic and foreign policy agenda he set for the nation more
than six decades ago. Each year, a dozen or more scholarly monographs
are published by major presses on President Truman and his era, and our
national leaders (including every president since Eisenhower) have quoted
the “man from Independence” and cited instances of his political courage
and wisdom.
The early Key West symposia were enthusiastically encouraged and
supported by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA)
under the leadership of Archivists of the United States John Carlin and
Alan Weinstein. In addition, the Truman Library Institute for National
ix
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 9
12/18/15 12:43 PM
x
Preface
and International Affairs provided significant funding and logistical assistance from 2001 to 2009. In recent years, however, both NARA and the
board of the Institute have become more inward-­looking; and conferences
offering academic exploration and support for endeavors to publish new
research are no longer priorities. Fortunately, the Truman Little White
House and its foundation, along with Historic Tours of America and various partners in Florida have picked up the slack. Furthermore, C-­SPAN
has invested in the Key West symposia by taping the programs for broadcast, thereby allowing the presentations to reach a wide and diverse international audience. Skilled editor Barbara Smith-­Mandell of the Truman
State University Press has been a thoughtful and patient partner from the
very initiation of this endeavor; and the Press’s publication of the papers
from each symposium, along with related essays and documents, has added
to our understanding of the Truman era and its legacy.
Dr. Samuel Walker, the editor of this volume, pulled together the academic component of the Key West event. Dr. Walker sought to go beyond a
reexamination of President Truman’s fateful decision to authorize the U.S.
military to strike Japanese targets with the new atomic weapons in order
to end World War II as rapidly as possible. With the experts he assembled,
Dr. Walker focused also on reviewing the legacy of that momentous decision on American military and domestic affairs.
As with all the previous Key West symposia, the twelfth resulted from
the outstanding efforts of many individuals. Bob Wolz, director of the
Truman Little White House in Key West, and Dr. Ray Geselbracht, special assistant to the director of the Truman Library, have provided essential
organizational and editorial skills from the very beginning of the series.
Clifton Truman Daniel has likewise played a central role in every symposium and has assisted in securing funding. Historic Tours of America,
under the leadership of President Ed Swift and CEO Chris Belland, provided valuable logistic and financial support for all twelve symposia. Delia
Rios of C-­SPAN arranged the taping and production of the broadcasts
that made the presentations of recent symposia available to a vast public
audience. Dr. Robert Watson of Lynn University played an important role
in initiating the Truman Legacy series. And, of course, dozens of folks in
Key West, Florida, have assisted in providing hospitality and logistical support for each symposium, beginning with the first in 2003. I am sincerely
grateful to all.
Michael J. Devine
Independence, MO
October 2014
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 10
12/18/15 12:43 PM
Nuclear Energy
and the Legacy of
Harry S. Truman
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 1
12/18/15 12:43 PM
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 2
12/18/15 12:43 PM
Introduction
J. Samuel Walker
Harry S. Truman’s nuclear policies and programs rank high among the
most significant, controversial, and enduring aspects of his presidency. He
not only authorized the use of atomic weapons against Japan in 1945 but
also decided in favor of a crash effort to build vastly more powerful hydrogen bombs five years later. He presided over the origins of the nuclear arms
race with the Soviet Union. And he took preliminary steps to make possible the development of civilian uses of nuclear energy, including the wide
distribution of radioisotopes for medical and other purposes and early
work on the promise and the perils of nuclear power. Truman’s nuclear
legacy is a subject of immense importance, and this book highlights several
key aspects of the reasons for and outcomes of his decisions.
The issue that has commanded the most attention and incited the
most controversy is, of course, Truman’s decision to use the atomic bomb.
In 1999, a poll of journalists ranked the atomic bombing of Japan as the
top news story of the twentieth century, placing it ahead of the landing
on the moon, the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Wright brothers’ first flight,
and other prominent events. The dispute among scholars over the atomic
attacks is arguably the most contentious in all of American history, because
of both the length of time it has raged and the intensity of the acrimony
it has generated.
The controversy over Truman’s decision is centered on two fiercely
competing interpretations of why the bomb was used and whether it was
necessary to end the Pacific war on terms satisfactory to the United States.
The traditional interpretation insisted that the bomb was necessary to
avoid an invasion of the Japanese mainland that would have cost hundreds
3
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 3
12/18/15 12:43 PM
4
J. Samuel Walker
of thousands of American lives. Scholars who advanced this position generally suggested that Truman faced a categorical choice between the bomb
and an invasion that was forced on him by Japan’s refusal to surrender.
The revisionist interpretation that rose to prominence in the mid-­
1960s took sharp exception. It held that the bomb was not necessary to
win the war because Japan was teetering on the verge of surrender. In this
view, Japan was seeking a way to end the war on the sole condition that
the emperor be allowed to remain on his throne, presumably as a constitutional monarch. Truman and his advisers were well aware of Japan’s
desperate straits and desire to quit the war, but they still elected to use the
bomb. Among differing revisionist explanations for the atomic attacks, the
predominant one is that Truman authorized the bomb to impress, and
indeed, intimidate the Soviet Union in the emerging Cold War. In this
view, the bomb was not used for military reasons to win the war against
Japan but for diplomatic reasons in the growing rivalry with the Soviet
Union.
The contrast between the two conflicting interpretations could hardly
be more stark. Traditionalists regarded the bomb was absolutely necessary to bring a prompt conclusion to the war and save huge numbers of
American lives. Revisionists claimed that the bomb was unnecessary to
win the war, and many argue that it was used instead for sordid diplomatic
purposes. The question of whether the use of the bomb was necessary, and
by extension, justifiable and moral, has long been the focus of the highly
polarized debate over Truman’s decision.
While scholars at the poles of the debate over the dropping of the
bomb continue to fight this battle, sometimes in a decidedly uncharitable tone, other experts have moved beyond the poles, or more precisely,
between the poles, to find answers to the questions surrounding the use
of the bomb in a broad middle ground. Middle-­grounders have found
that neither the traditional nor the revisionist position is convincing in
its pure form. Contrary to traditionalist assertions, for example, it is clear
that Truman did not face an either/or choice between the bomb and an
invasion. There were other means of ending the war, and contemporary
evidence strongly suggests that American policy makers did not regard an
invasion of Japan as inevitable. Several middle-­grounders, with varying
degrees of certitude, have suggested that victory over Japan would have
been achieved before a landing became necessary (the first phase of the
invasion was scheduled for November 1, 1945). Some have also expressed
grave doubts that had an invasion occurred, the costs in American lives
would have been in the range of hundreds of thousands, as Truman and
other officials claimed after the war. This does not mean, however, that
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 4
12/18/15 12:43 PM
Introduction
5
U.S. leaders were not committed to saving American lives by using the
bomb to shorten the war, even if the numbers were far smaller than they
cited at a later time.
The findings of recent scholarship have done serious, and perhaps fatal,
damage to the revisionist position. The opening of important Japanese
sources over the past several years has shown, seemingly beyond question,
that Japan was not on the verge of surrender at the time of Hiroshima.
The argument that Japan was actively seeking an honorable and reasonable
way to end the war, a cornerstone to the viability of revisionism, has been
effectively refuted. As a corollary, it is also apparent that American leaders
did not believe that Japan had opted for surrender and would quit the war
if only the status of the emperor was assured. Documentary sources leave
little doubt that Truman and his top advisers remained deeply concerned
about how the war would end and how long it would take.
In addressing the critical issue that has been at the heart of the
debate over Hiroshima, scholars of a middle-­ground persuasion generally
agreed that the bomb was necessary to end the war at the earliest possible
moment and in that way to carry out Truman’s primary goal of saving
American lives. They also affirmed that he had other, subsidiary motives
as well, including impressing the Soviet Union with America’s atomic
might. Despite wide concurrence among middle-­grounders on those matters, other questions continued to stir debate. One source of division was
the relative influence of the bomb and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria,
which occurred two days after Hiroshima. Another was the effect of the
atomic bombing of Nagasaki. Assessments of the impact of the second
bomb on Japan’s leaders ranged from considerable to none whatsoever.
Finally, a debate over projected casualty figures for an invasion of Japan
and their influence on Truman aroused great passion among some writers.1
The articles in this book, which were originally presented at a conference on Truman’s nuclear legacy that was sponsored by the Harry S.
Truman Little White House Foundation in Key West, Florida, shed light
on important aspects of Truman’s nuclear legacy. The first three essays
focus on the use of the bomb, and it is safe to suggest that they will not
resolve the debate on the subject. But they contribute substantially to our
knowledge of the events that led to Hiroshima and the Japanese surrender.
Richard B. Frank addresses the question of the relative weight of the
atomic bomb and Soviet entry into the war against Japan. He offers the
conclusion that both the bomb and the Soviet invasion were essential to
convince different and not necessarily compatible elements of the Japanese
leadership to surrender. The attack on Hiroshima was instrumental in
forcing Hirohito to recognize that the war must end. The Soviet attack was
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 5
12/18/15 12:43 PM
Ending the War with Japan
The Agony of 1945
Richard B. Frank
Grand Strategy: American
President Franklin Roosevelt publicly articulated the national political
goal of the United States at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943
as the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers. As it evolved over the
next two years, unconditional surrender was not simply a slogan about
victory but also a policy about peace. It provided the legal authority for
the extensive plans to renovate the internal structures of the Axis nations.1
Those who mistakenly regard unconditional surrender as merely a disposable propaganda cry fail to grasp its indispensable role in implementing the
occupation reforms that fundamentally transformed Japan.2
The American military strategy forged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS) in the spring of 1945 to secure that national political goal marked
an unstable compromise of two conflicting visions. Those visions arose not
from purely military considerations but from a question with profound
political origins: What factor was most likely to undermine the will of
the American people to see the war through to unconditional surrender?
The U.S. Navy, led by Fleet Admiral Ernest King, had studied war with
Japan since 1906. From these decades of analysis, naval officers distilled
a number of principles about defeating Japan. None of these axioms was
more deeply ingrained than the conviction that an invasion of the Japanese
home islands represented absolute folly. Naval planners calculated that
Japan would muster larger ground forces for defense than the United
States could ever deploy across the Pacific and that Japan’s terrain would
8
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 8
12/18/15 12:43 PM
Ending the War with Japan
9
negate American advantages of firepower and mobility. At the nub, naval
leaders placed casualties as the factor most likely to undermine popular
commitment to unconditional surrender. Thus, they advocated ending
the war by a campaign of blockade and bombardment, including intense
aerial bombardment by sea-­and land-­based aircraft.3 The U.S. Army, led
by General of the Army George C. Marshall, had never invested the same
intellectual capital in examining a conflict with Japan. It had, however,
explored the prospect of war with Japan in the late 1930s and concluded
that invasion might be necessary. Thus, when the army turned its attention
to the problem of ending hostilities with Japan in 1944, it swiftly adopted
a strategy of invasion of the home islands. This choice reflected the bedrock
army conviction that time was the critical challenge to public support for
unconditional surrender—­and thus an enduring peace.4
The JCS merged these two conflicting views into a strategic plan in
May 1945. The Chiefs authorized the continuation and intensification of
the strategy of blockade and bombardment until November 1, 1945. At that
point, the United States would launch a two-­phase invasion of the Japanese
homeland under the overall code name Operation Downfall. The first step,
Operation Olympic, involved the Sixth Army’s seizing approximately the
southern third of Kyushu, the southernmost main Japanese home island,
starting on November 1, 1945. Olympic would obtain air and naval bases
to support a second phase, Operation Coronet, tentatively set for March 1,
1946, involving three armies to secure the Tokyo-­Yokohama region.
As the JCS pointed out in the policy paper they adopted to support
this strategy, the overall Allied war aim remained unconditional surrender.
This would provide the legal authority to execute the far-­ranging political
changes in Japan that were designed to assure that it never again posed a
threat to peace. As the JCS acknowledged, however, in some two thousand
years, no Japanese government had ever surrendered to a foreign power.
Moreover, throughout the entire course of the Pacific war, no Japanese unit
had ever surrendered. Thus, the JCS cautioned that there was no guarantee that the surrender of the Japanese government could be obtained, or
that, even if the Japanese government capitulated, Japanese armed forces
would comply with that surrender.5 Consequently, the JCS recognized
that the ultimate, dire situation the United States faced was not Operation
Downfall, the two-­phase initial invasion, but the absence of an organized
capitulation of Japan’s armed forces. In the latter case, the United States
would face the prospect of defeating in detail four to five million Japanese
men under arms in the home islands, on the Asian continent, and across
the Pacific Ocean. This made even the potential casualties in Downfall
only a down payment on the ultimate cost of the complete defeat of Japan.
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 9
12/18/15 12:44 PM
10
Richard B. Frank
President Harry S. Truman reviewed the invasion strategy in June
1945. He authorized Olympic—­the invasion of Kyushu—­but withheld
sanction for Coronet. American naval and ground commanders drafted
detailed plans for the invasion of Kyushu. All of these plans assumed a
significant American superiority in ground and air forces at the time of
the landings.6
Grand Strategy: Japanese
New Year’s Day 1945 found Japanese military and naval leaders sober but
resolute. Their entrenched attitudes toward their American adversaries had
remained constant since the summer of 1941; only their goals had altered.
These men had plunged Japan into war with only a rough idea as to how
it might end. None of them believed Japan could physically conquer the
United States, and no Japanese leader questioned the ability of the United
States to produce vast quantities of matériel. But they calculated that
America would be compelled to divert much of it to Europe to counter
Germany and Italy. The bedrock belief shared by almost all Imperial Army
officers and many Imperial Navy officers, however, was that Americans,
lacking the racial purity and spiritual stamina of the Japanese populace,
possessed only brittle morale. A lengthy war with increasing losses would
sap American will to see the war through and force American political
leaders to negotiate an end to the conflict on terms favorable to Japan.
Initially, those terms would include Japanese control of resource areas in
Southeast Asia and a bristling defense perimeter to protect them. By 1945,
Japanese militarists viewed the attainable terms as at least the preservation
of the homeland, with a political order in which their position remained
dominant. They also hoped that Japan might still retain important gains
on the Asian continent.7
Officers at Imperial Headquarters held a chillingly acute appreciation
of U.S. intentions. Americans lacked the patience for a protracted strategy
of blockade and bombardment; they therefore would surely seek to end the
war quickly by an invasion of the homeland.8 That aim presented an opportunity. If the initial assault could be repulsed, or even if its cost could just be
made prohibitive, Japan might yet extricate itself from the war with honor.
Thus, with this goal in mind, the emperor sanctioned a new strategic directive published on January 20 that candidly declared that the homeland itself
would be the arena for the “final decisive battle” of the war.9
Preparations for the defense of the homeland demanded new commands, plans, and forces. The Joint Army-­Navy Air Agreement of February
6 resolved the acrimonious issue of command of aviation units. This pro-
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 10
12/18/15 12:44 PM
Truman, Hiroshima, and the
Morality of the Atomic Bomb
Wilson D. Miscamble
Anniversaries of the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki have become occasions for moralizing condemnations of Harry
Truman’s decision to use the powerful weapons. The rush to judge Truman
harshly is largely based on either limited or inaccurate historical knowledge of the basis for his decision and of the situation he confronted. It
has been aided by the unfortunate influence of some poor and misleading
accounts of Truman’s actions written by Gar Alperovitz and other members of the so-­called atomic diplomacy school. These historians mistakenly
alleged that Truman proceeded to drop two atomic bombs on a Japan that
he knew was on the verge of surrender so as to intimidate the Soviet Union
in the already developing Cold War.1 This flawed interpretation has led its
proponents to deem the atomic attacks immoral. Yet, to reflect well on the
morality of the atomic bombs, one must comprehend the issues surrounding the necessity of the weapons in ending the terrible war.
Subsequent to using the atomic bombs, Harry Truman always maintained that he had taken the necessary action in order to end the war
quickly and to save American lives.2 He authorized the bombs against
what he took to be military-­industrial targets, and indeed, both Hiroshima
and Nagasaki were cities of industrial and military significance. A number of major military camps were located close to Hiroshima, including
the headquarters of Field Marshal Shunroka Hata’s Second General Army,
which commanded the defense of all of southern Japan. Hiroshima also
was a supply and logistics base for the Japanese military, a communications
48
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 48
12/18/15 12:44 PM
Truman, Hiroshima, and the Morality of the Atomic Bomb
49
center, and an assembly area for troops. Nagasaki was one of the largest
seaports in southern Japan, and was of great wartime importance because
of its wide-­ranging industrial activity, including the production of ordnance, ships, and military equipment. These were the targets that Truman
wanted to destroy. He did not deliberately seek the destruction of innocent
civilians, whom, it should be added, had been warned regularly to evacuate
Japanese industrial cities.
Key advisers endorsed the wisdom of Truman’s decision. Notably, in
the 1950s General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff during World
War II and the great “organizer of victory,” sat for a series of interviews
with his biographer Forrest C. Pogue. When asked about the necessity of
dropping the atomic bombs, Marshall replied, “I think it was quite necessary to drop the bombs in order to shorten the war.” He explained that
“what they [the Japanese] needed was shock action, and they got it. I think
it was very wise to use it.”3 Marshall took no pleasure in their use, but the
distinguished soldier-­statesman correctly understood that the two terrible
weapons had forced the Japanese surrender when it occurred.
By July of 1945 the Japanese had been subjected to months of devastating attacks by B-­29s. Their capital and other major cities had suffered
extensive damage, and the home islands were subjected to a naval blockade
that made food and fuel increasingly scarce. The Japanese military and
civilian losses had reached approximately three million, and there seemed
no end in sight. Despite all this, however, Japan’s leaders and especially
its military clung to notions of Ketsu-­Go (Decisive Battle), to the plan
that involved inflicting such punishment on the invader in defense of the
homeland that the invader would sue for terms. Even after Hiroshima,
Nagasaki, and the Soviet attack in Manchuria on August 8, the Japanese
military still wanted to pursue that desperate option, but Emperor Hirohito
broke the impasse in the Japanese government and ordered surrender. He
came to understand that the atomic bomb undermined “the fundamental
premise” of Ketsu-­Go “that the United States would have to invade Japan
to secure a decision” in the war.4 Ultimately the atomic bombs allowed the
emperor and the peace faction in the Japanese government to negotiate
an end to the war.5 George Marshall portrayed the matter correctly. The
atomic bombs brought an end to the war in the Pacific.
Writers engaging in wishful thinking and fanciful re-­creations have
sought to fashion circumstances in which the A-­bombs might be seen as
unnecessary (and then as almost certainly wrong and immoral). Yet the
painful reality that fair-­minded observers must concede is that Japan most
certainly would have fought on considerably longer unless the United
States and its allies had accepted major changes to its Potsdam surrender
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 49
12/18/15 12:44 PM
50
Wilson D. Miscamble
terms. “Those insisting that Japan’s surrender could have been procured
without recourse to atomic bombs,” Richard Frank noted, “cannot point
to any credible evidence from the eight men who effectively controlled
Japan’s destiny.”6 The Japanese scholar Sadao Asada made essentially the
same point in concluding that “given the intransigence of the Japanese
military, there were few ‘missed opportunities’ for earlier peace and that
the alternatives available to President Truman in the summer of 1945 were
limited.” 7 Of course, it is clear that the United States eventually could have
defeated Japan without the atomic bomb, but one must appreciate that all
the alternate scenarios to secure victory—­continued obliteration bombing
of Japanese cities and infrastructure, a choking blockade, the fearsome
invasions—­would have meant significantly greater Allied casualties as well
as much higher Japanese civilian and military casualties.8
Those who rush to condemn Truman’s decision to use the atomic
bombs must hesitate a little so as to appreciate that had he not authorized the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, thousands of American and
Allied soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen would have been added to
the lists of those killed in World War II. This would have included not
only those involved in the planned invasions of the home islands but also
American, British, and Australian ground forces in Southeast Asia and the
Southwest Pacific who expected to engage the Japanese in bloody fighting
in the months preceding such assaults. Added to their number would have
been the thousands of Allied prisoners of war whom the Japanese planned
to execute. Could an American president have survived politically and personally knowing that he might have used a weapon that could have avoided
their slaughter? To complicate further the rush to judgment, one must
acknowledge that Truman was most likely correct in March of 1958 when
he told Tsukasa Nitoguri, the chairman of the Hiroshima City Council,
that the A-­bombs prevented a quarter of a million Japanese deaths in an
invasion.9 Hard as it may be to accept when one sees the visual record of the
awful destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japanese losses probably
would have been substantially greater without the A-­bombs. Furthermore,
the atomic attacks changed the whole dynamic of the occupation of Japan.
Ironically, they facilitated a quick, easy surrender and a broadly cooperative populace in a way that no other method of military victory could have
guaranteed.
Moreover, the use of the awful weapons abruptly ended the death
and suffering of innocent third parties throughout Asia. Rather surprisingly, the enormous wartime losses of the Chinese, Koreans, Filipinos,
Vietnamese, and Javanese at the hands of the Japanese receive little attention in weighing the American effort to shock the Japanese into surrender.
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 50
12/18/15 12:44 PM
On President Truman’s Use of the
Atomic Bomb
Momentum, Timing, and General Groves
Robert S. Norris
The subdiscipline of President Truman’s decision to drop the atomic bomb
needs fundamental reexamination. This chapter is not concerned with the
traditional issues raised in the extensive literature about Truman’s decision.1 These include, among other things, the morality of its use, whether
it was necessary, and whether it was the first shot of the Cold War directed
toward the Soviet Union. Rather it focuses on whether there was any decision at all and whether the word “decision” is the appropriate word to
describe what happened, and concerns the timing of the bombings and the
role of General Leslie R. Groves, commanding general of the Manhattan
Engineer District (MED), or Manhattan Project.
The simple fact is that Truman never made a decision to use the atomic
bomb. He acquiesced in the decisions and actions of others, went with the
momentum of events that culminated in the bomb’s use, and only in retrospect, in interviews and in his memoir, did he put himself more decisively
directing the use of the bomb in July and August 1945, more involvement
than was actually the case.
Almost fifty years ago, two authors set out to write about the decision
to use the bomb. They came to this conclusion:
There seems no doubt that by noon on Sunday, July 22, the
decision had been made. What is not clear, what remains a
puzzle clouded by lack of documented evidence, the passing
62
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 62
12/18/15 12:44 PM
On President Truman’s Use of the Atomic Bomb
63
of years, the dimming of memories, is how that decision was
made. Was it even made at Potsdam? Or was it perhaps made
by not being made at all, by allowing the machinery already in
motion to continue in the direction and on the schedule that
had been set long before?2
We are no closer today to determining precisely how that decision was
made, or when it was made, and for good reason. Even to use the word
“decision” distorts the process by which the use of the bomb occurred.
“Decision” implies thought, analysis, and discussion about a range of possible courses of action, a weighing of alternatives, and then, after the deliberation of the pros and cons of each, a choice being made. Clearly this is
not what happened with regard to use of the atomic bomb.3 As General
Groves said,
One detail, and it seems to me just a detail, has been discussed
by writers of recent years who were familiar with the workings
of the project, and that was the directive for the actual use of
the weapon. They have seemed to think that there would be
a formal paper on which the President of the United States
wrote: “The bomb will be dropped on such and such a place
after such and such a date.” That is not the way it was done.4
Of the seventy-­some documents posted on a section of the Truman Library
website entitled “The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb,” not one contains any language by Truman authorizing the use of the bomb before
August 6, an odd omission.
Truman was not totally ignorant of the bomb even in the first few
days after Roosevelt’s death on April 12, 1945. After the first cabinet
meeting, on the evening he became president, Secretary of War Henry
Stimson asked to speak to Truman “about an immense project that was
underway—­a project looking to the development of a new explosive of
almost unbelievable destructive power.” The following day, Secretary of
State Jimmy Byrnes provided a few details “about perfecting an explosive
great enough to destroy the whole world.”5
On the morning of April 25, 1945, almost two weeks after Roosevelt’s
death, Secretary Stimson and General Groves went to the White House
to brief the president about the status of the bomb. Groves presented a
twenty-­five-­page memorandum, dated April 23, to the president. Truman
said he did not have time to read reports, but after some gentle urging,
read it in its entirety. The information was staggering in its scale; indeed,
the bomb’s far-­reaching implications for the future concerned no less a
matter than the very survival of modern civilization. After reading the
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 63
12/18/15 12:44 PM
64
Robert S. Norris
memo, Truman said he approved of what they had done; at no time did
he criticize the weapon itself or plans for its use. He asked some questions,
and as Groves noted later, “A great deal of emphasis was placed on foreign
relations and particularly on the Russian situation.”6
In the minds of responsible officials, bombing civilians and cities was
already routine. For many this was just a bigger bomb that was more efficient at doing its work. One plane and one bomb might do the job of
hundreds of planes and hundreds of bombs.
Conceivably, the war in the Pacific against Japan might have ended
before the atomic bomb was ready, as was the case in Europe. As it turned
out, one bomb was ready on the last day of July 1945 and a second one in
early August. They were used soon after when the weather allowed. The
weather over Japan during the first few days of August was overcast and
rainy. The attack plan called for visual acquisition of the target with no use
of radar. Finally, on August 4, the weather was improving and the next day
General Curtis LeMay gave the order for an attack on the sixth (Tinian
time). The plane took off at 2:45 a.m. on Monday, August 6, and dropped
the Little Boy bomb on Hiroshima at 9:15 a.m. (8:15 a.m. Hiroshima time).
It was largely through the administrative and managerial skills of
General Groves that the bombs were finished when they were. While it is
easy to imagine how it could have taken longer, it is hard to see how the
feat could have been accomplished any more quickly.
It was clear from the outset that when there was enough material for
a bomb it would be used soon afterwards. Why research, develop, and
test a weapon if it was not intended to be used in war? As stated in the
Manhattan District History,
Reduced to its simplest terms, the mission of the Manhattan
District was to develop and manufacture atomic bombs for
combat use, at the earliest possible date, and ahead of the enemy, in order to help the United States and its Allies bring
World War II to a successful conclusion with the least delay
and the greatest possible conservation of life.7
In an amazing coincidence, a bomb’s worth of highly enriched uranium (HEU) (62 kilograms of HEU) and six kilograms of plutonium, for
two quite different bomb designs, were ready on almost the same day. It
could have turned out differently. For example, had the schedule been left
to DuPont, the contractor at Hanford, plutonium for a test bomb would
not have been ready until mid-­October and a combat-­ready bomb not
ready until mid-­November or later; had that been the case, the postwar
geopolitical situation would have been quite different.
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 64
12/18/15 12:44 PM
Harry S. Truman and the Origins
of the Nuclear Arms Race
Martin V. Melosi
The nuclear arms race began with the Manhattan Project in World War
II. The determination of the United States to beat Nazi Germany in developing an atomic bomb was the impetus. When the United States accomplished that task first, circumstances changed and so did the goals. More
than six months prior to the surrender of Germany on May 8, 1945, the
Allies knew that the Third Reich had not developed a bomb.1 The possible
use of the new weapon on Japan introduced different and weightier goals
than simply getting to the finish line ahead of Germany. President Harry
S. Truman and his advisers made a decision in the heat of battle to up the
ante in destructiveness of the war, and to quickly end the conflict that
engulfed the world. Such a choice had impacts well beyond the fatal days
in August when inhabitants of Hiroshima and Nagasaki became the first
casualties of a new kind of total war. The bombings and their aftermath
redefined the prosecution of war and the definitions of vulnerability and
security for all people.
Whether contemporaries realized it or not, the Trinity detonation—­
the first test of a plutonium bomb on July 16, 1945—­was a dividing line
in history. Scientific theory became physical reality. For many years the
National Park Service hoped to make the Trinity site into a national monument, but resistance came from government officials concerned about
security or questions of health and safety. The area was designated as a
National Historic Landmark in 1965 but was open to the public only twice
a year. Trinity became one of the first “nuclear landscapes” in the late
76
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 76
12/18/15 12:44 PM
Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the Nuclear Arms Race
77
twentieth century. For historian Ferenc Szasz, “What happened at Trinity
that Monday morning must go down as one of the most significant events
in the last thousand years.”2
Other choices and decisions of the Truman administration, aside
from stockpiling atomic bombs and using them in war, helped define their
tactical and strategic role in the American arsenal and how that related
to American postwar association with a new rival, the Soviet Union. The
Truman administration left a legacy for the nuclear arms race that established a baseline moving forward into future generations. Between the
Potsdam Conference in 1945 and the Sputnik launch in 1957, the Truman
administration helped define and shape the nuclear arms race (along with
their Soviet counterparts) in its early years especially. Key stages that set
precedents for the nuclear arms race include (1) Truman’s mention of the
Trinity test to Joseph Stalin at Potsdam; (2) the postwar debate over the
U.S. nuclear monopoly; (3) the Soviets’ successful test of an A-­bomb in
1949; (4) the establishment of U.S. containment policy and its initial
nuclear strategy; (5) Truman’s decision to develop the H-­bomb and the
first test in 1952 (possibly the single most important decision in the arms
race); (6) the role, or lack thereof, of atomic weapons in the Korean conflict; and (7) Dwight Eisenhower’s New Look policy and its relationship to
Truman-­era nuclear strategy. The Soviet launch of Sputnik in 1957 was the
symbolic beginning of a sea change in delivering nuclear warheads—­from
bombers to missiles. Such a dramatic shift altered the nature of nuclear
warfare in levels of destructiveness, in geographic range, and particularly
in time of delivery. The contributions of the Truman administration to the
nuclear arms race faded as a radically new phase emerged, focusing on new
strategies, a new scale, and style of defense.
Truman’s First Encounters with the Bomb
The Manhattan Project scientists concluded their work in July 1945. At
that point, the atomic bomb, and the crucial decisions about it, passed into
the hands of politicians and the military. For General Leslie R. Groves,
who headed the project, the most important duty was to notify President
Truman about the successful detonation and to apprise him about the
delivery of bombs to the war front. On April 12, 1945, President Franklin
Roosevelt had died, leaving his relatively inexperienced vice president in
charge of the American war effort. The former U.S. senator from Missouri
was FDR’s third vice president, and had held that position less than three
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 77
12/18/15 12:44 PM
78
Martin V. Melosi
months when he was elevated to the country’s highest office. In fact, not
until Roosevelt’s death did anyone inform Truman of the exact nature of
the work of the Manhattan Project.3 Less than a month later, on May 8,
German Admiral Karl Donitz signed the unconditional surrender documents ending World War II in Europe. One day after the Trinity test,
Truman arrived in Potsdam, Germany, to meet with Soviet leader Joseph
Stalin and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. The chief item on
the agenda for the United States was the Pacific war against Japan.
Truman had agreed to meet with the Allied leaders on July 1, and the
White House was pressuring Groves to arrange for the test of the plutonium bomb as quickly as possible. The president had been reluctant, and
even nervous, to confer with the more seasoned leaders, who might be
able to grab control of events leading up to the end of the war. Truman
clearly wanted the leverage of a successful test to bolster U.S. bargaining power before meeting with Stalin and Churchill, and thus postponed
the conference until the Trinity test could be scheduled. Even with that
strategy in place, he arrived in Germany determined to coax the Soviets
into participating in the defeat of Japan.4 In Truman’s first meeting with
Stalin on July 17, the Soviet leader pledged to have his country enter the
Pacific war on August 15. The president was relieved and presumed that he
had achieved his primary goal. He believed that the Soviet promise, along
with the availability of the atomic bomb, would secure a victory over the
Japanese. Truman’s view of the bomb, however, grew more ambivalent as
the conference proceeded. The new president was enthusiastic about the
achievement, but also noted in his diary that “It seems to be the most terrible thing ever discovered, but it can be made the most useful.”5
When the details of the Trinity test arrived in Potsdam, Truman
appeared self-­assured and more aggressive in dealing with his fellow leaders. Churchill later recalled that after the U.S. president read Groves’s full
report on the test he was a “changed man.” The prime minister received a
full description of the Trinity test on July 22, and he enthusiastically noted
that the atomic bomb was “the Second Coming in wrath.” As a savvy
realist, Churchill also viewed it as a potentially effective tool against future
Soviet ambitions in the Far East and elsewhere.6 Truman did not tell his
Soviet ally about the atomic bomb until July 24. Stalin openly reacted
almost indifferently to the disclosure, but privately he was very troubled
about the American advances in atomic energy and the possibility that its
use of the bomb would limit his country’s options in Asia. Stalin’s lack of
surprise was a result of Soviet spying within the Manhattan Project and
related ventures in England and Canada well in advance of Potsdam. At
least since 1940, Stalin had pushed the Soviets to develop their own bomb,
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 78
12/18/15 12:44 PM
Radioisotopes as Political
Instruments from Truman to
Eisenhower
Angela N. H. Creager
In the initial years of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC),
radioisotopes—­produced and distributed by the agency for civilian use—­
became political instruments in struggles over the control of the atom. Even
as the atomic bomb became the currency of the Cold War, radioisotopes
represented the U.S. government’s efforts to harness the power of the atom
for peace. In this respect, radioisotopes were promotional tools of a new
agency seeking to legitimate its civilian status. By the same token, politicians and journalists critical of the AEC (and of its chair, David Lilienthal)
inflamed anxieties that the circulation of isotopes beyond the country’s
borders would undermine national security. These concerns resulted in a
yearlong embargo on AEC-­produced isotopes to foreign institutions, and
continued to reverberate in congressional politics and the national press
into the early 1950s. In short, the nationalization of radioisotopes resulted
in their politicization.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was aimed at protecting or at least
prolonging the American atomic monopoly; to this end it prohibited the
export of “fissionable” materials. At the same time, the bill charged the
new agency with promoting civilian uses of atomic energy, authorizing
the distribution of reactor “byproduct materials” (namely, radioisotopes)
for peaceful uses.1 Since the 1930s, the development of medical therapies
and diagnostic tools with radioisotopes had led to great demand for these
108
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 108
12/18/15 12:44 PM
Radioisotopes as Political Instruments From Truman to Eisenhower
109
materials, but the cyclotrons that produced them could not keep pace with
demand. Nuclear reactors, first constructed to generate material for atomic
weapons, could. Leaders of the Manhattan Project decided that reactor-­
produced radioisotopes would be available for civilian institutions to purchase. Their announcement referred to “national distribution,” and there
was also a general assumption that domestic needs were to be filled first.2
Foreign purchasers were not simply at the back of the line; they could not
purchase the AEC’s isotopes at all. As one physicist reported at the end of
1946, “Although no one in this country knows of any regulations against
sending isotopes to foreign users, the conviction is wide spread abroad that
scientists in this country are unwilling to share their materials.”3 Access to
the bountiful radioisotopes generated by the former bomb project infrastructure was entangled in the politics of national security, in which the
ideals of internationalism in science vied with American suspicions of
communists abroad.4
Restrictions against sending radioisotopes abroad did not come from
the leadership of the Manhattan Project; the U.S. Army was inclined to
share the fruits of government reactors, at least with British and Canadian
wartime collaborators. The Truman administration, however, took a dim
view of the prospect of continuing any nuclear exchanges after the war.
In the summer of 1947, the issue of foreign distribution came to a head
among the five AEC commissioners, who voted—­without achieving unanimity—­to allow export. They justified their decision by appealing to the
Marshall Plan, not Anglo-­A merican military cooperation. In announcing
the program, President Harry S. Truman spoke of the foreign shipments
as securing “greater international cooperation in the field of medical and
biological research.”5 The first shipments of radioisotopes reached foreign
hospitals and laboratories in the fall of 1947.
As the Cold War intensified, conservative watchdogs of the AEC
monitored the agency’s foreign radioisotope shipments with suspicion.
In 1949, they alleged that shipments of isotopes to Norway and Finland
were undermining national security. The commission never altered its policy—­in fact, the agency expanded the purview of exports to include industrial shipments in the early 1950s—­but these shipments were featured in
1949 congressional investigative hearings of the agency as purported evidence of the AEC’s lax oversight. Just a few months later, the explosion of
the first Soviet atomic bomb shattered any illusions that the U.S. could
maintain its nuclear monopoly.6 In addition, the governments of Britain
and Canada began selling radioisotopes to foreign purchasers, with fewer
restrictions than the AEC. U.S. policy based on denying radioactive materials and nuclear technology to other nations had become pointless. In
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 109
12/18/15 12:44 PM
110
Angela N. H. Creager
the early 1950s, President Dwight D. Eisenhower took a new approach to
American nuclear supremacy in his Atoms for Peace program, shifting the
emphasis from guarding secrets to sharing technology. His depiction of
radioisotopes as tools of international diplomacy, in conjunction with 1954
revisions to the Atomic Energy Act permitting greater (though controlled)
access to nuclear materials and technology, finally quelled suspicions about
foreign shipments.7
Two features of the politicization of radioisotopes in the immediate
postwar years stand out. First is a recurrent symbolism that divided civilian uses from military uses along disciplinary lines, with biomedicine perceived as inherently civilian and physics and engineering as military. The
popular perception that nuclear physics research was unavoidably related
to atomic weapons development led the AEC to prioritize medical therapy and biological research in the export program, which the agency represented as a humanitarian endeavor.8 Nonetheless, a few shipments to
foreign physical scientists, especially those to countries in Russia’s sphere
of influence, alarmed the agency’s congressional critics. They alleged that
these radioisotopes could end up in the hands of Soviet government to
further military developments, undermining American national security. Second (and related), critics of these shipments, including dissenting
Commissioner Lewis Strauss, insinuated that the sharing of nuclear materials in the form of isotopes was equivalent to the dissemination of nuclear
information to foreign powers in a way prohibited under the 1946 Atomic
Energy Act. Conservatives used anxieties about the loss of the country’s
nuclear secrets to denounce the international circulation of the AEC’s
radioisotopes.
The Politics of Foreign Distribution of
“American” Isotopes
From the fall of 1945 to the spring of 1946, legislation over atomic
energy stalled in Congress. One of the sticking points concerned the
level of scientific and technical exchange that the U.S. would have with
its former allies.9 President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister
Winston Churchill had negotiated the so-­called Quebec Agreement in
1943, enabling exchanges of technical information among the American,
British, and Canadian participants in the bomb project.10 The British government hoped to continue Anglo-­A merican cooperation in the postwar
period. Truman’s administration, however, viewed the sharing of technical
information as antithetical to the American aim of maintaining a nuclear
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 110
12/18/15 12:44 PM
Triumph and Trouble in the First
Temple of the Atom
The Atomic Energy Commission and the Raleigh
Research Reactor
Thomas R. Wellock
In April 1950, the acting president of the University of North Carolina
system sent a novel proposal to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC),
one that he hoped would overcome the South’s uninspiring academic
history. “All too long,” he wrote, “the South has been laggard in its
participation in and contribution to scientific developments. Some of
us connected with universities and colleges in this area are determined
to correct this situation.” He requested permission to build a research
reactor at the campus of North Carolina State College of Agriculture
and Engineering (NC State) in Raleigh. NC State intended to use it for
radiation research and as the foundation for the nation’s first nuclear
engineering program. It would be the world’s first reactor not under the
control of a national government.1
NC State’s bid to build a research reactor was audacious. It was a
relatively unknown and little-­regarded technical school from a southern state so impoverished that mules were still the chief source of farm
power.2 The AEC considered the technical competence of southern universities as so weak that Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee
established on-­
site training schools for its staff rather than rely on
regional education programs.3 At the federal level, NC State faced many
obstacles. The technical information it needed was still classified, and
the AEC had no system to review the application or to offer financial assistance. Nevertheless, the “Raleigh Research Reactor” achieved a sustained
146
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 146
12/18/15 12:44 PM
Triumph and Trouble in the First Temple of the Atom
147
chain reaction in September 1953 and set off an educational chain reaction
as dozens of colleges scrambled to get their own reactor.4
NC State achieved this coup because its proposal helped fulfill
the goals of officials in the Truman administration to promote civilian
nuclear energy. It also received strong backing from southern politicians
and academics anxious to transcend a backward past. The Raleigh reactor project opened a new market for university research reactors and
provided a rationale to declassify atomic secrets just when the Soviets’
successful detonation of a fission bomb threatened to derail the drive to
“free the atom” for civilian applications. It spurred interest in research
reactors around the world, served as an important tool in the Atoms for
Peace program, and set several precedents for the AEC’s approach to
civilian reactor regulation. In tapping the expertise of the AEC’s national
laboratories, NC State showed how federal support could lift southern
higher education out of its doldrums and reorient part of its economy
toward high technology industries.
The Raleigh reactor is also a cautionary tale. It foreshadowed the
AEC’s later dilemma of how to execute a conflicting mission of promoting
nuclear energy uses while striving to be an independent safety regulator.
Eager to encourage reactor development, the AEC cleared many obstacles
for the Raleigh reactor. It expended considerable effort to ensure that the
reactor had a safe design, but it provided limited guidance on operational
safety. Designed and operated by NC State’s faculty in their free time,
reactor construction and operation required substantially more effort than
initially recognized. Controversial leadership in the physics department
created tensions among the faculty that erupted into conflict when radioactive leaks in the reactor were discovered in 1955. The conflict ended
when the reactor director resigned. NC State discovered that even a small
reactor demanded considerable attention to safety, adherence to procedures, and investment in staffing.
Postwar North Carolina—­Growth and
Ambition to Leave an Agricultural Past
The proposal to build a research reactor at NC State emerged from the
forces that were remaking the postwar southern economy. Defense spending during World War II had disproportionately stimulated the economies of the South and West, but economic development was uneven, of
low quality, and had not yet stemmed the exodus of southerners from
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 147
12/18/15 12:44 PM
148
Thomas R. Wellock
the region. The South’s growth was mostly in its traditional lower-­skilled
industries even in North Carolina, the manufacturing powerhouse of the
region. In 1948, for the first time more people in the Tar Heel State worked
in industry than agriculture, but these low-­paying jobs did not raise the
standard of living. North Carolina had the third lowest per capita income
in the nation.5
Higher education in the Tar Heel State was a similar mix of backwardness and progress. Like many public university systems, North Carolina’s
looked to aid in the state’s economic modernization, but it started far
behind higher education in the Northeast, Midwest, and West. UNC’s
acting president was not exaggerating when he lamented the “scientific
poverty” of his state. In the decades prior to World War II, even the main
campus at Chapel Hill could boast of graduating few notable scholars in
the sciences. The region imported its scholarly talent, and southerners typically headed north to get their graduate degrees.6
At NC State, North Carolina’s industrial growth represented an
opportunity to step out from the shadow of Chapel Hill as a research institution in its own right. In 1933, the state had consolidated engineering
programs at the Raleigh campus, and UNC’s president spoke of turning
the college into “the MIT of the South.” In reality, NC State and most
other technical schools in the South were dominated by a “shop culture”
that focused on providing foremen to local industry rather than engineers
with analytical design skills. There was little research done by faculty, and
the college did not begin awarding PhDs until 1948.
By the end of World War II, NC State’s administration saw an opportunity for the engineering college. In 1944, the governor and industry
leaders established an engineering fund to raise the salary of engineering
faculty. Harold Lampe, the new dean of the engineering college, concluded that an upgraded physics department was essential to developing
graduate programs in the college. He needed a new department chair with
“industrial physics experience” who could focus the department on practical research.7
Lampe’s search for the right person took him to Oak Ridge—­the
most industrially oriented of the national laboratories and fittingly run
by Union Carbide Corporation. In the spring of 1949, he landed Clifford
Beck, the director of the laboratory at the K-­25 gaseous diffusion plant. A
North Carolina native with a doctorate from Chapel Hill, Beck brought to
NC State an entrepreneurial recognition that by doing good for the AEC,
the college could do well.8 Beck’s idea to create a nuclear engineering program and build a research reactor offered three things the AEC wanted:
to spur civilian reactor construction, to produce nuclear engineering grad-
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 148
12/18/15 12:44 PM
The Decision to Drop the Bomb
and Truman’s Nuclear Legacy
Concluding Remarks
William Lanouette
The essays in this volume have all profoundly advanced our understanding
of two important, and still contentious, historical topics: the decision to
drop the bomb, and Harry S. Truman’s nuclear legacy. In making some
concluding remarks, what first comes to mind is that sign on President
Truman’s Oval Office desk—­“The Buck Stops Here!”—­because in this
volume, I have the last word. Rather than attempting to summarize the
essays in this volume, instead I hope to highlight some noteworthy perspectives about these two critical topics.
I’m grateful to have spent some time in Hungary doing research for my
biography of the physicist, biologist, and arms-­control activist Leo Szilard.1
Why? Well, as Hungarian historians like to say about their country’s political history, “The past is less certain than the future.” On the subject of
Truman’s nuclear legacy, our history is constantly rewritten, reinterpreted,
and rediscovered, and our understanding of the past continues to deepen
with research and reflection.
President Truman loved reading history, but seemed uncomfortable
about the way he was later said to have made it. Beginning in 1945, he first
took proud credit for having used A-­bombs on Japanese cities at the end
of World War II. But as scholars in this text have noted, within days after
Hiroshima and Nagasaki were leveled Truman was also disturbed, ambivalent, and conflicted—­first about what had just happened, then about his
own role in these historic events.
178
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 178
12/18/15 12:44 PM
The Decision to Drop the Bomb and Truman’s Nuclear Legacy
179
I have long wondered about Truman’s A-­bomb role, seeking to know
how and why those bombs leveled two cities. Popular history and Truman’s
own claims clearly credit him with the “decision” to drop two A-­bombs
on the Japanese. Sometimes anniversaries help us take stock of our own
history and in 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
raised and redefined decades of controversy. To mark that milestone, the
Library of Congress magazine Civilization convened a roundtable discussion of historians with wideranging views about “Why We Dropped the
Bomb.” And, after hours of discourse, we agreed on five major reasons for
why A-­bombs were used on Hiroshima—­and then on Nagasaki. It’s no
surprise that the authors in this text raised those same reasons.2
1. To end the fighting quickly. The United States and the Allies
were war-­weary by the summer of 1945. Victory won against Italy
and Germany in Europe still eluded them in the Pacific. Against
the vicious and determined Japanese, anything was worth a try
just to stop the fighting.
2. Postwar diplomacy. Truman’s new secretary of state, James F.
Byrnes, and some military leaders saw the awesome weapon as
a way to make the Soviet Union “more manageable”—­first, by
using the bomb to end the Pacific war before Soviet leader Joseph
Stalin had promised to join it in mid-­August; second, by countering political gains the Soviets had already made in Eastern
Europe.
3. Bureaucratic momentum. Fearing that Germany was working
on an A-­bomb, President Franklin D. Roosevelt began America’s
research in 1939, and he agreed to make it a high-­priority project just before Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.
This initiative became the Manhattan Project, a secret $2 billion
effort—­worth more than $20 billion today. In the end, the commitment to build the bomb produced a powerful impulse to use it.
4. Political justification. The impulse to use the bomb came also
from American military and civilian leaders to justify all that
was spent without Congress’s knowledge or approval. As one War
Department aide said, “If this thing works, they won’t investigate
anything and if it doesn’t work . . . they won’t investigate anything else.” Truman himself made this point on August 6 when
he declared, “We have spent two billion dollars on the greatest
scientific gamble in history—­we won.”3
5. Psychological factors. After four bloody years of war, Americans
in high office were eager to crush Japan and bring the boys home.
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 179
12/18/15 12:44 PM
180
William Lanouette
Public feeling was running so high against the Japanese and their
barbaric wartime behavior that many American leaders were in no
mood to take any additional casualties. In the eyes of war-­weary
Americans, the enemy had become merely “Japs” who needed to
be blasted and burned out of island caves and firebombed nightly
in their homes.
The Civilization panel agreed on these five reasons, but most historians
continue to argue about which of these reasons might have been dominant, or perhaps even decisive, at the time. Yet few dispute they were all
influential.
But there is something missing from the historians’ list of five reasons.
And that missing reason is the one that today we hear most often to explain
those two atomic bombings: to save American and Japanese lives and casualties from an Allied invasion. Why didn’t historians in 1995 consider an
invasion as a major factor, and why does it have even less importance today?
As Sam Walker and others noted, when those first A-­bombs fell in early
August 1945, the need for a costly invasion seemed possible, but not inevitable. America’s leaders knew something the American public didn’t: Stalin
had promised President Roosevelt, at the February Yalta Conference. that
the Soviet Union would declare war on Japan and join the Allies three
months after Germany surrendered. Germany surrendered on May 8,
meaning that Stalin would likely break his neutrality pact with Japan (well
before it was to expire in the spring of 1946) and attack in mid-­August.
Stalin confirmed with Truman this intention and the timetable
to attack Japan at their Big Three meeting with British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill at Potsdam in July 1945. Allied invasions weren’t
planned for Japan’s south island of Kyushu until November 1945, and
for the main island of Honshu until March 1946, giving Truman the
confidence that once Stalin attacked Japan, the war in the Pacific could
have ended well before then. In fact, at Potsdam after Stalin assured
Truman he would declare war on Japan as promised, Truman jotted in
his diary, “Fini Japs.”4
Thus, as we weigh the pros and cons of the atomic bombings today,
it is worth recalling that in the summer of 1945, an invasion of Japan was
a possibility but not an either/or alternative that many today consider it
to be. One reason for the public’s continued misunderstanding of this
point is the difference in knowledge within the military chain of command: between the very bottom and the very top. At the bottom, soldiers
in the trenches and aboard troop ships sailing to the Pacific only knew
that to finally defeat Japan it would likely take both a naval blockade
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 180
12/18/15 12:44 PM
Nuclear Energy and the
Legacy of Harry S. Truman
A Graphic Essay
Randy Sowell
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 193
12/18/15 12:44 PM
194
Randy Sowell
President Harry S. Truman was at the Potsdam Conference in Germany
when he learned of the successful test of the atomic bomb on July 16, 1945.
His diary entry of July 25 reflects his mixed emotions on the occasion.
Deeply troubled by the creation of “this terrible bomb” and its implications
for humanity, Truman was also hopeful that it could bring an early end to
the war against Japan, and grateful that Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union
had not developed the bomb first. Insisting that the weapon would not be
used against “the old Capitol or the new” (Japan’s historical capital, Kyoto,
or its modern capital, Tokyo), the president also expressed his intention that
“military objectives and soldiers and sailors” would be targeted, “not women
and children”—a desire completely inconsistent with the actual destructive
power of the atomic bomb. (President Truman’s Diary Entry, July 25, 1945,
President’s Secretary’s Files, Truman Papers, Truman Library)
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 194
12/18/15 12:44 PM
Nuclear Energy and the Legacy of Harry S. Truman: A Graphic Essay
195
On July 30, 1945, Secretary of War Henry Stimson sent War Department
Telegram No. 41011 to President Truman, who was still attending the Potsdam Conference in Germany. With preparations for use of the atomic bomb
against Japan almost completed, Stimson sought the president’s approval of
a White House statement announcing that the bomb had been dropped on
a Japanese city. That statement—the first public announcement of the existence of the Manhattan Project—had been carefully drafted over a period
of weeks. Truman turned Stimson’s telegram over and wrote his reply, seen
here, on the back. The phrase “release when ready” in his reply did not refer
to the bomb itself, but to the statement announcing its use against Japan.
Truman also specified that no action be taken until August 2, the day the
Potsdam Conference ended. (Message from President Truman to Secretary
of War Henry Stimson, ca. July 30, 1945, George M. Elsey Papers, Truman
Library)
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 195
12/18/15 12:44 PM
Contributors
Angela N. H. Creager is the author of Life Atomic: A History of
Radioisotopes in Science and Medicine (University of Chicago Press, 2013)
and other books on the history of science. She is Thomas M. Seibel
Professor in the History of Science at Princeton University.
Richard B. Frank is the author of Downfall: The End of the Imperial
Japanese Empire (Random House, 1999) and other books on the history
of World War II. He received the Harry S. Truman Book Award in 2000
for Downfall.
William Lanouette is the author of Genius in the Shadows: A
Biography of Leo Szilard, The Man Behind the Bomb (Scribner’s, 1992;
reprint, Skyhorse Publishing, 2013). He has written on nuclear weapons
and nuclear power for a wide variety of popular and scholarly publications.
Martin V. Melosi is the author of Atomic Age America (Pearson, 2013).
He has published a long list of books and received several prizes for his
work on environmental, urban, technological, and diplomatic history. He
is a professor of history at the University of Houston.
Wilson D. Miscamble is the author of The Most Controversial Decision:
Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan (Cambridge University
Press, 2011) and two other books on the Truman era that each received
the Harry S. Truman Book Award. He is a professor of history at the
University of Notre Dame.
Robert Standish Norris is the author of Racing for the Bomb: General
Leslie R. Groves, The Manhattan Project’s Indispensable Man (Steerforth
213
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 213
12/18/15 12:44 PM
214
About the Authors
Press, 2002), and other books on nuclear weapons. He has applied his
expertise on nuclear weapons in positions with the Natural Resources
Defense Council and the Federation of American Scientists.
Randy Sowell is an archivist at the Harry S. Truman Library. He
is a graduate of Wichita State University (BA, 1980; MA, 1985) and the
University of Kansas (PhD, 1992).
J. Samuel Walker is a prize-­winning historian and author of several
books on the history of nuclear energy. They include Prompt and Utter
Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs against Japan, rev. ed.
(University of North Carolina Press, 2004) and Three Mile Island: A
Nuclear Crisis in Historical Perspective (University of California Press,
2004).
Thomas R. Wellock is the author of Critical Masses: Opposition to
Nuclear Power in California, 1958–­1978 (University of Wisconsin Press,
1998) and important articles on the history of nuclear power safety. He is
the historian of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 214
12/18/15 12:44 PM
Index
Page references in italics indicate illustrations, and t indicates a table.
A
Academy of Sciences, USSR, 82
Acheson, Dean, 54, 90, 200, 210
actinium-­227 isotopes, 120
Aebersold, Paul, 112, 115, 121, 129,
137n43
Air Force, U.S.
nuclear capsules transferred (1951) to,
91
nuclear-­armed bombers and, 187
as postwar military offensive arm, 85
postwar war planning by, 86
target choices and, 70
air power, Japanese
for Ketsu-­Go on Kyushu, 22–­23
for suicide attacks, 16, 24
Allen, Louis, 36
Allies
on atomic bomb use in World War II,
51–­52
Krige on U.S. strategic goals for Atoms
for Peace and, 173–­74n36
Alperovitz, Gar, 47n88, 48
Amano Masakazu, 21
American magazine, 113
American Nuclear Society, 160
Amersham, 127, 144n136
Ames Laboratory, Iowa State College consultants, Raleigh reactor review by,
164–­65
Anami Korechika, 21–­22, 28, 32, 37, 43n40
Anscombe, Elizabeth, 56–­57
Arao Okikatsu, 43n40
Area Special Policing Units, Japanese, 17–­18
Argentina, civilian nuclear technology in,
119, 129
Argonne National Laboratory, 122, 150,
151, 154, 155
Arisue Seizo, 21, 41n21, 43n39
Army, U.S., 9, 86. See also Manhattan Engineer District
Army Air Forces, U.S., 66, 68–­69
Army Battle Casualties, 42n35
Army Strategic Air Forces, U.S., 69
Arnold, Henry H., 67, 70
Asada, Sadao, 50, 183
Ashworth, Frederick L., 68
atomic bomb
as diplomatic weapon against Soviets,
103n14
doubts among creators of, 183
Korean conflict and, 90–­91
Soviet testing, 77, 82, 125, 152
Soviet testing, U.S. radioisotopes and,
109
stockpiles, 86, 90, 96, 128
thermonuclear devices vs., 105n50
atomic bombing of Japan
competing interpretations for, 3–­5
deaths prevented by, 50–­51
Japanese overseas commanders and, 35–­
36, 47n90
major reasons for, 179–­80
Marshall and Nimitz on Operation
Olympic and, 27
redefining prosecution of war, 76
atomic diplomacy school, 48. See also diplomacy, atomic bomb and
215
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 215
12/18/15 12:44 PM
216
Index
Atomic Energy Act (1946)
AEC proposes amendment (1950) to,
142n120
on information with other nations, 123,
124
literal reading of, NC State reactor and,
153–­55
national security policy and, 149
provisions, 135n11
purpose for, 108
Truman signing, 201
Atomic Energy Act (1954), 110, 128, 161,
166, 177n72
Atomic Energy Authority, Baruch Plan for,
81
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
atomic energy development export controls and, 120–­21
on authority for radioisotope exports
and, 142n120
Beck joins, 165
civilian uses for nuclear power and,
150–­51
composition of, 192n16
declassification guide, 158–­59
declassifying NC State reactor and,
154–­55
Eisenhower on civilian control of, 93
on foreign vs. domestic isotope purchases, 118–­19
on H-­bomb development, 88–­89, 207–­9
isotope mission to South America and,
129
nuclear engineering programs and,
165–­66
on peaceful uses, 6–­7
Power Demonstration Reactor Program,
161
on radioisotope exports, 109, 126
radioisotope exports discussions by,
114–­16
radioisotopes for civilian use and, 111–­
12
on radioisotopes in early years of, 108
Raleigh reactor and conflicting mission
of, 147
Raleigh reactor approval by, 158, 166–­
67
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 216
Raleigh reactor leak and, 175n54
Raleigh reactor oversight and, 164
Raleigh reactor policy changes by, 153–­
55
Raleigh reactor repairs and, 166, 176n70
reactor operator credentials and, 177n72
Reactor Safeguard Committee, 155–­58
reporting requirement of, 126, 143n127
secrecy of, 7, 154, 189
votes on radioisotope export proposal by,
116–­17
See also General Advisory Committee
Atoms for Peace
Beck and, 160
civilian nuclear power and, 144n146,
144n148, 188
Krige on U.S. strategic goals for, 173–­
74n36
in Latin American countries, 145n157
radioisotopes and, 110, 127–­29
Raleigh research reactor and, 147, 165–­
68
Atsugi Airfield, revolt at, 34
Austin, Warren, 201
Australia
atomic bombing of Japan and, 50
radioisotope exports to, 119
Axis nations, unconditional surrender of, 8
B
B-­29 bombers, 49, 91
B-­52 bombers, 95
Bacher, Robert F., 111–­12, 136n16
Baruch, Bernard M., 81, 118
Baruch Plan, 81, 202
Bataan death march, 67, 75n19
Beck, Clifford
declassifying NC State reactor and,
154–­55
Murray on reactor repair and credibility
of, 163–­64
on purchasing a reactor, 176n62
radioactive leak in reactor and, 162
reactor design and, 158, 159
reactor project and fame for, 159–­60
reactor selection by, 157
12/18/15 12:44 PM
on reactor supervisors at universities,
167–­68
resignation of, 165
on training foreign students in reactor
technology, 160–­61
Belgium, reactor project in, 125–­26
Berkeley Rad Lab, 116
Berlin blockade crisis (1948), 53, 54
Beyar, Celal, 160
Bikini Atoll, testing near, 81
biomedicine, radioisotopes for, 110, 116,
138n45
Bissell, Clayton, 27, 45n59
Bix, Herbert P., 47n88, 55
Blakeslee, Edward, 159
Bockscar, Groves on atomic bomb use and,
68
Bohr, Niels, 115
bomb shelters, U.S., 98
bomber gap, 96
boron-­10 isotopes, 120
Brazil, isotope mission to, 129
breeder reactors, 188
Brereton, Lewis H., 118
Britain
on atomic bomb use, 51–­52
ground forces of, atomic bombing of
Japan and, 50
Quebec Agreement (1943) and, 110
radioisotope exports by, 127
radioisotope exports to, 109, 119, 125
radioisotope pricing for export and,
126–­27, 144n136
See also Churchill, Winston; Harwell;
United Kingdom
Brookhaven National Laboratory, 151,
173n33
Bundy, McGeorge, 182
Bush, Vannevar, 185
Butow, Robert, 28
Byrnes, James F.
atomic bombing of Japan and, 182
intelligence to Truman at Potsdam and,
44n46
on Soviets and atomic bomb, 79, 179
Truman learning of the bomb and, 63
as Truman mentor, 183–­84
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 217
Index
217
C
California Institute of Technology, 150–­51,
152, 153
Canada
medical isotope production and, 188
Quebec Agreement (1943) and, 110
radioisotope exports by, 125, 126–­27,
143n124, 144n136
radioisotope exports to, 109
Technical Cooperation Program and,
120
See also Chalk River
carbon-­14 isotopes, 116, 120
Casablanca Conference (1943), 8
catastrophic failure, NC State reactor design
and, 157
Cate, James, 69
Cavendish cyclotron, 115
Cavert, Samuel McCrea, 52
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 85
chain of command, 68–­69, 71
Chalk River (Canadian atomic energy installation), 111, 112, 117, 120
Chernobyl, reactor runaway hazard and, 157
China
atomic bombs and Japanese war on,
50–­51
Hirohito on new offensive in, 30
Japanese overseas commanders in, Soviets and, 35
U.S. atomic bomb use in Korea and, 91
China Expeditionary Army, 34
Christy, Robert, 74n8
Churchill, Winston
on atomic bomb political tool, 81
on atomic bomb use, 54
on postwar deterrence, 87
Potsdam summit and, 78
Quebec Agreement (1943) and, 110
World War II as total war and, 55
Civil Defense Administration, 98
civilian nuclear power
development of, 3
Soviet atomic bomb testing and, 7
state of (1949), 149–­53, 172n10
Truman encouraging atomic energy for,
53–­54
12/18/15 12:44 PM
218
Index
civilian nuclear power, continued
See also North Carolina State College of
Agriculture and Engineering; radioisotopes; Raleigh research reactor
civilians, Japanese
mobilization of, 17–­19
U.S. projections of Kyushu casualties
among, 20, 42n33
Civilization (Library of Congress magazine),
179–­80
Class I reactors, 154
Cockcroft, J. D., 111
code breaking. See intelligence, U.S.
Cold War
atomic energy and, 83
Atoms for Peace and, 128–­29
civilian uses for nuclear power and, 150
get-­tough policy against USSR and, 84
NSC-­68 on arms buildup and, 87–­88
nuclear arms race and, 100
See also Korean conflict; nuclear arms
race
Cole, Sterling, 159
Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet
(CINCPAC), 23–­24
Commerce, Department of, 118, 120
Communist Party, 122, 123, 124. See also
Soviet Union
Conant, James, 185
Congress, on Raleigh research reactor, 159.
See also specific committees of
Connally, Tom, 201
Consolidated University of North Carolina,
158
containment policy, U.S., 77, 85, 92,
106n69
covert operations, 92. See also Cold War;
intelligence, Soviet; intelligence, U.S.
Cowdry, E. V., 117, 203
Craig, Campbell, 80
Creager, Angela N. H., 6–­7, 172n10, 187
D
Daws, Gavan, 51
Dean, Gordon E., 125, 158, 211
decision to bomb, controversy over, 3–­5,
71–­72. See also ending war with
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 218
Japan; momentum and timing; morality of atomic bombs
Decisive Battle Educational Measures
Guidelines, Japanese, 18
Defense, Department of, 85
diplomacy, atomic bomb and, 80–­81,
103n14, 179, 183, 186
disarmament, U.N. on, 96–­97
Dogpatch. See Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Dulles, John Foster, 92, 94–­95
DuPont Corp., 64–­65
Durham, Carl, 160–­61
E
Eastern Europe, Soviet vs. U.S. interests in,
84
Einstein, Albert, 184, 185
Eisenhower, Dwight D.
on atomic bomb use, 51, 70, 75n29
Cold War and, 92
Geneva Summit (1955) and, 96
national security policy under, 93–­94
nuclear arms and, 6
nuclear arms for Korea and, 90
on training foreign students in reactor
technology, 160
See also Atoms for Peace
ending war with Japan
army and navy conflict over invasion
strategy and, 22–­27
Ketsu-­Go, atomic bomb and, 27–­33
Ketsu-­Go on Kyusu and, 13–­17
Ketsu-­Go vs. Operation Olympic,
19–­22
Soviet intervention and, 33–­37
U.S. strategy for, 8–­10
Energy, Department of, 189
engineering, military use of radioisotopes
for, 110
Eniwetok Atoll, as test site, 88, 202
Enola Gay, 68
espionage. See intelligence, U.S.
Europe
Eisenhower on troop strength in, 93
radioisotope exports to, 119, 125,
144n137
12/18/15 12:44 PM
radioisotope requests from, 116
See also specific countries
Evans, Robley, 115
F
fallout shelters, U.S., 98
famine, in Japan, 17, 41n26
Farrell, Thomas, 68
FBI, 113
Feis, Herbert, 52
Fellow Traveler. See Sputnik
Fermi, Enrico, 184, 189–­90
Fifteenth Area Army, Japanese, 14, 15
Fifth Air Force, U.S., 18
Fifth Amphibious Corps, U.S., 19
Fifth Area Army, Japanese, 11
Fifty-­Seventh Army, Japanese, 15–­16
Fifty-­Sixth Army, Japanese, 15
Finland
cancels radioisotope order, 123, 141–­
42n102, 142n103
mutual defense pact with USSR, 121,
140n86
radioisotopes requested by, 121, 140n85,
140–­41n88, 141n94
radioisotopes shipped to (1949), 109
U.S. checking on radioisotope use by,
139n70
First General Army, Japanese, 11, 15
The First Temple of the Atom, 159. See also
Raleigh research reactor
foreign purchasers of U.S. radioisotopes. See
radioisotopes
foreign relations, Truman on bomb and, 64,
84–­85
Forrestal, James, 44n46, 85
Fortieth Army, Japanese, 16
Fourth Anti-­Aircraft Division of Japanese
Fifty-­Seventh Army, 15–­16
France, experimental reactor in, 125
Franck Report, 186
Frank, Richard B., 5–­6, 50, 182–­83
Fund for Peaceful Atomic Development,
129
G
Gaither, H. Rowan, Jr., 98
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 219
Index
219
Gaither Report, 98–­99, 107n99
General Advisory Committee (GAC)
on H-­bomb development, 88–­89, 189,
190, 207–­9
on nuclear power plants, 149
radioisotope exports discussions by,
113–­14
See also Atomic Energy Commission
Geneva Summit (1955), 96
Golden, William, 87, 141n88
Gowing, Margaret, 51
Gray, Gordon, 158, 159
Great Britain. See Britain
Groves, Leslie R.
on atomic bomb use, 63, 67, 70, 73–­
74n4, 74–­75n19
atomic bombing of Japan and, 182
briefing Truman on the bomb, 63–­64,
77–­78, 184
chain of command in World War II and,
68–­69
civilian requests for radioisotopes and,
111
on end of a war, 74n15
on momentum of atomic bomb project,
66
plutonium for atomic bomb and, 65
on postwar deterrence, 87
role in the bombings, 62
on Soviet Union and atomic bomb use,
68
Trinity test report to Truman by, 78
Truman on halting bombing and, 70–­71
H
Handy, Thomas T., 69, 70
Hanford, 64, 65, 185
Harry S. Truman Little White House Foundation, Key West, Florida, 5
Hart, Thomas, 201
Harwell (British atomic energy installation),
111, 112, 120, 126–­27
Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi, 30
Hata Shunroku, 14, 21
Hayashi Saburo, 22, 37, 43n40
hazard reports, 156
helium-­3 isotopes, 120
12/18/15 12:44 PM
220
Index
Herring, George, 85
Hersey, John, 55
Hevesy, George, 116
Hickenlooper, Bourke
on AEC fellowships and Communist
Party, 122
anticommunism, radioisotope exports
and, 121, 123–­24, 141n94
Strauss and, 137n33
See also Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy
Hiranuma, 37
Hirohito, Emperor
Big Six deadlock and, 29
Frank on atomic bomb use and, 60n6
Ketsu-­Go on Kyusu and, 17
personal intervention in deadlock over
surrender and, 37
reasons for capitulating, 30–­31, 31–­32,
181, 182–­83
Hiroshima (Hersey), 55
Hiroshima bombing
Americans on date for, 181
directive for, 69
effects of, 5
Ketsu-­Go and, 11
marking fiftieth anniversary of, 179
order for, 64
press release on, 195
Stalin on, 82
as target, 48–­49, 70
Hitchcock, William, 55
Hitler, Adolf, 31, 55, 85
Hokkaido, 11, 31, 71, 181
Honshu, 11, 180
Hull, John E., 27
hydrogen bomb (H-­bomb)
building of, 3
development of, 88–­90, 210–­11
nuclear arms race and, 77
Strauss on Soviets and, 207–­9
U.S. tests, 96
I
Iceland, radioisotope exports to, 120
Ida Masataka, 45–­46n64
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 220
Imperial Army, Japanese
aircraft for suicide attacks, 16, 24
Big Six and, 28
ending World War II strategy of, 10–­11
Ketsu-­Go on Kyusu and, 11, 14, 15–­16,
17, 41n26
See also specific units
Imperial General Headquarters
Area Special Policing Units under, 17–­18
divisions for Kyushu and, 41n21
equipment and supplies on Kyushu for
Ketsu-­Go and, 16–­17
homeland mobilization programs of, 11
Manchuria written off by, 31
Soviet intervention, end of war and, 29
Imperial Navy, 10–­11, 16, 28, 34
India, civilian nuclear technology in, 125–­
26, 145n157
Indianapolis, USS, 65
intelligence, Soviet, 78–­79, 82
intelligence, U.S.
Cold War and, 92
Japanese buildup at home and, 22, 23–­
24, 44n46
Japanese capitulation and, 37
on Japanese military disagreement on
peace, 45n59
U.S. radioisotope exports and, 119
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
94, 97–­99, 100
Interim Committee, 73n3, 183, 186,
192n16
intermediate-­range ballistic missile (IRBM),
95, 98
International Atomic Energy Agency, 127,
144n140
International Cancer Research Congress
São Paulo, Brazil (1954), 129
St. Louis (1947), 117
International Declassification Conferences
(1949 and 1950), 154
invasion of Japan. See Operation Olympic
iodine-­131 isotopes, 116, 119
Iowa State College, Ames Laboratory, 164–­
65
iron isotopes, 120, 122
Iwo Jima, 13–­14, 66
12/18/15 12:44 PM
J
Index
221
Jadwin, Edwin, 70
Japan
Americans on date for surrender of, 181
brutality against prisoners of, 67, 74–­
75n19
civilian mobilization in, 17–­19
domestic morale, overseas commanders
and, 35–­36, 47n90
ending World War II strategy of, 10–­13
history of surrender by, 9
imperial institution preservation in, 28
planned U.S.-­led invasion of, 9, 10, 15,
40n3, 66
potential invasion of, atomic bombing
and, 180–­81
war prolonged by, 55–­56
See also atomic bombing of Japan; specific
cities and regions; specific military units
and leaders
Java, atomic bombs and Japanese war on,
50–­51
Jeffries, Zay, 185
Johnson, Edwin, 201
Johnson, Louis, 210
Joint Army-­Navy Air Agreement, Japanese
(Feb. 1945), 10–­11
Joint Army-­Navy Committee on the Japanese Air Forces, 23
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
approves Japanese invasion, 40n5
on atomic weapons if USSR entered
Korean war, 90
nuclear arms for Korea and, 91
on Olympic as unwise, 24
on unconditional surrender, 8–­9
war planning by, 85–­86
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 122,
123, 141n93, 189, 201
Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), 24
Joliot-­Curie, Frédéric and Irène, laboratory,
123, 124
Kasai Yukiko, 18
Kawabe Torashiro, 34, 37
Kazakhstan, Soviet testing atomic bomb
in, 82
Keller, Morton, 55
Kennan, George F., 99
Kennedy, John F., 128
Ketsu-­Go (Operation Decisive or Decisive
Battle)
atomic bombs and, 33, 49
ending the war and, 28–­33
Hirohito as advocate of, 30
Operation Olympic vs., 19–­22
plan for, 11–­13
Khrushchev, Nikita, 96, 97
Kido Koichi, 28, 30, 37, 47n90, 60n6
King, Ernest J., 8–­9, 23, 26–­27, 44n46, 69
Kirkpatrick, Elmer E., 203
Kokura, as atomic bomb target, 69, 70
Konoe Fumimaro, 30, 37
Korea
atomic bombs and Japanese war on,
50–­51
Soviet seizure of positions in, 31
Korean conflict (war), 77, 90, 187
Krige, John, 144n146, 173–­74n36
Kumamoto Division District, Ketsu-­Go on
Kyusu and, 16
Kuril Islands, Soviets and, 31, 71
Kurume Division District, Ketsu-­Go on
Kyusu and, 16
Kwantung Army, 31, 46n71
Kyushu
Allied invasion plans for, 180
invasion, Marshall on atomic bombs
and, 52
Ketsu-­Go and, 12, 13–­17
Ketsu-­Go vs. Operation Olympic on,
19–­22
U.S. intelligence on buildup on, 22,
23–­24, 44n46
U.S.-­led invasion of, 9, 10, 40n3
K
L
Kagoshima Bay, as U.S. target, 15
kamikazes, 13, 16, 24
Kanto. See Tokyo
Laika (dog), 97
Lampe, Harold, 148, 151, 152–­53, 162
Lanouette, William, 7
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 221
12/18/15 12:44 PM
222
Index
Latin America, civilian nuclear technology
in, 129, 145n157
Lauritsen, Charles, 115
Lawrence, E. O., 116
Leahy, William D., 26, 44n46, 51, 69
Leffler, Melvyn, 82
LeMay, Curtis E., 64, 86–­87, 90, 95, 187
Lewis, W. B., 111
Libby, Willard, 161, 165
Liberty magazine, 113
Lilienthal, David E.
on AEC critics, 136n25
on civilian uses for nuclear power, 149–­
50, 188
confirmation hearings, 112–­13
on Eniwetok atomic tests (1948), 53
Hickenlooper and Strauss on, 124
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
hearings and, 123
political debates over atomic energy and,
111
on radioisotope exports, 113, 114
resigns from AEC, 125
on secrecy costs, 154
Z Committee and, 210
Lindemann, Frederick A., 184
Little Boy bomb, 64, 65
Los Alamos National Laboratory, 154, 158,
185, 186
M
MacArthur, Douglas
on atomic bomb use, 51
on atomic bombs for Korean War,
90–­91
fitness to command, Stimson on, 45n56
food aid in 1946 and, 41n26
Marshall on casualty estimates by, 20–­21
on Operation Olympic projections, 26
Magic, 23–­24, 44n46. See also intelligence,
U.S.
Manchuria
Japanese overseas commands in, Soviets
and, 35
Ketsu-­Go and, 11
Soviet invasion (1945) of, 5, 31, 46n71,
181
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 222
Soviets move bombers (1951) to, 91
Manhattan Engineer District (MED) (Manhattan Project)
on countries requesting isotopes, 136n18
declassification committee of, 149
doubts among scientists working on,
183, 184–­86, 197–­99
infrastructure transferred to AEC, 111–­
12
Marshall on further atomic bombing
and, 27
mission of, 64
nuclear arms race and, 76
on radioisotopes for purchase, 109
reactor safety and, 157
Truman briefed on work of, 77–­78
Marshall, George C.
on atomic bombing necessity, 49
atomic bombing of Japan and, 182
on battlefield use of atomic bombs, 52
intelligence to Truman at Potsdam and,
44n46
on Japanese buildup for homeland
defense, 25–­26
on Soviets and atomic bomb, 79
on unconditional surrender, 9
Marshall Plan, 109, 114, 117, 188
martial law, Japanese militarists on civilians and decision-­making and, 29,
45–­46n64
Martin, Joseph, 91
Matsutani Makoto, 43n40
maximum credible accident, 156
McMahon, Brien, 124, 126, 201
McMahon bill (Act) (1946), 111, 201
medical isotope production, 6–­7, 110, 116,
138n45, 188
Melosi, Martin V., 6, 187
Metallurgical Laboratory (Met Lab), Chicago, 185, 186
middle-­ground interpretation, for atomic
bombing of Japan, 4–­5
Millikin, Eugene, 201
Minuteman, 106n86
Miscamble, Wilson D., 6, 81, 181, 182
Miyazaki, as U.S. target, Japanese on, 14–­15
12/18/15 12:44 PM
momentum and timing
Groves in spring/summer 1945 on,
66–­71
Soviet intervention and, 71
uranium delivery from Oak Ridge and,
65
morality of atomic bombs
British allies on, 51–­52
condemnation of Truman and, 55
lives saved and, 48–­49, 50–­51
Truman on least harm and, 57–­58
U.S. military leaders on, 49
U.S. religious leaders on, 52
war prolonged by Japan leaders and,
55–­56
World War II as total war and, 54–­55
Murray, Raymond, 163–­64, 166, 175n59,
176n62
Murray, Thomas E., 53, 190
N
Nagai Yatsuji, 43n40
Nagasaki bombing
Americans on date for, 181
casualty estimates, 196
directive for, 69
effects of, 5
marking fiftieth anniversary of, 179
as target, 48, 49, 70
Truman halting bombing after, 53, 71
National Academy of Medicine, Buenos
Aires, 119
National Historic Landmark, Trinity as,
76–­77
National Institute for Medical Research,
London, 119
National Resistance, Japanese, 13
National Resistance Manual, Japanese, 13
National Science Foundation, 166, 176n62
National Security Act (1947), 85
National Security Council (NSC), 85, 87–­
88, 93, 210–­11
national security policy
postwar, atomic and hydrogen bombs
and, 83
radioisotope exports and, 109–­10
National Volunteer Corps, Japanese, 13
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 223
Index
223
Navy, U.S., 8–­9, 40n3, 86
Nazi Germany, 76, 82
NC State. See North Carolina State College
of Agriculture and Engineering
negative temperature coefficient, reactor
runaway hazard and, 157
New York Herald Tribune, 115
New York Times, 123, 124
New Yorker, 55
New Zealand, radioisotope exports to, 119
Newman, Robert, 51, 56–­57
Newsweek, 160
Nichols, Kenneth D., 112
Niigata, as atomic bomb target, 69, 70
Nimitz, Chester, 23, 24, 25, 26–­27
Norris, Robert S., 6, 182
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), 94, 124
North Carolina, postwar ambitions of,
147–­49
North Carolina State College of Agriculture
and Engineering
AEC on nuclear program growth at, 161
consultants review reactor at, 164–­65
nuclear engineering program proposed
for, 146–­47
as Oak Ridge feeder school, 151–­53
radioactive leak in reactor at, 162,
175n54
reactor building at, 159, 205
reactor project and fame for, 159–­60,
206
Safeguard Committee review process
and, 156–­57
See also Raleigh Research Reactor
Norway
radioisotopes shipped to (1949), 109
reactor project in, 125–­26
Norwegian Defense Establishment at Kjeller,
122, 123, 141n95, 142n108
NSC-­68, 87–­88, 99
nuclear arms race
from bombers to missiles, 96–­99
Cold War and the bomb and, 83–­88
hydrogen bomb and, 88–­90
Korean War and, 90–­92
origins of, 6, 76–­77
12/18/15 12:44 PM
224
Index
nuclear arms race, continued
postwar U.S. nuclear monopoly and,
79–­81
scientists on controls for, 184–­85
Soviets get the bomb, 82–­83
nuclear engineering programs
Atoms for Peace and, 165–­66
first, at NC State, 151, 152–­53
See also radioisotopes; Raleigh research
reactor
nuclear nationalism, U.S., 79–­81
nuclear power, 188–­89
nuclear reactors, technical information on,
128–­29
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S., 189
nuclear victimization, Asada on, 183
Nucleonics, 158–­59
O
Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies, 151
Oak Ridge National Laboratory
consultants, Raleigh reactor review by,
164–­65
doubts among scientists working at, 185,
186
engineering shortage and, 151
foreign nationals at Isotope School of,
126
foreign requests for radioisotopes (1947)
to, 116
NC State reactor design and, 158
NC State training for, 160
radioisotope exports and, 117, 125, 127,
135n12
radioisotope sales by, 203
Reactor Safeguard Committee and,
173n33
on-­site training schools for, 146–­47, 151
Thomas on security system at, 113,
136n25
occupation of Japan, Big Six on, 29
Okamura Yasuji, 34
Okinawa, 13–­14, 17, 66
Operation Coronet, 9, 10
Operation Decisive. See Ketsu-­Go
Operation Downfall, 9, 43n41
Operation Greenhouse, 211
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 224
Operation Olympic
Japan invasion under, 9
Ketsu-­Go vs., 19–­22
MacArthur on projections for, 26
Marshall and Nimitz on atomic bombing and, 27
as unwise, Nimitz on, 23–­24
Operation Sandstone, 202
Oppenheimer, J. Robert
bomb design and, 74n8
bomb responsibility and, 184, 197–­99
on declassifying nuclear fission information, 149
on developing an H-­bomb, 88–­89
on radioisotope exports, 124
Strauss and, 188
Truman and, 54, 61n23
See also General Advisory Committee
oxygen-­18 isotopes, 120
P
Pacific war
atomic bomb and Soviet involvement
in, 79
Potsdam summit on, 78
See also atomic bombing of Japan
pain threshold, U.S. estimates of, Japanese
bargaining and, 20
Parsons, William S., 68
Patent Office, U.S., atomic energy patents
and, 113
Patriotic Citizens (or Volunteer) Fighting
Corps, Japanese, 18
Pearson, Drew, 112
Pentagon
on atomic bomb use in Korea, 91
nuclear arms for Korea and, 90
See also Joint Chiefs of Staff
Peru, radioisotope exports to, 119
Philippines, 17, 50–­51
phosphorus-­32 isotope, 115, 116, 119, 120
physics, military use of radioisotopes for,
110
physics department, NC State
Beck as chair of, 148–­49
questioning Beck as supervisor of, 163–­
64
12/18/15 12:44 PM
reactor built as extracurricular activity
for, 162
reactor project and fame for, 159–­60
Safeguard Committee review process
and, 157
Pike, Sumner T., 111–­12, 136n16, 139n70,
144n137
Pitzer, Kenneth, 152–­53
plutonium, for atomic bomb, 64–­65, 72
Pogue, Forrest C., 49
political tool, atomic bomb as, 80–­81, 179
pool reactors, 174n36. See also water boiler
reactors
Portugal, radioisotope exports to, 120
positive temperature coefficient, reactor
runaway hazard and, 157
Potsdam Declaration, 30, 37, 49–­50
Potsdam summit
intelligence to Truman at, 44n46
Soviet nuclear research and, 82
Trinity test and, 78
Truman on atom bomb testing during,
194
Power Demonstration Reactor Program, 161
power reactors, regulation of, 177n73
preventive war, LeMay on strategic bombing
and, 87
Princeton University consultants, Raleigh
reactor review by, 164–­65
private industry. See civilian nuclear power
psychological factors for atomic bombing,
179–­80. See also racism
Public Law Number 30, 18
Purnell, William, 68
Q
Quebec Agreement (1943), 110
R
Rabi, Isidor, 189–­90
Racing the Enemy (Hasegawa), 30
racism, 67, 179–­80
Radchenko, Sergey, 80
radio intelligence. See intelligence, U.S.
radioactive isotopes. See radioisotopes
radioactive leaks
in Raleigh research reactor, 162
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 225
Index
225
routine operational, 156, 157–­58
radioactive material release hazard, 156
radioactivity, as Cold War threat, 83
radioisotopes
Atoms for Peace and, 127–­29
conclusions, 129–­30
destinations and complications regarding, 119–­25
distribution in competitive foreign markets, 125–­27
foreign shipment destinations of, 204
introduction to, 108–­10
medical, industrial, agricultural, and
research applications for, 6–­7
politics of foreign distribution of, 110–­
19
Radium Center, Copenhagen, Denmark,
119
Raleigh research reactor
AEC and repairs to, 166, 176n70
AEC promoting/regulating conflict and,
189
approval of, 158
Atoms for Peace era and, 165–­68
consultants review operations of, 164–­65
declassification and, 154–­55, 206
dedication of and radioactive leak in,
161–­62
proposal for, 146–­47, 152
radioactive leak in, 162–­63, 175n54,
175n59
Reactor Safeguard Committee on, 205
reactor runaway hazard, 156, 157
Reactor Safeguard Committee (AEC), 154,
155–­58, 173n33, 205
reactors
AEC approval process for, 155–­56
AEC stimulating demand for, 172n10
declassified list of, 154
research vs. power types, regulation of,
177n73
types, in U.S., 188
See also Raleigh research reactor
religious leaders, U.S., on atomic bomb use,
52
research reactors, regulation of, 177n73. See
also Raleigh research reactor
12/18/15 12:44 PM
226
Index
Research Triangle, creation of, 166
revisionist interpretation, for atomic bombing of Japan, 4, 5
Roosevelt, Franklin D.
on atomic bomb use, 74n4
on atomic bomb value, 80–­81
death of, Truman learns of atomic bomb
and, 63
proposal on nuclear arms control to, 185
Quebec Agreement (1943) and, 110
Szilard and Einstein letter of concern
to, 184
on unconditional surrender, 8
World War II as total war and, 55
Rosenberg, David, 86, 93
Roth, Herman, 159
routine operational radioactive leaks, 156,
157–­58
Russell, Bertrand, 87
Russell, Richard, 201
S
safety regulation, AEC, Raleigh reactor and,
147
Sakhalin Island, 71, 181
Sanada Joichiro, 15, 21
Satsuma Peninsula, as U.S. target, Japanese
on, 14, 15
saturation bombing, in World War II, 55
Science magazine, 186
The Scientific Worker, 121
scientists
Manhattan Project, doubts among,
184–­86
private U.S. radioisotope sources for,
137n43
radioisotope exports and, 117
radioisotope exports to, 119–­20
See also physics department, NC State
Second General Army, Japanese, 11, 14, 48
Seeman, L. E., 27
Senate Appropriations subcommittee,
122–­23
Sherman, Forrest, 24
Sherwin, Martin J., 184
Shibushi Bay, as U.S. target, Japanese on,
14–­15
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 226
Shikoku, 11, 24
Shōwa Tennō dokuhakuroku (Hirohito), 29,
30
Shunroka Hata, 48
Simpson, William L., 203
Sixteenth Area Army, Japanese, 14, 15, 16,
41n21, 41n24
Sixth Army, U.S., 9
Smyth, Henry DeWolf, 122, 124
Smyth Report, 116, 138n52, 141n92
sodium-­24 isotopes, 115
South Africa, radioisotope exports to, 119
South America, civilian nuclear technology
in, 129, 145n157
Soviet Union
AEC export controls and, 121
atomic bomb testing by, 7, 77, 82, 125,
152
atomic bombing and Japan invasion by,
71
atomic stockpile (1950), 90
atomic stockpile (1955), 96
to declare war on Japan, 180
declares war on Japan, 181
diplomatic relations with, atomic bomb
use and, 68, 80–­81, 179
intervention, Japanese surrender and,
33–­37
intervention after atomic bombings, 29,
47n88
missile gap with U.S. and, 97–­98
mutual defense pact with Finland, 121,
140n86
naval forces, Manchurian invasion and,
31
nuclear arms race with, 3
nuclear reactor in, 125
radioisotope exports by, 127
radioisotope exports to, 120
targets in, 106n85
Truman on bomb and, 64
U.N. disarmament debates and, 97
U.S. fears of radioisotope exports and,
114, 116
U.S. radioisotope exports and, 118–­19
Spain, radioisotope exports to, 120
Sputnik, 77, 97, 98
12/18/15 12:44 PM
Sputnik II, 97
spying. See espionage
Stalin, Joseph
Cold War and U.S. demonization of, 85
death of, 92
nuclear research support by, 82–­83
Potsdam summit and, 78
Truman on Trinity test to, 77
on U.S. monopoly of atomic bomb,
80–­81
war of nerves by, 90
Yalta Conference and, 180
starvation, in Japan, 17, 41n26
State, Department of, 90, 91, 117, 121–­22
stigmatization, Tannenwald on second
pathway of, 96
Stimson, Henry L.
on atomic bomb use, 57
briefing Truman on the bomb, 63–­64,
184
chain of command in World War II and,
69
postwar Japanese casualty figures of,
42n33
press release on Hiroshima bombing
and, 195
target choices and, 70
Truman learning of the bomb and, 63
Strategic Air Command (SAC), 85, 86–­87,
90, 98
Strauss, Lewis L.
AEC service by, 111–­12
on atomic energy equipment exports,
121, 122
on civilian uses for nuclear power, 188
on declassifying nuclear fission information, 150
on H-­bomb development, 89, 95, 189,
207–­9
Hickenlooper and, 123–­24, 137n33
qualifications, 136n16
on radioisotope exports, 110, 114, 116,
118, 124–­25, 138n52, 139n62
on Technical Cooperation Program, 120
on training foreign students in reactor
technology, 161
suicide attacks, 13, 16, 24
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 227
Index
227
sulfur-­35 isotopes, 116
surrender, Suzuki cabinet proposal on, 30.
See also unconditional surrender
Suzuki Kantaro, 28, 29, 30, 32–­33, 37
Sweden, reactor project in, 125–­26
Sweeney, Charles W., 68
Switzerland, reactor project in, 125–­26
Szasz, Ferenc, 77
Szilard, Leo, 178, 184–­86
T
Taft, Robert A., 112
Tannenwald, Nina, 96
Target Committee, 70
Technical Cooperation Program, 120
Teller, Edward, 89, 95, 155, 189
Temple of Atom. See Raleigh research reactor
Terauchi Hisaichi, 34, 36
thermonuclear devices, definition of,
105n50. See also hydrogen bomb
Thirty-­Sixth Army, Japanese, 15
Thomas, J. Parnell, 113, 136n25
Thor (intermediate-­range ballistic missile),
95
Tibbets, Paul W., 68
Tinian, 64, 65, 69
Togo Shigenori, 28, 33, 37
tokko tactics, Ketsu-­Go and, 13
Tokyo
fire-­bombings, FDR and, 55
Hirohito on inadequate defenses of, 32
Ketsu-­Go and, 11, 12
U.S. intelligence on buildup around,
23–­24
U.S.-­led invasion of, 9
as U.S. target, Japanese on, 14
Toyoda Soemu, 28
traditional interpretation, for atomic bombing of Japan, 3–­4
Trinity test, 65, 76–­77, 78, 82
tritium, 120, 126
Truman, Harry S.
on atomic bomb value, 80–­81
authorizing atomic bombing, 48–­49, 69,
181–­82
on casualties and politics, 21
12/18/15 12:44 PM
228
Index
Truman, Harry S., continued
on civilian uses for nuclear power, 149–­
50, 187–­88
commander in chief authority challenged, 187
foreign policy perspective of, 85
on halting bombing, 70–­71
on H-­bomb development, 89–­90, 95
on his nuclear legacy, 178
invasion of Japan strategy and, 10
learns about atomic bomb, 63–­64, 74n5,
194
moral code of, 57
nuclear arms for Korea and, 90
nuclear weapons strategy and, 86
on Oppenheimer and blood on hands,
54, 61n23, 186, 200
postwar Japanese casualty figures of,
42n33
Potsdam summit and, 78
press release on Hiroshima bombing
and, 195
on radioisotope exports, 109, 113,
117–­18
radioisotope exports and, 109
Ultra/Magic materials delivered at Potsdam to, 44n46
Tsukasa Nitoguri, 50
Turkey, radioisotope exports to, 120
216th Division, Japanese, 16
typhoons, Japanese on U.S. invasion and, 15
U
Ultra. See intelligence, U.S.
Umezu Yoshijiro, 28, 31, 37
unconditional surrender, American strategy
on, 8–­9, 40n2. See also Potsdam
Declaration
Union Carbide Corporation, 148, 172n8
United Kingdom
medical isotope production and, 188
radioisotope exports by, 125, 126,
143n124
Technical Cooperation Program and,
120
See also Britain
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 228
United Nations
Atomic Energy Commission, Baruch
Plan presented to, 81
Beck, Atoms for Peace and, 160
General Assembly on disarmament
conventions, 96–­97
on nuclear disarmament, 84
U.S. radioisotope exports and, 118
United States
amphibious assault on Kyushu assessment by, 19–­22, 42n35
armed forces, atomic bombing of Japan
and, 50
atomic stockpile (1950), 90
atomic stockpile (1960), 128
ending World War II strategy of, 8–­10
Kyushu defense and, 32
Kyushu terrain analysis by, 14
medical isotope production and, 188
not using atomic bomb, domestic politics and, 67, 74n16
postwar debate on nuclear monopoly
of, 77
radiolabeled compounds produced by,
127, 144n135
Technical Cooperation Program and,
120
U.N. disarmament debates and, 96–­97
universities, early nuclear reactors at, 147,
171n4
University of California, Los Angeles
(UCLA), 150–­51, 152, 153
University of Chicago, 154
University of Southern California, 150–­51,
152, 153
uranium
East German, Soviet research and, 82
foreign countries as source for, 113, 114
highly enriched, 64–­65, 72
missing from Argonne National Laboratory, 122
for research vs. bomb-­making, 153
Technical Cooperation Program and,
120
Urey, Harold C., 185–­86
Uruguay, isotope mission to, 129
12/18/15 12:44 PM
Index
229
V
Venezuela, isotope mission to, 129
Vietnam, atomic bombs and Japanese war
on, 50–­51
Volunteer Enlistment Law, Japanese, 18
Volunteer Fighting Units, Japanese, 18
W
Walker, J. Samuel, 180, 182
Walker, Martin, 97
Wallace, Henry, 53, 71, 183
war crimes trials, Big Six on jurisdiction
over, 29
war planning, postwar, 85–­86
Warren, Shields, 129
water boiler reactors, 157, 158. See also pool
reactors
Waymack, William W., 111–­12, 136n16
weapons
for Japanese civilians, 18
for Ketsu-­Go, 16
weapons of mass destruction, 84, 104n27
weather, atomic bomb use and, 64
Weigley, Russell, 79
Wellock, Thomas R., 7, 189
Whyburn, William, 166
Wigner, Eugene, 203
Willoughby, Charles A., 23
Wilson, Carroll, 112
Wilson, Robert R., 185
World War II
American strategy to end, 8–­10
Japanese strategy to end, 10–­13
as total war, old morality and, 54–­55
See also Pacific war
Y
Yalta Conference, 180
Yokohama, U.S.-­led invasion of, 9
Yonai Mitsumasa, 28, 30, 36–­37
Yoshizumi Masao, 21–­22
Z
Z Committee, 210–­11
Walker-NuclearEnergyHST.indb 229
12/18/15 12:44 PM