What’s in a Symbol?
Emerging Parties and Anti-Corruption Symbols in
Indonesia’s 2014 National Legislative Election
Campaigns
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Elisabeth Anne Kramer
Department of Indonesian Studies
The University of Sydney
2015
This thesis is my own original work. It contains no material previously published or written by
another person except where due reference is made in the text. Clearance was obtained from the
University of Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee for the project.
Signed …………………………………………………………………….
TableofContents
Abbreviations..............................................................................................................................................ii
Anoteoncurrency...................................................................................................................................v
AnoteonIndonesianterms................................................................................................................v
Abstract.........................................................................................................................................................vi
Acknowledgments................................................................................................................................viii
Introduction.................................................................................................................................................x
Indonesia’spoliticalsystem...................................................................................................5
Emergingpoliticalparties.......................................................................................................7
Emergingpartiesandthe2014elections......................................................................10
Methodology..............................................................................................................................14
Limitations.................................................................................................................................19
Outlineofthesis.......................................................................................................................20
1.Politicalsymbols,campaignsandcorruption...................................................................25
Symbols.......................................................................................................................................27
Symbolsincampaigns.......................................................................................................29
Developinganarrative......................................................................................................32
Symboldiffusionacrossscales...........................................................................................36
Why(anti)corruptionsymbols?........................................................................................40
Conclusion..................................................................................................................................44
2.Tracingthehistoryofanti‐corruption..................................................................................47
AfterIndependence................................................................................................................48
DefendingGuidedDemocracy.......................................................................................54
TheNewOrder.........................................................................................................................56
CorruptionandthefallofSuharto...............................................................................64
Reformasi....................................................................................................................................70
Presidentialpressures......................................................................................................71
TheriseofYudhoyono......................................................................................................76
Conclusion..................................................................................................................................78
3.Politicsandcorruption,2009–2014.......................................................................................81
The2004and2009elections.............................................................................................81
Anunstablecoalition.........................................................................................................85
Corruptionandanti‐corruptionaspoliticalthemes.................................................86
AttacksontheKPK.............................................................................................................87
Centurygate...........................................................................................................................90
Thedrivingsimulatorprocurementcase..................................................................93
ThecaseofGayus.................................................................................................................95
Thetravellers’chequescandal.......................................................................................96
CorruptionintheDirectorateGeneralofCustomsandExcise.........................97
Corruptioninlocalgovernment....................................................................................98
ThefalloftheDemocrats..................................................................................................99
ThefallofPKS.....................................................................................................................102
CorruptionintheConstitutionalCourt....................................................................104
Publicopinion.........................................................................................................................106
Conclusion................................................................................................................................111
4.Emergingpartiesandcampaigningoncorruption......................................................113
Theanti‐corruptionstrategy............................................................................................114
Creatingandmobilizingthesymbol..............................................................................117
Partypublications.............................................................................................................118
Partyleaders.......................................................................................................................121
Partiesinthemedia.........................................................................................................124
Parties’OnlinePresence................................................................................................129
Conclusion................................................................................................................................135
5.Candidatesonthecampaigntrail..........................................................................................137
Hanura,EastJava...................................................................................................................139
Nasdem,SouthSulawesi.....................................................................................................151
Gerindra,NorthSumatra....................................................................................................158
Intra‐partyrelationships....................................................................................................166
Conclusion................................................................................................................................169
6.Asuccessfulstrategy?...................................................................................................................173
Justifyingtheuseofananti‐corruptionsymbol.......................................................173
Salientandprimed...........................................................................................................175
Theartofpersuasion......................................................................................................176
Candidatesmatter............................................................................................................180
Diffusionofsymbols.............................................................................................................183
Mixedmessages.....................................................................................................................188
Conclusion................................................................................................................................193
Conclusion...............................................................................................................................................195
Appendices................................................................................................................................................200
Bibliography.............................................................................................................................................203
ListofFigures
Figure6.1..................................................................................................................................................182
ListofTables
Table3.1......................................................................................................................................................84
Table3.2....................................................................................................................................................108
Table3.3....................................................................................................................................................109
Table6.1....................................................................................................................................................184
Abbreviations
ABRI
AngkatanBersenjataRepublikIndonesia(ArmedForcesofIndonesia)
Bawaslu
BadanPengawasPemilu(ElectoralSupervisoryBoard)
BNN
BadanNarkotikaNasional(NationalNarcoticsAgency)
BPK
BadanPemeriksaKeuangan(NationalAuditAgency)
Bulog
BadanUrusanLogistik(StateLogisticsAgency)
CSIS
CentreforStrategicandInternationalStudies,Indonesia
Dapil
DaerahPemilihan(Constituency)
DKIJakarta
DaerahKhususIbukotaJakarta(SpecialCapitalRegionofJakarta)
DPD
DewanPerwakilanDaerah(RegionalRepresentativeCouncil)
DPRI
DewanPerwakilanRakyatDaerahtingkatpropinsi,(RegionalPeople’s
RepresentativeCouncil,provinciallevel)
DPRII
DewanPerwakilanRakyatDaerahtingkatkapubaten/kota,(Regional
People’sRepresentativeCouncil,regencyorcitylevel)
DPR‐RI
DewanPerwakilanRakyat‐RepublicIndonesia(NationalPeople’s
RepresentativeCouncil)
G30S
Gerakan30September(30SeptemberMovement)
Gerindra
PartaiGerakanIndonesiaRaya(GreatIndonesiaMovementParty)
GolonganKarya(PartyofFunctionalGroups)
Golkar
GolonganPutih(‘WhiteGroup’orpeoplewhochosenottovotein
Golput
elections)
PartaiHatiNuraniRakyat(People’sConscienceParty)
Hanura
HimpuanKerukunanTaniIndonesia(IndonesianFarmer’s
HKTI
Association)
HMI
HimpuanMahasiswaIslam(MuslimStudents’Association)
ICMI
IkatanCendekiawanMuslimIndonesia(AssociationofIndonesian
MuslimIntellectuals)
ICS
IndonesiaSurveyCenter
ICW
IndonesianCorruptionWatch
IMF
InternationalMonetaryFund
INES
IndonesianNetworkElectionSurvey
KKN
Korupsi,KolusidanNepotisme(Corruption,CollusionandNepotism)
Kopassus
KomandoPasukanKhusus(IndonesianSpecialForces)
KPK
KomisiPemberantasanKorupsi(CorruptionEradicationCommission)
ii
KPKPN
KomisiPemeriksaKekayaanPenyelenggaraNegara(Commissionto
ExaminetheWealthofStateOfficials)
KPU
KomisiPemilihanUmum(GeneralElectionCommission)
LIPI
LembagaIlmuPengetahuanIndonesia(IndonesianInstituteofSocial
Science)
LSI
LembagaSurveyIndonesia(IndonesiaSurveyInstitute)
LSN
LembagaSurveiNasional(NationalSurveyInstitute)
Malari
MalapetakaLimabelasJanuari(15JanuaryIncident)
MPR
MajelisPermusyawaratanRakyat(People’sConsultativeAssembly)
MUI
MajelisUlamaIndonesia(IndonesianCouncilofIslamicScholars)
Nasdem
PartaiNasdem(NationalDemocraticParty)
NGO
Non‐GovernmentalOrganization
NU
NahdlatulUlama
OPSTIB
OperasiTertib(OperationtoImproveOrder)
PAN
PartaiAmanatNasional(NationalMandateParty)
PDI
PartaiDemokrasiIndonesia(IndonesianDemocraticParty)
PDIP
PartaiDemokrasiIndonesiaPerjuangan(IndonesianDemocratic
PartyofStruggle)
PEKUNEG
TimPenerbitanKeuanganNegara(TeamtoRegularizeState
Finances)
Perludem
RumahPemiluuntukDemokrasi(ElectionHouseforDemocracy)
PemilihanUmum(GeneralElection)
Pemilu
PerusahaanPertambanganMinyakdanGasBumiNegara(StateOil
Pertamina
andNaturalGasMiningCompany)
PKB
PartaiKebangkitanBangsa(NationalAwakeningParty)
PKI
PartaiKomunisIndonesia(IndonesianCommunistParty)
PKK
PembinaanKesejahteraanKeluarga(FamilyWelfareDevelopment)
PKS
PartaiKeadilanSejahtera(ProsperousJusticeParty)
PNI
PartaiNasionalisIndonesia(IndonesianNationalistParty)
PPATK
PusatPelaporandanAnalisisTransaksiKeuangan(Centrefor
FinancialTransactionReportsandAnalysis)
PPP
PartaiPersatuanPembangunan(UnitedDevelopmentParty)
PRD
PartaiRakyatDemokratis(DemocraticPeople’sParty)
PSI
PartaiSosialisIndonesia(IndonesianSocialistParty)
PUKAT
UniversitasGadjahMadaPusatKajianAnti‐Korupsi(Universityof
GadjahMadaCenterforAnti‐CorruptionStudies)
iii
Rp
Rupiah(Indonesiancurrency)
SMRC
SaifulMujaniResearchandConsulting
TGPTPK
TimGabunganPemberantasanTindakPidanaKorupsi(JointTeamto
EradicatetheCrimeofCorruption)
TII
TransparencyInternationalIndonesia
TimTastipikor
TimKoordinasiPemberantasanTindakPidanaKorupsi,(Coordination
TeamfortheEradicationoftheCrimeofCorruption)
Tipikor
PengadilanTindakPidanaKorupsi(Anti‐CorruptionCourts)
TPK
TimPemberantasanKorupsi(Anti‐CorruptionTeam)
UNDP
UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme
USD
UnitedStatesDollar
iv
Anoteoncurrency
MonetaryamountsthroughoutthisthesishavebeengiveninRupiah(Rp.),
Indonesia’snationalcurrency.Therearesomeexceptionswhensourcematerial
providestheamountinUSdollars(USD)only,especiallyforsourceswrittenduring
theOldOrderperiod(1949–1965).Inthehistoricalsectionsofthisthesis,this
amountisgiveninRupiahandUSdollars(wherepossible),inordertoreflectthe
real‐timevalueofthecurrency.
ForsectionsdiscussingIndonesiaintheReformasiperiod(1998–),amountsaregiven
inRupiahonly.However,thisthesisacknowledgesthattherewascurrency
fluctuationduringthistime.Between1998andthetimeofwriting,theRupiah
peakedatRp.6,758.42toUSD1inJuly1999anddippedtoalowofRp.12,023.3to
USD1inJanuary2014.Historicalconversionscanbemadeusingforeignexchange
informationfoundatOANDA(www.oanda.com).Allmonetaryconversionsinthis
thesisareapproximations.
AnoteonIndonesianterms
Whereappropriate,keyIndonesiantermsforspecificphenomenadiscussedinthis
thesisaregivenbothinEnglishandIndonesianlanguage.
Whererelevant,theshortnamesforindividualsusedthroughoutthethesisarebased
onthenamescommonlyusedbyIndonesiansthemselves.Thiscanbetheperson’s
firstname,familynameoraportmanteau(forexampleJokoWidodoiscommonly
knownas‘Jokowi’).
AnystudyofIndonesiapoliticsorhistoryissuretobefullofacronymsand
portmanteau,whicharecommonlyusedinIndonesia,especially(butnotexclusively)
inspokenlanguage.Thisthesishasgiventhefullnameofanyorganizationorterm
followedbyanycommonacronymorportmanteauinbrackets.Afulllistof
Indonesianacronymsusedthroughoutcanbefoundatthebeginningofthethesis.
v
Abstract
Thisthesisexplorestheuseofanti‐corruptionsymbolsduringIndonesia’s2014
legislativeelectionsfromanationalpartyandindividualcandidateperspective.Anti‐
corruptionhaslongbeenapoliticalissueinIndonesia,andtheentrenchednatureof
associatedrhetoricfacilitatestheongoingemphasisonanti‐corruptionsymbols.
However,recenthistoryandtheperceivedmisuseofsuchsymbolsbysomepolitical
partiesmeantthatmobilizingthemcarriedrisksin2014.Thisstudyaddressestwo
keyempiricalquestions:whywereanti‐corruptionsymbolsadoptedbyemerging
partiesandtheircandidates,andhowwerethesesymbolsused?Examiningthese
questionsallowsustoconsiderabroaderparadoxinIndonesia;thatwhileanti‐
corruptionrhetoricisprominent,sotooiscorruption—includingmoneypoliticsand
vote‐buyingduringpoliticalcampaigns.
Theoretically,thethesisspeakstotheliteratureonelectoralcampaignsandthe
diffusionofideasacrossscales,drawingonEdelman’sconceptualizationofpolitical
symbolsassignifiersofmoralityandaspirationthatareultimatelyintendedtosway
audiencesinordertogainpower.Apoliticalsymbolcomesintobeingwhenparties
attempttobindthemselvestoparticulardiscoursesorideasinordertowinfavour
withvoters.Theconceptofthesymbol,whetheritiseffectiveorweak,isbasedon
howsuccessfulpartiesareintheirattemptstobecomesynonymouswithaparticular
cause,withthisanalysisfocusedparticularlyontheanti‐corruptionsymbol.The
applicationofEdelman’stheoryofsymbolicpoliticstotheIndonesiancaseprovides
anopportunitytoextendtheoreticaldiscussionsoftheuseofsymbolsastoolsof
persuasionduringelections.Theincorporationofdiffusiontheorytointerpretthe
parametersandconstraintsofcampaigningrepresentsanoriginalapproachtothe
studyofelectoralcampaigns,notjustinIndonesiabutmorewidely.Thecombination
ofthesetheoreticalframeworkspresentsaninnovativewayofunderstanding
enduringquestionsregardingcoexisting,yetcontradictory,politicalphenomenain
Indonesia.
Focusingoncasestudiesfromthreedifferentemergingparties,thisthesisfindsthat
theuseofanti‐corruptionsymbolsvariedconsiderablybetweenthenationallevel
andthecandidates,evenifthesymbolsadoptedwereostensiblythesame.Parties’
executivecommitteesembracedanti‐corruptionsymbolsbecausetheybelieved
voterswouldrespondfavourablytothem,inspiteoftheinherenthazardsinvolved.
However,candidatesexercisegreatautonomyintheconstructionoftheirpersonal
vi
campaigns,andcouldchoosetofolloworignoretheirparty’santi‐corruption
symbol.Inthecasesexaminedhere,theextenttowhichthesymbolwasadopted
dependedheavilyonacandidate’spersonalhistory,throughwhich
personal‘ownership’oftheissuewasestablished.Thenatureofintra‐partyrelations
andtraditionalcampaigntechniquesinIndonesiareinforcedtheseintrinsically
differentcampaignarenas,oftenreferredtocolloquiallyasthe‘aircampaign’
(nationallevel)and‘groundcampaign’(candidatelevel).Giventhedifferent
audiencesandinteractionswithvotersineacharena,therewasscopefordiscrepancy
eventhoughnationalpartycommitteesandindividualcandidatesessentiallyshared
thesamegoalofwantingtomaximizevotes.
Thethesisarguesthatthedisconnectthatexistsbetweentheanti‐corruptionsymbol
constructedinnationalcampaignsandlocalpracticeisinherentlylinkedtothe
simultaneousprominenceofanti‐corruptionrhetoricandmoneypoliticsin
campaigns.Atthesametimethatpartiescompetetobeseenasthe‘cleanest’,
individualcandidatesarepressuredtobuyvotes,knowingthatitmaybetheirbest
chanceforsuccess.Theincongruitybetweenwhathappensindifferentcampaign
arenasnotonlydemonstratesthefragmentednatureofpoliticalparties,butalso
confirmsthatthevaluesanddecisionsofcandidatesplayacrucialroleinthe
perpetuationofmoneypolitics.Thisfindingchallengesthenormativeassumption
thatpoliticalpartiesaresingle,coherententitiesandadvancesanewwayof
understandingtherelationshipsbetweenanti‐corruptionrhetoricandelection
campaignoutcomesforIndonesia’semergingparties.
vii
Acknowledgments
ThankyoutoMicheleFordwhoguidedmewhilegivingmethespaceandsupportto
undertakethisprojectinmyownway.IamalsogratefultoSimonButtforhis
valuablecommentsondraftchapters.
ThankyoutoallmyintervieweesandfellowIndonesianpoliticsenthusiastsfor
helpingmepiecetogetherthispictureandespeciallytomythreecasestudy
candidateswhosharedtheirexperiencessogenerously.
Finally,thankyoutoeveryonewhoprovidedmewithencouragement,assistanceand
amusementoverthepastfewyears.IsuspectmostofyouwillnotreadthisthesissoI
willbesuretothankyouinperson.
viii
ix
x
Introduction
Apositiveimageisidentifiedasparamountforwinningpoliticaloffice,especially
whenpartyloyaltyislowamongstcitizens(CatterbergandMoreno2006;
Mainwaring1998:71;Rose1994),asitoftenisinyoungdemocraciessuchas
Indonesia.Investigatinghowintra‐partyrelationsandlocalcontextaffectdecision‐
makinginpoliticalcampaignsshedslightonthedevelopmentofthisimageandhave
beenidentifiedasimportantrealmsforresearch(Farrell2006:130;Rohrschneider
2002).Tofurtherexplorehowtheserelationshipsplayoutinthecontextofanational
electionand,inturn,influencepartyimage,thisthesisexplorestheuseofanti‐
corruptionsymbolsintheIndonesiannationalparliamentaryelectionsof2014.
Focusingonthepoliticalcampaignsofthreeemergingparties,itinvestigateshow
thesepartiesattemptedtoownanti‐corruptionissuesanddevelopapoliticalsymbol
thatcouldbedisseminatednationallyandbyindividualcandidates.Emergingparties
provideasuitablefocusastheirpre‐existingreputationisnotasentrenchedasthose
ofolderparties,andthereforethe2014campaignspotentiallyhadamoresignificant
impactinshapingpublicopiniontowardsthem.
ThereexistsaparadoxinIndonesia:althoughcorruptionseemsanormalpartof
politicaldealings—bothforgovernmentdecision‐makingprocessesandduring
electoralcampaigns—anti‐corruptionsentimentisalsopervasive.Politicalactorsin
Indonesiahavelongusedcorruptionasapoliticaltoolintheirattemptstocompete
forandpreservepower.Inaddition,itiseasiertocampaignonissueswithwhich
votersidentifyaspartoftheirdailylife,ratherthanonissuesthatmustbesupplied
andexplained(Popkin1991:101).Thereisnoneedtoexplainthatcorruptionisa
probleminIndonesiaasthereisalreadyawidespreadpublicperceptionthat
corruptionisrampantandneedstobequelled.Asaresult,severalpoliticalactors
believethatcreatinganidentitywhichissynonymouswiththefightagainst
corruptionwillboosttheirpopularity.Theuseofanti‐corruptionsymbolsin
Indonesianelectioncampaigns,includinginthenationallegislativeelectionsof2014,
isthereforepredictable.
Partiesdonotneedtoconvincevotersthatcombatingcorruptionshouldbeanational
priority;thisisseeminglyself‐evident.However,theuseofanti‐corruption
symbolismcanstillbeperilous.Ifapartypromotesitselfascleanandcorruption‐free,
itrisksbeingbrandedashypocriticalifanyofitsmembersarelaterfoundguiltyof
1
corruption.Duringthe2009‐2014parliamentaryterm,severalpartieswerepilloried
forthisreason,revealingthedangersinherentinthestrategy.But,judgingbythe
attemptsofpartiestoalignthemselveswiththeanti‐corruptionagendathatwas
prominentin2014,manypartiesdidnotdeemtheseriskstobeseriousenoughtoshy
awayfromexploitinganti‐corruptionsentiment.Theaimwasnotonlytoconvince
votersthattheywerecommittedtoeradicatingcorruption,butthattheyweremore
committedthantheirrivals.
Thisstudyexaminestheuseofanti‐corruptionsymbolsforcampaignpurposes,
drawinguponconceptualizationsfirstpioneeredbyAmericanpoliticalscientist
MurrayEdelman.Edelman(1964;1971)describespoliticalinteractionsassymbolicin
termsofboththeritualsassociatedwithpublicproceduresandintheuseofrhetoric
toinfluencethepublic.1Edelman(1988:12)arguesthatsocialproblemsareexploited
bypoliticians,whousethemassymbolsthatactas:
reinforcementsofideologies,notsimplybecausetheyarethereorbecause
theyareimportantforwellbeing.Theysignifywhoarevirtuousanduseful
andwhoaredangerousorinadequate,whichactionswillberewardedand
whichpenalized.Theyconstitutepeopleassubjectswithparticularkindsof
aspirations,self‐concepts,andfears,andtheycreatebeliefsabouttherelative
importanceofeventsandobjects.Theyarecriticalindeterminingwho
exercisesauthorityandwhoacceptsit.
Well‐chosenpoliticalsymbolscanevokeemotionsandtriggerastrongpersonal
responseinfavourofthepoliticalpartyorcandidateusingthatsymbol(Popkin1991:
102;RabinowitzandMacdonald1989:94).Edelman’sworkonpoliticalsymbols
inspiredarangeofsubsequentstudiestheorizinghowthepublicareaffectedbythe
ritualsandrhetoricofpolitics.Edelman’sframeworkprovidedafoundationfor
investigatingthedevelopmentandsignificanceofsymbolsinelectoralcampaigns.In
particular,thetheoryofpoliticalsymbolismhasinspiredideasof‘issueownership’—
thatis,howcandidatesestablishapositiveassociationwithspecificpoliticalissuesin
themindsofvoters—incampaigns(BélangerandMeguid2008;Druckmanetal.
2004;Petrocik1996;vanderBrug2004)and‘directionalvoting’,relatingtohow
1Forexample,Edelman(1964:3)arguesthatelectionsthemselvescanbeunderstoodasa
symbolicritualbecausealthoughtheygivecitizens‘achancetoexpressdiscontentsand
enthusiasms,toenjoyasenseofinvolvement…onlyinaminordegreeisitparticipationin
policyformation’.
2
votersdecidewhotoselect(RabinowitzandMacdonald1989).2Whilesomeofhis
conclusionswerescornedfortheircynicism—particularlyclaimsregardingthe
futilityofindividualactionsandthedifficultiescitizensfaceinavoidingmanipulation
bypoliticalelites—thefundamentalpremiseofhisworkcontinuestoresonatetoday.3
Edelman’sapproachtopoliticalsymbolismalsoallowustounderstandcampaigning
onanti‐corruptionissuesasanattempttoalignwiththesymbol’sbroaderfigurative
implications:tobe‘anti‐corruption’istosubscribetoawholerangeof‘public‐service
related’valuessuchastrust,honesty,humanity,equityandresponsibility;themoral
‘non‐negotiables’(Collins2012:6).Consequently,establishingananti‐corruption
symbolspeakstoa(declared)commitmenttoeradicatingcorruptionwhilealso
portrayingthepartyasarepresentativeofwhatisgoodandmorallyright.Morever,
thistheoryalsopositsthatwhilepoliticalsymbolsaimtoconjurepositive
associationsintheminds’ofcitizens,theyareessentiallyconstructedforthepurpose
ofacquiringand/ormaintainingpower.4Anappreciationofthecontextinwhich
politicalsymbolsareusedisessentialtorealizethisdesireforpoweras‘eventhe
mosttranscendentalimagesoccurinparticularsocialandontologicalspaces,facing
audiences,makinguseofperformersandtheirskills,presupposingcertain
assumptionsabouthowactionsoccurandwhatsortsofbeingsinhabittheworld,and
requiringeconomicandsocialresources’(Keane1997:11).Furthermore,asKeane
(1997:19)argues,themereactofselectingaparticularsymbolreflectsourown
understandingoftheexistingcontextbecausetheabilityofsymbolstoinfluence
2Particularlyrelevanttothisthesisarestudiesthatexaminehowcitizensareinfluencedby
politicalcampaigns,whichwillbeelaborateduponinChapterOne.Additionally,therearea
numberofotheracademicrealmsinwhichEdelman’sworkhasplayedacrucialrole,for
example,thepersuasiveroleofthemedia(Chadwick2001;Cottle2006;EntmanandRojecki
1993),theuseofpoliticalspectacleintheAmericaneducationsystem(Smithetal.2004),the
politicalusesofsymbolicwomen(Sapiro1993)andtherhetoricofmoralprotestsandpublic
campaigns(Lahusen1996).
3EdelmandrewlargelyonMarxistideasandwasconsequentlyoutoffavourwithmany
academicsworkingintheUnitedStatesinthe1960sand1970s(Bennett2005:354;DeCanio
2005:399).Hisworkwasaccusedofbecomingincreasinglypessimistic,culminatingina
sharplycynicalargumentinhisbooks,ConstructingthePoliticalSpectacle(1988)andThe
PoliticsofMisinformation(2001),whichbothpositedthatexistingdemocraticsystemshad
failedbecausecitizenswereinthegripofmanipulativepoliticaleliteswhoseprimaryinterest
wastomaintainpower(Bennett2005:354).Hisworkhasalsobeencriticizedforbeingoverly
deterministicregardingthepsychologyofthemassesashemakesanumberofgeneralizations
aboutvoterbehaviourandtheiroverallinteractionswithpoliticalideas(Fenster2005).Other
critiquesofEdelman’sworkinclude:KrausandGiles(1989),Sapiro(1993),andEwickand
Sarat(2004).
4ForthepurposesofthisthesisitisimportanttonotethatEdelman’sworkdidnotcentreon
themanipulationofsymbolsbyelites,butratheronhowtheuseofsymbolsaffectsthe
psychologyofthemasses,usuallytotheextentthatitproducesquiescence(Sapiro1993:
142).
3
stemsfromthewaythatpeopleassociatethemwithactionsandobjectsintheirown
lives.
Thisthesisalsousesthestudyofanti‐corruptionsymbolstoexploredeeperissuesof
scalarinfluence,diffusionandpartycohesion,representingastartingpointfor
understandinghowpoliticalcampaignsinIndonesiaareimaginedandexecutedat
differentscalesandtheintra‐partyinteractionandsynergy(ifany)thatoccurs.
Examiningthescalardimensionsofpoliticalcampaignschallengesatendencyinthe
literaturetotalkaboutpoliticalpartiesasmonolithicentitieswheninfacttheyare
complexinstitutionscomprisedofsubunits,internalsystemsandconflicts(Sartori
1976:71).5Redressingthenormativeconstructofpartiesasmoreorlesssingular
units,thisthesisexaminestherelationshipbetweennationaldiscourseandindividual
campaignstrategyinemergingpoliticalparties,notingHicken’s(2009:5)assertion
thatpoliticalpartiesoffercandidatesa‘brandname’andeconomiesofscalethrough
intra‐partycoordinationunderthecommongoalofpartypromotion.Thisstudy
investigateshowthesymbolofanti‐corruptionwasconceptualizedatnationaland
locallevels,hownationalleveldiscourseinfluencedwhatwassaidanddoneinthe
localcampaignsofparticularcandidates,andwhatotherinfluencescandidateshadto
consider.
Thisthesisfocusesonfourresearchquestions:
1. Howdidemergingpoliticalpartiesjustifyusingananti‐corruptionsymbolin
theircampaigns?
2. Howdidtheyconstructtheiranti‐corruptionsymbol?
3. Howdidtheydeliverandsellthesymboltovoters?
4. Whatwerethedifferencesbetweentheconceptualizationandthedeliveryof
theanti‐corruptionsymbolatthenationallevelandthelocallevel?
Eachofthesequestionsprovidesabasisforanalysingthedesignandexecutionofthe
2014electoralcampaignandunderstandingtheprominentuseofthisparticular
symbolbyemergingparties.Inaddressingthesequestions,thisstudyfoundthatthe
uniquefeaturesofacountry’shistory,electorallaws,mediasystems,andpolitical
partiesinfluencehowcampaignsareconceptualizedandimplemented(Bowlerand
5Kitschelt(1989:400‐401)contendsthatacademicstudiesoftenconceptualizepolitical
partiesas‘highlystatic’intermsoftheirbehaviourandthatthereisalackofstudies
investigatingtheinternalworkingofparties.Morerecentstudiesthatmakeasimilarpoint
includeDeschouwer(2003)andFabre(2011).
4
Farrell1992b:7‐8).Furthermore,individualcandidateshadagreatdealofautonomy
intheselectionanddevelopmentoftheirpersonalcampaignsymbols.Asaresult,
whiletheirpersonalsymbolssometimesalignedwiththoseoftheparty,atother
timespartysymbolswerereimaginedorevenignored,dependingonhow
determinedthecandidatesweretoestablishananti‐corruptionsymbol.Thiswas,in
turn,influencedbytheirbackgrounds,localcircumstancesandvoters’demands.
Althoughpartiesandtheircandidatesostensiblysharedthesamegoals—towinthe
election—thenatureoftheIndonesianpartysystemandcandidaterecruitment
accountedformuchoftheincongruencebetweennationalandindividualcampaigns.
Indonesia’spoliticalsystem
TheIndonesiannationalparliament,knownasthePeople’sConsultativeAssembly
(MajelisPermusyawaratanRakyat,MPR),iscomprisedoftheelectedrepresentatives
fromdifferentelectorates,formingthePeople’sRepresentativeCouncil(Dewan
PerwakilanRakyatRepublikIndonesia,DPR‐RI),andprovincialrepresentatives,
whichcomprisetheRegionalRepresentativeCouncil(DewanPerwakilanDaerah,
DPD).TheDPR‐RIhas560seatsandtheDPDhas132seats.DPR‐RIcandidatesmust
benominatedbyanapprovedpoliticalparty,whileDPDcandidatesarenotrequired
tohaveapartyaffiliation(thoughmanydo).Inadditiontothenationallevel
parliament,Indonesiansalsovoteforlegislativerepresentativesfortheprovincial
(DewanPerwakilanRakyatDaerahtingkatpropinsi,DPRDI)anddistrict(Dewan
PerwakilanRakyatDaerahtingkatkapubaten/kota,DPRDII)legislatures.6Elections
forallthesepositionsoccurredsimultaneouslyon9April2014.Theresultswere
verifiedbytheGeneralElectionCommission(KomisiPemilihanUmum,KPU)and
officialtallieswerereleasedon9May2014.
Electoralsystemsthemselvesoftenpresentbarriersfornewparties(Berrington
1985:446),andthisholdstrueinIndonesia.Politicalpartiesmustmeetanumberof
eligibilityrequirementstocompeteinIndonesia’snationalelections.Theymusthave
aregionalofficeineachprovince,aswellasapermanentofficein75percentof
provinces,districtsormunicipalitiesandachapterinatleasthalfofeachofthesub‐
districts,answeringtoapermanentoffice(thoughthesechaptersdonotneedtobe
permanent).Theymustalsohaveatleast1000officialmembers.7TheKPUmakesthe
6ForacomprehensiveoutlineofthenationalparliamentarystructureseeDPR‐RI(2014a).
7TheprovinceofAcehisanexceptiontotheserequirementsaslocalpartiesarepermittedto
competeunderthespecialautonomyagreementwiththecentralgovernment.SeeHillman
(2012)forfurtherdetails.
5
finaldeterminationastowhetherpartieshavemettheserequirements.Partiesmust
alsopassathresholdofatleast3.5percentofvotesinordertoassumetheirplacein
theparliament.8Formingapartythatmeetsalltheserequirementstakestime,money
andresources,nottomentionongoingcostsoncethepartyhasbeenvalidated.
TheDPR‐RIcandidatesnominatedbyeachpartystandforelectioninaspecific
electorate,knownasadaerahpemilihan(dapil).Eachelectorateisallocatedbetween
threeandtenseats,sopartiescommonlyfieldmultiplecandidates.9Thepartiesrank
eachcandidateandthiscorrespondstotheirplaceontheballot.Forexample,a
candidatemaybeassignedthenumber‘3’,signifyingthattheirnamewillappear
thirdontheballotsheet.Until2009,partylistrankingwascrucialbecauseparties
determinedtheorderinwhichcandidateswereallocatedvotes.However,votersare
nowabletodirecttheirvotestospecificindividuals.Despiteitslackofpractical
significance,candidateordercontinuestoincitemuchintra‐partydebatebecausethe
partylistrankingisseenasareflectionofthecandidate’sstatuswithinthepartyand
thelevelofpartysupporttheycanexpecttoreceive.
Oncepartieshavenominatedandrankedtheircandidates,theindividualcandidates
organizetheirowncampaigns.Whiletheofficialcampaignperiodisshort(in2014
from16Marchto5April)thecandidatesspendamuchlongerpreparingtheir
strategyandorganizingtheircampaigns.Thisstudydefinesthecampaignperiod
broadlytoincludeallactivitiesundertakentoadvertisethepartyandcandidatesto
membersofthepublicinthelead‐uptotheelection,aprocesswhichbeganfarearlier
thantheofficially‐mandatedcampaignperiod.Intheleaduptotheofficialcampaign
period,candidatesholdconsultationswithcommunitygroups,businesspeople,and
8LawNo.10/2008ontheGeneralElectionofMembersofthePeople’sRepresentativeCouncil,
theRegionalRepresentativeCouncilandtheRegionalPeople’sRepresentativeCouncil
originallystatedthatthethresholdforparticipationinthenationalparliamentwas2.5per
cent.ThiswasamendedinApril2012to3.5percent.
9ThefulldetailsofvotingprocedureandvoteallocationbypartiesisdetailedinLawNo.
8/2012ontheGeneralElectionoftheMembersoftheHouseofRepresentatives,People’s
RepresentativeCouncilandRegionalHouseofrepresentatives.
6
otherstakeholderstosourcesupportanddiscussthetermsofthissupport.10Some
candidatesalsonegotiatewithvotersand/orvotebrokers,particularlyiftheyplanto
offerincentivestovotersinreturnforsupport.11Thisthesistakestheview,inline
withBowlerandFarrell(1992b:11),thatan‘electioncampaign’incorporatesthese
periodsofpreparationandplanning.
Theresultsofthenationalparliamentaryelectionsareimportantnotonlybecause
theydeterminetheinfluenceofpartiesinthelegislature,butalsobecausetheyaffect
theirabilitytonominateapresidentialcandidates.UnderLawNo.42/2008onthe
GeneralElectionofthePresidentandVice‐President,partiesmusthaveover20per
centofseatsintheDPR‐RIor25percentofthepopularvotetonominatea
presidentialcandidate.In2014nopartyachievedeitherofthesetargets,and
coalitionswithotherpartieshadtobeformedinordertonominateapresidential
candidate.GiventhatmanypartiesinIndonesiaarevehiclesforpresidentialhopefuls,
thenationallegislativeelectionstakeonanadditionalsignificancebecauseapoor
resultcanthwartaspirations.
Emergingpoliticalparties
Institutionalizedpoliticalpartiesprovideamechanismforchannellingsocial
demandsandensuringeffectivedemocraticgovernance(HickenandKuhonta2011:
2).Politicalpartiesareheredefinedasformalpoliticalorganizationsthataimto
influencethepoliticalnatureofthestatebyparticipatinginelectionsandgaining
powerthroughtheiroutcomes.Duringanelectionpartiesalsoplayarolein
aggregating,organizingandcoordinatingcandidates,politicaldonationsandvoters
(Hicken2009:5).Whilesomedefinitionsofpoliticalpartiesarenarrower,this
definitionprovidesausefultheoreticallabelwithoutinadvertentlylimitingits
10UnderLawNo.01/2013GuidelinesfortheImplementationofElectionCampaignsby
MembersfortheDPR‐RI,DPDandDPRD),Article13,campaignsactivitiesinclude:(a)closed
meetingswithvoters,(b)face‐to‐facemeetings,(c)disseminatingcampaignmaterialtothe
public,(d)installingadvertisingmaterialinpublicplaces,(e)advertisinginprintand
electronicmedia,(f)generalmeetingsand(g)anyothercampaignactivitynotmentionedhere
thatarenotprohibitedbyotherexistinglaws.Article25ofthelawsstatesthatactivities(a),
(b),(c)and(d)arepermissiblefromthreedaysafterthepartyhasofficiallynominatedthe
candidateupuntilthe‘quietperiod’(masatenang)(whichismandatedbytheKPU)while(e)
and(f)areonlyallowedduringtheofficialcampaignperiod.Thelaw,inArticle26,alsostates
thattheofficialcampaignperiodisdeterminedbytheKPU.
11Someexamplesofcommonincentivesusedtogarnersupportincludeparaphernaliasuchas
t‐shirts,calendarsandclocksthatareoftendistributedinthemonthsleadinguptothe
elections,aswellasthedisplayofpromotionalposters.Morecostlyincentivesinclude
donationstoreligiousinstitutionsorcommunityorganizations,assistancewithsmall
infrastructureprojects,prizegiveaways,anddistributingcashpayments.
7
applicability.12Abroaddefinitionisparticularlyvaluableasnewpartiesmaybeyetto
contestanelectionorestablishthemselvesinaccordancewithlegislative
requirements.Similarly,measurementsofpublicsupportorpercentagesofvotesin
previouselectionscannotbeappliedtopartiescompetinginelectionsforthefirst
time.Defining‘new’politicalpartiesalsopresentsachallengegiventhatmanyparties
arisefromsplitswitholderpartiesorthemergingofparties,whileothersviewanew
nameasasufficientqualificationtobeconsiderednew(BarneaandRahat2011:
305).Janda(1980:22)assertsthatifa‘new’partyretainsanoldname,thenitcanbe
deemedanoldparty;however,ifapartyadoptsanewnamethenitisattemptingto
dissociateitselffromitspast,markingitselfasanovelalternative.Otherwaysto
identifynewpartiesincludetheiruseofstrikinglydifferentideologiestoexisting
partiesand/ortheirbringingtogetherofanew‘coalitionofvoters’.Sometheorists
argue,forexample,thatthepeoplewhovoteforthepartyarewhatdefineit,andthe
morenewvotersapartyhasattracted,themoreitsnewnesshasresonated(Barnea
andRahat2011:307).
Whenreferringtopartiesas‘new’or‘emerging’thisthesisadoptsthedefinition
presentedbyHarmel(1985:405‐406)thatposits‘new’asbothareferencetotheage
ofthepartyandasacommentaryontheirimpactinthepoliticalsphere.Emerging
partiesmaybe‘contenderparties’,whichgenuinelybelievethattheyhavean
opportunityforelectoralsuccess,or‘promoterparties’,whichrecognizethat
electoralsuccessisunlikelybutexisttochannelattentiontoparticularcauses
(HarmelandRobertson1985:517).Whateverthemotivation,thesepartiespresent
themselvesasabreakfromthepoliticalnorm,evenifinrealitytheysharemany
similaritieswitholderparties.Reflectingthisconceptualization,thisthesisalsotakes
intoaccounttheparty’sownself‐identificationasbeingnew.13Bydefinition,
emergingpartiesarealsooppositional,vyingforpoweragainstmoreentrenched
parties.Astheirpoliticalhistorygrowslonger,theiridentificationasanemerging
partynecessarilywanes.
12Forexample,somedefinitionslimitpoliticalpartiestoorganizationsthatnominate
candidatesinstateelectionsorimposeaminimumlevelofrepresentationtodenotethe
significanceofaparty(Harmel1985:405).
13Thisisimportantgiventhattheemergingpartiesinthisstudywereformedbyfigureswho
hadpreviouslybeenmembersofotherpoliticalparties.While,inreality,thepartiescontinue
toespousemanyofthevaluesthatthesefiguresheldduringtheirtenureintheirformer
parties,theyneverthelessattempttopresentthemselvesasbeingnewanddifferent.
8
Studyingnewpartiesoffersanopportunityto‘observetheformationofanewtypeof
politicalorganization’(Harmel1985:411),aswellasofferingalensforexploring
changeandcontinuitywithinapoliticalsystem.Thepopularityofnewpartiesmay
reflectdeepdiscontentwitholderpartiesorwiththepoliticalsystemingeneral.
Manynewpartiesariseas‘protestparties’,seizingupondissatisfactionwiththe
politicalstatusquo(HarmelandRobertson1985:502),sometimesevenwithnoreal
expectationoftakingpower(HarmelandRobertson1985:517;Powell1982:94).
Theremayalsobecaseswherenewpartiesdonotactuallyrepresentanygenuine
differencesfromotherexistingparties,provokingquestionsastowhyanewparty
wasformedatall(Berrington1985:442).Aspreviouslymentioned,severalpartiesin
Indonesiaareconsideredvehiclesforelitesseekingtogainpower,suggestingthat
newpartiesmaybemediumsforacquiringpower,ratherthanissue‐focused.14The
leadersoftheemergingpartiesexaminedinthisstudyhadall,atonetimeoranother,
attemptedtotakeovertheleadershipofan‘old’partybeforeleavingtoformtheir
own(Sherlock2013:4;Tomsa2009),implyingthistobethecase.
Emergingpartiesfaceanumberofchallengesintheirbidforpower.Theseinclude
establishinglegitimacy,buildingrecognitionamongvoters—referredtoinIndonesia
as‘socialization’(sosialisasi)—andboostingtheircompetitivenessagainstbetter‐
establishedrivals.Theymustbalancepromotingthemselvesasanewhopeforthe
countrywiththefactthattheyhavelittleornotrackrecordingovernment.Howcan
politicalpartiesprovethattheyoffervotersnewhopeandrepresentabreakfromthe
past?Onewaythatemergingpartiesdothisisbyportrayingthemselvesasforcesof
change,whatSikk(2012:478)describesasa‘projectofnewness’.Toarguethat
change,initself,isadesirablepoliticaloutcomeisapopularstrategybecauseitdoes
notrelyonclearpoliciesorpracticalsolutions.Newleaders,asdistinctfromold‐
guardpoliticalelites,becomearallyingpointfortheprojectofnewness,evenifthe
party’sideasarenotnovel(Edelman1988:51).Aslongasapartycanconvincevoters
thattheyrepresentsomething‘better’thanwhatcurrentlyexists,ithasthe
opportunitytoappealtodisillusionedvoters.Newpartiesalsohavetheprospectof
constructinga‘politicalenemy’onthegroundsthattheoldpartieshavefailedtomeet
publicaspirations(Edelman1988:66).Whenconstructingtheirpositioninrelation
14Theterms‘elites’canbeusedtodescribe‘rulingelites’,whohavecontrolovertheday‐to‐
dayrunningofthestate;‘oppositionelites’,whocontroloppositionparties,movementsor
NGOsthatplacepressureontheregimetomeettheirdemands;and‘economicelites’,who
controlthevastmajorityofbusinessinterestsinthecountry(Tolstrup2014:127).Whilethis
thesisfocusesonrulingandoppositionelites,theyoftenintertwinewitheconomicinterests
makingitdifficulttodiscretelycategorizeelite.
9
toolderparties,emergingpartiesbenefitfromhavinghadlittlenegativepublicityin
thepastandcanmakeaccusationsagainstrivalswithoutfearofbeingbranded
hypocrites.Forexample,theycanaccuseotherpartiesorpoliticiansofcorruption
withouthavingsufferedfromanymajorscandalsthemselves.Theycanalso,inother
cases,criticizeeconomic,religiousandsocialpolicystanceswithouteverhavingbeen
responsibleforanyunpopulardecisionsinthepast.
Votertendenciesalsopresentanobstacleforemergingparties.Inmostcontexts,
whencompetingagainstolder,moreestablishedparties,newpartiesaregenerally
seentobeatadisadvantage.AstudybyDaltonandWeldon(2005:942)concludes
thateveninsituationswherecitizensaregenerallydistrustfulofpoliticalparties,they
tendtoremainloyaltomoreestablishedparties.15Emergingpartiesmusttherefore
battlenaturaltendenciestovoteforthefamiliar,aswellasthetemptationforcitizens
toforfeittheirvoteasaformofprotest—apracticecommonlyreferredtoin
Indonesianasbelongingtothe‘whitegroup’(golonganputih,golput).16Thismeans
newpartiesfacetheadditionalchallengeofpresentingthemselvesasaviable,
preferablealternativetopre‐existingpartiestowhichthepublichavealreadygrown
accustomed.ThisisallthemoredifficultintheIndonesia,wherevotercynicism
towardspoliticalpartiesishigh.17
Emergingpartiesandthe2014elections
Threeemergingpoliticalpartiescompetedinthe2014Indonesiannationallegislative
elections:thePeople’sConscienceParty(PartaiHatiNuraniRakyat,Hanura);the
GreatIndonesiaMovementParty(PartaiGerakanIndonesiaRaya,Gerindra);andthe
NationalDemocraticParty(PartaiNasdem).Allthreewerebornoutofthepolitical
ambitionsofprominent,wealthyindividualswhohadtriedbutwereunabletotake
15Inrelatedstudies,Mainwaring(1998:71‐72)assertsthatthemoreinstitutionalized
politicalpartysystemsare,thelessopportunitiestherearefornewparties.Dalton(2002:32)
contendsthatevenincountrieswherepartisantiesaredeclining,voterscontinuetouseparty
identificationstohelpthemdeterminewhichpartybestalignswiththeirownpoliticalbeliefs.
Popkin(1991:96‐98)arguesthatvoterssearchfor‘connections’andthelongeraparty’s
history,theeasieritistomakeconnectionsbetweenfutureresultsandpastactions.Thus,
commondecisionmakingstrategiesfavourolderpoliticalparties.
16Thisphraseoriginatesfromthefactthatvoterschosenottovoteforanyparty,thusleaving
theirballot‘white’.Themeaninghasalsobeenextendedtoincludepeoplewhoalsodonot
physicallyvote,eitherasapoliticalstatementoroutofapathy.Officialestimatesin2014
showedthatvoterturnoutwasapproximately75.11percent,anincreaseof4.12percent
from2009,while7.86percentofthosevotesweredeemedspoiltornull(Pemilu2014).
17Furtherdiscussionofvoterattitudestowardspoliticalparties,particularlythosefoundin
surveysbetween2013and2014,canbefoundinChapterThree.
10
overtheleadershipofanexistingparty(Sherlock2003:4).Torealizetheirpolitical
ambitions,theyformednewparties—apracticalnecessitytoachievetheir
presidentialaspirations.Intermsofideology,thesenewpartieshavemany
similarities.Theyallproclaimstrongnationalisticideals,withaferventallegianceto
thenationalethosofPancasilaandIndonesia’s1945Constitution.18Thedifferences
betweenthepartiesaremoredifficulttodiscern,thustheroleofleadershipfiguresas
abasisfordifferentiationwasvital.
HanuraisthepoliticalvehicleofWiranto,aformerhigh‐rankingmilitaryofficerwith
considerableinfluenceduringthelateNewOrder.HeservedasSuharto’saidede
campandascommanderofthearmyduring1998,acriticalperiodinthetransitionto
Reformasi(1998–).After1998,heservedasCoordinatingMinisterofPoliticsand
SecurityunderPresidentAbdurrahmanWahid.Thisappointmentlastedonlythree
monthsasPresidentWahidfacedpressuretodismissWirantofollowinghis
indictmentbytheNationalHumanRightsCommissionforfailingtoeffectively
safeguardhumanrightsfollowingEastTimor’sindependencereferenduminAugust
1999(Crouch2010:138),althoughultimatelynotchargedbytheAttorney‐General’s
office.In2004WirantocontestedthePresidentialelectionasthecandidateforthe
GolkarParty,theelectoralvehicleofformerPresidentSuharto.19Hefinishedthirdin
thepresidentialrace,blaminghisfailureonalackofsupportfromwithinhisown
party(Kawamura2013:16).SeeingnofutureforhimselfinGolkar,heestablished
Hanurainpreparationforthe2009elections(Tomsa2009).Inhispartylaunch
speech,Wirantocriticizedthecurrentleadershipfornothavingthenation’sbest
interestatheart(Hanura2008),butplayeddownhispoliticalambitions,instead
describingtheformationofHanuraasadirectresponsetothegovernment’sfailureto
18PancasilaisIndonesia’snationalphilosophy.Itincludesfivetenets:beliefintheoneand
onlyGod,ajustandcivilizedhumanity,theunityofIndonesia,democracyguidedbytheinner
wisdomandunanimityarisingfromconsensusamongstrepresentatives,andsocialjusticefor
allofthepeopleofIndonesia.Severalofthetenetswerebornoutofthegoalsofthepre‐
independencenationalistmovement.Thesewere:humanity,unity,sovereigntyofthepeople
andsocialjustice.SukarnofirstintroducedhispoliticalphilosophyofPancasilain1945ina
speechon1June1945.ThephilosophycontinuestobetheideologicalbasisfortheIndonesian
Stateandofseveralpoliticalparties.Forfurtherdetailsonthehistoryandpoliticaland
culturalsignificanceofPancasilasee:FeithandCastles(1970);Liddle(1992);Schwarz
(2004);Sundhaussen(1981).
19GolkarwasestablishedbySuhartoforthe1971elections.Liddle(1985:72)describedthe
partyas:‘thegovernment'sparty,anelectoralvehicle…todenyaparliamentarymajorityto
theotherparties.Itsseatsarefilledwithmenandwomenwhohaveorhavehadbureaucratic
careersorareinotherwaysconnectedtothebureaucracy.InParliamentandtheAssembly,
theGolkardelegationshavenevertakenanautonomousinitiative,butserveinsteadasthe
sponsorsofpoliciesarrivedatelsewhereinthegovernment.’
11
fulfiltheaspirationsofthe1945NationalConstitution.20Hanuradescribesitselfasa
’nationalist‐religious’party,whichdrawsitsmoralinfluencebothfromnational
doctrinessuchasPancasilaandreligion(Wiranto2009a).Thepartypurportedto
acceptmoralinputfromallnationally‐recognizedreligions,claimingthatequalityisa
fundamentalgoal,thatpeopleshouldbetreatedequallyregardlessoftribe,religion,
race,politicalbelief,socialstatusandgender.
TheestablishmentofGerindrawascomparabletothatofHanurainseveralways.It
wasalsoestablishedbyaformermilitaryleader,PrabowoSubianto,theformerson‐
in‐lawofPresidentSuharto,whoisbest‐knownforleadingtheIndonesianSpecial
Forces(Kopassus).21WhilePrabowo’spoliticalcareerflounderedafter1998,he
returnedtopoliticsin2004,hopingtogainpresidentialpre‐selectionwithGolkarbut
wasdefeatedbyWiranto.AftersecuringcontroloftheNationalFarmer’sAssociation
(HimpuanKerukunanTaniIndonesia,HKTI)in2004,PrabowoestablishedGerindra
inordertorealizehispresidentialambitions(Tomsa2009).Gerindra’sofficial
declarationalsoarguedthatthegovernmenthadfaileditscitizens(Gerindra2008).
Gerindrapresenteditselfasapeople’spartythatwouldworkto‘buildIndonesia’s
spiritandbody,’andwouldfightforprosperityandjustice.LikeHanura,theparty
alsopledgedacommitmenttoPancasilaandtheConstitutionof1945(Gerindra
2012c).ButPrabowo’scontroversialmilitarypastproveddifficulttoovercome,even
thoughhewasapopularcandidateinsomecircles(Mietzner2010:188).This
controversyincludedallegationsthatheoversawandcondonedhumanrights
violationsinEastTimorandinJakartaduringtheriotsin1998.Hispresidential
prospectsimprovedfrom2009to2014,accompaniedbyanelaborateandexpensive
politicalcampaign(Tempo2014;TimurandPriamarizki2014).Intheend,hefailedto
winthepresidentialelection,receiving46.85percentofoverallvotescomparedto
53.15percentofvotesgarneredbyrivalJokoWidodo(popularlyknownas‘Jokowi’)
(KomisiPemilihanUmum2014b).
20AlsoreferredtoastheRevolutionaryConstitutionof1945,whichincludedthetenetsofthe
Pancasiladoctrineinitspreambleaswellaschaptersaddressingtheunitarynatureofthe
Indonesianstate,thepowersofvariouslevelsofgovernment(namelythelegislatureand
executive),thehumanrightsandreligiousfreedomsguaranteedtoallcitizens,theobligation
thatthegovernmentmustspend20percentofitsbudgetoneducation,stateownershipofthe
majormeansofproduction,andthestate’ssocialwelfareresponsibilities(Republicof
Indonesia1945).
21PrabowoandSuharto’sdaughter,SitiHediatiHariyadi(commonlyknownbyhernickname,
‘Titiek’)divorcedin1998afterSuhartoresignedfromthepresidency(Winarno2014).
12
UnlikeHanuraandGerindra,Nasdemdidnothaveaformermilitarypersonatits
helm,thoughtherewereanumberofex‐officersamongstitsleadership.Nasdemwas
regardedasthepoliticalvehicleofmediamagnateSuryaPaloh,whowasdefeatedin
hisbidforGolkarPartyleadershipbybusinesstycoonAburizalBakriein2011.The
supportstructureforapoliticalpartypre‐datedtheofficiallaunchoftheNasdem
partyinJuly2011intheformofamassorganizationcalledtheNationalDemocrats
establishedin2010.2014markedNasdem’sfirstnationalparliamentaryelectionand
itwastheonlypartythathadnevercontestedanationalelectionbefore.In
rationalisingtheneedtoformanewparty,Nasdemleadershipclaimedthat
Reformasihadfailedandthattherewasaneedtoreturntobasics,arestorationof
Indonesiabasedonthegoalsofthe1945Constitution(Nasdem2011a).Initsparty
manifesto,Nasdempledgeditscommitmenttoademocracythatservedall
Indonesiancitizens,notonlyelites,andfundamentallyrejectedthecurrenttrendof
‘routinelyrecirculatingpower[amongstelites]withouttheemergenceofaleaderof
qualityorworth’(Nasdem2011b).
Forminganewpartywasanecessaryconditiontoachievethepresidential
aspirationsoftheseindividuals,giventherequirementthatapartyholdaminimum
of20percentofseatsinordertonominateapresidentialcandidatewithoutbeing
obligedtoformacoalition.BothHanuraandGerindraactivelypromotedtheirleaders
aspresidentialcandidatesintheleaduptothelegislativeelections.Nasdemdeclined
todothis,primarilybecauseitdidnotactuallybelievethattheywouldgainover20
percentofseatsintheelection.22Finally,onlyGerindra’sleader,PrabowoSubianto,
wentontocontestthepresidentialelections,asHanurafellshortofthethresholdand
subsequentlyoptedtoformacoalitionwiththeIndonesianDemocraticPartyof
Struggle(PartaiDemokrasiIndonesiaPerjuangan,PDIP).Supportingthepresidential
bidoftheeventualwinner,Jokowi,Hanurauseditscampaignmachinestopromote
him.AnumberofpartymembersweresubsequentlyselectedforJokowi’scabinet
andtherehasbeendiscussionabouttheinfluencethatthesepartyleaders,
particularlySuryaPalohfromNasdem,havehadonJokowi’sdecisions.23
22InterviewwithNasdempartyofficial,11April2014.
23DiscussionofthisinfluencecanbefoundinnumerousmediareportfollowingJokowi’s
election.Forexample,respectednewsmagazineTempopublishedanarticleinNovember
2014onPaloh’sstronginfluenceoverPresidentJokowi’sdecisionsandhasunparalleled
accesstothepresident(TempoEnglish2014;Widiarsietal.2014).Otherexamplesofmedia
reportspositingthatSuryaPalohholdssignificantswaywithJokowiinclude:Fakhruddin
(2014);Kiswondari(2014);Sutrisno(2014).PoliticiansassociatedwithNasdemwerethree
grantedministerialpositionsinJokowi’sOctober2014cabinetaswellasthepositionof
attorney‐general,whileHanura‐affiliatedmemberreceivedtwopositions.
13
EquallyimportantinthepresidentialelectionwastheprominenceofGerindra,who
fieldedtheonlyotherpresidentialcandidateinthe2014race.WhileGerindra’s
nationallegislativeoutcomedidnotqualifythemtonominatePrabowowithouta
coalitionofparties,theircampaignmachinewassoeffectivethatthewhatoriginally
seemedlikeaclear‐cutracebecameacloselycontestedbattle—Prabowolostbyonly
46.85percentofvotestothe53.15percentgarneredbyJokowiandhisrunningmate
JusufKalla.Thesenewpartieshaveproventhattheyarenotmerelyafootnotein
Indonesia’spoliticalhistory,buthaveestablishedthemselvesasprincipalactorsin
thepoliticalgame.Whiletheycannotyetclaimthelonghistoryorpopularityofsome
otherparties,theirrespectiveleadershipsareplayingastrategicgamewhichwill
continuetoinfluenceIndonesia’spoliticalsphereintothefuture.
Methodology
Instudyingthesepartiesandindividualcandidates,Ihaveadoptedamixed‐methods
approach.First,Idrewfrom‘groundedtheory’,whichemphasizesthatresearchers
‘setasidetheoreticalideas’whencollatingdatato‘letthesubstantivetheoryemerge’
(Urquhart2013:5).Dataforthisprojectwascollectedoverthreeseparateperiodsof
fieldwork:December2011‐February2012,July2012‐July2013andMarch2014‐
April2014.24IntheinitialproposalforthisstudyIsetouttoresearch
conceptualizationsofcorruptioninIndonesia.Earlyreadingfocusedgenerallyonthe
historyofcorruptioninIndonesiaanddebatesaboutitsimpact.Mythesistopic
narrowedasaconsequenceofobservationsmadeduringmyfirstperiodoffieldwork
tofocusonemergingpartiesandthe2014election.ItwasatthisstagethatI
identifiedthecasestudymethod,anintensivestudyofspecificinstancesofthe
phenomenon(Swanborn2010),asthemostusefulmeansforgatheringandanalysing
furtherdata.
Isubsequentlyrefinedmyconceptualframeworkthroughacomprehensiveoverview
ofrelevantliterature,providingabasisfortheoreticalpropositionsandanalytic
generalization.25Animportantpartofthisprocesswastodeepenmyunderstanding
oftheterm‘corruption’andtoidentifyawaytostepbackfromtheethicalproblemof
corruptpracticesandanalysehowdiscoursesaroundcorruptionareusedin
24ApprovalforthisfieldworkwasreceivedfromtheUniversityofSydneyHumanResearch
EthicsCommittee(HREC)on22August2011.
25Yin(2014:41)assertsthatincasestudies,analyticalgeneralizationisbasedon
corroborating,modifying,rejectingoradvancingnewconceptsasaresultofthestudy.The
ensuinggeneralizationsmadearethusataconceptuallevelwhichishigherthanthatofthe
specificcase.
14
campaigns.Theterm‘corruption’isregularlyusedasacatch‐allforarangeofdistinct
socialpathologiesincludingmismanagementofpublicresources,weakgovernment
institutions,andcomplexrelationshipsbetweenpoliticalactorsandpubliceconomic
assets(ChengandZaum2008:302).Onewidelyuseddefinitionofcorruption
describesitastheabuseofpublicrolesforprivategain(Johnston2005),while
anotherprevalentdefinitionisproposedbyNye(1967:965‐966),identifying
corruptionasbehaviourthatdeviatesfromtheformalpracticeofapublicroledueto
personal(‘private‐regarding’)gains,orthatviolatetherulesofexercisinginfluence.
Thesedefinitions,however,arecriticizedforover‐generalizingtheproblem,failingto
adequatelydefinewhatexactlyconstitutes‘abuse’or‘personalgain’(Philp2008:
311‐312).26Broadlyspeaking,corruptionisnormativelyacceptedasinvolvingsome
formofdeceitwith‘thepretenceofbeingabsolutelyloyaltotheprincipalwhilstin
actualfactbeingintentonbenefitingoneselfand/orthirdparties’(Brasz1963:112).
Whateverformcorruptiontakesitiscommonlyunderstoodashavinganegative
politicalandeconomiceffectonordinarycitizens.Suchunderstandingsconsequently
leadcitizenstoregardcorruptionasaformofinjustice(Anduizaetal.2013:1665).
Despitethegeneralattitudethatcorruptionisbad,conceptualizationsofcorruption
basedonthelaw,moralityandsocialnormsarenotnecessarilycongruent.Legal
definitionsofcorruptionarethosefoundinstatelegislationwhereasmoral
definitionsaredeterminedbysocialcontext.27Moralinterpretationsofcorruptionare
often(butnotexclusively)drawnfromreligionandculture,andidentifycorrupt
actionsasthosewhichareevil(Marquette2012:14)whereassociologicaldefinitions
arederivedfromthesocialnormsofacceptableandunacceptablebehaviourwithina
society(Leys1990:55).Thecontrastbetweenthesedifferentperspectivesis
apparentwhenconsideringLey’s(1990:54)assertionthatforeverycorruptact
deemedbadbyoneperson,thereisatleastoneotherpersonwhoregardsitasgood.
InIndonesia,thisincongruenceisvisibleinthefactthatcorruptioniswidely
26Thereisextensivedebateoverthedefinitionofcorruptioninacademicliterature.For
examplesseeBullandNewell(1997);ChengandZaum(2008);Friedrich(1990);
Heidenheimeretal.(1990);Heywood(1997);Johnston(2005);Mény(1996);Rose‐Ackerman
(1999);Warren(2004).
27TheIndonesianstatehasimplementedanumberofinitiativesinitseffortstocombat
corruption,suchastheCorruptionEradicationCommission(KomisiPemberantasanKorupsi,
KPK)andtheAnti‐CorruptionCourts(PengadilanTindakPidanaKorupsi,Tipikor),designed
toimplementanumberofanti‐corruptionlawsincluding:LawNo.28/1999onState
OrganizersWhoAreFreefromCorruption,CollusionandNepotism,LawNo.31/1999onthe
EradicationoftheCriminalActofCorruption,LawNo.71/2000onProceduresfor
ImplementationofPublicParticipationandProvisionofAppreciationinthePreventionand
EradicationoftheCriminalActofCorruption,andLawNo.8/2010ontheCriminalActof
MoneyLaundering.
15
condemned,yetprevalent.Whatisregardedascorruptionunderthelawmayclash
withsocialnorms,forexample,whatKing(2000:618)describesasriftsbetween
legalnormsand‘folknorms’suchassocialnetworks,kinshipties,friendships,
patron‐clientrelationsandfamilyloyalty.Thedifficultyinestablishingaworkable
definitionforcorruptionlendsitamalleabilityandpropensityformanipulationthat
makeitanattractiveissueforpoliticalpartiesinIndonesia.
Inseekingtoexplainhowunderstandingsofwhatdoesanddoesnotconstitute
corruptionplayintobroadernarrativesofmoralitywithinpoliticalcampaigns,it
becameevidentthatthewaysinwhichpoliticalpartiesandindividualcandidates
definecorruptionareimportant.Inthediscoursesadoptedbypartiesandcandidates
duringelectoralcampaigns,oneoftheprincipalinterpretationsofcorruption
revolvesaroundtheuseofincentivestoattractvoters.Thisisoftendescribedas
‘moneypolitics’and‘vote‐buying’,termsusedtodescribethedistributionofmoney
(orgoods)inordertogainormaintainoffice(Goodpaster2002:100;Mietzner2007).
InIndonesia,thesepracticesareillegalunderLawNo.10/2008ontheGeneral
ElectionofMembersfortheDPR,DPDandDPRD,whichstatesinarticle87(1)that
candidateswillbesanctionedifitisproventhatacampaignerhaspromisedorgiven
moneyorothergoods,directlyorindirectly,inreturnforparticipantsto(a)notuse
theirrighttovote,(b)usetheirrighttovoteinsuchawaythattheyselectacandidate
inawaythatinvalidatestheirvote,(c)voteforaspecificpoliticalpartyparticipating
intheelection,(d)selectaspecificcandidateforDPR,DPRDI,DPRDIIor(e)selecta
specificcandidatefortheDPD.Moneypoliticsisa‘householdphrase’inIndonesia
duetoitsnormalcyduringelectoralcampaigns(Mietzner2007:239).However,as
AspinallandSukmajati(Forthcoming‐b:7)argue,theterm‘moneypolitics’is
imprecise.28Recognizingthisshortcoming,thisterminologyisneverthelessadopted
because,despiteitsfluidity,itiscommonlyusedinIndonesiabypartiesand
candidatesthemselves.Identifyinghowthesetermsareusedtoconceptualize
corruptionisimportantforunderstandinghowsymbolsareimaginedandanti‐
corruptionimagesareincorporatedintocampaigns.
Instudyingtheuseofanti‐corruptionsymbolsbyemergingparties,Idecidedtoadopt
amulti‐scalarapproachwithineachcasestudy,examiningtwodifferent‘units’of
28Instead,AspinallandSukmajati(Forthcoming‐b)adopttheterms‘patronage’and
‘clientelism’asmorespecificdescriptionsofthephenomenaobserved.
16
analysis.29First,thethreecasestudypartiesareexaminedatthenationallevel(the
firstunitofanalysis),lookingatbothmaterialsproducedbythepartyheadoffice—
including,butnotlimitedto,informationoneachparties’‘visionandmission’and
otherdocumentationregardingtheparties’objectivesandraisond’etre,postingson
theofficialwebsiteandsocialmediapostsmadebythoseinthecentralparty
committee(DewanPerwakilanPartai,DPP)andpublicstatementsmadebyparty
leadersandofficialspokespersons—andinterviewswithmembersoftheDPP.
Second,Iconducteddetailedobservationsofthreeparliamentarycandidates(the
secondunitofanalysis),onerepresentingeachparty.Byobservingcampaign
planningandexecution,aswellashavingdirect,personal,accesstothecandidates,
thecasestudiesdevelopedreflecthowtheseindividualsformulatedtheanti‐
corruptionsymbolintheirowncampaigns(i.e.howtheylinkedthemselvestothe
symbol)andwhytheychosetodeliverthesymbolinthewaytheydid.
Intheinitialstagesofthisproject,thequestionofaccesstointerviewsubjectscaused
someconsternationasIdidnothaveanydirectrelationshipswithmembersfromthe
politicalpartiesIwishedtoresearch.However,basingmyselfinJakartaanddrawing
uponcontactsprovidedthroughmypre‐existingnetworksthere,Iwaseventually
abletoorganizeinterviewswithpartymembersfromalmostallpoliticalpartiesthat
competedinthe2014nationalelections.Theseinterviews,inturn,allowedaccessto
otherpartyofficialsforinterviews.Itwasduringthistimethatthefeasibilityofa
studyofemergingpartieswasconfirmed,asIfeltIhadaworkablelevelofaccessto
seniorpartymembersforthepurposesofthisresearch.30ThefactthatIspeak
Indonesianalsoenabledmetodevelopcloserrelationshipswithinterviewees
(althoughsomedidspeakEnglish)thatwouldnothavebeenpossibleusingan
interpreter.Thisexperienceresonateswiththeoriesaboutparticipantobservation,
whichencourageresearcherstousethelocallanguageandengagethroughinformal
interaction(DeWaltandDeWalt2010:4).
Thesecondroundoffieldworkprovidedanopportunitytoconductmoretargeted
interviewswithmembersfromtheselectedcases.Theseinterviewsinitiallyfocused
uponseniorpartymembersbasedinJakarta,withaviewtoestablishhownational
partyleadershipconceptualizeanti‐corruptionissuesandtheimportanceofanti‐
corruptionsymbolsfortheirrespectiveparties.InMarch2013Iapproachedfive
29‘Embeddedcasestudydesign’referstocasestudiesthat‘involveunitsofanalysisatmore
thanonelevel’(Yin2014:53).
30FurtherdetailsofthefieldworkconductedcanbefoundinKramer(2014b).
17
differentparliamentarycandidates(allofwhomIhadalreadyinterviewed)toaskif
theywouldallowmetoaccompanythemasanembeddedobserverwhileintheir
localelectoratesforpartsoftheircampaign.Threecandidatesagreedandpermitted
metotravelwiththemintheirelectorates,intheprovincesofEastJava,South
SulawesiandNorthSumatraastheyorganizedandexecutedtheirelectoral
campaigns.
Athirdperiodoffieldworkprovidedanopportunitytogathermorespecificdata
duringtheofficialcampaignperiodbetween16March2014and6April2014.Access
affordedduringtimespentintheelectoratesincluded:attendanceatstrategy
meetings,logisticalplanningandprocurementdiscussions,attendanceatcommunity
meetingsandrallies,aswellasthe‘off’timeoftravel,lunchandrestingaftertheday’s
activities.Thelatterprovidedanopportunitytoaskquestionsandreflectonthedays’
events.31Visitstothelocalelectoratewereinterspersedwithinterviewsconductedin
Jakarta,whereeachofthecandidatesusuallyresided.Intotal,thecandidateswere
formallyinterviewedaminimumofsixtimesoverthecourseofcampaignplanning
andexecution,inadditiontotimespenttogetherintheirelectorate.Duringthese
periodsItookdetailedfieldnotesinordertobuildanarrativesurroundinghowthe
candidatebehaved,whattheirprioritieswereandwhethercorruptionremaineda
focusoftheircampaign.Intheinterim,Icommunicatedwiththecandidatesface‐to‐
faceinJakarta,andviaemailandtextmessages.Thenarrativedevelopmentdrew
uponanethnographicmethodologyinwhichI,astheresearcher,establisheda
physicalpresenceatmysitedesignedtohelpmeunderstandthe‘aroundchains,
paths,threads,conjunctions,orjuxtapositionsoflocations’(Marcus1995:105).In
addition,usingnon‐physicalcommunicationtodiscussprogress,targetsand
campaignissuesalsoallowedmetodevelopafullpictureofcandidatesandtheir
strategiesovertheyearprecedingtheelection.Havingamassedfirst‐handdata,Ithen
returnedtotheliterature(primaryandsecondary)toexaminehistoricaleventsmore
closelyinordertotracechangesandcontinuitiesinanti‐corruptionsymbolism,with
aneyetounderstandingitsprominenceincontemporaryIndonesia.
31Thelevelofinteractionduringtheseperiodsdependedonthecandidateandcircumstances.
Sometimesthecandidateswouldinvitemefordinnerandwewouldstayinthesame
hotel/houseovernight.Othertimesthiswasnotpossible.Ileftittothecandidatetodetermine
thelevelofinteractiontheywerecomfortablewithduringthese‘off’times.
18
Analysisofdatagatheredfrominterviewsandobservationswasdonefirstthrougha
bottom‐upcodingprocess,whichwasusedtoidentifythemessuggestedbythedata
ratherthantheliterature.32Thethematiccodingwasbuiltuponcommonphrasesand
ideasembeddedintheinterviewtexts.Forinterviewswithpartyofficials(notthe
casestudysubjects),interviewswerecodedtoseeifthereweresimilaritiesand
disparitiesinhowtheindividualsunderstoodtheirparty’santi‐corruptionsymbol.
Thecodedmaterialwasthencross‐referencedtothethemesandrhetoricfoundin
theparty’sofficialdocuments,mediareportingandonlinepresenceinordertogaina
holisticideaofhowthepartyconstructeditsanti‐corruptionsymbol.Forthethree
casestudycandidatesinterviewswerealsocodedthematically,buttheinitialanalysis
comparedtheprominenceofthemesovertimewithineachcaseandthencompared
thethreecasesagainsteachother.Inthisway,theanalysistrackedchangeswithin
theindividualcandidate’sowncampaignandattitudetowardtheanti‐corruption
symbolovertime,aswellascontextualizingitagainsttheothercases.
Limitations
Thisstudyfocusesonhowthesymbolofcorruptionasidentified,developedandused
byanindividualparliamentarycandidatefromeachofthreeemergingpolitical
parties.Asaconsequence,therearelimitationsinitsscope.WhileIndonesian
politicalpartiessharemanysimilarities,theresultsofthisthesisarenotintendedto
begeneralized.Italsoisimpossibletodrawuniversalconclusionsaboutthe
relationshipbetweennationalrhetoricandindividualcandidatesbasedonthese
threecases.Furthermore,giventhecultural,ethnicandreligiousdiversitywithin
Indonesia,eachofthecasestudiesreflectstheparticularitiesofitsgeographic
location.TheindividualcasestudiesforthisresearchweretakenfromNorth
Sumatra,SouthSulawesiandEastJava—threeverydifferentcontexts.Attimes
duringtheresearchIheardanecdotalevidenceexplainingwhycertaincandidates
hadadvantagesordisadvantagesaccordingtoreligion,genderandfamily
background.Whiletheanalysisofcandidatebehaviouraccountsforthesedifferences,
itdoesnotattemptanin‐depthbackgroundstudyontheculturaldifferencesbetween
theregionsandhowthisaffectedcandidatebehaviourorconstituents’reactionto
them.
32Forfurtherdetailsonbottom‐upcodingseeUrquhart(2013:38).Otherrelevantdiscussion
isfoundinYin(2014:136‐137)detailingtheprocessof‘workingyourdatafromthe“ground
up”’.
19
Anotherlimitationofthisstudyisthatitdoesnotincludeanyassessmentofhowthe
parties’anti‐corruptionsymbolsareunderstoodandinterpretedbythevoters,
althoughrelevantliteraturehasbeencitedwhereapplicable.Becausethefocusofthis
thesisistounderstandtherationaleandrelationshipswithintheparty,ithasnotset
outtoassesstheimpactofthesesymbolsonthepublic.Theinformationgatheredis
basedmainlyoninterviewswithmembersofparties,ratherthanthosedecidingtheir
fate.However,whilethecitizenperspectiveofanti‐corruptionsymbolsisoutsidethe
boundsofthisparticularproject,itwouldbeapotentialtopicforfutureresearch.
WhendiscussingissuesofcorruptionandelectionsinIndonesia,thetopicof‘money
politics’invariablyemerges.Understandingthecircumstancesthatpromotetheuse
ofcash,goods,orfavoursinexchangeforvotesisanimportantareaofresearchthat
hasbeentakenupbyotheracademicresearchers.Thisworkisreferencedthroughout
thisthesis.33Butwhilethisstudydoesnotshyawayfromobservationsrelatingtothe
useofmoneypolitics,theseobservationsaredescribedinordertounderstandthe
rationalebehindcertaincampaignstrategiesadoptedbyindividualcandidates,rather
thantoassesstheprevalenceofmoneypoliticsitself.Moreover,thisthesisdoesnot
attempttoexplaininanydetailwhyvotersseekmaterialgoodsorfinancialbenefits.
WhilethisquestionispertinenttoelectoralpoliticsinIndonesia,itfallsoutsidethe
parametersofthisstudy.Anydirectobservationsonthistopicincludedinthisstudy
aresignificantinthecontextofthethreecasestudies,butarenotintendedtocapture
theextentofvote‐buyinginIndonesiaasawhole.
Outlineofthesis
Thisthesisbeginswithadiscussionofrelevanttheoreticalliteraturepertainingtothe
developmentofapoliticalsymbolandhowitiscommunicatedacrossscalestothe
intendedaudience(i.e.voters)withinthecontextofelectioncampaigns.This
literatureunderscorestheinstrumentalsignificanceofcampaignsandthatthe
constructionofpoliticalsymbolsisadeliberateprocessshapedthroughlanguageand
drivenbythedesiretomaximizevotes.Electoralcampaignsaredesignedtoinfluence
voterstoactinacertainwayandtheeffectiveuseofsymbolsiscrucialduringthis
process.Ifpartiesorcandidatesmissthemarkintheirframingofsymbolstheyrisk
experiencingvoterbacklash.Thischapteralsoexplorestheappealofusinganti‐
corruptionsymbolsinpoliticalcampaignsmoregenerallyarguingthat,while
33InparticularseeElectoralDynamicsinIndonesia:MoneyPolitics,PatronageandClientelism
attheGrassroots,editedbyAspinallandSukmajatianddueforpublicationin2015.
20
appealingtomoralpanicscanbeusefulforparties,therearealsohazardsin
convincingthepublicthattheiranti‐corruptionintentionsaregenuine.
ChapterTwotakesupthispoint,chartingthepoliticalhistoryofcorruptionin
Indonesiasincethelatecolonialperiodupuntilthenationalelectionsin2004,andin
doingsopayscloseattentiontohowithasbeenco‐optedbypoliticalactorsovertime.
Indonesia’sgovernmenthas,thusfar,beencharacterizedbythreeverydifferent
regimes—theOldOrderunderSukarno(1945–65),Suharto’sNewOrder(1966–98),
andtheeraofdemocratizationthathascometobeknownasReformasi(1998–).
Therearecommonthreadsintheuseofanti‐corruptionrhetoricthroughoutthese
regimes.Itwasroutinelyusedbygovernmentstodenouncetheirdetractorsduring
boththeOldandNewOrders,andithasbeenopenlyusedinpoliticaljostling
betweenpartiessincetheendoftheNewOrder.Thus,whilethegovernmentsmay
havechangedmarkedly,themobilizationofanti‐corruptionissueshasbeena
continuoustheme.
ChapterThreeprovidesamoredetailedoverviewoftheIndonesianstatefrom2004
to2014,coveringtwotermsofgovernmentunderformerIndonesianpresidentSusilo
BambangYudhoyono.Inunderstandingthisperiodmoredeeply,thesceneissetfor
ananalysisoftheelectoralcampaignsthattookplacein2014.Inparticular,the
prominenceofcorruptionscandals,affectingseveralpartiesbutmostnotably
Yudhoyono’sownDemocraticParty(PartaiDemokrat),wereofmajorsignificancefor
therulingelite.Theyfosteredthescepticismofcitizenstowardpoliticians,
demonstratedbyverylowlevelsofpublicsatisfactionwiththegovernment,and
providedanopportunityforemergingpartiestoportraythemselvesasaclean
alternativetothecorruptandself‐interestedelitesinpower.Itwasinthiscontext
thatemergingpartiesmovedtoattachthemselvestoanti‐corruptionsymbols.
Buildinguponthiscontextualanalysis,ChapterFourexploreshowemergingparties
constructedtheiranti‐corruptionimageatthenationallevel,particularlyintermsof
rhetoricandthemeanstheyusedtopublicizethisimage.Analysingpartydocuments,
theuseofleadershipfiguresandthemedia,thischaptercomparesandcontraststhe
techniquesemployedtoprojectanti‐corruptionsymbolsfromthenationallevel.
Whilethereweredifferencesinhowthesymbolwasconstructed,thereisnodoubt
thatallthreepartieswantedtoportrayapublicimageofbeingcleanandvehemently
againstcorruption.Eachpartyemployedavarietyofchannelsforbroadcastingthis
21
imageacrosstheIndonesianarchipelago,includingofficialwebsites,traditionaland
socialmediaandralliesbynationallevelfigures.Theseefforts,however,fellshort
andnoneofthepartiesperformedaswellastheyhadhoped.
Sohowdidthesenationalcampaignsinfluencecampaigningbyindividual
candidates?Howwerethesenationalanti‐corruptionsymbolsincorporated,ifatall,
inthecampaignsofparticularparliamentaryhopefuls?Thesequestionsare
addressedinChapterFive,whichdescribeshowonecandidatefromeachofthethree
emergingpartieschosetousetheanti‐corruptionsymbolthattheirpartieshad
promotedsostronglyatthenationallevel.Inanalysingtheirexperiences,decisions,
andrationales,thechapterconcludesthattheadoptionandpreservationofnational
levelsymbolsishighlydependentuponthementalityandpersonalconvictionsofthe
individualcandidate.
TheanalysisiscontinuedinChapterSix,whichdrawsthestudy’sfindingstogetherin
ordertoassessthesuccessandsignificanceofusinganti‐corruptionsymbols.It
concludesthatpoliticalsymbolsarechosenbecausetheyreflecttheimportant
politicalissuesofthetime,asidentifiedbypoliticalparties.Buttheirusealsoreflects
thecandidate’spersonalidealsandtheirlocalcontext.Tensionsarisewhenthe
actionsofcandidates,especiallytheuseofmoneypoliticsandvote‐buying,
underminetheanti‐corruptionsymbolthatpartieshaveworkedsohardtoestablish
onthenationalscale.Ifelectioncandidateswishtopresentacredibleimagethatis
persuasive,theymustconsiderhowvoterswillviewtheuseofthesymbolvis‐à‐vis
theiruseofmoneyandgoods.Thefactthatmoneypoliticsandvote‐buyingremains
sorifeinIndonesiacanbeinterpretednotonlyasaperpetuationofingrained
politicalcustoms,butalsoasevidencethatpoliticalcandidateseitherfailto
effectively‘own’theanti‐corruptionsymbolorthattheyareunabletopersuade
votersthateradicatingcorruptionisapriority.Thus,theyareforcedtoresortto
otherformsofpersuasion.
Thethesisconcludesbyunderscoringthatpoliticalsymbol‐creationisinfluencedby
thescaleitisconstructedatandtypeofdiffusionusedtobroadcastit.Thediffusionof
symbolsinnationalelectioncampaigns,conceptualizedbytheDPP,isarelativelyuni‐
directionalandtop‐downprocessinwhichpartiesusepropagandatoinfluence
voters.However,individualcandidatesadoptandreconstitutethesymbolintheway
thattheybelievewillbemostinfluentialforgainingvotes.Itimbuedwiththe
22
candidate’sownpersonalhistoryandideals.Theincongruencebetweennationaland
individualsymbolscanbeexplainedbythedifferentfactorsshapingcampaignsat
thesetwoseparatescales.ThefragmentednatureofIndonesianpoliticalpartiesis
amplifiedbythelackofpartycoordinationandcontrolovertheactionsofindividual
candidateswho,whilerepresentingtheparty,havealotofautonomyinchoosing
howtheycampaignandfaceimmensepressuretoengageinmoneypolitics.
23
24
ChapterOne
Politicalsymbols,campaignsand
corruption
Theuseofpoliticalsymbols,createdwhenpartiesattempttobindthemselvesto
particularsocial,politicaloreconomicissuesinordertoshapetheirpublicimage
andmobilizesupport,isintendedtocreateabondbetweenvoterandparty.
Throughtheuseofthesesymbols,politicalactorsseektoboosttheir‘validityand
legitimacy’and‘symboliccapital’inordertogarnerpopularity(Lahusen1996:48),
andwiththeever‐increasingreachofthemedia,politicalpartiesandcandidates
facemorescrutinythanever(Balkin1999:395‐402;Rosenbergetal.1991:345;
Street2001).Indeed,anumberofstudieshavearguedthatimageismoreimportant
indeterminingvoterpreferencesthanotherfactorssuchaspolicy(Dalton2000:
923‐924;Edelman1988;KrausandGiles1989;Rosenbergetal.1991;Smith2001;
Trilling1975).Duetotheirage,emergingpartiesfaceadditionalchallengesin
demonstratingtheirlegitimacyandcredentials,aswellasmarketingtheirimage,in
theirbidtoseizepowerfrommoreestablishedpoliticalrivals.1
Peoplederiveimpressionsofpoliticsfromtheireverydayexperiences,andpolitical
campaignsrepresentaconsciousattempttoexploitthesedailyinputsinorderto
influencevoters(Schmitt‐BeckandFarrell2002:183‐184).Downs(1957)asserts
thatbecausemostpeopleareunableorunwillingtoinvestlargeamountsoftimein
gatheringinformationinordertomakeelectoraldecisions,votersuse‘information
shortcuts’inordertomakesenseofpolitics.2Inaddition,the‘mentalpicture’ofa
politicalpartyheldbymostvotersisoftenvagueandcontradictoryandtherefore
pronetomanipulation(Trilling1975:285).Assuch,targetedcampaignscanplaya
roleininfluencingpeople,especiallythosewithnofirmpoliticalallegiance.For
1BowlerandFarrell(1992b:4)arguethat,initsmostrationalform,anelectoralcampaign
aimstowin,almostatanycost.Itshouldbenoted,however,thatelectoraltriumphisnot
necessarilytheendgoalforallparties.Forexample,somemaybeconsidered‘promoter
parties’,whichexistnamelytohighlightparticularissues.Thesepartiesmaynothave
sufficientappealorresourcestoactuallywinanelectionbutusethecampaignprocessto
focusattentiononspecificconcerns(BarneaandRahat2011:310;Berrington1985:457;
HarmelandRobertson1985:517).
2Downs’1957workTheEconomicTheoryofDemocracyisrecognizedasaseminaltextin
studyinghowvotersandgovernmentmakerationaldecisionsinthedemocraticcontext.
Numerousstudiesdrawuponthisearlyworkintheirownresearch,forexample:Bowlerand
Farrell(1992b);Capelos(2010);ConoverandFeldman(1989);GreenandHobolt(2008);
Kitschelt(2000);Rohrschneider(2002)andvanderBrug(2004).
25
newerparties,voteruncertaintiesaboutwhatpartiesactuallystandforoffersan
opportunitytoconnectwithvoters;toputdown‘politicalroots’.3Basingerand
Lavine(2005:181‐182)contendthatwhilenotallvoterswillbeswayedby
campaigns,theyprovideanopportunityto‘informandpersuade’thosewhoare
ambivalent.Bychoosingsymbolsthatresonatewithvoters,partiesendeavourto
garnerenoughpublicsupporttoachieveelectoralvictory(GibsonandRömmele
2001;Graber1976:19‐21;Kaufmann2004;Smith2001).4Moreover,evenindefeat,
campaignsservetobuildtheparty’sprofile,withaviewtofutureelections.
Thecreation,transmissionandmutationofpoliticalsymbolsarecoreaspectsof
campaigning(Howard2003:213).Campaignscanbeunderstoodascomprisingfour
basicelements:themessagesthatthecampaignwishestocommunicate;the
channel(s)ofcommunicationemployedtorelaythesemessages;theimpactofthese
messagesupontargetaudiences;andthefeedbackloopfromtheaudiencebackto
thecampaigningorganization(Norris2002:128).Whileselectingpertinentpolitical
symbolsisimportant,framingthesesymbolseffectivelyisalsoparamount.5Oncea
partyhasdecidedwhichsymbolsitwishestoproject,campaignstrategiesand
propagandamustconstructtheminmeaningfulwaysthatareattractivetovoters
(Herrnson1988:14‐15).Withoutaneffectivecommunicationstrategythattakes
intoaccountthesocio‐politicalcontextofthecampaign,partieswillfailtomaximize
theinfluenceoftheirmessage(Grofman1985).Finally,the‘feedbackloop’allows
fortheongoingadaptationofmessagesandcommunicationmechanismsasthe
campaignprogresses,inresponsetoaudienceinput.
TheprominenceofcorruptionasamoralandpoliticalprobleminIndonesiamakes
theanti‐corruptionsymbolattractivetopartiesandcandidates.Corruption—and
3Forfurtherdiscussionontheconceptof‘politicalroots’seeMainwaring(1998:72).
4Farrell(2006:129)arguesthatpartieshaveshiftedfrom‘selling’to‘marketing’
themselves,gatheringinformationaboutvoterwantsandattitudes,andframingtheir
symbolwithinthesenarrativesinordertopursuevotes.Asaconsequence,campaigns
involvemuchmoreplanningthantheyoncedidandpreparationtimesarelonger(Farrell
2006;IyengarandSimon2000).
5Framingistheprocessbywhichactorsare‘activelyengagedintheproductionand
maintenanceofmeaningforconstituents,antagonists,andbystandersorobservers’
(BenfordandSnow2000:613).Inimbuingsymbolswithmeaning,actorsusethemto
generateframesthatsupporttheirviewpoint,whilepossiblychallengingexistingframes.
ForfurtherdiscussionsonframingseeBenfordandSnow(2000);CappellaandJamieson
(1996);ChongandDruckman(2007);Fischer(2003).
26
effortstocombatit—datebacktothecolonialera.6Atthesametime,theperceived
lackofprogressineradicatingcorruptionandpublicbeliefthatitisanentrenched
facetofpoliticsrenderstheissueasensitiveone.7Politiciansmustbalancetheir
attemptstomobilizetheissueinawaythatfosterstheircredibilitywhilealso
allayingpubliccynicism.Individualpoliticiansmayshyawayfromtheanti‐
corruptionissuealtogether,evenwhencombatingcorruptionisapartypriority,
fearingthatscepticalvoterswillscornthemforit.Theymayevendirectlycontradict
theirownparty’sattemptstobuildananti‐corruptionsymbolbytryingtoassure
theirvictorybyengagingincorruptpractices.Incongruentrhetoricandactions
withinapoliticalparty’selectioncampaignmayunderminetheunitedfrontofthe
party,subsequentlyfuellingfurtherscepticismandpublicbacklashfromvoters.
Thischapterdiscussestheoriesonsymboluseincampaignsandwhycorruption,in
particular,maybeapopularpoliticalissueforemergingpartiestodiscuss.Itbegins
withanexaminationofwhysymbolsareimportantforpartiesandthe
considerationsrequiredtoeffectivelypromotethem.Italsodiscusseshowaparty
invokessymbolsacrossdifferentscalesandthedifferenttypesofinfluenceexerted
bytheparty’snationalexecutiveandbyindividualcandidates.Itthenreflectsupon
theabstractbenefitsanddisadvantagesofusingcorruptionasapoliticalsymbol,
whichareparticularlypertinentgivenitshistoryintheIndonesiancontext.The
chapterarguesthatevenintheoreticaltermstherearedangersinusingcorruption
asacampaignissue,especiallygiventhat,inthemindsofmany,thegovernmentand
corruptiongohand‐in‐hand.
Symbols
Symbolsconstitute‘carefullyexecutedattemptstoinfluencethepublicagendain
ordertoshapeelectionoutcomes’(GreenandHobolt2008:473).Partiesattemptto
frametheirimageintermsthatcorrespondwithpublic‘patternsofperception,
interpretationandevaluation’,mobilizingandinterpretinggrievancesinorderto
appealtovoters(Lahusen1996:46).Theymay‘mobilize’votersbyappealingto
ideologicalpriorities,or‘chase’thembyfocusingonpollsandcraftingrhetoricin
linewithwhattheybelievethepublicwantstohear(Rohrschneider2002:368‐
6Corruptionwasalreadyconsideredanentrenchedaspectofthegovernmentbureaucracy
duringtheDutchcolonialperiod(Wertheim1963).Thehistoryofcorruptionandanti‐
corruptioneffortsinmodernIndonesiawillbediscussedatlengthinChapterTwo.
7Citizens’attitudestowardspartiesandpoliticiansintheIndonesiancontextarediscussed
inChapterThree.
27
369).8Assymbolsareintendedtopersuade,partiestendtowardsmainstream
issuesthatlackfinedetail,affordingvoterstheopportunitytointerpretthemin
accordancewiththeirownworldviews.
BowlerandFarrell(1992b:15)contendthatelectoralsuccesshingesonawell‐
conceivedandwell‐executedcampaignbuiltonthreefoundations:partyimage,
leaderimageandtheparty’smanifestoproposals.9Politicalsymbolsaimtogenerate
positiveassociationsacrosstheseelements.Harrop(1990:278)likensthe
campaignprocessto‘servicessoldontrust’,inwhichvoterschoosethesupplier
(thepartyand/orthecandidate)thattheybelievewillmostlikelyoffer‘future
satisfaction’.Assuch,partiesmustconvincevotersthattheyarecompetent,reliable
andconsistent.Furthermore,votersaregenerallyscepticalofgrandpromises,and
thereforepartiesmustbecarefultobuildsymbolsthatareappealingandcredible
(TomzandVanHouweling2008:303).Settlingonthebestsymbolstoadoptisalso
difficultbecausetheymustappealtoswingvoterswithoutalienatingtheexisting
supportbase(Herrnson1988:12).10
Againstthebackdropofaparty’snation‐widecampaign,thepoliticalimageofits
leadersandofindividualcandidatesiscrucial.Thisimagecanbeinfluencedby
physicalelements,includingcandidates’appearanceandpresentationskills,aswell
asasuccessfuluseofrhetorictoframesymbols.11Thecreationofapositive
personalimagepromotesthe‘validityandlegitimacy’ofanactorandhis/hergoals,
8JowettandO'Donnell(2006:33)identifytwomeansthroughwhichpeopleseekto
persuade:eitherbyconfirmingexistingbeliefsorbychallengingthem.Challengingexisting
beliefsoftenfacesresistance.Consequentlymanypoliticalstrategies,particularlyduring
electioncampaigns,focusuponconcernsthatwilleasilygaintractionratherthanattempting
tochangewhatpeoplealreadythink.
9Thesethreekeytenantsareofvaryingsignificanceduringanelectioncampaign.
10Swingvotersareoftenidentifiedasthecoreaudienceforpoliticalcampaigns,asitisthe
undecided,‘centre‐ground,floatingvoters’thatarebelievedtoholdthekeytoelectoral
triumph(Evans2004:137).
11AccordingtoDruckmanetal.(2004:1184),politicalpsychologistshighlightfourimagesor
personalitycharacteristicsthatthepublicfindsappealingandmaybestrategicallyattractive
tocampaigns:competence,strength,warmth,andtrust.Theyarguethatcompetenceis
generallyidentifiedbyvotersasthemostimportanttrait,givingcandidatesanincentive‘to
boostvoters’perceptionsoftheircompetenceandstrengthtohandletoughproblems’.
28
knownas‘symboliccapital’(Lahusen1996:48).12Harrop(1990:279)contendsthat
sincevotersliketoputahumanfacetotheparty,itisuptoindividualmembersto
establishthenewparty’scredibility,thenengendertrustfromthecommunity.For
somevoters,leaderscometoembodythesymbolsandrhetoricoftheirparty,so
muchsothatpartycredibilitycomestodependonaclosealignmentbetween
personalandpartyimage(Capelos2010;Harrop1990).
Thesuccessthatpartieshaveinaligningthemselveswithcertainpoliticalsymbolsis
alsoimportantinestablishing‘cues’forvoters.RecallingDowns’(1957)assertion
thatvotersuse‘informationshortcuts’tounderstandpolitics,cuesareonesuch
shortcutthatassistvoterstomakeinferencesaboutpartiesandcandidates
(ConoverandFeldman1989:914;Hicken2009:5).Forexample,itmaybedesirable
tobuildananti‐corruptionsymbolbecauseofitslinkstoawholerangeof‘public‐
servicerelated’valuessuchastrust,honesty,humanity,equityandresponsibility
thatfeedintomattersofsocialjusticeandequalitybeforethelaw(Collins2012:6).
Ifapartyisabletocreateapopularsymbol,individualcandidatesmaybenefitfrom
beinglinkedtotheparty’s‘brand’(GeysandVermeir2014:1030;Popkin1991:
100).Inbuildingtheirbrand,partieshopetoachieve‘issueownership’—whena
partyorcandidatehassosuccessfullyboundthemselvestoaparticularsymbolthat
theybecomedirectlyequatedwithit—andthemoresalienttheissue,themore
appealingitistobeassociatedwithit.13
Symbolsincampaigns
Petrocik’stheoryof‘issueownership’(1996)isausefulconceptualtoolfor
examininghowpartiestrytoattachthemselvestosalientissues.Petrocik(1996:
826)contendsthatelectoraloutcomesare,tosomeextent,basedonacandidate’s
abilitytoconvincevotersthattheyarebetterpositionedtohandlecertainissues
12Therearedifferentformsofcapital.Inadditiontosymboliccapital,theseinclude
economiccapital(cash,saving,property,etc.),whichfundthecampaign;culturalcapital
(knowledgeandknow‐howassembledbypoliticalactors);andsocialcapital(because
networkscancompelpeopletovoteacertainway)(Lahusen1996:48).Thehigherthese
levelsofcapital,themorelikelyacandidateistosucceed.Inhisstudyofthelegitimacyofaid
organizationsusingcelebrityendorsementforpoliticalmobilization,Lahusen(1996:48‐49)
contendsthatsymboliccapitalplaysanessentialrolein‘capitaltransformation’becauseit
spurstheconversionofotherformsofcapitalintoactivesupport.
13‘Salience’isatermfrequentlyusedtodenotetheimportanceassignedtoaparticularissue,
designatingtheweightthatindividualsattachtopoliticalinformation.Issuesaliencecanbe
increasedthrough‘elitecommunication’withanagenda‐settingfunction,amplifiedbythe
mediaandbyinternationalcommentary(McCannandDomı́nguez1998:485;Zaller1992:
268).However,thereissomedebatearoundtheexactmeaningoftheword(Wlezien2005).
29
thantheiropponents—inotherwords,theycometo‘own’thatissue.14Accordingto
thistheory,themoststraightforwardwayforapartytogainownershipofanissue
isviaa'historyofattention,initiative,andinnovationtowardstheseproblems,
whichleadsvoterstobelievethatoneoftheparties(anditscandidates)ismore
sincereandcommittedtodoingsomethingaboutthem’(Petrocik1996:826).15For
example,intheUnitedStatestheDemocratsaretraditionallyassociatedwithissues
ofeducationandwelfare,whereasRepublicansaremorecloselyassociatedwith
socialissuessuchasfightingcrimeandprotectingmoralvalues.Thisownershiphas
becomeentrenchedoveryearsofpoliticaldiscourseandrivalrybetweentheparties
andtheseassociationswouldbedifficulttoreverse(Petrocik1996).Ownershipcan
alsobe‘performancebased’,suchasinthefieldsofeconomicmanagement,national
securityandbureaucraticperformance,whicharenotautomaticallyownedbya
particularpartybut,rather,areattributedbasedonpolicysuccessesandfailures
(Petrociketal.2003:599).Thusthereareboth‘associative’and‘competence’
dimensionstoissueownership,wherebyvotersassociateapartywithanissue,as
wellasjudgeitscapabilitytoaddressit(Druckmanetal.2004:1182;Walgraveetal.
2012:772‐773).16
14Petrocik’stheoryhasbeenfurtherdevelopedbyanumberofstudies,forexample:
BélangerandMeguid(2008);GreenandHobolt(2008);Kaufmann(2004);Sellers(1998)
andvanderBrug(2004).HeacknowledgesthathisworkdrawsheavilyfromRabinowitz
andMacdonald’s(1989)‘directionaltheory’ofissuevoting,whichpositedthatthesalience
ofissuesforvoterscouldbemeasuredbywhethertheyconjuredpositiveornegative
feelings(markingdirection)andwhetherthosefeelingwerestrongorweak(marking
intensity).RabinowitzandMacdonald,inturn,drewtheiranalysisfromobservationsby
Edelman(1964)thatmostcitizensoperatewithlowlevelsofinformationandtherefore
mostpoliticaldecisionarebasedonemotionalresponses(RabinowitzandMacdonald1989:
94).AnotherrelatedtheorywasputforwardbyCoxandMcCubbins(1986),whoarguethat
itisnotsomuchissues,butratherthepromisetoredistributefavoursandbenefitsonce
elected,thatdrivessupportforcertaincandidates.Thistheoryisbasedonthepremisethat
votersareprimarilydrivenbyself‐interestandwillsupportthecandidatethatpromisesto
channelthemostbenefitstothem.Whilethisargumentholdsadifferenttheoreticalbasisto
Petrocik’sconceptof‘issueownership’,itdoesnotnegatetheimportanceofissueownership
asameansforpromotingacandidate’spromises.
15Thisisnotthesoletheoryadvancedtoexplainvoterdecisions.TomzandVanHouweling
(2008)outlinethreedifferenttheoriesonhowvotersjudgepoliticalcandidates:proximity
theory,whichholdsthatcitizensprefercandidateswhosepositionisclosesttotheirown;
discounting,whichpositsthatvotersrealizethatcandidatesrarelydeliverfullyontheir
campaignpromisesandthereforevoterselectthecandidatetheybelievewillfallclosestto
theirownviewsoncecompromiseshavebeenmade;anddirectionaltheory,whichhas
alreadybeendiscussed.Thesetheoriesarguefordifferentdecision‐makingprocessesbutall
agreeontheimportanceofgainingissueownership.
16Studieshavefoundthatwhilethecompetencedimensiontendstohaveadirectimpacton
voterpreferences,theassociativedimensionisonlyimportantifthevoteralreadydeemsan
issuetobeimportant(GreenandHobolt2008;Walgraveetal.2012).
30
Petrocik(1996:828)arguesthattheownershipofissuesischangeableas
‘reputations…[are]regularlytestedandreinforced’.Thisispertinenttoemerging
partiesthatmaynothavehadtheopportunitytoentrench,orevendemonstrate,
theirperformancecredentials.Issueownershipbyapartymayalsocomebyvirtue
ofbeinguntaintedbytheproblemsfacingotherparties.Corruptionisonepolitical
concernoverwhichpartiescanseizeownershipfromrivals.Forinstance,ifaparty
suffersacorruptionscandalandlosepublicconfidence,rivalshavetheopportunity
toappropriateownershipoftheissue(Pujas2006:36).However,ownershipgained
undersuchcircumstancesislikelytobeshort‐termless(or‘leased’)andless
entrenchedthanthatwhichisbasedonhistory.Inaddition,particularcandidates
cancometo‘own’issuesthatarenottraditionallylinkedtotheirpartiesiftheyhave
anindividualhistorywhichaffordsthemcredibilityoncertainissues(Kaufmann
2004;Sellers1998).IntheIndonesiancase,severalemergingpartypoliticians—
includingtheleadersofallthreepartiesexaminedhere—previouslybelongedto
otherparties,andbringwiththemthereputationsthattheyestablishedtotheir
newroles.Thoseenteringpoliticsfromotherfields,suchasactivistsorbusiness
people,mayalso‘own’anissuebyvirtueoftheirpastprofessionalexperience.
Issueownershipissignificantbecauseitpromotesthebeliefthatcertainparties
and/orcandidatesarebetterabletohandleparticularpoliticalconcerns,allowing
voterstoselectpartiesthattheybelievewillbestaddresstheissuestheyprioritize
(BélangerandMeguid2008).Notonlyarepartiesactivelyadvertisingthemselves
andtheirsymbolstothemasses(GibsonandRömmele2001:32;Smith2001),but
themassesaresearchingforhintsastowhowillbestmeettheirpolitical
expectations.However,advertisingisnotastraightforwardprocessascampaigns
needtoaccountforcitizens’priorknowledgeandlong‐heldbeliefsaboutparties
andcandidates(AnsolabehereandIyengar1994:335;DaltonandWeldon2005).
Campaignsdonotoccurinavacuumandeffectiveissueownershipneedstohave
somebasis,eitherinthehistoryoftheparty(orlackthereofinthecaseofemerging
parties)and/orthecandidate,andsymbolsmustbedevelopedthrougheffective
narratives.Otherwise,campaignsruntheriskofbeingunconvincing,oreven
appearinghypocritical,iftheytrytogainownershipoveranissueonwhichthe
partyorcandidatehasapoortrackrecord.
Inattachingthemselvestoasymbol,politicalpartiesandcandidatesmustensure
notonlythattheirmessageisbeingrelayedeffectively,butalsothattheaudienceis
31
asreceptiveaspossibletothemessage.Onestrategyusedtoimprovethesalienceof
symbolsis‘issuepriming’whereby‘extensivemediacoverageorcandidate
discussionofspecificpolicyareas…primevotestogivemoreweighttothoseareas
assessingcandidates’(Druckmanetal.2004:1180).17Inanattempttonurture
discussionfocusedonissuesrelatedtotheirchosenpoliticalsymbols,partiesand
candidatesrepeatedlyunderscoretheissueinpublicforums,hopingtoconvince
votersthatitshouldbetheirprioritytoo.Throughsuccessfulissuepriming,the
salienceofthechosenissueisincreased,hopefullyleadingtopublicsupportforthe
party’s(orcandidate’s)stanceand/orrecognitionoftheissueasbeingofnational
importance(JacobsandShapiro2000;TraugottandLavrakas2000).
Issueprimingmaybeinfluencedbythecandidate’sownviewsbutmustalsotake
intoaccountexistingpublicdiscourseandexternaleventsthatmaylimitorbroaden
thepublicagenda.Voterdecisionsmaybeinfluenced,inpart,bythepolitical
campaign,buttheimpactofissueprimingwillalsodependuponaperson’s
individualbeliefs,religion,ideologyandpersonalhistory.18Somevotersarestaunch
supportersofaparticularpoliticalpartyorfaction(Reid1988:42).Thesepeople
aregenerallynotthetargetsofpoliticalcampaigns,whichareaimedatswingvoters
whoaremorelikelytorespondtodiscussionsoncontemporaryissues.Conversely,
as(Capelos2010)contends,ifavoterissympathetictoaparticularcandidate,they
mayalsotendtoagreewiththemintheirevaluationofpolicyissues.Amongstthese
voters,thecandidaterepresentstheprimaryvehicleofdebate,providinga
justificationforcandidate‐centriccampaigns(Reid1988:38).
Developinganarrative
Politicalsymbolscanbeconstructedintwomainways.Thefirst,asdiscussedinthe
workofPetrocik,isthroughlong‐termattentiontowardsaparticularissueorsome
otherdemonstrationofcommitmentthroughperformance.Thesecondisthrough
persuasion.Persuasivenarrativesrepresentakeymethodofconstructing,
preservingandsellingpoliticalsymbols.Ifapartycannotdemonstrateanongoing
historicalcommitmenttotheissueitwishestouseasasymbol,itmustdevelopa
17Issueprimingisalsoreferredtoas‘agendasetting’(IyengarandSimon2000:157).
18HuckfeldtandSprague(1992:83)notethatindividuals’politicalpreferencesare
influencednotjustbypartiesasorganizations,butalsobyfactorssuchaseducation,age,
gender,religionandethnicattachment.Inaddition,anumberofstudiesinvestigatevoters’
perceptionsandreactionstopoliticalcandidates.Thisresearchwasprimarilypioneeredby
politicalscientistsintheUnitedStates,suchasLazarsfeldetal.(1948).Forotherexamples
seeHuckfeldtandSprague(1992);Lodgeetal.(1995);Rahnetal.(1994).
32
coherentandconvincingnarrativethatpositionsthepartyinrelationtothat
symbol.BennettandEdelman(1985:159)definenarrativesas‘sociallyexistent,
patternedinterpretationsoftheworld…thatframepeople’sviewsofsituations,of
“rationality,ofobjectivity,ofmorality,andoftheirconceptionsofthemselvesand
others”’.Politicalcommunicationisbasedonthecreationof‘stockpoliticalplots’:
formulaicstoriesthatdissolveambiguitybycreating‘blackandwhitereplaysof
politicaldramas’whicharedesignedtopacifythepublic.19Apter(2006:223)
describessuchdiscoursesas‘masternarratives’,inwhichpoliticianstakeissuesof
everydayconcern,playinguponmoraldiscontent,tocreate‘expressionsofgoodand
evilastheultimatepoliticaldivide’.
Politicalsymbolsareprimarilybroadcastthroughlanguageandactionsthatare
deliberatelyfashionedtopersuadevoters.20Inhistreatiseonrhetoric,Burke(1969:
41)describesitastheartofpersuasionitselfwiththebasicintentionofinducing
actionsinhumanagents.21Rhetoriccantakeanumberofforms,butisbroadly
definedbytheintentiontopersuadeobservers,toorganizetheirattitudesandalter
theirviewsofobjectsandissues(Gusfield1986:170).Itisabehaviourthatisboth
instrumentalandsymbolic:instrumentalbecauseitisintendedtoprovokea
particularactionandsymbolicbecauseitdrawsuponexamples/wordsinorderto
elicitmuchbroaderideasoremotionswithintheaudience(BowersandOchs1971:
2).Specificvocabulariesaredevelopedtodeliverthesenarratives,resultingin‘a
particularmodeorethosofmoralreasoning…thatincludesnotonlyparticular
formsofmoralargumentation,butalsoparticularsymbols,signs,codewords,and
othermoralresources[emphasisintheoriginal]’(Lowe2002:108).Intermsof
19PioneeredbyBennettandEdelman,the‘narrativeapproach’topoliticalcommunication
viewsitastheadaptationoffacts,newsandeventstocreate“stockpoliticalplots”intended
topersuadevoters(Lahusen1996:21).Itshouldbenoted,though,thatthefactthata
politicalplotisconsidered‘stock’,doesnotmeanthatitisnotcontroversial—indeed,a
controversialplotmaybemoreusefulbecauseitgarnersmoreattention.Whatpartiesmust
dowithsuchissuesisensurethattheyfallonthe‘right’sideofthecontroversialdebatein
ordertoappealtotheirtargetaudience(Edelman1988:14).
20This‘artofpersuasion’refersbothtotheactofcommunication(fromthelistener’s
perspective),andpersuasionbeingtheintention/successfuloutcomeofthatcommunication
(fromthespeaker’sperspective)(Chateris‐Black2005:8).
21Burke(1952:x‐xvi;1969;1989),apioneerinthestudyofpoliticallanguage,arguesthat
languageandsymbolsarequintessentiallysignificanttopoliticalandsocialprocesses.
Moreover,thefunctionoflanguageis‘whollyrealistic,andiscontinuallybornanew;theuse
oflanguageasasymbolicmeansofinducingcooperationinbeingsthatbynaturerespondto
symbols’(Burke1969:43).Burkeproposeda‘dramatismpentad’,inwhichmotiveis
attributedtolanguagebasedonananalysisofact(whathappened),scene(whereitwas
done),agent(whodidit),agency(howtheydiditandwhatmethodsortechniquesthey
used)andpurpose(whyithappened)(Burke1989:14‐15).Hecontendsthattextualanalysis
usingthistechniqueallowsobserverstodiscernthemotivesbehindrhetoric.
33
politicalmarketing,wordsalsomatter;theycreatea‘positiveresidualstimulus’
whilealsoattractingattentionviasound‐bites(Reid1988:37).
TheclassicalnotionofsuccessfulrhetoricwasfirstdefinedbyAristotleasthe
demonstrationofethos,logosandpathos—tohavemoral‘worthiness’orcredibility
(ethos),prooftosupportargument(logos),andthecapacitytoarousefeelingsinthe
audience(pathos)(citedinChateris‐Black2005:11).Investigatingthesethree
elementsprovidesavaluablestartingpointforassessingwhyrhetoricmaysucceed
orfailinitsaims.Forexample,aspeechbyapoliticianmayevokeasenseofmoral
worthiness,butiftheoratorfailstoprovideprooftosupporttheargument,or
deliveritpersuadingly,thentherhetoricwillfailtomovetheaudience.
Aristotle’stheorydoesnotclarifytherelativeimportanceofeachoftheseelements,
butwiththesignificanceofimageandpersonalityinpolitics,themethodof
communicatinghasbecomeincreasinglymeaningful.Withregardtopathos,the
impactofcharismaandrhetoriconemotionssuchasfear,weaknessand
ignorance—orwhatissometimesreferredtoasdemagoguery—canbeparticularly
influential,dependingonthecontextandaudience.22Charismacanneverbeentirely
divorcedfromactions(Keane1997:12),butwhataleaderlacksinmoralcredibility
andproofmaybecompensatedforbyhisorherabilitytostirtheemotionsofthe
audience,usingbothanarrestingstyleofdeliveryandsymbols.Drawingfrom
Weber’stheoryofcharismaticleadership,thebenefitsofthischarismacanbe
transferredtoothermembersofthepartythroughthecoordinatedadoptionof
matchingsymbols,linkingothersinthegroupwiththeimageofitscharismatic
leader(Starratt1993:12).23Inotherwords,ifcommunicatedeffectively,the
symbolswithwhichtheleaderisassociatedmaycometobeassociatedwiththe
partyasawhole.Intheabsenceofcharismaordemagoguery,anarrativemust
demonstratealogicalandmeaningfulrelationshipbetweenthefacts,events,objects
andpersonsinvolvedifitistobecredibletoanaudience(Lahusen1996:24).
Withoutsucharelationship,thenarrativebecomesunintelligibleandincoherent.
22Lindholm(1990:7)definescharismaasarelationshipbetweenleaderandfollowersin
whichtheleaderisimbuedwithextraordinaryqualities.Forexample,peoplewhoare
‘downtroddenandoppressedbyasystemtheyconsiderillegitimate’maylooktoa
‘charismaticsaviour’toaddresstheirconcerns(Lindholm1990:175).
23Weber(1947:328)definesthree‘pure’typesoflegitimateauthority:rationalgrounds,
traditionalgroundsandcharismaticgrounds.Charismaticlegitimacyisbasedon‘devotionto
thespecificandexceptionalsanctity,heroismorexemplarycharacterofanindividual
person,andofthenormativepatternsororderrevealedorordainedbyhim’.
34
ReturningtoAristotle’sfacetsofsuccessfulrhetoric,rhetoriccannotsucceedifthe
linguisticchoicesofthespeaker(thelogos)donotmatchthelistener’sevaluationof
thespeaker’sethos.24
Thenotionthatthedesiretoinfluenceopiniondetermineslanguagechoiceisalso
thefoundationfortheconceptof‘dramatism’(Burke1952;1989;Gusfield1986).
Dramatismrepresentsthedistinctionbetweenpoliticalactionas‘significantperse’
and‘asameanstoanends’(Gusfield1986:166).25Language,here,isdramatic
becauseitsprimarymotiveistoinspireacertainactionintheaudience.Theconcept
ofdramatism,or‘politics‐as‐theatre’,alsoprovidesaframeworkforunderstanding
themotivationsbehindcertainpromisesortokenisticactionsthatmaybevery
visiblebutyieldlittleintheformofactualchange.26Apter(2006:222)claimsthat
decisionsmadebypoliticiansshouldbeviewedasinstrumental,astheirultimate
intentionistomanipulatepublicopinioninordertogenerateormaintainpower.27
Theinfluenceofpoliticaltheatreshouldnotbeunderestimatedbecause:
Itoffersopportunitiestobeguile,entice,orentrapaudience,apublic,ora
citizen.Itisalsoawayofencouragingapreferenceforpassionoverreason
…Inshortitis,amongotherthings,amethodofinstrumentalgulling…It
canbesimplyfun,entertaining,butnotwhenthatpreventscitizensfrom
takingamorepropermeasureoftruth(Apter2006:247).
24Thefailuretounderstandtherelationshipbetweenthesetwofacetshasledtoanegative
viewofrhetoricasmerelyan‘over‐decorativeuseoflanguage’(Chateris‐Black2005:9).
Rhetoricisoftennegativelyequatedwithstyleoversubstance,thoughthisunderstanding
ignoresthenotionthatcredibilityis,infact,anintrinsicfacetofsuccessfulrhetoric.
25Burke’stheoryofdramatismwasexpandedinthepoliticalcontextbyGusfield(1986)in
hisseminalworkontheAmericantemperancemovement.Throughthisstudy,Gusfield
elaboratedtheideaofdramatisminpoliticsandthe‘state‐as‐theatre’,arguingthattheuseof
symbolsisofcrucialsignificanceforshapingpublicopinion.
26Blackbourn(1987:149),inhisstudyofGermanpoliticsfrom1848–1933,contendsthat
theconceptofpoliticsastheatrefirstemergedin1848whenalooselycoordinated
revolutioneruptedintheGermanstatesagitatingfortheunificationofallGerman‐speaking
states.Therevolutionwasunsuccessful,butthisperiodbecamerenownedforthecharisma
andpublicimagedevelopedbyrevolutionaries:‘Fewwhohavewrittenontheeventsofthat
yearhavefailedtonoteinpassingtheself‐consciousnessoftherevolutionaries,theirverbal,
gesturalandsartorialtheatricality.’
27Anderson(1990:152‐193)outlinesseveralformsofpoliticalcommunicationinIndonesia
thatcanbeviewedthroughthelensofdramatism,includingthebuildingofmonuments.
Aimingtorousenationalistsentimentamongstthemasses,severalmonumentswerebuiltin
JakartaduringtheSukarnoPeriod,eachwithitsownassociatednarrative.Theactof
buildingthesemonumentswasadramaticgestureintendedtodemonstrateSukarno’sown
commitmenttothenationwhilstalsoencouraginganimpassionedresponsefromcitizensto
supporthisregime,evenwhileitwasfailingpoliticallyandeconomically.Thepoliticaland
economichistoryofSukarno’sOldOrderruleisdiscussedfurtherinChapterTwo.
35
Thereisnothingbanalaboutpolitics‐as‐theatresincethepurposeofdramatismlies
inthemanipulationofpublicsentiment,whichisinturnusedtoseize,retainand
exercisepower(Apter1992).28Becausepeoplearegenerallydistrustfulofpolitical
rhetoric,apolitician’ssuccessliesnotonlyintheirabilitytoselectpertinent
politicalsymbolsbutalsotoportraytheminawaythatconvincesvotersthattheir
‘dramatic’selfisatruereflectionoftheir‘authentic’self(Giesen2006:354‐355).
Symboldiffusionacrossscales
AsSartori(1976:71)argues,farfrombeingasingleunit,partiesareinfact
miniaturepoliticalsystems.29Withinthesesystems,symbolsaredefinedand
communicateddifferentlyatdifferentlevels.Theoriesofdiffusion,whichseekto
explainhowideasspread,provideawayofunderstandingthesedifferencesin
termsofthetypesofinteractionsthatvaryinglevelsofapartymayhavewith
voters.30Classicaldiffusiontheoryholdsthatideascantravelthroughrelational,
non‐relationalormediatedchannels(Givanetal.2010:2;Tarrow2011:192).
Relationalchannelsrelyondirectcontactbetweenpeople,mostoftenthosewho
trusteachother.Non‐relationaldiffusionoccursdirectlybetweenpeoplewhodo
nothavearelationshiporindirectlythroughthesharingofideasviathemedia.
Mediateddiffusionoccursthrough‘brokers’whotalkabouttheideasofothers,
actingasabridgebetweenpeoplewhomightnototherwisehaveknowneach
other.31Morerecentdiscussionsofdiffusionassertthattheprocessisfluidand
oftentheideabeingdiffusedisneitherclearnorevenafinishedproduct.Attention
28Forexample,Rauer(2006)describestheoutpouringofnationalandinternationalsupport
garneredthroughthesymbolicactionofGermanChancellorWillyBrandtkneelingatthe
WarsawMemorialin1971,whichhonouredmembersoftheJewishGhettoUprisingof1943.
Treisman(1998:15),inanotheracademicdiscussionofthepowerofpoliticalsymbols,
contendsthatinRussia’sdemocratictransitionduringthe1990s,theuseofcontroversial
issues,languagethatflatteredvotersandsexualimageryledtoanelectionthatfocusedless
onthe‘credibilityandattractivenessofpoliciesthanonentertainmentvalueandthe
catharticreleaseofthepoliticalspectacleitself’.
29Sartori’sanalysisfocusesupontheunitsthatcompriseapartyandintra‐partyrelations.
Hedoesnotseektoexplainhowthedifferentelementsofparties’internalpoliticalsystems
affecttheflowofpoliticalsymbolsandtheproductfinallypresentedtovoters.
30Predominantlyassociatedwithstudiesofsocialmovements,thetheoryofdiffusionwas
adoptedbyacademicsduringthe1990stounderstandhowideasspreadwithin,and
between,socialmovements(ChabotandDuyvendak2002).Earlystudiesfocuseduponhow
innovationsspreadfromtransmittertoadoptercommunities(StrangandSoule1998).The
conceptlaterexpandedtoincludethetransmissionofideas(BaybeckandHuckfeldt2002:
197).
31Whilethereisageneralconsensusintheliteraturethatthesethreechannels,eitheralone
orincombination,areameansforthetransferofideas,forexamplesseeMcAdamandRucht
(1993);StrangandMeyer(1993),therehasalsobeendebateovertheessentialistnatureof
diffusiontheoryinitsclassicalform(ChabotandDuyvendak2002).
36
mustbepaidtohowagroupreceivinganoutsideideamakesittheirown.Also,
diffusiondoesnotnecessarilyoccurinlinealprogressivestagesbutisrathera
dynamicprocessthatismultidirectionalinitsmovementsacrossscalesandcanskip
steps(ChabotandDuyvendak2002).32
Thenotionofdiffusionasaprocessthatoccursacrossscales,butnotnecessarilyin
aunidirectionalmanner,providesaframeworkforanalysinghowpoliticalsymbols
arebothinfluencedandtransmitted.Inapoliticalcampaign,thediffusionof
symbolsworksprimarilyintwodifferentways.First,therearenationalcampaigns
thatreach‐outvotersvianon‐relationalchannels,suchasadvertisingandreporting
inthenationalmedia.Inasense,these‘skip’alevelbecausethemessageis
broadcastdirectlyfrompartyheadquarterstoindividuals,by‐passingpartyofficials
atthelocallevel.Inacentrally‐organizedelectioncampaign,thecentralparty
leadershipselectswhatitbelievestobethemostpertinentsymbols,thencreatesa
campaignthatpresentsthemasbeingrepresentativeofthepartyasawhole.It
decidesuponnarrativeandcampaigntechniques.Discussionsamongstseniorparty
membersdeterminetheoverallcampaignprioritiesofthepartyandtheuseof
resourcesatthenationallevel.Centralizedfundsearmarkedforpublicityareused
todisseminatethesymbolsthroughvariousadvertisingmethods.Withthe
‘professionalization’ofelectioncampaigns,thecentralpartyofficealsohasan
increasedimportanceasasiteofcoordinationforthedifferentfacetsofa
professionalcampaign,includingtraditionalcommunicationsandevents,television,
andnewtechnologies(FarrellandWebb1998:4‐6;GibsonandRömmele2001).33
Partieshiremediaandmarketingprofessionalsascampaignconsultantstodevelop
targetedmessages,whicharethenbroadcasttovotersacrossthecountryusing
variousnon‐relationalchannels.Themarketingteamaregenerallychargedwith
lobbyingnationalmediaoutlets,aswellasusingthemforpaidadvertising
(Hopmannetal.2012),furtherconsolidatingtheroleofsymboldevelopmentatthe
nationalscale.
32InhisstudyoftheIndonesianpro‐democracymovement,Uhlin(1995)employsdiffusion
theorytoexplainthespreadofdemocraticideasfromforeigncountriestoIndonesia.While
thisthesisfocusesonthetransferofideasdomestically,itdrawsfromsimilar
understandingsofdiffusiontheory.
33FarrellandWebb(1998:4)definetraditionalmeansofcampaigningascommunication
throughpartypress,posters,massralliesandcanvassingaswellaseventscentredaround
partyleaders,suchas‘whistlestoptours’andmassrallies.
37
Second,thecandidatesthemselvescanbeviewedasconduitsthattransmitthe
symbolviarelationaldiffusion.Partysymbolsareconceptualizedandrecordedin
manifestos,‘visionandmission’documents,andactionplans,itissharedwiththe
individualcandidates.Onceinthefield,itisthecandidateswhoaresingingthe
praisesofthepartyandtryingtopersuadevotersthattheirgroupisthebest.
However,oncecandidatesare‘released’intotheelectionwild,sotospeak,they
decide,basedontheirownideasandexperiences,howbesttoexhibitthesymbolin
ordertooptimizeresults(i.e.gainthemostvotes).Inrealitythen,candidatesare
notonlyachannelfortheparty’sideas,butalsoasymbolcreatorthemselves,
instillingtheirownvalues,historyandpersonalityintothesymbolsasthey
translatethemintotheirlocalcontext.Indonesia’sdemocraticsystemrequiresthat
partiesnominatecandidatestorepresentthemineachelectorateandtocompetein
nationalelections,butthecampaignfocusofmostcandidatesisatthelocallevel(a
few,thoughnotmany,maybeactiveonthenationalscale).Thelackofoversightof
localcampaignsbythecentralpartyofficefostersanenvironmentinwhich
candidateshaveagreatdealofautonomyovertheimagetheyprojectandthe
campaignstrategiestheyuse.Asaconsequence,candidatesfeelentitledtoadopt
theirownsymbols,regardlessofwhathasbeendecidedatthenationallevel.
Giventhatvotersarealreadyexposedtopartysymbolsvianon‐relationalmeans,it
wouldappeartomakesenseforindividualcandidatestoappropriatethesesymbols
intotheirownelectioneering,buildingupontheeffortsofthenationallevel
campaign.34However,candidatesdonotalwaysusesymbolsidentifiedbydecision‐
makersatthenationallevelinthesameway,ifatall.Theymayholdverydifferent
ideasaboutvoterinterestsfromprofessionaladvisorsbasedinJakarta,orthe
attitudes,habitsandbeliefsofvotersmayforcethemtoadapttheircampaign
(Fionna2014:12‐13).35Thepoliticalsymbolisthus(re)constitutedwiththe
prioritiesoflocalvotersinmind.36Thesocialcontextissignificanthere:for
example,ifacommunityismostlypessimisticinitsviewofpoliticsoraparticular
34Hicken(2009:5)referstothisintermsof‘economiesofscale’,notingthatthereare
advantagestocooperatingwithothercandidatesunderacommonpartybannerbecauseall
candidatescanbenefitfrompartyinvestmentinvotereducationoreffortstoincrease
turnout.
35ResultsofanIndikator(anIndonesianpollingcompany)pollconductedinDecember2013
suggestthatvotereducationandincomeplayasignificantroleinattitudestowardsvote‐
buyinginIndonesia,withmoreaffluentandbettereducatedvotersmorelikelytoshunsuch
practices(Halim2013).Thismayaccountfordisparitiesintheacceptanceofvote‐buying
betweendifferentregionsinIndonesia,furtherunderscoringtheimportanceoflocalcontext.
36ThesepointsareaddressedinfurtherdetailinChaptersFiveandSix.
38
candidate,thensocialnetworkswillensurethatthisviewspreads.Inthesecases,
candidatesmayfindthatpoliticalsymbolshavenoeffectonvotersthatmayinturn
leadthemtovote‐buying,which,althoughillegal,iscommonintheIndonesian
context.37
Candidatesthemselvesalsocarrytheirownideas,views,historiesandnarratives,
whichinfluencehowtheyconstructtheirsymbols.Forexample,along‐timeanti‐
corruptioncampaignerislikelytousethisanti‐corruptionsymbolregardlessof
whetheritresonateswiththelocalvoters,whereasabusinessperson‐turned‐
candidatemayavoidananti‐corruptionsymbolbecauses/hehaspaidbribesto
officialsinthepastandfearsexposureasahypocrite.Somecandidatesmayidentify
verystronglywiththenarrativeofbeinga‘clean’candidate,whileothersmayhave
noqualmsaboutofferingcashinreturnforvotes.Moreover,since‘oneperson’s
bribeisanotherperson’sgift’(Rose‐Ackerman1999:5),candidatesmayunderstand
differenttypesofpracticesinvariousways.Forsomecandidates,givinggifts,money
orfavourstovotersdoesnotconstitutebribery,butisinsteadframedaspartof
socially‐embeddedandexpectedpracticesofclientelismwhichdemonstraterespect
orgratitude,orareintendedasareimbursementforthetimeandeffortofvoters.38
Furthermore,candidateswillnotnecessarilyadheretooneparticularstrategy.
Randall(1988:177)referstothis‘schizophrenicblend’ofcorruption/clientelism
andideology,that‘ambitious’politiciansmayusetodiversifytheirstrategy,to
demonstratethatsymbolsmaybeconsideredoneofmanycampaigntoolsavailable
tocandidates,andatotalcommitmenttothesymbolisbynomeansaprerequisite
foritsattempteduse.
37LawNo.10/2008ontheGeneralElectionofmembersfortheDPR,DPDandDPRDstates
inarticle87(1)thatcandidateswillbesanctionedifitisproventhatacampaignerhas
promisedorgivenmoneyorothergoods,directlyorindirectly,inreturnforparticipantsto
(a)notusetheirrighttovote,(b)usetheirrighttovoteinsuchawaythattheyselecta
candidateinawaythatinvalidatestheirvote,(c)voteforaspecificpoliticalparty
participatingintheelection,(d)selectaspecificcandidateforDPR,DPRDI,DPRDIIor(e)
selectaspecificcandidatefortheDPD.
38Clientelism,definedbyHicken(2011:289‐290)as‘thecombinationofparticularistic
targetingandcontingency‐basedexchange’withinadyadicrelationshipbetweenpatronand
client,canalsobeviewedsimplyasanormalandnecessarycomponentofsecuringsupport
forelectionsratherthanaformofiniquity.KitscheltandWilkinson(2007)alsodistinguish
betweenclientelisticandprogrammaticlinkagesintermsofthetargetofbenefits.For
example,clientelisticlinkagestargetindividualsandsmallgroupswhileprogrammatic
linkagesdeliverbenefitstolargegroupsorrepresentacollectivegood.Forfurther
discussiononthedefinitionofclientelismseeHicken(2011);Hutchcroft(2000:214‐216);
KitscheltandWilkinson(2007);Randall(2001:249‐251).
39
Why(anti)corruptionsymbols?
Selectingsymbolsthatdrawheavilyuponideasofwhatconstitutesrightandwrong
isapopularstrategyamongstpoliticalparties.Contextualunderstandingsof
morality—thecriteriausedtoevaluatesocialbehaviourandgoalsasgoodorbad,
desirableorundesirable(LidzandWalker1980),orientinganddirectingsocial
actionwithinboundariesofculturalacceptability(Ben‐Yehuda1986:495)—playa
roleindeterminingwhatsymbolsapartymaychoose.AccordingtoBen‐Yehuda
(1986),theuseofmoralarguments—specifically‘moralpanics’inpolitics—canbe
viewedintwoways:fromamoralperspectivetheyreflectstruggleswithinsociety
itself.Fromaninterestperspective,moralargumentsareusedtoadvancethe
politicalinterestsofcertainpeople/groupsandchallengeexistingpowerrelations.
Whilethetwoapproachesarenotmutuallyexclusive,theinterestperspective
explainsthemotivationforpoliticalpartiestolatchontoaparticularmoralissue
duringcampaigningandtouseitasasymbolinthecontestagainstotherparties.
AsBecker(1973:2)asserts,thereisasenseofcommunitasforthosewhoidentify
withtheseideasofmoralitythatpromotesthesocialattachmentthatpartiesseek
fromvoters.39Thosewhoexploitmorality,usingthefeargeneratedbymoralpanics
fortheirownbenefit,aredescribedas‘moralentrepreneurs’(Becker1973).Their
manipulationofmoralitysuggeststhattheyaredrivenbyfunctionalismratherthan
anactualsenseofinjustice,‘imply[ing]thatmoralitymaybeusedfornonmoral
issues’(Ben‐Yehuda1986:496).Inacontextwherecorruptionisseenas
ubiquitous,theidentificationofcorruptionasaformofdeviancefromacceptable
socialbehaviourservesaparticularpoliticalfunction.Sincethebehaviourisnotout
oftheordinary,anti‐corruptiondiscoursesmustdrawonmoral(andsometimes
legal)understandingsofcorruptionratherthanonsociologicalunderstandings.The
easewithwhichtheideacanbeengineered,andwhocanbedeemedcorrupt,is
39Lahusen(1996:51)identifiesBourdieu’sconceptofthe‘classhabitus’inrelationtothis
point.Acommunitymaybeunitedbya'specificpatternofperception,judgementsand
evaluationsthatdetermineswhatparticularindividualsandclustersofindividualsjudgeas
beingmoralorimmoral,asmakingsenseornosense,beingmeaningfulormeaningless,
tastefulortasteless'.
40
appealingtopoliticalcampaignersaimingtoattractsupport,inspiretrust,represent
‘good’andattackenemiesinonefellswoop.40
Whilecorruptionisnormativelyunderstoodashavinganegativeimpact,
intensifyingsocietalinequalitiesandunderminingdemocraticsystems(Mény1996:
309‐310;Sampson2010;UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme1997),itis
inextricablylinkedtothepracticalitiesofholdingpoliticaloffice.41AsGronbeck
(1978:156)contends:
Wearedealing…witharangeofpoliticaloffenceswhichperhaps
characterizeanygovernmentatanytime—graft,kickbacks,overzealous
promotionthroughthemeritocracy,slushfundswhichhavepubliceffects
withoutpublicaccountability,favorswhichbypassnormalchannels.Weare
dealing,insum,withthosebehaviorswhichmanypeopletakeaspartofthe
everydaycostofgovernment.Indeeditistheveryroutinenessofpolitical
corruptionwhichmakesitspublicairingandtreatmentsofascinating
rhetorically.Itsroutinenessandubiquity…makeitatoncefarcicaland
tragic.
YetwhilesomeIndonesiansmayviewcorruptionasnormal(orevennecessary),
thisdoesnotmeanthatanti‐corruptionsymbolsmustbeavoided.Asnotedearlier,
therearepolitically‘safe’symbolsthatpeoplearesoaccustomedtotheideological
formulationofthesestockplotsthattheyseemtobe‘naturalandadequate
characterizationsofreality’(BennettandEdelman1985:185).Thesimplificationof
corruptionwithinamoralframeworkofgoodversusevilmeansthatpoliticiansare
onlyrequiredtoelaborateontheissueinordertoaffirmthattheyfallonthe
virtuoussideofthedivide.Asatopicthatisneitherradicalnorpolarizing,
40HighlightingcorruptionasapoliticalconcernisnotuniquetoIndonesia.McCoyand
Heckel(2001)arguethataglobalanti‐corruptionnormemergedinthe1990s.Examplesof
country‐specificstudiesinclude:McCannandDomı́nguez(1998),whodiscusstheroleof
anti‐corruptiondiscourseinmobilizingvotersinMexicobetween1986and1995,
concludingthatlongstandingcorruptionissuesdidnotnecessarilyleadtosupportfor
oppositionparties;Lawson(2009),whoresearchedtheanti‐corruptionsymbolsusedin
KenyaandNigeria,wheresuchcampaignshavesufferedfromissuesoflegitimacy;and
Costas‐Pérezetal.(2012),whostudiedtheimpactofcorruptionscandalsonincumbentsin
Spain,findingthatacandidatecanloseupto14percentoftheirvoteifmediacoverageis
extensive,butmayloseveryfewvotesifthescandalisnotwidelypublicized.
41Functionalistargumentsportraycorruptionasplayinganimportantroleinfacilitating
governmentprocessesbecauseitcanpromoteflexibilityand‘unblocksystems’inorderto
getthingsdone,particularlyinstateswithbureaucraciesthataredifficulttonavigate
(Becquart‐Leclerq1990:193).
41
corruptionisabroadandmalleableissuewhichcanbeusedtoinfluenceundecided
voterswithoutalienatingexistingsupporters.Moreover,sincecorruptionis
notoriousinIndonesia,theissuehasalreadybeenprimedandpartiesdonotneed
tospendtimeconvincingvotersofitssignificance.Thestrong,almostuniversal,
identificationofcorruptionasagravepolitical,economicandsocialproblemhasled
toageneralconsensus,atleastpublicly,thatitneedstobeeradicated.
Campaigningonananti‐corruptionplatformpresentsanopportunityforpoliticians
topositionthemselveswithinamoralframeworkwhichhasbroaderimplications
thanjusttheeradicationofcorruption.Tobuildanimageofbeingstaunchlyagainst
corruptionspeaksnotonlytoa(declared)commitmenttofightingcorruption,but
alsopaintsthepartyinapositivelightoverall.Cultivatinga‘persona’isanintegral
partofthepoliticalcampaignprocess,andbeing‘anti‐corruption’isnotonly
publiclypalatablebutbrandsthepartybyassociatingitwithkeypoliticalvalueslike
ensuringruleoflawandequalaccesstogoodsandservicesfromthegovernment.
Animageofbeingcorruption‐freealsoplaysintotheelectabilityofa
party/candidate.Partiesthathavenotsufferedfromcorruptionscandals(likenew
parties)arewell‐placedtoadoptananti‐corruptionsymbolgiventheir(relatively)
‘clean’histories.Thisprovidesthemacomparativeadvantagewhichfacilitatesissue
ownership(IyengarandSimon2000:157)andthusincreasestheirsymboliccapital.
Ifapartycanconvincethepublicthattheirdedicationtocombatingcorruptionis
strongerthanthatoftheirrivals,itwillboosttheirsupportamongstvoterswho
agreethateradicatingcorruptionshouldbeprioritized.
Oppositionpartiesandcandidatesmayhaveanumberofothermotivationstouse
anti‐corruptionsymbols.First,drawingattentiontocorruptionissuesduringthe
earlystagesofcampaigning,particularlyaspectsrelatedtoelectoralfraud,allows
themabasistoquestionunfavourableresults(McCannetal.1998:485).Second,
usingsuchsymbolsassistsinattackingopponents,especiallyincumbents,levying
chargesofimproprietyorcorruptionagainstthem,promotingcampaignsfocused
onmoralcharacter,personalfinances,familylifeanddailyhabits(Welchand
Hibbing1997:228).Oppositionpartiesoftenappealtovotersforsupportonthe
groundsthattheyarebestplacedto‘banishelectoralfraudandcorruptionforever’
insituationswheretheincumbentgovernmenthasfailedinthisregard(McCannet
al.1998:485).Third,anti‐corruptionrhetoricmayalsoprovideameansfor
conveyingveiledcriticismsofotherparties,cloakingunpalatablepowerstruggles.
42
Asaninstrumentalsymbol,itdoesnotopenlyinsultopponents,butprovideswhat
Graber(1976:25)termsa‘codedmessage’ofcriticism.
However,adoptionofananti‐corruptionsymbolmayalsobeperilous.Corruption
reinforcesasymmetricalpowerrelationsandthusbenefitsthosewithavested
interestinmaintainingthesystem.Moreover,becausecorruptionandpowerareso
closelyassociated,candidates’attemptstoportraythemselvesortheirpartiesas
‘anti‐corruption’maybegreetedwithscepticism.Becquart‐Leclerq(1990:191)
arguesthatthepubliccaneasilybecomedeaftopoliticiansclaimingthattheyare
notorwillneverbecorrupt,becausetheybelievepoliticsisaninherentlydirty
game:
Feelingsofdislike,evendisgust,forpoliticsarequitefrequentandtranslate
intoapathy,orcynicism,orarejectionofpolitics.Thesesentimentsare
ambivalent,becausecorruptionseemsinherenttotheexerciseofpower.
Thelinkcanbefatal:couldonedobetterintheplaceofthosewhogovern?
Isitpossibletoplaypoliticswithoutdirtyingone’shand?
Ifcorruptionisconsideredaninherentaspectofwieldingpower,thenananti‐
corruptionsymbolmaynothavethedesiredeffectonvotersbecausetheyexpect
politicianstobecorrupt,andthereforetheexposureofcorruptactivitiesisjustthe
confirmationofsomethingalreadysuspected(WelchandHibbing1997:238).Voter
sympathiescanalsoleadthemtorationalizecorruptionscandalsinvolvingparties
thattheyhavepreviouslysupported.AstudybyAnduizaetal.(2013)inSpainfound
thatvotersaremorelenienttowardscorruptionifitaffectsapartytowhichthey
aresympathetic.42Theargumenthereisthatcognitivedissonancebetweena
preferredpartyandacorruptcandidateisaddressedbymodifyingoneofthe
cognitions,suchthatvotersaremorelikelytodownplaytheimportanceof
corruptionratherthanchangetheirpoliticalpredisposition.Researchsuggeststhat
citizensarestilllikelytovoteforcorruptpoliticiansiftheyperceivethatitwillbring
materialbenefittotheirdistrict(KonstantinidisandXezonakis2013).Ananti‐
42Inarelatedstudy,MullainathanandWashington(2006)assertthatvotersarelikelytobe
moreforgivingofpoliticiansthattheyhavevotedforbecauseoftheirinternalneedfor
consistency,resultingincognitivedissonancerationalizingbetweentheiractionsandtheir
morals.Theargumentisthatvotersdonotwishtobelievethattheyhavedoneabadthingin
votingforaparticularcandidateandarethereforemorelikelytojustifythecandidate’s
actions.
43
corruptionsymbol,therefore,holdnoguaranteesforthosewhochoosetoadoptit
andadopteesshouldunderstandtheprioritiesandattitudesoftheiraudienceifthey
wishtomaximizethebenefitsofaligningthemselveswithananti‐corruptioncause.
Conclusion
Thisthesisdrawsuponthesetheoriesofsymbolicpoliticsasastartingpointfor
examininghowIndonesia’spoliticalpartiesconstructtheiridentity.Thedesireto
winvotescompelspartiesandcandidatestoidentifyandshapesalientsymbolsthat
elicitsupportfromvoters.InthecaseofpoliticalpartiesinIndonesia,official
symbolsaredevelopedatthenationallevel.ThecentralizedstructureofIndonesian
politicalpartiesmeansthattheyaredevisedalmostexclusivelybyparties’central
management,usuallywithlittlefeedbackfromlocalbranchoffices.Their
manifestos,platformsandmediaimagesarecontrolledfromJakarta,wheretheir
centralcommitteesarebased.Butwhiledecision‐makingovercorepartyideasare
thedomainofthesecommittees,itisindividualparliamentarycandidateswhoare
chargedwithpromotingthepartytoconstituentsatthelocallevel.Thecentral
committeehavelittlecontroloncethecampaignisinthehandsoflocalcandidates,
lackingtheresources,andarguablyinterest,tomonitorhowcandidatesconstruct
theirindividualcampaignsorhowtheyusesymbols.43
Alltheemergingpartiesdiscussedinthisstudyadoptedananti‐corruptionsymbol
duringtheir2014legislativecampaigns.Therewasawidespreadperception—
confirmedbyanumberofsurveysconductedbetween2012and2014thatfound
thattheIndonesianpublichadlowlevelsoftrustintheirrepresentatives44—that
incumbentparliamentariansandpoliticalpartieswereoverwhelminglycorruptand
drivenbyeliteambitionratherthantheaspirationsofthepeople.Atthenational
level,Hanura,GerindraandNasdemadoptedrhetoricanddramatismintendedto
persuadevotersthattheyweretheanti‐corruptionpartytosupport.Atthesame
time,individualcandidateswereaffordedtheopportunitytoestablishtheirown
43AsGantanandBusrya(2014)note,politicalpartiesdoverylittletoensurethatpolitical
candidatesdonotbuyvotesortoestablishabetterpoliticalcultureinIndonesia.
Furthermore,asMietzner(2013:83)argues,candidatesarerarelypartycadresandare
morelikelytobeindividualsseekingpartyendorsementfortheirelectoralbid.Inthis
context,hequotesacentralpartyofficialwhostatedthattheprimarycriteriaforselecting
candidateswerepopularityinsurveys,theirabilitytofundtheirowncampaignand
governmentexperience.Whiletheyshouldnotcontradictpartyideology,thereisno
compulsionforthemtobepartycadres.
44ThesesurveysarediscussedfurtherinChapterThree.
44
symbolsandcampaignstrategies.Theprevalenceofmoneypoliticsandvote‐
buying,combinedwiththelackofpartyoversight,meantthatcandidatesfaceda
difficultdecisionofwhethertomarketthemselvesas‘clean’andanti‐corruption,to
buyvotesorto—somewhatprecariously—doboth.
Inordertounderstandhowcorruptionbecamesuchanentrenchedaspectof
Indonesia’spoliticaldiscourseand,asaconsequence,suchapopularpolitical
symbol,itisimperativetounderstandthehistoricalcontextofcorruption.
Indonesia’sdeeppoliticalhistoryregardinganti‐corruptiondiscoursegoessome
waytoexplainingitscontemporarypopularityasapoliticalsymbol.Immortalizedin
theearlyyearsoftherepublicasaproblemofmoralimperative,anti‐corruption
discoursecametorepresentthemyriadillsfacingIndonesia;itwasthereasonwhy
theelitesmaintainedpower;itwasthereasonforbureaucraticinefficiency;andit
explainedtheincreasingdisparitybetweentherichandthepoor.Theneedto
eradicatecorruptionbecamearallyingpointbothforthoseingovernment,who
usedittodenounceadversaries,andoppositionforces,whousedittoattackthe
statusquoandcallforchange.Yet,allthewhile,noneoftherhetoricorstepstaken
tocombatcorruptionseemedtosuccessfullyputanendtoits(perceived)endemic
nature,anditremainsaprevalentconcerninIndonesiatoday.
45
46
ChapterTwo
Tracingthehistoryofanti‐corruption
Precisedefinitionsandinterpretationsofcorruptionareelusive;however,the
embeddednatureofanti‐corruptionsymbolisminIndonesianpoliticsisapparent,as
evidencedbyitsrecurringprominencesinceindependence.Followingindependence,
Indonesia,likemanyfledglingpost‐colonialstates,facedtheproblemofentrenched
governmentcorruption(Khan1998:17‐19;Myrdal1968:948;Smith1971:23‐24).
Severalscholarsarguethatthesocialnormsofpre‐colonialIndonesiansociety,such
asstrongpatronagenetworksandafocusonfamilythatencouragednepotism,
providedabasisforcorruptpractices(Anderson1990:59‐62;Smith1971;Soedarso
1969).1Deep‐seatedcorruptioninthebureaucracyisalsoattributedtothe
continuationofmanycolonialinstitutionsfollowingindependence(Cribb1994:1).2
Whileanti‐corruptioneffortsinIndonesiahavebeenvisible(thoughinconsistent)
sinceindependence,itwasduringcolonialismthatthefirstconcertedattemptsto
addresstheproblemweremade.Dutchcolonialleadershipidentifiedcorruptionasa
prominentissueduringthe1920s,whenGovernor‐GeneralDirkFock,whopresided
overtheNetherlandsEastIndiesfrom1921–1926,commissionedinvestigationsinto
corruptofficialswhohadacceptedkickbacksorembezzledfromthetreasury.The
Governor‐Generalappearedintentontacklingcorruptionwithinthecolonial
administrationandanumberofconvictionsandseveraldismissalsensued
(Wertheim1963:144).Fock’sactionshighlightedchangingperceptionsinthe
1Inparticular,Anderson(1990:58‐60)arguesthatJavaneseideasofpower,basedaround
patron‐clientrelationshipsandaculturallyembeddedpatrimonialmodel,fosteredsystemsof
dependencyevidentinthemorphologyofcorruptioninmodernIndonesia.
2ThemechanismsofDutchbureaucracyduringthecolonialperiodinstitutionalized
corruptionintheeverydaydealingsofthestate(Kahin2003:10;Smith1971:23;
Sundhaussen1978:54).Atfirst,theDutchdidlittletodevelopstateinstitutionswithintheir
colony,theNetherlandsEastIndies,insteadattachingthemselvestopre‐existingfeudalistic
systemswiththeJavaneseeliteoverseeingagriculturalproduction(Kahin2003:2;McCarthy
2011:95).ThecomplicatedadministrativefunctionsoftheDutchEastIndiesCompany
(VereenigdeOost‐IndischeCompagnie,VOC),establishedin1602,asbothacompanyandan
administrator,shapedthebehaviourofbureaucrats(Day1904;Smith1971;Wertheim1963:
142).WhiletheVOC’sprofitswerehigh,theadministratorsthatoversawthevaluable
shipmentsofgoodsreceivedlowwages,encouragingillicitconduct.Later,around1830,the
DutchintroducedtheCultivationSystemwhichinvolvedtheproductionofcashcrops
overseenbylocalregentsandsoldtotheadministrationatfixed,low,prices(Kahin2003:11).
ThesystemintroducedIndonesianelitestoacasheconomy.Meanwhile,Dutchadministrators
werediscouragedfromreprimandinglocalregentswhoabusedtheirsubjectsinorderto
maximizepersonalprofitsfromcashcropproduction,fosteringanenvironmentwhereelites
couldexploitvillagerswithrelativeimpunity(Fasseur1994:52‐53;Ricklefs2001:157).
47
acceptabilityofsuchpracticeswithinthestate,butthesemeasuresdidnotassumea
symbolicsignificancebecausetheywereprimarilyaimedatsecuringgovernment
revenueratherthanboostingtheadministration’spopularity.
ChangingattitudestowardscorruptionwerealsolinkedtotheriseofIndonesian
nationalismandthedesireforindependence(Smith1971:25).Asconceptualizations
of‘acceptable’and‘non‐acceptable’behaviouramongstgovernmentofficialsaltered,
ideologiesofequalityandsocialjusticealsocametothefore,drivingthenationalist
movement.3CorruptionbecameyetanothersourceofgrievanceagainsttheDutch,
viewedasunderminingthevaluesofdemocracyandjusticethattheindependence
movementwasfightingfor(Kahin2003:52).Fromthe1920s–1930s,suchideals
werelargelyconfinedtotheeducatedelite(McVey1996:13)and,asWertheim
(1963:149)argues,therevolutionreflectedaburgeoningnationalsolidarity,but‘this
senseofunityhasnotpenetrateddeeplyenoughtoguaranteestrictloyaltyfromcivil
servantsandcitizensintimesofpeacefulconstruction’.Nationalistsidentified
corruptionasacolonialproblem,buttherewasworsetocomefollowing
independence.
Thischapteroutlinesabriefhistoryofthemannerinwhichanti‐corruptionsymbols
weremobilizedinIndonesiafromindependenceupto2009,establishingthatanti‐
corruptionhasbeenapersistentpoliticalsymbol.However,thelonghistoryofanti‐
corruptionrhetoricisnotnecessarilyreflectiveofagenuinedesiretoeradicate
corruption.Thishistorydemonstratesthatalthoughcorruptionhaslongbeenan
issueofpublicconcern,anti‐corruptionsymbolsemergepredominantlywhenthey
offerpoliticalleverage.Conceptualizinganti‐corruptionasapoliticalsymbolallows
forthefurtheranalysisofanapparentparadoxwithinIndonesianpolitics:while
manypoliticiansandpartieshavetalkedwithgreatfanfareaboutcombating
corruption,generalpublicsentimentisthatverylittleprogresshasbeenmadeonthe
issuesince1998.
AfterIndependence
SukarnoandHatta,Indonesia’sfirstpresidentandvice‐president,declaredIndonesia
anindependentstateon17August1945,twodaysafterthesurrenderoftheJapanese
3TheseideologiesofequalityandsocialjusticewerelaterenshrinedinIndonesia’snational
ideology,Pancasila,asdiscussedintheIntroduction.
48
duringWorldWarTwo.4FollowingawarforindependenceagainsttheDutch,which
endedin1949,afledglingparliamentarydemocracywasestablished.Theearly
periodofparliamentarydemocracywasmarkedbyintensebattlesbetweenarange
ofactors,includingpoliticalparties,figuresintheArmyandSukarnohimself(Lev
1994:41).Politicalpartiescompetedforpower,themostsignificantbeingthe
NationalistParty(PartaiNasionalisIndonesia,PNI);Masyumi,whichrepresented
Islamicpoliticalinterests;theSocialistParty(PartaiSosialisIndonesia,PSI);andthe
CommunistParty(PartaiKommunisIndonesia,PKI).5Mostcabinetswerebasedon
precariouscoalitions,withpartiesfocuseduponsecuringtheirpoliticalsurvival
ratherthanaddressingpolicyconcerns(CribbandBrown1995:64;Feith1962:
165).6
Partiesbegantoplayanimportantpatronagefunctionsoonafterparliamentwas
established.Severalministersusedtheirpositiontohelpfamilymembers,repay
personaldebtsandcreatelucrativebusinessopportunities(Feith1962:147;Vickers
2013:137).Recognizingpotentialcareerbenefits,manybureaucratsalsojoined
politicalpartiesandbytheendof1950mostcivilservantswerealsopartymembers
(Feith1962:125).Partyleaderswereobligedtodistributefavoursandmaterial
rewardstoloyalsupportersthroughcabinetposts,businessopportunities,overseas
junkets,housesandcars(CribbandBrown1995:59‐60;Feith1962:123),whichalso
ledtofactionalismandtheriseofintra‐partycompetition(Feith1962:126).
Politicianswhorefusedtodistributepatronageriskedfacingoppositioninparliament
andlimitingtheircareers.7
4Japansurrenderedunconditionallyon15August1945,presentingtheIndonesianleadership
anopportunitytodeclareindependencebeforetheDutchcouldrestoretheirauthority
(Ricklefs2001:259).However,thisstatuswasnotinternationallyrecognizeduntil1949when
IndonesiaprevailedintherevolutionagainsttheDutch.ForfurtherdetailsontheIndonesian
struggleforindependencefrom1945–1949seeReid(1974)andKahin(2003).
5Differentideologiessupportedspecificpartiesandthisphenomenoncametobeknownas
aliran(literally‘stream’).AlirantendanciesgainedtractionduringtheOldOrderand
remainedprominentthroughouttheNewOrderregimeaspeopleidentifiedwithparticular
‘streams’ofpolitics(Ufen2008).Theconceptofaliranhasalongpoliticalhistorythat,infact,
pre‐datestheOldOrder.ForfurtherdiscussionoftheinfluenceofaliranonIndonesianpolitics
seeCrouch(1980);Feith(1962);FeithandCastles(1970:13‐18).Forfurtherinformationon
thesepoliticalparties,theirbackgroundsandideologiesseeFeith(1962),McVey(1994)and
Ricklefs(2001:292‐294).
6FromSeptember1950toApril1957thereweresixseparatecabinets,lasting,onaverage,a
yeareach(Brown2003:181).
7Forexample,Feith(1962:169)assertsthattheNatsircabinet(September1950–April1951),
ledbyMasyumipoliticianMohammadNatsir,facedoppositionbecausetheFinanceMinister,
SjafruddinPrawiranegara(alsofromMasyumi),refusedtodistributepatronage.
49
Ingrainedcorruptioninthebureaucracyisoftenattributedtothelowremuneration
ofcivilservants(Legge1972:331;McLeod2008;Smith1971;Wertheim1963).After
thestruggleforindependence,thegovernmentslashedthesalariesofhigh‐ranking
bureaucratswhohadservedundertheDutch,placingthemonsimilarpay‐gradesto
newercivilservants.Benefitstobureaucratswereagaincutin1952whenthe
governmentwasunabletoaffordwageincreases,provideIdulFitribonusesorrice
allowances(Feith1962:256‐247).8Thedisparitybetweensalaryandstatusfostered
discontent,asmanycivilservantsperceivedthattheirearningsdidnotbefitthe
importanceoftheirpositions.9Dissatisfactionwithpayledcivilservantstoseekother
sourcesofincome,oftenusingtheirauthorityasleverage(Legge1972:331).Withthe
governmentincapableofimplementingstrictsanctionsagainstcorruption,such
practicesflourished.
Militaryinvolvementineconomicactivities,whichalsoencouragedcorruption,
becamenormalizedduringthewarforindependenceandcontinuedintothe1950s
(Crouch1975;1980:38‐41;Ricklefs2001:306).High‐rankingofficerslaunched
businesses,collectingprofitsforboththemselvesandthemilitary(CribbandBrown
1995:75;Crouch1975;Penders1974).Armyleadersrationalizedthesepracticesas
subsidizingtheinadequatebudgetreceivedfromthestate(CribbandBrown1995:
75;Crouch1980:39;Ricklefs2001).Inaddition,militaryofficersturnedapersonal
profitfromtheirbusinessdealingsandsubsequentlydistributedpatronageto
subordinates,fosteringnetworksofloyalsupporterswithinarmyranks(Crouch
1979;McLeod2011a:56).Whilesuchpracticesweregenerallytoleratedbyarmy
leaders,theirexistencewas,nevertheless,sometimesusedwhenofficerswishedto
publiclydefamerivals.Forexample,oneoftheearliestpublicaccusationsof
corruptioninthenewrepublicwasmadein1952,stemmingfromaconflictbetween
theChiefofStaff,ColonelNasution,andstaunchSukarnosupporter,ColonelBambang
Supeno,resultinginaflurryofaccusationsbetweendifferentfactionsinthe
8IdulFitriistheIslamicholidayfollowingthefastingmonthofRamadan.Itistraditionally
markedbythegivingofgifts,includingemployeebonuses.
9Aliteraryexamplefromthisperiod(1954)detailingthisdilemmaisthenovelKorupsi
(Corruption)byrenownedIndonesianauthorPramoedyaAnataToer.Thebookdetailsthe
moralstruggleofacivilservantwhoisunabletoprovidehisfamilywitha‘respectable
standardofliving’onhismeagregovernmentsalary(Foulcher1995:167).Therationalization
usedbythebook’sprotagonist,Basir,isbaseduponasenseoffinancialentitlement,whichis
atoddswithhiscurrentstandardofliving.Basirturnstocorruption,adecisionheagonizes
over,ontheonehandknowingitis‘immoral’butontheotherhandfeelinghehastherightto
abetterstandardoflivingbyvirtueofhisposition(Toer1954:12).
50
military.10Whilethechargesyieldednoconvictions,theyintensifiedfactionalschisms
withinboththearmyandthegovernment.
Mirroringtheinternalallegationsinthemilitary,accusationsofcorruptionbecame
commonamongstparliamentarians.Theneedtoeradicateitbecameagovernment
catch‐cryinthelead‐uptoIndonesia’sfirstdemocraticelection,heldon29
September1955.Keentoestablishtheiranti‐corruptioncredentials,thecaretaker
cabinetledbyBurhanuddinHarahap,basedonacoalitionbetweenMasyumi,PSIand
NahdlatulUlama(NU),claimeditwantedtoreinstatethemoralauthorityofthe
governmentintheleaduptotheelection.11Adoptingapublicanti‐corruption
campaign,itsetouttocleanuptheadministrativeandexecutivebranchesofthe
government(Penders1974:151;vanderKroef1956:131).Whiletherewaslittleto
suggestthatthenewcabinetwasanylesscorruptthanitspredecessors,theHarahap
cabinetaccusedpreviouscabinetsofseveralcountsofcorruptionandworkedwith
thearmytoarrestindividuals(Penders1974:151;Ricklefs2001:303;Teik1972).12
Thoughthegovernmentstatedthatthearrestswerenotpoliticallydriven,most
arrestedweremembersofrivalpartyPNI.
Theprosecutionofthosearrestedproveddifficult.Thecaretakergovernmenthad
troublebuildingcasesagainsttheaccused,claimingtheyhadbeencarefultocover
theirtracks.Themootedsolutiontothiswasthepassingofanemergencylaw,which
allowedforseparatetribunalstohearcorruptioncases,compellingdefendantsto
answerquestionsputtothem(Feith1962:438‐439).Thisbillwaspassedinthe
10Severalleaders,alldeemedtobesympathizersoftheIndonesianSocialistParty,were
accusedofcorruption(Feith1962:252).Inresponse,amotionwascalledinOctober1952for
aspecialparliamentaryinvestigationintoadministrativeandfinancialfraudintheMinistryof
DefenceandArmedForces.TheMinisterforDefence,SultanHamengkuBuwonoIX,sawthis
asapersonalattack.Asawell‐respected,independentmemberofthecabinet,theSultanhad
supportfromanumberofsmallerpartieswhorejectedthemotion,claimingitwould
destabilizethegovernment.PSIalsocounteredthemotion,statingthatmostparliamentarians
werehypocriteswholived‘luxuriouslyandirresponsibly’andwereessentiallyinnoposition
tojudgeothers(Feith1962:256).
11NahdlatulUlama(NU)isanotherIslam‐basedgroupwhichsplitfromtheMasyumipolitical
partyon6April1952.Thetwohadhadanuneasyallianceuptothispointanddisagreedover
theleadershipofthepartyandrepresentationsinthecabinet,whichtendedtobegivento
Westerneducated,modernistMuslims.ForfurtherdetailsseeFeith(1962:233‐237).
12ThedayoftheHarahapcabinet’sformalinstallationthemilitaryarrestedtheformer
MinisterofJustice,DjodyGondokusomo,forcorruption.Althoughthenewcabinetclaimedno
knowledgeofthearrest,thepublicsupportedthemeasures,gladthatstepswerebeingtaken
topunishcorruptofficials.FollowingthistheformerMinisterforEconomicAffairs,Iskaq
Tjokroadisurjo,wasalsoarrested,aswereemployeesfromtheCentralImportOfficeanda
numberofbureaucratsfromtheMinistryofJustice.SeeFeith(1962:422‐424)foradetailed
discussionoftheseevents.
51
cabinet,buttherewasoppositionfromNU,whoseranksincludedsomeindividuals
accusedofcorruption.Moreover,Sukarnorefusedtosignthebill,meaningitcould
notbecomelawandputtinghimatoddswiththeHarahapcabinet.Thealternative
wastopresentthebilldirectlytotheparliament,whichwouldbetimeconsuming
andpotentiallydamagingtothegovernment’sreputationifitwasnotpassed.
Harahapdidinfactpresentthebilltotheagendacommitteeoftheparliamenttobe
presentedduringaparliamentarysitting,butitwasneverhandeddown(Feith1962:
440).
Corruptionwasidentifiedasacampaignissueinthe1955election.Vice‐President
MohammadHatta,whowaslinkedtoPSI,expressedhisconcernsaboutcorruptionin
thelead‐uptopolling.Duringhisannualnationalco‐operativesdayaddresson11
July1955,heobservedthat:
Amoralcrisishasblurredthedistinctionbetweengoodandbad,between
legalandillegal,betweendecencyandmoralobnoxiousness,betweenright
andwrong.Corruptionrunsriotthroughoursociety;corruptionhasalso
infectedagreatmanygovernmentdepartments,andunlessdrasticmeasures
aretakenverysoon,thisevilmaybecomefirmlyrootedintheorganizationof
oursocietyandourcountry.Briberyandgrafthavebecomeincreasingly
common,tothedetrimentofourcommunityandourcountry(Hatta1957:
84).
Politicalpartiesalsocompetedtodiscreditrivals,especiallyevidentinthe
accusationsbetweenPNIandIslamicoppositionpartyMasyumi.Masyumicriticized
previousPNI‐ledcabinetsfor‘inflation,theshortagesofessentialimportsandthe
abundanceofluxuryautomobiles,“arbitrary”politicalappointmentsanddismissals…
andthe“speciallicenses”fornationalimporters’(Feith1962:354).Masyumi’s
newspaperAbadiandotherpro‐governmentmediaoutletsalsogavesignificant
coveragetothecorruptionchargesofformerministers(Feith1962:424).Indeed,it
wasinthemedia,notparliament,thatmanyofthemostheatedclashesofideology
andscathingattacksonrivalsoccurred(Hill2010:3).13Severalaccusationsof
corruptionagainstrivalsweremootedthroughthepress,requiringalowerthreshold
forevidenceandgreaterscopetosensationalizecharges(Feith1962:424).For
13Duringtheperiodofconstitutionaldemocracy,almostallnewspaperswereattachedtoa
politicalparty(orthemilitary)(SenandHill2000).
52
example,inthelead‐uptotheelectionsofSeptember1955,PSI’snewspaperPedoman
publishedascathing,anonymouslettertotheeditorclaimingthatSukarnowasa
lackeyofthe‘Co‐operativeOrganizationforCorruption’,theMasyumi‐PSInickname
forthosewhosupportedthefirstAliSastroamidjojocabinet(Feith1962:427).
Inspiteofpre‐electiontensions,PNI,MasyumiandNUformedarulingcoalition
(withoutPKIorPSI)underpreviousPrimeMinisterAliSastroamidjojoinMarch
1956.14Shortlyafterthecabinet’sformation,conflictwithinthemilitaryspilledover
intoparliamentaryaffairs,signallingthebeginningofthemosthigh‐profile
corruptioncasesoftheOldOrder.Thearmyhadsufferedinternalpowerstruggles
sincetherevolutionandlegaciesoftheseriftsemergedduring1956(Reid1974).15
CleavageswidenedwhenarmyChiefofStaff,Nasution,whohadrecentlyallied
himselfwithSukarnoandPNI,begantoorderpersonneltransfersinaneffortto
combatsmugglingactivitiesandregionalismthathadtakenholdwithinthemilitary
(Teik1972:238).OneofthemajoractorsaggrievedbythesetransferswasDeputy
ChiefofStaff,ColonelZulkifliLubis,anofficeralignedtoPSIandMasyumi,whowas
alsoresentfulthatNasutionhadbeenpromotedoverhim,whichheperceivedtobea
politicalappointmentratherthanonebasedonmerit.16
TheresultingpowerstruggleeventuallyledtotheindictmentofRoeslanAbdulgani,a
PNImemberandthethen‐MinisterforForeignAffairs.The‘RoeslanAffair’wasaclear
exampleoftheuseofcorruptionallegationsforpoliticalgain(Ricklefs2001:307;
Teik1972).On13August1956,oneofNasution’srivalsissuedanarrestwarrantfor
Roeslaninconnectionwithcorruptioninthedisbursementofstateprintingcontracts.
RoeslanwasaccusedofconspiringwithLieHokThay,theformerdirectorofthe
nationalprintingplant,andofacceptingRp.1.5millioninbribes(vanderKroef1957:
49).ThearrestwarrantwasquicklyrevokedbyNasution,andRoeslansubsequently
leftIndonesiaforLondononadiplomaticvisit.Anti‐Nasutionofficersthenaccused
NasutionofcondoningcorruptionbyallowingRoeslantoleavethecountrywithout
properinvestigationintotheallegations(Teik1972:238).
14Thiscametobeknownas‘thesecondAlicabinet’.
15Thiswasnotunexpected,giventhatthemilitaryhadbecomeheavilypoliticizedduringthe
earlyOldOrder.Withthefragilenatureofparliamentarycabinetsfollowingindependence,the
armyhadcometoseeitselfas‘theguardianofnationalinterestwiththeresponsibilityto
interveneinpoliticalaffairswhenevertheweaknessesofciviliangovernmentmadeit
necessary’(Crouch1980:30).
16ForfurtherdiscussionofinternalmilitarydiscordduringthisperiodseeTeik(1972).
53
UponRoeslan’sreturn,aspecialcommissioncomposedmostlyofothercabinet
membersclearedhimofcomplicity,butthisfailedtoendspeculationabouthisguilt.
Thecabinet’s‘whitewash’oftheaffairgeneratedintensemediascrutiny,primarily
fromMochtarLubis,therespectededitorofIndonesiaRayaandalsoadistantrelative
ofZulkifliLubis(Hill2010:64‐65).MochtarLubislambastedthegovernment,
runningasensationalheadlinestatingthatRoeslanhadengagedincorruptactivities
withLieHokThayandmustbeprosecuted.ThenewspaperquotedZulkifliLubisas
sayingthat‘thePrimeMinisterandtheChiefofStaffhaddefendedevilbyreleasing
Roeslanfromthehandsofhiswould‐bearresters’(Feith1962:503).IndonesiaRaya
andPSI’snewspaperPedomancontinuedtheattack(Feith1962:504).Aftertheaffair
dieddown,MochtarLubiswaschargedwithdefamingcabinetmembers,butwas
acquittedinDecember1956.Inthemeantime,tensionscontinuedtomountwithin
thearmy.Whenitbecameclearthattheplantodestabilizethegovernmenthad
failed,ZulkifliLubisinstigatedafailedcoupinNovember1956(vanderKroef1957:
50).Later,inApril1957,theSupremeCourtfinedRoeslanforunintentionally
breachingforeignexchangeregulations;however,hewasnevertriedforcorruption
(Hill2010:48;Ricklefs2001:307).Theaccusationsagainsthimremained
unsubstantiated(Setiyonoetal.2012:42‐45).
DefendingGuidedDemocracy
ParliamentarydemocracycollapsedinDecember1956whenofficersfromthearmy
regionalcommandseizedthegovernmentsofWest,NorthandSouthSumatra,
declaringthemselvestobethe‘RevolutionaryGovernmentoftheRepublicof
Indonesia’(PemerintahRevolusionerRepublikIndonesia,PRRI)andprompting
Sukarnotodeclaremartiallaw.17Sukarnoappointedanemergencycabinetunder
DjuandaKartawidjaja(April1957–July1959),whichmanagedgovernmentaffairs
untilhecouldofficiallyreinstatethe1945Constitutionanddissolveparliamentin
July1959,pavingthewayforGuidedDemocracy(Lev1966;Penders1974:157).18
ChargesofcorruptionwereusedbySukarnotoemphasizetheflawednatureofthe
partysystemandtojustifyhisgrowingalignmentwiththePKI(Ricklefs2001:308‐
309).Eagertojustifyhisnewregime,Sukarnoblamedgreedyandimmoral
individualsformanyofthefailingsoftheperiodofconstitutionaldemocracy.For
17ForadetaileddiscussionofthePRRIrebellionanditsconsequencesseeFeith(1962:578‐
608)andLegge(1972:281‐284).
18ForadetailedexplorationofthetransitionfromconstitutionaldemocracytoGuided
DemocracyseeLev(1966).
54
example,inhisIndependenceDayaddressin1959headmonishedthosewhohad
usedtheirpositionsinstateenterprisesforpersonalgainnotingthat:
thosebodies[havebecome]thenestofpeoplewhofilledtheirownpockets
tilltheybulged,peoplewhobecamewealthy,peoplewhobecamemillionaires.
Theremustbeanendtothis!Suchasituationmustbechanged!...Itmaynot
beallowedtohappenagainthat...afewspeculatorsorafewprofiteerscan
shakeourwholenationaleconomy(Sukarno1964:52).
Inthesamespeech,Sukarnoassertedthat‘Whoeverscoopsupwealthattheexpense
ofthepublic,whoeverdisruptsthepubliceconomy,willbearrested,willbe
sentencedtodeath!’(Sukarno1964:55).Inhis1961IndependenceDayAddress,
Sukarnoalsoreferredtotheprominenceofcorruptionwithinthegovernment,
classifyingitasoneofthe‘threesi’s—tjaripromosi,birokrasi,korupsi[emphasis
inoriginal]’—theseekingofpromotion,bureaucracyandcorruption.Hewentonto
proclaimitwouldbebetterif‘suchpeoplewerepushedaside!’(Sukarno1964:153).
Sukarnodefendedhisnewregime,evenasitbecameincreasinglyevidentthatithad
manyofthesameflawsasthepreviousestablishment.Hemaintainedthatcorruption
ingovernmentwastheresultofindividualgreed,ratherthaninstitutionalized
practicesdrivenbythesystemitself.
Sukarnoalsoboostedhisownanti‐corruptionreputationbyachievingwhatnoneof
thepreviouscabinetshadbeenabletodo:actuallypassanti‐corruptionlaws.Priorto
this,corruptionarrestshadbeenfacilitatedbyamilitarymandatetoactinthe
interestsofthepeople(Crouch1980:40).Itwasnotuntil1960thatanofficial
governmentdefinitionofcorruptionwascodifiedandpunishmentsforrelatedcrimes
institutionalizedthroughLawNo.24/1960ontheDetermination,Prosecutionand
InspectionoftheCriminalActofCorruption.Inthefirstparagraphofthislaw,
corruptionwasbroadlydefinedashavingtwofacets.First,itinvolvedaviolationof
thelawcausinganeconomiclossforthestate,anareaoranyotherlegalbodywhich
usesstatefundingandconcessions.Second,corruptionwasalsotheabuseofposition
orauthorityforself‐enrichment,orthatofanotherpersonorbody.Inreality,the
passingofsuchlegislationwashardlyafeatgiventhatSukarnoheldcloseto
dictatorialpoweroverthegovernment.However,itsenactmentdemonstratedthat,at
theveryleast,Sukarnobelievedsuchalawtobenecessary.
55
However,itwasdifficulttofocuspublicattentiononcorruptionwhenSukarno’spoor
economicmanagementwasplungingthecountryintoeconomicandsocialchaos.
CallsforchangemountedasthePKIandthemilitarybothcompetedforpower
(Brown2003;Crouch1980:69‐96).Theeventsof30September1965,inwhichPKI
supportersattemptedacoupandassassinatedsixarmygenerals,broughtthisrivalry
toahead(AndersonandMcVey1971).Whilethecoupfailed,itunleashedachainof
eventsculminatingintheriseofSuharto,Indonesia’ssecondpresident.19On11
March1966SukarnosignedanordergrantingSuhartofullauthoritytorestorethe
peace(Ricklefs2001:349).20BetweenJuneandJuly1966theParliamentratified
Suharto’sposition,bannedthePKI,outlawedMarxismasapoliticalideologyand
calledforelectionstobeheldin1968(Ricklefs2001:351).
TheNewOrder
IntheearlydaysoftheNewOrder,Suhartowaseagertobuildanimagethatwould
sethimapartfromearlierpoliticians(Elson2001:140).Alongwithpromisesof
developmentandprosperity,ananti‐corruptionsymbolwasanimportantpartofthis
effort.Suhartopromisedthathewouldaddresscorruptionandsupport‘notonly
goodgovernmentbutalsocleangovernment’(Robertson‐Snape1999:589).Eventhe
regime’sname—the‘NewOrder’—wasintendedtodistanceitfromthepreviousera,
whichhadbecomesynonymouswiththeextravagancesoftheeliteandthe
corruptionofbureaucratsontheonehand,andthesufferingofthepoorontheother
(Feith1994:16;Ricklefs2001:342).
Ananti‐corruptionsymbolbecameacorepartoftheimageofthenewregime.In
April1966SuhartoestablishedtheTeamtoRegularizeStateFinances(Tim
PenerbitanKeuanganNegara,Pekuneg)tocollect‘incriminatingmaterial’asevidence
ofcorruptactivitiesundertakenbymembersoftheOldOrdergovernment(Crouch
19ThiscoupwasawatershedmomentinIndonesianhistory.Theeventsofthefailedcoup
remainmysterious,withspeculationthattheUnitedStatesSecretServicewereinvolvedand
continuedquestionsaboutwhatroleSuhartoplayedintheevents.Themasskillingsthat
followedthecouphavecontinuedtodrawacademicinquiryduetothecomplexnatureofthe
massacres—whokilled,whowaskilledandwhytheywerekilled.TheNewOrderregimeused
thecoupextensivelyinitsanti‐CommunistpropagandaandtopromoteSuharto’srolein
protectingthenation.ForadetailedanalysesofthecoupanditsfalloutseeAndersonand
McVey(1971),Cribb(1990),Roosa(2006)andKammenandMcGregor(2012).
20Duringthisperiodofuncertainty,Suharto’seffortstodiscreditSukarnoweresubtle,fearing
retaliationfromdie‐hardSukarnoists,butitdidnottakelongforhimtomanoeuvrehimoutof
politicsaltogether(CribbandBrown1995:111;vanderKroef1971:38‐40).Beforelong,
Suhartohadremovedenoughofhisdetractorsfromthegovernmenttobeconfidentthatthe
People’sConsultativeAssemblywouldsupporthim(Ricklefs2001:351).
56
1980:296).ShowtrialswereconductedagainstformerOldOrderministers,
highlightingtheireconomicmismanagement,corruptionandgeneraldisregardfor
publicwelfare(CribbandBrown1995:111;Pauker1967:145‐146).Publicattention
wasalsodrawntoongoingmilitaryandbureaucraticcorruption(Dahm1971:262;
Feith1968:95).21Inresponse,Suhartomountedaconcertedpubliccampaignagainst
corruption,makinganumberofpublicstatementsinthelatterhalfof1967.Suharto’s
effortsreflectedhisdesiretoprojectareformistimage,withactionsandspeeches
usedasrhetoricaltoolsdesignedtopaintSuhartoastheleaderthatIndonesians
wanted.
Yet,despitethispublicanti‐corruptioncampaign,progresswasslow.Suhartowasina
difficultposition,needingtobuildananti‐corruptionimagetoappealtothemasses
butalsorequiringthesupportofmilitary,parliamentaryandbusinessleaderswho
benefitedfromthestatusquo(Mackie1970:88).PekunegandtheAnti‐Corruption
InvestigationTeam(TimPemberantasanKorupsi,TPK),launchedinAugust1967,
werechargedwithinvestigatingcorruptioncasesandreferringsuspectsforarrest
andtrial;however,thesebodieshadlittleimpact(Crouch1980:296).InDecember
1967SuhartoissuedaninstructiontotheAttorney‐General,withassistancefromthe
MinisterforJusticeandcommandersofthearmedforces,to‘takefirmmeasures
againstallformsofcorruption’(citedinPauker1968:137).However,Attorney‐
GeneralSoegihArtocomplainedinApril1968thattheTPKwasunabletodoitsjob
effectivelybecausethedefinitionof‘corruptconduct’inexistinglawswastoovague.
Atthesametime,TPKemployeescomplainedthattherelativelyshorttimewithin
whichalleged‘corruptors’hadtobechargedandbroughttotrial(sixmonths)made
convictionsdifficult(vanderKroef1971:76).Corruptionsuspectswereregularly
releasedduetoaproclaimedlackofevidence(Crouch1980:296;vanderKroef1971:
77).22
21Oneexampleofacorruptionscandalreportedinthemediawasthe‘HoldenAffair’of
November1967,inwhichtheplannedtax‐freeimportofAustralian‐madeHoldencarsforthe
benefitofMPs‘eruptedintoablackmarketscandalinNovember1967,attheverytimewhen
demandsforamoreintensifiedtaxcollectionprocedureandforageneralausteritywere
beingheardinParliamentitself’(vanderKroef1971:76).
22InFebruary1969thepoliceannouncedthatover159officialsandprivatebanking
enterpriseshadbeenfoundguiltyoffraudand85percenthadbeentried(vanderKroef
1971:77).Twogeneralswerealsotriedandconvictedforcorruptionin1969(Crouch1980:
293).Therewasaflurryofannouncements,withthegovernmenthopefulitwouldbeseento
betakingaction.Detractorsnotedthatthearrestsweremostlyofinsignificantindividualsor
peoplewhohadfallenoutoffavourwithSuharto,suchasthetwomilitaryofficialsindicted,
andnoparliamentarianswerearrested.
57
Bymid‐November1968,theanti‐corruptionmovementwasgainingmomentum.
Between1965and1970,asMackie(1970:88)asserts,‘there[were]fewburning
issuesofcomparablehorse‐powerforopponentsorcriticsoftheregime’.Student
groupsralliedaroundtheissueandthreatenedvigilanteactionagainst‘corruptors’.A
numberofnewspapersfuelledstudentconcerns,includingMochtarLubis’Indonesia
RayaandNusantara,aswellasotherstudentpublicationssuchasHarianKamiand
MahasiswaIndonesia(Crouch1980:294‐295).Concernedaboutpublicorder,the
governmentbannedallnon‐approveddemonstrationsinJanuary1970.Subsequent
meetingsbetweenstudentleadersandcabinetministersledtopromisesthatanti‐
corruptionmeasureswouldbeagovernmentpriority(Dahm1971:263;vander
Kroef1971:232).
Arenewedanti‐corruptionoffensivebeganon31January1970whenSuharto
announcedtheformationofthe‘CommissionofFour’ledbyformerPrimeMinister
Wilopo,workingwithformerVice‐PresidentHatta.TheCommissionwascharged
withinvestigatingtheextentofthecorruptioninthegovernmentandproviding
recommendationsforitseradication(Elson2001:195;Mackie1970;vanderKroef
1971:78).SuhartoalsoreleasedapublicstatementprintedinthenewspaperKompas
on2February1970;inwhichhestated:
Corruptionanddeviantactionsintheeconomicfieldingeneralnotonly
conflictwiththelawandwithsecurity,butareclearlyincompatiblewith
morals,andpuncturethefeelingofjustice[sic].Corruptionblocksthe
implementationofthestate’sprograms,damagestheprinciplesandreduces
theauthorityofthegovernmentapparatus,ifitisnotcurbed,lessenedand
supressedasmuchaspossible(citedinElson2001:195).
SuhartohighlightedcorruptionagaininhisIndependenceDayspeechofAugust1970,
assertingthat‘thereshouldnolongerbeanydoubtsaboutit.Imyselfwillleadthe
fightagainstcorruption’(citedinElson2001:196).Inthesameyear,Attorney‐
GeneralSoegihArtointroducedanew,moredetailedanti‐corruptionbilltothe
parliament(vanderKroef1971:233).Thebill,passedasLawNo.3/1971onthe
EradicationofCriminalActsofCorruption,waswelcomedbyactivists(Brata2009:
136).23
23Suhartoalsoagreedtoregularweeklymeetingsinwhichstudentactivistscouldpresent
evidenceofofficialcorruptiontohim.Whilethisseemedapositivedevelopmentforactivists,
58
AttemptsbySuhartotoconsolidateananti‐corruptionimagewere,however,
underminedbylackofaction.Thenewanti‐corruptionlegislationwasnot
retroactive,muchtothedisappointmentofactivists(vanderKroef1971:233).
SuhartoalsorefusedtopubliclyreleasetheCommissionofFour’sfindings(Crouch
1980:297),althoughtheyweresubsequentlyleakedtothemedia(Crouch1980:297;
Elson2001:196;Mackie1970:87).TheCommissionsubmittedreportsonthe
Attorney‐General’sOffice;thenationaloilcompany,Pertamina;thestate
procurementagency;thestateforestryenterprise;aswellastworeportsadvisingthe
governmentonwaystoaddresscorruption.Thefindingssuggestedthatthelackof
transparencyinbudgetspendingcontributedtocorruptionandrecommended
structuralreformsfortheAttorney‐General’sofficeandPertamina.TheCommission
alsoadvocatedthearrestsofsomeofSuharto’skeysupporters,includinghiscousin
Sudikatmono(Elson2001:196).TheCommission’seffortsledtothepunishmentof
someminorofficials,butrecommendationsthatofficialsmustdeclaretheirprivate
assetsandtheimplementationofalawregulatingtheoversightofPertaminawere
neverexecuted(Elson2001:196).
TheCommissionwasaccusedofbeinga‘whitewash’bystudentgroups,whostepped
uptheircampaigningtohighlighttheongoingnegativeimpactsofcorruption.
Newspapers,suchasIndonesiaRayaandHarianKami,continuedtoreportoncorrupt
dealingsbetweenprominentbusinessandpoliticalfigures(vanderKroef1971:78).
Pamphletsaccusingtopmilitaryofficialsofcorruptionwerealsocirculatedinthe
maincitiesofJava(vanderKroef1971:78).Suharto’spersonalaides,whowerealso
militaryofficers,weresingledoutforpeddlinginfluenceonbehalfofpartiesor
businesses(vanderKroef1971:82).Inresponse,thegovernmentexpeditedthetrial
ofninestateelectricitycompanyofficials,facingchargesofembezzlingbetweenRp.
150(USD0.40)andRp.34,000(approximatelyUSD90)(Crouch1980:298).This
episodedemonstrateddiscrepanciesinhowthepublicandthegovernmentviewed
corruption—thegovernmentfocusonsmall‐scalecorruptionwasseentoglossover
thelargerissue.Meanwhile,Suhartohadformalizedhispowerthroughanelection
deemedtobe‘heavy‐handed’andundemocratic(Elson2001:194;Jackson1978),and
theagreementwasshort‐lived,withSuhartodismissingmuchoftheevidencepresented
(Brata2009:136).
59
activistsremainedtroubledbytheabuseofpositionbythepresident’sinnercircle
(Aspinall2005b:23;Crouch1980:299).24
Fromthebeginningofthe1970s,thegovernmentbeganattemptingtocurbpublic
anti‐corruptionsentiment.TheNewOrdergovernment’santi‐corruptionsymbol
sufferedanumberofblowsduringthisperiod.InSeptember1971,respectedPolice
Commissioner‐GeneralHugengImamSantosowasdismissedfromhispositionafter
heannouncedthathisteamhadbrokenasmugglingringwhichimportedluxurycars
forresale(Elson2001:198;Jenkins1984:330‐331).Thesmugglingringreportedly
hadmilitarybackingaswellasinvolvingSuharto’swife,IbuTien.From1971,Tien
wasalsoheavilycriticizedforherplantodevelopaculturalthemepark(TamanMini
IndonesiaIndah,BeautifulIndonesiaMiniaturePark),fundedby‘donations’from
businessleadersandgovernmentofficials.ProtestsaroundtheTamanMiniproject
becameviolent,promptingpresidentialaidestorequestmilitaryintervention(Elson
2001:199;Samson1973:128).Afurtherexampleofanti‐corruptionactivismduring
thisperiodwasthe‘PetitionofOctober24’,signedinOctober1973byagroupof
studentsfromtheUniversityofIndonesia.Itoutlinedgovernmentcriticismsincluding
risingprices,corruption,abuseofpower,unemploymentandthelackofeffective
publicparticipationingovernmentdecision‐making(Hansen1975:148).
Therewereongoingprotestsuptothemid‐1970s,foreshadowingmoreserious
demonstrationsagainstthegovernment.InJanuary1974,massstudentprotestswere
sparkedbyanofficialvisitbytheJapanesePrimeMinistertoIndonesia.TheMalari
Affair,asitisknown,wasmotivatedprimarilybyangeratthestate’seconomic
policieswhichmanysawasfavouringforeigninvestors.However,italsotouched
uponcorruptionandtheundueinfluenceofseniormembersinSuharto’sgovernment
(Elson2001:207;Liddle1996:188).25Theriotsturnedviolent,leaving11dead,200
24Forfurtherdetailsonthe1971electionsseeJackson(1978:31‐32).Followingthe1971
electionstherewerefurtherrestrictionsagainstrivalparties,pressuringtheremaining
politicalpartiestoformtwogroups,theUnitedDevelopmentParty,representingIslamic
groups(PartaiPersatuanPembangunan,PPP)andtheIndonesianDemocraticParty,
representingnationalistandnon‐Islamicpoliticalparties(PartaiDemokrasiIndonesia,PDI)in
1972.
25Theriotsthemselveswerelargelytheresultofpowerstruggleswithinthearmy,withthe
militarycommanderinchargeofthearea,GeneralSumitro,hopingtodestabilizeSuharto’s
governmentbyallowingstudentstoprotestfreelyandembarrassthegovernmentinfrontof
itsinternationalguest.Thegamblebackfired,though,whenthedemonstrationsbecame
violent.Suhartohimselfacknowledgedtheriotsastheoutcomeofa‘powerstruggle’between
sectionsoftheArmyandhisadvisers(Elson2001:207).
60
seriouslyinjuredandover800arrested.26TheoutcomeoftheMalariaffairwasa
heightenedvigilancetowardsdissentandamovetowardsstrongerpolitical
repressionandthesuppressionofpublicprotest(Elson2001:209;Liddle1996:189).
Suhartodidtrytopacifythemovementbyamendingforeignownershiplawsto
facilitatemorebusinessopportunitiesforIndonesiansandaskedthatfriends‘tone
downexcessivedisplaysofwealth’(Vatikiotis1993:38).Furthermore,theregime
embarkedonanewdevelopmentfocus,leadingtoincreasedspendingonlocallevel
projectsincludingschool,healthcentres,roadsandotherendeavours,seenas
coercivemeasurestoboostsatisfactionwiththegovernment(Liddle1996:189).
Thesemeasuresandthecrackdownonprotestingdampened,butdidnoteradicate,
studentactivism.Whilemoststudentsstillsawthemselvesthemoralguardiansofthe
nation,protestsalsobegantotakeonamore‘anti‐government’tone(Aspinall2005b:
119;Glassburner1978:164).ThediscontentgeneratedbytheNewOrder’sfailureto
deliverhigh‐levelsofdevelopmenttoordinarypeoplewhileelitesprospereddueto
corruptionledtoangertargetedatSuharto,hiswifeandhiscronies(Vatikiotis1993:
38).ThiswasevidencedbytheinterestsurroundingtheSawitoAffair,namedafter
theJavanesemysticandformeremployeeoftheDepartmentofAgriculturewho
denouncedSuhartoasthesourceof‘moraldecay’inthestateandassertedthathe
hadbeendivinelychosentoruleJava(Bourchier1984;Grant1979:143‐144;Liddle
1977:103).Hewasarrestedafterwritinganumberofinflammatorydocuments,
whichweresupportedbyanumberofprominentIndonesians,includingformerVice‐
PresidentHatta(Bourchier1984:1).TheSawitoAffairisnoteworthyfortheharsh
reactionitprovokedfromSuharto:Sawitowastriedforinvolvementinanillegal
movementandsentencedtoeightyearsimprisonment.Suhartoeventookthestepof
respondingtoSawito’sallegationsinapublicstatement,claimingthat‘neitherhenor
anymemberofhisfamilyhadusedhispositionforpersonalfinancialgain’(Liddle
1977:103).Thetrialitselfbecameaforumfordissent,withwitnessesusingitasan
opportunitytocondemnthecorruptionandweakleadershipofSuharto’sregime
(Bourchier1984;Grant1979:143‐144).27
QuestionssurroundingSuharto’santi‐corruptionagendaalsostemmedfromhis
reluctancetoaddressglaringproblemswithinthestatebureaucracy.Forexample,in
26SeveralprominentstudentleaderswerearrestedincludingSyahrir(Liddle1996:148),who
becameaprominenteconomistandwaslateraneconomicadvisortoPresidentSusilo
BambangYudhoyonofromApril2007untilhisdeathinJuly2008.
27ForadetailedaccountoftheSawitoAffairseeBourchier(1984).
61
1975,aseriouscorruptionscandaleruptedinvolvingthestate‐ownedoilcompany,
Pertamina,whichhadamassedapproximatelyUSD10billionworthofdebts,
apparentlythroughmismanagementandembezzlementbyitsmanager,IbnuSutowo
(Chalmers2006:222;Liddle1977:96‐99;Vatikiotis1993:37).Despitetheearlier
misgivingsoftheCommissionofFour,PertaminahadbeenhailedasaNewOrder
‘successstory’andan‘icon’oftheregime’seconomicperformance(Elson2001:215).
ThePertaminascandalthreatenedtounderminetheregime’slegitimacy,whichwas
premiseduponsteadyeconomicdevelopment,whilealsochallengingitsfinancial
credentials(Suryadinata1998:123).Sutowowaseventuallydismissedbutwasnever
chargedwithanycrime,eventhoughthesubsequentinvestigationrevealedboth
grossmismanagementandlavishbehaviour(McCawley1978:5‐6).Dickand
Mulholland(2011:71)arguethatSutowohad,infact,loyallyservedasatrusted
subordinatewhoSuhartocouldcalluponforcreditatshortnotice.Suharto’s
reluctancetoapproveprosecutionagainstSutoworeflectedanaversiontopunishing
corruptionifitunderminedhisowninterests.
ItwasinthisclimatethatagroupofBandungstudentsissueda‘WhiteBook’(Buku
Putih)inJanuary1978—amanifestodemandingthatSuhartostepdownaspresident
(Indonesia1978:165).28TheWhiteBookwasadirectattackonSuhartoandhis
government,detailinganumberofcorruptionscandalstoarguetheywere‘self‐
serving’and‘greedy’(Indonesia1978:181).Thegovernmentreactedimmediately,
banningthebook,shuttingdownfournewspapers,includingKompasandSinar
Harapan,androundingupstudentactivists(Elson2001:224).Later,atotalofseven
dailynewspapersandsevenstudentpublicationswerebannedaspartofthe
crackdownonintellectualsandstudents(SenandHill2000:57).Thegovernment
temporarilyclosedmanyprominentuniversities,anduniversityleadershipwere
directedto‘depoliticise’campuses(Aspinall2005b;Jackson2005:185‐187).
StudentsinvolvedinwritingtheWhiteBookwerearrestedandtriedinJanuary1979
undertheanti‐subversionlaws.29Theseactsofrepressionandlegalretribution
markedthegovernment’sdecreasingtoleranceforpubliccriticismandthatsilencing
28ThejournalIndonesiapublishedthedefencestatementsfromstudentsontrialinApril1979.
Theaccompanyingeditorialcontentwaswrittenanonymously,presumablytoavoid
ramificationsfromtheNewOrderregime.
29Anti‐subversionlegislationwasfirstenactedin1963viaPresidentialDecisionNo.11/1963
andwaslaterratifiedbyparliamentin1969asLawNo.5/1969.Thisoutlawedpublicdisplays
ofhostilityorcontempttowardsthegovernmentandotherpopulationgroupsinIndonesia.In
1971theSupremeCourtruledthatsubversionincludedactsthatdidnothavesubversive
intentbutresultedinsubversiveoutcomes(Pompe1992:398).
62
and/ordiscreditingcriticswasnowacommonmethodofdealingwithcorruption
allegationsagainstthoseinpower.30
TheWhiteBookwasoneofthefinalpubliccritiquesofthegovernmentduringthe
NewOrder.Thesubsequenttrialsandcrackdownoncampusactivismquashedthe
studentmovement,whichhadbeenoneofthelastbastionsofcensureagainstthe
prevalenceofcorruption.Moreover,thebanningofsomenewspapersandanew
emphasisontheresponsibilityofthepresstopromotenationalstability(Brown
2003:224;SenandHill2000:53)curtailedthefreedomofthemediaandreportingof
corruptionscandals.31Anti‐corruptionprotestswerenotcompletelysilencedandthe
issueremainedoneofpublicconcern.32Therewereperiodicattemptsto‘defuse’the
issueusingthearrestsandtrialsofindividuals,butthosefoundguiltyweremostly
lowormid‐rankedbureaucrats(CribbandBrown1995:154;Liddle1996:87).Inan
attempttore‐establishafirmanti‐corruptionimage,thegovernmentcreatedanew
anti‐corruptioncampaign(OperasiTertib,OPSTIB)in1980,aimedateradicating
corruptionandsmuggling.However,OPSTIBwascriticizedforselectivelytakingup
casesandavoidinginvestigationagainsthigh‐levelofficials(Palmier1982:5;Pauker
1981:236).33Liddle(1996:24)suggeststhat‘theseperiodic
crackdowns…encourage[d]thepublictobelievethatthegovernment[was]atleast
well‐intentioned’.
30Inanotherexample,inMay1980agroupof50prominentIndonesians,includingretired
armygeneralsandformerprimeministers,signedapetitionknownas‘ThePetitionof50’
whichwascriticalofSuhartoandhismanipulationofPancasila,whichtheybelievedhewas
usingtothreatenpoliticalenemies.Inordertodiscreditthepetition,someofSuharto’saides
doctoredadocumentwhichtheyreleasedtothepress,claimingthatthosewhohadsignedthe
petitionweresecretlycallingforacoup.Thosewhohadsignedthepetitionwerepunished
withvariousarbitraryrestrictions,suchasrestrictingtheirabilitytoaccesscredit,restricting
theirtravelanddenialofgovernmentcontracts.SeeElson(2001:231‐232)andRicklefs
(2001:374‐375)forfurtherdetails.
31Theregimewasalsosensitivetoreportingoncorruptionbyinternationalmediaoutlets.For
example,in1986anarticleintheAustraliandaily,TheSydneyMorningHerald,which
investigatedthebusinessholdingsofSuharto’sfamily,ledtoa‘briefcrisisinAustralia‐
Indonesianrelations’(Ricklefs2001:381).
32A1980Temposurveyfoundthat42.8percentofrespondents,whichwasthehighest
number,singledout‘corruptionandabusesofpower’asthegreatestinternalthreatfacing
Indonesia(Pauker1981:237).
33(Tanter1989)contendsthattheabolitionofOPSTIBin1988wasdrivenbyhigh‐level
militaryofficersinvolvedinsmugglingwhohadlobbiedfortheclosureoftheoperation.
63
CorruptionandthefallofSuharto
Whilevocalanti‐corruptionprotestswerequashedinthepublicsphere,corruption
remainedan‘opensecret’(rahasiaumum).34Theinstitutionalizednatureof
corruptioninthebureaucracyledtowhatMcLeod(2011a:52)callsa‘parasitic’
relationshipbetweenthepublicsectoranditsclientsinwhichpublicservants,police
andthemilitaryextortedcitizenstosupplementtheirlowwages.35Fromthe1980s,
thebusinessdealingsofSuharto’sfamilyandhiscroniesbecameincreasingly
brazen.36TheSuhartofamilyanditscroniesestablishedacomplexnetworkof
‘foundations’(yayasan)tomaskcorruptionandlaundermoney.Bribescouldbepaid
intoafoundationownedbyamemberofthefamilytoescapedetectionandwithout
subjecttooversight(Vatikiotis1993,51).Donationsbystate‐ownedenterpriseswere
alsomadeintofoundationsasameansforsiphoningfundsfromthegovernment
(Aspinall2005b:93;Elson2001:281).Meanwhile,corruptionthatthreatenedthe
interestsofSuharto’sallieswascurbed,eitherthroughlawenforcementormore
sinistermeans(Widoyoko2011).37
The1980stotheearly1990swasaprofitableperiodforSuharto’schildrenand
cronies(Chalmers2006:233;Winters2014:19).38Theemphasisoneconomic
developmentandmarketderegulationcreatedopportunitiesforbusinesspeople
34Aspinall(1995:28)arguesthattherehadbeena‘traditionofdissent’amongsturbanelites
throughouttheNewOrderandthisthesisdoesnotdisputethis.Anti‐corruptiondiscoursewas
used,albeitsuperficially,byPPPandPDIduringelectioncampaigns,highlightingtheopenness
ofcorruptpractices.
35McLeod(2008;2011a)identifieslowpublicservantwagesasakeydriverofcorruption
amongstgovernmentofficials.Asaresult,muchofhisresearchincombatingcorruptioninthe
governmentfocusesonpayingcivilservantsaliveablewage.
36AsRicklefs(2001:366)argues,theeconomicsuccessesoftheNewOrderdidmuchto
mollifyIndonesians,particularlythemiddleclass,whoenjoyedtheadvantagesofabooming
economy.Atthesametime,villagersinruralareaswerealsobenefitingfromtargeted
developmentprograms(Suryadinata1998:120‐121).
37Forexample,Widoyoko(2011:168)arguesthattheprivatizationofthecustomsofficein
themid‐1980swasaresponseagainstsmugglingwhichthreatenedtheIndonesianeconomy
and,therefore,Suharto’sinterests.
38MuchhasbeenwrittenonSuharto’suseofpatronageasbeinglinkedtohisJavaneseroots,
thatheessentiallysawhimselfasamonarchwhodistributedfavourinreturnforfinancial
benefitandsupport(Anderson1990:187;Elson2001:301‐302;Vatikiotis1993:111‐114).
Counter‐argumentstothishavealsobeenmade,forexampleRobinson(1981;1982)who
describestherelationshipsaslessdrivenbycultureandmorebypoliticalfunctionalismand
asnecessarytogarnerandcementsupportforhisleadership.Similarly,Ascher(1998)
contendsthatpatronageismorecloselylinkedtotheneedtounifyadisunitedgovernment
undermutuallybeneficialcircumstancesthanculturaltraditions.
64
interestedinnewventures.39Suhartopubliclyendorsedpoliciessuchasfinancial
deregulation,butheensuredthathischildrenandcroniesenjoyedprivilegedaccess
toloansfromstatebanks,governmentfundingandconcessions(Elson2001:279).
Suharto’swifehadalreadybeennicknamed‘MadameTienPercent’,referringtothe
allegedshareofprofitsshedemandedfromthosegrantedbusinessfavoursbyher
husband(CribbandBrown1995:126).40Suharto’syoungestson,HutomoMandala
Putra(commonlyknownas‘Tommy’),wasawardedacontractin1996toproduce
Indonesia’snationalcar—inreality,aone‐yearlicensetoimportcarsfromSouth
Koreawithoutpayingdutiesorluxurytax,allowinghimtoundercutcompetitors
(Hale2001:631).Theprojectwasestablishedagainsttheadviceofboththeministers
fortradeandfinance.41SimilaropportunitieswereaffordedtoSuharto’sother
children.42Bytheearly1990stheSuhartofamilyassetswereestimatedatUSD2–3
billion(Vatikiotis1993:50)andSuhartohadcreatedanetworkofsupportersaround
himwhowereextremelywealthy,butalsoheavilydependentonthePresidentfor
businessfavours(Liddle1996:88,188;Vatikiotis1993:50).
WhileSuharto’spatronagenetworksinthebusinessspherewerestrong,hissupport
fromthemilitarybegantowane.Fromthelate1980s,militaryleaderswere
particularlyconcernedwithSuharto’ssuccessionplan,pressuringSuhartotoresign
attheupcomingelectionstomakewayfornewleadership(Jenkins1984;Liddle
1992:545).MilitaryleadersalsofeltmarginalizedasSuhartoexpandedhisinfluence
amongstciviliansandseniorbureaucratsbutseemedtoneglectthem(Aspinall1995:
23).Atthesametime,internationalsupportfortheregimeweakenedwiththeendof
theColdWar(Crouch1993:91;Ford2011)andstudentpressureonthegovernment
toaddressinequality,humanrightsandcorruptionmounted,asdidcondemnation
39Fallingoilpricesintheearly1980smeantIndonesiacouldnolongerridethecoat‐tailsofoil
profits(Liddle1987:206;Ricklefs2001:374).Robertson‐Snape(1999:595)alsoarguesthat
deregularizationimpactedbureaucratsasthenumberoflicenses,permitsandfeeswere
reducedsothey‘losttheiropportunitytobenefitfrom'gratuities'frequentlyconferredfor
performingsuchservices’.
40Liddle(1977:104)statesshewasalsonicknamed‘MadameFifty‐Fifty’.
41TheTimorcarprojectfacedproblemsfromthestart.Shortlyafteritbegantherewasa
sharpdecreaseinautomobilepurchasesinIndonesia.Kia,themanufacturer,alsofaced
financialtroublesinitshomelandofSouthKorea,andtheAsianEconomicCrisisfollowedsoon
afterin1997.In1998Indonesiasignedarequestforfinancialassistancefromthe
InternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)whichdemandedanendtoconcessionsfortheprojectas
partofthestructuraladjustmentplanandtherewasthethreatofsanctionsfromtheWorld
TradeOrganization(WTO)iftheydidnotcomply.ForfurtherinformationabouttheTimor
projectseeHale(2001).
42FormoreexamplesoftheconcessionsgrantedtoSuharto’schildrenseeVatikiotis(1993:
152‐153)andRobertson‐Snape(1999).
65
fromIslamicleaders.43Inthepoliticalsphere,theDemocraticPartyofIndonesia
(PartaiDemokrasiIndonesia,PDI)andthePeople’sDemocraticUnion(Persatuan
RakyatDemokratis,PRD),formedfromradicalelementsofthestudentactivist
movement,alsobecamemoreoutspokenintheirreproachesoftheregime.
ItwasthesechallengesthatpromptedSuhartotobroadenthepoliticalspacein
Indonesiainthelate1980sthatcametobeknownastheperiodof‘openness’
(keterbukaan).44Keterbukaansawcensorshipofthepressrelaxed,theestablishment
ofacommissionforhumanrightsandsometolerationofpoliticalprotests,
demonstrationsandgovernmentcritiques(Bertrand1996:325).In1990,Suharto
alsoannouncedthecreationoftheAssociationofMuslimIntellectuals(Ikatan
CendekiawanMuslimIndonesia,ICMI)which—whilenotuniversallyacceptedby
Islamicintellectuals—appealedtomanyurban,educatedandmodernistMuslims,
presentingthemameanstoinfluencestatedecision‐makingandadvancethecauseof
Islamwithinthegovernment(Aspinall2005b:40).45Suhartoalsoreorganizedthe
armedforces(AngkatanBersenjataRepublikIndonesia,ABRI)removingperceived
threatsincludingformerprotégéBennyMurdani(Bertrand1996).46However,
Keterbukaanendedin1994,withthesuddenclosureofthreemajormedia
publications,Tempo,DetikandEditor,aftertheypublishedaseriesofnegativereports
aboutadecisionbythen‐MinisterforResearchandTechnology,B.J.Habibie,to
purchaseEastGermanwarships(Bertrand1996:336;Eklof2003:230;Ricklefs2001:
399).Thepresshadalsobeguntoinvestigateanumberofpotentiallyembarrassing
corruptionscandalslinkedtoSuharto’sinnercircle,providinganadditionalimpetus
forthebans(Bertrand1996:336).
43Aspinall(2005b:128),describingthenatureofstudentprotestsinthemid‐1990s,writes:
‘studentsincreasinglyraisedwhattheysometimesreferredtoas“elite”issuesconcerning
nationallevelcorruptionandpoliticalleadership.Thiswashighlightedbyaseriesofprotests
directedagainstSuhartoin1993…theirtypicalmodusoperandiwasrelativelysmall
demonstrationswhichinvolvedconsiderablerisk.’
44Eklof(2003:107)arguesthattheexactperiodisdifficulttodefineasbyMarch1988MPR
parliamentarysessionswerealreadyengaginginlivelydebateonissuesregardingthevice‐
presidency,electoralreformandeducation.However,thetermketerbukaanfirstgained
popularityin1989,followinganarticleintheFarEasternEconomicReviewwrittenbySuharto
detractor(retired)GeneralSumitrocallingforgreaterpoliticalopennessinIndonesia.
45OneprominentcriticwasAbdurrahmanWahid,fromNU,whobelievedICMIwouldfoster
divisionswithinIndonesiansocietyandsoestablishedarivalgroup,theDemocracyForum
(Barton2002:184‐185).
46SuhartoalsowentontheHajpilgrimageandselectedadevoutMuslim,FeisalTanjung,as
ABRIChief,whichwasseenasamovetoappealtotheIslamiccommunityasacounterbalance
tothemilitary(Aspinall2005b:40‐41;Bertrand1996:331;Ricklefs2001:401).
66
Alongsideincreasinglyprominentmediacriticism,politicalrivalsalsobeganto
challengeSuhartoandhisregime,especiallymembersofPDIandPRD(Aspinall
2005b).47Fromthelate1980s,PDIbecamea‘semiopposition’(Aspinall2005b:168)
anditsattemptstoassertitsownanti‐corruptionsymbolalsohighlightedthe
government’slackofaction.Forexample,in1987,PDIpointedlyproposednewanti‐
corruptionandanti‐monopolylegislationdirectedatthePresident’snepotistic
policies(Eklof2003:109).TheproposalwasrejectedbyGolkarandthemilitary
factionwithintheMPR.PDI’scampaignsleadinguptothe1992electionsalsofocused
oncorruption,collusionandnepotism(korupsi,kolusi,nepotisme,KKN)and
monopolies(Aspinall2005b:175).Furthermore,outspokenPDIpolitician,KwikKian
Gie,releasedareportin1991claimingtherewasan‘alarmingmentalandmoral
erosioninalmostallofthenation’selitecircles,’andin1992presenteddraft
legislationforaneweconomiccompetitionlawpromotingtransparencyandareview
onmonopolyrights.However,nootherfactioninparliamentsupportedthebillandit
wasneverformallyintroduced(Eklof2003:121).
In1993,PDIelectedSukarno’sdaughter,MegawatiSukarnoputri,asitschairperson.48
Megawati’sappointmentwasrecognizedasanopportunitytouniteopposition
againsttheNewOrder(LiddleandMallarangeng1997:170).49Theappointment
emboldenedPDImembers.Forexample,outspokenPDIlegislatorssometimesgrilled,
orevenboycotted,governmentministersduringparliamentarycommissionhearings
andPDIwastheonlyfactionintheDPRtocondemnthe1994pressbans(Aspinall
2005b:167).Duringthisperiod,PRDwasalsoorganizingprotestsandproducing
publicationstargetingSuhartoandhisfamily,claimingthatallsocialandpolitical
problemsinIndonesiacouldbetracedbacktohim(Aspinall2005b:138).50The
growing,andincreasinglycoordinated,oppositionmovementprompteda
governmentefforttosabotageMegawati’sre‐electionasPDIchairpersonin1996
(Aspinall2005b:178;Eklof2003:251).ThegovernmentsupportedformerPDI
chairpersonSoerjadifortheposition,intimidatingpartymembersandusingfraudto
47ThePeople’sDemocraticParty(PartaiRakyatDemokratik),thatwasbornoutofthePRD
studentmovement,publiclydeclareditselfapoliticalpartyinJuly1996(Aspinall2005b).
48Eklof(2003:207‐216)arguesthatMegawati’srisetothePDIleadershipwasacomplicated
affairinvolvingdealswiththegovernmentandmilitaryinreturnforsupport,mobilizingher
father’sreputation,aswellasout‐manoeuvringothercontendersandwas,therefore,basedon
morethanoutrightpopularity.
49Wantingtobuildacoalition,PRDmembersassistedPDIactivistsviainformalchannels,
sharingwiththemtheirmobilizationtechniques(Aspinall2005b:186).
50Aspinall(2005b:138‐139)writesthatthiswasdenotedbythephrase‘ujung‐ujungnya
Suharto’(UUS),roughlytranslatingto“somethingthatcanbetracedbacktoSuharto”.
67
securehisnominationandsubsequentappointmentatanextraordinaryparty
congressinMedanduringJune1996(Aspinall2005b:177‐184).
WhileSoerjadiwasofficiallybeingselectedasPDIChairpersoninMedan,Megawati
wasaddressingsupportersinJakarta.Pro‐democracydemonstratorsthatmarched
throughthecityfollowingthespeechweremetbygovernmenttroops,whoassaulted
protestors.Morethan100peoplewereinjuredandover50peopleweredetained,
sparkingmoreproteststhroughoutthecountry(Aspinall2005b:178).Meanwhile,
Megawati’ssupportersrefusedtoacknowledgeSoerjadi’snewposition,prompting
legalactionwhichalsospilledoverintoprotestsandpublicrallies(Aspinall2005b:
188;Ricklefs2001:403).Thetensioncametoaheadon27July1996,when
Megawati’sJakartaPDIofficewasattackedbythugssaidtorepresenttheopposing
factionofPDI(butwerealsofoundtoincludemilitaryofficersoutofuniform)and
twodaysofriotingensued,inwhichfivepeopledied,149werewoundedand74
peoplewent‘missing’(Ricklefs2001:403).Thegovernmentlaterblamedthese
attacksontheleft‐wingPRD,withABRImembersclaimingitwasareincarnationof
theoutlawedPKI(Aspinall2005b:192).SeveralPRDleaderswerearrestedfor
subversion,however,thesearrestsweremorelikelyaresultoftheparty’srecent
successinmobilizingworkers’strikesinanumberofcitiesratherthananyactual
involvementintheriots(LiddleandMallarangeng1997:170).Thecrackdownon
PRDspurredraidsonotherNGOofficesandthedetentionofactivists(Aspinall
2005b:192;Bird1998:169).
ThefinalyearsoftheNewOrderwerecharacterizedbygrowingdissatisfactionwith
theregime,includingagrowingconcernoverthegovernment’sbrutalitytowardsits
owncitizens.51Governmentcorruptionalsoattractedsignificantpublicdiscontent
(Liddle1996:88;Schütte2009:83),astheblatantwealthofSuharto’sfamilyand
croniesgrewincreasinglyobvious.52TheissuewasracializedasmanyofSuharto’s
cronieswereChinese‐Indonesian,leadingtoangeramongst‘native’(pribumi)
51ThesituationinEastTimorfuelledgrowingdiscontenttowardstheNewOrderamongst
humanrightsactivists(Anderson1999;Ricklefs2001:395).Workers’rightsalsocameunder
scrutinyastheinternationalcommunitydevelopedatougherstanceonworkingconditions
andthebrutaldeathofprominentactivistandfemaleworker,Marsinah,highlightedtheuseof
violencetosuppressdissent(Ford2003:93‐94;MacIntyre1994:117).
52Ricklefs(2001:402)discussesspeculationthatafterthedeathofSuharto’swife,IbuTien,
therewerenoremainingchecksonthemoney‐hungrybehaviourofhischildren,whichinturn
ledtoevenmoreflagrantexamplesofcorruption.
68
entrepreneurs(Crouch1993:80).53DiscontentwasintensifiedbytheAsianFinancial
Crisis.54Indonesia’seconomyhadexperiencedhighsandlowsinthe1990s,but
nothingofthescaleofthecurrencycrisisof1997.55Priortothecrisis,theUSdollar
hadbeenworthapproximatelyRp.2,500.ByOctober1997ithadincreasedtoRp.
4,000,thenRp.17,000inJanuary1998(Ricklefs2001:404).Thedramatic
devaluationoftherupiahcausedthestockmarkettoplummet,leadingnumerous
businessestodeclarebankruptcy,wipingoutthesavingsofthemiddleclassand
causingmassunemployment(Wade1998;Wie2003:186‐187).TheCentralBank
providedliquidityinjectionstoflailingbankswhoseownersborrowedheavilyto
managetheirglobalportfoliosinsteadofusingthefundstostabilizesavingsand
reserves(McLeodandDuncan2007:79‐80).Inanotherexampleofgrowing
frustrationwiththecountry’sleadership,Bird(1998:174)assertsthecredibilityof
thegovernmentsanktonewlowsafteritwasrevealedthattheMinisterofManpower
hadusedUSD1.3millionfromtheworkers’socialinsurancefundtopayfor
parliamentarians’accommodationandexpenseswhiletheyweredeliberatinganew
billonmanpowerin1997.
WhenitbecameclearthattheRupiahwouldcontinuetoplummet,thegovernment
soughttheassistanceoftheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)andtheWorldBank,
whorespondedwithaUSD38billionrescuepackageinOctober1997(Bird1998:
173‐174;MacIntyre1999:157).However,inspiteofagreeingtoanumberof
conditionsthatrequiredIndonesiatoadoptausteritymeasures,strengthenits
financialsectorandoverhaulthegovernment’sroleintheeconomy,Suhartostill
attemptedtoblockreformsthatinterferedwiththeprojectsofhiscronies(Bird
1999:28;Ricklefs2001:404;Sherlock1998).Nepotismcontinued,illustratedbythe
appointmentofB.J.Habibie,widelyregardedasSuharto’sheirapparent,asVice‐
President,hisdaughter,SitiHardiyantiRukmana(commonlyknownas‘Tutut’),and
severalclosefriends,ascabinetministerswhenhewasre‐electedPresidentinMarch
53Forexample,in1994,anumberofstudentsfromtheMuslimStudents’Association
(HimpunanMahasiswaIslam,HMI)andICMIstagedprotestsagainstcorruptioninthe
IndonesianDevelopmentBank(BankPembangunanIndonesia,Bapindo)afterascandal
eruptedinvolvingChinese‐Indonesianelites(Aspinall2005b:135).
54WhiletherewereseveralfactorsleadingtotheAsianfinancialcrisis,theimmediatecause
wasthefloatingoftheBahtbytheThaigovernmentafteritcouldnolongersupportthe
currency’sexchangerate.AsthevalueoftheBahtdroppedsignificantly,sotoodidthe
currenciesofneighbouringcountries.ForfurtherdetailsontheAsianfinancialcrisisandthe
implicationsforIndonesia,seeWie(2003)andHillandShiraishi(2007).
55AccordingtoLiddle(1992:542)theearly1990switnessedimpressivegrowthandan
increaseintheannualnationalbudget.Incontrast,MacIntyre(1993:208)arguesthatthere
hadbeensomealarmin1992atthehighlevelsofnationalforeigndebtandoffshore
borrowing.
69
1998.DissatisfiedwithSuharto’sreformssofar,theIMFmootedanewagreementin
April1998,requiringaraftofnewpolicyreformsaccompaniedbyclosemonitoring.
Soonafter,on4May1998,Suhartoapproveda70percentincreaseinfuelprices,
sparkingriotsacrossthecountry(Bird1999:29).Demonstrationsagainstthe
subsequentpriceincreasesledtocallsforReformation(Reformasi)(Siegel1998:74).
WhileSuhartoattemptedtomanoeuvrehiswaythroughthecrisis,soldiersopened
fireonprotesterson12May1998,killingfourstudentprotestersfromTrisakti
Universityandinjuringseveralothers(Bird1998:29).Publicoutrageatthedeaths
sparkedriotsinJakartaandseveralothermajorcities.Suhartofamilyenterprisesand
thoseofChinese‐Indonesiansbecameprimetargetsforarsonandlooting,with
hundredsperishinginshoppingmallfires(Aspinall2005b:232;Siegel1998).56The
riotsconfirmedthegovernmentwasunabletomaintainruleoflaw(Aspinall2005b:
232).Suhartolostnotonlythesupportofeverydaycitizensbutalsothatofthe
businesselite,manyofwhomfledthecountry.Politicalelitesalsorebelledwith14
cabinetmemberswhohadbeenappointedbySuhartorefusingtoserveunderhim.In
addition,themilitary,underWiranto,withdrewitssupportforthepresidentand
Islamicleadersadvisedhimtoresign(Aspinall2005b:234‐237;Ricklefs2001:406‐
407).57Suhartosteppeddownon21May1998andwasreplacedbyVice‐President
Habibieuntilnewelectionscouldbeconducted.
Reformasi
TherelativelyswiftcollapseoftheNewOrderregimethrewIndonesiaintochaos.
Recognizingtheneedtoaddresspublicdemandsforincreasedtransparencyand
accountability,Habibiesignedtwobillsintheimmediatepost‐Suhartoperiod.InMay
1998hesignedLawNo.28/1999ontheEstablishmentofaCommissiontoExamine
theWealthofStateOfficials(KomisiPemeriksaKekayaanPenyelenggaraNegara,
KPKPN)andinAugust1998hesignedLawNo.31/1999ontheEradicationofthe
CrimeofCorruption(Butt2011b:15;King2000:621).Theselawsauthorized
investigationsintothedealingsofpoliticiansandbureaucratswhocouldbe
reasonablysuspectedofcorruption,aswellastheformationofananti‐corruption
commissionwithintwoyears(Butt2011b:15;Crouch2010:212‐213).Thelaws
56Chinese‐Indonesians,whohadbeensuspectedofprofiteeringfromthecrisis,were
particularlyvictimized(Elson2001:288;Purdey2006:Chapter4;Siegel1998:76).Fora
detailedaccountofanti‐ChineseviolenceinIndonesiabetween1996and1999,seePurdey
(2006).
57ForfurtherdiscussionofthefracturingoftheeliteinthefinaldaysofSuharto’spresidency,
seeAspinall(2005b:234‐238).
70
werewell‐received,buttheupheavaloftheearlyReformasiperiodandtheupcoming
electionsin1999soonovershadowedtheseanti‐corruptionefforts.Asaresult,the
commissionforinvestigatingthewealthofstateofficialswasnotsetupuntilJanuary
2001(Crouch2010:213).
Later,inNovember1998,theMPRalsopassedaresolutioncommittingtothe
investigationofallcorruptionduringtheNewOrder,includingSuhartoandhisfamily
(Bird1999:31;Crouch2010:200).AlthoughSuhartoclaimedtohavefewsavingsand
deniedowningoffshorebankaccounts,in1995fourofthefoundationshecontrolled
werevaluedatRp.2.5trillion(overUSD310million).InDecember1998,sevenmore
foundationswerefoundtobeholding‘quintillionsofrupiah’(Ricklefs2001:409).
SubsequentinvestigationsconductedunderHabibie’spresidencyfoundnoevidence
tosuggestthatSuharto’swealthhadbeengainedthroughinappropriatemeans(Elson
2001:295).The‘show’oftheinvestigationwasunconvincing,leadingtopublic
demandforamorethoroughinquiry(Hadiz2000:27).
Presidentialpressures
Habibieoptednottorunasapresidentialcandidateinthe1999generalelections.58
Asthefieldnarrowed,AbdurrahmanWahidandMegawatiSukarnoputri,whoformed
herownpartycalledtheIndonesiaDemocraticPartyofStruggle(PartaiDemokrasi
IndonesiaPerjuangan,PDIP)followingSuharto’sresignation,emergedasthetwo
maincontendersforthepresidency.AlthoughMegawati’spartywonthelargestshare
ofseatsinthenationallegislature,theMPRchoseWahidaspresident(Liddle2000:
33).Wahidbenefitedfromaninitialreputationofbeing‘clean’andrecognized,at
leastrhetorically,thatcombatingKKNshouldbeagovernmentpriority(King2000:
604).Healsosupportedincreasedpublicspaceformediaoutlets,whichcouldnow
reportopenlyoncorruptionscandalsinwaysthatwerenotpossibleduringtheNew
Order(Hara2001:314).
Acknowledgingthepublicpressuretoinstitutereformsacrossthepoliceforce,
judiciaryandthepublicprosecutor’soffice,Wahidsoughttoportraycorruption
eradicationasa‘centralplank’ofhisadministration(HadizandRobinson2014:49).
58Thesewerethefirstelectionssince1955inwhichpartyrepresentationwasnotrestricted.
Severalpartiesparticipated,themajoronesbeing(inorderofvotesgarnered):PDIP,Golkar,
theNationalAwakeningParty(PartaiKebangkitanBangsa,PKB),PPPandtheNational
MandateParty(PartaiAmanatNasional,PAN).Forafulloverviewoftheelectoraloutcomes,
seeLiddle(2000).
71
Accordingly,WahidestablishedtheJointTeamtoEradicatetheCrimeofCorruption
(TimGabunganPemberantasanTindakPidanaKorupsi,TGPTPK)asastop‐gap
measurewhileprovisionscouldbemadefortheestablishmentofaCorruption
EradicationCommission(KomisiPemberantasanKorupsi,KPK).Wahidalso
establishedtheNationalOmbudsman’sCommissionin2000,withPresidentialDecree
No.44/2000,taskedwithreceivingcomplaintsfromthepublicregardingtheconduct
anddecisionsofpublicofficials(Sherlock2002:367).Moreover,therewereattempts
toreinvigoratethestateauditinstitutionsandimproveoversightofgovernment
spending(Hamilton‐Hart2001:73).
Theseearlyattemptstocombatcorruptionweremetwithresistance,particularlyas
membersofthejudiciarywereaprimarytargetoftheTGPTPK.Thoseseekingto
uncoverthecorruptactivitiesoftheelitewereoftenmetwithcounter‐claimsof
defamationbythosetheyhadaccused.Forexample,thecaseofwomen’srights
activist,YeniRoslaini,who,afterprovidinglegalassistancetoavictimofrape,was
prosecutedforlibelbytheaccused.Duringthecase,Roslainicontendedthatthetrial
hadbeenunfairandthedefencehadbribedthejudgesforafavourableruling.59In
anotherexample,EndinWahyudinwassentencedtothreemonthsinprisonandsix
months’probationin2003afterreportingbriberyinvolvingthreejudgesinMalang.
Thejudges,whowerefoundnotguilty,latersuedWahyuddinfordefamation(Butt
andLindsay2011;Liputan62003:199‐204).
WhileWahidhimselfappearedcommittedtofightingcorruption,hewasnotabove
usingcorruptionaccusationforpersonalpoliticalinterests.InJuly1999,aGolkar
electionfundingscandalcametolightinvolvingfinancialmisdealingbetweenBank
BaliandacompanynamedPTEraGiatPrima(EGP).60EGPhadstruckadealto
channelfundsfromBankBalitomembersofGolkar.TheGovernorofBankIndonesia,
SyahrilSabarin,whohadbeenappointedbySuhartoin1998,wasaccusedofhaving
knowledgeofthedealings.WahidwantedtoappointhisownBankIndonesia
GovernorandgaveSabarintheoptiontoeitherresignorfacecorruptioncharges.
Refusingtoresign,SabarinwasarrestedinJune2000andconvictedofcorruptionin
March2002.61Wahidalsochargedkeymembersofhiscoalitionofcorruptionsothat
hecouldreplacethem.HamzahHazfromtheUnitedDevelopmentParty(Partai
59SeeCollins(2007:125‐126)forfurtherdetailsoftheRoslainicase.
60ForfurtherexplanationoftheBankBalicorruptionscandalseeCrouch(2010:207‐209),
Goodpaster(2002:95‐96)andHamilton‐Hart(2001:76‐77).
61ThisconvictionwasoverturnedbytheJakartaHighCourtinAugust2002(Crouch2010:
209).
72
PersatuanPembangunan,PPP),LaksamanaSukardifromPDIPandJusufKallafrom
Golkar,wereallaccusedofcorruption,althoughthecaseswerenotinvestigatedand
nochargeswerelaid(Liddle2001:209).62Despitethefactthattheaccusations
remainedunsubstantiated,Wahidusedthemasabasisfordismissal.Thisstrategy
backfiredwithWahidlosingtheconfidenceofhiscoalitiongovernmentand
subsequentlybeingaskedbyparliamenttoaccountforhisactions(Liddle2001:209).
Wahid’santi‐corruptionrhetoricwasinconsistentwiththeongoingleniencyshown
towardsNewOrderelites(Barton2006:345‐346).63Withanewleadershipinstalled,
thepublichadhighhopesthatSuhartoandhisassociateswouldfinallybepunished
fortheircorruption.Hamilton‐Hart(2001:66)arguesthatpublicperceptionswere
thatthefinancialcrisiswasintensifiedbygovernmentcorruptionandthatKKNhad
cometo‘symbolisethesocialcosts,inequitiesandabusesoftheSoehartoregime’.
Pressuremountedtore‐opentheinvestigationintoSuharto—legalchargeswere
finallylaidagainsttheformerpresidentinAugust2000(Elson2001:295‐296)—but,
thechargesweredroppedinFebruary2001asdefencelawyersandtherulingjudges
agreedSuhartowastooilltofacetrial(Aditjondro2002;Brown2003:243).Itwas
widelyknownthatWahidalwaysintendedtopardonSuhartoifhewasfoundguilty,
undermininghisanti‐corruptioncredentials(Brown2003:243;King2000:624).
TheonlychildofSuharto’stobetriedwasTommySuharto.AsprogressinSuharto’s
casestalledongroundsofillness,TommycametorepresenttheexcessesoftheNew
Order,withhis‘playboylifestyle’andpenchantforluxuryvehicles(Tupai2005).
Tommywassentencedto18monthsimprisonmentinlate2000forswindlingthe
StateLogisticsAgency(BadanUrusanLogistik,Bulog)outofRp.95billion
(approximatelyUSD11million)(Crouch2010:202).The18monthsentencefor
corruptionwasseenasbeinginadequate.Hewentintohidingafterhisappealwas
rejectedandwassubsequentlyimplicatedinthemurderofthechiefjudgeinvolvedin
hisconviction,SyafiuddinKartasasmita(Brown2003:243;Crouch2010:202).
Reportsofspecialtreatmentwhileinprisonandoutingstonightclubscontinuedto
62Kallawentontobecomevice‐presidentin2004,contestthepresidency(unsuccessfully)in
2009andbecomevice‐presidentagainin2014.
63AnotherexampleofthiswasthecaseofAkbarTandjung,StateSecretaryin1999and
GeneralChairmanofGolkar,whowasaccusedofusinggovernmentfundingintendedfor
socialwelfareprogramstobankrollGolkar’s1999electioncampaign(Crouch2010:209).
TandjungwasaccusedofdivertingRp.40billion(USD4million)fortheparty’selectoraleffort.
HewastriedinMarch2002andsentencedtothreeyearsinprison,however,theconviction
wasoverturnedinFebruary2004andTandjungservedonlyamonthofhissentence.
73
feedpopularsuspicionsthattherichremained‘abovethelaw’(Hainsworth2007).64
TheonlyothermemberoftheSuhartoclantobechargedandjailedforcorruption
wasSuharto’shalf‐brother,Probosutedjo,whowasconvictedin2003for
misappropriatingRp.49billion(approximatelyUSD5million)fromagovernment
reforestationproject(Kompas2001).
Tommy’strialputWahidinadifficultposition.Whilethepresidenthadnocontrol
overjudicialprocesses,thelenientsentenceswereinterpretedasfurtherevidence
thatthenewleadershipwasunwillingtobetoughoncorruption.Wahid’sreluctance
tocondemnSuharto(andhisfamily)hadalreadydisappointedthosewhobelieved
thatbringingNewOrdercorruptorstojusticewouldreflectbroadergovernment
reform(Liddle2000:42).Havingalreadylostthesupportofmostcoalitionmembers,
Wahidfacedincreasedscrutinythateventuallyledtohisimpeachment.In2000,
allegationsofcorruptionwerelevelledatWahidwhenitappearedthatfundinggiven
toBulogbytheSultanofBrunei,whichwastobespentinAcehinordertogainthe
supportofreligiousleadersinordertohaltcivilunrest,hadbeenmisused(Barton
2006;Liddle2001:210).ThelackoftransparencyinBulog’sprojectsinAcehcast
doubtoverhowmuchhadactuallybeenspentintheprovince(Collins2007:163;
Crouch2010:30).Crouch(2010:30)describesWahid’suseoffundingas‘casual’and
theuseofhispersonalmasseuseasago‐betweenwithBulogas‘bizarre’,leavinghim
vulnerabletoattacksfromaparliamentthatnolongersupportedhisrule.65The
impeachmentprocessbeganinFebruary2001andWahidwasdismissedfromthe
presidencyandreplacedbyMegawatiSukarnoputriinJuly2001.
WhenMegawatibecamepresidenttwentymonthsafterthe1999election,shetoo
spokeabouttheimportanceoferadicatingcorruption.Shesuggestedthatindividuals
neededtoexercisebettermoraljudgementandresisttheirgreed,ratherthan
implementinginstitutionalchangestoaddressanentrenchedproblem(Sherlock
64Tommywaslaterconvictedto15yearsinprisonforhiringhitmentomurderKartasasmita
(Brown2003:243).Crouch(2010:202)outlinesthedetailsofthetrial,notingthatalthough
TommySuhartowasconvictedfororderingthemurderheservedonlyfouryearsofhis
sentence,whilethetwomenfoundguiltyoftheactualshootingweresentencedtolifein
prisonandremainincustody.AfteranumberofremissionsTommywasreleasedin2006,
havingservedjustfouroutofthefifteenyearsofhisprisonterm(Kingsbury2007:157).
65Itisdifficulttoascertainwhethertheseactsweredeliberate.Ricklefs(2001:421)argues
thatWahidwasinfactthevictimofrichcorruptorswho‘circledaroundtheAbdurrahman
regime’,whileBrown(2003:244)concursthatitwasunlikelythatWahidhadintentionally
embezzledstatefunds:‘theevidenceforWahid’smalfeasanceinthesetwocasesisthin;what
doesseembeyonddoubt,though,isthathehasprovedtobeapoorjudgeofhispersonal
assistants’.Barton(2006),authorofWahid’sofficialbiography,isalsosympathetictothe
leader,portrayinghisdownfallasa‘tragedy’.
74
2002:379).LikeWahid,sheneededtoappeaseGolkarandthemilitaryinorderto
gainparliamentarysupportforherleadership.66UnlikeWahid,though,shepacified
herreluctantsupportersratherthanconfrontingthem,resultinginthe‘stonewalling’
ofreformefforts(Brown2003:272;Sherlock2002).67Shealsoseemedreluctantto
openlysupportTGPTPKinvestigations.68AlongsideMegawati’sreluctancetoact,
PDIPgainedareputationforcorruption,withmembersusingtheirnew‐found
authorityfortheirownbenefit(Crouch2010:32;naThalang2005:330),whichmay
havecontributedtothisreluctance.Wanandi(2004:124)contendsthatmembersof
Megawati’sownfamilywerealsoundersuspicionofbeinginvolvedincorruption
(althoughnoarrestshaveeveroccurred).Someinthejudiciaryandlawenforcement
agenciesalsoseemeddeterminedtoundermineanti‐corruptionefforts.InMarch
2001ateamofthreeSupremeCourtjudgesannulledthelawallowingfortheTGPTPK
altogether.69ProgressoftheCommissiontoExaminetheWealthofStateOfficials
(KomisiPermeriksaKekayaanPenyelenggaraNegara,KPKPN)wassimilarlystifledas
itrequiredsupportfromthePoliceandtheAttorney‐General’sofficetomount
prosecutionagainstcorruptionsuspectsandcooperationbetweenthetwowaspoor
(Butt2011b:19).TheKPKPNonlyreportedeightofficialstothepoliceonsuspicions
ofcorruptionthroughoutitslifetime.ItwassubsumedintotheKPKin2003.Thelack
ofprogressonissuesofcorruptionacrossalllevelsofgovernmentwassymptomatic
ofmoregeneralcriticismsoftheMegawatiregimeasshewasderidedforlacking
visioninguidingthecountry(Crouch2010:32).70
66ThisalsoincludedtheinstallationofHamzahHazasvice‐president,despitepreviously
beingdismissedfromWahid’scabinetonsuspicionofcorruptionandeventhoughhehad
rejectedherpresidencyin1999onthebasisthatshewasawoman(Crouch2010,32).
67Crouch(2010:210)contendsthatMegawatipurposefullydidnotpushfortheconvictionof
AkbarTandjung,leaderofGolkarchargedwithdivertingfundsfromBulogforGolkar’s
electioncampaignin1999,asallowinghimtomaintainhispositioninspiteofcontroversial
corruptionchargeswasofpoliticalbenefittoPDIP.Furthermore,whenMegawati’s
governmentpassednewanti‐corruptionlegislation,whichprovidedforanewcommission
andcourts,severalamendmentsweremadetothebillsintheparliament,wateringthem
downbeforetheywereenacted(Crouch2010:34).Thecourtsystemswerereputedtoberun
bya‘legalmafia’(mafiahukum),whoacceptedbribesinreturnforfavourablecourtrulings
(Lindsey1998),andthegovernmenthaddonelittletoreignthemin.
68TheTGPTPKneededofficialpresidentialapprovalbeforequestioningseniorofficials,which
Megawatirarelygranted(Crouch2010:215).
69MembersoftheTGPTPKbelievedtherewasaconspiracyagainsttheteam,laterconfirmed
whenapetitionwassubmittedtotheSupremeCourttoreviewthestatuteunderwhichthe
teamhadbeenestablished.ThecaseledtheSupremeCourttoannulLawNo.31/1999,which
wasthelegalbasisfortheTGPTPK(ButtandLindsay2011:202‐203).Theannulmentwas
viewedasanattemptbySupremeCourtjudgestoprotecttheircolleagues(Crouch2010:214).
70Despiteadisinclinationtoopenlysupportanti‐corruptionefforts,MegawatisignedtheLaw
fortheCommissiontoEradicatetheCrimeofCorruption(LawNo.30/2002)inDecember
2002,pavingthewayforanewanti‐corruptioninvestigativebodywithbroader‐ranging
powers.TheAnti‐CorruptionCourts(PengadilanTindakPidanaKorupsi,Tipikor),however,
75
TheriseofYudhoyono
In2004,SusiloBambangYudhoyono(oftenreferredtoas‘SBY’)bestedMegawatiin
Indonesia’sfirstdirectpresidentialelection.71Yudhoyonohadservedasacabinet
ministerforbothWahidandMegawati,butwasdismissedbyMegawatiaftershe
realizedthatheintendedtochallengeherforthepresidency.Asearlyas2001
YudhoyonowasinvolvedintheDemocraticParty,whichlaterbecametheelectoral
vehicletosupporthispresidentialnomination(Crouch2010:35;Slater2004:64).In
thefinalrun‐off,whichpittedYudhoyonoagainstMegawati,bothcandidatespledged
thattheywouldcombatcorruption(Anantaetal.2005).72Withapoortrackrecord
ontheissue,Megawati’scredibilityregardingthispromisewasquestionable.Thelack
ofreformsimplementedduringherpresidencyfuelledperceptionsthatcorruption
hadworsenedunderherrule(Slater2004:64;Wanandi2004:116).Bycontrast,
Yudhoyonowasabletopainthimselfasbeingcommittedtocombatingcorruption
(Anantaetal.2005:117;Hadiz2003:596).73Withsurveysillustratingthatthe
economy,socialwelfareandcorruptioneradicationwerethehighestprioritiesof
Indonesiancitizens(Aspinall2005a:124),supportemergedforanewleadershipthat
couldreversethestagnationofearlieryears.Reflectingthissentiment,Yudhoyono’s
DemocraticPartygained7.5percentofvotes,whilePDIP’svotedeclinedfrom39per
centin1999to19percentin2004(Wanandi2004:117).
YudhoyonowonadecisivevictoryoverMegawatiinthepresidentialelection’s
secondroundrun‐off,winning60.6percentofthepopularvote(LiddleandMujani
2005:122).Afterbecomingpresident,Yudhoyonoembarkedonamuch‐laudedanti‐
corruptiondrive.HeauthorizedtheKPKtoinvestigateseniorofficialsand
parliamentariansandin2004announcednewmeasuresto‘accelerate’the
eradicationofcorruption(Crouch2010:217).By2006,Yudhoyono’santi‐corruption
driveledtotheinvestigationand/orarrestofatleastsevengovernors,63district
headsand13nationalparliamentarians(McGibbon2006:325).Duringhisfirstyear
aspresident,Yudhoyonosignedoffoninvestigationsinto57officials(Crouch2010:
218).ThefirstTipikortrialinvolvingformerAcehnesegovernorAbdulSaleh,who
werenotestablisheduntilOctober2004(Butt2011b:32),largelyindicativeofagenerallack
ofenthusiasmforthebody,notleastfromMegawatiandtheparliament.
71Upuntil1999,thepresidentwaschosenbytheMPR.Foradiscussiononthetransitionto
directpresidentialelections,firstheldin2004,seeTan(2006).
72Aspinall(2005a:118)assertsthatwhilethe‘dominantdiscourseoftheelectionswas
democratic,againstcorruptionandevenpro‐‘change’(perubahan),thiswasmerelyanempty
rhetoricaldeviceintendedtomaskcontinuedelitedominance’.
73AfocusgroupstudyconductedbyAnantaetal.(2005:91)foundthatYudhoyonowasseen
as‘firm’(tegas)andparticipantsfelthewouldbefirmindealingwithcorruptioninIndonesia.
76
wassentencedtotenyearsimprisonmentinApril2005,wasseenasalandmarktrial
(Crouch2010:218).Followingthis,aslewofhigh‐profilecorruptioncaseswere
mounted,includingsomethatMegawatihadpreviouslyrefusedtoapprove.
AcknowledgingthelimitedresourcesoftheKPKandtheanti‐corruptioncourts,
YudhoyonoapprovedtheformationofanadditionalbodycalledtheCoordination
TeamfortheEradicationoftheCrimeofCorruption(TimKoordinasiPemberantasan
TindakPidanaKorupsi,TimTastipikor).DrawnfromtheAttorney‐General’soffice,
thepoliceandtheFinanceandDevelopmentBoard,theteamanswereddirectlytothe
presidentandbroughtcasestotheordinarycourtsinsteadoftheanti‐corruption
courts.It,too,ledsomehigh‐profileprosecutionsincludingthecaseagainst
Megawati’sMinisterofReligion,SaidAgilHusinAlMunawar,whowaschargedand
convictedofembezzlingfundsdesignatedtoassistIndonesiancitizensintheir
pilgrimagetoMecca(Crouch2010:219).
YudhoyonosteadfastlysupportedtheKPKandanti‐corruptioneffortsthroughouthis
firstterminoffice(2004–2009).However,asconvictionsbegantomount,critics
accusedhimoffocusingonrivalparties.Moreover,theinvestigationsdidnotreach
thehighestechelonsofpowerinthegovernmentandbusiness(Crouch2010:38).74
Nevertheless,withhisrelativelycleanbackgroundandlessinvolvementinpatronage
politicsthanhispredecessors,Yudhoyonowasabletocapitalizeontheseconvictions
inordertoboosthispopularity.Therewasmuchpraiseforhisleadershipashewas
seenashavingstabilizedthenation’seconomyafterseveralyearsofpooreconomic
growth(Sukma2009:350),whilethecountry’scontinuedeconomicgrowthappeared
tospareIndonesiafromtheworstoftheglobalfinancialcrisisin2008(Aspinall2010:
105).Meanwhile,Yudhoyono’sdeputy,JusufKallafromGolkar,hadbrokeredapeace
74Forexample,YudhoyonofacedcriticismforgrantingclemencytoTommySuhartoand
reducinghissentenceandfailingtoprosecutehimforothercrimesasnewevidencecameto
light.Anti‐corruptionandhumanrightsactivistsvoicedstrongoppositiontoTommy’sparole
earlyin2006,claiminghehadreceivedspecialtreatmentduetohispositionandinfluence
(Cochrane2006).Tommyhasbeenlinkedtoanumberofothercorruptionscandals,including
acourtcasebroughtbythestatelogisticsagencyagainsthimforUSD70millionoveraland
scamin1995inwhichheusedgovernmentconnectionstoswapswamplandsinNorth
JakartaforprimerealestateintheheartofJakarta.ThecasewasdismissedandTommywas
awardedUSD630,000inacounterclaim,adecisionthatangeredanti‐corruptionactivists
(Quarrata2008;Thompson2008).In2012allegationscametolightthatTommyhadreceived
aUSD20millionbribefromRollsRoycein1990forthecontracttoprovideairplanesto
Indonesia’snationalcarrierGaruda,buthedidnotfacefurtherprosecution(Aditjondro2002:
14).
77
agreementinAcehprovinceafterdecadesofcivilunrestdatingbacktotheDarul
Islamrebellionofthe1950s.75
Mobilizinghiscleanimageandcommitmenttofightingcorruption,Yudhoyonoand
theDemocraticPartyrepeatedlyusedananti‐corruptionsymbolincampaign
advertisementsleadinguptothe2009elections.Recontestingthepresidency,
Yudhoyonospokeofhisongoingcommitmenttoeradicatingcorruption,while
membersofhispartyappearedina(nowinfamous)‘say“no”tocorruption’campaign
onnationaltelevisioncampaign.76In2009,withapositivereputationandtrack
record,theDemocraticPartyincreaseditsnumberofseatswithinthenational
legislature,gaining93seats,witharesoundingvictoryforYudhoyonointhe
presidentialelection.
Conclusion
ThischapterhasoutlinedhowanumberofpoliticalfiguresinIndonesiaattemptedto
usecorruptionissuesfortheirownpoliticaladvantage.Theprevalenceofcorruption
reinforcedperceivedinequalitiesbetweenprivilegedeliteswithaccesstopatronage
networksontheonehandandordinaryfolkontheother.Leveragingcitizens’
discontentwithpoliticalleadership,anti‐corruptionrhetoricdrewuponthese
prevailingimagesofcorruptofficialsandpoliticians.Theperceptionsofinjustice
associatedwithcorruptionhavebeenaconsistentrallyingpointforanti‐government
sentiment,whilepromisestoseriouslyaddressitremainapopularcatch‐cryfor
politicians.
CorruptionhasbeenaconstantpartofIndonesia’spoliticallandscapesinceDutch
colonizationFollowingIndonesia’striumphinitsbattleforindependence,thenew
governmentthatwasestablishedseemedtobeperpetuatingratherthancombating
corruption.Thiswastruebothfortheparliamentariansandcabinetmembersaswell
aspublicservantswhoseremunerationwasoftenviewedasdisproportionatetotheir
socialstanding.Corruptioninallbranchesofgovernmentseemedubiquitousand
therewasageneralperceptionthatthoseingovernmentweremoreintenton
protectingtheirownintereststhanservingtheIndonesianpeople.
75TheDarulIslamrebellionbeganin1953andaimedtocreateanautonomousAcehwithina
FederalIslamicIndonesianstate.Foranoverviewofthelong‐standingconflictbetween
AcehneseseparatistsandtheIndonesiangovernment,whicheffectivelyendedwiththe
signingoftheHelsinkiMemorandumofUnderstandingin2005,seeAspinall(2009);Kramer
(2009).
76FurtherdetailsofthisspecificadvertisingcampaigncanbefoundinChapterFour.
78
Asthepubliccametoseecorruptionasapervasivepoliticalevil,theuseofanti‐
corruptionsymbolsgainedtraction.FromasearlyastheSukarnoyears,purportingto
standagainstcorruptionwasapopularwayforpoliticianstogainpublicsupport
fromthemanypeoplewhodidnotbenefitfromcorruption.TheNewOrderregime
attemptedtowinpublicsupportwithanearlyandhighlyvisibleanti‐corruptiondrive
inthelate1960sandearly1970s,butthelackofmeaningfultransparencyand
accountabilityreformsledtoevenmorepublicoutcry.Thoughthissentiment
dissipatedwithincreasedeconomicdevelopment,corruptionremainedasourceof
publicdiscontent,attimesbecomingarallyingpointforanti‐governmentprotests.
PubliccynicismtowardsSuhartoreachedfeverpitchin1998,whenhisassertionsof
beingopentoreformspromotingaccountabilityandtransparency,andthathisown
familyhadnotbenefittedfromhisposition,fellondeafears.Indonesianscouldno
longerbepersuaded,evenwiththreatsofviolenceand/orimprisonment,tosupport
theregime.AfterSuhartoresigned,newleaderssoughttodemonstratethattheyhad
brokenfromthelegaciesoftheNewOrder.Being‘anti‐corruption’wasadesirable
image.But,inreality,asevidencedbyPresidentsWahid,MegawatiandYudhoyono,it
proveddifficulttomaintain.
Ofcourse,anti‐corruptionrhetoricisnotalwaysdivorcedfromaction.Thereare
severalexamplesofconcretestepstakenbysuccessivegovernments,particularly
duringReformasi,tocombatcorruption.Lawsallowingfortheestablishmentofthe
KPKandTipikor,coupledwiththeeffortsoftheseinstitutions,ledtothearrestand
prosecutionofanumberofsuspects,bothwithinthegovernmentandtheprivate
sector.However,eventhemostsuccessfulrhetoricandanti‐corruptionsstepscanbe
undonebyscandalsthatcontradictthedeclaredvaluesofthepartyorperson.After
thedisappointmentsoftheearlyReformasi,suchasthefailuretoprosecuteSuharto
andhisfamilysatisfactorily,allegationsofcorruptionagainstPresidentWahidand
Megawati’sreluctancetocountertheinterestsofold‐schoolelites,Yudhoyono
representedanewhope.TheDemocraticParty’stoughstanceoncorruptionwas
supportedbynotonlyYudhoyono’swords,butalsohisactions—atleast,asfarasthe
publiccouldsee—markingthisasthepinnacleoftheparty’spopularity.His
continuedsuccessin2009demonstratedasuccessfulmaintenanceoftheanti‐
corruptionsymbol.However,corruptionissueswouldsurfaceforthepartyfollowing
its2009victoryandthesignificantnumberofcorruptionscandalsarisingthroughout
Yudhoyono’ssecondtermwouldsettheagendaforthe2014electoralcampaigns.
79
80
ChapterThree
Politicsandcorruption,2009–2014
Theoutcomeofthe2009electionreflectedcontinuingsupportfortheincumbent
administration,withGolkarandPDIPlosingseatstoPresidentYudhoyono’s
DemocraticPartyinthenationallegislatureandtheProsperousJusticeParty(Partai
KeadilanSejahtera,PKS)becomingthemostdominantIslamicpartyinthe
parliament.GerindraandHanura,competingintheirfirstnationalelections,obtained
asmallproportionofthevote,butenoughtomeetthethresholdrequiredtosecurea
presenceinthenationalparliament.WhilethesepowershiftsgavetheDemocratic
Party‐ledcoalitioncontrolofbothparliamentandtheexecutive,theensuingfive
yearswerefarfromsmoothsailing.Approachingthe2014election,theYudhoyono
administrationhadlostmuchofitspopularity,withapprovalratingsfallingsteadily
from2011.ManyfeltthatYudhoyonofailedtomaintainthevigourwithwhichhehad
addressedcorruptionduringhisfirstterm,contributingtovoterdisenchantment
(BurkeandResosudarmo2012:300;Mietzner2012).
ThischapterbrieflydiscussesIndonesia’snationallegislativeelectionsin2004and
2009beforehighlightingvariouscorruption‐relatedcasesthataffectedpublic
sentimenttowardsthegovernmentduringthisperiod.Thechapterunderscoresthe
dominanceofcorruptionthemesinthepublicsphere,outliningsomeofthe
prominentanti‐corruptioneffortsandcorruptionscandalsduringthisperiod.The
chapterconcludesthatthevolumeofcorruptioncasesandmediaattentionon
scandalsdamagednotonlythereputationofparticularpartiesandindividuals,but
alsothatofthepoliticalsystemasawhole.Thisaffordedemergingpartiesthe
opportunitytopresentthemselvesasanewer,cleanerandbetteralternativeintheir
2014electoralcampaigns.
The2004and2009elections
The2004nationallegislativeelectionswerecontestedby24parties.Indonesia’sfour
majorparties—Golkar,PDIP,theNationalAwakeningParty(PartaiKebangkitan
Bangsa,PKB)andtheUnitedDevelopmentParty(PartaiPersatuanPembangunan,
81
PPP)—wonthemostseatsinparliament(Sebastian2004:274).1However,some
minorpartiessurfacedasseriouspoliticalcontenders,particularlytheDemocratic
Party,ledby(soontobepresident)Yudhoyono,andPKS.Thissuccesswasallthe
moreunexpectedgiventherelativelylowprofilesofbothpartiespriortotheelection
(Aspinall2005a).Yudhoyono’sDemocraticPartyreceived7.5percentofthepopular
voteintheparliamentaryelectionwhilePKSgarnered7.34percentofthepopular
vote,asharpincreasefromthe1.36percentitobtainedwhenitranastheJustice
Party(PartaiKeadilan,PK)in1999.
TheemergenceofbothYudhoyonoandPKSinthe2004electionsreflectedageneral
dissatisfactionwithMegawati’spresidencyandtheparliamentmorebroadly(Liddle
andMujani2005:125;Sebastian2004;Wanandi2004:117).Drawinguponthis
discontent,Yudhoyonopresentedhimselfasaviablepresidentialalternativeto
Megawati,eventhoughhispartywassignificantlylesspopularthanPDIP.By
contrast,PKS’successwasattributedtoatwo‐foldstrategy.Ontheonehandit
focusedongrassrootscampaigningandtargetingnewrecruits,oftenbyappealingto
religioussentiment(Permata2008).Ontheotherhand,itdrewsecularappealby
demandingmoretransparencyandaccountabilityingovernment(CollinsandFauzi
2005;Machmudi2006).PKSwasthusabletoexploitgrowinganti‐corruption
sentimentamongstthebroaderpopulationwhilemaintaininganauraofbeinga
conservativeIslamicparty.
Partiesthathadnotfaredwellin2004facedadditionaldifficultiesin2009.LawNo.
3/1999onGeneralElectionshadalreadyprecludedpartiesgarneringlessthan2.5
percentofparliamentaryseatsinthepreviouselectionfromrunninginsubsequent
elections.LawNo.10/2008onGeneralElectionsforthePeople'sRepresentative
Assembly,theRegionalRepresentativeAssemblyandtheRegionalHouseof
Representativesputinplacestrictereligibilityrulesforparticipatinginnational
parliamentaryelections(Mietzner2009;Sherlock2009a:11;Sukma2009).Changes
werealsomadetothewayvoterscouldselecttheirrepresentatives.InDecember
2008theConstitutionalCourtruledthattheseatsobtainedbyeachpartyweretobe
allocatedtoindividualsbasedonthenumberofpersonalvotestheygarnered,as
opposedtotheorderofcandidates’namesontheparties’candidatelist(Sherlock
1SeetheElectoralCommissionwebsiteforfulldetailsofthe2004nationallegislativeelection
results(KomisiPemilihanUmum2009a).Theresultswerecontestedbysomeofthesmaller
parties,with14partiesrefusingtoendorsetheelectionresults,citing‘electionirregularities’
(Sebastian2004:264).
82
2009a:8).Thisincreasedcompetitionwithinpartiesandledtoanumberof
incumbentDPR‐RImemberslosingtheirpositionstocelebritycandidatesorother
contenderswithlegitimatelocalsupport(Sukma2009:321).Inaddition,LawNo.
42/2008alsolimitedtheabilityofpartiestonominatepresidentialandvice‐
presidentialcandidates.In2004,allpartiesthatreceivedover3percentofthe
popularvoteorheld5percentofDPR‐RIseatswereallowedtonominatea
presidentialcandidate(naThalang2005:332;Tan2006).However,in2009,parties
neededover20percentofthepopularvoteor25percentofDPR‐RIseatsinorderto
nominateacandidate.PartysuccessintheDPR‐RIelectionsbecamemoreimportant
thanever,asthosefailingtopassthisthresholdwereforcedtoformstrategic
coalitionswithotherpartiesiftheywishedtoputforwardapresidentialteam.
TheDemocraticPartyacquiredanadditional93seatsintheDPR‐RIin2009,gaining
over20percentofthepopularvote.ThisallowedthepartytoadvanceYudhoyonoas
theirpresidentialcandidate,andBoedionoasvice‐presidentialcandidate,without
needingtonegotiatewithotherparties.GolkarandPDIP,previouslythetwomost
popularparties,bothlostseveralseatscomparedtotheir2004results,fallingto
secondandthirdrespectively(Aspinall2005a;Wanandi2004)(seeTable3.1).2While
theelectionsawageneraldeclineinsupportforIslamicparties,PKSincreasedits
parliamentaryshareby12seats,makingitthemostinfluentialIslamicpartyinthe
nationalparliament.PKS’successarguablyreflectedthestrongcommitmentof
cadres,providingPKSwithconsistentsupportthatotherIslamicpartiessimplydid
nothave(Tomsa2012).3
2Electoralproblemsfacedduringthe2009electionincludedissuessuchas:incorrectvoter
registry,ballotsprintedincorrectly,alackofballotsatcertainpollingbooths,ballotpapers
senttothewrongprovincesanddistrictsandalackofexperiencedstaffoverseeingoperations
ontheground.Foracomprehensiveoverviewoftheelectoralmanagementproblemsfacedby
theKPUseeSukma(2009;2010).
3While2009sawPKSbecomethemostpowerfulIslamicpartyinthenationalparliament,the
resultwasonlymarginallybetterthanin2004.Despiteextensivecampaigning,inasimilar
veintothestrategiesusedforthe2004elections,thepartywasunabletopickupvoteslostby
otherIslamicparties(Pepinskyetal.2012;Sukma2009:321).Thiswasindicativeofan
overallshiftinvotesawayfromIslamicpartiestosecularparties.Mietzner(2010:187)
assertsthatthiswastheresultofatrendtowards‘politicalcentrism,’frombothsidesofthe
politicalspectrum,withsecularpartiesincreasinglyembracingIslamicvaluesandIslamic
partiespresentingamorepluralistimage.
83
Table3.1Outcomeofnationallegislativeelections,2009.
%of
+/‐changein
popular
popularvote
vote
from2004
20.81
+13.4
148
+93
Golkar
14.45
‐7.13
106
‐22
PDIP
14.01
‐4.5
94
‐15
PKS
7.89
+0.54
57
+12
PAN
6.03
‐0.43
46
‐7
PPP
5.33
‐2.83
38
‐20
PKB
4.95
‐5.63
28
‐24
Gerindra
4.46
—
26
—
Hanura
3.77
—
17
—
Party
Democratic
Party
No.ofseatsin
parliament
+/‐no.ofseats
from2004
election
Source:KomisiPemilihanUmum(2009b).
Sukma(2009:320)contendsthattheincreasedsupportfortheDemocraticPartywas
moreareflectionofYudhoyono’spopularityandthegeneralsatisfactionwithhis
performance,ratherthananincreaseinpublicaffinityforthepartyitself.His
successesprovidedthepartywiththegroundstocampaignwiththepartyslogan
‘lanjutkan!’or‘continue[asbefore]’(Aspinall2010:106).Votersevidentlysupported
asecondYudhoyonoadministration,withYudhoyonoandBoedionosubsequently
receivingover60percentofvotesinthefirstroundofthepresidentialelection,
easilydefeatingthepairingsofMegawati–PrabowoSubiantoandJusufKalla–Wiranto.
ThoughbothMegawatiandKalladisputedtheoutcomeoftheelectionsinthe
ConstitutionalCourt,theywereunsuccessful.Yudhoyono’sdecisivewinmeantthat
therewasnoneedforasecondroundrun‐offbetweenthefirstandsecond‐placed
candidatesastherehadbeenin2004(Aspinall2010:111).
HanuraandGerindraalsoperformedwell,competingforthefirsttimeinthenational
elections.Althoughthenumberofvotesreceivedwasrelativelylow—Hanuraonly
gained3.77percentandGerindragained4.46percent—bothpassedthe3.5percent
thresholdrequiredtotakeupseatsintheDPR‐RI.Theirperformancewasimpressive
whencomparedtothatofestablishedIslamicparties,whichdidnotfaremuchbetter
84
despitehavingmoreprominentpublicprofiles.4WithafootinthedooroftheDPR‐RI,
thesetwonewpartiescouldworktowardsimprovingtheirresultsinthe2014
elections.
Anunstablecoalition
Severalscholarshavearguedthattheelectionsof2009demonstratedtheon‐going
successofdemocraticconsolidationinIndonesia(see,forexample,Mietzner2010;
Sukma2009;vonLuebke2010).However,inthefollowingyears,somesuggested
thatthereformprocesshadstagnated(Mietzner2012;Tomsa2010).5One
explanationforthiswasthediversityoftherulingcoalitioninthenationallegislature
formedbythepresident.Followingtheparliamentaryelections,Yudhoyono
convincedGolkar,PKSandmostotherminorpartiestoformacoalitiongovernment
(oftendubbedthe‘RainbowCoalition’)withtheDemocraticParty,leavingPDIP,
GerindraandHanurainopposition(Aspinall2010;Tomsa2010).ThePresident
assignedmostofthe34ministerialcabinetpositionsalongcoalitionlines,withsix
goingtotheDemocrats,fourtoPKSandthreetoGolkar(Aspinall2010:110).Non‐
partymemberswereassignedtotheremainingpositions(JakartaPost2009b).
Concernsabouttheefficacyofsuchagrandcoalition,giventhedisparateinterestsof
thepartiesinvolved,turnedouttobewell‐founded(Sherlock2009b).Divergent
politicalinterestsofcoalitionpartnersbegantomanifestthemselvesthroughvisible
disagreements.LessthanayearintoYudhoyono’ssecondtermtherewasacabinet
4Theresultsforthesenewpartiesasseeminglyattheexpenseofthemoreestablishedparties
ofGolkarandPDIP(Ufen2010:284).However,asTomsa(2009)argues,theresultsofthe
electionwereprobablydisappointingforHanuraandGerindrainlightofthelargefinancial
investmentallegedlymadebyeachparty.Gerindra’sleader,Prabowo,wasrumouredtohave
spentoverUSD100milliononhismediacampaign(Tomsa2009),whileHanuracertainly
hadenoughfinancialbackingtoensureitwashighlyvisible(Ufen2010:282).KPUaudits
from2009reportthatHanura’scampaignbudgetwasRp.19billionandGerindra’swas
approximatelyRp.308billion(KomisiPemilihanUmum2009c).However,therewere
suspicionsthatthesefiguresdidnotreflectthetrueamountinvestedincampaigns(Mietzner
2007:258;SiswantoandSusila2009).
5Forexample,arguingthatlocalelectionswereexpensiveandpronetomoneypolitics,
Yudhoyono,supportedlegislationtoendthedirectelectionsofgovernmentleadersandfor
themtobechosenbylocallegislativecouncilsinsteadofvoters,reversinglegislationpassedin
2004(Mietzner2012:122).Mietzner(2012:123)arguesthattheseplansdefiedpopular
opinion,with2011pollingsuggestingthat66percentofrespondentswereinfavourofdirect
electionsattheprovinciallevel.Furthermore,theproposalwaslambastedbyanumberof
provincialheads(Buehler2012).Theunpopularbidwastemporarilyshelvedin2012,onlyto
berevivedinJuly2013,whentheMinisterofInteriorreiteratedthedisadvantagesofdirect
gubernatorialelections.Itwasraisedagainin2014,justpriortotheendofYudhoyono’sterm,
thoughbythistimethepoliticallandscapehadchangedandthepresident’sattitudetothe
changeswasunclear.TheDemocraticPartyboycottedtheparliamentaryvotebutthebillto
enddirectelectionsforprovincialleadershippassed,supportedbythenewMerahPutih(Red
andWhite)Coalition,whichhadformedafterthe2014legislativeelectionandincludedGolkar
andGerindra(Asril2014b;Puspita2014).
85
reshuffleinresponsetodecreasingpublicapproval(Kimura2012:188‐189).
Althoughtherewasspeculationthatthereshufflewasaformofrevengeagainst
GolkarandPKSforvotingagainsttheDemocraticPartyinparliament,thecabinet
representationofboththesepartiesremainedrelativelyunchanged,withonlyPKS
losingaministerialposition(Mietzner2012:121).Somepostulatedthatthereshuffle
representedthePresident’sownformofpatronagepolitics,withanumberof
controversialappointeesappearingtohavebeenrewardedforpersonalloyaltyto
Yudhoyono(Kimura2012:189).6
Corruptionandanti‐corruptionaspoliticalthemes
Scandal,especiallycorruptioncases,dominatedIndonesianpoliticsbetween2009
and2014(Amiruddin2012;Kramer2013).Asenseofdisappointmentwasevidentin
publicandmediadiscourse,drivenbythefailureofpoliticalpartiestoaddress
corruptioneffectivelyandimprovetransparency,evenwithintheirownparties.7Yet,
evenwhenfacingallegationsofcorruption,partiesusedcorruptionscandals
involvingtheirrivalstotheirpoliticaladvantage.Severalmembersofthepolitical
eliteownedmediafranchises(Tapsell2010;Winters2014)andusedtheir
newspapers,radio,televisionandinternetvehiclestoderidepoliticalopponentsand
underscorethegovernment’slackofprogressineradicatingcorruption.Themedia
highlightedmanycorruptioncasesduringtheperiod,illustratingthatcorruptionwas
wide‐reachingandconcernedallarmsofgovernment.Thesecasesreflectednotonly
continuingproblemswithgovernanceandtheruleoflaw,butalsotheabsenceof
generationalchangethathadbeenanticipatedwiththenewwaveofpost‐Reformasi
civilservantrecruits.8Politicalcommentatorsandanti‐corruptionactivistsalikehad
6Intra‐coalitionclashesoverthecessationoffuelsubsidieswerealsodivisive.InJanuary
2012,parliamentvotedagainstaproposaltomakesubsidizedfuelavailableonlyforpublic
transport,motorcyclesandfishingvesselsandamotiontoendsubsidiesforfuelsaleto
privatecarsinGreaterJakarta(MahiandNazara2012).Whenthebillwasreintroducedin
2013,themostcontroversialoppositioncamefromthePKS,whichnotonlyrefusedtobackits
coalitionpartners,butbeganacounter‐campaign,urgingcitizenstoattenddemonstrations
againstthefuelpriceincreases.PKS’rejectionofthebillwasseenasapopulistmoveandthe
partywasaccusedoftryingtoappealtovotersinthefaceofdamagingpublicityrelatedto
corruptionscandals(ChenandPriamarizki2013).
7Thiswasreflectedbyanumberofarticlesthathighlightedhowongoingcorruptionanda
lackoftransparencycontinuetoimpactdemocraticchangeinIndonesia.SeeKimura(2012)
forfurtherdetails.
8Forexample,aneditorialinKompaslamentsthefocusonmaterialismandwealthamongst
youngIndonesiansthatwasleadingthemtofollowthecorruptpracticesoftheprevious
generations(Kompas2011).AnotherarticlehighlightsthattheCentreforReportingand
AnalysingMonetaryTransactions(PusatPelaporandanAnalisisTransaksiKeuangan,PPATK)
hadfoundatleast10youngcivilservants(undertheageof35)withassetsworthbillionsof
rupiahandsuspectedthatthereweremanymore(SeputarIndonesia2011).
86
hopedthatpost‐Reformasiyouthtakingoverfromoldguardcivilservantswould
bringwiththemnewidealsthatwoulddiscourageinvolvementincorruption.
However,thesehopesfadedwhenyoungpoliticiansindictedforcorruptionwere
joinedbyyoungpublicservantsalsochargedwithgraft‐relatedcrimes.Arashof
corruptioncaseswithinthebureaucracyconfirmedthatanti‐corruptionmeasures
hadfailedtoreinincivilservants,policeofficersandjudges.
Thissectiondiscussessomeofthemostprominentcorruptioncasesofthisperiod,
demonstratingthatcorruptionremainedaprominentpoliticalthemefrom2009to
2014.Theincessantmediacoverageofthesecasessawthatcorruptionremained
squarelyinthepubliceyeandscrutinyofthecharactersinvolvedinthesecases
fosterednegativesentimentstowardsthoseinparliamentwhohadpreviously
promisedtofightcorruptionwholeheartedly.Conversely,theconvictionofseveral
defendantspromotedpublicsupportfortheKPK’sworkasaninstitutioncommitted
tocombatingcorruptionregardlessofambivalentgovernmentsupportandinspiteof
the(perceived)lightsentenceshandeddownbyjudges,whichwereoftenlessthan
requestedbyprosecutors.Assuch,attacksonthemuch‐laudedKPKbysome
parliamentariansandmembersofthepoliceforcesparkedoutragefromcitizens.
AttacksontheKPK
Followingitsestablishmentin2003,theKPKdevelopedareputationfortenacityafter
severalsuccessfulconvictionsforcorruption.9ItbecameoneofIndonesia’smost
respectedinstitutions,enjoyingstrongsupportfromcitizens(Butt2011a:384;
Schütte2013).However,thissuccessalsomadeitatargetforeliteswhowereintent
onmaintainingthestatusquo.From2009,therewereconcertedattemptsto
underminethelegitimacyoftheKPK,primarilybyattackingitsleadership.InMay
2009theChiefoftheKPK,AntasariAzhar,wasarrestedformurder,accusedof
orderingtheassassinationofaprominentbusinessman,NasruddinZulkarnaen,who
wasshotintheheadon14March2009(Aspinall2010:114;Butt2011b:72).Itwas
allegedthatAntasarihadbecomeromanticallyinvolvedwithNasruddin’sthirdwife,
9Itwasestimatedthat,in2001alone,thecommissionrecoveredRp.139.8billionasaresult
ofsuccessfullyprosecuting31cases(Aspinall2010:114).AftertheKPK’sinception,
Indonesia’srankingonTransparencyInternational’sCorruptionPerceptionIndeximproved
dramatically(Aspinall2010:114).In2001,IndonesiarankedpoorlyintheIndexasthethird‐
mostcorruptcountryintheworld,whereasin2009itwasranked111outof180countries.In
2013itfellslightlytonumber114outof177countries,rankingbetterthan62othercountries
(TransparencyInternational2013).Thefall,possiblyareflectionofdiminishingconfidenceas
aslewofcorruptioncasescametolightafter2009,stillreflectedanimprovementfromits
positionin2001.
87
who,inturn,haddecidedtoblackmailAntasariwiththisinformation.Butt(2011b:
88‐89)contendsthatthecaseagainstAntasariwasfarfromiron‐cladandthathis
involvementinthemurderremainsunclear,withtheevidenceputforwardduring
thetrialbeing‘weak,unreliableorcontradictory’.Nevertheless,theSouthJakarta
DistrictCourtfoundAntasariguiltyandhewassentencedto18years’
imprisonment.10ThecaseledtocallsfromsomepoliticalelitestoreducetheKPK’s
powers,ortoabolishitaltogether(Aspinall2010:115).11
Towardstheendof2009,inthewakeoftheAntasaricontroversy,theKPKbecamea
battlegroundforanti‐corruptionactivistswhoaccusedothergovernmentbodies,
includingthenationalpoliceandpublicprosecutor’soffice,ofahigh‐levelconspiracy
toweakentheKPK(Aspinall2010:113;Sukma2009:332‐333).Theconflictallegedly
stemmedfromtheBankCenturycase.12Theheadofthepoliceforce’scriminal
investigationsunit,SusnoDuadji,(whowaslaterjailedforcorruption)wassuspected
ofinterveninginthebailoutofBankCenturyonbehalfofbusinessmanBudi
Sampoerna,inreturnforaUSD1millionkickback(Kurniadi2009).TheKPKacted
uponthesesuspicions,tappingthetelephoneofSusnotoinvestigatehisinvolvement.
Theinquiryintoatop‐levelpoliceofficerpresentedathreattothepowerofthepolice
elites,promptinganallegedplottounderminetheKPK.
InSeptember2009,YudhoyonoformallysuspendedtwoKPKDeputyCommissioners,
BibitSamadRiantoandChandraM.Hamzah,fromtheKPKafterthepolicenamed
themassuspectsintheirowncorruptioninvestigation.Subsequently,thepairwere
arrestedandchargedwithabuseofpowerandextortioninrelationtoAnggoro
Widjojo,abusinessmanwhowasbeinginvestigatedbytheKPKforbribingthehead
oftheDPR‐RI’sForestryCommissioninOctober2009(Butt2011b:91;JakartaPost
10In2011,AntasarifiledanappealwiththeSupremeCourtwhichwasrejectedduetolackof
newevidence.However,inMarch2013Antasarilodgedasecondjudicialreviewwiththe
ConstitutionalCourtwhichruledinhisfavourinMarch2014,statingthathecouldmounta
secondappealtohisconviction.AsofNovember2014,Antasarihadanappealinthe
TangerangDistrictCourt,claimingthatevidenceinthecasehadbeentamperedwith.For
moredetailsseeSaragih(2014).
11WhileitisdifficulttoidentifyexactlywhichindividualswantedtoweakentheKPK,some
membersoftheDPR‐RIweredescribedas‘understandablykeentocurtail[theKPK’s]power
giventhattheKPKarrestedsomeoftheircolleaguesoncorruptioncharges’(Sukma2009:
137).Asanindependentbody,detractorsarguedthattheKPKwasapoweruntoitselfthatdid
nothavetoreporttootherlawenforcementagencies.TherewasalsospeculationthattheKPK
wouldbestrippedofthecapacitytoprosecuteandwire‐tapsuspects.Whilethisdidnot
eventuate,thedebatesurroundingitspowersanditslackofaccountabilitydrewfurther
attentiontothecommissionanditsleadership.SeeButt(2011a)forfurtherdetails.
12‘Centurygate’willbediscussedlaterinthischapter.
88
2009a).ArecordingwaslaterproducedinwhichWidjojoadmittedthathehadbribed
membersoftheKPKtohalttheinvestigationintohispersonalfinances.Therewasno
evidencethattheseaccusationsreferredtoBibitorChandra,butthepoliceused
them,alongsideothercircumstantialevidence,tochargethepairwithextortion(Butt
2011b:90‐91).13Meanwhile,BibitandChandrachallengedtheirsuspensionon
constitutionalgrounds,arguingtheyhadtherighttobepresumedinnocentuntil
provenguilty.Aninjunctiontothesuspensionwasgrantedand,whilethelegalityof
thiswasdebateable,thehearingallowedanumberofKPKwire‐tappedrecordingsto
beplayedduringtheproceedings(Butt2011b:99‐102).Theserecordingsincluded
conversationsbetweensomeofIndonesia’smostseniorlawenforcementofficials
disclosingplanstoframethepair,aimingtoruintheKPK’sreputation(Jansen2010).
Uponhearingtherecordings,theConstitutionalCourtdeclaredBibitandChandrathe
victimsofaset‐upandorderedtheirreinstatement(Butt2011b:102).
PriortotheConstitutionalCourt’sruling,therewasanenormouspublicoutcryatthe
arrestofthetwodeputycommissioners,particularlyafterSusnoDuadjilikenedthe
KPK’sconflictwiththepolicetoageckotryingtofightacrocodile,animage
subsequentlyadoptedbycivilsocietyactivistsandthemediaintheirsupportforthe
KPK(Aspinall2010:116).14Publiccommentaryviasocialmediaoutletssuchas
Facebook,YouTubeandTwitterhelpedrallysupportandraisepublicawarenessof
thecase(Lim2013).Forexample,IndonesianCorruptionWatch(ICW)used
FacebooktoorganizeamarchinJakarta,attractingover5000people.Thoughthe
mediareducedthenarrativeofthecasetoasimplisticbattleof‘good’(KPK)versus
‘evil’(oldelites)(Lim2013:644),theon‐goingpublicsupportenhancedthestanding
oftheKPK,nowoneofthemosttrustedinstitutionsinthecountry(Agustiaand
Manggiasih2010).AsthemovementtodefendtheKPKgrew,theanti‐corruption
commitmentofIndonesia’sleadersandlawenforcementbodieswastested.The
government’sresponse,particularlythatofYudhoyono,waslambastedonsocial
media,withpublicassertionsthatthegovernmentwascomplicitinweakeningthe
KPK.Withmountingcriticism,Yudhoyonowasforcedtoactandestablishedan
independentteam,knownasthe‘TeamofEight’,toinvestigatetheallegationsagainst
BibitandChandraandthehandlingofthecasebythepolice.Theteamproduced
13AdetaileddescriptionandanalysisofthecaseagainstBibitandChandraandthe
subsequenteventsoftheindictmentcanbefoundinButt(2011)CorruptionandLawin
Indonesia,ChapterFive.
14Thegecko(cicak)versuscrocodile(buaya)analogyisanIndonesianequivalentofthe
BiblicaltaleofDavidandGoliath.Aspinall(2010:113)assertsthatthemovementdrewpublic
supportattheleveloftheproteststhatsawtheresignationofSuhartoin1998.
89
findingsandrecommendationsforthePresident,suggestingthatseveralseniorpolice
officersbedismissed(includingSusno)andthatthechargesagainstBibitand
Chandrabedropped.
AlthoughtherewerefarmorearrestsforcorruptionunderYudhoyono’sleadership
thananyotherpresident,thegeckoversuscrocodilecaseexposedYudhoyono’sown
concernsoverthepowersoftheKPK(Sukma2009:332).ThePresidenteven
commentedthattheKPKseemedaccountableonlytoGodandsuchpowershouldnot
gounchecked(Butt2011b:93).TherewerealsocriticismsthatYudhoyonohadonly
becomeinvolvedinthecasewhenhisownreputationwasjeopardizedbyrising
publicdissatisfaction(Aspinall2010:117).Asaconsequence,whiletheKPKmay
haveemergedunscathed,Yudhoyono’sreluctancetodefendtheKPKweakenedhis
anti‐corruptionsymbolintheeyesofIndonesiancitizens(Fealy2011;Kimura2012;
Mietzner2012;Tomsa2010).
Centurygate
EarlytensionswithinthecoalitionparliamentwerebroughttotheforebytheBank
Centurybailoutscandal,whichimplicatedVice‐PresidentBoedionoandtheMinister
forFinance,SriMulyani,oneofYudhoyono’sclosestaides.Alsoknownas
‘Centurygate’,thecaseinvolvedagovernment‐approvedbailoutofRp.6.7trillionfor
theprivately‐ownedBankCentury,underwhatGolkarclaimedweresuspicious
circumstances.Thebailoutpackagewasallegedlyfarlargerthanrequiredandthere
wereindicationsthatasubstantialproportionwassiphonedoffandusedforpolitical
purposes,includingelectoralcampaigns(Soesatyo2012).SeveralGolkarandPKS
memberssuccessfullylobbiedforaparliamentaryinquiryintothebailout,even
thoughadversefindingswouldreflectpoorlyontheDemocraticParty.Regardlessof
thelegitimacyoftheinquiry,itappearedthatthecasewasbeingemployedbyGolkar
andPKSwhowerekeento‘settleoldscores’,especiallywithMulyani,whowasa
knownreformistanda‘thornintheside’ofGolkar(Tomsa2010:311).15Patunruand
vonLuebke(2010:11‐12)surmisethatmanyparties,bothoppositionandthosein
thecoalition,stoodtobenefitfromtheBankCenturycase.ForIslamiccoalition
15MulyanihadrepeatedlyclashedwithGolkarchairmanAburizalBakrie,aprominent
businesstycoon,overtaxevasionandhiscompany’sinvolvementintheLapindomudflow
disaster(Kimura2011:187;Tomsa2010:312).TheLapindomudflowdisasteroccurredin
Sidoarjo,EastJava,allegedlyasaresultofdrillingbythecompanyPTLapindoBrantas,in
whichtheBakriefamilyownedacontrollingstake.Thedisasterhadgraveenvironmentaland
economicimpactsuponlocalresidentsandeffortstodealwiththedisasterandcompensate
victimswereheavilycriticized.ForfurtherdiscussionseeMcMichael(2009).
90
partners,itwasanopportunitytoattackVice‐PresidentBoedionoandpressfora
more‘Islam‐friendly’replacement.Thecasealsogaveoppositionpartiesan
opportunitytounderminetheanti‐corruptionimagethatYudhoyonohadspentso
manyyearsfostering.
On3March2010,theparliamentaryinquiryfoundthattherehadbeenanabuseof
powerinthebailoutandrecommendedthatMulyaniandBoedionobeinvestigatedby
theKPK.TheKPKtookupthecase,butMulyaniandBoedionowerenotidentifiedas
primarysuspects,withMulyanionlybeingquestionedinMay2013(Setuningsih
2013c).Whilecallsto‘solve’Centurygatecontinuedtoresoundamongstanti‐
corruptionactivistsandotherpartiesuptothe2014elections,Golkar’sinterest
wanedafterMulyaniresignedfromherpositionasFinanceMinisterinMay2010to
becomeManagingDirectoroftheWorldBankinWashingtonD.C.(Kimura2011:188;
Tomsa2010:313).DaysafterMulyaniresigned,Golkarchairman,AburizalBakrie,
wasappointedchairofanewjointsecretariataimedatimprovingthecoherenceand
cooperationbetweencoalitionmembers.Themovewasregardedasatriumphfor
BakrieandademonstrationofhispoliticalcloutinthewakeofMulyani’sdeparture
(Kimura2011:188;Tomsa2010:314).16DPR‐RIrepresentativesfrommostofthe
RainbowCoalitionpartnersstoppedpursuingthecaseonceSriMulyaniresignedas
FinanceMinisterinMay2010.Thescandaldieddownbetween2010and2011,but
thecaseremainedanongoingirritantforYudhoyonoduringhissecondterm.
Avocalminorityofoppositionparliamentarians,however,continuedattacking
YudhoyonoandhisgovernmentfortheirlackofactiononCenturygate(Aritonang
2013;McBeth2013;PatunruandvonLuebke2010:12).Inresponse,thenew
ChairpersonoftheKPK,AbrahamSamad,vowedin2011toprioritizetheresolution
16However,whileaimingtoimprovecommunicationandunityamongstcoalitionmembers,
thejointsecretariatwasunabletopreventongoingpublicdisagreementswithinthecoalition.
Forexample,in2010,GolkarproposedtoconferRp.15billiononeachDPR‐RImembertobe
spentondevelopmentprojectsintheirconstituencies(Tomsa2010:315).Althoughthe
proposalwasconditionallysupportedbyPDIP,Golkar’spartnersintherulingcoalition
rejectedtheproposal.Islamicparties,inparticular,arguedthatthemoneywouldlikelybe
usedformoneypoliticsandvote‐buyingandthatitblurredthelinesbetweenlegislativeand
executivepower(Maulia2010).Surprisedbythisopposition,inSeptember2010Golkar
threatenedtoblockthegovernment’splannedstatebudgetfor2011ifthe‘aspirationfund’
wasnotaccepted.GolkarlegislatorandHouseDeputySpeaker,PriyoBudiSantoso,was
quotedassaying:‘Thegovernmentisbeingverymeanbynotgivingusachancetodiscussit.
Don’tforgetthatjustastheycanteardownourproposal,Golkarcanalsoteardowntheir
proposalforthestatebudget’(JakartaGlobe2010).However,followingpublicoutcryagainst
theproposal,includingcampaignsonTwitterandFacebook,theproposalwasdropped
(Kimura2011:189).
91
ofthecase(JakartaPost2011;Suhartono2012).MediacoverageofCenturygate
intensifiedagaininAugust2012whenformerKPKchiefAntasariAzhar,bythenin
prisonformurder,allegedthatYudhoyonohadmetanumberofotherhighprofile
officialsinOctober2008todiscussthelegalramificationsoftheBankCentury
bailout.AntasariaccusedthePresidentofpersonallyapprovingthebailoutplan,
contradictingstatementsfromthePresidenthimself,whoclaimedthathehadleftthe
approvaltotheFinanceMinistry(Gunn2013:120).Antasari’sallegationswere
deniedbyseveralhigh‐rankingpeople,includingHattaRajasa,then‐Coordinating
MinisterfortheEconomyandleaderoftheNationalMandateParty(PartaiAmanat
Nasional,PAN),andDennyIndrayana,theDeputyMinisterforLawandHuman
Rights.17Therevivalinmediaattentioncreatedrenewedpressureforconvictionsin
thecase.
InDecember2012,theKPKnamedformerBankIndonesiaDeputyGovernorBudi
Mulyaasacriminalsuspectforabusinghispowerinapprovingashorttermloanto
BankCenturyeventhoughitwasnottechnicallyeligibleforone.18But,evenwitha
potentialconvictiontobehad,oppositiongroupsintheDPR‐RIcontinuedtovoice
disappointment.Somepoliticians,particularlyfromtheCoalition,accusedtheKPK’s
AssetRecoveryTeamofbeingawasteofgovernmentmoneybecauseithadnotbeen
abletorecoupmuchofthelossestothestatefromthiscase(Waskita2013a).InJuly
2014,MulyawasconvictedofcausinglossestotheStateandreceivingaRp.1billion
inkickbacks.However,whiletheprosecutionhadrequesteda17yearsentenceanda
Rp.800millionfine,hewassentencedtotenyearsimprisonmentandfinedRp.500
million(BBCIndonesia2014;Mahmudah2014).Thesentencewascriticizedbymany
inthegovernment,includingtheexistingBankIndonesialeadershipandtheMinister
forFinance,whoclaimedthatBudihadactedwithinthelawandthathissuperiors,if
anyone,shouldbeprosecuted(Galih2014a;b).19InvestigationsbytheKPK
recommencedinYudhoyono’sfinalyearinoffice(2014),particularlyintotheroleof
17ForexamplesofmediacoverageseeBeritaSatu(2012)andSundari(2012).Speculation
aboutYudhoyono’sdenialwastypifiedinaTempo(2012)editorial,whichventuredthatthe
President’sswiftdenialwasindicativeofdeeperconcerns:‘Oddlyenough,thePresident
seemedtofeeltheneedtoreinforcethedenial.Itcreatedthesensethattheissueisvery
worryingforthePresident’,suchthatevenissuingadenialofinvolvementspurredfurther
speculationofhisroleinCenturygate.
18AntaraNews(2013b)reports:‘BudiMulyawasnamedasuspectinDecember,2012on
chargeofabusinghispowerbyapprovingashorttermloanfacility(FPJP)fortheailingBank
Centuryalthoughitwasnoteligibleforit.TheSupremeAuditBoardsaidBankIndonesia
changedaregulationitmadeitselftoallowBankCenturytogettheloanfacility’.
19Theelectionin2014ofanewpresident(Jokowi)sparkedrenewedpubliccallsfor
investigationintoCenturygate(Akuntono2014;Faizal2014).However,atthetimeofwriting
therehadbeennofurtherdevelopmentsintheinvestigation.
92
Vice‐PresidentBoedionoinCenutrygate(Asril2014c;Setuningsihetal.2014),butno
chargeswerelaid.20
Thedrivingsimulatorprocurementcase
Between2009and2014,severalcorruptionscandals,inadditiontoCenturygate,
underminedthereputationofthepoliceforce(Schütte2012:39‐40).Oneparticularly
prominentcaseinvolvedallegedgraftintheprocurementofdrivingsimulatorsfor
thetrafficpolicein2011.Atthecentreofthecasewasformertrafficpolicechief,
DjokoSusilo,whowasaccusedofacceptingbribesinreturnforcontractstoprovide
thesimulators.Whenirregularitiesintheprocurementprocessweredetectedin
2012,boththepoliceandtheKPKlaunchedinvestigations.InlateJuly2012,theKPK
raidedtheformerheadquartersofthetrafficpolice,sparkingoutragefromsome
policeleaders(AritonangandDewi2012).TheninAugust2012,theKPKannounced
thatithadintervieweddozensofwitnessesinconnectionwiththecase.Atthesame
time,thepolicecriminalinvestigationteamalsoclaimedtheywereinterrogating
witnesses,focusingtheirsuspicionsontwoofSusilo’spersonalassistants(Paraqbueq
andRosarians2012).ThepolicenamedSusiloasawitnessinthecaseratherthana
suspect,whiletheKPKbelievedhehadmastermindedtheplot(Rosarians2012).The
caseevolvedintoanotherconflictbetweentheKPKandthepoliceforce,withthetwo
institutionsattemptingtoasserttheirauthoritytoinvestigatethecase.
Threemonthslater,thepolicefiledacivillawsuitagainsttheKPKrelatingtoaraidit
hadconductedonpoliceoffices,contendingthattheKPKhadcausedRp.425billion
worthofmateriallossesandRp.6billionworthofnon‐materialdamages.They
arguedthattheirowninvestigationhadbeenunderminedbytheKPKseizingcrucial
documents(JakartaPost2012b).21Inthesamemonth,thepolicerecalled
investigatorssecondedtotheKPK.Thisstrategybackfiredwhensomeinvestigators
refusedtocomplywiththeorder.Oneinvestigator,NovelBaswedan,wasthevictim
ofapolicesmearcampaign,withthepolicetryingtoarresthimattheKPKofficesfor
20AsquotedfromTheJakartaGlobe,13September2013:‘Awidelyheldbeliefamong
legislatorsandcriticsoftheRp.6.7trillionbailoutofBankCenturyisthatthedecisionwas
madetoprotectdepositorswithcloselinkstoPresidentSusiloBambangYudhoyono,the
Democrats’chiefpatron.’(Sihaloho2013a).TheJakartaGlobealsowrotethat‘criticscontend
[thebailout]wasfartoocostlyandpoliticallymanipulatedtorescuedepositorslinkedto
PresidentSusiloBambangYudhoyono’sDemocraticParty’(Amelia2013a).Itwasalsoalleged
thatYudhoyono’sparents‐in‐lawwerebeneficiariesofthedealalongwithanumberofother
wealthyIndonesians(Guntensperger2009).
21Thecivilsuitsubsequentlyseemedto‘disappear’,withnooutcomeshavingbeenmade
public.
93
hisallegedinvolvementinshootingsuspectsin2004whileservinginBengkulu
(Pramudatamaetal.2012).InsteadofprovidingpolicewithleverageovertheKPK,
Baswedanwasdepictedinthemediaasaherowhohadchosentodefythecorrupt
policeleadership.FollowinganattemptbypolicetostormtheKPKbuildingand
arrestBaswedan,anti‐corruptionactivistsstagedavigilaroundtheKPKofficeto
preventfurtherattemptsbythepolicetoraidthepremises(JakartaGlobe2012a).
ThepolicefurtherthwartedKPK’sinvestigationbyrefusingtosubmitevidence
relatingtothepurchaseofdrivingsimulatorequipmenttotheKPK,claimingthe
investigationwastheirjurisdiction.ThelegislationthathadestablishedtheKPKshed
littlelightonthedelineationofresponsibilitiesbetweenthetwoinstitutionsand
neitherlookedsettoacquiescetotheother,eventhoughpublicsupportlaysquarely
withtheKPK(McRae2013:299).Afterbeingcriticizedforhissilence,Yudhoyono
wasforcedtointervene,declaringtheKPKresponsiblefortheinvestigation,butalso
stressingtheimportanceofcooperationbetweenthetwobodies(Gunn2013:120;
JakartaPost2012c).On8October2012,thePresidentorderedthepolicetohandthe
investigationovertotheKPKandrefrainfrominterferingwiththeprogressofthe
case(JakartaGlobe2012b).Thepolicechosenottocomplyimmediately,continuing
topursuethecaseagainstBaswedanandrefusingtohandoverdocumentsrelatingto
theinvestigation.Inresponse,theKPKsignedamemorandumofunderstandingwith
theArmyforon‐goingsupportininvestigatingcorruptionwithinthepoliceforce,
compellingthepolicetorespectthepresident’sdirective(Rastika2012).
Actingonitsauthority,theKPKnamedSusiloasasuspectandhewasarrestedon4
December2012(Febriyan2012).22Followinganinvestigation,theKPKidentified
overRp.200billionworthofgraftrelatedassetslinkedtoSusilo(Setuningsih2013a).
Inaddition,itwasallegedthathehadusedhisseveralmarriagestohidehiswealth,
mostsensationallymarryinga19yearoldbeautyqueenwhenhewas48and
reportedlygivingheradowryofRp.15billion(Jong2013b).InSeptember2013
Susilowassentencedto10years’imprisonmentandaRp.500millionfine.Thiswas
lessthantheprosecution’sdemandthathebeimprisonedfor18yearsandthathebe
barredfromparticipatinginelectionsbothasavoterandacandidate,thus
disappointingthosewhohadhopedthataharshpunishmentthiscasewoulddeter
otherpoliceofficersfromcorruption(Suharman2013).However,thesentencewas
22OncetheKPKarrestsasuspectthecaseislegallyrequiredtogotocourtunderLawNo.
30/2002ontheCommissiontoEradicatetheCrimeofCorruption(RepublicofIndonesia
2002).
94
subsequentlyincreasedto18years’imprisonment,aRp.32billionfineandthe
removalofhispoliticalrightswhenSusiloappealedthedecisionintheSupreme
Court(Amelia2013b).
ThecaseofGayus
InJuly2009,30yearoldtaxofficebureaucratGayusTambunanmadenational
headlinesasevidencemountedthathehadengagedinembezzlementandmoney
launderingonbehalfoflargeIndonesiancorporations(JakartaPost2012a;McLeod
2011b:7;Ranfurlie2011).Thescandalhighlightedproblemsinseveralstate
institutionsincludingthetaxoffice,policeforce,judiciaryandimmigrationoffice.It
alsoillustratedthatgenerationalchangewouldnotsolvecorruptionproblems.Asthe
caseunfolded,Gayusthreatenedtoimplicatemanymoretaxofficials,thereby
focusingattentionuponthepoorperformanceofthetaxofficeandthedifficultiesof
cleaningupbureaucraticinstitutionswithsignificantopportunitiestoengagein
corruption,oftenreferredtoasbasah(literally‘wet’)departmentsordirectories
(BairdandWihardja2010:144).
Gayuswasinitiallyaccusedofmoneylaunderingwhenhewasfoundtohaveover
USD3millioninhisbankaccountin2009(Kimura2012;McLeod2011b).Hewas
chargedbutacquittedbytheTangerangDistrictCourtinMarch2010(McLeod
2011b:8).Gayuswasagainarrestedon31March2010atahotelinSingaporeand
broughtbacktoIndonesiaafterSusnoDuadji,ofcicakvsbuayafame,claimedthat
Gayushadpaidtwopoliceofficerstobrokerhisacquittal(AntaraNews2010;Baird
andWihardja2010:145;Kimura2012:187).Gayussubsequentlyadmittedthathe
hadacceptedbribesfromanumberoflargecompanies,includingsomebelongingto
AburizalBakrie,politicalhopefulandformerchairpersonoftheIndonesian
conglomeratetheBakrieGroup(McLeod2011b;Saragih2010).Atthesametime,he
wasindictedforobstructingjusticebybribingjudgestoobtainanacquittalinhis
previouscourtcase,thoughintheendhewasnotchargedwithbribingthepolice
officers.InJanuary2011,theSouthJakartaDistrictCourtfoundhimguiltyof
acceptingbribes,sentencinghimtosevenyearsinprisonandaRp.300millionfine,
whichwasdeemedcontroversialforitsleniency.23
23Onlookersatthetrialweresaidtohavebooedandyelledatthejudgesindisappointmentat
thelightsentence(Ramadhan2011).
95
ThemostsensationalaspectofthecaseemergedinSeptember2010whenGayuswas
photographedataBalitennistournamentwhilehewassupposedtobeinpolice
detentioninJakarta(McLeod2011b).Widelypublishedinthemedia,the
photographsledtorevelationsthat,havingbribedhisjailers,Gayushadtravelled
domesticallyandinternationally—includingtoSingapore,KualaLumpurand
Macao—onafalsepassportwhileawaitingtheoutcomeofhissecondjudicialappeal
(Kimura2012:187).24InMarch2012,hewastriedagainbytheAnti‐Corruption
Courtforacceptingbribes,moneylaunderingandbribingpoliceofficers(Firdaus
2012).Havingamassedapproximately28yearsofcumulativeprisontimeand
additionalfines,GayuslodgedanappealinAugust2013.TheSupremeCourtupheld
thedecisionsofthevariouscourts.Furthermore,sincethesentenceswerehanded
downbydifferentcourts,hisoverallsentencecouldnotbecommutedandhewas
requiredtoserveallhisprisontermsconsecutivelyratherthanconcurrently
(Natahadibrata2013).
Thetravellers’chequescandal
TheTravellers’Chequescandalcaughtpublicattentionnotonlybecauseofthe
flamboyantcharactersinvolved,butalsobecauseitexposedapervasivecultureof
briberyinparliament.AtthecentreoftheincidentwasNununNurbaeti,wifeofaPKS
politician,whowasaccusedofdistributingapproximatelyRp.20.65billionin
travellers’chequestomembersoftheDPR‐RICommissionXI,whowereresponsible
forelectingthenation’sReserveBankleadership.25Inreturn,theywereaskedto
appointMirandaGoeltomasdeputychairpersonoftheBankofIndonesia.Whilethe
bribesweresaidtohavebeenpaidin2004,thecaseonlycametotheattentionofthe
publicin2009whentheKPKpubliclyidentifiedfourparliamentariansassuspectsin
thecase.26ByMarch2010,39parliamentariansfromPDIP,PPPandGolkarhadbeen
chargedforacceptingbribesfromNurbaeti(Rayda2010).27
Nurbaetiabscondedonceherstatusasasuspectwaspublicized,claimingthatshe
wassufferingfrommemorylapsesthatrequiredspecialisttreatmentinSingapore.
24Hewaslatersentencedtoanadditionaltwoyears’imprisonmentforusingafalsepassport
(Kimura2012:187).
25WithintheDPR‐RIthereare11commissionsresponsibleformanagingparliamentary
businessinrelationtovariousaspectsofthestate’saffairs.CommissionXIisresponsiblefor
mattersrelatingtofinance,developmentplanningandbanking.ForfurtherdetailsseeDPR‐RI
(2014b).
26ThesesuspectswereidentifiedaslawmakersDhudieMakmumMurodfromPDIP,EndinAJ
SoefiharafromPPP,aswellasformerlawmakersHamkaYandhufromtheGolkarPartyand
UdjuJuhaerifromthepoliceandmilitaryfaction(JakartaGlobe2009).
27Thisnumberwasrevisedto24inSeptember2010(Hapsari2010).
96
ShewasrecognizedwhileoutshoppinginBangkokandwasextraditedtoIndonesia
inDecember2011.Themediafocusedonthelifeofluxurysheledwhilehidingfrom
Indonesianauthorities(Kramer2013:66).28Evenwiththeresolutionofthecase—
mostofthepoliticiansaccusedweretriedandfoundguilty,whileGoeltomreceiveda
three‐yearprisonsentenceandNurbaetireceivedtwoandahalfyears—itremains
unclearwhofundedthebribesandwhatintereststheyserved.Goeltomhas
maintainedherinnocence,assertingthatshehadnoconnectionwiththebribespaid
forherappointmentanddidnotknowwherethemoneycamefrom(Pramudatama
2012).
TheTravellers’Chequescandal,involvingpartiesfromboththerulingcoalitionand
theopposition,highlightedtheinstitutionalizednatureofcorruptionwithintheDPR‐
RI.Thecasewasusedstrategicallybythosenotinvolvedtodiscreditthosewhowere.
ThisprovedausefultacticfortheDemocraticPartywhichhadanumberofmembers
implicatedinothercorruptioncasesatthetime.MarzukiAlie,leaderoftheDPR‐RI
andDemocraticPartymember,urgedallparliamentarianssuspectedofaccepting
bribestoresign,statingthatitwashypocriticalofthemtodemandothersaccusedof
corruptiontostepdownbeforetrialwhentheywouldnotdosothemselves
(Munawwaroh2010).InMarch2010,leadinguptotrialsoftheaccusedpoliticians,
Megawati,leaderofthePDIP—oneofthepartiesinvolved—defendedherparty’s
members,statingthatalldefendantsareinnocentuntilprovenguiltyandderidingthe
politicizationofcorruptioncases(Simatupang2010).Inadditiontothefantastical
natureofNurbaeti’scaptureandtheintriguesurroundingwhohadsuppliedthe
travellers’cheques,thispolitickingsawthescandaldrawevenmoreattentiontothe
cultureofcorruptioninparliament.
CorruptionintheDirectorateGeneralofCustomsandExcise
InOctober2013,themediareportedthearrestofaprominentcustomsofficial,the
Sub‐DirectorfortheExportDirectorate,HeruSulastyono,whowasaccusedof
acceptingbribesandmoneylaundering.HeruhadallegedlyreceivedRp.11billionin
returnforassistingcompaniestoevadepayingtaxbetween2005and2007(Perdani
2013b;Tempo2013b).Investigationslaterrevealedtransactionsintohispersonal
bankaccounttotallingoverRp.60billionbetween2009and2011,andthatheowned
fivehouses(Perdani2013a).TherevelationsledtoclaimsbyICWthatacutelevelsof
28Forexample,anarticleintheJakartaGlobe(2011a)describedNurbaetiashavingbeenona
‘nine‐monthshoppingspreeinSingaporeandThailand’whileanarticleinTempo(Septian
2011)highlightedherlavishaccommodationwhileinBangkok.
97
corruptionafflictedtheofficeonthebasisthatHerucouldnotpossiblyhaveacted
alone.Furthermore,thebribesweresupposedlypaidviainsurancepolicies,notcash,
representinganew,lessvisiblemeansfordisbursingmoneytoofficials(Muhyiddin
2013).
SeniorfiguresintheDirectorateGeneralofCustomsandExcisedeniedallegationsof
acultureofcorruption,arguingthattheyhadthemselvesdetectedandsuspended
severalofficersforacceptingbribesfromimporters.Theycitedthereforms
undertakenbyformerMinisterforFinance,SriMulyani—includingthere‐assignment
ofofficerstobreak‐uppatronagenetworksandasalaryincrease—asevidencethat
thedirectoratewasseriousabouteradicatingcorruption.29SeniorCustomsofficials
alsonotedthatin2012,84officialshadreceivedsanctionsforethicalanddisciplinary
violations,whilein2013,41officialshadbeenpunished(Perdani2013a).InFebruary
2014,thedossierforSulastyono’scasewasofficiallyhandedovertotheAttorney‐
General’sOfficeforprosecution(JakartaPost2014c).Sulastoyonowasprosecuted,
foundguiltyofacceptingbribes,moneylaunderingandembezzlement,sentencedto
6.5yearsimprisonmentandaRp.200millionfine,aswellasbeingorderedtoreturn
themoneyheembezzledfromthestate(Kurniawan2014).
Corruptioninlocalgovernment
Localgovernmentswerenowresponsibleforlargerbudgetsthantheyhadbeenin
thepast,exacerbatingcorruptionandcollusionatthesubnationallevel.30Several
localgovernmentcorruptioncasesattractedpublicattentionandhadimplicationsfor
theKPKandothernationalbodies.OnesuchcasewastheSocialAid(BantuanSosial,
Bansos)scandalintheBandungadministrativeregioninWestJavafrom2012.The
Bansosscheme,whichprovidedgoodsand/ordirectcashtransferstocitizensin
need,wasalreadynotoriousforitsvulnerabilitytoembezzlement.In2012,theKPK
chargedsevenmembersoftheBandunglocalcouncilwithcorruption,citing
cumulativelossestothestateofoverRp.66.5billion.Thecase,whichwastriedina
regionalanti‐corruptioncourt,gainednotorietywhenthoseconvictedwereonly
sentencedtooneyearimprisonmentandaRp.50millionfine(Yulianti2012).The
prosecutorshaddemandedsentencesofthreetofouryearsandthepunishments
29SeeEvan(2012)foranoutlineofthesesalaryincreases.
30Thisreflectedoneofthemajorcriticismslevelledatgovernmentdecentralization:that
corruption,too,hadbeendecentralized(Hadiz2004;Pepinsky2008:238‐239;vonLuebke
2009).
98
wereperceivedtobetoolenient,giventhatprecedingcasesinvolvingfarsmaller
amountsofmoneyhadattractedharshersentences(Hardi2012;Yulianti2012).
Evenafterthetrialhadconcluded,thecasecontinuedtoattractattention,feedinginto
debatesaboutthesuccessofthedecentralizationoftheanti‐corruptioncourt.Priorto
theestablishmentofregionalAnti‐CorruptionCourtsinIndonesianprovincial
capitals,thesinglecourtinJakartahada100percentconvictionrateandthelength
ofsentenceswasincreasing,inlinewithbroaddemandforharsherpunishmentsfor
corruption(Butt2011a:381).Butwiththedecentralizationofthecourtscamehigher
ratesofacquittalandperceivedlightersentences.InMarch2013,theKPKarresteda
deputychiefjudgeinBandung,oncorruptionchargesrelatedtothecase.Thejudge
wasaccusedofacceptingabribeinreturnforhandingdownlightersentencesinthe
faceofoverwhelmingevidenceagainsttheaccused(AntaraNews2013a).InApril
2013,oneofthesuspectsfoundguiltyofcorruptionadmittedtobribingthejudge,
spurringtheKPKtocontinuewiththecase(Setuningsih2013d).TheKPKmademore
subsequentarrests,includingofBandung’sactingheadofregionalassetsand
financialoversightandthesecretaryoftheBandunglocaladministration.Finally,the
mayorofBandunghimselfwasarrestedinAugust2013(AlfiyahandSuharman2013;
Amelia2013d).WhenhewasfinallyconvictedforembezzlingpartoftheBansos
budgetinApril2014,hewassentencedtotenyears’imprisonment(Yulianti2014),a
significantincreaseonthepunishmenthandeddowntohiscolleaguestheprevious
year.Thecasealsoledtoquestionssurroundingtheintegrityofregionalbranchesof
theAnti‐CorruptionCourt,whichhadbeenaccusedof‘failing’duetolowconviction
rates(Butt2012).31
ThefalloftheDemocrats
Themostdamagingcorruptionscandalsforpoliticalpartieswerethoseinvolving
theirownparliamentarians.Aselectedrepresentatives,DPR‐RImembersare
entrustedwithpursuingthepublicinterestsandprotectingcitizens.Their
involvementincorruption,notunexpectedly,provokedwidespreadpublic
31DickandButt(2013:21‐22)arguethatthelowerconvictionratesbyregionalAnti‐
CorruptionCourtsdoesnotnecessarilymeanthattheirintegrityhasbeencompromised,
assertingthatthe100percentconvictionrateoftheJakartaAnti‐CorruptionCourtsuggested
thatthecourtshadbeen‘forgoingthepresumptionofinnocence’andthat‘giventhedeep
abhorrencethatmostIndonesiancitizensfeeltowardscorruptionwithintheirinstitutionsof
government,itmightalsobearguedthatAnti‐CorruptionCourtjudges–particularlythead
hocjudgeswhohavebeenemployedaspartofeffortstomaintaintheintegrityoftheAnti‐
CorruptionCourts–feelunderunduepressuretoconvictincorruptioncaseslesttheybe
labelledanti‐reformist’.
99
dissatisfactionnotjustwiththeparliamentbutwiththegovernmentoverall.
Furthermore,withpartiesjockeyingforinfluencewithintheparliament,these
scandalsplayedintobroaderpowerstrugglesbetweenparties.Oppositionparties,for
example,couldusethecorruptionscandalsasevidenceoftherulingparties’
untrustworthiness.Yudhoyono,inparticular,wascalledtoaccountfortheactionsof
severalDemocraticPartymemberswhowereaccusedofcorruption,withcritics
arguingthattheprevalenceofcorruptionwithinthepartyreflectedweakleadership
andevenpersonalmoralbankruptcyonthepartofthePresident.32
TheDemocraticPartysufferedasignificantdeclineinpopularityinthe2009—2014
period,insomepartduetothecorruptionscandalsembroilingitsmembers.The
partyhademphasizedtheiranti‐corruptioncredentialsduringits2009electoral
campaign.Ithad,forexample,runatelevisioncampaignentitled‘saynoto
corruption’(katakantidakpadakorupsi),inwhichhigh‐profilepartycandidates
sternlyrejectedcorruptpracticesinparliament.Twoyearslater,anumberofhigh‐
profilememberswereimplicatedinseveralcorruptionscandals.Giventhe
DemocraticParty’sprioruseofananti‐corruptionsymbol,itwasparticularly
susceptibletocriticismanddisappointmentwhenitsownrepresentativeswere
exposedasbeingnolesscorruptthanthoseofotherparties(Aspinall2010;Mietzner
2009).33
InApril2011,MuhammadNazaruddin,a33year‐oldlegislatorandnationaltreasurer
fortheDemocraticParty,wasaccusedofacceptingbribesinrelationtothe
constructionofanathletes’villageinSouthSumatra,aspartofthe2011Southeast
AsianGames(SEAGames).ThecasecametobeknownastheWismaAtlet(Athletes’
guesthouse)scandalandwasoneofthemostreportedcorruptionscandalsofthat
year,notablysalaciousbecauseNazaruddinfledthecountryandwaspursuedinan
internationalmanhuntbytheKPKandwasarrestedinColombiainAugust2011
(Fealy2011:341;MahiandNazara2012:9).InApril2012,hewassentencedtofour
yearsand10monthsimprisonmentforacceptingRp.4.6billioninreturnforrigging
constructiontendersforthevillage(ParlinaandAritonang2012).Theruling
32Forexample,tomarkInternationalAnti‐CorruptionDayon9December2013,ICW
publishedadocumentdetailingtherolesoffiguresclosetothePresident,includinghiswife,in
anumberofcorruptdealings,implyingthatYudhoyonomusthavehadsomeknowledgeof
them.WhilethePresident’sofficedeniedaccusations,thedocumentreceivednationalmedia
coverage(Jong2013a).
33SeeMietzner(2014a)forapreliminarydiscussionoftheresultsofthe2014electionsand
thedeclineinsupportfortheDemocraticParty.
100
promptedoutrageamonganti‐corruptioncampaignersforitsleniencygiventhatthe
prosecutionhaddemandedasevenyearsentence(ParlinaandAritonang2012).
Thoughtheverdictsaidnothingtolinkthebribetothepartymorebroadly,
Nazaruddindidimplicateseveralcolleaguesduringhistrial,claimingtheywerealso
involvedinahigh‐levelwebofcorruption(Fealy2013:105;MahiandNazara2012:
9;ParlinaandAritonang2012).
Nazaruddin’saccusationsweredamagingbecauseheandmanyoftheother
DemocraticPartysuspectswereyoungrecruitswhohadbeenheraldedasanew
generationofcleanpoliticians.Nazaruddin’saccusationshadseriousrepercussions
forparticularpartycolleagues,includingAngelinaSondakh,whowasfoundguiltyof
acceptingRp.2.5billioninbribesinreturnforawardingSEAGamesconstruction
contractstospecificbidders(Rastika2013).InJanuary2013shewassentencedto
4.5yearsimprisonmentandfinedRp.500million.Dubbed‘Angie’bythepress,she
wasaformerbeautyqueenandastarrecruitfortheDemocraticPartyin2009.Her
casewascloselyfollowedbyIndonesia’smedia,withsomecoverageresemblingthat
giventocelebritiesbythepaparazzi(Kramer2013).Angelina’scaseattracted
renewedinterestinNovember2013when,onappeal,theSupremeCourtincreased
hersentenceto12yearsandherfinetoRp.27.4billion,theoriginalpunishment
soughtbyprosecutors.Theincreasewassignificantbecauseinseveralothercases
Tipikorjudgeshadbeencondemnedforhandingdownlightsentencesforthose
foundguiltyofcorruption.TheharsherSupremeCourtsentencewaspossiblya
responsetopublicdemandsthatthoseguiltyofcorruptionfacetougherpunishment.
Alsoindicted,thoughinadifferentsports‐relatedcase,wasAndiMallarangeng,then
MinisterforSports.MallarangengresignedfromhispositioninDecember2012in
responsetoaccusationsthathehadabusedhisministerialpowerinthetenderingof
constructionworksfortheHambalangsportingcomplex,asportsfacilityforelite
athletesontheoutskirtsofBogor,resultinginstatelossesofRp.463.3million
(RahmanandMahmudah2013).HewasaccusedofacceptingRp.4billionandUSD
550,000(cash)inbribesinexchangeforawardingtenderstospecificconstruction
companiesandhewaseventuallyarrestedbytheKPKinOctober2013.Hewas
convictedofabuseofauthorityinJuly2014andsentencedtofouryearsinprisonand
finedRp.200million(Maharani2014b).
101
EvenmoredamagingfortheDemocraticPartywastheindictmentofitsChairman,
AnasUrbaningrum,forusingmoneyearnedillicitlyfromtheHambalangprojectand
othergovernmentschemestofundhis2010campaigntobecomepartyleader(Mahi
andNazara2012:9).Becauseofhisposition,hisimplicationinthescandalinferred
thatcorruptionschemespervadedtheupperechelonsoftheparty.Yudhoyono
rejectedthissuggestion,proclaimingcorruptiontobetheexceptionratherthanthe
rule.Nevertheless,thescandalfuelledthedecliningpopularityoftheDemocratic
Party(Fealy2013:105).34ThedownfallofUrbaningrumpromptedapanicwithinthe
party,resultinginYudhoyono’selectiontothechairmanshipin2013inanattemptto
restoreconfidenceintheparty’sleadership(Nehru2013:141).However,thismove
indicatedthattheDemocraticPartylackedasuitablenextgenerationofleadersand
wasoverlyreliantuponYudhoyonoasitsfigurehead(Cochrane2013b).
UrbaningrumwaseventuallyconvictedforhisroleintheHambalangscandalandfor
moneylaunderinginSeptember2014.Hewassentencedtoprisonforeightyearsand
finedRp.300million.Intheirverdict,theTipikorjudgesappearedtoreflectpopular
sentiment,statingthathehadfailedtosetagoodexampleasbothapublicofficialand
partychairmanand‘failedtosupportthespiritofsocietyinfightinggraft’(Jakarta
Post2014a).
ThefallofPKS
Atthebeginningof2013,thecleanimagethatthePKSspentyearsfosteringwas
threatenedbytheso‐calledBeefgatescandal.35PKSchairpersonandlegislator,Luthfi
HasanIshaaqandAhmadFathanah,wereaccusedofacceptingbribesfromabeef
importcompany,PTIndonguna,inreturnforincreasingtheirbeefimportquota.36
TheKPKarrestedAhmadFathanahinafive‐starhotelroominJakartaon29January
2013.Thecasebecameasensationwhenitwasrevealedthathehadbeencaught
sharingaroomwithanakedcollegestudent,withwhomhehadsexualrelations
(Subkhan2013).HewasalsoinpossessionofasuitcasecontainingRp.1billion
(Cochrane2013a),whichwasallegedlyapaymentforLuthfifromPTIndoguna
executives,receivedbyFathanah.LuthfiandFathanahwerelaterchargedwith
acceptingbribesandmoneylaunderinginMarch2013.
34Growingpublicconcernabouttheparty’sintegritywassupportedbyWikiLeakscables
publishedin2012,suggestingthatYudhoyonohadpersonallyintervenedtoinfluencejudges
andprosecutorstoprotectofficialsclosetohim(Kingsbury2012:19).
35AspartofYudhoyono’sRainbowCoalition,Suswono,amemberofPKShadbeenappointed
theMinisterforAgriculture.Suswonowasnotimplicatedinthescandal.
36ForadetailedrecountofthiscaseandtheimplicationsforPKSseeKramer(2014a).
102
Mediascrutinyintensifiedasmoredetailsofthecasebecamepublic,paintingan
increasinglynegativepictureofcertainpartymembersandthepartyasawhole.PKS
ralliedsupportfromitscadres,alludingtoaconspiracyagainstthepartyand
contendingthatpoliticalinterestsseekingtodamagethereputationofPKSwereat
play.37ThepartylaunchedacounterattackupontheKPK,claimingthattheanti‐
corruptionagencyhadlostitsindependenceandwasthepuppetofPKS’political
rivals.TheKPKattemptedtoseizefivecarsbelongingtoLuthfifromthepartyinMay
2013,claimingthattheymayhavebeenpurchasedwithproceedsfromcorruption.
PKSofficialsrefusedtohandoverthevehicles,insteadlodgingapolicecomplaint
againsttheKPK,claimingthatKPKofficialshadabusedtheirpower,enteredPKS
premisesbyforceandfailedtoproduceawarrantfortheseizureofthecars(Perdani
andAritonang2013;Saragih2013b).
Theattacksonthewell‐respectedKPKtookatollontheparty’simagebuttheillegal
importquotadealwaslaterovershadowedbyanincreasedfocusupontheprivatelife
ofFathanah,whowaseventuallylinkedtoover45women.Itwasallegedthat
Fathanahhadgiventhesewomenexpensivegifts,insomecasespossiblyinreturnfor
intimaterelations,despitealreadyhavingtwowives.TheIndonesianmediafocused
onwhothesedifferentwomenwere,whattheirexactrelationshiptoFathanahwas
andwhattheydidinreturnforthesegifts.Therewasalsospeculationthatthese
womencouldthemselvesbetriedformoneylaunderingthoughthisdidnoteventuate
(Apriantoetal.2013;JakartaPost2013a).FurthermoreinDecember2012,during
thecourseoftheinvestigation,itwasrevealedthatLuthfihadgottenmarriedfora
thirdtimetoahighschoolstudent.ManyIndonesianswerecriticaloftherelationship
betweenthe52yearoldandtheteenager,furtherdamagingthepolitician’s
reputation(Ucu2013).
ThechargesofcorruptionandmoneylaunderinglevelledagainstLuthfiandFathanah
weresufficienttodamagetherelativelycleanreputationofthePKS,butthemedia
focusontheirrelationshipswithvariouswomenpresentedanevengraverchallenge
totheparty’sstanding.Theparty,withitssolidIslamicvalues,andconservative
viewsonwomenwearingshortskirtsandpublicdisplaysofaffection,nowfound
itselffirmlylinkedtotwohigh‐profilemenwhoseprivatelivesdidnotseemtofit
withinthePKS’moralframework(Cochrane2013a).PKS’attemptstolaytheblame
37On1February2013itwasreportedthatPKS’DPR‐RIleadersuggestedthatPKSmayhave
beenframedbyotherpartiesbecauseofitsstronganti‐corruptionstance(Alford2013a).
103
on‘beautifulwomen’temptingIslamicpoliticianstotarnishtheirreputationsgained
littlepublicsympathy(SuaraPembaruan2013;Sukoyo2013b).Thenegative
publicitywasreflectedinnumeroussurveysthatpredictedPKSwoulddopoorlyin
the2014nationalelection(Damarjati2013;Ruslan2013).
Afterahighlypublicizedtrial,Fathanahwasfoundguiltyofcorruptionon4
November2013forreceivinggrantsandincentivesonbehalfofLuthfi.TheJakarta
Anti‐CorruptionCourtsentencedFathanahto14yearsinprisonandfinedhimRp.1
billionoranadditionalsixmonthsinprison(JakartaGlobe2013).Oncethisverdict
waspassed,LuthfiattemptedtoshifttheblametoFathanah.Luthfi’strialbeganafter
Fathanah’sandduringquestioningLuthficlaimedthatFathanah,along‐timefriend
sincetheystudiedtogetherinSaudiArabiainthe1980s,haddeceivedhimandused
hisnametomakeunsavourydealswithouthisconsent.Heclaimedthathehad,ashis
friend,attemptedtoprotecthim(JakartaPost2013b).Thedefencepleafellondeaf
earsandLuthfiwassentencedto16years’imprisonmenton9December2013.He
wasalsofinedRp.1billionoranadditionalyearinprison.Luthfiimmediately
claimedthathewouldappealthesentence.Inthemeantime,PKShaddistanceditself
fromLuthfi,statingthatitplannedtofocusontheupcomingelectionsandwouldnot
seektointerveneorinfluencethecaseinanyway,hopingtorecoverbeforenational
pollinginApril2014.38
CorruptionintheConstitutionalCourt
Oneofthemostsensationalscandalsrevealedbetween2009and2014wasthearrest
andconvictionofAkilMochtar,theChiefJusticeofIndonesia’sConstitutionalCourt,
foracceptingbribes.39TheMochtarscandaldominatedthenationalheadlinesinearly
October2013whenrumoursbegancirculatingthattheKPKhadbeeninvestigating
him.HewaschargedwithreceivingalmostRp.4billionforfavourablerulingsin
disputesoverthedistrictelectionsofGunungMas,inCentralKalimantan,andLebak
intheprovinceofBanten.Later,hewastriedforacceptingbribestofix11electoral
rulings(SetuningsihandCahyadi2014).Hewasalsochargedwithmoneylaundering
viahiswife’scompany(Amelia2013c).Tomakemattersworse,marijuanaand
methamphetamineswerefoundduringasearchofhisoffice,requiringhimto
38ThePKSvotedecreasedfrom7.88percentofthepopularvotein2009to6.79percentin
2014,thoughthiswasabetterresultthanexpected(Fealy2014;Kramer2014a).
39TheConstitutionalCourtwasformedunderarticle24CoftheIndonesianConstitutional
amendmentspassedin2001.ItrulesonmattersrelatedtotheConstitution,thepowerofstate
institutions,thedissolutionofpoliticalpartiesanddisputesoverelectoraloutcomes.For
furtherdetailsseeMahkamahKonstitusi(2014).
104
undergoDNAanddrugtesting(Primandari2013).Whileurinetestsfoundnotraces
ofdruguse,hewaschargedwithdrugpossession.40AlthoughNationalNarcotics
Agency(BadanNarkotikaNasional,BNN)statedinFebruary2014thatitwouldnot
seekprisontimefortheoffence(JakartaGlobe2014a),Mochtar’scredibilityhad
alreadybeenfurtherdamaged.Finally,Mochtarwassentencedtolifeimprisonment
forreceivingRp.57.78billioninbribesandlaunderingRp.160billionduringhis
tenureasaConstitutionalCourtjudge(Alford2014).
ThecaseprovokedparticularlyvisceraloutcrybecausetheConstitutionalCourthad
developedareputationforbeingcleansinceitsinceptionin2003—andso,unlike
othermoreestablishedjudicialinstitutions,waswidelyrespectedbytheIndonesian
public.TheCourt’spreviousChiefJudge,MahfudMD,wasrenownedforhishard‐line
stanceagainstcorruption.41ThescandalwasalsounexpectedbecauseMochtarhad
promotedhimselfasananti‐corruptioncrusader,atonepointstatingthatthose
guiltyofcorruptionshouldhaveafingercutoff(MacLaren2013).Yudhoyono
releasedapublicstatementalmostimmediatelyafterthearrest,expressingshockand
dismaythatthecourthadbeencompromised(Prihandoko2013).Thiscasewasalso
damagingforthePresidentbecauseoneofhisexplicitlystatedaimsduringhissecond
termwastocombatthe‘judicialmafia’(SuaraPembaruan2011).42Withrevelations
thatcorruptionhadinfectedeventheConstitutionalCourt,Yudhoyonowasagain
deridedforfailingtocurbthejudicialcorruption.43
ThecasewasalsodamagingforGolkar.NotonlyhadMochtarrepresentedtheparty
inparliament,butseveralGolkarofficialswereimplicatedinthebriberycases.In
March2014,ChairunNisa,aGolkarparliamentarianfromCentralKalimantan,
receivedafouryearprisonsentenceandaRp.100millionfineforbrokeringthe
40BNNconfirmedthechargesinJanuary2014,sayingthatalthoughMochtar’sdrugtestshad
provennegativetheyhadfoundseveralwitnessestotestifythattheformerjudgehadused
narcoticsinthepast(Maharani2014a).
41Forexample,Mahfudhadstatedinthepastthatthedeathpenaltywassuitableinsome
corruptioncasesandoncefloatedtheideaofa‘zoo’forcorruptionperpetratorsinwhich
membersofthepubliccouldgoandjeeratthecriminals(JakartaGlobe2011b).
42AtaskforcewasestablishedinDecember2009totakeonthejudicialmafia,butwaswidely
criticisedanditsmandatewasnotrenewedwhenitendedinDecember2011.Foran
extensivediscussionofthejudicialmafiainIndonesiaseeButtandLindsay(2011).
43Thesurprisegeneratedbythescandalechoedthroughinternationalmediareporting.The
Australianassertedthat‘AkilMochtar’sarresthasraisedangerabouthigh‐levelcorruptionto
anewpitchandthecourt'sfoundingchiefjustice[JimlyAsshidique]hascalledforthedeath
sentence’(Alford2013b).TheEconomist,(2013)meanwhile,reportedthat:‘itisthoroughly
depressingthatthisnewinstitutionisnowbeingaccusedofthesamebadbehaviourastheold
ones’,especiallygiventhatithad‘wonrespectforitsimpartialrulings’.
105
briberydealbetweenGolkarmembersandMochtar(Setuningsih2014a;Wanto
2013).Astheinvestigationscontinued,Banten’sGovernor,RatuAtutChosiyah,also
madeheadlinesasheryoungerbrotherwaslinkedtothebriberycase(Firdaus
2013).44AtutherselfwastriedinAugust2014forallegedlypayingMochtarRp.1
billiontosecureaGolkarvictoryintheregencyofLebakwhenGolkarappealedthe
electoralresultsintheConstitutionalCourt(Rikang2014).Althoughprosecutors
soughtatenyearprisonsentenceforAtut,shewasonlysentencedtofouryears’
imprisonmentandaRp.200millionfine.Publicoutrageatthelightsentencewas
widespread,especiallyacrosssocialmedia,where‘netizens’complainedthatit
underminedthedeterrenteffectthataharsherpunishmentwouldhaveotherwise
achieved(Soares2014).Mochtar’sarrestandconvictionwereseenasagross
betrayaloftrust,whileAtut’sconvictionreflectedtheongoinguseofbriberytofix
politicaloutcomes,demonstratingthatcorruptionstillreachedthehighestechelons
andcontinuedtounderminedemocraticprocesses.
Publicopinion
Themediafocusoncorruptioncasesnodoubtfuelledpublicresentmenttowardsthe
governmentbetween2009and2014.Therearetwomainargumentsastohowmedia
reportinginfluencespublicopinion:audiencesmayinterprettheincreasedvisibility
ofcorruptioninvestigations,arrestsandconvictionsasreflectingpositiveprogressin
the‘war’oncorruption,orthehighvolumeofcorruptionreportingmaysimply
reinforceexistingperceptionsthatcorruptionisendemicandthattheinvestigations
andconvictionsmerelyscratchthesurfaceofthisendemicproblem.45Themajorityof
surveys,opinioncolumnsandacademicliteraturepublishedbetween2009and2014
suggestthatmanyIndonesiancitizensweredisappointedinthegovernment’santi‐
corruptionefforts.Beinglinkedtocorruptionscandalsalsocontributedtoadeclinein
thepopularityofYudhoyonoandseveralpoliticalparties,andfosteredageneral
distrustofseveralstateinstitutionssuchasthejudiciary,thepoliceandtheDPR‐RI.
44ForascholarlyanalysisofRatuAtutChosiyah’sfamilydynastyinBantenseeGunn(2014:
52)andHamid(2014a).InOctober2014theKPKfiledanappealagainstthefiveyearprison
sentenceandRp.150millionfinehandeddowntoAtut’sbrother,TubagusChaeriWardana,
forbribingAkilMochtar,claimingitwastoolenient(Setuningsih2014b).
45ThisargumentisprogressedbySchmidt(1993)inheranalysisofpublicresponsestomedia
reportingabouttradeunions.
106
Surveysconductedduringthisperiodindicatedthatcitizensweredissatisfiedwith
thegovernmentinspiteoftheincreaseincorruptionconvictions.46Despitegrowing
convictionnumbers,yearlysurveysconductedbytheIndonesianSurveyGroup
(LembagaSurveiIndonesia,LSI)showedthatpublicsatisfactionwiththe
government’santi‐corruptionendeavourshaddeclined.47In2008asurveyrevealeda
77percentapprovalrateforthegovernment’sworkoncombatingcorruption.By
2011thisnumberhadfallento44percent(LembagaSurveiIndonesia2012).A
numberofsurveysundertakenin2012and2013alsoreflectedthedepthofpublic
discontentwiththegovernment’santi‐corruptionprogress,especiallyhighlighting
disappointmentwithYudhoyonoandparliament(Table3.2).48
46Anumberofinstitutionswereengagedinpublicsurveysofthisnaturefrom2013‐2014.14
ofthemaininstitutionswere:BiroPusatStatistik,CentreforStrategicandInternational
Studies,Indonesia(CSIS),FoundingFatherHouse(FFH),IndonesianNetworkElectionSurvey
(INES),LembagaSurveiIndonesia(LSI),LembagaSurveiNasional(LSN),LingkaranSurvei
Indonesia,PoliticalWeatherStation,PusatDataBersatu,SaifulMujaniResearchand
Consulting(SMRC),SoegengSarjadiSchoolofGovernment(SSSG),SPACE,Transparency
InternationalIndonesia(TII)andUniversitasGadjahMadaPusatKajianAnti‐Korupsi(UGM
PUKAT).Numerousinformalconversationswithstaffinpoliticalpartyheadofficessuggest
thatitisdifficulttodeterminethereliabilityofsurveydatacollectedinIndonesia,primarily
becausepoliticalpartiessometimescommissionsurveystosuittheirownagendas.Acommon
modusoperandiforpoliticalpartieswhowishtoreceivefavourablemediacoverageisto
commissionasurveywithfavourableoutcomes,whichisthenreleasedtothepressasan
independentstudy.Nevertheless,thereisanevidenttrendacrossthesurveys,supportedby
mediareports,illustratingthattheIndonesianpubliccontinuedtoviewthegovernmentas
corruptduringthisperiod.
47In2013,theKPKreleaseddatashowingthatithadsecured59convictionsforcorruptionin
thatyear,upfrom50convictionsin2012and39convictionsin2011butlowerthanthe65
convictionsitsecuredin2010.In2014KPKreported58corruptionconvictions.When
comparedtoearlierfiguresfrom2004(4convictions),2005(23convictions),2006(29
convictions)and2007(27convictions),thenumberofconvictionshasincreasedsignificantly
(KPK2014).
48Itshouldbenotedthesurveysareusedheremerelyasanindicationofpublicsentiment.
SurveyinstitutionsinIndonesiaaresometimesknowntobepartisan,orevenpaidbypolitical
parties/candidatestoconductsurveysthathavebeneficialresultsforthem.Therefore,this
thesisavoidsreadingtoomuchintothespecificstatisticsandinsteadhighlightscommonly
identifiedtrendsinpublicsentimentbylookingatarangeofsurveysbydifferentsurvey
institutes.
107
Table3.2.SurveysfromJuly2012‐2013addressingcorruptionissuesinIndonesia49
Released
Institution
Findings
Jul2012
CSIS
77%of respondentsbelievethemajorityofgovernment
officialsarecorrupt.50
Jan2013
BiroPusatStatistik
Onaverage,respondentsratecorruptioninthe
Indonesiangovernmentas3.5outof5(with5beingvery
corrupt,0meaningnocorruption).51
Jul2013
LingkaranSurvei
52%ofthosesurveyedsaytheydonottrustpoliticians.52
Indonesia
Sep2013
Oct2013
IndonesianNetwork
86%ofrespondentsbelievethatallpoliticalpartiesare
ElectionSurvey
corrupt.53
LembagaSurvei
55.9%ofrespondentsbelievecorruptioneradicationis
Nasional
themostimportantissuefacingthegovernment(the
highestrankingissueinthesurvey).55.4%of
respondentsbelievedthatthestateofthenationhadnot
improvedduringYudhoyono’ssecondtermand25.9%
believedithadgottenworse.54
Dec2013
Indikator
41.5%ofrespondentsbelievethatpoliticalpartiesare
theprimarygroupresponsibleforpreventingmoney
politics.55
Dec2013
Transparency
CorruptionPerceptionsIndexfindsthatnational
International
parliamentariansareperceivedasthemostcorrupt
figuresinIndonesia.56
PollingfromarangeoforganizationspredictedthattheDemocraticPartywould
concedeitsparliamentarymajorityin2014,whileseveralpollsalsosuggestedthat
PKSwouldfailtowinenoughvotestomeettheparliamentarythresholdrequiredto
49Fromtheendof2013,surveysbegantofocusmuchmoreonthepopularityofpartiesand
potentialpresidentialcandidates.ThisstudyfoundnosurveysconductedbetweenJanuary
andApril2014thataskedgeneralquestionsabouttheexistinggovernment’santi‐corruption
efforts.
50AsreportedbyDetik.com(Dhurandara2012).
51AsreportedintheWallStreetJournal(IsmarandHusna2013).
52AsreportedinRepublika(Rini2013).
53AsreportedinKompas(Gatra2013).
54SurveyresultspostedtothewebsiteofLembagaSurveiNasional(2013).
55AsreportedinTempo(Purnomo2013).
56AsreportedintheJakartaGlobe(Setuningsih2013b).
108
takeupseatsatall(seeAppendix1).57Themostpopularpresidentialcandidatesalso
camefromtwooppositionparties:JokowifromPDIPandPrabowofromGerindra.
MostsurveypredictionsfortheDemocraticPartyaccuratelypredictedthatitwould
pollfarbelowits2009achievement.WiththeDemocraticPartylosingoverhalftheir
seatsandPDIPunderperforming,severalotherpartiesdidbetterthanexpected,
particularlyIslamicparties(Fealy2014)(seeTable3.3).
Table3.3.Outcomeofthenationallegislativeelections,2014.
Party
%ofpopular
vote
+/‐changein
popularvote
from2009
No.ofseatsin
parliament
+/‐no.of
seatsfrom
2009
PDIP
18.95
+4.92
109
+15
Golkar
14.75
+0.30
91
‐15
Gerindra
11.81
+7.35
73
+47
10.19
‐10.66
61
‐87
PKB
9.04
+4.10
47
+19
PAN
7.59
+1.58
49
+3
PKS
6.79
‐1.09
40
‐17
Nasdem
6.72
—
35
—
PPP
6.53
+1.21
39
+1
Hanura
5.26
+1.49
16
‐1
Democratic
Party
Source:KomisiPemilihanUmum(2014a).
Growingdiscontentwithpoliticalpartieswasalsoillustratedbygrowingreluctance
toassociatewiththem(Fealy2011:340).58Surveysconductedin2011byLSIfound
thatonly20percentofrespondentsconsideredthemselvesto‘belong’toaparty,
comparedto86percentin1999(LembagaSurveiIndonesia2011).TheSPACE
survey,conductedinJuly2013,foundthat43percentofthosesurveyedwerenot
planningtovoteatall.Italsosuggestedthat,ninemonthsaheadoftheelection,a
largeproportionofcitizensfeltnopartyloyalty,wereopentovotingdifferentlyin
2014thantheyhadin2009and/orwerenotplanningtoparticipateintheelection.59
57TheDemocraticPartyandPKS,wereconsistentlyshowntohavelostsupportafter2009,
indicativeofanoveralldeclineintheirpopularity.
58Slater(2004:88)arguesthatthistrendexistedbeforethe2004elections,inwhich‘voters
feltlessbeholdentothedictatesofpartymachines’.
59Golput,theactofnotcastingavalidvote,wasdiscussedintheIntroductionofthethesis.
109
TheSaifulMujaniResearchCenterpollinMarch2014istellinginthat47.7percentof
respondentsdidnotnominateapreferredparty.Thedeclineofpartyloyalty—
althoughaphenomenonthatexistedpriorto2014—representedastarkcontrastto
thealiranalignmentsprominentduringtheOldandNewOrders.60Whileitis
impossibletoidentifyasinglereasonforthislackofpartyloyalty,orindeedpolitical
engagementmorebroadly,theapparentprevalenceofcorruptioninthegovernment,
acrossallbodies,certainlybredcynicismamongstvoters.
Howsuccessfulwereemergingpartiesinthe2014nationallegislativeelections?
Noneoftheemergingpartiesperformedaswellastheyhadhoped.Gerindrabecame
oneofthe‘bigthreeparties’,butfailedtoreachitselectoraltarget.61Gaining11.81
percentofthepopularvote,whichwas13.04percentofparliamentaryseats,
Gerindraimproveduponits2009result.However,thepartyfellshortofitsaimto
garner20percentofparliamentaryseatssoitcouldnominatePrabowoasa
presidentialcandidatewithoutneedingtoformacoalition.HanuraandNasdem,
whichhadalsoaimedtobecomeoneofthe‘bigthree’parties,received5.26percent
and6.72percentofthevotesrespectively.Yet,whilethesepartiesalsohadnotdone
aswellastheywished,theresultsensuredthattheyremainedimportantplayersin
thepresidentialelections.Bothpartieshadtheabilitytomakeasignificant
contributiontothecoalitionforthepresidentialcandidatetheyoptedtosupport.In
theend,bothNasdemandHanurachosetobackPDIP’scandidates,JokowiandJusuf
Kalla,whereasGerindranegotiatedwithotherpartiestoformacoalitiontonominate
Prabowoandhisrunningmate,HattaRajasa,fromPAN.62
60AliranwasdiscussedinChapterTwo.
61Theresultsofthe2014nationallegislativeelectionsproveddifficulttopredict.PDIPwas
theclearfavouritetowinbyawidemargin,especiallyafteritannouncedthatitwould
nominateJokowi,ratherthanMegawati,asitspresidentialcandidate.PDIPhopedthatit
wouldbenefitfromthe‘Jokowieffect’(Kwok2014;McRae2014;Simanjuntak2013;Witoelar
2014),butwhileJokowiwentontonarrowlywinthepresidentialrace,hisnominationdid
littletoenhancesupportforPDIPduringthelegislativeelection.
62Twomajorcoalitionswereformedforthepresidentialelection.PDIPledonecoalition,
supportedbyPKB,NasdemandHanura,nominatingJokowiandJusufKallaforpresidentand
vice‐president(respectively).TherivalcoalitionwasledbyGerindraandbackedbyGolkar,
theDemocraticParty,PAN,PPPandPKS.ThiscoalitionnominatedPrabowoforpresidentand
HattaRajasa,leaderofPAN,ashisrunningmate.Thedifficultyinnegotiatingcoalitions
highlightstheadvantagestobegainedinmeetingthepresidentialthreshold.
110
Conclusion
The2014legislativeelectionsheraldedachangeinfortuneforanumberof
Indonesia’snationalpoliticalparties.PDIP,whichhadpreviouslybeeninopposition,
wasthefavouritetowinamajority.Eventhoughitfellshortofexpectations,itstill
wonmoreDPR‐RIseatsthananyotherparty(Hamid2014b;Tomsa2014a).63The
maincasualtywastherulingDemocraticParty,whichlost87seatsanditsdominance
inparliament.PKS,whichgainedasignificantnumberofvotesin2009,becamethe
onlyIslamicpartytoloseseats.64ThedeclineinpopularityforboththeDemocratic
PartyandPKSappearedtobecloselytiedtonumerouscorruptionscandals,which
underminedtheparties’anti‐corruptioncredentialsintheleaduptotheelection.65
Thischapterhasprovidedabriefoverviewofsomeofthecorruptionscandalsthat
emergedbetween2009and2014,highlightingthatcorruptioncontinuedtobea
prominentpoliticalconcern.DespiteYudhoyono’selectoralpromisesthatheandthe
DemocraticPartywouldcondemncorruption,emergingscandalsunderminedhis
politicalimageandledtoasignificantdecreaseinsupportforthepartyinthe2014
election.Thehypocrisyofthoseingovernmentwascompoundedbyattacksonthe
much‐lovedKPK,leadingmanycitizenstobelievethatmanyingovernmentwere
moreinterestedinprotectingthemselvesratherthaneradicatingcorruption.Surveys
alsoindicatedthattheIndonesianpublicwasgrowingwearyofthepoliticaleliteand
politicalpartiesingeneral,reflectedbythefallingassociationwithpoliticalparties
63PDIPofficiallygained18.95percentofvotes,whichwasfarlessthanitstargetof27.02per
cent(Sadikin2014).Theresultwassurprisingtomanyobservers.Forexample,prominent
IndonesiapoliticalanalystWimarWitoelar(2014)stated‘Iwaswrong.Themediawaswrong.
Thepollswerewrong…PredictionsthatPDIPwouldcapture35percentormoreinthe
legislativeelectionsprovedtobegrosslyillusoryastheygotlessthan20percent,justafew
morepercentagepointsmorethanGolkar,GerindraandeventheDemocratParty.’
64PKSdid,however,dobetterthananticipated.Itgained6.79percentofthevotein2014in
thefaceofpredictionsthatitmaynotevenpasstheparliamentarythresholdof3.5percent
(Fealy2014;Kramer2014a).
65WhilesurveyresultsinIndonesiacannotalwaysbetakenatfacevalue,theoverwhelming
trendreflecteddecliningsupportfortheDemocraticParty.InaMarch2013survey,the
NationalSurveyInstitute(LembagaSurveiNasional,LSN)foundthat40.4percentof
respondentssawtheDemocraticPartyasthemostcorruptpartyinIndonesia.Itselectability
alsofell,withonly4.3percentofrespondentsselectingthemastheirpreferredparty(Ledysia
2013).AsurveypublishedbyTransparencyInternationalIndonesiainApril2013foundthe
DemocraticPartytobetheleasttransparentpartyinparliamentinrelationtoitsfundingand
partybudget(alongwithGolkarandPKSwhowerealsodefinedas‘nottransparent’)(BBC
Indonesia2013).PollingbytheUnitedDataCentre(PusatDataBersatu,PDB)releasedinJuly
2013foundthatonly9.4percentwouldvotefortheDemocraticParty,comparedto26.43per
centofvotesattainedin2009.AnIndikatorsurveyreportreleasedon4April2014foundonly
7.2percentofthosesurveyedplannedtovotefortheDemocraticParty(Indikator2014).The
DemocraticPartyactuallygained10.19percentoftheofficialvote(Pemilu2014),slightly
higherthanmostpredictions.
111
andtheriseof‘non‐elite’presidentialcandidate,Jokowi.Furthermore,theperception
thatpoliticiansweremoreinterestedinmaintainingthestatusquothancombating
corruptionledtogrowingdiscontentwitholdguardelitesandpresented
opportunitiesforemergingparties.
Partofthe‘projectofnewness’adoptedbyemergingpartieswastoposition
themselvesastheantithesistotheexistingpoliticalelites.WithYudhoyono’s
perceivedlackofprogressincombatingcorruptionandadecliningtrustinthe
parliament,emergingpartieswerepresentedwithaclearandconvenientplatform
uponwhichtobothcriticizethegovernmentanddepictthemselvesascleanand
staunchlyanti‐corruption,incontrasttothoseinpower.GerindraandHanurawere
abletocapitalizeonthegainstheymadeinthe2009nationallegislativeelection
(Sukma2009:320).ByoptingtoremaininoppositionratherthanjoinYudhoyono’s
RainbowCoalitionbetween2009and2014,GerindraandHanurawereableto
distancethemselvesfromthefailingsoftheYudhoyonoadministration.Nasdem,too,
capitalizedontheongoingdissatisfactionwiththeincumbentgovernment.Although
itwasanewparty,Nasdemcampaignedonthesloganofbeinga‘Movementfor
Change’(GerakanPerubahan),adoptingoppositionalrhetoricwhichpositioned
themselvesagainstthoseinpower.Projectingananti‐corruptionsymbolwasone
meansfornewpartiestoemphasizethedifferencebetweenthemandrivals.In
articulatingtheirstaunchsupportforanti‐corruptionmeasuresandstressingthe
absenceofnationallevelcorruptioncaseswithintheirownparties,theseparties
attemptedtopresentthemselvesasbroaderforcesofchangeandrighteousness.
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ChapterFour
Emergingpartiesandcampaigningon
corruption
Inthelead‐uptothe2014legislativeelection,thecentralcommitteeofemerging
partiesdecidedwhatsymbolswouldbeacampaignfocusandfacilitatedtheir
transmissionacrossthecountryviaprintmedia,televisionandtheinternet.Party
leaders,particularlypresidentialcandidates,hadaprominentroleinconstructing
anddisseminatingthissymbolastheytouredthecountryinthelead‐uptothe
election.Withtheprevalenceoffigure‐drivenpoliticsinIndonesia,muchattention
wasgiventowhatpartyleaderssaidwhileelectioneering.Officialstatementswere
alsomadebypartyspokespeople,dependingontheirpositionandexpertise.
Whoeverthespeaker,thesepublicannouncementswereintendedtoreflectparty
idealsasawhole.
Intracinghowemergingpartiesdevelopedtheiranti‐corruptionsymbolnationally,
thischapterfirstinvestigatestherationaleforselectinganti‐corruptionasacore
politicalsymbol,drawinguponinterviewswithseniorpartyofficialsregardingtheir
useofanti‐corruptionideasintheircampaigns.Itthenexaminesthemechanisms
usedbythepartiestodevelopananti‐corruptionsymbol,lookingparticularlyatthe
nation‐widestrategiesthatwereconceptualizedandfundedfromthecentralparty
office.OrganizingthesecampaignsfromJakarta,theseapproachesfocusedheavilyon
non‐relationaldiffusionofpartyrhetoric,namelyviapartypublicationsandthe
mediacoverageofstatementsbypartyleaders.Whileitisimpossibletoknowhow
parties’useofanti‐corruptionsymbolismaffectedvotingoutcomes,electoralresults
fellshortofpartyaspirations,eventhoughalltheemergingpartieswereabletopass
theparliamentaryelectoralthreshold,suggestingthatananti‐corruptionsymbolwas
notthepanaceathatpartieshadhopedfor.Inexploringtheintegrationofthissymbol
intonation‐widepartycampaigns,thischapterlaysthefoundationforaclose
discussionoftheengagementofthecentralpartywithcampaignsofindividual
candidatesandtheimpactthishadforthedevelopmentanduseofanti‐corruption
symbolsoverall.
113
Theanti‐corruptionstrategy
Parties’rationaleforadoptinganti‐corruptionsymbolsinthe2014national
legislativeelectioncampaignisimportantgiventhewidespreadacknowledgement
thatthesesymbolshadbackfiredfortheDemocraticPartyandPKS.Inspiteofthis,
partiesstilljudgedcorruptiontobeakeyconcernforvoters—sometimesreferredto
asa‘vote‐getter’issue.Thepublicsoughtapartythatwouldbringaboutfundamental
changestothewaygovernmentworkedandastronganti‐corruptionsymbolwas
intendedtopromotethisgood(newparty)versusbad(oldparties)dichotomy.
Emergingpartiesalsoidentifiedthisrealmasoneofcompetitiveadvantage,asthey
themselveshadneversufferedfromanymajorcorruptionscandalsandcould
thereforecriticizeotherpartiesfromapositionofrelativevirtue.Another
rationalizationespousedbysomepartyofficialswasthatapowerfulanti‐corruption
messagewoulddiscourage‘non‐genuine’candidatesfromjoiningtheparty.This,they
argued,wouldensurethelongevityoftheparty’scleanimage,intermsofbeingfree
ofcorruptionandahostofotherundesirableactivities,suchasillicitdrugtakingand
infidelity.Emergingpartieswereacutelyawareofthedangersofbeingseenas
hypocritical.Havingseenthepublicrelationsdamagecausedbycorruptmembers,
partieshopedtominimizefuturerisksbydeterringcandidatesthattheybelieved
couldjeopardizetheparty’simage.Eachpartyclaimedtheyhadstrictproceduresfor
selectingpartycandidates,includingpsychologicaltestingandbackgroundchecksfor
druguseand‘suspicious’earnings.PartyofficialsinbothGerindraandHanura
contendedthattheirleadershipswereextremelyunforgivingofcorruption,having
madeseveralpartydecreesdemandingthatanymembernotfullycommittedtothe
partyshouldleaveimmediately.1
AccordingtoseveralHanurapartyofficials,being‘clean’wasaniconicpartof
Hanura’simage,sothatwhenpeoplethoughtofcorruption‐freeparties,they
immediatelythoughtofHanura.2OneHanuraofficialacknowledgedthatHanura
mightnotbe100percentclean,butaddedthatitsmemberswerewellawareofthe
consequencesoftarringthepartyname,includingexpulsion,quiteapartfrom
damagetotheirpersonalreputation.Thisofficialwas,therefore,confidentthatthe
1InterviewwithHanuraofficial,24October2012;interviewwithGerindraparty
parliamentaryaide,February42013;interviewwithGerindraparliamentaryrepresentative,
9March2013.
2Thispointwasbroughtupseveraltimesinofficialinterviewswithatleastfourdifferent
partymembers,aswellasduringoff‐the‐recordconversations.Animpressionemergedthat
thisargumenthadbeengeneratedbycentralpartymembersandthatpartycadreswere
instructedtoadvanceitindiscussionswithoutsiders.
114
partywas,infact,cleanerthanitsrivals.3Hanuraleader,Wiranto,assertedthat
advocatingforanti‐corruptionmeasures,suchasincreasedtransparencyandthe
swiftresolutionofcorruptioncasesthathavedraggedonforyears,werepopular
withcitizens.4WirantoalsocontendedthatinIndonesiacorruptionisrelatedto
issuesofjustice—thatordinarypeopledesperatelywanttoseethosewhoarecorrupt
punishedfortheircrimes.HearguedthattheIndonesianpeoplewantedaleaderwho
wouldactwith‘firmness’(ketegasan)inthefaceofcorruption;astrongleaderwho
couldappropriatelypunishthoseprofitingattheexpenseofthenation.Infact,
Wirantohadsuchfaithinthepowerofananti‐corruptionsymboltoattractvotesthat
hepushedforittobeincludedinHanura’sbranding,againsttheadviceofhischief
mediaadvisor.5
Standingfirmagainstcorruptionwasalsoidentifiedasapartysymbolbyseveral
Gerindraleaders,withoneofficialassertingthatpeoplewereattractedtoGerindra
becausetheysawitasthepartythatwouldfightcorruptionwithoutmercy.6He
believedthatcampaigningonthisissuewouldnotbackfireforGerindrabecauseit
hadconsistentlyrejectedcorruptionsincethepartywasformed.7SeveralGerindra
membersalsoassertedthatitsactionsinparliamentsupportedtheparty’srhetorical
anti‐corruptionsymbol,sothatitcouldlegitimatelybillitselfas‘clean’withoutfearof
backlash.Gerindraleader,PrabowoSubianto,wasadamantthathewasafearless
anti‐corruptioncampaignerandwouldridthegovernmentofsuchevils.Prabowo’s
useofanti‐corruptionsymbolismwasobservedbyMietzner(2014:114)whostated
he‘presentedhimselfasaclassicpopuliststrongman,lambastingtheweaknessand
corruptionofIndonesia’spoliticalclass.’
3InterviewwithHanuraofficial,24October2012.
4InterviewwithWiranto,24October2013.
5OneHanuramediaadvisorsaidthatWirantohadinsistedonmakinganti‐corruptionideasa
centralfocusofthecampaignandhebelievedthatthiswasprimarilyoutofpersonal
convictionratherthanstrategicbenefit.Initially,Wirantohadbeenadvisedtopromotesocial
welfareandaddressinginequalityastheparty’schiefpoliticalsymbols,onthegroundsthat
theyhadbroaderappealandwerelesspronetocynicismthananti‐corruption.Themedia
advisorbelievedthattalkingaboutcorruptioncouldbedangerousandthatmore
advantageouscampaignsymbolsexisted(interviewwithHanuramediaadvisor,17February
2013).Thisscenario,inwhichtheclient(theparty/politician)overrulesthemediaspecialist
isidentifiedbyBowlerandFarrell(1992b:4)asoneofthetypesofstructuralrelationships
observedduringcampaigns.Theyarguethat,ingeneral,mostrelationshipsbetweenthe
‘client’andthe‘mediapeople’willfallsomewherebetweentwoextremes:devolvingpower
andauthorityformarketingentirelytomediaprofessionalsortheclientdominatingthe
mediateam,dictatingtothemwhattheyshoulddo.BowlerandFarrell(1992a:226)also
assertthatstudiesacrossanumberofcountriesdemonstratethatpartiesand/orcandidates
areoftenreluctanttogiveupcontrolofcampaignstoconsultants.
6InterviewwithGerindrapartyparliamentaryaide,4February2013.
7InterviewwithGerindraparliamentaryrepresentative,9March2013.
115
Nasdemofficialsdidnotovertlyidentifyusingananti‐corruptionsymbolasavote‐
getterfortheirparty;however,theyrecognizedtheappealofapartythatcouldbe
trustedtofighttheproblem.8Allpartiesemphasizedtheimportanceofpublicly
denouncingcorruptioninallitsforms,deemingthatthepublicdemandedit.Nasdem
officialsacknowledgedthattheiranti‐corruptionrhetoricwasnotasintensiveasthat
ofHanuraorGerindra.Oneofficialclaimedthat,asthenewestparty,‘Wedon’tneed
totalkaboutittoomuchbecauseitisexpectedwewillsayweareanti‐corruption…
theproofliesmoreinouractionssofarratherthanwords’.9However,Nasdem
certainlydidnotrefrainfromusingitasapoliticalsymbol.Throughoutitscampaign,
Nasdemcontinuedtodrawattentiontogovernmentfailuresincombatingcorruption,
particularlypressuringthegovernmenttoresolveon‐goingcorruptioncasessuchas
Centurygate.10Bymaintainingthispressure,theofficialcontendedthat‘Nasdemwill
showitselftobeabetteralternativetotherest[oftheparties]’.Inassertingtheir
cleanstatus,Nasdemofficialsalsocapitalizedonitsstatusasanewparty.For
example,anotherpartymemberstatedthatifaspiringpoliticiansmerelywanteda
seatinparliamentformoney‐makingpurposesthentheywouldjoinabiggerparty
becauseemergingpartiesgenerallyremainedunderdogs.11Inlinewiththis,another
Nasdemofficialalsoclaimedthatthepartywas‘pure’,assertingthatitsmembers
werededicatedtorealreformratherthanjustseekingself‐gratification.Whether
thesejustificationsweregenuineorawhite‐washwasdifficulttodiscern;however,
theirrepetitionoftheseassertionsillustratedentrencheddiscoursewithinemerging
parties—thatupholdingacleanimagewasparamount.
Whiletherationaleforthesepartiestopromoteananti‐corruptionsymbolwasbased
onsubjectiveopinionsandsteepedinpoliticalrhetoric,itwasapparentthatparties
usedanti‐corruptionasasymbolinthe2014legislativecampaignbecausetheparty
elitebelieveditwouldwinthemvotes;partieswantedtobeassociatedwithbeing
clean.Ostensibly,eachpartywasconfidentinitsabilitytocarrythroughwiththeir
electoralpromisesandbeaforceofchange.Partieswereconsciousofthedangersof
portrayingthemselvesasanti‐corruptioncampaigners,however,whethertheycould
maintainthisimagefollowingtheelectionwasseeminglyamatterforthefuture.
Theypronouncedthattheywouldnotsufferthesamefateasotherparties,notonly
8InterviewwithNasdempartyofficial,11April2013.
9InterviewwithNasdempartyofficial,11April2013.
10Frequentpublicstatementsensuredthatmajorcorruptioncasesremainedinthepubliceye,
somethingoneofficialidentifiedasbeingcrucialbecause‘peopleforgetthecrimesofpolitical
partiestooquickly’(interviewwithNasdemcandidate,25May2013).
11InterviewwithNasdemofficial,16May2013.
116
becausetheirmembersknewthatcorruptionwasillegal,butbecauseitwouldbea
seriousbetrayalofpartyvalues.
Creatingandmobilizingthesymbol
ChapterOneidentifiedanumberofconceptsthathelpinunderstandinghowpolitical
partiesdevelopasymbol,includingthenotionsofmorality,issueownershipand
narrativedevelopment.Byportrayingcorruptionasamoralissue,partiesareableto
castthemselvesintheroleofthe‘good’(asopposedtorivalpartieswhoaretainted
andtherefore‘evil’).Theongoinguseofrhetoricdevelopsanarrativewhichparties
hopewillconvincethepublicoftheirgenuinecommitmenttoanti‐corruption,
eventuallyleadingtoissueownership.Anotherwaytoobtainissueownershipmight
besimplybybeinguntaintedbyaproblem(Petrocik1996:827).Inthecaseof
corruption,emergingpartieshavetheadvantageofashort,(relatively)untarnished
historyinwhichtheyhavenotfacedacorruptionscandal.12Comingto‘own’theissue
ofanti‐corruptionandcreatingasymbolwhichissynonymouswiththepartyitselfis,
inthisinstance,facilitatedbytheirshorthistory.However,theymuststillprojectan
anti‐corruptionsymbolthatovershadowsthatofrivals,especiallysincetheyare
competingwithotheremergingpartieswithsimilarlyshorthistories.
Thepromotionofthisanti‐corruptionsymbolisneededsothatthevotingpublic
connectsthepartywiththisparticularissue.13Havingconceptualizedhowtheparty
wishedtopresentthemselvestothepublic,Hanura,GerindraandNasdemrelayed
theiranti‐corruptionsymbolthroughanumberofnon‐relationalmechanisms.Parties
hiredmediaandpublicrelationsspecialistsandteamstodevelopandcoordinatethe
promotionofthepartyimage,usingbothpaidadvertisingandthemedia.Social
mediawasalsousedincampaigning,withpartiespromotingthemselvesviawebsites
suchasFacebook,TwitterandYouTubeinordertoappealtoIndonesia’smore
internet‐savvyvoters.Themulti‐channelapproachwasadoptedtobroadenthereach
ofpartysymbols,asmediaadvisorsunderstoodthatsuchanapproachwasimportant
tomaximizingtheimpactofmessagediffusiontothepublic.
12Partyreputationswere‘relatively’untarnishedbecause,asdiscussedlaterinthischapter,
someminorcasesdidcometolightbeforetheelection.
13Itisalsonecessarytomanagepartysymbolsbyensuringthatmembersmaintainaunited
voice,inlinewiththeprioritiesestablishedbycentralpartyrepresentatives.Whilethecentral
committeemaybeabletomanagethesymbolcreationatthenationallevel,thisismuchmore
difficulttocontrolatthelocallevel,aswillbediscussedinChapterFive.
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Partypublications
Partypublicationsincludematerialssuchasthepartymanifesto,missionstatement
andpamphletsthatpromotethepartyanditsobjectives.Earlydocumentssuchasthe
manifestoareintendedtoestablishtheaimsofthepartyandthepremiseforthe
party’sformation,whilelaterdocumentssupplementand/orprovidefurther
clarificationoftheseoriginalpublications.Intheirofficialdocuments,Hanura,
GerindraandNasdemallhighlightedthefailingsofthecurrentgovernmentin
hyperbolicandemotiveterms,withtheapparentaimofgalvanisingmistrustand
consequentlypromotingsupportforthealternativetheyoffered.Therhetoricusedis
intendedtojustifythecreationofanewpartyandoutline,atleastintheory,howthis
partydiffersfromexistingparties.
Hanura’spartydoctrinebooklet(2009a)assertsthatIndonesiawasfullofleaders
whohad‘forgottenthemselves’and‘shamelesslyexploittheirpositions’.These
officialshad‘losttheirconscience’,fuelling‘acultureoftheft,collusionandcorruption
whichhadledtogrosssocialsuffering’.Therepeateduseoftheterm‘conscience’is
intendedtoevokeconceptsofmoralityintheaudience.Tobecompelledbyyour
‘conscience’,asdefinedbyHanura(2008),istobedrivenbyhonesty,truth,goodness
andabeliefinGod.Hanura’smanifestocontendsthatwithoutconsciencethereisno
hopeforimprovement.Therefore,asHanuraisthepartydrivenbyconscience,
citizenswantingtoseeajustandmoralgovernmentshouldvoteforit.Hanura’s
publicationsalsoemphasizedanti‐corruptionsymbolismbyreferringtoideassuchas
beingclean,honest,transparentandaccountable.Forexample,thefirstpoint(outof
eight)inHanura’smissionstatement(2010:9)isthe‘creationofagovernmentthatis
clean...toserveademocraticstatethatistransparentandaccountable’.Moreover,
accordingtopointseveninHanura’shandbook,thepartyiscommittedto‘thetotal
eradicationofcorruptiontofacilitatethecreationofanadvanced,independentand
prestigiousnation’(Hanura2008:15).
Gerindra’sdocumentsframedthepartyasacrusaderforchange,depictingthe
politicalsceneasabattlefoughtinthenationalinterest.Thelanguageemployedby
Gerindrawasverymuchthatofacalltoarms,vowingtofightforprosperityand
justiceinallspheresofIndonesianlife(Gerindra2012c).AccordingtoGerindra’s
‘manifestoofstruggle’,Indonesiahasbeenbattlingpovertysinceindependencebut
couldnotovercomeitduetoanunjustpoliticalsystempopulatedbyweakand
corruptofficials(Gerindra2012b).Itwastimeto‘standfirmtoachievejustice’by
118
givingGerindratheopportunitytoleadafair,prosperousandharmoniousIndonesia
(2012b:5).TheideathatGerindrawasfulfillingacallingwaselaborateduponinThe
HistoryofGerindra(2012d),whichstatedthatthepartywasinspiredbyEdmund
Burke(famouslyquotedassaying‘Theonlythingnecessaryforthetriumph[ofevil]
isforgoodmentodonothing’).InpamphletsdistributedatGerindraralliesinthe
lead‐uptovotingduringApril2014,‘buildingagovernmentthatisfreefrom
corruption,strong,firmandeffective’wasidentifiedasoneoftheparty’score
electoralpromises.Thepamphletendedwith‘Ifnotus,thenwho?Ifnotnow,then
when?’SuchrhetoricalquestionsimpliedthatGerindrawastheonlypartycapableof
improvingIndonesia’srecordagainstcorruption.
Initspoliticalmanifesto,Gerindraspecificallyaddressedcorruptionasalegalissue,
assertingthatwhilethelawswereadequatetheywereinconsistentlyappliedbythe
judiciary.Thepunishmentsforthoseinvolvedincorruption,collusionandnepotism
(korupsi,kolusidannepostisme,KKN)mustbeharsheriftheyaretoactasaneffective
deterrent(Gerindra2012b:33).ThisstanceisreiteratedinGerindra’sofficial
regulations,whichstatethatoneofGerindra’sresponsibilitiesistoinfluenceand
overseethecreationofan‘honest,cleananddignified[government],thatisalsofree
ofcorruption,misappropriationandmisuseofpoliticalpower’(Gerindra2012a:7).
Thedocumentclaimsthatthepartywouldaddresscorruptionbystrengtheninglaw
enforcementandthebureaucraticsystem,assertingalsothatitsmembershada
unique‘identity’whichmeantthey‘willnevercheat,stealorcorruptlyusemoney
fromtheParty,letalonemoneyfromthepeopleorthestate’(Gerindra2012a:31).
GerindraalsopublisheditsownnewspaperfromApril2011toNovember2013,
GemaIndonesiaRaya,featuringarticlesbyPrabowoandotherseniorfiguresabout
partyideologyandactivities,includingafocusonGerindra’santi‐corruptionstance.
Whilethenewspaperhadalimitedreadershipoutsideoftheparty,itprovideda
writtenrecordofpartydiscoursewhichcouldbeusedbycommentatorsand
journalists.
Intheyearleadinguptotheelection,GemaIndonesiaRayaprovidedadedicated
mouthpiecefortheparty,featuringrepeatedreferencestoGerindra’sstatusasaclean
partycommittedtocombatingcorruption.Forexample,intheJune2013edition,
Prabowowroteafrontcoveropinionpiecetitled‘Wewanttowinbybeingclean’,in
whichhestatedthat‘wewanttowinbybeingclean,honest,transparentand
legitimate[emphasisinoriginal]’(Subianto2013).Inthesameedition,the
119
newspaperalsofeaturedanarticlewrittenbyoneoftheparty’scommunication
advisorsaboutBeefgate,describingthearrestofPKSpresidentLuthfiHasanIshaaq
as‘anewchapterinIndonesia’sfightagainstcorruption’thatdemonstratedhow
politicaleliteswerenowbecomingKPKtargets,aswelltheyshould(Nasution2013c).
ThesamecommunicationadvisoralsowroteintheOctober2013editionthatthe
PresidentialPalacewashometoanelite‘mafia’(Nasution2013b).IntheNovember
2013editionhearguedthatYudhoyonomusthaveknownaboutthescandalbecause
itseemedtoinvolvesomanyDemocraticPartymembersandthatthePresident
shouldbeinvestigatedforinvolvementinCenturygatefollowingtheendofhisterm
(Nasution2013a).
WhileNasdem’sreferencestoananti‐corruptionagendainofficialpublicationswere
lessovertthanthoseofHanuraorGerindra,thediscourseremainedanimportant
facetoftheparty’sidentity.Partydocumentationoutlinesthatthe‘restoration’of
Indonesiaisaprocessthatrequiresbothastructuralandmoraladjustmentof
government,butalsoamoraladjustmentofthoseinpolitics,toovercometheir
‘materialisticandhedonisticnature’,toinsteadprioritizepublicwelfareover
personaldesires(Nasdem2011b:19).Inpoint17ofitsplatformoutline,oneofthe
party’sstatedgoalswastocreateacleanandprofessionalbureaucracythatworks
onlyintheinterestofthepeople.Inlinewiththisgoal,accordingtotheparty
handbook(Nasdem2011a),allpartycadresarerequiredtosignacontractstating
thattheywillnotundertakeanycorruptionorotherimmoralactivities.Nasdem’s
brandingalsoattemptedtoframethepartyasanti‐eliteandpro‐people(pro‐rakyat).
Itsmanifestostatedthatpartymembers‘rejectademocracythatisamerecirculation
ofpoweramongsteliteswhoarenotleadersofqualityorworthyoftheposition’
(Nasdem2011a:3).ThisreferencetothenegativeinfluenceofelitesinIndonesia’s
governmentintendedtoappealtoalienated‘ordinarycitizens’whoviewedpoliticsas
thedomainoftherich.InNasdem’snationalistnarrative,thepoorhadbeen
marginalizedfortoolongbecausethoseinchargefailedtofulfiltheidealsof
IndonesiannationalismbasedonPancasila.Thepartyreferredtoitselfasa
movementfor‘restoration’(restorasi)and‘change’(perubahan),aimedatchanging
thementalandmoralattitudesofthegovernmentinordertobuildanhonestand
productivesocietybasedonintegrity(Nasdem2011b:21).Indepictingitselfastrue
nationalists,Nasdempositioneditselfashavingamoralauthorityoverthecurrent
governmentleaders,whowere,byimplication,nottruenationalists.
120
Theprevalenceofanti‐corruptionsentimentwithintheseofficialdocuments
illustrateshowpartiesattemptedtosellthemselvesaspreferablealternativestothe
existingparties.Thesedocuments,inasense,formthebasisformuchoftherhetoric
usedinsymbol‐building.Inidentifyinggoalssuchasabeing‘clean’andcondemning
the‘exploitation’ofIndonesiabysomewithinthegovernment,emergingparties
aimedtoalignthemselveswithreadily‐acceptableprinciples.Partiesdid,however,
recognizethatmostvoterswouldnotreadtheirmanifestos,letaloneconductin‐
depthresearchintotheir‘visionandmission’.Thismeantthatpartieshadtofind
otherwaystoappealtothemasses,forexample,establishingapositivepublicprofile
forseniorpartyfigurestonotonlypromote,butindeedexemplify,thecoresymbols
oftheparty.
Partyleaders
Partyleadersplayanintegralroleinestablishingtheimageofapartyandembodying
thesymbolsthatitwishestopresent.Harrop(1990:279)contendsthatleaders’
wordsandactionsareimportantinthecreationandpromotionofpartysymbols
becausevotersliketoputahumanfacetoaparty.AsdiscussedinChapterOne,the
imageofpartyleadersiscrucialandtheircredibilityrestsonaclosealignment
betweenpersonalandpartyimage(Capelos2010;Druckmanetal.2004;Harrop
1990).Inthelead‐uptothegeneralelections,selectedmembersoftheparty
leadership,particularlythepresidentialcandidates(orseniorpartyfiguresinthe
caseofNasdem)touredthecountrygivingspeechesatpoliticalralliestopromote
theirrespectiveparties.Theserallies,oftenpopulatedbypaidattendees(Pepinsky
2014;Simandjuntak2012:101),weremoreaspectaclethananythingelse—ashow
ofstrengthtothepublicratherthanatruereflectionofpopularity.Still,knowingthat
theseorationswereanopportunitytopublicizethepartyandgiventhehigh
likelihoodofmediacoverage,partyleadersusedtheseopportunitiestofurther
establishananti‐corruptionimage.
Leadersofemergingpartieshadalreadybeguntoaligntheirpartiestoananti‐
corruptionsymbolwellbeforetheofficialcampaignperiod.Wiranto,Prabowoand
SuryaPalohallpublishedbooksintheyearsleadinguptothe2014electionthatwere
designedtobuildtheirimageasagentsofchange.Forexample,Paloh’sbookMari
BungRebutKembali(2012)wasacompilationof‘inspirational’speechesbyPaloh
invokingtherevolutionaryandpatrioticspiritofformerpresidentSukarno.In2013,
Prabowoalsopublishedabookinasimilarvein,entitledSuratUntukSahabat(Letter
121
toaFriend),arguingthatIndonesianeededtoworkhardertoachievethedreamsof
thenation’sfoundingfathers.Wirantoalsoauthoredanumberofbooks,including
MeretasJalanBaruEkonomiIndonesia(PavingaNewRoadforIndonesia’sEconomy)
andMeluruskanJalanDemokrasi(StraighteningtheRoadtoDemocracy),presenting
hisvisionforthecountry’sfuture(Wiranto2009b;c).
Inthe2014electioncampaigns,leadersfromeachemergingpartycultivatedmedia
relationsinordertobroadcasttheirmessageviapresscoverage.Atthesametime,
partiesorganizedpublicappearancesandranadvertisingcampaignsthat
prominentlyfeaturedimagesofthepartyleader(s).Wiranto,Hanura’spresidential
candidate,andmediatycoonHaryTanoesoedibjo(oftenreferredtoas‘HaryTanoe’),
thevice‐presidentialcandidate,werefrequentlyquotedinthemediadiscussing
issuesofcorruption.Similarly,Prabowospokerepeatedlyabouttheneedfor
corruptioneradication,usinghismediatopromotenotonlyhimself,butalsothe
party’santi‐corruptionsymbol.Nasdem,whichdidnothaveapresidentialcandidate,
neverthelessalsosolditsanti‐corruptionsymbolthroughseniorpartyfigures
includingSuryaPalohandpartychair,PatriceRioCapella.
Gerindra’sPrabowowasalsoconsistentlyvocalinhisstanceagainstcorruptionin
electioncampaigningleadinguptothe2014nationalelections.InMarch2013,he
observedthat‘thelevelsofcorruption[inIndonesia]areinsane’andmuchofthe
nationalbudgetwentmissingeveryyear.Theseleaks(bocoran),hesaid,werethe
resultofapoorlyrungovernmentthatneededtoimproveitstransparencyand
accountability(Kompas2013b).DuringhisIndependenceDayaddressinAugust
2013,PrabowoaccusedtheYudhoyonogovernmentofbeingfullofcorruptpeople
whowerebeingcaught‘onebyone’bytheKPKfortheircrimes(Riadi2013).Indeed,
sostrongwashisproclaimedcommitmenttofightingcorruptionthathewaswilling
todieforthecause(Tribunnews2013b).A2014pollreleasedbyIndonesiaSurvey
Center(ICS)foundPrabowo’s‘competence’and‘bravery’concerningcorruptionwere
identifiedasmajorcontributorstohispopularity(Alfiyah2014).Thepoll’scredibility
aside,Prabowolatchedontoitsfindingsinhiscampaignrhetoric.14Later,inMarch
14Anumberofsurveyswereconductedinthelead‐uptotheelection,donebycompeting
surveyinstituteswishingtopredicttheelectoraloutcome.Theveracityandneutralityof
surveyinstitutescameintoquestionsduringthistime,particularlyduetothefactthatpre‐
electionsurveyresultswerevastlydifferentfromtheactualoutcome.Thiswasmostevident
inthefailureofPDIPtogainover20percentofvoteswhenithadpolledsowellinthelead‐up
tovoting.Thismightbeexplainedonthebasisthatsomeoftheseinstitutesareprivately
ownedandsurveyresultsplayaroleinshapingpublicopinion(notjustviceversa).Plus,
122
2014,PrabowodeclaredthatanyGerindramemberaccusedofcorruptionwasa
‘bastard’andthat,whilehecouldnotbecertainthateverymemberofGerindrawas
clean,hewassurehewouldhavenotroubledismissingthemiftheywerefoundtobe
corrupt(Asril2014a).
Billingtheircandidatesasleadersofthefuture,Nasdemcontendedthatits
parliamentarycandidateswouldbe‘forwardthinking,freefromanylegaland
corruptioncharges,andpro‐thepeople’(BeritaTVIndo2012).Nasdemchairperson,
PatriceRioCapella,claimedthepartyhadbeenformedbyconcernedcitizensin
responsetodecreasingpublicregardforpoliticiansandthereforehadaresponsibility
toofferbetterleadership(Republika2013).15Nasdemleadershipalsocriticized
PresidentYudhoyono’sinabilitytocontrolparliamentariansfromhisownparty.For
example,inJune2013SuryaPalohaccusedthegovernmentofshirkingitsanti‐
corruptionresponsibilities,arguingthatthecontinuedpresenceofcorruptparty
membersindicatedapartyleadershipthatwas‘half‐hearted’intheircommitmentto
fightingcorruption(Gustaman2013).InanotherpublicstatementinJune2013,Paloh
statedthatNasdemwouldacceptresponsibilityforanycorruptioninvolvingitsparty
members,whichhedidnotbelievewouldbeaproblembecauseNasdemcandidates
wereclean(Badudu2013;Nasdem2014a;c).16
Hanura’spresidentialteamcandidates,WirantoandHaryTanoe,usedsimilar
rhetoricduringtheirorations.DuringaspeechinBali,March2013,Wirantostressed
thatHanurawasapartyofjustice,including‘justiceagainstcorruptors’andagainst
allthosewhocausedsufferingtothepeople.Wirantoalsorepeatedlycalledformore
severepunishmentstobeimposedforcorruption,sayingthosefoundguiltyshould
notonlybestrippedofallassets,butalsofacethedeathpenalty.17Demandingthe
deathpenaltyforcorruptionnotonlyemphasizedthatHanurawascleanitselfand
hadnothingtofearfromharsherpenaltiesforcorruption,butalsodemonstratedthat
itwassocommittedthatitwaspreparedtosupportthedrasticmeasureofcapital
somesurveyinstituteswereassociatedwithspecificcandidates.Foranindividualaccountof
thedifficultiesinrelyingonsamplesandpolls,seeSalim(2014).
15Thisstatementwasmadeinresponsetosurveyresultsrevealingthatover52percentof
peopledidnotthinkthatpoliticianssetagoodexampleofethicsandmorality.
16Inordertodiscouragecandidatesfromspendingtheirownmoneyoramassingdebt,
Nasdemagreedtofundseveralindividualcampaigns.Thepartyclaimedithadbillionsof
rupiahsetasidetoassistcandidates,claimingthiswouldboostcampaignaccountability
(Badudu2013).
17ForexamplesofreferencestothedeathpenaltyforcorruptioninWiranto’sspeeches,see
BeritaSatu(2014a);SoloposTV(2014).
123
punishment.Thoughhedidnotadvocateforthedeathpenalty,HaryTanoealso
emphasizedthenegativeimpactofcorruptioninIndonesia.InhisJuly2013
nominationacceptancespeechhestatedthathehadbeendriventoenterpolitics
becauseofalltheconcernshehadforthecountry.Helamentedthat‘theproblemsof
corruption,ruleoflaw,educationandmanyothersocialproblems’hadprevented
Indonesiafromreachingitsfullpotential(Tanoesoedibjo2013).18Astheelection
approached,HaryTanoeemphasizedtheneedtoeradicatecorruption,sayingthat
Indonesia‘hasmanyissuestoface,includingtheproblemofunresolvedcorruption
cases’andthat‘whenwegetridofallcorruptioncasesthiscountrywillhaveastrong
economythatisabletohelpallIndonesians’(Hidayat2014).
Theprevalenceofanti‐corruptionrhetoricmeantthatwhencorruptionaccusations
arose,partyleadershipwereforcedtoact.Forexample,inMarch2014,Wirantowas
forcedtoannouncethatBambangSoeharto,aseniorpartyofficialinLombokand
chairmanofHanura’selectionboard,hadsteppeddowninthelead‐uptothe
electionsfollowingallegationsbytheKPKthathehadbribedmembersofthe
Attorney‐General’sofficeandjudgesinreturnforafavourablecourtrulinginaland
ownershipcaseinwhichhehadapparentlylodgedfalseownershipdocuments(Lubis
2013;Manggiasih2013).Whileapotentialblowtotheparty’simage,thisstatement
wasalsoanopportunitytodemonstrateHanura’szero‐tolerancepolicyagainst
corruptionwithinitsranks.Inannouncingthedismissal,Wirantostressedthatsince
Hanura‘hasalwaysbeencommittedtobeingclean’,hehadnochoicebuttodismiss
Soehartowhileawaitingtheoutcomeofcriminalinvestigationsagainsthim(Berita
Satu2013a).Whilethepublicannouncementwasembarrassingfortheparty,itwas
notthepublicrelationsdisasteritcouldhavebeen,withthedismissalframedas
evidencethatthepartywouldrootoutcorruptionthroughoutIndonesia,starting
fromwithinitsownranks.
Partiesinthemedia
Emergingparties,likeothers,believedthatextensivemediacoveragewasessential
fortheircampaignsandtheyweredeterminedtouseallthepromotional
opportunitiesavailabletothem.Mediacoverageallowedemergingpartiesto
commentoncurrenteventsastheybrokeandtoreinforcetheirsymbol(s)
throughoutthecampaign.AsbothHanuraandNasdemhadmediabaronsinkey
18Inanotherexample,on1October2013,theJakartaGlobenewspaperranafeaturearticle
entitled‘HaryTanoeasCorruptionFighter’(Bastian2013),profilinghimfollowinga
presentationhemadeattheSingaporeanChamberofCommerceinJakarta.
124
leadershippositions,theywereaffordedextraordinaryopportunitiesformedia
coverageinthelead‐uptothe2014elections.Concernsarosethatthesemedia
ownerswouldencouragepartisancoveragebytheirmediaoutlets.Itwasextremely
difficulttoregulatepartisannewscoveragegiventhat,arguably,thiswasnotabreach
ofthelaw.19Assuch,inFebruary2013PresidentYudhoyonoappealedtothemediato
self‐regulateandmaintainbalancedandfairreportingonpartiesinthelead‐uptothe
2014election(Perdani2013c).PalohrejectedaccusationsthatNasdemhadflaunted
campaignregulationsbyusingitsMetroTVconnectiontocampaignbeforetheofficial
period(Iman2014).HaryTanoepledgedthatHanurawouldnotbreachanyelectoral
campaignregulations(BeritaSatu2013b).20WhileGerindrahadnotiestoany
specificnewsoutlet,itreportedlyhadacampaignbudgetofsomeRp.300billionand
spentsignificantamountsonmediaadvertising.21
Havingprivilegedaccesstomediaoutletsdidnotmeanthatpartypromotionwas
unfettered.UndertheKPU’s2013regulationsonpartyadvertisingduringelections
campaigns,politicalcommercialsandopenmeetingswereallowedbetween16March
2014and5April2014butpartieswereprohibitedfromusingmassmedia,printor
electronic,forcampaignpurposesbefore15March2014.22Thisdidnotpreventnews
reportingonactivitiesorpublicstatementsfrompoliticalpartiesduringthisperiod.23
Inaddition,throughout2013,manypartiesairedcommercialsdesignedtofamiliarize
thepublicwithparticularpartymembers,especiallypresidentialcandidates.While
theseadvertisementsviolatedthespiritoftheKPUregulationstheydidnot
technicallybreachthem.
19McCargo(2012:207‐211),inabroadstudyoftheconnectionbetweenmediaandpoliticsin
Asia(thoughfocusedonThailand),assertsthattherelationshipbetweenthetwoisoften
murkyandmediaownershiptendstopromotepartisanreporting.
20Hanura’svice‐presidentialcandidate,HaryTanoe,istheowneroftheMNCmediagroupand
RCTItelevisionstation,whileNasdemleader,SuryoPaloh,ownsMediaIndonesianewspaper
andMetroTV.
21ThisbudgetfigurewastheofficialamountreportedbyGerindraintheirmandatory
reportingtotheKPU.However,therewasmuchspeculationthatmostpartiesspentfarmore
ontheircampaignsthanreported.DidikSupriyanto,fromtheNGOElectionHousefor
Democracy(RumahPemiluuntukDemokrasi,Perludem)suspectedthatGerindra’sactual
spendingwasmuchhigherthanitsreportedpoliticalfundingofRp.300billion(Afriantiand
Dewi2013).
22AcopyofLawNo.01/2013onGuidelinesfortheImplementationofElectionCampaignsby
MembersfortheDPR‐RI,DPDandDPRDcanbefoundattheKPUwebsite(KomisiPemilihan
Umum2013).
23SuryaPalohevenclaimedthatgaggingmediacoverageandrestrictingadvertisingviolated
freedomofthepress(Rochmanuddin2014).
125
Partyrhetoricinthemedia,bothbeforeandduringtheofficialcampaignperiod,
clearlydrewuponanti‐corruptiondiscourse,withnewpartiesseekingtodrawmedia
attentiontothepoorperformanceofthegovernment.Inthelead‐uptotheelection,
Hanuramadeseveralpublicstatementsaboutthegovernment’sfailuretoprosecute
officialsovertheBankCenturycorruptionscandal,callingforaninvestigationinto
theinvolvementofBoediono,Indonesia’sthenVice‐President.Hanuraspokespersons
accusedthegovernmentofacover‐up.24Atthesametime,Hanurapromotedpolls
conductedinOctober2012andMarch2013thatnamedthemasthe‘cleanest’party
inIndonesia,havingneverbeenimplicatedinanycorruptioncase.25Thisframing
clearlysoughttoportraythegovernmentas‘bad’andHanuraascleanandtherefore
‘good’.Inanotherexample,WirantodeclaredtoRepublikanewspaperthatIndonesia
wasindireneedofnewleadershipthatwastrustworthy,cleanandcorruption‐free—
notingthat,ifcalledupon,hewasreadyforthejob(Sudiaman2013).Laterinthe
campaign,WirantohighlightedmorerecentsurveyswhichagainnamedHanuraas
thenation’scleanestparty.HereinforcedHanura’s‘clean’statuswiththepublic
statement:‘Hanuraisfreeofcorruption;canotherpartiesclaimthesame?’
(Kuswandi2013).
Hanurauseditsmediaprofiletodrawattentionexplicitlytoitsanti‐corruptionstance
severaltimesinthecampaign.First,revelationsthatparliamentariansconvictedof
corruptioncouldstillreceivestatepensionsspurredanangryresponsefromHanura.
Itbecameamediaheadline,withseveralreportspublishedcriticaloftheYudhoyono
administration’sreluctancetoamendlegislationinordertostripcorruptpoliticians
ofparliamentarybenefits(Kurniawan2013;Sihaloho2013b;Yulika2013).In
November2013,Hanura’sparliamentaryfactionheaddeclaredthatany
parliamentarianfoundguiltyofcorruptionshouldlosealltheirentitlements,
includingtheirpensionandaccesstogovernmentfacilities,nomatterwhatpartythey
werefrom(Hanura2013a).Thestatementcoincidedwithinvestigationsintothe
corruptdealingsofDemocraticPartylegislatorAndiMallarangeng,whowasdetained
amonthearlier.Second,HanuraalsoprovokeddebatessurroundingtheKPK’sarrest
24Hanurareleasedapublicstatementonitswebsiteon30November2012entitled‘KPK
confirms2newsuspectsintheCenturycase’.InthisarticleaHanuraspokesperson
condemnedtheKPKfortakingsolongtonamethesesuspectswhentheirinvolvementhad
beenknownsince2010.Thespokespersonalsoclaimedthatthesetwomenmaybetakingthe
fallfortheirsuperiors,includingVice‐PresidentBoediono,whoarebeingprotectedbythe
currentleadership(Hanura2012).
25PollingbytheNationalSurveyInstituteinOctober2012foundHanuratobetheleast
corruptpartyintheDPR(Fadly2012;Giyanto2012).AsimilarsurveyinMarch2013bythe
samecompanyfoundthatHanurahadmaintainedthisstanding(Ferri2013;Khaddaf2013).
126
ofChiefJusticeoftheConstitutionalCourt,AkilMochtar,inOctober2013.26Ina
statementtothemediainOctober2013,HanuraDeputySecretary‐GeneralforLaw
andHumanRights,Kristiawanto,lambastedotherpoliticalpartiesas‘ambitiousfor
powerandmoney’andsupportingcorruptioninthejudiciary(Wijaya2013).He
urgedthegovernmenttocooperatewiththeKPKtoacceleratetheinvestigationso
thattheperpetratorwouldhavelessopportunitytohideevidenceoftheir
wrongdoing.Third,duringtheofficialcampaignperiodWirantoandHaryTanoe
repeatedlyhighlightedthedelayedimplementationofinfrastructureprojectsdueto
corruption,blamingthelackofdevelopmentforongoingpoverty(Bramantyo2014;
Dzulkarnaen2014).Finally,inMarch2014,HaryTanoealsostatedthatIndonesian
‘regulationsforbudgetmanagementneedtobeclearandtransparent…andwith
clean,firmleadership,corruptioncanbeended’(Waskita2014),implyingthatthe
currentgovernmentwaseithernotcleanorcommittedenoughtocombatcorruption
effectively.
WhileGerindraitselfdidnothavedirectlinkstoanynationalmediaoutlets,its
campaignteamfocusedongettingpartycoverageviamediareportsofstatementsby
seniorfigures.Sensationalstatementsandaccusationswereparticularlyusefulin
attractinggeneralmediaattention.Forexample,GerindraaccusedPresident
YudhoyonoofhidinghisowninvolvementinCenturygateandusinghispositionto
protectmembersofhiscabinetfromcorruptioninvestigations.27InMarch2013,for
example,aGerindraspokespersonclaimedthatYudhoyonohaddeliberatelyshifted
theMinisterofFinance,AgusMartowardojo,tothepositionofGovernoroftheBank
ofIndonesiainanattempttoshieldhimfromtheHambalanginvestigation(Gerindra
2013a;Malau2013).28Astheelectioncampaignintensified,Gerindramedia
statementsbecameincreasinglybelligerenttowardstheYudhoyonoadministration.
Earlyon,inDecember2012,Prabowoclaimedthathispartywastheonlychoicefor
citizenswhowantedaleaderfreefromcorruption(Ratya2012),whileanother
GerindraofficialexplainedthatGerindrawouldgainmorevotesthantheDemocratic
Partyinthe2014electionbecauseofitsreputationforbeingclean.29Later,Gerindra’s
attacksagainstthegovernmentbecameevenmorevociferous.Forexample,inJune
26DetailsoftheAkilMochtarcasecanbefoundinChapterThree.
27TheHambalangscandalwasdiscussedinthepreviouschapter.
28ItisunclearfromGerindra’sstatementsexactlyhowthismovewould‘shield’him,butthe
implicationappearedtobethatifhewasnolongerMinisterforFinancehewouldcomeunder
lessscrutiny.
29SpokespersonandGerindraparliamentarymemberMartinHutabarat,quotedinVivanews,
20February2013(KusumadewiandYulika2013).
127
2013,PrabowoattackedYudhoyonoandhisadministrationinastatement,urging
citizensnottoelectanother‘thief’aspresidentin2014(Gerindra2013b).Following
Yudhoyono’sNationalDayaddresson17August2013,aGerindraspokesperson
criticizedthepresidentforfailingtoprioritizeanti‐corruptionefforts,despiteitbeing
oneofIndonesia’smajorpoliticalchallenges.Hiscommentssuggestedthat
Yudhoyonodidnotmentioncorruptioneitherbecausehedidnotfeelitwas
importantorbecausemembersofhispartywerebeinginvestigated,whereas
Gerindra’splatformclearlyprioritizedcorruptioneradication(Tribunnews2013a).
Gerindraalsoseizedonsurveyresultsthatreflectedpositivelyontheparty,using
themtosupportassertionsoftheparty’ssuperiorityoverrivals.Forexample,in
January2014,itpromotedtheIndonesianSurveyCentre’sfindings,whichindicated
Gerindrapartycadreswereconsidered‘relativelycleanofcorruptioncases’andthat
Prabowowasthepotentialpresidentialcandidatewiththe‘highestcompetencyfor
eradicatingcorruption’(Alfiyah2014).Theseresultswerepublishedbyseveral
mediaoutletsincludingreputableonlinenewswebsiteTempo.co.id.30Gerindraalso
usedthemediatopromoteinternalpoliciesthatfosteredananti‐corruptionsymbol.
ItpublicizeditspolicyofprohibitingGerindraparliamentariansfromundertaking
overseasstudytours.Thepartyarguedthatthesetripsweremerelyjunketsanda
wasteofgovernmentfunding.InDecember2013,PrabowocontendedthatGerindra
wastheonlypartywithsuchapolicy,claimingithadsavedthegovernmentaround
Rp.26billion(Fitrat2013).31PrabowoalsomadeheadlinesinNovember2013when
hecondemnedtheplannedrenovationsofthenationalparliamentbuilding,claiming
thattheyweremerelyanopportunityforskimmingmoneyfromthestate(Waskita
2013b).Thebuildingcompaniesawardedthetender,PTAdhiKaryaandPTDGI
(DutaGrahaIndah),werealsoimplicatedintheHambalangscandal,linkingthe
renovationprojecttodisgracedDemocraticPartypoliticianssuchasNazaruddin,who
wasalreadyinprisonforcorruption.
NasdemalsoattemptedtokeepCenturygateinthespotlight,determinedtomaintain
publicinterestintheunresolvedcase.32Inanotherexample,Nasdemlauncheda
30ThestorywasalsoreportedbyBeritaSatu(2014b),PosKota(2014)andRepublika(2014)
amongstothers.
31Otherpartymembershavemadesimilarstatements,see(HarianMetro2013;Paparazie
2013;Prihandoko2014).
32Forexample,inMarch2013,themediareportedthatNasdemwaslobbyingtheKPKto
questionformerfinanceminister,SriMulyani,abouttheBankCenturybailout,eventhough
shehadalreadyrelocatedtoWashingtonD.C.tobecomeManagingDirectorattheWorldBank
128
mediacampaigninDecember2013toencouragecitizenoversightofpollingbooths
andvote‐countinginordertodecreasethelikelihoodofmoneypoliticsinthe
legislativeelections.Arguingthatsmallerpartiesweredisadvantagedinelections
becauselargerpartieshadmoremoneyandinfluence,Nasdemleaderscalledon
voterstoensuretherewereimpartialwitnessesateachpollingstation(Media
Indonesia2013;Novaria2013).Soonafterthelaunchofitsvote‐monitoringappeal,
Nasdemalsohighlightedareportfromthegovernment’sCentreforFinancial
TransactionReportsandAnalysis(PusatPelaporandanAnalisisTransaksiKeuangan,
PPATK),whichfoundanincreasein‘suspicioustransactions’bypoliticalpartiesin
theyearleadinguptotheelection,urgingthattheybefullyinvestigated(Nasdem
2014f).Intheseappeals,Nasdemcapitalizedonitsstatusasapoliticalunderdog,
threatenedbythetreacheryoflarger,moreestablishedparties.Inarguingthatmore
independentoversightwasneeded,Nasdemalsoportrayeditselfastrustworthyand
clean:ithadnothingtohidefromthepublic,sothemorewitnessesandinvestigations
thebetter.
Parties’OnlinePresence
AsHoward(2003:213‐214)argues,technologicalinnovationhasradicallyaltered
powerrelationsinpoliticsascampaignscanbelessexpensivewhilesimultaneously
morereflexive,operatingwithfewerbarrierstoentry.Asopposedto‘modern’forms
ofcampaigningwhichrelyuponthenewsmedia,campaigninginits‘postmodern’
formusestheinternetasitsprimarymeansofpoliticalcommunicationtovoters.33
Digitalmediafacilitatesanewwayforboththeproductionandconsumptionof
politicalinformation(Howard2005:154).Althoughgenerallyamediumfor
mobilizingexistingsupportersratherthanpersuadingundecidedvoters(Vaccari
2008:649),Indonesianpartywebsitesprovideinformationaboutwhattheparty
standsfor,withmostsitescontainingelectroniccopiesofkeydocuments,suchasthe
partymanifestoand‘visionandmission’.Partywebsitesalsoenablethereal‐time
disseminationofpublicstatements.
Allthepoliticalpartiesstudiedinthisthesishadanofficialwebsite,establishedwell
beforethe2014election.However,thefrequencyofpostingsandstatements
(Rimanews2013).NasdemalsopartneredwithLilyWahid,daughterofformerPresident
AbdurrahmanWahid,tosubmitdocumentstotheKPKthat,theyclaimed,shedlighton
Centurygate(Irianto2013).However,thecontentofthesedocumentswasnevermadepublic.
33Foramorein‐depthdescriptionofwhatconstitutespremodern,modernandpostmodern
politicalcampaigns,seeHoward(2003).
129
increaseddramaticallyinthemonthsleadinguptopollingday,particularlyduring
theofficialcampaignperiodwhenthereweremoreralliesandeventstocover.34
Althoughnotasreflexiveassocialmedia,officialwebsitesprovidedaforumfor
disseminatingpartymessagesintwomainforms.First,partiescirculatedreport‐style
piecesonsurveyresultsorpartyactivities,forexampletheturnoutataparticular
rally,ornewsofapartybranchundertakingcharitablework.35Thesestories
inevitablyportrayedthepartyinapositivelight.
Second,partywebsitespublishedseveralopinionpieces.Someofthesewerewritten
anonymously,appearingasagenericpartystatement.Notonlydidpartiesmount
politicallystrategicattacksonrivalsandcorruptioningeneral,theyalsousedtheir
websitestorestatetheirowncommitmenttotheissue.Forexample,inFebruary
2014,Nasdempostedanarticleentitled‘Nasdemurgesareturntothefightagainst
KKN’,insistingthatNasdemmembersmakethefightagainstcorruptionapriorityin
theirlives,justasNasdemhadcommittedtodoingovernment(Nasdem2014b).On
30March2014,Hanurapostedanarticlenamingitselfasthe‘cleanestandmostanti‐
corruptionparty’inthelegislativeelections(Hanura2014b).Gerindra,too,
continuallyreiterateditsanti‐corruptionstanceonitswebpage.Forinstance,in
February2014itclaimedthat‘fullysupportingtheKPK,Gerindrainstructs
candidatestorefusetheuseofallformsofinducements(gratifikasi)’statingthat
Gerindrabelievesacorruption‐freeelectionwillbe‘awinforallIndonesians’
(Gerindra2014a).Eveniftheaudienceforthesestatementswaslimitedtothose
alreadyinclinedtosupporttheparty,thewebsiteswereashowcaseforkeypolitical
symbols,allowingcitizenstoeasilygainasenseofpartypriorities.
Websitearticlesalsoreinforcedandjustifiedcriticismofpoliticalrivals.Forexample,
Gerindra’sofficialwebsitepostedcommentaryonthecorruptioninvestigationsinto
Atut,whowasinvestigatedforlarge‐scalecorruptionalongwithseveralmembersof
herfamily.Inaddition,everyGerindrapostonthetopicofcorruptionwasfollowed
byashortsummaryofGerindra’sowncommitmenttocorruption.Thesummary
34Basedonauthorobservations,Gerindraseemedthemostprolificpublisherofwebsite
content,sometimespostingupto6timesperdayonitswebsiteinthemonthsleadingupto
theelection.
35Forexample,on14January2014anarticlewaspostedonHanura.comentitledWiranto
bantukorbanbanjirdiPurworejo(‘WirantoassistsfloodvictimsinPurworejo’)(Hanura
2014a);NasdempublishedNasdemPekalonganBantuKorbanBanjir(NasdeminPekalongan
HelpsFloodVictims’)on23January2014(Nasdem2014d).Alsopublicizingtheirflood
assistance,GerindrapostedPrabowoBantuKorbanBanjirSoppeng(‘PrabowoassistsFlood
VictimsinSoppeng’)on28January2014(Gerindra2014f).
130
reads:‘Gerindraisapoliticalpartythathasthevisionofbecomingthepartythat
bringsprosperitytothepeople,socialjustice,andorderbasedonnationalismand
religionwhilepreservingtheUnitaryStateofIndonesia…Gerindraistheonly
politicalpartywithaclearandstructuredprogramenshrinedinthe6pointaction
planfortheTransformationoftheNation.Amongstthenumerousawardsreceivedby
GerindraareawardsfromTransparencyInternationalIndonesiaandICWastheparty
withthebestfinancialtransparency’.36Inonepost,FadliZon,DeputyLeaderof
Gerindra,demandedthatAtutresignimmediatelyandallowanewgovernortobe
appointedforBanten.Zoncriticizedexistinglegislation,whichallowedagovernorto
continuetoruleevenifindictedoncorruptioncharges(Gerindra2014c).37Gerindra
alsopostedanopinionpieceontheHambalangscandal,condemningAnas
Urbaningrum,formerChairmanoftheDemocraticParty,forfailingtoattenda
hearingcalledbytheKPK.Inthestatement,ZonstressedGerindra’sunconditional
supportfortheKPK,whilecontendingthatafailuretocooperatewiththeKPKseta
poorexampleforotherpoliticians(Gerindra2014b).Inanotherexample,on12
March2014thepartyissuedanopinionpieceassertingthatvotersneededto‘punish’
corruptpoliticalpartiesbyrefusingtovoteforthemintheelection(Gerindra2014d).
Nasdemsimilarlyuseditsofficialwebsitetodrawattentiontothecorruptbehaviour
ofitspoliticalrivals.Forexample,inJanuary2014itarguedthatthree‘stars’ofthe
DemocraticParty’santi‐corruptionadvertisementshadbeendishonest,referringto
thenowinfamous‘saynotocorruption’politicaladvertisingcampaignfrom2009
(Nasdem2014e).38Thestoryquotedanexpertinpoliticalcommunicationfromthe
UniversityofIndonesia,TjiptaLesmana,whostatedthattheadvertisementreflected
inconsistenciesbetweentherhetoricandactionsoftheDemocraticParty,whilealso
warningthatthepartywaslikelytosufferpoliticalbacklashintheelectionbecauseof
thishypocrisy.NasdemalsopublishedarticlesoncorruptioncasesinvolvingAnas,
AkilandLuthfi.Althoughthesearticleswereopinionpieces,theywereusuallyframed
asamediaarticlereportingfacts,unlikethoseontheGerindrawebsite.Incases
whereopinionwasincluded,Nasdemtendedtoquoteoutsidersratherthanmembers
ofitsownparty.Incontinuingtopublicizethesecorruptioncases,Nasdemfocused
36AnexamplecanbeseenatGerindra(2014b).
37Zonnotedthatgovernmentofficialsareonlytechnicallyrequiredtoresignoncefoundguilty
bythejudiciary.
38ThisadvertisementwasscreenednationwideduringtheDemocraticParty’s2009legislative
campaign.Itfeaturedrisingstarsoftheparty,aswellasYudhoyono,filmedsaying‘no’to
corruption.
131
publicattentiononthelargenumberofscandalslinkedtotheYudhoyono
government.
Whilesomeemergingpartieshadprivilegedaccesstotraditionalmediaoutlets,the
internetandsocialmediaplayedanimportantroleinelectioncampaigning.39Offering
instantandunrestrictedaccesstoofficialpartystatements,aswellasthosemadeby
individuals,socialmedia—inparticularTwitterandFacebook—wasameansof
communicatingdirectlywithvotersvianon‐relationalchannels.40Thesenew
technologies,tosomeextent,reducedtheimportanceofpersonalsocialrelationships,
aswellason‐the‐groundcampaigningbypartymembers,becausemessagescould
diffusedirectlyfromthepartyelitetovoterswithouttheneedforanintermediary.Of
course,moretraditionalformsofcampaigningcontinuedtoexistaselectioneeringin
ruralandregionalareasstillreliedontelevisionandtheprintmedia,aswellaseven
moretraditionalcampaigntechniques,suchasposters,pamphletsand‘whistlestop
tours’,especiallywhentheinternetwasunavailableorunreliable.
Socialmediawasanimportantcomponentofthecampaigns,particularlyinreaching
outtoupperandmiddleclassvoterswhoweretechnologicallysavvy.41Itallowed
partiestodevelopanonline‘trackrecord’oftheiranti‐corruptionrhetoric,
reinforcingtheireffortsinotherspheresandbuildingandentrenchingtheiruseof
anti‐corruptionasapoliticalsymbol.Thiswasparticularlyimportantforemerging
39Whilethereislittleinthewayofpublishedacademicstudiesontheimpactofsocialmedia
intheIndonesianelection,thereismuchanecdotalevidenceshowingitplayedakeyrole.
Indonesiaisoneofsocialmedia’slargestmarkets.AccordingtofiguresreleasedbyTwitterin
June2014,thereareapproximately20millionactiveTwitterusersinIndonesia(Lukman
2014).IndonesiaisalsothefourthlargestcountryforFacebookuse,witharound60.5million
registeredusersaccordingtoasurveybyresearchfirmeMarketer(Ross2014).Forsome
examplesofcommentaryontheimportanceofsocialmediaduringIndonesia’selections,see
Belot(2013)andHearne(2014).
40Muchofthesocialmediapresencewasalsofragmentedbecauseseveralcandidateshad
theirownFacebookandTwitteraccounts.EnliandSkogerbø(2013)arguethatFacebookand
Twitterare,bytheirnature,anindividual‐focusedarena,andthereforearemoreusefulfor
personalizedcampaigning,particularlygiventhateventhoughcandidatesrepresent
particularparties,theyessentiallycampaignforthemselves.However,duringthepresidential
elections,thesocialmediapresencewasmuchmorecoherent,withthecampaignmessages
clearlyemanatingfromthecentraloffice.Formoreacademicstudiesontheroleofsocial
mediainelections,seeBennettetal.(2008);Howard(2003);andHoward(2005).
41Inastudyontheuseofsocialmediaforthe2014electionsinIndonesia,Yuliatiningtyas
(2014)foundthatalthoughtelevisionandnewspaperadvertisingwerestillthemostpopular
campaignstrategies,theuseofsocialmediadidhavesignificantresults.Thisissupportedby
researchfromothercountries.ForexampleBean(2011:27),researchingtheuseofinternet
forpoliticalengagementinAustralia,foundthatasignificantamountofvotersgained
informationfromtheinternet.InNorway,EnliandSkogerbø(2013)assertthattheuseof
social‐medialedtoincreasinglypersonalizedcampaignstrategiesandhigherindividual
profilesofcandidates.
132
partieswithlittlehistoryofanti‐corruptionactivismtodrawuponinconstructing
theirsymbols.Partieshopedthatconsistentonlinepostsdiscussingtheparty’santi‐
corruptionstancewouldhelpthemto‘own’theissue.Gerindra,whichwas
acknowledgedashavingoneofthemoretech‐savvycampaignsduringtheelection,
wasattheforefrontofthisstrategy(AsiaCalling2013).Gerindrahadanentireoffice
dedicatedtotheparty’ssocialmediamarketing,respondingtomessagesand
tacticallyuploadingpictures,statementsandmedialinksthatportrayedthepartyina
positivelight.42Toalesserextent,HanuraandNasdemalsousedtheinternetto
promotethemselvesandtheiranti‐corruptionideas.
SocialmediaformatssuchasTwitter,FacebookandYouTubewereanotherpopular
meansforcommunicatinginformationtovoters.Oftenechoingorlinkingtowebsite
posts,theseforagavepartiestheopportunitytoprovidereal‐timeinformationto
votersandresponsestoquestionsandcriticisms.Eachofthethreepoliticalparties
hadaprofessionalcommunicationsteamresponsibleforupdatingsocialmedia
content.Theseteamscontrolledtheofficialpartyaccounts,aswellasthoseofthe
mainleaders.Forexample,inHanura,Wirantowouldsometimescontactthe
communicationsteamtoputupacertainmessage,butoftentimestheteamwould
postupdatesonhisbehalf,followingthedirectionsofthecampaignmanager.Linksto
televisioninterviewsandpositivemediaarticlesdominated,buttheteamalsoposted
messagesofgratitudetocitizensfortheirsupportandgenericstatementsaboutthe
politicalprioritiesoftheparty.43
Gerindrawasthemostpopularandprolificacrosssocialmedia,amassingover3
million‘likes’onitsofficialFacebooksiteandover180,000‘followers’onitsofficial
Twitterhandle.44Thepartypostedregularlyinthelead‐uptothelegislativeelections,
linkingtoarticlesaboutGerindraanddisplayingphotosofitsleadersinaction.45The
Twitteraccountalsoprovidedoneoftheonlyup‐to‐datesourcesofinformation
regardingwhenandwherepoliticalrallieswouldbeheld.46Similarly,Nasdem’s
Twitteraccount,withover25,000followers,linkedtonewsarticlesabouttheparty,
42InterviewwithGerindrapartyofficial,28May2013.
43InterviewwithHanuramediaadvisor,17February2013.
44Thesefigureswerecorrectasof2May2014.
45Gerindra’ssocialmediaactivityincreasedafterthelegislativeelectionasPrabowolaunched
hispresidentialcampaign.
46TheauthorusedTwittertokeeptrackoftheralliesorganisedbytheDPPduringtheofficial
campaignperiod.
133
aswellasprovidingdetailsofrallies.47WhileitdidhaveapresenceonFacebook,this
wasmostlyaforumforuserstopostopinionsaboutNasdemratherthanamedium
forpropagatinginformation.Activityonthepageincreasedduringthepresidential
campaign,inwhichNasdemultimatelybackedJokowi‐JusufKalla.48Hanuraalsohad
activeFacebookandTwitteraccounts,withover500,000and11,000followers
respectively,thoughtheywerenotupdatedasoftenasthoseofGerindraandNasdem.
Hanura’sonlineactivityalsointensifiedintheweeksleadingupto9April2014but
droppedoffaftertheofficialelectoralresultswereannounced.
EmergingpartiesalsomadeuseofYouTubetopostvideosrelatingtotheir
campaigns.YouTubeeffectivelyprovidedafree‐of‐chargeonlinedepositoryforopen‐
accessadvertisingmaterial.Clipspostedbythepartiesduringthelegislativeelection
campaignaimedtoportrayapositivepartyimageoverall,unlikevideoclipspostedin
thelead‐uptothepresidentialelections,whichhadaclearfocusoncandidates.One
exampleoftheuseofviralvideocampaigningwasGerindra’s‘MasGaruda’series,
whichfeaturedasuper‐herolikefiguredressedinaneaglemaskaddressingvarious
politicalissuesincludingcorruptionand‘voteselling’(votersacceptingbribesfrom
candidates).49TheofficialGerindraYouTubechannelcontainedavarietyofother
videosonthetopicofcorruption.Theseincludedtitlessuchas‘Prabowo:whatwill
happenifweallowcorruptiontocontinue?’(GerindraTV2013b),‘Prabowo’s
struggle:anIndonesiafreefromcorruption’(GerindraTV2013a)and‘Prabowo:At
thistimethegovernmentsystemisweak,inefficientandcorrupt’(GerindraTV
2013c).Hanura’sofficialYouTubechanneloperatesunderthename‘Wiranto
Channel’.WhileHanura’schannelhadfewervideosthanthatofGerindra,itfeatured
similarclipsemphasizingHanura’scommitmenttobeingclean.Forexample,itposted
anineminuteillustratedvideoentitled‘YourConscienceEradicatesCorruption’
(Hanura2013b),explainingthelinkbetweencorruptionandtheothersocialills
facingIndonesia.50
47Thesefigureswerecorrectasof2May2014.
48Nasdemwasquicktodeclaretheir‘unconditional’supportforthepresidentialcandidate
Jokowiandhisrunningmate,JusufKalla,releasinganofficialstatementon14May2014
(Hutasoit2014).Hanurafollowed,declaringtheirbackingforthepairon17May2014
(RuqoyahandAnsyari2014).
49ThefullrangeofvideoscanbefoundattheMasGarudaYouTubechannel:
https://www.youtube.com/user/MasGaruda.
50Nasdemdidnothaveanactive,party‐runchannelonYouTube;however,advertisements
andspeechesbypartyleaderswerepostedbyindividualNasdemmembersanddistrictoffices
andwere,therefore,availableonline.Mediaoutletsalsopostedsomeinterviewsandnews
storiesfeaturingNasdemleaders,suchasSuryaPalohandPatriceRioCapella.
134
Conclusion
Emergingpartiesacknowledgedtherisksofusingananti‐corruptionsymbolintheir
electioncampaignsbutchosetodosoanyway.Whiletheyidentifiedthesesymbolsas
vote‐gettersthatwerepopularwithvoters,thelackofhesitationinadoptingthem
suggeststhatpartiesonlysuperficiallyconsideredtheserisks,judgingthatanti‐
corruptionsymbolswouldbackfireonlyifthepartylaterbecameembroiledina
corruptionscandal.Underscoringtheneedtoremaincleanandensurethatparty
membersdidnothingtojeopardizetheparty’sreputation,thesepartiessimply
threatenedtoexpelanyoneaccusedofcorruptionandhopedthattheirmembers
wouldupholdpartyvalues.
Assessingthisstrategyintermsofthebenefitsofusingsalientissues,emerging
partiesneeddonothingtopromotetheimportanceofcorruptionasaseriouspolitical
concern.Giventheongoingattentioncorruptionscandalsreceivedbetween2009and
2014,aswellasitslongpoliticalhistorysincecolonialtimes,emergingpartiesdidnot
needtoconvincevotersthatcorruptionwasbad,oreventhatitwasprevalent—both
wereobvioustocitizens.Ascorruptionwasalreadyastockpoliticalplot,issue
priming,whichcanbedifficultandtimeconsuming,wassimplynotrequired.What
partiesdidneedtodowasconvincevotersthattheywerethemostcommittedto
addressingcorruptioninIndonesia,moresothanallotherpoliticalrivals.Assuch,
partieshadtoconstructanarrativethatcasttheminapositivelightwhilevilifying
otherparties.
Tothisend,emergingpartiesusednon‐relationalchannelstohighlightcorruption
casesandthefailingsofthegovernment,hopingtodemonstratethatcurrentpolitical
eliteswereinsincereintheiranti‐corruptionpromises.Moreover,newparties
developedtheirownanti‐corruptionsymbolthroughmasternarrativesaround
corruptionissues.Throughthisnarrative,partiescouldcapitalizeonthemoral
discontentofvotersandcasttheproblemasoneofgoodversusevil.Havingalready
outlinedthefailingsofolderpartiesandtheneedforchangeintheirparty
manifestos,otherpartypublicationsreinforcedtherhetoricofemergingpartiesof
beingcleanerandmorecommittedtobuildingabettercountry,freefromcorruption.
Duringtheelectioncampaign,thesemessageswereaugmentedandfurthermarketed
throughcoverageofpartyleadersinthemediaaswellasthroughmoretraditional
articlesandadvertisingformats.The2014electioncampaignalsosawariseinthe
135
useofonlinecommunicationtoreachouttovoters,appealingparticularlytomiddle
andupperclassvoterswithreadyaccesstotheinternet.
Inspiteofthesecampaignefforts,emergingpartiesdidnotachievetheirstated
electoralgoalsanditmayappearthatthecampaignssimplyfailedtoinspirethe
publicsupportthatemergingpartieshadhopedfor.Thisfailure,however,cannotbe
putdowntothefailureofnon‐relationalcampaigning.Whilethesecampaignswere
costlyandintendedtoswayvotersacrossthecountry,theywerefarfromtheonly
inputreceivedbyvoters.Whilecampaignsatthenationallevelweredesignedto
constructtheanti‐corruptionsymbol,thisremaineddifficulttoreconcilewiththe
experiencesofvotersintownsandvillagesacrossthearchipelago.Inorderto
understandthelatter,itisnecessarytoconsiderhowpartysymbolsweresoldto
voterswithinthemulti‐scalarframeworkinwhichcampaignsoperated.An
examinationofhowpartiescampaignednationallycanonlyanswerquestionsabout
whatthepartiesdid,nothowvotersrespondedtopartyattemptstoowntheissueof
anti‐corruption.Asexpensiveorexpansiveasthesenationalpoliticalcampaigns
were,theinfluenceofindividualcandidatesremainedparamountinlegislative
electionsinIndonesia.Thenextchapterexploresthreecasestudiesofindividual
candidatesfromeachoftheemergingpartiesandexamineshowtheypersonally
interpretedandpresentedtheanti‐corruptionsymbolthattheirpartieswereso
desperatetoown.
136
ChapterFive
Candidatesonthecampaigntrail
Whilepoliticalpartiesundertakenationalcampaignstoattractsupport,individual
candidatesstillplayanintegralroleincampaigning,bothforthemselvesandtheir
parties.Mostcandidatesstillcampaigninpersonatthelocallevel,hopingtouse
relationalchannelstowinvotes,ratherthansimplyrelyingonthepopularityofthe
partytoensuretheirsuccess.Relyingonpartyreputationisinsufficient,notleast
becausetheopenpartylistsystemmeansthatthepartycandidatethatgarnersthe
mostpersonalvoteswillwinoffice.1Underthissystem,theimportanceofindividual
campaignsisparamount,ascandidatescompetenotonlyagainstthosefromother
parties,butalsoagainstothercandidatesfromtheirownparty.2Giventhatthe
electionsforthenational,provincialanddistrictparliaments,andtheDPD,occur
concurrently,votersareexposedtothenamesandfacesofhundredsofpolitical
hopefuls,placingcandidatesunderadditionalpressuretostandoutfromthecrowd.3
Furthermore,Aspinall(2014a:96‐97)arguesthattheintroductionoftheopenparty
listsystemhasledtoanincreaseinmoneypoliticsasvotersbecomemorepragmatic
inassessingcandidates‐assessingthemontheirabilitytodelivercashorgoods
ratherthantheirpoliticalideals.
Thischapterdrawsonclosestudiesofthreeemergingpartycandidates,representing
Hanura,GerindraandNasdemrespectively.4AllwerecandidatesfortheDPR‐RIand
1AsnotedintheIntroduction,inthepast,politicalpartiesrankedandnumberedtheir
candidatesandvoteswereallocatedaccordingtoacandidate’splaceonthepartylist.From
2004,voterscouldopttovoteforaparticularindividualandtheremaybeuptoten
candidatesfromanygivenpartycontestingaparticularelectorate,correspondingwiththe
numberofseatsavailabletobewon(Sherlock2004).
2Theinfluenceofthepartylistsystemcanalsobeseenintheshiftofallegiancefromtrade
unioncandidatestopartycandidatesinelections(Carawayetal.2014).Previously,candidates
withstrongunionlinkswererecruitedbypoliticalpartiesas‘vote‐getters’andplacedbelow
partycadresinordertoboosttheparty’soverallvote.Someunioncandidatessuspectedthat
inthe2009electionpartyofficialsbribedelectoralofficerstoreallocatevotesintendedfor
themtocandidateshigheronthepartylist.Forfurtherdiscussionofthisrelationship,see
CarawayandFord(2014).
3Mietzner(2013:121)touchesonthisissueinhisdiscussionoftheneedfornational
candidatestohavegoodrelationswithdistrictbranchesinordertobettercompeteagainst
rivalsinelections.However,whilethepointiswidelyaccepted,theinfluenceoftheopenparty
listvotingsystemuponintra‐partycompetitioninIndonesiaisasyetunderstudied.
4Informationwasgatheredviainterviewsandparticipantobservationconductedfrom2013–
2014.AsdiscussedintheIntroduction,thisparticipantobservationwas‘moderate’.I
attemptedtobalancemyrolesasanoutsider(Ididnotjoinanypoliticalpartyoroffersupport
inanyformtoapartyoritscampaign)andinsider(Itravelled,ate,socializedwith,andstayed
inthesameaccommodationasmysubjectswhileinthefield,whichallowedmetodevelopa
137
werethefirst‐rankedcandidatesonthepartylistintheirelectorate,butdifferedin
termsofgenderandexperience.TheHanuracandidateobservedinEastJavawas
female,whiletheothertwocandidates,inSouthSulawesiandNorthSumatra,were
male.TheGerindracandidateinNorthSumatrawasanincumbentwhiletheother
twowerenot.TheSouthSulawesiNasdemcandidatewasaformerDPR‐RI
parliamentarianwhoresignedin2013afterchangingparties.5
Inthe2014legislativeelections,thesecandidateswereinfluencedtodifferentextents
bythenatureoftheirrelationshipswithcentral,provincialandlocalparty
committees.6NominationsfortheDPR‐RIcandidateswereregisteredandapproved
bythecentralcommittee,whichalsodeterminedthecandidate’srankingontheparty
list.However,ontheground,candidatescampaignedalongsidefellowparliamentary
hopefulsfromthenational,provincialanddistrictlevelsoflegislature.Thisprovided
scopeforbothcooperationandfurthercontestation.Furthermore,acandidate’s
relationshipwiththecentralcommitteeaffectedtheresourcestheyreceived.
Althoughthecasestudiespresentedhereareallbasedontheexperiencesoffirst‐
rankedcandidateswithclosetiestothecentralofficeinJakarta—boththeNasdem
andGerindracandidateswereinvolvedintheirparties’centralcommittees,whilethe
Hanuracandidatehadlongworkedintheaccountsdepartmentoftheparty’scentral
office—theyreceiveddifferentlevelsofcentralsupport.
Candidatesfacedmanydecisionsinoperatingtheirowncampaigns.Withthe
autonomytodecidehowmuchmoneytheyspent,whotheyemployedandhowthey
campaigned,theywereabletodrawuponsymbolschosenbythecentralcommittee,
createtheirownsymbols,or,iftheydecidedthatcampaignsymbolsandrhetoric
werenotuseful,theycouldinsteadchoosetobribevoters.Candidatescouldevenopt
tomobilizeanti‐corruptionsymbolismandpayforvotesiftheywished(Aspinall
leveloftrustwiththemasthecampaignsprogressed).ThroughoutthischapterIhave
referencedthespecificdateofinterviewswhererelevant,butnotwherecommentshavebeen
madethatappliedtothecampaigningeneral.InthesecasesIhaveindicatedwhetherthe
commentwasmadeattheoutset,duringthemiddle,ortowardstheendofthecampaignin
ordertoproviderelevantcontextforstatements.
5DPR‐RImembersarevotedinaspartyrepresentatives.Assuch,ifamemberoptstoleave
theirparty,theymustalsoresignfromtheirpositionasamemberofparliament.
6InteractionbetweenDPR‐RIcandidatesandtheprovincialbranchofficewasleastevident.
Whilecandidatesknewtheprovincialpartyleadership,nonewerecampaigninginprovincial
capitalareasandthereforetheydidnotcooperateorcoordinatecloselywithlocalleaders.
However,thesenationalcandidatesdidhaveindividualrelationshipswithspecificprovincial
candidateswithwhomtheycampaignedintandem.
138
2014b;MuhajirForthcoming).7Theextenttowhichtheindividualcandidatesstudied
hereusedanti‐corruptionsymbolsdependedmainlyonhowtheywishedtopresent
themselvestothepublic,whichinturnwaslargelydictatedbytheirownhistoryand
idealsandthoseoftheirtargetaudience.Eachcandidatestressedininitialinterviews
theimportanceofcombatingcorruptionandatotalrejectionofmoneypoliticsand
vote‐buying.Byfollowingtheprogressionofthethreecampaignsfromtheir
commencementduringthefirsthalfof2013throughtotheelectionon9April2014,I
wasabletocomparehowcandidateswereinfluencedbyexternalfactors.8The
candidatesrespondeddifferentlytothepressuresplacedonthembytheirpartiesand
voters:theHanuracandidateseeminglyacquiescedtodemandsforgoodsandmoney
andbegantodownplayanti‐corruptionsymbols,theNasdemcandidatebecameeven
moreferventinhisanti‐corruptionandanti‐vote‐buyingrhetoric,whiletheGerindra
candidatemaintainedasteadycourseinhisuseofanti‐corruptionsymbols.
Hanura,EastJava
WhenIfirstmettheHanuracandidateinOctober2012,shewasintheplanning
stagesofherbidforpartynomination.9Asthedaughterofapreviousmemberofthe
MPRselectedbyformerPresidentSuharto,shehadworkedforthepartysinceits
inception,havingknownandrespectedthepartyfounder,Wiranto,forsometime.As
sheexplainedit,herfatherhadbeeninthemilitaryatthesametimeasWirantoand
theywerefriends,andthiswashowshemethim.Herinitialmotivationforjoining
thepartywashersupportforWiranto’spresidentialbid.ShedescribedWirantoas
‘patientandwise’,andbelievedhecouldleadIndonesia‘backontothetrackof
Reformasi’.HersupportforWiranto’spresidentialbidwas,therefore,animportant
motivationforbecomingaHanuracandidate,ratherthanaparticularaffinitywiththe
party’sideologyorplatform.Herimpetusforrunningforofficealsostemmedfrom
herfamilyhistory—shehadobservedandadmiredherfather’sworkwhenhewasa
7Forexample,duringapresentationonvote‐buyinginIndonesia,Aspinall(2014b)relayedan
anecdoteaboutaPANcandidateinRembang,CentralJava,whosentouttwosetsofenvelopes
tovoters.Hedistributed12,000envelopestomiddleclassvoterswithananti‐corruption
messageenclosedand15,000envelopestoothervoterswithmoneyinside.Inanother
example,Muhajir(Forthcoming:203‐204)discussesthecampaignofsomePKScandidatesin
SouthKalimantan,describingthatwhilecandidatesmadeashowofrefusingtobuyvotes,
thereweresuspicionsthatsomecandidatesdidsoinspiteofthisrhetoric.
8SeetheIntroductionforthedefinitionof‘campaignperiod’adoptedinthisstudy.
9Hanuraopenednominationsforcandidatesatthenational(DPR‐RI),provincial(DPRDI)and
district(DPRDII)levelsinNovember2012,withfinalcandidatelistssubmittedtotheKPUin
March2013.TheKPUwasthenresponsibleforensuringthatcandidatesmetallthenecessary
eligibilitycriteriaforparticipationinthe2014election.Theconfirmedlistofapproved
candidateswasreleasedbytheKPUinMay2013.
139
parliamentarian.Thecandidatedid,however,highlightanumberofissuesthatshe
supportedthatwerepartofHanura’simage‐building,includingitsstanceagainst
corruption.ShestatedthatWirantohadidentifiedanti‐corruptionasapartypriority,
bothformaintainingHanura’sintegrityandinpresentingitselfasanalternativeto
thecurrentleadership,whichHanuraclaimedwasthoroughlycorrupt.10
Attheoutsetofthecampaign,theHanuracandidatemadeitclearthatshebelieved
thatbeing‘clean’wasveryimportantfortheparty’scampaign.Shecontendedthat
thefundamentalaimofthefightagainstcorruptionwastoimprovethelivesof
ordinarypeopleandthateradicatingcorruptionwouldalsoalleviatepovertyin
Indonesia.ThecandidateacknowledgedthatitwascrucialthatHanuramaintainits
anti‐corruptionreputationbecausethisdifferentiateditfromtheotherparties.For
her,theanti‐corruptionsymbolprovidedapointofdifference,andthepartywouldbe
atriskifthissymbolwasco‐optedbycandidateswhothenengagedincorruptionand
briberytowinseats.Becauseanti‐corruptionsymbolismgavethepartyacrucial
advantage,ensuringthatHanura’sreputationwasupheldbypartymembersand
politicalaspirantswasapartypriority.TheHanuracandidatewasadamantthatshe
wasagainstbuyingvotesandusingbribes.11
However,whilethecandidatefeltthatcombatingcorruptionwasbothaparty
priorityandusefulforherowncampaign,shewasapprehensiveaboutexplicitly
usingtheterm‘anti‐corruption’.DuringmyfirstsitevisittoherelectorateinMarch
2013,shediscussedconcernsabouttheterminologyusedinhercampaignmaterials
atsomelength.Someofhercampaignteamwereworriedaboutusingtheterm‘anti‐
corruption’,andsuggestedthatthecandidateinsteadusetheword‘clean’—theterm
usedintheparty’sofficialslogan.Presentingherselfas‘clean’,ratherthanasbeing
‘anti‐corruption’,waspreferableasitwasseenasamoreencompassingterm.Itcould
refertoanumberofhercharacteristics,suchascomingfromamodestbackground,
beinghonestandhard‐working.Thecandidateandtheteamagreedthattheterm
10ThisstatementwasreiteratedinanumberofpublicpresentationsmadebyWiranto.For
example,inhisinitialspeechespresentedinearly2013,therewererepeatedreferencesto
Hanurabeingthe‘cleanest’partyinIndonesia(2013a;2013b).Thisclaimwasframedas
legitimizingHanura’sclaimtopower,centringonitsdistinctionfromthecurrentleadership,
whichitclaimedwascorruptanduntrustworthy—aclaimthatWirantofeltHanuracould
affordtomakegiventhatitremainedinoppositionthroughoutthe2009‐2014termandhad
noparliamentariansaccusedofcorruptionduringthisperiod.
11Itwaspossibletospeculate,though,thatshetookthisstancebecauseshefeltshehadless
fundingtodrawonthanseveralofhercompetitors.Evenifshehadwantedtofloutparty
symbolsandgivemoneyforvotes,shesimplycouldnotcompetewithwealthiercandidates.
140
‘anti‐corruption’hadbeentaintedbyitsuseinthe2009election,whenthe
DemocraticPartyused‘saynotocorruption!’asitsnationalcampaignslogan.The
Hanuracandidatewantedtoavoidanyparallelsbetweenthetwocampaigns,given
thesubsequentfateoftheDemocrats.
Duringtheearlystagesofcampaignplanning,theHanuracandidateoftentalkedof
herintentiontoconductacleancampaign,regardlessofthesedebatesover
terminologyandtheidentifiedrisksofusingsuchsymbolism.Shehadrunforofficein
2009andthereforeknewthatshelackedthecapitaltoeffectivelyusevote‐buyingto
winoffice.Thecandidatealsofeltthatvote‐buyingwasnotonlyexpensive,buthadan
uncertainreturn.Therewasnomeansforensuringthatpeopleactuallyvotedasthey
saidtheywouldandnorecourseifvoterstookthemoneybutvotedforsomeoneelse.
Instead,sheplannedtofocusuponbuildingapositiveimageassomeonecommitted
topublicwelfarewhilesupplementinghercampaignrhetoricwith‘charitableworks’,
suchaspurchasingnewequipmentforthecommunitymosque,donatingtolocal
schools,andbankrollingentertainmentevents.12Inadditiontogivingmoneytosuch
causes,thecandidateoftensubsidizedthecostsoffood,tea,cigarettesandtransport
forvillagerswhohadtravelledtoattendmeetings(whichthecandidateoften
referredtobytheArabic‐derivedtermsilaturrahmi,meaninggroupdiscussionsthat
areintendedtobuildfraternityoraffectionforapersonoranidea).Paymentswere
sometimesinkind,andsometimesinsmallamountsofcashthat(atleastintheory)
compensatedpeoplefortheirtimeandeffortinattending.
TheHanuracandidatedidnotconsidersmallgiftsandothergratuitiestobeaformof
moneypolitics.13Thesegiftsweresecondarytohermainaimofgeneratingsupport
bymeetingvoterspersonally,andherprimarycampaignstrategyrevolvedaround
villagevisits.Whiletimeconsuming,thisapproachcircumventedthebanonmass
ralliesoutsidetheofficialcampaignperiod.TheHanuracandidatestatedthatshewas
followingJokowi’sstrategyofblusukan,whichinvolvedwalkingthroughvillagesand
12ObservationofconversationsbetweentheHanuracandidate,herstaffandotherparty
membersshowedthatthiscandidatehadpurchasednewsoundsystemsforlocalmosques,
refurbishedthewashingareaatlocalmosques,providedfemalestudentsatalocalIslamic
boardingschool(pesantren)withnewheadscarves,rancolouring‐incompetitionsatlocal
primaryschoolswithsmallcashprizesforwinners,purchasednewpercussioninstruments
foralocalmartialartsgroupandfundedashadowpuppet(wayang)performance.
13Aspinall(2014a:104)foundthattherewereanumberofcommonlydistributedgiftsduring
campaigns,rangingfromtokensbearingthepartylogoandthecandidate’spicture,religious
giftssuchasprayermatsorheadscarvestobasicfoodstuffs,whichwerecommonlydelivered
bythecandidate’scampaignteamratherthanthecandidatesthemselves.
141
talkingtopeopleintheirownenvironments,andhadprovenpopularduringhis
tenureasbothmayorofSoloandgovernorofJakarta.TheHanuracandidateargued
that,asmanyJavanesevillagersstilldidnotuseTwitterorFacebook,campaigning
throughsocialmediawasbetterdirectedtowardsurbanvoters.Eventelevisionand
printmediacampaigns,shecontended,werenotguaranteedtoreachmanyofthe
ruralconstituentsandsocouldbeawasteofmoney.Shethereforeoptedtovisither
potentialconstituentswhereshecouldpresentherself,answerquestionsandhand
outtrinkets,t‐shirtsorfood.
Thesevisits,whichwereusuallysetupinadvancebyhercampaignteam(often
referredtoinIndonesiaastimsukses),variedinnature.14Sometimestheywerebrief
andconfinedtomeetingswithvillageleadersandothertimestheyweregatherings
attendedbyupto50people.TheHanuracandidatewouldusuallyintroduceherself,
highlightherlinkstotheareaandthefactthatshehadfamilythere,anddiscussher
educationalbackground(sheheldaMaster’sDegreeandtaughtatauniversityin
Jakarta).Shealsoattemptedtoengagewithvillagersinordertodiscovertheir
‘aspirations’(aspirasi),hopingtobuildtrustwithvillagersbyseeminginterestedin
andempathetictowardstheirproblems.Thisstrategymetwithdifferentdegreesof
success.Sometimestherewasdialoguebetweenthecandidateandtheattendees,but
onotheroccasionsattendeeswereunresponsive.Shewassometimesmetwith
requestsformoneyorservicestothevillage.Shewasdisappointedbythese
experiences.Onotheroccasionsshesuspectedthattheunresponsivenesswasdueto
thefactthatthevillagehadalreadybeen‘bought’byanothercandidateandwas
irritatedwithhercampaignteamforsettingupapointlessmeeting.
Inspiteofherfrustrations,theHanuracandidatecontinuedtovisitvillagesandmeet
withvotersintheseforum‐styleevents.Sometimesshewenttofivevillagesinone
day,focusingparticularlyonthoseinmoreremoteareasthatwereunlikelytohave
beenvisitedbyotherparliamentaryhopefuls.Herpersonalphilosophywasbasedon
anoldIndonesiansaying:‘Ifyoudon’tknowthem,youcan’tlovethem’.Inmyearliest
interviewwithher,shearguedthatapoliticalpartycouldnotexpectsupportwithout
beingtrusted,orhavinga‘mandate’(amanat)fromvoters.Talkingtopeoplein
personwas,tohermind,thebestwaytobuildthistrust.Shealsoidentifiedthisasa
pointofdifferencebetweenHanuraandotherparties—Hanuracandidateswere
14‘Timsukses’hasalsobeentranslatedliterallyas‘campaignteam’intheworkofscholars
suchasAspinall(2014c:546)andMietzner(2013).
142
willingtogotovillagesandengagewithordinaryvoters,unlikeofficialsfromother
partieswhoweretoo‘arrogant’(sombong)todoso.
TheHanuracandidatefocusedparticularlyongainingaccesstocommunitiesthrough
twowomen’sgroups:theFamilyWelfareDevelopment(PembinaanKesejahteraan
Keluarga,PKK),alocallybasedmothers’associationwhichwasestablishedduringthe
Suhartoperiodandusuallyrunbythewifeofthevillagehead,15andJemaahTalil,an
Islamicdevotionalgroupwherewomengathertosing/recitepassagesfromthe
Qur’an.Sheconcentratedonwomenfortworeasons.First,thecandidatebelieved
thatwomenoftenfeelignoredbyparliamentarycandidatesand,therefore,were
morelikelytovaluesomeoneshowinganinterestintheirconcerns.Second,the
candidatesaidthatshesometimesfoundmenirritatingandcondescending.During
hermeetingswithwomen’sgroups,shewouldemphasize‘women’sspirit’(semangat
perempuan)asareasonforvotingforher,arguingthatwomenunderstandeach
other’sproblemsandafemalecandidatewasmorelikelytosympathizewiththeir
priorities.
Intheearlystagesofcampaigning,theHanuracandidateusedmeetingswithcitizens
toexpressHanura’spartylineoncorruptionandvote‐buying—namely,thatasking
formoneypromotes‘low‐qualityleadership’(pemimpinyangkurangberkualitas).
Thisargumentwasbasedontwocontentions.First,ifacandidatehaspaidmoneyto
gaintheirpositionthentheywillhavespentlargeamountsofmoneyduringthe
campaign,whichwillthenneedtoberecoupedonceinoffice.Second,ifacandidate
haspaidvotersfortheirpositionthentheyhavenoresponsibilitytovotersonce
electedbecausevotershavealreadybeencompensated.Thisideawasadvancedto
discouragecitizensfromaskingfororexpectingmoneyinreturnforvotes.Italso
echoedargumentsusedbytheparty’scentralleadership,playingupontheparty’s
cleanreputationanditspurporteddesiretoremainfreefromcorruption.Shealso
usedthisargumenttoemphasizetheirloyaltytovoters—thefactthatshedidnot
offermoneywasademonstrationofherlong‐termcommitmentbecausesheintended
todeliverbenefitstocitizensbydoingagoodjobasaparliamentarian.16
15FormoreonthehistoryandworkofPKK,seeMarcoes(2002).
16Forexample,shehaddeclaredtoanumberofvillagersduringdifferentmeetingsthat‘You
shouldn’tsellyourselvessocheaply’andhadsuggestedthattheydeserved‘morethanRp.
20,000orRp.50,000foryourvotes’.
143
ThecandidatechosetoadoptHanura’sofficialslogan—clean,caring,decisive(bersih,
peduli,tegas)—asherownsloganduringthecampaign.Thiswassignificant,because
Hanuracandidatesweregivenautonomyindesigningallaspectsoftheircampaigns,
includingalltheirpublicitymaterials.Therewasnodirectivefromthecentralparty
officerequiringtheuseofaparticularsloganorformat.Assuch,candidateshad
controlovertheimagetheywishedtoportray.Thisparticularcandidategavea
numberofreasonsforchoosingtodirectlyalignherselfwithnationalpartysymbols.
First,shebelievedthatinusingtheofficialpartysloganandpicturesofWirantoon
someofhermoreprominentadvertisements(suchaslargebillboards);shewas
aligningherselfascloselyaspossiblewiththevaluesofthepartyandthefigureof
Wirantohimself.Shesawthisasbeingamajordraw‐card,explainingthatoneofthe
mainreasonswhypeoplewouldchooseHanurawasbecausetheysupported
Wiranto’spresidentialbid.Second,asacandidatewhowasneitherindependently
wealthynorwishingtogointodebt,shefelttheargumentthatbuyingvotes
promotedapoorlevelofparliamentaryrepresentationwasoneshecouldusetoher
advantage.Third,shealsomentionedthatitwasaclaimthatcouldbesupported,
citingasurveyundertakeninMarch2013thatnamedHanurathecleanestpolitical
partyinIndonesia.17
Despiteherinitialrejectionofvote‐buyingasastrategy,theHanuracandidatecame
underincreasingpressuretopaycashtovillagersinreturnfortheirvotesasthe
electionneared.Thispressurecamechieflyfrommembersofhercampaignteam.
Respondingtointernalpollingdoneinthesecondhalfof2013thatsuggestedshe
wouldnotsecuresufficientvotesforelection,somewithinhercampaignteamurged
theuseofcashpayments,especiallytovillageheadsorrespectedfigures(tokoh)who
couldpromiseanumberofvotesinreturnforthemoney.18Manymembersofher
campaignteamwhohadworkedonvariousotherelections,eitherthenational
electionin2009orotherlocalelections,arguedthatmoneywastheonlywayto
securevotesinthearea.Becausevote‐buyingwassuchaprominentstrategyinEast
Java,someteammemberswereconcernedthatifsherefusedtooffercashthenshe
hadnochanceofsuccessasitwasassumedthatseveralrivalcandidateswoulddoso.
17SeeChapterThreeforsurveydetails.
18Peoplecapableofrallyingvotesaresometimesreferredtoas‘brokers’.Thecampaignteam
isusuallycomprisedofatleastsomevotebrokers,peopleofinfluencewhoclaimtobeableto
persuadeotherstovoteforaparticularcandidate.Thephenomenonofusingbrokerswas
widespreadin2014andbrokerswieldedsignificantinfluenceovercampaignsandtheir
successfuloutcomes(Aspinall2014c).
144
Asoneteammemberputit,‘Ithelpsifpeoplelikeyou…Butit’shard[towin]if
someoneelseisofferingthemmoney’.
ThesesuggestionsconcernedtheHanuracandidate,whowastornbetweenherdesire
tomaintainherprinciplesandkeephercampaignbudgettoaminimumandhowbest
towin.Tofurthercomplicatematters,notallcampaignteammembersagreedthat
usingcashwasagoodidea.Mosthadnomoralobjectionstovote‐buying;rather,they
didnotbelieveitwouldbeaneffectivestrategyforher.Theyalsoreasonedthatshe
lackedthelocaltiesneededtowinusingmoney,asshewasanoutsiderfromJakarta.
Inshort,evenifshechosetoengageinvote‐buying,shecouldnotbecertainthat
thoseshepaidwouldactuallyvoteforher.Moreover,shehadalreadytoldvoters
duringmeetingsthataskingformoneyreflectedpoorlyonthemandwouldleadto
theelectionofleaderswhodidnotreallycareabouttheirneeds.Thesediscussions
highlightedatensionwithinhercampaignthatworsenedastheelectiondrewnearer.
WhiletheHanuracandidatefocusedherenergyonblusukan,shealsoadoptedother
commoncampaignstrategies.InAugust2013,afewmonthsintocampaigning,a
posko—akintoacampaignofficewherecitizenscancomeandtalktothecandidateor
theirteam—wassetup.Massrallieswereusedlaterduringtheofficialcampaign
period.Laterthatyear,shepurchasedspaceinsomelocalmediaoutletsand
organizedtohavepositivebiographicalpiecesaboutherpublished.19Thecandidate
lackedconnectionswithinthelocalmediaandfoundthatrivalcandidates,even
withinherownparty,hadmadedealswithcertainmediaoutletsthatmadeitdifficult
forhertoadvertiseinthem.Consequently,themediaoutletsshepaidweresmalland
hadlowcirculations.Atthebeginningof2014,theHanuracandidatealsosetup
FacebookandTwitteraccounts.Thoughshehadpreviouslystatedthatshewaswary
ofusingsocialmediainhercampaign,shenowsaidthatcandidateshadbeen
encouragedbythecentralofficetomakeuseoftheinternet,particularlysincemany
serviceswerefree.TheHanuracandidatewasnotespeciallytechnologicallysavvy,so
mostoftheFacebookupdates,tweetsandphotospostedwerehandledbyherstaff.
ThereweresomeoccasionswhentheHanuracandidatewasquizzeddirectlyby
audiencemembersaboutherowndedicationtoremainingcorruption‐free.Onone
19Thesewerefundedbytheparty.Thoughshehadbeenreluctanttopayformediastories
aboutherself,shehadreceivedmoneyfromthecentralofficespecificallytodoso.However,
thisparticularstrategywasnotoverlysuccessful.Whileonearticlewenttoprint,anotherdid
not,beingpurchasedinamagazinethatsubsequentlywentbankruptbeforetheelection.
145
suchoccasion,shewastoldnevertobecomelikeAngelinaSondakh,apoliticianwho
becameinfamousforherinvolvementincorruptionandeventuallyimprisoned,an
admonitionshereadilyagreedto.Othertimes,villagersrequestedpaymentsor
favours,implyingtheywerenecessaryforhertowintheirvotes.Veiledrequestsfora
‘contribution’(kontribusi)tothevillagewerenotunusualandearlyinhercampaign
theHanuracandidatewouldtrytoexplainwhyshecouldnotprovideanything.
Shearguedthatthiscouldbeseenasatypeofvote‐buyingandevenifshecould
affordit,itwouldstillbewrong.Forexample,duringonemeetinginMarch2014she
wasaskedtocontributemoneytoaPKKtostartanewtrainingprogram.Sherefused,
sayingthatunfortunatelyshecouldnotdothisbecauseshewasafraidpeoplewould
thinkshewasbuyingtheirvotes.Latersheexpressedannoyanceattherequestasshe
believedthatthevillagewasfairlywelloffandthewomendidnotreallyneedtraining
andwerejustfishingformoney.Onyetanotheroccasion,shewasaskedwhather
contributiontothevillagewouldbe.20Thecandidaterespondedbyassertingthat
candidateswhospendlotsofmoneyontheircampaignsandhavetogetloanswill
havetoresorttocorruptiontopaytheirdebtsbecausethesalariesof
parliamentariansarenotthatbig.Thisstatementwasinitiallywelcomedbythe
women’sgroupbeingaddressed,butthediscussionchangedcoursewhenadifferent
womanaskedifthecandidatemightconsiderdonatingmoneysotheycouldpurchase
newuniforms.Thisrequestwasdeflectedwiththerationalethatshewasaclean,
simplecandidatewhodidnothavelotsofmoneylikesomeofherrivalsandshecould
notaffordtocontributemuchmoney.Furthermore,shearguedthatifshebought
uniformsforonegroup,shewouldhavetobuythemforallgroups.Inmakingthis
statement,sheusedtheopportunitytohighlightthefactthatshewasnotacorrupt
candidate,andalsothatshehadasenseoffairness.However,afterleavingthe
meeting,sheexpressedirritationattherequestandsaidthatshefeltthatthewomen
wouldnotvoteforherbecausetheyhadnotreceivedanythingfromher.
Aftercampaigningforseveralmonths,thecandidatehadbecomecynicalaboutthe
motivesofvoters.Havingbeenrepeatedlyaskedforcontributions,bothsubtlyand
overtly,thecandidatebegantoexpressasenseofhopelessnessabouthercampaign
towardstheendof2013.Shebelievedthatpresentingherselfasacleanandhonest
candidatewasnotappealingtovotersbecausetheyweremoreinterestedinthe
materialbenefitsofferedbycandidates.Subsequently,theHanuracandidatereferred
20Thecandidateadoptedachidingtoneduringthisinteractionon6June2013butagreedto
contributeRp.500,000tothelocalmosque.
146
tothetopicofcorruptionlessandlessfrequently.Ifshewasaskedaboutitbya
villagershewouldmethodicallyrehashHanura’s‘tagline’(whichwasalsoherown)of
being‘clean,caringanddecisive’.However,evenwhengiventheopportunitytotalk
inmoredepthaboutbeing‘clean’,thecandidatedidnotchoosetofocusonthis
symbol.Theexplanationshegaveinvillagesaboutbeing‘clean’wasas
straightforwardassaying:‘ourpartywantshonestcandidatesandwon’ttolerate
memberswhoarenothonest…thatliketo“playgames”(main‐main)’.Inadifferent
villagesheexplainedbeing‘clean’asmeaning‘wedon’thavecandidateswhoare…
likethat(sepertigitu)’,butprovidednoelaboration.21Herdiscussionofthepartyand
itsstanceagainstcorruptionbecameincreasinglyvagueasherinterestinpromoting
herselfasbeingalignedwithHanura’santi‐corruptionsymboldiminished.
Astheelectionapproached,theHanuracandidate’sreferencestocorruption
diminishedsignificantly.Bythetimeoftheofficialcampaignperiod,shehad
developedaformulaicapproachtomeetingsthatofteninvolvedasimilar,rehearsed
introductionwhichincludednomentionofanyanti‐corruptionstance,eitherasan
individualorfromapartyperspective.EvenindiscussingHanura,herfocuswasupon
theparty’sleaderratherthanitsgoalsorpolicies.Bythisstage,theHanuracandidate
feltthatrhetoricwouldnotpersuadevotersandthemostimportantaspectofher
meetingswasprovidinginstructionsonhowtovote,includingwherehernamewas
ontheballotpaperandhowtoavoidcastinganinvalidvote.Sheevendevelopedatip
tohelpvotersrememberher.Sinceshewasthefirst‐rankedcandidateforHanura,
shesuggestedthatvotersthinkoftheshapeofanail,whichIndonesianvotersuseto
piercetheirballotpapers,asresemblinganumber‘1’toremindthemthatshewas
the‘number1’candidate.
Whileherfocusonanti‐corruptionsymbolsdiminishedoverthecourseofthe
campaign,thecandidate’sstrategicdonationstomosques,schoolandartsgroups,as
wellasfundingvillageworks,increased.TheHanuracandidatebecameless
concernedaboutupholdinga‘clean’symbolandincreasedcontributions,eventhough
shewasuncomfortableaboutthem.Usually,membersofhercampaignteamwould
scoutareastofindinstitutionsorschoolsthatcouldbenefitfromadditionalfundsand
thennegotiatewiththeleadersoftheareastoarrangeadonationinreturnfor
electoralsupport.Alternatively,theywouldapproachlocalfiguresandaskthemhow
21Thesecommentswerebothmadeonthesameday(11March2014)whenthecandidate
visitedfourdifferentvillages.
147
thecandidatecouldhelpthevillage—thatis,towhatpurposecouldshedonate
money.22Thecandidate’sdiscomfortwiththesetransactionsreflectedthefactthat
shesawthisasagreyareaandwasworriedabouthowheractionswouldbe
perceivedbyonlookers.Whiledonationscouldbejustifiedasactsofcharity,ifthey
weregivenwiththeintentiontoinfluencevoting,thenthiswas,technically,illegal.
Thecandidatewaswaryofherbudgetlimitations,andsoughttostrategicallydonate
formaximumreturn.Abigbudget,sheasserted,providedadistinctadvantagewhen
campaigningbecauseitcouldfundseveraldifferentprojectsandifonegroupdidnot
voteforyou,othergroupswould.Shecouldnotafforddonationsthatdidnotresultin
votes.OnedonationmadebytheHanuracandidatewastoalocaltraditionalmartial
arts(pencaksilat)groupwhoperformedatpublicevents.Therationalebehindthis
donationwasthatitwouldgivehertiestothegroup,enablinghertoaskthemto
performatherfunctionswhentheofficialcampaignperiodbegan.However,other
donationsappearedtobelesssuccessful.Shemadeasubstantialdonationtoan
Islamicboardingschool(pesantren).However,duringalatermeetingwiththe
school’sleader,theHanuracandidatewasdisappointedtofindthattheschooland
villagewereflyingbannersandflagsfromanotherpoliticalparty.Thepreacher
explainedthatthevillagechiefhadafamilymembercompetingintheelectionand
therewasnothinghecoulddoaboutthebanners.Afterthemeeting,thecandidate
expressedherfrustrationthatherdonationappearednottohavegarneredthe
influenceshehadhopedforandworriedthatshehadwastedhercampaignfunds.On
anotheroccasion,theHanuracandidateagreedtouseherownmoneytofinancethe
provisionofanewpipingsystemforavillageinreturnfortheirsupport.Atthetime,
thecandidatejustifiedtheupfrontdonationasagoodstrategybecausepeoplewere
usedtounfulfilledpromisesfrompoliticians.
Anothercommoncampaignstrategywastoteamupwithothercandidatesfromthe
samepartywhowerecompetingatotherparliamentarylevels.Thisisoftenreferred
tousingtheEnglishword‘tandem’,meaningtocampaigntogether,sometimeswith
namesappearingonthesamepostersorbanners,andsharingthecostofrallies.In
thisEastJavaelectorate,therehadbeenmuchin‐fightingbetweenlocalcandidates,
precipitatedbycontestednominationsandrankingsonthepartylist.TheHanura
candidateherselfhaddisplacedasittingparliamentarian,whowasmovedtoanother
22Thelanguageusedwhendiscussingthistopicwaseuphemistic.Nooneeverreferredtothis
processas‘vote‐buying’.Thepaymentswerealwaysreferredtovaguelyas‘contributions’or
‘donations’(donasi).
148
electorate.Thishadcausedconsternationandfactionalism,astheincumbenthad
severalfamilymembersinthepartywhodisagreedwiththepartylistrankings.This
frictionalienatedthecandidatefromsomefactionswithintheparty.However,asthe
electiondatedrewcloseritbecameevidentthatHanurawaspollingpoorlyandthat
cooperationwasneededifthepartywastowinanyseatsatall.Thispromptedthe
HanuracandidatetoreachouttocandidatesattheDPRDII(district)level.She
alreadyhadsometandemagreementswithothercandidatesinplace,buttheywere
lowlyrankedandpoorlyfunded.Thecandidateneededtofindamorelucrative
tandemarrangementthroughwhichtobetterpromoteherselfduringthecruciallast
weeksofcampaigning.Sheenteredintoanarrangementwithanincumbentwho
camefromawealthyfamilyandhadahighprofileinherdistrict.Throughthis
arrangementshewasabletopiggybackonabetter‐fundedcampaign,butwasalso
expectedtocontributemoremoneythanshewouldnormallyspend.Theeventsof
hertandempartnersweremuchmorelavishthanherowneventshadbeen,andshe
wasobligedtocontributetothecostofmarchingbands,dancers,singersandother
entertainment,aswellastheusualpaymentstoattendeesforfoodandtravelcosts.
Shewasalsorequiredtopurchaseseveralmotorcyclesandarefrigeratorrequested
as‘doorprizes’attheirsharedrallies.
Asthecampaigndrewtoaclose,theHanuracandidateadmittedthatherstrategies
hadchangedovertimeandthatheremphasisonbeingcleanhaddiminished.She
gaveseveralreasonsforthis.First,shehadfoundthatcorruptionwasan
uncomfortableissuetodiscusspublicly(nggakenakdibahas).Everybodyknewwhat
corruptionwasandtherewasnopointinbringingitup—peoplecouldseethatshe
wasnotcorruptsimplybecauseshedidnotseektobuytheirvotes.Second,itwasan
awkwardsubjectbecauseshebelievedmostpeopleactuallydidwanttobebribed.
Shefearedalienatingthembytalkingaboutanti‐corruptionissuesormoneypolitics,
makingthemfeelguiltyandherunpopular.Third,peoplethoughtallpoliticianswere
corruptinsomewayandfoundithardtobelievethatcandidatesgenuinelycared
aboutfightingcorruption.Inotherwords,shebelievedthattalkingaboutcorruption
alienatedvotersandmadeherseemlikeahypocrite.Asaconsequence,anti‐
corruptionsymbolismbecamesomethingofadefensivetoolfortheHanura
candidate;adiscourseusedtocounterrequestsformoneyorgoodsthatshewasnot
willingtogive.Shelamentedinanobservationthatunderscoredthecynicismwith
whichmanyviewtheelectoralprocess,‘evenablindpersonherecanstillread
money’.
149
Ultimately,theHanuracandidatepulledbackfromusinganti‐corruptionsymbolism
inhercampaignbecauseshefeltthatvotersdidnotreallyconnectwiththeissue.
Duringapost‐electioninterviewinApril2014,sheobservedthat:‘anti‐corruption
doesn’tmeananythingtothosepeople...theydon’tcare’.Sheaddedthatpartiestried
theirbesttoavoidbeingcorrupt,butitwasjustan‘intellectualexercise’because
thereisamarketforvotesandvotersdemandmoney.Expectationsofbeingpaidin
exchangeforvotesweretoostronginEastJavaandtoohardtofight.Contemplating
herexperiences,theHanuracandidatedescribedthecampaignas‘unfair’(nggakfair)
and‘amess’(kacau)becauseitwasallabout‘playinggames’(main‐mainan):
Everyelectionislikeaparty(pesta).Peoplewantapresent.Thepeoplewho
takethemoney,theyaren’ttakinganyrisks…who’sgoingtoarrestthem?It’s
thepeoplewhogivethemoneywhogetblamed…thecandidates.
ShethoughtIndonesiawasnotreadyforacleanelection,sinceevensomeofherown
staffurgedhertobuyvotesontheeveoftheelection(ngebom).23Reflectingonher
loss,theHanuracandidateopinedthatherelectoratedidnotsupportclean
candidatesandthattheelectionhadreinforcedmoneypolitics.Commentingonthe
issueingeneralterms,sheobserved:
Innewspaperstherearealwayscommentsaboutelitespaying[forvotes],but
theyarequietabouttheothersideofthestory.Nooneeverwritesaboutwhat
peopledemandfromcandidates.Butit’sthetruth…whywouldanybodypay
[forvotes]iftheydidn’thaveto?
Theexperiencewasabitteroneforthecandidate.Shefeltforcedtogoagainsther
ownvaluesinthecampaignandwasstillunsuccessfulinherbidforparliament.Her
cynicismtowardstheelectoralprocessunderscoredheroverallfrustrationthatvote‐
buyingstillplayedacrucialroleintheelection,andthatcandidateswithlargecoffers
hadadistinctadvantage.
23Oneofthecandidate’sstaffreportedthattheyhadbeenaskedtowithdrawRp.200million
on8April2014(thedaybeforetheelection)anddistributeittomembersofthecandidate’s
campaignteam(personalcommunication,Hanuracampaignteamstaffer,8March2014).This
suggeststhatthecandidatemayhaverenegedonherresolvenottobuyvoteswithcash.
150
Nasdem,SouthSulawesi
MyfirstmeetingwiththeNasdemcandidatetookplaceinMay2013.Asnotedearlier,
hehadjoinedNasdemearlierthatyearafterresigningfromparliament,wherehehad
representedadifferentpoliticalparty.Thecandidatefeltheneededtoexplainthis
movebecauseallegationsofpoliticiansswitchingpartiesbecausetheythinkitwill
improvetheirchanceofsuccessarecommoninIndonesiaandhedidnotwanttobe
accusedofactingoutofself‐interest.Suchmovesareoftencriticizedasbeingself‐
servinganddevoidofideologicalconviction.Hestressedthatthedecisionhadbeen
verydifficultbuthefelthispreviouspartyhadnotsupportedhisstanceonanumber
ofissues.InjoiningNasdem,thecandidatesoughttoreturntoparliamentwitha
partythathebelievedwasmorecommittedtoimprovingthecountryanda
leadershipthatwasmoregenuineinitsintentions.Nasdem’sstatedpledgetochange
thelotofordinaryIndonesianswassomethingthecandidatebothrelatedtoand
believedin.Whileheknewhewouldbecriticizedfordefecting,hefeltitwasarisk
worthtaking.Thecandidate’sexplanationforjoiningNasdemwasindicativeofthe
discourseandsymbolismhewouldusethroughouthiscampaign.
TheNasdemcandidatewasaseniorpartyofficialandamemberofthecentralparty
committeeresponsibleforoverseeingthenation‐wideelectoralcampaign.While
Nasdemhadmadeuseofanti‐corruptionsymbols,theparty’snationalcampaign
focusedmoreuponbroaderthemesofchange(perubahan)andrestoration
(restorasi),playingtotheparty’snewness.24However,thecandidatestrongly
supportedanti‐corruptionissuesasakeyplankoftheparty’splatform.Thisfitwell
withhisownbackgroundasanactivist.Havingbeeninvolvedintheprotestsagainst
Suhartoin1998andhavingworkedasajournalist,hedecidedthatbeinganactivist
wasnotenoughandresolvedtotrytochangethesystemfromwithin.Hisspeeches
duringralliesdrewonthisnarrative.Nasdemwascommittedtochange,justashe
was,andhewasconvinceditwouldsupporthiseffortstofightcorruptionifelected.
Throughouthiscampaign,thecandidateleveragedhispasttojustifyhisuseofanti‐
corruptionsymbols.Accordingtohisnarrative,hewasunlikeothercandidates,who
wereprimarilyinterestedinbeingelectedfortheirownpersonalprofit,whether
moneyorprestige.Inspeechestovoters,herepeatedlydiscussedhisexperiencein
theDPR‐RI,claimingthathehadlefthisformerpartybecause,amongstother
24Asdiscussedinthepreviouschapter,Nasdem’sadvertisingbilledthepartyasamovement
torestorethespiritofthe1945constitutioninIndonesia.
151
reasons,hedidnotwanttobetraythepeople.Hehadfeltlikeatraitorforaccepting
thesalaryandperksofparliamentaryofficewhilenotbeingabletofightforwhathe
believedin.Referringtohimselfsatiricallyas‘stupid’forleavingthelarge,secure
salaryandlifestyleofaDPR‐RImember,hesaidhewouldratherresignthanbepart
of‘adirtyplace…fullofcorruptorsandtraitors’.Indoingso,hepositionedhis
actionsasevidenceofhiscommitmenttothepeople:hewassodisgustedbythe
behaviourandprioritiesofotherparliamentariansthathesimplycouldnotbeoneof
them,evenifitwasacomfortablejob.Bycontrast,hearguedthatNasdemwas
differentanditsmemberswoulddotheirutmosttoworkforthepeopleratherthan
forpersonalgain.
TheNasdemcandidatealsomobilizedanti‐corruptionsymbolisminstressinghis
commitmenttoagitatingfortheresolutionoftheBankCenturycase,usingthis
commitmentbothasproofofhistrackrecordagainstcorruptionandasafuture
promise.25Thecandidatehad,duringhistimeintheDPR‐RI,crusadedtohavethe
BankCenturycaseinvestigatedfurther,workingtokeepitinthemediaspotlightand
findingnewevidencerelatingtothecase,whichhepresentedtotheKPK.26His
campaignrhetoricandparaphernaliadrewheavilyuponhisinvolvementinthe
investigations,includinginhiscampaignslogan.Indemonstratingaprior
commitmenttofightingcorruption,forwhichhehadmadesacrifices,hebelievedhe
wouldhaveanadvantageovercompetitorswholackedexperienceorevidenceof
ongoingengagementinanti‐corruptionefforts.Healsohopedhisdedicationtothe
casewouldmakehimseemtrustworthy.Heconcededthatanti‐corruptionsymbols
mightnotappealtomostvotersbecausemoneypoliticswasstillveryinfluentialin
SouthSulawesi.But,heargued,thosenotswayedbyfinancialbenefitwouldbemore
inclinedtovoteforsomebodylikehim,whohadprovenhiscommitment.Hewas
targetingthesepeoplewithhiscampaigning.
25Nasdem’sfocusonthisparticularcorruptioncasewasdiscussedinChapterFour.
26Thisnewevidencewasgiventohimbyanunnamedsource,butitwashewhoofficially
presentedittotheKPK.Itscontentswereneverrevealed,butthecandidatemaintainedthat
thedocumentswouldhelptheKPKtoprosecutethoseinvolvedinCenturygate.Itispossible
thatthiswasmoreamediastuntthanthesubmissionofbeneficialevidenceforthe
investigation.
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Becausethecandidate’scampaignsymbolsdrewsoheavilyonhispersonalhistory,
herarelydiscussedotheraspectsofNasdem’splatforminhispublicappearances.27
Whenhediddiscussthepartymorebroadly,hedrewparallelsbetweenitsstatusas
anemergingparty,anditsneedtobe‘brave’and‘unyielding’initsapproachtopolicy.
Heusedtheexampleof‘attacks’againsttheKPK—byDPR‐RImemberswhowished
tocurtailitsauthority,particularlylimitingitssurveillancepowers—andasserted
thatNasdemwasnotafraidtovigorouslyopposesuchmoves.Inthecandidate’sview,
Nasdemcouldnotignorecorruption,andmakingitacoreelectionissuewasboth
strategicandnecessary.HearguedthatbecauseNasdemwasanewparty,its
candidateshadtoworkhardertoconvincevotersnotonlythattheywereserious
aboutfightingcorruption,butalsothattheyweremoreseriousthancandidatesfrom
otherparties.
Inmanyways,thecandidate’suseofanti‐corruptionsymbolswasmoreprominent
thantheparty’s.Hespokeoftenaboutthenegativeimpactofcorruptioninhis
speeches,reflectinghispersonalopinionthatwasthesinglebiggestthreatto
Indonesiandemocracy.TheNasdemcandidate’scampaignrhetoricwasmuchmore
individualizedthanthatoftheHanuracandidate,portrayinghimselfasachange.28
TheneedtopresentNasdem(and,byextension,himself)asevenmore
uncompromisinglyagainstcorruptionthatotheremergingpartyrivals,Hanuraand
Gerindra,wasalsosomethingthatheconsideredwhendetermininghowtopresent
himself:
WehavetolearnfromHanuraandGerindrainparliament…theyhaveno
corruptioncasesagainstthemandwecanlearnfromthat…[But]asthe
newestparty,wehavetoaimhigher[thanHanuraandGerindra],bemore
thoroughandmoredisciplinedaboutit…ifwebreachitevenonce,we’llbe
finished.Ithinkotherpartieshavealreadyfelttheeffectofthat.
27Forexample,Nasdem’ssloganinthe2014electionwas‘therestorationofIndonesia’
(restorasiIndonesia),claimingthattheDPR‐RIhadbecometoopowerfulandcallingfora
returntothe1945constitution.Thisincludedadvocatingforstrongerexecutivepowers,
givingthepresidentcontroloverthepoliceanddispensingwithdirectelectionsatthedistrict
andtownlevel.Whilethiswaspartoftheparty’scentralplatform,frontandcentreinparty
advertisingandontheNasdemwebsite,theseaspectsofpartypolicywerenevermentioned
duringanyofthecampaignactivitiesIwitnessed.
28IncontrasttotheHanuracandidate,theNasdemcandidaterarelyspokeabouttheleaderof
Nasdem,SuryaPaloh,ormadeanymentionoftheparty’spresidentialaspirations,relying
muchmoreonsellinghisownpersona.
153
Besidesacknowledgingthatanycorruptionsscandalswithinthepartywouldbe
dangerous,theNasdemcandidatealsoassertedthatNasdemwasstricterthanmost
otherpartiesintryingtoensurecandidatesdidnotviolatepartyrulesorthelaw.29In
thecandidate’sopinion,anypartymemberaccusedofcorruptionshouldbe
immediatelyexpelledandonlybereinstatediftheirnamewascleared.30Evenifthere
weresubsequentindicationsoftheirinnocence,thepartycouldnotaffordtobe
underminedbyanysuspicion.TheNasdemcandidateexplainedthatasanewparty,
thesemechanismsfordealingwithcorruptionallegationshadnotbeentested,buthe
wasinfavourofbeingstrictand‘merciless’(tanpaampun).
WhilethefundinghereceivedfromNasdemtoconducthiscampaigncoveredmostof
hiscosts,thecandidategenerallyaimedtominimizespending,andtoavoidusinghis
ownfunds.Hisformercareerasajournalistgavehimaccesstolocalmedia,whichhe
usedtobuildapositiveimageofhimself,Nasdemanditsothercandidates.Coming
fromNasdem,healsohaddirectaccesstonationalandlocalmediaoutletsownedby
SuryaPaloh.Duringtheofficialcampaignperiodhewasfollowedbyatelevisioncrew
fromMetroTV,whorecordedfootageandreportsforbroadcastonlocaltelevision.
Healsoparticipatedinteleviseddebates,whichhelpedhimtofurthercementhis
mediaprofile.Inaddition,hecampaignedviaFacebookandTwitter,tweetingdaily
(oftenmorethanonce)andansweringquestionsposedbyhisfollowers.His
Facebookpagewaslessactive,butstaffwoulduploadphotosfromhiscampaigning
activitieseveryfewdays.31
Likeothercandidates,theNasdemcandidatealsomadestrategicdonations,most
commonlytolocalmosques.Heclaimedthathewouldnotmakepaymentsto
individuals(evenforacharitablecause)ortovillageprojects,becauseitwastooeasy
forindividualstoembezzlethefunds.Fearingthathemightbeperceivedasengaging
inmoneypolitics,hediligentlycheckedreceiptsforservicesandgoods(thoughhe
acknowledgedthatthesewereeasilyforged).Gift‐givingwasalsoasensitiveissuefor
29Theselectionofcandidates,accordingtoaNasdemmember,carefullyconsideredthe
backgroundofpotentialcandidates,claimingthatsomehadbeenrejectedbecausetheparty
couldnotascertainexactlyhowtheyhadgainedtheirwealth(interviewwithNasdemcentral
committeemember,23May2013).
30Partyruleswere,infact,moreflexible,withmembersaccusedofcorruptionbeinggiventhe
opportunitytopresenttheircasetoaninternalcommitteethatdecided,alongwiththeparty
executive,whetherthemembershouldbesuspendedorexpelled.
31TheNasdemcandidate’sFacebookpageactuallybecamemuchmoreactiveinthelead‐upto
thepresidentialelection,inwhichNasdemoptedtopubliclybackJokowiandJusufKallafor
presidentandvice‐president.
154
thecandidate,whodidtakepartintheusualcampaignactivitiesofgivingoutt‐shirts
andothermemorabilia,providingfoodandorganizingevents,includingatraditional
JavanesepuppetperformanceforJavanesemigrantsinhiselectorate,andasoccer
clinicforyoungboysinhishometown.
TheNasdemcandidateundertooktheseactivitiesreluctantly,andwhenaskedwhyhe
didso,herespondedthatitwasexpectedandthathewouldnotliketolosebecause
ofa‘trivialthinglikenotgivingawayt‐shirts’.Tohismind,thecampaignshouldfocus
ondemonstratinghiscommitmenttoimprovingthelotofordinarypeople.Inone
addresstoalocalpartybranchoffice,hebecameiratebecausehefeltthathis
campaignstaffwerefailingto‘sell’himtolocalvoters.Hewasannoyedtosee
membersofhiscampaignteamsimplygivingoutt‐shirtsandwalkingaway.Thisdid
notmeethisexpectationsthattheywouldusetheirinteractionwithvotersto
promotehispoliciesandideas.Inthesamemeeting,theNasdemcandidatereiterated
thatmoneypoliticswascompletelyagainsthisethosandurgedhisstafftoreportany
suspiciousbehaviouronthepartofotherNasdemcandidatessothathecouldhave
themdismissedfromtheparty.Healsoaskedthatdetailsofviolationsbycandidates
fromrivalpartiesbeconveyedtothenationalElectionSupervisoryBoard(Badan
PengawasPemilu,Bawaslu).
TheNasdemcandidate’suseofmeetings,andlaterrallies,followedatypical
campaigntrajectory.However,duetohisseniorityintheparty,hewasforcedto
dividehistimebetweenlocalcampaigningandnationallevelcommitments.The
candidatethereforereliedgreatlyonlocalstaffmembersandhiscampaignteamto
campaignonhisbehalf.LiketheHanuracandidate,hebelievedthattheoptimal
campaignstrategywastomeetandconversewithvotersdirectly,eventhoughitwas
time‐consuming.Thesizesofthemeetingsvaried,usuallybetween15and50people,
andwererelaxed:hewantedtoavoidlavish,formaleventsinordertopromotehis
imageas‘oneofthepeople’.Healsoexplainedthathepreferrednon‐formalsettings
becausetheymadeiteasierforhimto‘connect’withvoters.TheNasdemcandidate
metwithvotersinmosques,atpeople’shousesorathisownposko.
IncontrasttotheHanuracandidate,whoseuseofanti‐corruptionsymbolismwaned
overtime,theNasdemcandidate’spersonalpledgetocontinuetofightcorruption
gainedincreasedvisibilityduringtheofficialcampaignperiod.Hisviewson
corruptiondidnotneedtobesolicitedthroughquestionsfromtheaudience;he
155
invariablysharedthemwithoutprompting.Atmeetingswithvoters,thecandidate
presentedhisideasongovernmentandencouragedaudiencememberstosharetheir
concernsandaspirationswithhim.Becausehewasaknownanti‐corruption
campaigner,instancesofallegedlocalcorruptionweresometimesraisedduringthese
meetings.Forexample,onevillagercomplainedthatthevillagechiefhadmadeadeal
withaprivatecompanytosetupanirrigationsystemforcrops.Inreturn,villagers
hadtogive15percentoftheircrops(orcashequivalent)tothecompany,andthey
wererequiredtobuyalltheirfertilizerfromit.Thecompanywasownedbyalocal
districtparliamentarian,whowasexploitingthevillagersbymarkingupthecostof
fertilizer.TheNasdemcandidaterespondedpassionatelytothisstory,sayingthatit
wasclearlyacaseofrent‐seeking.Heencouragedthevillagerstosharethestorywith
neighboursandfriendstopreventtheownerfromgainingre‐electionandalsoto
documentthecasesothathecouldreportthevillageheadtotheauthorities.His
responsewasreceivedpositivelybyvillagers,whowerepleasedthatsomeonein
powerwouldtakethetimetolistentotheircomplaintsandlobbyontheirbehalf.
Asthisexamplesuggests,theNasdemcandidatewascertainlynotafraidtocondemn
(perceived)moneypoliticswhenhesawit.OnoneoccasioninJuly2013,meetinghis
teammembersinafive‐starhotelinMakassar,hediscoveredthatarivalfrom
anotherpartywashostinga‘workshop’fordistrictheads(bupati)attheconference
centreofthehotel.Thisrivalcandidatehadpaidfordistrictheadsfromalloverhis
electoratetocometoMakassar,accommodatingtheminthehotel.WhentheNasdem
candidatediscoveredthis,hewasoutragedandexpressedhisfrustrationtosomeof
histeammembers.Heclaimedthatthelavishtripwasclearlyanattempttowin
favourwiththebupatiandthatifthemeetingwasjusttodiscusslocalissuesthen
therewasnoneedtoholditinsuchanexpensivehotel.Atonepoint,herecognized
someofthebupatiandconfrontedtheminthehotellobby.Hetoldthem,infullpublic
view,thathehopedtheywereashamedtobeacceptingfavoursfromamanwho
wantedtousethemtogetvotes.Heurgedthemtothinkaboutthevillagersandwhat
wasbestforthem,notwhowouldgivethemostnightsinafancyhotel.The
confrontationwasawkwardandthetargetedbupatisdidnotdefendthemselves
againsthisaccusations.Hetoldthemthatiftheysoldthemselvesformoneythey
riskedlosingtheirdignity,andweretraitorstothenation.
Oncetheofficialcampaignperiodbegan,theNasdemcandidatefocusedonattending
largerallies—bothhisownandthoseofotherNasdemcontenders—atwhichhe
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introducedandendorsedothercandidates.Thoughheclaimednottoenjoythem,he
feltthattheyweremoreeffectiveforbroadcastinghismessagesbecauseofthelarger
audiences,ofteninthethousands,whichtheyattracted.Asamemberofthecentral
partycommitteeandtheparty’sfirst‐rankedcandidate,hereceivedsignificant
fundingfromthecentralcommitteeanddidnotenterintotandemarrangementswith
anyprovincialordistrictlevelcandidates.Hedid,however,attendanumberof
differentralliesinordertopromotetheparty.32
LiketheHanuracandidate,though,theNasdemcandidatebecameincreasingly
cynicalabouttheelectionasthecampaignprogressed.Hisdisillusionmentwasclear
whenIinterviewedhimaftertheelectoralquickcountresultsbecameavailable.
Whilehewassuccessful,hereceivedfewervotesthanpollinghadsuggestedinthe
weekleadinguptotheelection.Beingalocal—a‘sonoftheregion’(puteradaerah)—
hewasdisappointedthathedidnotreceivemorevotesinhisown‘backyard’
(kampunghalaman).Hisdisappointingresultwasnot,hefelt,areflectiononhis
efforts,butratherthefactthatvote‐buyingremainedthenorm,makingitdifficultfor
honestcandidatestosucceed.Heblamedhispoornumbersontheuseofmoney
politicsbyhisrivals,claimingthat‘thewinneroftheelectionwasmoneyandbasic
goods’.Heclaimedthatthebriberyhadbeen‘brutal’,muchworsethaninthe
previouselection,andreflectedtheothercandidates’lackofmorals.Afterthe
electionstherewereseveralreportsinthemediaofcandidatescomplainingaboutthe
useofvote‐buyingandmoneypolitics.Forexample,itwasarguedthatwomen
candidatesweredisadvantagedbymoneypoliticsandthiswaswhytheyperformed
poorlyintheelection(Syafari2014).InBandung,hundredsofcandidatesregistered
dissatisfactionswiththevotecount,suspiciousoftheelectionoversightcommittee
(Rizal2014).33
Upsetbytheextentofmoneypoliticsintheprovince,thecandidateformedacoalition
withothercandidatesinSouthSulawesiwhosharedhisconcerns.Coalitionmembers
fromarangeofpartieswereunitedintheirdisappointmentattheinfluenceofmoney
ontheelection.Theywereparticularlydisheartenedbythefactthattheirattemptsto
runcleancampaignshadbeenunderminedbyunscrupulousrivals.Thecoalition
receivedsomemediacoverageintheperiodafterthewinnerswereannouncedbut
32Forexample,atarallyon19March2014,theNasdemcandidategaveaspeechendingwith:
‘Voteforanyofthesepeople,theyareallgood,butdon’tforgettochooseNasdem!’
33Forfurtherexamplesofcandidatesreportedinthemediaformoneypoliticsandvote‐
buyingsee,JPNN(2014),Khosir(2014)andSyahni(2014).
157
otherwisedidnotgainmuchtraction.Accusationsofvote‐buyingandmoneypolitics
werecommonplaceandcomplaints,evenwhenreportedtotheelectoralcommission,
rarelyendedinprosecution.Accusationsthatelectoralprocesseshadbeenunfair
wereregardedasjustified,butevenso,theconcernswerenottakenupbytheKPU.
Gerindra,NorthSumatra
TheGerindracandidatehadbeeninparliamentforover25years,havingfirstbeen
electedin1987asamemberofGolkar.InourfirstmeetinginApril2013,he
recountedhisdecisiontojoinGerindrainthelead‐uptothe2009nationallegislative
election,theparty’sfirst.Indecidingtoshiftpartyallegiance,thecandidate
highlightedhisinterestinpromotingeconomicequalitywithinIndonesia,particularly
assistingthe50percentofIndonesiansworkingintheagriculturalsector.Ashis
interestinagriculturalpolicygrew,hebecameinvolvedintheIndonesianFarmer’s
Association(HimpunanKerukunanTaniIndonesia,HKTI),ledbyPrabowo
Subianto.34AfterdiscussionswiththeGerindraleadership,hedecidedtorepresent
thepartyinthe2009elections.ThecandidateassertedthathehadmovedtoGerindra
becausethepartywasbetteralignedwithhispriorities,notbecauseofill‐feeling
towardsGolkar.
Inourfirstinterview,thecandidateassertedcorruptionwastiedtobroader
problemsofinequalityinIndonesiaandwasthereforeoneofthemostimportant
challengesfacingthecountry.ThiswaswhyGerindrawasfirminitscommitmentto
combatingcorruption.Intermsofitssymbolism,thecandidatearguedthatGerindra’s
imagehadbecomesynonymouswithfightingcorruptionandthatitwaswidely
recognizedasthecleanestpartyinIndonesia.Thepublic,hesaid,appreciatedthat
consistency:
Gerindrahastakenaleadingpositionineradicatingcorruption.That’swhat
wehopewilldifferentiateusfromotherparties…Liketheseriousnesswith
whichwedefendtheKPK…thatincreasesourvalue[topeople]…now
Gerindraisseenasoneofthecleanestpartiesbecausewedon’thaveany
cadresinvolvedincorruption.
Thecandidatecontendedthateverypersonwhojoinedthepartywasobligedto
upholdthesevalues,withoutexception.ThefactthatGerindrahadneverhadany
34FormorehistoryoftheHKTI,seeHadiwinata(2003:126).
158
membersarrestedforcorruptionremindedpeoplethatthiswasapartyintenton
remainingclean.Membersaccusedofcorruptionwouldreceivenoprotectionfrom
theparty,andfacedimmediateexpulsion(thoughifabsolvedbythecourtstheycould
return).Fortunately,accordingtothecandidate,Gerindrahadyettofinditselfinthis
position.
Thecandidateadmittedthatthiselectionwouldnotbeaseasytowinasprevious
electionsbecausetherewasincreasingcynicismtowardsparliamentarians,drivenby
prevailingstereotypesthatallwerecorruptandself‐serving.Heclaimedthatevenhe
hadbeenaccusedofcorruption,notbecausetherewasevidenceagainsthimbut
becausepeoplerefusedtobelievethattherewereanycleanparliamentarians,buthe
concededthatvotershadarighttofeelangryaboutthehighlevelsofcorruptionin
thenationalparliament.Thelackoftrustgeneratedbythesestereotypesledthe
GerindracandidatetodrawheavilyonhisethnictieswithintheBatakcommunity.As
arespectedBatakelder,hehopedthatancestraltieswouldgivehimanadvantage
overothercandidates.Duringspeechestoaudiencesfromrelatedfamilygroups,he
wouldmakereferencetotheircommonancestors(samanenek)toencourage
support.Healsoappealedtoreligiousties.BeingChristian,thecandidateoptedto
concentratehiscampaignactivityinmajorityChristianareas,arguingthatitwas
unlikelythatMuslimswouldvoteforaChristiancandidate,regardlessoftheirviews
onotherissues.Healsonotedthatvotescouldneverbetakenforgranted,andhe
wouldneedtofocusparticularlyonareasthathadsupportedhimpreviously,butthat
hehadnotmanagedtoassistthroughdevelopmentorinfrastructureprojectsduring
hispastterm.
ThecampaignstrategyoftheGerindracandidatedifferedfromtheNasdemand
Hanuracandidatesforanumberofreasons.First,asanincumbent,theGerindra
candidatecoulddrawuponhispreviouselectionresults.Duetothelargesizeofhis
electorate,itwasimpossibletocampaignacrosstheentirearea.Thushechoseto
focusonareaswherehehadpolledwellinthepastandhewasmostlikelytowin.The
candidatebelievedthatifyoupreserveda‘goodreputation’(namayangbaik)
throughoutaparliamentaryterm—whichhefelthehad—peoplewouldprobably
voteforyouagain.Hiscampaignstrategywasthustoreclaimpreviousvotesrather
thantoseekoutnewsupporters.Second,thecandidatecoulddrawuponatrusted
networkofpeoplewhohadassistedhiminpreviouscampaigns,allowinghimtobe
morehands‐offthantheothertwocandidates.Thiswasapracticalnecessitybecause
159
helivedandworkedinJakarta.Hismodusoperandiwastomeetwithpower
brokers—usuallyinfluentialpartyorethnicgroupfiguresandbusinessmenwith
whomhehadworkedinthepast—andrequesttheirassistance.They,inturn,would
rallyvotesonhisbehalf.Thesemeetingswereoftenfamiliar,resemblingaget‐
togetherbetweenoldfriends,andrevolvedmostlyaroundhowthevotecollecting
wasprogressingandwhetheranyadditionalgoods(suchast‐shirtsorbusiness
cards)ormoneytopayforeventswererequired.Theyalsodiscussedwhetherthere
wereanylocalissuesthecandidateshouldbeawareof,especiallywhetherhisrivals
werecampaigningintheareaandwhethertheypresentedathreat.Inthemeetings,
combatingcorruptionwasnotdiscussed.Thecandidatedidnotfeelthatheneededto
talktohiscampaignteamaboutthepartyoritsplatformbecausetheywerealready
willingtochampionhim.Hearguedthesepeoplewantedtohelphimbecausethey
‘knowmyname,knowmywork…knowIamagoodperson’.
Third,thecandidate’shistoryinparliamenthelpedhimattracttheattentionof
journalists.Beingaseniorpartymember,hewasoftencontactedbythemedia,
especiallylocaloutlets,forcommentonpoliticalissues,subjecttoatacitagreement
thatthepaperswouldpainthiminagoodlight.Healsohadgoodrelationswith
certainjournaliststowhomhegavemoneyinreturnforfavourablenewsstories.
This,heexplained,wasapaymentforaserviceinrecognitionthatjournalists
receivedlowsalariesandthereforeneededadditionalincome.Thecandidatehad
FacebookandTwitteraccountsbuttheseweremanagedbyoneofhisassistants.He
admittedthathewasnotverygoodwithtechnology,butunderstoodthatGerindra
expectedcandidatestomakeuseofsocialmedia.However,hedidnotthinkthat
socialmediawasparticularlybeneficial,believingthatitwasmoreusefultonew
candidateswhoweretryingtobuildtheirprofile,butnotsomeonelikehimselfwho
wasalreadyafamiliarface.
Inhisspeeches,theGerindracandidatealsoemphasizedsomeofthesmall‐scale
effortsthatGerindrawasmaking,withoutsupportorendorsementfromother
parties,toreducecorruptionwithinthenationalparliament.Oneoft‐repeated
examplewasGerindra’sbanonlegislatorstakingpartinoverseasstudytours.The
candidatearguedthatthiswasanunnecessaryexpensewhichdidlittletobenefitthe
country;forhimtheywereaformofcorruptionandanexcuseforparliamentarians
160
togoonholiday.35WhileevensomeothermembersofGerindrahadaskedifPrabowo
mightmakesomeexceptionstothisban,thecandidatewasunwaveringinhis
supportforit.Inpresentingthisstancetohisaudience,heframedtheissuein
comparativeterms,suggestingthatbecauseotherpartiesdidnotcareenoughtoask
theirmemberstorefrainfromparticipatinginthese‘unnecessary’studytours,they
weremorallybankruptanduninterestedinsavingthegovernmentmoney.
AnotherachievementthecandidatepromotedwasGerindra’spublicrejectionof
planstorenovatetheparliamentbuildinginJakarta.Thepartycontendedthatthe
projectwasmerelyamoney‐makingopportunityfortherulingDemocraticParty.In
severalspeeches,thecandidateoutlinedhisviewabouttheproposedrenovations
andtheirbudgetofRp.1.8trillion.Heallegedthattheprojectbudgethadbeen
markedup,andstatedthatthecompanyawardedtheprojecttenderwaslinkedto
Nazaruddin.36Hesaidthathesuspectedthatthemark‐upwasameansforthe
DemocraticPartytochannelfundingintoitscampaigncoffers.Healsonotedthat
Gerindrahadconsultedwiththebureaucratstaskedwithbuildingmanagementand
maintenance,whohadestimatedthatthecostoftheproposedrenovationswasRp.
700billion—lessthanhalfoftheallocatedbudget.Theprojectwasslatedtogoahead
inspiteofGerindra’sopposition,butitwashaltedatthelastminuteduetothearrest
oftheconstructioncompany’sdirectoronanunrelatedcorruptioncharge.The
candidatereferredtothisarrestasan‘interventionfromGod’,allowingprotestto
mountuntiltherenovationplanswerefinallyabandoned.
Thecandidateusedtheseexamplestoillustratehiscommitmenttothetransparent
andresponsibleuseofpublicfunds.HisspeecheslinkedGerindra’soverallanti‐
corruptionsymbolismtohisownvisibleeffortstofightcorruption,whichhethen
comparedtotherecordofotherparties,whichhadmanyseatsintheparliamentbut
hadachievednothing.Withasmallnumberofseatsinthenationallegislature(26
seats),Gerindrawasnotinapositiontodrivechangestothelaw,budget,orpolicy.
Nevertheless,thepartywasdoingwhatitcouldtoimprovethegovernment.These
small‐scaleachievementswerepresentednotonlyasconcreteevidenceoftheparty’s
anti‐corruptionstance,butalsoasanindicationofwhatcouldbeexpectediftheparty
gainedpower.Inhisspeeches,thecandidaterepeatedlyunderscoredthefactthat
35Forexample,inaspeechon13July2013hestatedthat:‘Flyingoverseasisabigwasteofthe
people’smoney…They[parliamentarians]flyBusinessClass,theygetperdiems,theystayin
expensivehotels.GerindrahassavedthegovernmentoverRp.40billionoverthepastfour
yearsbecausewerefusetogo[onthesetrips]’.
36TheNazaruddincasewasdiscussedinChapterThree.
161
evenwithitssmallrepresentationinparliament,Gerindrastrivedtobehonest(jujur)
andsupportanti‐corruptionmeasuresinanywayitcould.
Thecandidateemphasizedhisown‘trackrecord’(rekamjejak)topromotehimselfas
asymbolofanti‐corruption.Whileinparliamenthehadbeenvocalinthepress,for
example,speakingindefenceoftheKPKandagainstperceivedgovernmenteffortsto
undermineit.Hewasfrequentlyinterviewedbyjournalistsaboutthis,whichfurther
fosteredhisanti‐corruptionreputation.Thecandidatebelievedhewasobligedto
highlightcorruptionissuesinthegovernmentandtodemonstrate,throughthe
media,thatGerindrawasstaunchlyagainstcorruption.Whilehecommentedona
rangeofissues,corruptioncaseswereapriorityforhim.Healsobelievedthatthe
medianowsoughthimoutforcommentsbecausetheyknewthathewouldhavean
opiniononthevariouscorruptionscandalsfacedbythegovernment.Atthesame
time,headmittedthatamemberofasmalloppositionpartywouldfinditdifficultto
makelarge‐scalechanges.Indeed,hepresentedthisasanotherreasontovotefor
Gerindra:ifGerindracouldincreaseitsparliamentarypresence,itcouldimplement
government‐widestrategiestocombatcorruptionmoreeasily.
Inordertofurtherestablishhisanti‐corruptionimage,thecandidatedistributed
bookletsathismeetingsandrallies.Thebookletboretheslogan‘corruptionbreeds
poverty,fightcorruptionforaprosperoussociety’(Korupsiakarkemiskinan;Berantas
korupsi,rakyatsejahtera)andincluded36pagesofmediaarticlesinwhichthe
candidatehaddiscussedarangeofissues,mostprominentlycorruption.Some
articlesincludedinthebookletwereentitled:‘[Name]choosesthelonelyroad
amongstthe“cowboys”atSenayan’,‘[Name]:Consistentineradicatingcorruption’,‘A
newparliamentbuildingisnotwhatthepeoplewant’and‘Gerindraispreparedto
protecttheKPKfromthreatstodissolveit’.Allthearticlesfirmlyalignedthe
candidatewithanti‐corruptionsymbolism,whichsupportedGerindra’shard‐line
anti‐corruptionrhetoric.
Duringtheofficialcampaignperiodthecandidate’sspeechescontinuedtoemphasize
theimportanceoftrustbetweenvotersandleadership,drawingalinkbetweenthe
needfortoughreformsandfirm(tegas)leadershipinordertore‐establishpublic
faithintheparliament.Thispresentedanopportunityforthecandidatetofocuson
someoftheadvantagesofPrabowo’sleadership,whichhedescribedas‘strong’and
having‘provenintegrity’.HepresentedPrabowoastheonlyleadercommitted
162
enoughtoeradicatecorruption,somethingwhichhehadpromisedsincefounding
Gerindrain2008.Thecandidatecontrastedthiswithotherleaderswhohadnotmade
corruptionapriority.HealsoreferredtoPrabowo’smainrivalforthepresidency,
Jokowi,as‘untrustworthy’,especiallybecausehehadbetrayedPrabowobyelecting
torunforPresident.37Incontrast,thecandidateportrayedPrabowoasatrustworthy
leaderwhohadclearlystatedhisplatformtothepublicandintendedtofollow
throughwithit.Tosomeextenthewasalsopragmaticinhiscampaigning,admitting
thathesometimessaidthingsthatwereuntrueinordertoappealtovoters.For
example,atonerallyhestatedthatGerindrawasstaunchlyagainstpolygamyandthat
nomanwhowasapartymemberwaspermittedtohavemorethanonewife,
expectingthiswouldbewell‐receivedbyhisfemaleand/orChristianaudience.38He
laterconcededthatGerindrahadneitherpoliciesagainstpolygamynoranyparty
rulesaboutitformembers,admittingthathemadethestatementtoincreasehis
popularity.
Whileearningtrustwasimportant,theGerindracandidatealsoacknowledgedthat
moneywascrucialinpoliticalcampaigns.Hewasopenaboutthisfact,statingthathis
owncampaignhadcosthimaroundRp.3.5billion.This,heacknowledged,wasa
significantsum,thoughmuchlessthananewcomerwouldneedtospend.Hedidnot
needtoworryaboutbrandingasmuchasothercandidates,becausehehadalready
hadalongandsuccessfulcareerinpoliticswithoutanyhintofscandal.Healsosaid
thatwhilearoundRp.1billionofhiscampaignfundscamefromhisownpocket,the
remainderwasprovidedbythepartyordonated.Donations,thecandidatestated,
mostlycamefrombusinesspeoplewithwhomhewasongoodterms.Whilehe
acceptedthatsomepeoplemayseethisasbuyinginfluence,hearguedthathehad
neverdoneanythingillegalinreturnforthesedonations.Hegaveanexampleofa
donorwhohadfacedcourtandwasaskedformoneybythejudgeinordertorulein
hisfavour.Thecandidateclaimedthatwhenthebusinessmanhadaskedhimto
intervenesothathecouldhaveafairtrialwithouthavingtopay,thecandidateranga
friendofhisinthejudiciaryonthebusinessman’sbehalfandrequestedheaskthe
judgetorescindhisrequestforabribe.Intheend,thedonordidnothavetopaya
37ThisaccusationofbetrayalwasbasedonthefactthatPrabowohadsupportedJokowi’s
mayoralcandidacyinJakartaduring2012andcontributedsignificantlytohiscampaign,and
theallegedbreachoftheBatuTulisPact(PaktaBatuTulis)inwhichMegawati,chairpersonof
PDIP,hadallegedlypromisedinwritingtosupportPrabowo’spresidentialbidin2014.
38ThedebateoverwhethertolegalizepolygamyinIndonesiaiscontroversial,with
proponentsonbothsides.FormoreinformationaboutthehistoryofthisdebateseeButt
(1999).
163
bribeandthejudgestillruledinhisfavour.Thecandidatealsoclaimedthathehad
beenaskedtomediateinlanddisputesinvolvingpeoplewhohadbackedhis
campaign,butassertedthathehadneverbeencorrupt.39
Accordingtothecandidate,theavailabilityoffundsplayedakeyroleincampaigns
becauseitdeterminedthefeasibilityofdifferentcampaignstrategies.Ralliesand
meetingswerecostly.Asinglerallywithjust500attendeescouldcostuptoRp.35
millionincludingrentalcostsforequipment,food,t‐shirts,entertainmentand
‘transportationmoney’(uangtranspor)fortheaudience.40Thecandidatefoundthese
expensesirritating,butacceptedthemasanintegralpartofIndonesia’s‘campaign
culture’(budayakampanye).LiketheHanuracandidate,healsolamentedthateven
afterthisexpendituretherewasnoguaranteethatpeoplewouldvoteforhim.He
estimatedthatforeveryrallyheld,acandidatemightexpect40percentofthe
audiencetovoteforher/him.Forthisreason,candidateshadtoholdasmanyrallies
astheycouldaffordinordertobeassuredofwinningthenumberofvotesthey
needed.
Thecandidatewasnotopposedtoindividualpaymentstopeopleatrallies,stressing
thatsuchpaymentswerenotbribes,butratherreimbursementsforthecostsof
attending.Itwasimportantthatpeoplewerenotleftout‐of‐pocket.Moreover,hesaid
thatifattendeesdidnotreceiveapaymenttheywouldbedisappointed,becausethey
expectedtobecompensated.Withoutasmallpayment,therallycoulddomoreharm
thangood,becausetheattendeescouldendupdisgruntled.Thecandidatecontrasted
suchpayments,whichhedescribedastokensofappreciation,with‘moneypolitics’,
whichusuallyinvolvedmuchlargersumsofmoneyandwasimproper.Whenasked
whathedeemed‘alargeamountofmoney’herepliedthathewouldnotgivemore
thanRp.10,000toanyindividual,andthattheamountwoulddependonwhere
peoplehadtravelledfrom.Iftheylivedneartherallysitehesaidhewouldnotgive
themanymoney,butwouldprovidefoodanddrinks.Thesemoralqualmsaside,the
candidate’srationalewasalsopragmatic.Becausehewasanationalparliamentary
candidate,distributinglargeamountsofcashacrosshiselectoratewouldhavebeen
39TheuseofpoliticalcampaigndonationstobuyinfluenceisnotuncommoninIndonesia,
especiallysinceindividualcandidatesoftenhavetosourcetheirownfunds.BoththeHanura
andGerindracandidatesacknowledgedthatcampaigndonationsoftenheldimplicit
expectationsofpoliticalfavoursiftheywon.However,bothalsodeniedthattheywouldaccept
suchdonationsiftheybelievedthedonorwouldaskforsomethingillegalastheywouldprefer
tostaycleanratherthanhavethemoney.
40Thecandidatesaidhedistributedover80,000t‐shirtsduringthecampaign.
164
prohibitivelyexpensive,claimingthatevengivingRp.10,000torallyattendees,in
spiteofitbeingasmallamountofmoney,addeduptoasignificantexpense.41
Inadditiontoexpenditureonrallies,theGerindracandidate,likeothercandidates
describedhere,madedonationstolocalcausesandgroupsinordertocurryfavour
withvoters.Hesaidthatthesepaymentsdemonstratedhisgenerosityandhelpedto
ensurethatpeopledidnotforgethim.Manyofhisdonationsweregiventhrough
churchcommunities.HesupportedlocalChristianyouthgroupsandparishesand,in
turn,manyyouthgroupmembersvolunteeredtobepartofhiscampaignteam.When
askedaboutcontributingtolocaldevelopmentprojects,thecandidatesaidthathe
rarelydidthisunlesshewasapproachedbyafriendandcouldtrustthatfundswould
bespentappropriately.Also,asanincumbent,hehadaccesstoparliamentaryfunds
suchas‘SocialAssistance’(BantuanSosial,Bansos)and‘AspirationFunds’(Dana
Aspirasi),whichhecouldchanneltowardsvillagelevelinfrastructureandsocial
development,andthereforedidnotneedtofundsuchprojectshimself.Hehadno
qualmsabouttakingcreditfortheseprojects,eventhoughtheywerefullyfundedby
thegovernment.
Healsoacknowledgedthat,sincehisstafforganizedtheevents,itwassometimes
difficulttosayexactlywhathappenedtoallthemoneyheprovidedtocoverexpenses.
Forexample,hedidnotpersonallyselectwherethefoodwasbought,soheconceded
itwaspossiblehisstaffmightchannelmoneyforthispurposestrategicallyinorderto
getvotes,butaslongastheeventransmoothly,thiswasnotaproblemforhim.In
essence,delegatingplanning,procurementandpaymentresponsibilitiestohis
campaignteamallowedhimtobemoreblaséabouthowcampaignfundswerespent,
solongastheeventsweresuccessful.
TheGerindracandidatewascertainlythemostexperiencedandrelaxedcandidateof
thethree.However,whilehewasafrontrunnerforre‐electionandseemedconfident
ofretaininghisseat,thecandidatestillexpressedfrustrationattheexpectationsof
hisparty,especiallyinthelead‐uptovoting.Hesaidthathehadbeentoldby
Gerindra’scentralcommitteethathemustwinatleast150,000votesinNorth
Sumatra.Whenhecomplainedthiswouldbeextremelydifficult,thecentral
41WhilefollowingtheGerindracampaigninNorthSumatraIwitnessedseveralexchangesof
moneyinreturnforattendingrallies.WhiletheGerindracandidateseemedtobeexemptfrom
havingtofind‘supporters’toattendhisrallies(possiblybecauseofhisstatus),otherGerindra
candidates(runningforalllevelsofparliament)whowerenotsohighlyrankedweregiven
quotasofhowmanypeopletheyhadtofindtoattend.Paymentswitnessedforattendanceat
anothercandidate’srallyinMedanrangedbetweenRp.20,000andRp.30,000.
165
committee’sresponsewasthatheshould‘dowhatisnecessary’togetthevotes,even
ifhehadtobuythem.Whilethisclearlywentagainsttheparty’sownanti‐corruption
rhetoric,thecandidatewasnotmorallyoutragedattherequestitself,arguingthat
entrenchedelectionpracticeswereunfortunatebutdifficulttoignore.Whilethenew
quotasputhimunderconsiderablestress,hewasconfidentofwinningwithout
buyingvotesbecauseoftherelationshipshehadfosteredovertimewithhis
constituents.Hegaveanexampleofhelpingresolvelanddisputesintheearly2000s,
whenhewasaskedbysomelocalpeopletocallthepoliceandthejudgestoexplain
theirsituation.Thesepeople,hesaid,werenowpartofhiscampaignteamandhe
couldrelyonthembecausehehadhelpedtheminthepast.Healsobuiltrelations
withpeopleincommunitiesbyusingtheirservicesduringcampaigns(suchas
purchasingfoodorpayinglocalyouthstoputupposters).Hisstrategiespaidoffashe
wasre‐electedforanotherterm.
ThecandidatesfromHanuraandNasdembotharguedthatacceptingpaymentin
returnforvoteswasimmoralandwouldleadtopoorleadership.Bycontrast,the
Gerindracandidateacknowledgedthatitwasnormalforcandidates,especially
newcomers,tobuytheirwayintoparliament,eitherthroughlavishcampaignsand/or
vote‐buying.Inonediscussion,theGerindracandidategaveanexampleofan
acquaintancefromapartythatwasunlikelytopasstheparliamentarythreshold,and
saidthathewasamazedathiscampaignspendingbecausehebelievedhewas
wastinghismoney.Outofconcernforthispersonhesaidherangandadvisedhimto
stop‘wasting’hismoney.Healsojokedthattheperiodfollowingelectioncampaigns
wasagoodtimetobuylandbecausesomanycandidateswentintodebtasaresultof
campaignspending.Whilethiscandidatedidwanttoupholdhisanti‐corruption
imageanddidnotcondonevote‐buying,hisprimaryargumentagainstitwasbased
onpracticalityratherthanmorality;itwasexpensive,couldnotguaranteehimvotes
andwaspotentiallyawasteofmoney.
Intra‐partyrelationships
Allthreecandidatestrackedinthisstudywerepartystaff.TheGerindraandNasdem
candidateswereintheirrespectivecentralpartycommittees,whiletheHanura
candidatehadworkedforthepartysinceitsinception.Ofthethree,theHanura
candidatewasthemostremovedfromthecentralpartycommitteeasshewasthe
onlyonewhowasnotpartofthedecision‐makingteamthatdevelopednational
campaignstrategies.Forothercandidates,whowerenotpre‐existingpartymembers,
166
sometrainingwasavailabletobriefthemonthebasicsofthepartyplatform.While
therewasan‘induction’programdesignedtointroducenewrecruitstotheparty’s
visionandmission,thiswasseeminglydoneonanad‐hocbasis,ifatall.Regularparty
meetingswereheldinkeypartyoffices,usuallyinlargertowns,buttheseweremore
gearedtowardsplanningstrategyratherthaneducatingnewrecruits.Partymembers
reportedthatthefrequencyofthesemeetingswasusuallydrivenbythebranch
leader—iftheywereorganizedandcommittedthentherewouldberegularmeetings.
However,thiswasnotalwaysthecaseandsomebranchleaderswerelaxincalling
suchmeetings.Mostcandidateshadlittleinteractionwiththelocalbranchoffice
beyondthis,letalonethecentralpartycommittee.
Thethreecasestudiesexhibiteddifferentdynamicsbetweenthecandidateandthe
centraloffice.TheHanuracandidatereceivedfundingfromthecentralofficeinmid‐
2013.Astheparty’sfirst‐rankedcandidate,shewasgivenfundingtoleasebillboards,
printpostersandbanners,rentaposkoandhireateamofofficestaff.Thisfunding
wasinsufficienttocovermostofthedonationsandsmall‐scaleprojectsthatshe
offeredtovotersinordertosecuresupport.Towardstheendofthecampaign,the
candidatewasspendingherownmoneytopayforrallies,prizesandtravel.Similarly,
theGerindracandidatereceivedsomeinitialfundingbutwasexpectedtofinancethe
majorityofhiscampaigncosts.Beinganincumbent,hehadaccesstogovernment
fundswhichhecoulddirectstrategicallytopleasehisexistingsupportbase.Whilehe
diddrawuponsomepersonalfunds,heacknowledgedthathehadasignificant
advantageasanincumbentbecausehecouldtakecreditforgovernmentdevelopment
projects.TheNasdemcandidatereceivedmuchmorefundingfromthecentralparty
officethantheothercandidates.Hedidpaysomedonationcostsoutofhisown
pocket,butotherexpensesweremetbytheparty.Asoneoftheparty’smost
prominentcandidates,withahighpotentialforsuccess,thepartyinvested
substantiallyinhiscampaign,withmuchofthefundsspentonralliesduringthe
officialcampaignperiodwhichhesharedwithothercandidatesfromtheprovincial
anddistrictlevels.ThiswasinlinewithNasdem’spledgetosupportcandidateswith
fundingofRp.5‐10billionineachelectorate(Badudu2013).42
42AsnotedinChapterFour,Nasdemhadundertakentofundcandidates’campaignsinan
efforttodiscouragecorruption.Therationalewasthatifacandidatedidnothavetospend
theirownmoneythroughoutthecampaign(whichcanbeverycostly)thentheywouldbeless
likelytoneedtorecouptheirspendingthroughcorruptionwhileinparliamentiftheywere
successfulintheelection.
167
Nationalcandidates’interactionwithlocallevelpartyofficesalsodependedupon
theirpersonalrelationshipwithlocalbranchleaders.FortheGerindraandNasdem
candidates,whowerebothnativesoftheirelectoratesandseniorpartymembers,the
localbranchesprovidedintegrallogisticsupportduringcampaigns,suchasputting
upbannersandorganizingrallies.TheNasdemcandidate,inparticular,drewheavily
uponlocalcadrestocampaignonhisbehalf,alsowantingthemtoapproachpeoplein
publicanddiscusswiththemthebenefitsofvotingforthecandidateandNasdem.In
thecaseofHanura,therelationshipbetweenthelocalbranchesandthecandidate
wereinitiallystrainedbecauseshehadtakenthepositionofanotherHanuramember
whohadstronglocalsupport.Shereceivedlittlesupportfromlocalcadresformostof
hercampaign.Additionally,whiletheofficesofothercandidateswerestaffedbyparty
cadres,theHanuracandidatewasforcedtohirecontractstaffforthedurationofthe
campaign.Thisreflectedthefactthatshewasnotalocaltotheareaandcouldnot
drawuponfamilyorclosepartytiesforsupport.
Nationalcandidatessometimesagreedtosharecostswithothersinthepartywho
werevyingforpositionsinprovincialorlocalparliament.Thismeantorganizingjoint
electionactivitiesandsometimesevenprintingbannerswiththecandidatestogether,
hopingtoreducetheirownexpenditure.Althoughtandemarrangementswere
generallyinformal,theyprovidedameansforcandidateswithinthesamepartyto
worktogether,whichdidnotusuallyoccurbetweencandidatescompetingforseats
atthesamelevelofgovernment.Whilethearrangementswereprimarilyfinancial
ones,therewasscopeforintra‐partyinfluencethroughthesecooperativeefforts.
Tandemarrangementscouldbolsteranti‐corruptionsymbolismifthecandidates’
rhetoricwasinalignment,butitcouldalsounderminesuchasymbolifrhetoricwas
inconsistent.Forexample,ifonememberofthetandempartnershipdecidedthey
wouldgivepeoplemoneyinexchangeforvotes,theotherswithinthepartnership
mightbepressuredtocontribute.Moreover,ifonememberinthetandem
arrangementdidbuyvotes,citizensmayassumethatalltheassociatedcandidates
wouldfollowthesamestrategy.Ifcandidateshadpreviouslyattemptedtoprojectan
anti‐corruptionsymbol,vote‐buyingbytandempartnerscouldweakenit.
Theprimaryconcernofthecentralpartycommitteewastomaximizevotes.Targets
wereidentifiedforeachelectorate,nominallybasedontheparty’shistoryinthearea
168
andtheestimatednumberofvotesneededtowinaseat.43Whilethecentralparty
fundedandapprovedmarketingwhichithopedwouldpositivelyinfluencevoters,
theyalsoplacedsignificantexpectationsoncandidates.Yet,despitethedependence
partieshaveoncandidatesuccess,inthethreecasestudiesobservedtherewasvery
littleoversightovercampaignactivitiesatthelocallevel.Allcandidateschosetheir
ownslogans,designedtheirowncampaignmaterialsandselectedtheirownmeeting
andrallysites.Therewasnoformalapprovalprocessoroversightforanyofthese
activities.44Candidatescoulddecidehowcloselytheywishedtoalignwithparty
symbolsastherewasnorequirementforthemtobeincludedinthecampaign
publicitymaterial,orsystemstoenforceuniformityofsymbolsamongstcandidates.
Monitoringwasfurtherconstrainedbythesheernumberofcandidatescompetingin
thenationalelection.Evenifpartieswantedtoensureuniformityofsymbols,or
monitortheuseofvote‐buyingacrossthecampaignsofcandidates,itwouldbe
difficultgiventhattherewerearound180,000candidatesacrossfourlevelsof
governmentcompetingfor19,699positionsin2014(Aspinall2014a:97;Iqbal2014).
Whilecooperationcouldbebeneficialforbothcandidatesandpartiesasawhole,the
scalardimensionsofcampaigninginIndonesiamadeitdifficulttocoordinateacross
nationalandindividualcampaigns.
Conclusion
Thesecasestudiespresentanempiricalbasistoinvestigatehowanti‐corruption
symbolismisemployedintheconceptualizationandexecutionofacampaignstrategy
atthelocallevel,discussingtherelationaltransferenceoftheanti‐corruptionsymbol
(orlackthereof)fromthecentretothemasses,viatheconduitofindividual
candidates.Candidatescoulddrawfromthenationallevelpartysymbolscreatedat
thecentre;however,therewasnocompulsionforthemtodoso.Anti‐corruption
symbolswereused,tovaryingdegrees,byallthreenationallegislativecandidates.
Thecandidateshaddifferencesintermsofpastexperiences,standingwithinthe
communityandtheparty.Eachcampaignwasconductedinauniquepolitical
43Themeansthroughwhichthistargetwasdeterminedvariedacrossthecandidates.While
theNasdemcandidatedidhisowncalculations,createdhisowntargetandreportedthisback
tothecentralpartycommittee,boththeGerindraandHanuracandidatesweredictated
numbersbythepartyseparatetotheirowncalculations.AsidentifiedinChapterFive,the
Gerindracandidatewasannoyedatthehighexpectationsplacedonhimbyhisparty,
concernedthattheywereunrealisticwithoutresortingtobribery.TheHanuracandidatewas
alsoconsiderablyanxiousabouthertargets,especiallywhenitbecameapparentlaterinthe
campaignthatshewasnotontracktoachievethem.
44Thiswasevidencedbythewidevarietyofpostersandbannersamongstcandidatesfrom
thesamepartyduringtheelectionperiod.Therewaslittleconsistencybecausetherewasno
externalimpetustoadoptpartysymbols.
169
environmentandthecandidates’ownbackgroundssawthemrespondtoelection
demandsdifferently.Thesedistinctionsplayedintothenarrativesusedtoconstruct
theanti‐corruptionsymbols.
Thewaycandidatesusedsymbolswasnotstatic—thesymbolwaspromotedwhen
candidatesdeemeditbeneficialanddownplayedwhenitwasconsideredunhelpful.
Althoughcorruptionwasidentifiedasaprimaryelectionsymbolnation‐wide,
candidatesfoundthattalkingaboutfightingcorruptiondidnotalwayselicitthe
desiredresponseamongstcitizens.Voterswhorejectedtheanti‐corruptionsymbols,
forwhateverreason,sentamessagetothecandidatesaboutitslackofvalue.
Candidatesadaptedtheircampaignstrategiesindifferentwaystomanagethese
responses.TheHanuracandidateeventuallystoppedusingsuchsymbolsaltogether,
claimingtheywerecounterproductivewhiletheNasdemcandidateincreasedthe
intensityofhisanti‐corruptionsymbolandtheGerindracandidatemaintaineda
steadyapproachtoconstructinghissymbol,drawinguponhisyearsofelection
experience.Ontheotherhand,candidatesalsorecognizedthelimitationsofusing
moneypolitics,whichcouldbecostlybutunabletoguaranteevictory.Facedwiththis
dilemma,itwasthepersonalidealsofthecandidatethateventuallydeterminedwhat
campaignapproachtheywouldtake.
Evenanadamantself‐identificationas‘clean’or‘anti‐corruption’didnotpreventthe
candidatesfromusingmoneytoinfluencevoters.Candidatesoftenexpresseda
narrowdefinitionofelectoralcorruption,whichwasusuallydescribedasthe
exchangeofcashforvotes,orbribingelectoralofficialstomanipulateresultsintheir
favour.Butwhilegivingcashtoindividualsinreturnforvoteswasdeplorable,other
typesofcontributions,althoughsometimesgivenreluctantly,wereacceptedasa
normalaspectofpoliticalcampaigning.Thoughacknowledgingthatsuchcampaign
normswereexpensiveandnotideal,theydidnotnecessarilyconsidergivingout
moneyorgoodsasmoneypoliticsperse.Forexample,donatingtovillagefunds,
religiousinstitutionsorpayingcitizens‘transportmoney’asreimbursementfor
attendingrallieswereacceptableandstandardcampaignpractices,ratherthan
immoralorcorruptbehaviour.Aftertheelectionwasover,candidatesexpressed
differentopinionsregardingtheuseofmoneyinelections.WhiletheHanuraand
Nasdemcandidatesvocallybegrudgeditandblameditfortheirunsatisfactory
results,theGerindracandidatestoicallydescribeditasjustanotherpartofelections
170
inIndonesia.Hissympathieslaywithnewcandidateswhodidnothavethebenefitof
incumbencyandaccesstogovernmentfundstoinfluencevoters.
Partieshadavestedinterestinthesuccessoftheircandidates,buttheyperformed
minimaloversightoftheircampaigns.Whilecandidateshadtoaccountfortheir
spendingwithreceipts,manytransactionsoccurred‘offthebooks’andinreality
partiesdidlittletopreventthispractice.Outwardly,partiestookastrongstance
againstcorruptionandmoneypolitics,butinrealitythedefinitionswereunclear,and
insomecasesthemessagegiventocandidatescontradictedthesymbol.Candidates
cameunderpressuretoengageinvote‐buyingfromthecentralpartycommittee,
whichsetambitiousvotequotasforcandidates,andsuggestionsfromcampaign
teamsthatwithoutvote‐buyingtheyriskeddefeat.
171
172
ChapterSix
Asuccessfulstrategy?
ThethreecasestudiesoutlinedinChapterFiveprovideabasisforexploringhow
anti‐corruptionsymbolswereimaginedandmobilizedbyindividualcandidatesinthe
2014legislativeelections.Consideredinthecontextofbroadernationalcampaigns,
theemploymentofananti‐corruptionsymbolbycandidatesrevealsboththe
influenceoflocalcontextandthenatureofintra‐partyrelations,uncoveringtensions
betweenpartystructureandindividualagency.Focusingontheconsistenciesand
inconsistenciesinhowanti‐corruptionsymbolswereimaginedanddeployedby
differentemergingparties,andtheresultstheygarnered,allowsustointerrogatethe
linkbetweennationalandlocalsymbols,andelectoraloutcomes.Thecoordination
(orlackthereof)thatexistswithincampaigns,inturn,helpstoexplainwhythis
campaignstrategyissoflawed.
Whilethenationallevelelectioncampaignswereintendedasanall‐encompassing
reflectionofpartyvaluesand,subsequently,thevaluesofitsmembers,local
candidateshadtheautonomytodecidewhethertheywishedtomobilizethesame
symbolsasthoseinthenationalcampaign.Evenwhencandidatesdidadoptthesame
symbols—aswasthecasetoagreaterorlesserextentforthethreecasestudy
candidates—theyadaptedthemtosuittheirlocalcontextandimbuedthemwiththeir
ownprinciples.Somecandidates,especiallythosewithpositionsintheirparty’s
centralcommittee,feltpressuretoupholdpartysymbols,but,inreality,therewas
littledonebypartyofficialstoensurethatcandidatesmaintainedthepartylineor
refrainedfromusingmoneypolitics.1Partiesdidnotforcetheirsymbolsupon
candidatesand,therefore,whetheracandidate‘stucktotheirguns’andmaintained
ananti‐corruptionsymbolwastheresultsofpersonaljudgement.
Justifyingtheuseofananti‐corruptionsymbol
Oppositionpartiesaroundtheworldoftenuseanti‐corruptionsymbolstopromote
themselvesandchallengerivalsandIndonesiaisnoexception.Viewedasmoral
1Thisthesisdoesnotseektogointodetailabouttheopinionsorrationalizationsfor
corruptionandvote‐buyingfromthevoterperspective.Whilethefieldworkconductedcasts
somelightonpossibletheoriesastowhymanyvotersintheparticulardistrictscoveredby
thisresearchwishtobepaid(eitherincashoringoods/services)byparliamentary
candidates,itwasnotthefocusoftheresearch.Whiletherearefewin‐depthacademicstudies
onthistopic,Wahid(Forthcoming)providessomeinsight.
173
resources,partiesseethefightagainstcorruptionasauniversallyappealingissue
alignedwithbroaderidealssuchastrust,honestyandhelpingordinarycitizens.
Decidingtovocallyopposecorruption,partiesdrawuponmoralargumentsto
portraythemselvesasbastionsofallthatisgood,whilehopingtocreateasymbol
thatisaneffectivevote‐getter.Establishingananti‐corruptionsymbolnotonly
presentsemergingpartiesinapositivelight;italsoframesexistingpartiesasvillains
withinablack‐and‐whitediscoursethatignoresthecomplexitiesandnuancesof
entrenchedpoliticalcorruption.Thesimplificationoftheproblemisevidentas
electioncampaignsusuallyseektoassignblameratherthanproposemeaningful
solutions.Presentedcrudelyasastockpoliticalplot,thecomplexityoftheproblemis
dissolvedandrhetoriccanbesimplified.Ananti‐corruptionsymbolalsorepresentsa
competitiveadvantageforemergingpartiesthathaveyettosufferfromany
significantcorruptionscandals.Theparties’lackofhistory,insomecasesa
disadvantage,canbeleveragedtopromotethepartyasacleanand,therefore,
preferablealternativetothoseinpower.2
Emergingpartieswereeagertoportraythemselvesaspoliticalsaviours,andoneway
todothiswastoembarkona‘projectofnewness’.Downplayingtheparty’slackof
pastachievementsandarguingthatchange,initself,isadesirablepoliticaloutcome,a
projectofnewnessemphasizeswhatnewpartiesarenot—mostparticularlythatthey
arenotresponsibleforthecurrentstateofgovernmentaffairs.3Anti‐corruption
symbolsfitwellwiththeprojectofnewness,especiallyasnewpartiescanportray
themselvesinoppositiontothestatusquo,relyingontheassessmentthatnothing
couldbeworsethantheincumbentgovernmentreturningtopower.Campaigns
contributedtothisprojectbypaintingoldpartiesasfailuresandnewpartiesas
much‐neededchange.ThiswasmostexplicitlyillustratedthroughNasdem’s
campaignslogan,‘GerakanPerubahan´(MovementforChange),althoughother
emergingpartiesusedsimilarthemesintheirrhetoric.However,simplybeingnewer
thanotherpartieswasnotenough,particularlyforindividualcandidateswhowere
competingagainstseveralrivals
Hanura,GerindraandNasdemallbrandedtheincumbentgovernmentasbeing
corruptintheir2014nationalelectioncampaigns.Thiswasnotsurprisinggiventhe
2Thisisnottosaythattheemergingpartiesstudiedhadnocandidatesormemberswith
‘questionable’pasts,butingeneraltheydidnothavememberswhohadbeeninvolvedin
grossmisconductormisuseofpublicofficeforpersonalbenefit.
3Whilethecampaignlanguageofemergingpartiescastolderrivalsinabadlight,therewas
almostnoantagonismamongstthethreenewpartiesthemselves.
174
numberofscandalspublicizedbetween2009and2014.4Opinionsurveysinthelead‐
uptotheelectionsuggestedthatIndonesianvotersfeltthatmanyDemocraticParty
membershadhadnointentionof‘sayingnotocorruption’,despitetheparty’s
campaigntothateffect.Concentratingpublicattentiononcorruptionwasaneasy
wayfornewpartiestofueldisdainforthepoliticalelitesinpower.Althoughnotall
thescandalsinvolvedthecabinetorparliament—therewerenumerouscorruption
casesthataffectedthejudiciary,thepoliceandthebureaucracy—thepervasiveness
ofcorruptionmadethegovernmentseemallthemorehypocritical.Byattemptingto
keepcorruptioncasesinthepubliceye,emergingpartiesbecomemoral
entrepreneurs,hopingtocapitalizeontheperceivedflawsoftheincumbent
leadership,whilstmaintainingalevelofmoralpanicinordertoconvertanti‐
governmentsentimentintosupportfortheirparties.
Salientandprimed
Thesalienceofanti‐corruptionissuesinthe2014electioncampaignwasundeniable.
Thehistoryofcorruptionasapoliticalconcernmeantthatthepublicwerealready
awareoftheseriousnessoftheproblem.Withissuesaliencealreadyestablished,
partiesandcandidatescouldpositionthemselveswithinthedominantdiscourses
explainingwhycorruptionwassoprevalent.Pastattemptstolinkcorruptiontoelite
greedanddisregardforthegoodofthenationfosteredasenseofmoralpanicand
outragearoundcorruptionissues.Partiescouldpositionthemselvespositivelyby
exploitingthispanic,hopingtoprovokeanemotionalconnectionwithvoterswho
werefrustratedbycorruptgovernmentpractices.5Theyseizeduponnarratives
holdingthatcorruptionimpedednationalandsocialdevelopmentandwasdrivenby
selfishmaterialism.Whetherthesenarrativesreflectedrealitywasirrelevant.The
questionwastheextenttowhichtheycouldbuilduponthissaliencewiththeirown
declarationsinordertobetteralignthemselveswithananti‐corruptionsymbol.
Primingisintendedtoconvincevoters‘togivemoreweighttothoseareaswhen
assessingcandidates’(Druckmanetal.2004:1180).Althoughanti‐corruptionwas
alreadyasalientelectoralissue,emergingpartiesusedtheirnationalcampaignsto
furtherhighlighttheconcern,primingvotersusingextensivemediacoverageand
publicstatementsbypartyleaders.Indoingso,theyaimedtosettheagendaforthe
election,reinforcingtothepublicthatcorruptionwasacriticalnationalissue.Parties
4AsdiscussedinChapterThree.
5ThisideaisdrawnfromBecker(1973:2),whoassertsthatpartiesseektoengenderasense
ofcommunitaswithvoterswhoidentifywiththemoralspromotedbytheparty.
175
alsoneededtoconvincethepublicthattheywerebestplacedtoleadthefightagainst
corruption.6However,whilehistorymayhaveprimedcorruptiontobeofgrave
concerntovoters,emergingpartiesstillhadtoexploittheissueeffectivelyinorderto
benefitfromsalienceandpriming.
Withonlyashorthistoryandsomesmall‐scaleanti‐corruptionefforts(generally
commensuratewiththeirexistingpoliticalinfluence),theemergingparties’successin
owningtheissuecameprimarilyfromtheirclaimsofnothavingbeencorruptrather
thanclaimsaboutwhattheyhaveachieved.Ownershipgainedundersuch
circumstancesis‘leased’ratherthanentrenchedandisgenerallyprecarious,
requiringeffectiverhetoricintheabsenceofconcreteexamplestoconvincevotersof
agenuinecommitmenttofightingcorruption,particularlyifpartieshavealong‐term
plantoestablishmorestableissueownership.
Theartofpersuasion
Edelman’s(1964;1971)earlyworkonpoliticalsymbolismallowsforthe
conceptualizationofanti‐corruptionissuesasatoolforpersuasionratherthana
partyplatformorevenarudimentarybasisforpolicy.Inthe2014elections,emerging
partiesbelievedasuccessfulanti‐corruptionsymbolwouldactasareflectionofthe
moralcredibilityofthepartyanditscandidates.Buildingmoralcredibilityrelieson
bridgingthegapbetweenthesymbolic(dramatic)andtheauthentic,convincingthe
publicthatthereisadirectcorrelationbetweentherhetoricusedandthevaluesheld
bypartiesandcandidates.InIndonesia,thisalignmentwaschallengedbypre‐existing
publiccynicism,aspastexperiencehasrepeatedlyshownthatpoliticiansoftensay
onethingbutdoanother.7Inthissense,attemptstoestablishananti‐corruption
symbolweretreacherousbecausepartieswhohadusedthesymbolinthepasthad
sincebeencastashypocrites.8
Withoutalong‐standingtrackrecordinfightingcorruption,emergingpartieswere
lefttoconvincevotersoftheiranti‐corruptioncredentialsusinglanguageand
dramatism.TheAristoteliandefinitionofsuccessfulrhetoric—consistingofethos,
6AsdiscussedinChapterThree,corruptionwaswidelyidentifiedasakeypoliticalconcernin
Indonesiathroughanumberofpublicsurveysconductedintheleaduptothe2014election.
7AsevidencedbythepoliticalcorruptionscandalsoftheDemocraticPartyandPKSdiscussed
inChapterThree.
8TheHanuracandidatearticulatedthisexplicitlywhensheadmittedthatheruseofanti‐
corruptionsymbolswasinfluencedbyitsco‐optioninthe2009campaignsoftheDemocratic
PartyandPKS.
176
pathosandlogos—allowsustoassessthequalityofanti‐corruptionsymbolsinthe
Indonesiancontext.9Ifemergingpartiesweretoeffectivelyconfrontthepublic
disappointmentfosteredbythepreviousregime,theyneededtocraftrhetoricthat
wasmorallycredible,supportedbyevidenceandabletoarousesympathyfromthe
audience.However,whileethosandpathoswereoftendrawnupontoestablishan
anti‐corruptionsymbol,bothbythepartiesasawholeandindividualcandidates,
logoswasoftenmoredifficulttodemonstrate.
Emergingpartiesreliedontheirnewnessandtherelativeabsenceofscandalintheir
shorthistoriestoestablishethos.Whenscandalshaderupted,suchastheBambang
SoehartocasefacedbyHanura,theleadershipwasquicktocondemntheperpetrator
andmaintainthatthisindividualactwasnotareflectiontheparty’sculture.10
Individualcandidatesplayedontheircleanreputationstoprovetheirpersonalethos,
butalso,wherepossible,focusedonestablishingethosthroughtheirconnectionsto
thearea,especiallyhighlightingtheirkinshipand/orreligiousties.Indoingthis,
candidateshopedtowinthetrustofvotersastheywereaputeradaerah(‘localson’)
whowasmorecommittedtorepresentingtheirfellowlocalsthancandidatesfrom
otherareas.FortheHanuracandidate,wholackedstrongfamilialtiestoher
electorateinEastJava,establishingcredibilitywasespeciallydifficult.11
Pathosplayedacentralroleinthecampaignsofthetwosuccessfulcandidatesfrom
GerindraandNasdem,bothofwhomwereengagingpublicspeakers.Asahighly
emotiveissue,speakingabouttheevilsofcorruptioncompellinglyandpledgingto
fightitwascertaintorousepublicinterest,ifnotsupport.Conversely,eventhough
theHanuracandidatecouldlegitimatelypromoteherselfasuntaintedbycorruption,
shelackedthecharismaoftheothercandidatesobservedinthisstudy.12Sheshied
awayfromspeakingtolargeaudiencesofmen,andevenwhentalkingtogroupsof
womenherorationsweregenerallyshortandperfunctory.Moreover,asmentioned,
shewasuncomfortablespeakingopenlyaboutcorruption,claimingthatitwasan
9Theseare:tohavemoral‘worthiness’orcredibility(ethos),prooftosupportargument
(logos)andbeabletoarousefeelingsintheaudience(pathos).Theseconceptswerediscussed
inChapterOne.
10TheBambangSoehartocasewasdiscussedinChapterFour.
11TheHanuracandidatecomplainedthathereffortstodemonstratethatshewouldbeaclean
andcommittedrepresentativewereoftenmetwithrequestsforacontribution,eventhough
shehadhopedthatthisrhetoricwoulddissuadepeoplefromaskingforgoodsormoney.
12Thisassertionisbasedontheresearcher’sownexperienceswiththethreedifferent
candidates.
177
unsavouryissuethatmadeheraudiencesfeeluncomfortable,andsowaslessclearin
publiclyarticulatingherviewsoncorruptionotherthantoassertthatsheopposedit.
Whiledemonstratinglogosseemedthemostdifficultaspectofrhetoricconstruction
forpartiesasawhole,theabilityofindividualcandidatestoestablishitdependedon
theirpastexperience.Inparticular,theGerindraandNasdemcandidatesmademuch
oftheirpersonalcommitmenttofightingcorruption,usingstoriesoftheirpastanti‐
corruptionendeavours.TheGerindracandidatetalkedabouthiseffortsasa
parliamentarian;thathehadfullysupportedandimplementedthebanon
internationaltravelbyGerindralegislatorsatpublicexpenseandralliedagainst
unnecessaryrenovationstothenationalparliamentarybuilding,whichhebelieved
werepartofaplotintendedtochannelfundstotheDemocraticParty.TheNasdem
candidateunderscoredhispastasanactivistandhispreviousresignationfromthe
DPR‐RI,contendingthathehadbeendisgustedbytheimmoralandcorruptbehaviour
ofhispeers,andnowwishedtoreturninordertoexposetheirvenality.Whileboth
assertedthattheirpartieswerecommittedtoeradicatingcorruption,itwasdifficult
topresentconcreteexamplesofimpactfulanti‐corruptionmeasuresundertaken
becausethepartieshadneverbeeninapositiontomeaningfullyinfluenceanti‐
corruptionefforts.Itwasalsostrategictohighlighttheirowntrackrecordasshould
theirpartysufferfromamajorcorruptionscandalinthefuture,theycouldmaintain
theiranti‐corruptionsymbolbecausetheybaseditmostlyuponpersonal
achievementinsteadofpartyrhetoric.
Intheearlystagesofthecampaignthesecandidatesclaimedastrongassociationwith
theirparty’sideals,includingincombatingcorruption.However,theframingofthese
symbolswasdrivenmorebytheindividual’sownprioritiesratherthanthoseofthe
party.Forexample,whileHanurapublicationscriticizedthedeepentrenchmentof
corruptionattheelitelevelandWirantohadarguedforthedeathpenaltyforthose
foundguiltyofcorruption,theHanuracandidatedidnotmentionanypolitical
corruptionscandalsorspeakaboutpunishmentforcorruptionduringhercampaign.
Conversely,theNasdemcandidate’santi‐corruptionsymbolwasmorepronounced
thanthatofhisparty.Hiscampaigncentredonhiscommitmenttofighting
corruption,bothinCenturygateandagainstthe‘traitors’inparliament.Nasdemparty
rhetoricwasmuchmoregeneral,emphasizingnationalismandtheparty’s
commitmenttoaddressingallofIndonesia’sproblems,oneofwhichwascorruption.
TheGerindracandidate’santi‐corruptionsymbolwasthemostcloselyalignedwith
178
thatofhisparty:hisstatusasaseniorpartymemberandincumbentmeantthathe
couldinfluencepartypolicyanditsnationalcampaign.Atthesametime,theredidnot
appeartobeanyadditionalcompulsionforhimtofollowthepartylineand,likeother
candidates,hewasfreetocampaigninwhateverwayhesawfit.Itwasclear,too,that
eachcandidatepresentedthesymbolinawaythatunderscoredtheirpersonal
achievementsandpromises,ratherthanthoseofthepartyasawhole.
Inaddition,whileallcandidatesstatedattheoutsetofthecampaignsthattheywere
opposedtocorruption,somewerecautiousabouttheuseofthisrhetoric,
acknowledgingthatithadbeenco‐optedinthepast.Thehistoricalcontextofthe
symbolmeantthatitwouldbedifficulttoconvincevotersthatthedramatism
surroundingtheuseofanti‐corruptionrhetoricwasatruereflectionofthe
candidate’sauthenticself.Inthisrespect,theparties’cleanimagewashelpfulto
candidatesandallowedthemtospeakaboutcorruptionfromapositionofauthority,
butwasnotthesolebasisfortheirpersonalanti‐corruptionsymbols.Ascandidates
werecompetingagainstahostofrivals,bothfromotherpartiesandtheirown,the
methodsofpersuasiontheychosewereofparamountimportance.Votersupportwas
fuelledbytwomeans:usingthemostconvincingrhetoricorbyofferingmaterial
rewards.Giventhedifficultiesinconvincinglyestablishinganti‐corruptionsymbolsin
thefaceofvoterscepticism,itisunsurprisingthatcandidatesdidnotrelysolelyon
rhetorictowinthemvotes.
Appealingcampaignsymbolspresentedacompetitiveedge,especiallyincaseswhere
numerouscandidatesofferedcomparablematerialrewardstovoters.13For
candidateswholackeddeeppockets,anti‐corruptionsymbolswerealsoamechanism
forjustifyingtheabsenceofsizeablematerialrewards.Thiswasparticularlyvisiblein
theHanuracampaign.Whenaskedwhethershecouldprovideacontribution,the
candidatedeflectedrequestswithresponsesthatidentifiedsuchcontributionsas
illegalandthatcandidateswillingtomakethemwouldnotservevoters’interests.
Ultimately,though,allthreecandidatesusedbothsymbolsandmaterialrewardsto
lurevoters,hopingthedualstrategywouldsecurevictory.Thescopeofmaterial
rewardswasdeterminedbythecandidates’campaignbudget.Thedecisionof
whethertoprovidematerialrewardswasalsolinkedtothecandidate’srelationship
13Aspinall(2014b)suggeststhatintheeventthatseveralcandidatesdistributedmoneyor
goodsforvotes,voterstendedtoselectthecandidatethattheypersonallylikedthebest.
179
withpartynetworks(localbranches)andtandemagreementswithothercandidates,
whichaffectedtheircapacitytomaximizethegeographicscopeoftheircampaign.
EventhoughLawNo.10/2008ontheGeneralElectionofMembersfortheDPR,DPD
andDPRDforbidstheuseofanyincentivestogainvotes,thefactthatthisbehaviour
hasbecomecommoncampaignpracticemeantthatcandidateshadtodecidehowto
confrontthechallengesthisposes.Inthecasestudiesobserved,candidateswalkeda
linebetweenacceptableandillicitpracticesandwherethislinefellwasmostly
determinedbytheirownconceptofmoralbehaviour.Materialrewardswere,infact,
anindispensableaspectofelectioncampaigning.Moreimportant,though,washow
thecandidatesthemselvesjustifiedtheiruseintermsoftheirownself‐identification
asbeingcleanandtheirdefinitionsofmoneypoliticsandvote‐buying.Material
contributionswerealwaysframedasagiftandthecognitivedissonancewas
addressedbyrationalizingcontributionsasbothnormalandpermissible.Sociological
definitionsofcorruptionplayedacrucialroleinfacilitatingthisrationalizationas
ideasofwhatwasnormalandacceptablewereusedtojustifyactionsthat,strictly
speaking,wereillegal.Thecandidatesthemselvesseemedtooscillatebetween
acceptanceandfrustrationthattheboundariesofnormalbehaviourandillegal
behaviourwerenotoneandthesame.Asthecampaignsworeonandtherewas
increasingpressuretoengageinmoneypoliticstosecurevotes,allthecandidates
becameincreasinglyannoyedbutalsorespondeddifferentlytothepressure.
Candidatesmatter
AsAspinall(2014a:101)contends,votersaremoreinfluencedbyindividual
candidatesthanthepartiestheyrepresent.Logically,then,thecampaignstrategies
theyadoptatthelocallevelaremoreimportantthanthoseadoptedatanationallevel
bythepartiestheyrepresent.Thedecisionbyindividualstoadoptananti‐corruption
symbolfortheirpersonalcampaignsrestsontwofactors—whetherthecandidates
believesthesymbolwilldrawsupport(narrativepreference)andwhetheritfitswith
theirownmoralpriorities.Havinggreatautonomyinplanningandexecutingtheir
ownelectioncampaigns,thesymbolschosenbycandidatesneededtoresonatewith
theirownsetofvaluesand/orbeseenasavote‐getter.Ifasymboldidnotresonate,
theywerefreetoignoreit.Inotherwords,allthe‘bigpicture’rationalizationsfor
usingananti‐corruptionsymbolmayormaynothaveconvincedcandidatestoadopt
them.
180
Justashistoryhadprimedtheelectoratetoscorncorruption,thenationalelectoral
campaignprimedthesymbolforindividualcandidates.Asaconsequenceofthe
symbioticrelationshipbetweenpartiesandcandidates—candidatesrequireparty
nominationinordertorunforoffice,whilethepartiesneedtowinseatsin
parliamenttogainpoliticalinfluence—theimageofcandidateswasnecessarily
affected,toagreaterorlesserextent,bytheoverallimageoftheirparty.Intheory,
candidateshavetheopportunitytocapitalizeonnationalagenda‐setting,relyingonit
tofill‘knowledgegaps’(GeysandVermeir2014).Intheabsenceofinformationabout
aparticularcandidate,votersdrawon‘partycues’,judgingthemonthereputationof
thepartythattheyrepresent.Inpractice,somecandidatesrecognizedthattheir
partieshadalreadydevelopedananti‐corruptionsymbolandcapitalizedonthisby
adoptingitasapersonalsymbolaswell.However,whilepartyimagecanplayarole
indeterminingvoterdecisions,mostcandidatessawnational–levelcampaignsas
‘secondarytotheirownefforts’(Aspinall2014a:107).
Amongstcandidateswhooptedtoconstructananti‐corruptionsymbol,the
conceptualizationoftheissuevariedleadingtodifferenttypesofnarrativesintheir
electioncampaigns.Theycould‘mobilize’votersbymakingtheirpersonalideological
prioritiesattractivetovotersor‘chase’thembycraftingrhetoricinlinewithwhat
theybelievedthepublicwantedtohear(Rohrschneider2002:368‐369).TheHanura
candidatewasclearlychasingvotes,illustratedbyherdecisiontostopusingananti‐
corruptionsymbolwhenshefeltitwasnotappealingorifitmadepeoplefeel
uncomfortable.TheGerindracandidate,whileusingaverydifferenttypeofrhetoric,
alsoappearedtobechasingvotes.Whilehetouchedupontheimportanceof
combatingcorruptionduringsomespeeches,hisfocuswasondemonstratinghis
commitmenttotheproblem.Heassumedthatpeoplewantedparliamentariansthat
wouldfightcorruptionandbelievedhehadtoprovethathewasthecontenderfor
thisjob.Partypoliciesweregenerallyonlymentionedwhentheysupportedhis
personalsymbol.Bycontrast,theNasdemcandidatetriedtomobilizevotes.Hespoke
ofcorruptionasaterribleevilthroughoutthecampaign,rampinguphisrhetoricas
theelectiondatedrewcloser.Heopenlycriticizedothers,inspiteofthediscomfort
thiscaused,andendeavouredtopersuadevotersoftheimportanceofdealingwith
whathebelievedtobemajorcasesofcorruption.Hisapproachreliedpartlyon
convincingvotersthathavingcleanlegislatorswhowouldnotbreakthelaw,rather
thanthe‘traitors’whowerealreadyinparliament,wascrucialtotheirowninterests.
181
Therelationshipbetweencandidatesandtheirparties’nationalleadershipplayed
someroleinshapinghowcandidatesusedthesesymbols.Allthecandidatesinthis
studywerepartymemberswithstronglinkstothecentralcommittee,ifnotmembers
ofitthemselves.Asseniorrepresentativesoftheparty,theyfeltmoreinclinedto
adoptapartysymbolastheirown.Itwasalsomademorelikelybythefactthatall
threeofthesecandidateshadbeenpartymemberspriortobeingnominatedand
werethefirst‐rankedpartycandidateintheirrespectiveelectorates.Theyfeltthe
needtoupholdthereputationofthepartyandpaintitinthemostpositivelight
possible.Inaddition,asspokespersonsfortheirparties,theGerindraandNasdem
candidateswerepublicfiguresanditwouldreflectpoorlyonthemiftheyignored
partyrhetoric.TheHanuracandidatewasakeensupporterofWirantoandthusalso
hadanallegiancetothepartyandincentivetosupportitsrhetoric.
However,ultimately,thedecisiontoupholdpartysymbolswasdrivenmorebythe
candidates’desiretowinthanbytheirsenseofpartyloyalty.Andwhileallthree
candidatesassertedthattheywishedtoappealtovotersbydenouncingcorruption
andportrayingthemselvesasclean,theystillhadtogaugetheirlocalcontextwhen
decidinghowbesttorousesupport(Figure6.1).
Figure6.1Influencesuponcandidates’politicalcampaignstrategy
182
Localcontextwasparticularlyinfluentialforcandidateschasingvotes,becausetheir
strategydependedonselectingsymbolsthatwerepertinenttovoters.Also
important,however,wastheirabilitytoinfluencevotersusingkinshiptiesand
brokernetworks.Wheresuchtieswerestrong,theuseofsymbolswasmore
consistentbecausethecandidatecould,onatleastsomelevel,beassuredofsome
votersympathyifnotoutrightsupport.Buttheselocalrelationshipsstillneededtobe
complementedwitheffectivecampaigns,especiallywherecandidatesneededto
appealtoswingvotersorifmorethanonecandidatehadstronglocaltiesinthesame
electorate.Theoretically,themosteffectiveapproachwouldincludeacoordinated
useofsymbols,representingthepartyasaunitedforcecommittedtoeradicating
corruptionandworkingforthebenefitofthepeople.However,giventhegeographic
distancesandthedifferentscalesacrosswhichelectioncampaignsoccurinIndonesia,
ensuringthatpartysymbolsarepromotedinaconsistentmannerismoreeasilysaid
thandone.
Diffusionofsymbols
Ingeneral,politicalcampaignsinIndonesiaarehighlyindividualized.Eveninnation‐
widepartycampaignsmediaattentionisoftenfocusedonkeypartyfigures,rather
thanonrelayingtheparty’svisionandmissionasawhole.Similarly,atthelocallevel
candidatestendtoemphasizetheirindividualfamilyorethniclinksandpersonal
historyratherthantheplatformoftheirparty.Thenatureofelectioncampaignsin
Indonesiaissuchthatitgeneratestwodifferentarenasofcampaign‘theatre’.14The
arenasaredistinguishedbywhoorganizesthecampaignsandthescopeofthe
audience.Aspinall(2014a:101)identifiesthesedistinctarenasinhisdiscussionof
thedifferentterminologyusedtodescribepoliticalcampaignsinIndonesia,namely
the‘air’and‘ground’wars.Ontheonehand,thereisanational‐levelcampaignledby
professionalmediapersonnelinconjunctionwithseniorpartyofficials,targeting
votersacrosstheentirecountry.Ontheotherhand,thereareindividualcandidates
lookingtoraisetheirprofilewithinspecificelectoraldistricts.Thesensethatnational
campaignsareremovedfromthoseofindividualcandidatesiscultivatedbythe
natureoftheirtargetaudienceandthestrategiesthosetargetaudiencesinspire.
Thesetwotheatricalarenasnecessarilyusedifferentcampaignmethodstosellthe
anti‐corruptionsymboltovoters(seeTable6.1).Nationalcampaignsaredesignedto
ChapterOne),
whoarguethatpoliticsisaformoftheatrebecauseitinvolvestheinstrumentalmanipulation
ofsymbolsinordertoattainpower.
14ThetermisdrawnfromBlackbourn(1987)andApter(2006)(discussedin
183
appealbroadlybutarerelativelystatic.Atthelocallevel,becauseoftheirdirect
proximitytovoters,candidatesaremoresusceptibletocitizenscrutinyandrequests.
Table6.1Summaryofdifferenttypesofdiffusioninelectioncampaigns
NATIONAL
INDIVIDUAL
Characteristics
Mechanisms
Non‐relational
Relational
Mediated

Mediaadvertising

Grassrootsmeetings

Campaignteam

Mediareports

Publicrallies

Brokers

Televisionadvertising

Donationsand/or

Contributionsand

Officialwebsite
contributions

Socialmedia

Masspublicrallies

Centralized

Unidirectional,top‐
diffusion;candidates’
socialnetworksfor
downdiffusion
campaignsinfluenced
support

Multi‐directional
fromaboveandbelow

othermaterialrewards


Drawsuponexisting
Usedtofacilitatethe
Campaignstrategies
transferof
mayincludetheuseof
goods/moneyto
symbolsandvote‐
influencevoters
buying
Outcomes


Lessscopeforvotersto

Votersareableto

Logisticallyeasierfor
directlyinfluence
personallymake
candidatestogather
strategy
demandsofcandidates
votes
Themesofthe

Candidatespressured

Easierformoneyand
campaignand
torespondtovoter
goodstochangehands
strategiesrelatively
requests
static

Candidatesmayadapt
campaignsinresponse
tovoterfeedback
Cross‐scalardiffusionprovidesaconceptualframeworkforunderstandingthe
communicationofsymbolsduringanelectoralcampaign.Nationallevelcampaigns
occurprimarilythroughwhatdiffusiontheoristsdescribeasnon‐relationalforms
suchaspublications,themedia,theInternetandbillboards.Concentrationsof
funding,advertisingresourcesandmarketingandcommunicationsexpertisewere
184
foundinthecentralpartyoffice,controlledbytheCentralCommittee.Whileparty
leaderstouredthecountrypriortotheelectiontoappearatrallies,theseeventscould
hardlybeconsideredrelationalformsofdiffusionastherewaslittledirectcontact
betweenthepartyleadersandattendees.Theefficacyoftheseralliesisalsodebatable
giventhatpeoplewereoftenpaidtoattend.15Politicalcommunicationinthese
nationalcampaignswasgenerallycharacterizedbyaunidirectionalflowof
propaganda.Inthenon‐relationaldiffusionofideas,scopefordynamismand
multidirectionalflowsisinherentlylimitedbythelackofdirectcontactwithvotersor
feedbackfromthem.16Usingdogmaticandabsolutistslogans,whichdonotinvitea
responsefromcitizens,partiesdiscouragedmeaningfulvoterengagement.17
Furthermore,marketingandpublicrelationsexpertswerebasedinJakartaandwere
unlikelytogooutoftheirwaytoelicitinputorcriticismfromthoseoutsideofmajor
urbancentres,letaloneincorporatefeedbackintothecampaignstrategy.
Whilenationalcampaignsreliedprimarilyonnon‐relationaldiffusion,many
candidateschosetocampaignontheground,hopingtogarnersupportviarelational
electioneering.AsnotedinChapterOne,relationaldiffusionispremisedonthenotion
thatideasarespreadbycontactbetweenpeople,flowingbetweenthemonthebasis
oftrust.TosaythatIndonesianvotersaregenerallydistrustfulofpoliticalpartiesis
reflectiveofthecountry’spoliticalreality(Tomsa2014b:249)socandidateshopedto
buildsocialcapitalwithvotersthroughdirectengagement.Inspiredbythepopularity
ofnow‐PresidentJokowi’sblusukanstyleofcampaigning‐gettingclosertovotersby
visitingthemintheirvillages‐candidateswantedtobeseentobelisteningtovoters.
Thus,trust‐buildingwaspremisedontheideathatmeetingthecandidatesinperson
wouldincreasesupport.AstheHanuracandidateexplained,‘Iftheydon’tknowyou,
theycan’tloveyou.’Whilecandidatesdiduseposters,stickersandthemedia,they
generallyfeltthatmeetingswithvillagersweremostinfluential.Allofthecandidates
studiedlivedinJakarta,andthereforehadtotraveltotheirelectoratestocampaignin
person.Eachassessedthatthiswasacrucialpartoftheircampaignsandmadetime
totourtheirlocalelectorate.
15AsdiscussedinChapterFour,ralliesareoftenpopulatedbypaidattendees(Pepinsky2014;
Simandjuntak2012:101).
16Fionna(2014)arguesthattheprominentmediacampaigntacticsadoptedbypartiesfailto
trulyinfluencetheirintendedaudience,withsurveyfindingssuggestingthatvotersdonot
considertelevisionadvertisingandtheuseofbannersandposters,whicharetheprimary
modeofelectioneering,tobeeffective.
17Forexample,oneofGerindra’sprimarycampaignsloganswas:‘GerindraWins,Prabowois
President’(GerindraMenang,PrabowoPresiden).
185
Ontheirvisitstoneighbourhoodsandvillages,candidatescouldnotsimplygivea
stumpspeech.Theyhadtobeopentovotercommentsandrequests—oratleastgive
theimpressionofbeingopentothem—inordertogaintheirconfidence.Thiswas
especiallyimportantiftheydidnothavefamilialtiestotheareaorotherkindsof
socialnetworks.Thisdirectinteractionbetweencandidatesandvotersfacilitateda
moremulti‐directionalflowofideas.Moreover,theinfluenceofvotersthemselves
becamemorecogent,sincecandidatesgenerallywantedtosecuretheirvotesin
advance.18Candidatesthusfeltpressuredtomeettheirrequests.Thiscouldbe
problematicbecausesomevillagesmadedemandsthatcouldnotbeaddressedwithin
thelimitsofthecandidate’sbudget.Inaddition,thecandidatehadtodecidehowto
proceed,knowingthatwhilevote‐buyingwasstandardpracticeinsomeplaces,itwas
alsoillegal.Althoughitwasunlikelythattheywouldbeprosecutedforbribingvoters,
theyriskedbeinglabelledahypocriteforprojectingananti‐corruptionsymbolwhile
atthesametimeusingmoneypoliticstogainsupport.19
Someofthedifficultiesinestablishingtrustonthegroundcouldbemitigatedbyusing
amediatedapproach.Campaignteamsareakeycomponentinthe‘groundwar’,
becausetheyallowcandidatestomakeuseofthetrustandinfluenceofrespected
communitymembersintheirteaminordertoreachawidergroupofpeople.20These
teamsoftenincludememberswhoarehiredspecificallybecauseoftheirpre‐existing
influencewithinareasoftheelectorate.Thispracticeisaformofmediateddiffusion,
whichoccursthroughtheuseofa‘broker’toconnectpeoplewhowouldnot
otherwiseknoweachother,thatis,thecandidateandthevoterviathebroker.
Brokersarevaluablebecausetheyprovideinsightintothevoterpatternsofa
neighbourhood:
18ResearchbyAspinall(2014a:101)onthestrategiesofindividualcandidatecampaigns
supportsthisassertion.Heproposesthatvoterspreferredcandidateswhowereableto
connectwithordinarypeople,speaktothemintheirownvernacular,werewillingtovisit
themintheirownhomesandweregraciousratherthat“arrogant”.Asaresult,many
candidatesadoptedcampaignstrategiesthatprioritizedgrassrootsmeetingsratherthan
mediacampaignsandlarge‐scalepartyrallies.
19Thornley(2014),inanopinionpiecewrittenfollowingtheelection,contendsthatvote‐
buyingandmoneypoliticswasamalignantfeatureofthelegislativeelectionsandthatthe
ElectoralSupervisoryBoard(BadanPengawasPemilu,Bawaslu)didnotdemonstrate‘aclear
commitmenttopreventandprosecutecasesofelectoralcorruption’.
20Thispracticeiscommoninseveralcountriesacrosstheworld.Forexample,Callahan
(2005)exploresvote‐buyingandsocialnormsinThailand;GonzalezOcantosetal.(2014)
conductedastudyonvote‐buyingnormsfromarangeofcountriesinSouthAmerica;and
Wantchekon(2003)providesinsightintovote‐buyingandclientelisminBenin.
186
Ofparticularvaluearepeoplewholiveinthesameneighbourhoodastheset
ofvotersforwhoseactionstheyareresponsible.Itismucheasierfora
neighbourhoodinsidertoknowwhosechildrenareill,whoturnedoutinthe
lastelectionandwhostayedhome,whetheravoterturnedagainstaparty,or
whoseemstohavedefectedandvotedforanopponent,despitehaving
benefittedfrompartylargesse(Stokesetal.2013:19).
Mostbrokershavepositionsofinfluenceandusepoliticalconnectionstoassist
peopletogainvotesintheirneighbourhoods(GonzalezOcantosetal.2014).Wherea
decisionismadetodistributegoodsorcashtovoters,brokersdosoonbehalfofthe
candidate—therationalebeingthatthebroker’ssocialstatuswilladdvaluetothe
giftswhilealsoinsulatingthecandidatefromallegationsofwrongdoing.
Thebrokersystem,byitsverynature,requirescandidatestodeeplytrusttheir
campaignteamsasitcanbedifficultforcandidatestoensurethatbrokersfulfiltheir
promisesandthatvoterswhotaketheirmoneydoinfactvoteforthem(Stokesetal.
2013).21Employingbrokersisrisky.Theymaybetraythecandidatetheyagreedto
help,forexample,bytakingmoneyfromseveralopposingcandidatesinoneareaor
siphoningmoneyfromthefundstheyhavebeengiventodistributetovoters
(Aspinall2014c).Theuseofbrokersvariedbetweentheindividualcandidates
observedinthisstudy,influencedbytheirpersonalcircumstances—experience,
backgroundandpartystatusallmattered.TheHanuracandidatewasmostrelianton
advicefromhercampaignteam,whoconvincedhertoengageinvote‐buyinginthe
latestagesofthecampaign,eventhoughshehadclaimedfromtheoutsettobe
staunchlyagainstthepractice.TheGerindracandidateusedthesamepeoplehehad
usedinpreviouscampaigns,withwhomhefelthehadestablishedstrongtrust
relationships.Asaresult,hewasnotconcernedaboutbeingbetrayed.TheNasdem
candidateprimarilyusedpartycadrestoorganizehiscampaignanddidnotexpress
anysuspicionsaboutpeopleonhisteammisusingmoney.
Theseparatecampaignspheres,associatedwithdifferenttypesofdiffusion,alsohad
distinctpurposes.Thenationalcampaign,whichwasintendedtorepresenttheparty
asawhole,focusedonbuildingananti‐corruptionsymbolthatwouldnotonlyprime
theissueofcorruptionbutalsoestablishastrongownershipoftheissue.Non‐
21Foracomprehensiveoverviewoftheuseofbrokersinthe2014Indonesianlegislative
election,seeAspinall(2014c).
187
directionaldiffusion,however,leftlittleroomfornuanceddiscussionandtended
towardspropaganda.Meanwhile,thetwo‐waycommunicationflowbetweenthe
individualcandidateandthevotersfacilitatedbyrelationalinteractionsaccountedfor
lesscohesivesymboldevelopmentaswellasdivergentstrategies.Ontheonehand
therewasadesiretoowntheanti‐corruptionsymbolandbeperceivedasjust,
righteousandclean.Ontheotherhand,therewasastrongtemptationtorespondto
voterdemandsformoneyandgoodsinordertosecurevotes,butgivingintothis
demandwoulddamagetheanti‐corruptionsymbolandpaintthecandidatesandtheir
partiesashypocrites.
Mixedmessages
Emergingpartiessoughttoowntheanti‐corruptionsymbolbecausetheythoughtit
wouldhelpthemachievetheirelectoralgoals.Gerindrabecamethethird‐largest
partyinparliament,Hanuraimprovedonits2009resultsandNasdemattractedmore
thanenoughvotestoensureitspresenceinparliament—yetallthreefellshortof
theirstatedtargets.Whilemanyfactorscontributedtotheseresults,includingover‐
ambitioustargets,itisclearthattheircampaignstrategiesdidnotdeliver.Using
symbolismwasonecampaignstrategyamongmany,andanti‐corruptionsymbols
wereoneofmanysymbolsadoptedbytheparties.Buttheevidencepresentedhere
suggeststhat,whilepotentiallyapositivecampaigntool,theparties’anti‐corruption
symbolsfailedtoinspiremasssupport.
Akeyreasonforthiswasthedisjuncturebetweenthenationalandlocalarenas.
Disparitiesbetweennationalandindividualrhetoric,asaconsequenceoftherelative
independenceofthetwocampaignarenas,ledtoaninconsistentuseofanti‐
corruptionsymbols.Whilethecampaignsoperatedsimultaneouslyandhadthesame
ultimategoal—tomaximizepublicsupportfortheparty—coordinationacrossscales
wasneitherprioritizednorencouraged.Moreover,therelationshipbetweenthetwo
arenasdependedonthecandidate’sownstatuswithintheparty.Asnotedabove,
candidateswithpartyleadershiprolesatthenationalleveltendedtoadoptcampaign
symbolsthatmatchedthoseselectedbytheparty.Attimes,also,theyusedtheir
positiontosteertheparty’scampaigninadirectionthatservedtheirowninterests.
ThiswasthecasewiththeNasdemcandidate,whosemainprioritiesincludedthe
resolutionoftheBankCenturycase,whowasabletomakethispartofthenational
partysymbol.Forthemostpart,though,individualcandidateshadverylittle
influenceuponthecampaignstrategiesdevelopedbytheirparty’scentralcommittee.
188
Theconverseprovedtobealmostequallytrue.Partiesrelyingonindividual
candidatestoadoptcampaignsymbolsusedatthenationallevelalsoignoredthe
possiblemotivationsthatcandidatesmayhaveforrunningforoffice.Whilesome
candidateswerealreadypartymembers,stafforevenleaders,manymorewere
recentrecruitswithlittlegroundingintheparty’s‘visionandmission’,orpeoplewho
simplywishedtorunforofficeandwentshoppingforapartytoallowthemtodo
so.22Becausethenumberofpartymemberswantingtorunforofficeoftenfellshort
ofthenumberofseatsavailableinanygivenelectorate,partiesoftenapproved
candidatesthatweremoreinterestedinwinningthanadheringtopartynorms.23
Recruitingcandidatesfromoutsidethepartywasevenencouraged,asmanyparties
chargedafeeinreturnfortheirbacking,providingarevenue‐raisingopportunity
(Mietzner2013:85).Furthermore,partiesmadelittleefforttoensurethatcandidates
weregenuinelycommittedtopartyvalues—infact,itwaswidelyacceptedthatmost
candidatesfeltlittleobligationtotheirpartyaftertheelection(Mietzner2013:85).In
manycases,theonlyrealrequirementwasthatthecandidatepaidtheparty
nominationfeeand/orthattheywerevote‐getterswhocouldpotentiallyamassvotes
throughtheirpopularityorconnections.24
Parties,moreover,hadnoinstitutionalmeansforensuringthatsymbolswereused
consistentlyorthatcandidatesrancleancampaigns.Half‐heartedattemptsto
sanctionwrongdoingfelltotheparty’sethicscommittee,whichhandledcomplaints
andreportsofelectoralmisconductinternally.Ifpartymemberswerefoundtohave
boughtvotesorotherwiseusedfundsillegallyduringthecampaign,thentheywere
(theoretically)answerabletoboththeethicscommitteeandthelawgoverning
electioncampaigns.25Giventheenormousnumberofcandidatesandthelimited
resourcesoftheparty,itwasnotsurprisingthattheethicscommitteewasrarely
22Tomsa(2014b:269‐270)arguesthatthishadledtothephenomenonof‘partyshopping’,in
whichcandidateswouldsimplyswitchpartiessothattheycouldattainthehighestparty
rankingpossible.Whiletheopenlistsystemhaseffectivelyabolishedthisneed,many
candidatesstillbelievethatafirst‐rankedpositionwillincreasetheirlikelihoodofsuccess.
23Partieswantingtorunthemaximumnumberofcandidates,believingthatthiswilltranslate
tothemaximumnumberofvotes,oftenneedtorecruitcandidatesfromoutsidetheparty.This
wasparticularlythecasewithsourcingfemalecandidates,withpartiesrequiredbylawto
haveatleast30percentfemalecandidatesontheircandidatelists(Shair‐Rosenfield2012:
579‐580).
24Carawayetal.(2014)contendthatthisisthecasewithmanytradeunionleaderswhoare
invitedtobecomecandidatesforparties.Politicalpartiesassumethatthesecandidatescan
rallyvotesfromthemembersoftheirunion,thereforeactingasa‘vote‐getter’fortheparty.
25Theonlycorruptioncasetoaffectanemergingpartyduringthe2014campaignswas
Hanura’scaseofBambangSoeharto.Theparty’sethicscommitteeruledtosuspendSoeharto’s
membershipuntilthecasewasresolved,butotherwisetherewerenoreportedcasesofthe
ethicscommitteesdismissingpartymembersforillicitactivityduringthecampaign.
189
calleduponduringthecampaignperiod.Moreover,ifused,thesemechanismshadthe
potentialtodrawpublicitytoillegalcampaignpracticeswithintheparty,whichcould
damageitsreputation.Whethercompelledbylackofresourcesorlackofwill,the
ethicscommitteecouldalsosimplychoosetoignorecomplaints.Themostcommon
accusationsofmoneypoliticsandvote‐buyingwere,infact,usuallylodgedvia
informalchannelsbyfellowpartycandidates.26Sometimesthesecomplaintsreflected
disputessurroundingterritory,accesstoresources,orparty‐listcandidaterankings.
Suchcomplaintswereusuallyexpressedtobranchofficepartyleadersratherthan
nationalofficebecausethoserelationshipsweregenerallystrongerandlocalparty
elitesweremoreattunedtothecampaignactivitiesofcandidates.However,even
whensuchcomplaintsweremadefromwithintheparty,dismissalswere
uncommon.27Thelackofoversightofindividualcandidatesleadstoquestionsabout
whetherthepartiesweregenuinelycommittedtopreventingelectoralcorruption.As
notedearlier,partyrhetoricformulatedatthenationallevelaimedtoconvincepeople
thattheywerecommittedtomaintainingtheintegrityoftheirparties—thatis,
ensuringthattheirmembersdidnotactillegally—andtotheeradicationof
corruptionmorebroadly.Buttheparties’anti‐corruptionsymbolswereconveniently
vagueontheuseofmoneypoliticsinelections,andthelackofeffectiveoversight
mechanismsimpliedlittleinterestinpolicingtheproblem.
Withalmostnoinputoroversightoflocalcampaignsbytheparties’central
committeesafterthecandidateshadbeenselected,itwasultimatelyuptoindividuals
astowhethertheyadoptedananti‐corruptionsymbol,howtheyconstructedthat
symbol,whatrhetorictheyused,andwhethertheysustainedthesymbolthroughout
theirentirecampaign.Whilenationalpartysymbolshadsomeinfluence,candidates
26Partymemberscouldreportbacktothelocal,provincialorcentralpartyleader(s)about
perceivedbreachesbyotherpartycandidates.Duringfieldworkthisprocesswasobserved
onceintheEastJavaelectoratewhereaDPRDIIcandidatehadcomplainedaboutthetacticsof
anationallevelcandidate,whowasalsoawell‐knownbusinessman,accusinghimofspending
vastsumsofmoneytobuyvotesinparticularvillageswithwhichtheDPRDIIcandidatewas
connected.Theaccusationswerecommonknowledgewithinthepartyandahottopicof
conversationforseveralweeks.Inspiteofthis,thecandidatesufferednosanctions,norwas
thereaninvestigationintotheallegations.TheHanuracandidateheldthatthepartyneeded
thebusinessman’smoneyandthereforewasreluctanttodismisshim.
27Someeffortwasmadetopolicecampaignterritorytoavoidoverlappingcampaigns.This
wasobservedanecdotallyinallthreecasestudies,althoughitsintensitydependedonhow
involvedindividualpartyleadersatthelocallevelwerewillingtobecomeinthedisputes
betweencandidatesduringthecampaign.Hamdi(Forthcoming:186)describestheterritorial
divisionsbetweencandidatesinMadiun,EastJava,notingthatstrivingforterritorial
dominanceinareasofinfluenceandadvantagewasapopularelectionstrategy.
190
focusedonpromotingapersonalrhetoricintheircampaigns.28Thedistinction
betweenrhetoricusedbythepartiesandindividualcandidatesreflectedthedifferent
arenasinwhichtheyoperated.Afurtherexplanationforthedisparitybetween
nationalandlocallevelcampaignswasthatthesymbolsidentifiedbythepartysimply
didnotresonatewithvotersinparticularelectorates.Individualcandidateswho
chosetoprioritizepersonalencounterswithvotersfoundthatanti‐corruption
discoursecouldbeunpersuasive.Forthosecampaigningontheground,itwasalltoo
evidentthattheprovisionofmaterialrewardsremainedanintegralpartofelectoral
politics.Candidatescommonlydistributedelectionparaphernalia(suchast‐shirts
andstickers)andprovidedfoodandentertainmentatralliesinordertoinvoke
backingfromcitizens.Butthatwasoftennotenough:voterswereusedtobeing
offeredmaterialrewardsfortheirsupportandprovedinmanycasesnotonlytobe
comfortablewiththepractice,butindeedtoexpectit.
Cognitivedissonanceisgeneratedbetweenthevoters’perceptionthatmoneypolitics
continuestobethemodusoperandiofcandidatesandparties’anti‐corruption
rhetoric,whichultimatelyunderminestheanti‐corruptionsymbolitself.Ethoswas
lost,asitisdifficulttoestablishmoralcredibilitywithinasystemthatseemsso
thoroughlycorrupted.Allthreecandidatescomplainedaboutmoneypolitics,but
eventheyhadtocarefullyconsidertheprosandconsofrefusingtoengageinit.For
example,theHanuracandidate—whodidnothavethesamelocalconnectionsas
othercandidates,andthusfounditmoredifficulttowinoverpeople—believedatthe
outsetofhercampaignthatshecouldgarnersupportthroughananti‐corruption
symbolandbypromotingherselfascleanandhonest.Shecautionedvillagersagainst
acceptingmoneyforcandidates,asvote‐buyingleadstopoorgovernment
representativesthatwillnotprotecttheinterestsofordinaryfolk.Citizens,she
argued,shouldselectthepersonwhoismostcommittedtorepresentingtheir
interests,notthepersonwhooffersthemostmoney.But,intheend,shefeltthatthis
28Thetraditionoffigure‐centricpoliticscontinuestobeevidenttoday,demonstratedbothby
thenationalparty‐levelfocusonpromoting(potential)presidentialcandidatesandthe
individual‐centriccampaignsofthecandidatesthemselves.Alongsidecampaignsbasedon
symbols,partiesalsoattemptedtoappealtovotersbasedontheirpreferredpresidential
candidate.Someparties,includingGerindraandHanura,identifiedtheirpresidential
nomineesfromtheoutset.Inthesamevein,PDIPusedthenominationofJokowitogarner
popularsupportamongstvoters,hopingthatpeoplewouldvoteforthepartybecausethey
wantedJokowitobecomethenextpresident(Kwok2014).Theso‐called‘Jokowieffect’was
expectedtohelpPDIPgainenoughvotestonominatehimasapresidentialcandidatewithout
havingtoformacoalitionwithotherparties.PDIPdidgainmoreparliamentaryseatsthanany
otherpartyintheelection,butfellshortofexpectations,withthepartyfailingtoobtainover
20percentofvotes(Croft‐Cusworth2014;McRae2014;Mietzner2014:118).
191
approachwasineffective,notbecauseshewasunsuccessfulincreatingananti‐
corruptionsymbol,butratherbecausevoterswerenotactuallyinterestedinclean
candidates.HeropinionwassupportedbyanIndikatorsurveyreleasedinDecember
2013,whichfoundthat41.5percentofthosesurveyedconsideredvote‐buyingan
‘acceptablepartofdemocracy’whileonly4.3percentofthosesurveyedsaidthey
wouldnotacceptanyformofpaymentfortheirvote(Halim2013).29
Ultimately,allthreecandidatesfeltpressuretousemoneytogaininfluence.30This
puttheminadifficultposition—knowingthatthepartysymbolcontradictedthe
electionnormsofmoneypoliticsandvote‐buyingandthattheyjeopardizedtheir
chancesofwinningiftheyrefusedtousemoneyasatoolofpersuasionaltogether.
Whilethecandidateshopedthatanti‐corruptionrhetoricwouldappealtotheir
constituents—bothbecauseitwaspartoftheirownmoralbeliefsandvote‐buying
wasprohibitivelyexpensive—inreality,theydidnotfindthistobethecase.Research
fromothercountriessuggestsatleasttwofactorsthatmayfostersuchasituation.
First,asGonzalezOcantosetal.(2014)foundintheircross‐nationalstudyofLatin
Americanstates,themorenormalvote‐buyingis,thelessstigmatizedpeoplewhodo
itwillbe.Peoplerationalizetheirbehaviourtoavoidcognitivedissonance,becauseno
onelikestothinkofthemselvesas‘bad’.Thus,ifpeoplehaveacceptedmoneyinthe
past,theymaybereluctanttobuyintoanti‐corruptionsymbolismbecauseitwill
forcethemtoacceptthattheyhavebeen‘bad’inthepast.Second,asBalmasand
Sheafer(2010:208)contendinrelationtoIsrael,themoresalientanissueistothe
publicmind,themorelikelyitistobeacriterionforcandidateevaluation.Itseems
thatcorruption,atleastinsomeelectorates,wassimplynotassalientanissueas
candidateshadexpected.Asaconsequence,theyadoptedmultifacetedcampaigns
29Thisstudydidnotseektodeterminewhytheelectoratecontinuestoseekmaterialrewards
fortheirvotes.However,thecasestudiesdemonstratethatthiswasapersistentquestion
facedbycandidates.Anumberofacademicshaveproposedexplanationsforthis
phenomenon.Goodpaster(2002:100)arguesthatcitizensunderstandthattheiropinionsare
oflittleconsequencetooffice‐holdersonceelected—asentimentthatremainstruetoday—
andsobelievethatcandidatesareaccountabletotheirconstituentsonlyduringtheirbidsfor
(re)election.Havingbeenrepresentedbyparliamentarianswhopaidlittleattentiontotheir
needsinthepast,votershavebecomeaccustomedtojudgingcandidatesonthematerial
benefitstheyofferinthe‘hereandnow’.Votercynicismtowardspoliticiansisnotnew:
Aspinall(2005a)arguesthatitwascommonearlyonintheReformasiperiod.Thecorruption
scandalsduringYudhoyono’ssecondtermdidlittletoquellthiscynicism.
30ThisissupportedbyMietzner(2014:119),whoarguesthatthe2014elections
demonstratedthe‘continuedimportanceofmoneyandorganizedmachinepoliticsinpost‐
SuhartoIndonesia’.ResearchbyMcRae(2013:291)alsofoundthatthecostofrunningfor
officecanbe‘prohibitivelyexpensive’,withparliamentariansinterviewedestimatingthatthey
wouldspendaroundUSD100,000ontheirre‐electioncampaignsfor2014.
192
thatintegratedanti‐corruptionsymbolismintoelectoralstrategiesthatalsoincluded
theuseofvotebrokersandmoneypoliticsinordertoinfluencevoters.
Inordertorationalizetheincongruenceofcombiningananti‐corruptionsymbolwith
moneypoliticsandvote‐buying,thecandidatesframedtheiruseofmoneyas
donations,reimbursements,orculturally‐necessarygifts—allofwhichwerenotonly
normalelectionpracticebutarewidelyaccepted.Theyopenlyadmittedto
strategicallyusingdonationsandgivinggiftsinordertopersuadevoters,but
vigorouslydeniedthattheyhadengagedinmoneypolitics.Indoingso,theymediated
theunderlyingcognitivedissonancetheyexperiencedbynarrowlydefiningmoney
politicsandvote‐buyinganddistinguishingitfromotherpayments,which,although
intendedtopersuade,falloutsidethenarrowlimitsofthedefinitionstheyadopted.
Thisalsoallowedthecandidatestomaintainthattheywere‘clean’inspiteof
distributingmoney,therefore,retainingtheiranti‐corruptionsymbolandsustaining
itslinktobroaderpartysymbols.
Conclusion
Politicalsymboltheoryallowsustounderstandthattheintentionofemerging
parties’useofanti‐corruptionsymbolswastoinfluencetheaudienceandgainvotes
ratherthannecessarilybeingasincerereflectionofpoliticalprinciples.Successful
alignmentwithaparticularpoliticalsymboldependsuponwell‐constructedrhetoric
thatisabletopersuadevotersthatthesymbolsputforwardareatruereflectionof
authenticgoals.Whileboththenationalcampaignsoftheemergingpartiesandthe
localcampaignsofthoseparties’individualcandidatesattemptedtomobilizeananti‐
corruptionsymbol,neithertrulyachievedownershipofthesymbol—letalone
coherenceacrossscales.Thedeepdisconnectbetweentheanti‐corruptionsymbol
constructedatthenationallevelandwhathappenedonthegroundcompromisedthe
symbol’sintegrity.Atthenationallevel,partiescompetedtobeseenasthe‘cleanest’
andthemostfirmagainstcorruption.Individualcandidates,however,foundthat—
despitetheapparenttractionoftheanti‐corruptionmovement—moneystilltalks.
Thislackofcohesionprovidesaprismforunderstandingoneofthekeypolitical
paradoxesofIndonesia:howcananti‐corruptionrhetoricbesowidespreadandyet
moneypoliticsandvote‐buyingbesoprolific?Thesimultaneousexistenceofthese
phenomenacanbeexplainedatleastinpartbythelackofcoherencewithinpolitical
partiesduringelectoralcampaigns.In2014,partyactorsinthenationalarena
constructedsymbolswithlittleinputfromthevoters,identifyingcorruptionasa
193
popularpoliticalissue.Whenindividualcandidatesinvokedthesesymbolsintheir
‘groundwars’,thereactionofvotersdemonstratedthattheassumedsalienceofthe
issuedidnotalwaysresultinelectoralsupport.Thecandidatesexaminedinthis
studytrulywantedtorunacleancampaign.However,theyfacedaconflictbetween
moralityandpracticality.Vote‐buyingisariskyendeavourwithuncertainreturns.
Butwhilepayingmaynotguaranteeawin,failuretodistributematerialrewards
almostcertainlyguaranteedaloss.Refusaltoengageinmoneypoliticsandvote‐
buyingthusmeantjeopardizingtheirelectoralfate.
Theincongruitybetweenwhathappensatthesedifferentscalesdemonstratesthe
fragmentednatureofpoliticalpartiesmorebroadly,reflectingthattheyarenota
single,coherententity,butacollectionofindividualswiththeirowninterestsand
priorities.Thesuccessfuluseofpoliticalsymbolsincampaignsdepends,tosome
extent,onconsistencyofrhetoricandaction.Whilealreadyprimed,ananti‐
corruptionsymbollosesallpersuasivepowerifitisnotcredible,demonstrableand
convincinglyrelayed.Aspoliticalpartiesandcandidatesalreadyhavetobattlevoter
perceptionsofbeinguntrustworthyandcorrupt,thelackofcohesioninpolitical
symbols—particularlybetweenwhatvotershearandwhattheyexperience—
underminestheuseofananti‐corruptionsymbolasawhole,squanderingresources
andopportunitiestotrulyconnectwithvotersandlimitingtheirchancesofsuccess.
194
Conclusion
Severalstudieshaveidentifiedtheimportantroleofpoliticalcampaignsin
determiningtheoutcomeofelections(Dalton2000:923‐924;Edelman1988;
Grofman1985;KrausandGiles1989;Rosenbergetal.1991;Smith2001;Trilling
1975).Studyingtheselection,developmentandmobilizationofpoliticalsymbols
duringelectioncampaignsallowsustobetterunderstandtherelationshipbetween
rhetoric,persuasionandpoliticaloutcomes.Acloseanalysisofemergingparties’
campaignsinthelead‐uptoIndonesia’s2014nationallegislativeelectionsprovidesa
basisforanalysingthesuccessesandfailuresofsymboldevelopmentandpromotion
bothbythepartiesandthecandidateswhorepresentedthem.Infocusingontheir
useofanti‐corruptionsymbols,thisthesishasofferedanexplanationforwhythese
symbolsfailedtohelppartiesachievetheresultstheywerehopingfor.
Intheopeningchaptersofthisthesis,thecontextualsignificanceofcorruptionasa
politicalissueand,subsequently,ofanti‐corruptionsentiment,washighlighted
throughahistoricalaccountoftheuseandmanipulationofanti‐corruptionsymbols
sinceIndonesianindependence.Appreciatinghowanti‐corruptionsymbolshavebeen
used(andabused)bypoliticiansinthepast,itisnotsurprisingthatcorruption
remainsaconcern,especiallygiventhefrequencyandseriousnessofcorruption
scandalsintheperiodprecedingthe2014nationallegislativeelection.Arecounting
ofboththelong‐termandmorerecenthistoryofcorruption,andattemptstofoster
ananti‐corruptionsymbol,providesthecontextbothforwhythesesymbolswereso
prominentin2014andwhytheirprojectioncarriedcertainrisks.Emergingparties,
inparticular,wereabletobenefitfromtherecentcorruptionscandalsfacedbyrivals,
butadoptingananti‐corruptionsymbolwasalsoperilousbecauseithadbackfiredfor
otherparties,namelytheDemocraticPartyandPKS,intheveryrecentpast,andthis
wasstillfreshinvoters’minds.
Usingaframeworkofanalysisdrawnfrominsightsprovidedbytheoreticalliterature
onpoliticalsymbolism,thethesisthenhonedinonthetwobasicelementsofelection
campaignsidentifiedbyNorris(2002):themessagesthatthecampaignwishesto
communicateandthechannel(s)ofcommunicationemployedtorelaythose
messages.Theframingofcampaignmessageswasdescribedusingthelensofrhetoric
anddramatismastoolsofpersuasion,whilechannelsofcommunicationwere
exploredusingpertinentaspectsofdiffusiontheory.Inanalysingthequalitativedata
195
collectedrelatedtothesetwoelements,thisstudyalsoassessedtheimpactofthese
messagesupontargetaudiencesandthefeedbackloopfromtheaudiencebacktothe
campaigningorganization.
Inordertomorecomprehensivelyunderstandhowanti‐corruptionsymbolswere
imaginedandpromotedtothepublic,symbolusewasstudiedatthenationaland
locallevels.Thenatureofcampaignsatthesescaleswasverydifferent,especially
withregardtothetargetaudienceandthetypeofdiffusioninvolved.Atthenational
level,emergingparties’professionalpublicrelationsmanagerscreatedhomogenous
campaignsintendedtoestablishanti‐corruptioncredentialsnationally.Sellingthe
symbolnon‐relationallytovoters,thepartiesinvokedasimplisticanti‐corruption
discoursethatblamedtheincumbentgovernment’slackofcommitmentandthe
greedofgovernmentofficialsfortheongoinglackofprogressincorruption
eradication.Perhapsmoreimportantly,thecentralizeddecision‐makingthat
underpinnedthesenation‐widecampaignswasfarremovedfromtheday‐to‐day
campaignactivitiesofindividualcandidates,whowerelefttopromotethemselves
withlittleguidanceoroversight.
Forthe2014election,thecandidatesfollowedinthisstudycouldchoosetoadoptor
ignoretheirparty’santi‐corruptionsymbol.Ineachcase,theextenttowhichthe
symbolwasharnesseddependedheavilyonthecandidate’spersonalhistoryandhow
usefultheythoughtthesymbolwouldbeinattractingsupport.Assuch,theirpersonal
choices,beliefsandlocal‐levelexperiencesshapedtheircampaignsfarmorethanany
nationalparty‐levelsymbolsevercould.Localcontextwasalsoextremelyimportant
insettlingonacampaignstrategy.Inadditiontofactorssuchastheextenttowhich
candidateswereembeddedinlocalcommunities,theprevalenceofmoneypoliticsin
thosecommunitieswasinfluential,ascandidateshadtogaugeitspotentialeffecton
theirchancesofbeingelected.Incaseswheretheuseofmoneypoliticsbyrivals
posedarealthreattoelectoralsuccess,thecandidates—allofwhomhadstatedatthe
outsetthattheywouldliketoportraythemselvesascleanandavoidmoneypolitics—
wereforcedtodecidewhethertheywouldmaintainananti‐corruptionsymbolornot.
ThisfindingshedsfurtherlightontheparadoxofcorruptioninIndonesia:althoughit
isalmostuniversallycondemneditisalsoexceedinglyprevalent,notonlywithinelite
politicalcirclesbutalsowithinvotercommunities.Moneypoliticsisseenasparfor
thecourse,notleastbyvoters,manyofwhombothexpectandembraceit.The
196
dilemmafacedbythesecandidates,whochosetoadoptanti‐corruptionsymbolsbut
werethenconfrontedbythedemandsofvotersthatcontradictedthissymbol,was
noteasilyresolved.ThestereotypeofIndonesiancandidatesaswantingtowinatany
costwaschallengedthroughthisconsideredportraitofthree(aspiring)politicians,
bothintermsofhowtheyviewedthemselvesandhowtheyreconciledtheirchoiceto
useanti‐corruptionsymbolswiththerealitiestheyfacedduringtheircampaigns.
Candidatesarecommonlyassumedtobe‘corrupt’,butthecasestudiespresented
heredemonstratethat,atleastforsome,thedecisiontoengageinmoneypoliticswas
nottakenlightly.Theillegalpracticestheyadoptedwereapragmatic,yetreluctant,
responsetolocalcontextandtheirinterpretationofvoterdemands,ratherthana
pre‐meditatedstrategyforvictory.
Diffusiontheory,meanwhile,providedavaluablemechanismforunderstandingthe
inconsistenciesthatoccurinelectioncampaignsexplainingthisparadoxintermsof
thedisconnectbetweenrhetoricatthenationallevelandactionsatthelocallevel.It
alsorevealstheinconsistenciesinthelegal,moralandsociologicaldefinitionsof
corruptionthatco‐existinIndonesia.Legaldefinitionsofcorruptionareroutinely
criticizedfortheirlimitations(ChengandZaum2008;Philp2008)whilemoral
interpretationsofcorruptionaredrawnfromreligionandculture,alsomakingthem
difficulttoclassify.Sociologicaldefinitionsofcorruption,whichframebehaviourin
termsofwhatisdeemedacceptableorunacceptable,areatoddswithboththelegal
andstatedmoralviewsofcorruptionheldbycandidates.Theillegalpracticesthey
engagedin,suchasgivinggoodsandcashtovoters,issonormalizedinIndonesiathat
candidatescouldre‐framethemasbeingacceptableandroutine;evenculturally
appropriate.Thelackofaccordbetweenthethreefacetsofthedefinitionundermines
thecoherenceofthesymboland,therefore,itsethos.Despitealltheresources
candidatesputintoconstructingasymbol,bothintermsoffinancesandtime,the
symbolpresentedisfundamentallyflawed,renderingtheseeffortslargelyfruitless.
Theoretically,thisthesisspeakstotheliteratureontheselection,developmentand
broadcastingofpoliticalsymbolsinelectioncampaignsbyelucidatingthe
relationshipbetweensymboldevelopment,mobilizationandeffectiveness.Indoing
so,ithasdeepenedourunderstandingoftheuseofpoliticalsymbolsby
demonstratingthatsymbolspresentbothanopportunityandarisktothosewho
adoptthem.Edelman’s(1964;1977)seminaldiscussionofpoliticalsymbolsframes
themprimarilyintermsoftheirpersuasivevalueandtheirimpactonpublic
197
acquiescence,aninterpretationthathascontinuedlargelyunchallenged.Marrying
politicalsymboldiscourseandtheoriesofpersuasionandrhetoric,thisthesishas
foundthatthecampaignrhetoricaroundtheissueofcorruptionwasnotcohesive,
ultimatelyunderminingthevalueoftheanti‐corruptionsymbol.Thislackofcohesion
placedadditionalweightonlocalcontextsandindividualstrategies.Candidates
exploitedtheirlocaltiesorusedmoneypolitics,ratherthandirectingtheireffortsto
formulatingamorecompellinganti‐corruptionsymboltocapturetheimaginationof
voters.Partyanti‐corruptionsymbolswereunderminedbyothers’attempts—and
eventhoseofthecandidatesthemselves—towinvotersoverwithdonationsor
favours.
Thisthesisalsoextendsdiffusiontheoryfromitsbasisinsocialmovementstudies,as
developedbyGivanetal.(2010)andTarrow(2011),tounderstandtheparameters
andconstraintsofelectioncampaigningatdifferentscales.Applyingdiffusiontheory
tocampaignstrategiesandclassifyingthemasnon‐relational,relationaland
mediated,allowsforamorenuancedunderstandingofhowdifferentaspectsof
campaigningcanbothsupportandweakensymbolconstruction.Whilemanystudies
focuseitherontheactionsofnation‐widecampaignsorindividualcandidates,this
thesiscombinedthetwoinordertofullyexplaintheimpactofintra‐partyrelations
oncampaignmessages.Theapplicationofdiffusiontheoryinthiswayillustratedthe
importanceofconsideringelectioncampaignsatavarietyofscalesinordertogaina
holisticpictureofhowsymbolsareusedandwhytheyfailtoresonate.
Theincongruencebetweennationalandindividualcampaignsdescribedinthisstudy
isaconsequenceofthelackofcoordinationacrossscale,confirmingthecritiquesof
Sartori(1976),Deschouwer(2003)andFabre(2011)ofthetendencytoviewparties
asmonolithicentities.Inobservingpartyinteractionsatanumberoflevels,this
thesisfurtherdevelopsthisinsightbyhighlightingtheimportancenotonlyofparties’
subunitsandinternalsystems,butofindividuals,whohavethepowertoestablish
theirownsystemsamongstvoterswiththeassistanceoftheircampaignteamsand
brokers.Furtherchallengingtheviewthatpartiesareunifiedorganizations,this
studydemonstratedthattheroleofindividualcandidatesisparamountinelections.
Whilejoiningapartywasnecessary,andmayhaveofferedcandidatesabrandname
torallybehind,theirownbackgroundandlocalcontext—includingthepervasiveness
ofmoneypoliticsatthegrassrootslevel,whichconstitutedanearlyinsurmountable
198
obstacletothosewishingtoretainacleanreputation—remainedinfluentialin
determiningtheirpopularitywithvoters.
Giventhatpoliticalsymbolsareconstructedforthepurposeofacquiringor
maintainingpower,theirsuccessorfailurespeakstothepoliticalparty’sabilityto
effectivelyusetheirresourcestoinfluenceelectoraloutcomes.Awell‐chosenand
convincinglyportrayedsymbolhastheabilitytoswayvotersand,consequently,
conferpoweronaparticularpartyorindividual.ThisthesisconfirmsKeane’s(1997)
assertionthatthesocialspacesinwhichsymbolsoccurplayacrucialrolein
determiningtheirinfluence.Partiesandcandidatesassumedthatanti‐corruption
symbolswouldbepopularbecausetheywereprimedbytheexistingpoliticalcontext;
however,aligningthemselveswiththesymbolprovednotonlydifficult,butinsome
casesineffective.Tosomeextent,nationalcampaignscouldaffordtooverlooklocal
contextbecauseoftheiremphasisonwidespread,non‐relationaldisseminationof
theircampaignsymbol.Yetwhiletheblack‐and‐whitenarrativeofcorruptionissues
presentedinthesecampaignssuggeststhatparties,andthecandidateswhochoseto
adoptthesymbol,viewedcorruptionasamoral‘non‐negotiable’,itwas,infact,a
highlymalleableconceptinthemindsofvoters.Keane’sargumentresonates
particularlyatthislocallevelbecausethesuccessofsymbolswasdeterminedbyhow
welltheywerereceivedbyindividualvoters.Whilecitizensmayhavesupportedanti‐
corruptionmovementsagainstthoseintheupperechelonsofpower—suchas
criticizingtheabuseofpowerbygovernmentofficials—theydidnotnecessarily
associatevote‐buyingormoneypoliticswithcorruption,despiteitbeinganillegal
exchange.
199
Appendices
Appendix1:SurveysfromJanuary2010‐2014addressingthepopularityof
partiesandthePresident
Released
Institution
Findings
Jan2010
LembagaSurvei
YudhoyonoandVice‐President Boediono'sapprovalrating
Indonesia
Dec2010
LembagaSurvei
Indonesia
May2011
LembagaSurvei
downfrom85%inJuly2009to70%inJanuary2010.1
Yudhoyono'sapprovalratingat63%.DemocraticPartythe
mostpopularpartywith21.4%ofvotes.2
Yudhoyono'sapprovalratingat56%.3
Indonesia
Jun2011
LingkaranSurvei
Indonesia
Sep2011
LingkaranSurvei
Indonesia
Jan2012
LembagaSurvei
Indonesia
Feb2012
CSIS
Satisfaction with the Yudhoyono‐Boediono leadership at
47.2%.4
Satisfaction with the Yudhoyono‐Boediono leadership at
37.7%.5
Only10.5%onlythosesurveyedplantovoteforthe
Democraticparty.6
Surveyshowednopartyhadaclearlead inthe2014
elections,althoughPDIPwasslightlyinfront.7
Jun2012
LingkaranSurvei
Indonesia
MegawatifromPDIP themostpopularcandidatefor
presidentwith18.2%ofthevote.Nocandidatefromthe
DemocraticPartyratedinthesurvey.8
July2012
CSIS
54%ofthosesurveyedarenotsatisfiedwithYudhoyono's
performanceasPresident.9
Apr2013
CSIS
2.7%ofrespondentsplantovoteforPKS.10
Transparency
Gerindra,PANandPDIP arethemost'transparent'parties
International
intheelectoralraceaccordingtothosesurveyed.11
Indonesia
May2013
LembagaSurvei
3.8%ofrespondentsplantovoteforPKS.12
Nasional
1AsreportedbyBBCIndonesia(BBCIndonesia2010).
2AsreportedinTempo(Jusuf2011).
3AsreportedinIndonesia‐2014(Indonesia‐20142012).
4AsreportedbyDetik.com(Nugroho2011).
5‘AsreportedbyOkezone(Wirakusuma2011).
6AsreportedinRakyatMerdeka(Dalimunthe2012).
7AsreportedintheJakartaPost(Dewi2012).
8AsreportedinTempo(Wijaya2012).
9AsreportedbyDetik.com(Dhurandara2012).
10AsreportedinRepublika(Ruslan2013).
11AsreportedbyBBCIndonesia(BBCIndonesia2013).
12SurveyresultspostedtothewebsiteofLembagaSurveiNasional(2013).
200
Released
Institution
Jul2013
SPACE
Findings
43%ofthosesurveyedplannottovote(golput).Golkar,
PDIPandGerindraleadthepartiesinpopularity.13
SoegengSarjadi
Inpartypolling, PDIP ismostpopularwith13.6%ofthe
Schoolof
vote,whiletheDemocraticPartyhasfallento10.3%of
Governance
votes.MeanwhileIslamicpartieshavedeclinedin
popularityandPKSholdsonly1.88%ofthevote.14
Jul2013
LembagaSurvei
Nasional
Sep2013
HanuraandGerindraareperceivedasbeingthetwo
cleanest(bersih)partiesintheelectionrace.15
IndonesianNetwork 56.3%ofrespondentsarenotsatisfiedwiththeeffortsof
ElectionSurvey
YudhoyonoandBoediono.90.2%ofrespondentsassociate
theirgovernmentwithcorruptionandscandal.16
Oct2013
LingkaranSurvei
JokowiandPrabowoarethepresidentialfavouritesand
Indonesia
thethreemostpopularpartiesare:Golkar,PDIPandthe
DemocraticParty.17
Oct2013
PoliticalWeather
Prabowoisthefavouredpresidentialcandidatewith
Station
16.7%ofrespondentssayingtheywillvoteforhim,
followedbyMegawati(12.5%).18
Nov2013
LembagaSurvei
Nasional
Dec2013
CSIS
Only36.4%ofvoterspolledwhovotedforPKSin2009
willvoteforthepartyagain.19
Jokowiis themostpopularpresidentialcandidatewith
34.7%ofrespondentschoosinghim,followedbyPrabowo
with10.7%ofsurveyedvotes.20
Dec2013
SoegengSarjadi
Schoolof
Governance
Feb2014
LingkaranSurvei
Indonesia
Analysed30opinionpollsandfoundthatPDIPwasthe
mostpopularparty,forecasting17.4%ofvotes,followed
byGolkarwith17.01%andGerindrawith10.51%.21
NasdemandPKSmaynotpasstheparliamentary
threshold.PKSpredictedtogain3.12%ofvoteswhile
Nasdempredictedtowin2.68%.22
Feb2014
LingkaranSurvei
Indonesia
PresidentialcandidateJokowiwouldwin,receiving 22.3‐
35.6%ofthevote,againstPrabowowhowouldgarner
13AspublishedinKompas(Kompas2013a).
14AsreportedbyDetik.com(Damarjati2013).
15AsreportedbyDetik.com(Ledysia2013).
16AsreportedinKompas(Gatra2013).
17AsreportedintheJaakrtaGlobe(Sukoyo2013a).
18AsreportedinTempo(Anam2013).
19AsreportedinMerdeka(Simanjuntak2013).
20AsreportedinTempo(Tempo2013a).
21AsreportedintheJakartaPost(Saragih2013a).
22AsreportedbyTribunnews.com(Ihsanuddin2014b).
201
Released
Institution
Findings
12.6‐19.7%.23
Mar2014
SaifulMujani
ResearchCenter
PDIPpredictedtowintheelectionwith16.4%ofvotes,
Golkarsecondwith15%.However47.7%ofrespondents
decidednottochooseaparty.Thesurveyalsopredicted
thatallpartieswouldproceedtoparliamentexceptthe
CrescentandStarParty(PartaiBulanBintang,PBB)and
theIndonesianJusticeandUnityParty(PartaiKeadilan
danPersatuanIndonesia,PKPI).24
Apr2014
RoyMorgan
PDIPexpectedtogain37%ofvotesandJokowitheclear
Research
presidentialfavouritewith45%ofrespondentschoosing
him.25
Apr2014
PusatDataBersatu
SurveyfoundJokowitobethepreferredpresidential
candidate.26
23AsreportedintheJakartaPost(Aritonang2014).
24AsreportedintheJakartaPost(JakartaPost2014b)andMediaIndonesia(Mustain2014).
25AsreportedinKompas(Ihsanuddin2014c)andtheJakartaGlobe(JakartaGlobe2014b).
26AsreportedinKompas(Ihsanuddin2014a).
202
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