Community Engagement in Post-Conflict Situation: The Case of Solomon Islands
Kaua T1* & Sore R2*
1
Secretary to the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Office of the Prime Minister and Cabinet,
Solomon Islands
2
Deputy Secretary for Policy, Office of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Solomon Islands
Abstract
The Solomon Islands is a diverse, vast and multi-layered society. It consists of six big islands and
numerous small ones. In the country we have Melanesians, Polynesians, Micronesians, Chinese,
Australians, New Zealanders, Pacific Islanders and others. Over 80 Indigenous languages and
dialects are spoken in the islands. Patrilineal, matrilineal and ambilineal descent principles prevail
in different parts of the country.
Population distribution in the country is skewed towards rural. The 1999 Population Census
enumerated that 84 per cent of the people live in small and widely-dispersed rural settlements,
mostly along the coasts of rural Solomon Islands. Twelve per cent of them live in Honiara and
four per cent live in provincial urban centres (Solomon Islands Government 2002).
It was non-recognition on the part of decision-makers and development stakeholders of these
regions, coupled with the lack of appreciation of a multi-layered society, that led to five years of
ethnic crisis. The conflict began in the latter part of 1998 with the emergence of a self-styled
militia group known as Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army (GRA) and ended with the interventions
of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) in mid 2003.
In the short-term, interventions by the RAMSI restored law and order and brought back peace.
However, sustaining law and order and permanence of peace in the country requires active forms
of community engagement.
The Kemakeza-led National Coalition Government for Peace, Unity and Restoration was formed
on 17 December 2001. Upon coming to power, it came up with a Programme Of Action (POA) for
2002–2005. This POA is a short-term policy agenda that stems from minimal community
engagement.
1
The National Economic Recovery, Reform and Development Plan (NERRDP 2003–2006) is
merely a medium-term plan developed with very little community consultation. These policy
documents, though developed at a time of the conflict, contain superficial solutions to the
prevention of future conflicts.
Community engagement in a post-conflict Solomon Islands society needs to dig deeper into the
diversity, vastness and multi-layered richness of the country. To this end, the need for institutional
strengthening and capacity building of community structures is crucially important. At the same
time, the process of bottom up approach to development planning and budget formulation is
essential.
This paper looks at options of improved mechanisms of community engagement with views of
preventing further occurrences of ethnic conflicts in the country.
Introduction
Solomon Islands is richly blessed with abundant natural resources and attractions, but
paradoxically the economy is no larger now than it was 20 years ago.
Ideally, the economy must expand to support a rapidly growing population. However, over the
years since independence, deeper underlying socio-cultural and economic problems has eroded
the fundamental stability of Solomon Islands economy.
In order to thoroughly understand these complications one needs to review historical events that
led to the formation of the country. In this regard, this paper puts into perspective the roles played
by explorers, black birders and traders, missionaries and colonial powers. Their interventions are
indispensable to avoid.
At the same time, the role played by the relocation of the capital from Tulagi to Honiara, as a
result of the Second World War, is also instrumental to the redirection of the lives of Indigenous
islanders.
Explorers
Alvarro de Mendana, a Spanish explorer, first set foot on the island of Isabel in 1568. He wasted
six months searching fruitlessly for the fabled gold mines of King Solomon. He left behind him the
names Solomon Islands, Guadalcanal, Santa Isabel, San Cristobal and Santa Cruz.
2
Afterwards, Philip Carteret blundered into the coastlines of Santa Cruz in 1767. Soon after, a
stream of British, American and French explorers discovered other islands in the archipelago.1
Black birders and traders
In the late 18th century, seafaring black birders and commercially-minded traders not only
invaded the south seas but also they came to the islands for massive extraction of resources.
Use of iron tools, firearms, calico and tobacco spread throughout the islands.
Transactions based on the barter-type system of exchange began and an export-oriented
economy was introduced. In disregard of island protocols, i.e. respect for culture, norms and
values, the islands were used as sources of labour, sandalwood, whales, bêche-de-mer and
other natural products. One could say that it was the black birders and traders that opened the
gates of a once-closed island economy of the now modern Solomon Islands.
Missionaries
In the early 20th century, missionaries came with the Bible. They played a more gradual,
enduring and lasting role. On one hand, the wave of Christianity moved swiftly and cautiously to
tame fierce, warlike and cannibalistic locals who were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the
activities of black birders and traders. On the other hand, they divided the diverse, vast and multilayered society with factions based on Christian affiliations.
Again, introduced Christian beliefs were disrespectful of the time-tasted values and cultures of
Indigenous islanders. In fact, cultural practices of the Indigenous islanders were said to be
uncivilised. Although Christianity itself wasn’t wrong, it must be put into right perspective that the
processes of Christianisation sidelined, if not downplayed, useful elements of cultural upbringing
in the island communities.
From the years 2000 to 2005, Christians in the country are celebrating centennial festivals to
mark the arrival of Christianity. Early missionaries have clearly made a marked difference in the
lives of Indigenous islanders.
1
This observation was clearly specified in Growing With Economic Recovery, Reform And
Development In Solomon Islands: Report Of The Tripartite Taskforce Of Solomon Islands, 2003,
p. 27. The Prime Minister, Hon. Sir Allan Kemakeza, appointed the Parliamentary Tripartite
Taskforce to review Pipe-Line Projects and Projects For Further Assessment of the 2004
Development Estimates after the subsequent passing of the 2004 Approved Appropriation Budget
2003. The Taskforce was co-chaired by former prime ministers Hon. Bartholomew Ulufa’alu and
Hon. Manasseh Sogavare.
3
Colonial powers
British control of the islands was formalised in 1893. The islands became known as the British
Solomon Islands Protectorate (BSIP). In 1899 authority over the Shortland Islands, Choiseul,
Ontong Java and Isabel was transferred by Germany to the BSIP.
The boundaries of the modern Solomon Islands nation-state were a creation of imperial design
and not based on cultural heritage or relationships. This means that the people of Bougainville
have cultural ties with the people of Shortland Islands. However, Bougainville became part of
Papua New Guinea and the Shortland Islands became part of the Solomon Islands. Similarly, the
people of Santa Cruz have cultural attachments with the people of Santo. Again, Santa Cruz
became part of the Solomon Islands and Santo became part of the New Hebrides.
To this end, Elsina Wainwright, author of Our Failing Neighbour: Australia and the Future of
Solomon Islands, later amplified that the nation state had never taken root in the country. She
said:
“…..the British colonial presence was not as engaged in Solomon Islands as it was elsewhere. As
a result, the institutions of statehood in Solomon Islands never firmly took root, even after
decolonization on 7th July 1978. A question therefore exists as to whether Solomon Islands was
ever a properly functioning state. There remained an ill fitting overlay of state institutions with
traditional structures, and the traditional structures proved to be enduring. This contributed to the
weakness of the state’ (Wainright 2003, pp. 487-8).
Second World War
The Second World War in the Pacific erupted in 1942. When the war spread to the Pacific region,
Indigenous islanders in the archipelago witnessed fierce battles between Japanese and Allied
Forces. Tulagi, the colonial capital of the islands, was gutted, hence immediately after the war the
capital was relocated to Honiara.
It could be said that attempts by explorers, black birders and traders, missionaries and colonial
powers to exploit, organise, develop and govern the islands led not only to the marginalisation of
Indigenous islanders but also caused massive destruction of legitimate structures.
Furthermore, one could not bypass the fact that the evil forces of the Second World War also
contributed to the emergence of ethnic crisis in the country. On this claim one could rightly say
that it was during the Second World War that locals showed guns and ammunitions for the first
time. During the ethnic tension, it was these weapons that were later used by them to advance
vested interests against communal welfare.
4
Top-down development planning
The relocation of the national capital to Honiara came with execution of National Development
Plans (NDP) by colonial administrators. The NDP was a tool used by the colonial administration
to organise, control and plan the socio-economic development of the nation-state.
However, critics say that organising, controlling and planning of socio-economic development of
the nation state had never taken root in the islands. Instead it led to the marginalisation of
community structures. In theory, benefits of socio-economic development were expected to trickle
down to rural communities. In reality this was a misnomer.
National Development Plans
Nonetheless NDPs, which ran for five years, guided a continuous and systematic pattern of
development in the islands. Successive NDPs became extensions of previous ones. Continuity
was the order of top-down development planning.
It could be said that strategic industries like the Solomon Islands Plantations Limited (SIPL),
Russell Islands Plantation Estates Limited (RIPEL) and most hospitals and schools of today were
outputs of programs and projects of these NDPs.
At the same time, development of utilities such as water and electricity and building of supporting
infrastructures like roads and bridges were concentrated in district centres. As a result, life in the
centres became attractive to Indigenous islanders. Urban drift then began.
One could conveniently say that these strategic industries, utilities and supporting infrastructures
assisted to sustain an ‘attractive life’ at the centre but failed considerably to strengthen and
improve capacities of legitimate community structures.
Notable in this regard was a deliberate attempt by colonial powers and successive NDPs to
discourage development on Malaita so as to use the island as source of indentured labourers in
order to sustain plantation operations in Queensland, Fiji, Samoa and other parts of the country. It
was such an imbalance, that it drove aspiring Malaitans to capitalise on available opportunities in
order to excel, hence conversely ill-feelings and jealousy were targeted against them. Against
such intentions, ethnic tension erupted in the country.
5
Three-tier system of government
It was agreed in London in September 1977 that the constitution should provide for provincial
governments. Based on this agreement, Section 114 of the constitution explicitly provides that
“Solomon Islands shall be divided into provinces, the number and boundaries of which shall be
prescribed by Parliament after considering the advice of the Constituency Boundaries
Commission.”2
The introduction of the three-tier system of government in the country was pre-destined by
colonial masters. The Provincial Government Act 1981, when passed by the national parliament,
led to the formation of seven-provincial assemblies. Later, two-provincial assemblies were added.
Central Government became the top layer of the three-tier system of government. The second
layer was Provincial Assemblies and the third was Area Assemblies. The system dictates that
political and economic power remains with the Central Government and spill-over benefits of such
power-sharing spreads to Provincial Assemblies. Area Assemblies, on the other hand, were
neglected, hence they died a natural death.
The Constitutional Review Committee of 1987 found that the majority of islanders in the island
state were dissatisfied with the massive duplication of responsibilities of the three-tier system of
government. This was mostly due to the fact that the system has no resemblance to the
legitimate community structures of the island nation. Ownership of the system, therefore, was
absent from the start.
As such, one could say that later it became known that the introduction of the three-tier system of
government was alien to the predominant legitimate community structures in the country.
Programme of Action
In 1980, at the reign of the late Solomon Mamaloni, a strategic switch in terms of policy was
introduced. The Governments Programme of Action (POA) took prominence and replaced the
five-year NDP. The POA contained broad political policy statements, which procedurally should
form basis of development strategies, programs and projects.
It is the duty of technocrats and bureaucrats to translate these policy statements to development
strategies, programs and projects. In most instances, though, a sudden switch to POA caused
problems for administrators. They lacked technical competency to sufficiently translate
development policies into development strategies, programs and projects.
2
Section 114 of the National Constitution of Solomon Islands.
6
Despite the fact that policy statements of succeeding governments have always been genuine
and noble in intent; misdirection by bureaucrats led to designing of inappropriate policies, hence
this caused wastage of resources. The end result of the process is development of the core at the
expense of the periphery.
Furthermore, it was also observed that POAs by succeeding governments lacked continuity. As a
result ad hoc planning, disjointed POA and frequent change of regimes in almost all cases
contributed to the downward spiral of the economy.
The hard-hit impact of such economic downturn was experienced by marginalised owners of
resources, hence this led to the occurrence of the recent ethnic crisis.
Ethnic crisis
Marginalised resource owners of Guadalcanal organised themselves in the latter part of 1998
with the emergence of a clandestine militia group known as GRA. The GRA working alongside
Guadalcanal Provincial Assembly petitioned the government on ‘Demands by The Bona Fide And
Indigenous People Of Guadalcanal’ on 4 February 1999.
Among other things they demanded the following:
1. State government — That Government introduces state government as recommended by the
1987 Constitutional Review Committee Report and later the Provincial Review Committee
Report
2. Review of constitution — Review the constitution so that it provides for the protection of
properties, protection to life, freedom from fear, freedom of movement and freedom of
expression
3. Land and Titles Act — Reviewed to encompass the diversity, vastness and multi-layered
pillars of Solomon Islands society
4. Transfer of perpetual estate titles — Immediate transfer of perpetual estate titles to the
province
5. Honiara Rental — Solomon Islands Government to pay rental of Honiara land and land
occupied by Temporary Occupancy License holders
6. Internal Migration — Legislation to control and manage internal migration
7. Electoral Act — Amendment to disallow persons from other provinces to contest in another
province
8. Reconciliation of murdered Guadalcanalese — That government pays $2.5 million for the
brutal murder of 25 Guadalcanalese.
7
Close analysis of these bona fide demands reveals a direct relationship between alienation of
resource owners and disengagement of communities in development processes. It was such a
discomforting experience, that it urged young Guadalcanalese to revolt against domination by
Malaitan settlers. The dispute resulted in the displacement of about 20,000 Internally Displaced
Persons (IDP).
In response to the operations by GRA, on 5 June 2000 the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF), in a joint
operation with members of the regular Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIP), seized control
of the main police armoury at Rove, captured the patrol boat vessels and cordoned off Honiara.
Thereafter, exchanges of fierce warfare happened between Guadalcanal and Malaita militants.
The conflict caused misery to lives of innocent civilians, left thousands of IDPs homeless and
brought the economy to its knees.
Peace was brokered with the signing of the Townsville Peace Agreement on 15 October 2000.
The agreement declared renouncement, giving up of violence and condemned the use of arms
and required both parties to “take all steps within their means to prevent, remove and eliminate
any case of ethnically rooted uprising, complaints, demands and organizations from their province
or communities”.
Despite the signing of the TPA, lawlessness and economic downturn continued. Skirmishes of
militant activities existed and innocent civilians were harassed and threatened. The investment
climate for private sector development became non-conducive to attract foreign investments.
Looting and theft became common sights of city life in Honiara.
Jon Fraenkel, in his book The Manipulation of Custom: From Uprising to Intervention in the
Solomon Islands, agreed that although the underlying cause of the law and order problem was
regularly personified as Harold Keke, the real roots lay in Honiara. It was observed that in
Honiara, Malaita and rural Guadalcanal the politics of plunder ruled the roost. Worse still, gunmen
were able to act with impunity around the city (Fraenkel 2004).
On 17 December 2001 Sir Allan Kemakeza was elected as prime minister of the newly-formed
National Coalition Government (NCG), a merger between the Peoples Alliance Party (PAP) and
Association of Independent Members (AIM). Hon. Snyder Rini, leader of the AIM, became the
deputy prime minister.
8
However, it was common knowledge that the announcement of the prime ministership of Hon.
Kemakeza was greeted with a lukewarm spirit by crowds that gathered outside of the National
Parliament. But the victorious Kemakeza dismissed the critics. He insisted that his mandate came
from villages, not from Honiara, implying of course that this is the essence of community
engagement in decision-making and participatory planning and development processes. It is this
promise of working togetherness that this paper further extrapolates in the discussion of
community engagement in post-conflict situations.
The coming of RAMSI on 24 July 2003 brought new hopes to civilians. Innocent as they are,
RAMSI was like a saviour to them. They likened RAMSI to a force that has the power to break
and loosen thestrengthen and power base of militants who had been terrorising them and
corrupting the government machinery.
National Coalition Government — Programme of Action 2002–2005
The NCG, having being mindful of its clear mandate from its electorate, as confessed by Prime
Minister Kemakeza in his speech outside of the national parliament after his election, produced its
POA that contained policies, priorities, strategies and targets for the years 2002 to 2005.
The POA is guided by five founding principles. These are:
I. Redirection
II. Reconstruction
III. Participation
IV. Production
V. Distribution.
In short, it could be said that the POA foresees the redirection and reconstruction of post-conflict
Solomon Islands society and to base such processes on broad-based participation and
community engagement so as to ensure maximum levels of production and provide equitable
distribution of goods and services in the country.
The policy directives of POA 2002-2005 are:
• Restoration of law and order
• Peace process
• Constitutional, legislative, political and structural reform
• Education
• Health and medical services
• Finance (monetary and fiscal sector)
9
• Productive sector (agriculture, lands, forestry, fisheries and tourism)
• Infrastructure development
• Commerce, trade and industries.
Whilst it was announced that the NCG was a gift from God and its mandate came from the people
of rural Solomon Islands, it could also be said that the POA contains short term political agendas
that superficially represent the views of the people. As such, ownership of POA by the people and
for the people is debatable and raises more questions than answers.
With these questions in mind one wonders whether the POA:
• could be sufficiently translated by technocrats and bureaucrats into development strategies,
programs and projects
• could attract funding from development partners and donor agencies so as to implement its
development strategies, program and projects
• could deliver equitable distribution of goods and services to the people of Solomon Islands so
as to attain zero chance of future ethnic-based crises
• could lead to sustainability of law and order and permanence of peace
• could lead to improved livelihood of all Solomon Islanders and inversely cause eradication of
poverty
• could, learning from the ethnic crisis, lead to empowerment of resources owners and actively
engage communities in development and decision-making processes.
As a way out of this dilemma the government saw it proper to produce a recovery plan, which has
the support and concurrence of some development partners and donor agencies. To this end,
government came up with the National Economic Recovery, Reform and Development Plan
2003–2006.
National Economic Recovery, Reform and Development Plan 2003–2006
The National Economic Recovery, Reform and Development Plan 2003–2006 was prepared in
the aftermath of the breakdown of law and order, a period dominated by ethnic strife and civil
disorder.
As such, it became obvious for ‘Normalizing Law and Order and Security Situation’ to become its
first key Strategic Area. The other four Key Strategic Areas are:
• Strengthening democracy, human rights and good governance
• Restoring fiscal and financial stability and reforming the public sector
• Revitalising the productive sector and rebuilding supporting infrastructure
10
• Restoring the basis of social services and fostering social development.
Like most Development Plans, the overarching developmental goal of the NERRDP is to enhance
and improve the livelihood of all Solomon Islanders. In doing so, this medium-term plan
anticipates reduced poverty levels within a time span of four years. This, according to the plan,
would become obvious in the case “not just [for] some people or groups but all people and all
groups in Solomon Islands”.3
Again, just like the POA, one wonders whether this donor endorsed NERRDP:
• could deliver an equitable distribution of goods and services to the people of the Solomon
Islands so as to attain zero chance of future ethnic-based crises
• could lead to sustainability of law and order and permanence of peace
• could improve the livelihood of all Solomon Islanders and inversely cause eradication of
poverty in the county. In this regard, empowerment of resource owners and active
engagement of communities in development and decision-making processes would be useful
for improved livelihood and poverty reduction.
With these doubts in mind, the government saw it necessary and fitting to approve subsidiary
policies on bottom-up approaches to development planning and budget formulation. The design
of these secondary policies is meant not as substitutes to the government’s principal policies as
stated in POA and NERRDP, but rather they should be seen as complementary documents.
Engaging communities — the way forward
Several Tripartite Communities of Parliamentarians were formed to look at the causes of poor
service delivery, analyse reasons for the breakdown of law and order and suggest ways of
coming up with a lasting solution to economic recovery, reform and development.
Having examined all options these communities came up with a number of reports. Some of
these reports provide critical suggestions for engaging communities in a post-conflict situation in
the country. These reports are:
• Growing With Economic Recovery, Reform and Development in Solomon Islands: The New
Road Map – A Bottom up Perspective, Report of the Parliamentary Tripartite Taskforce of
Solomon Islands
• The New Base: Road Map To Economic Recovery, Development and Nation Building in
Solomon Islands, Report of the Economic Taskforce of Solomon Islands
3
National Economic, Recovery, Reform and Development Plan 2003–2006, p. 6.
11
• Long Term Measures for Sustainable Service Delivery: A Critical Analysis of the Capacity of
the country to Deliver Services after the Departure of RAMSI, Report of Service Delivery
Taskforce of Solomon Islands.
Nonetheless, it could be said that on the one hand these reports contain noble and genuine
conclusions that favour ideals of community engagement, and on the other hand it must be noted
also that the absence of willpower on the part of the ruling government and its constituents would
result in the predominance of income inequity and unbalanced development, which are outcomes
of community disengagement. In this case, one would not rule out the likelihood of future conflicts
in the country.
Among suggested options for effective community engagement in a post-conflict Solomon Islands
society are:
• institutional strengthening and capacity building of community structures
• a bottom-up approach to development planning
• a bottom-up approach to budget formulation.
It is envisaged that doing ‘business as usual’ and continuing with the top-down approaches of
POA and NDPs, with expectations of benefits trickling down to the rural populace, had not only
failed in the past but also would fail to bring about sustainable law and order and permanent
peace in a post-conflict situation in the country.
Institutional strengthening and capacity building of community structures
The Parliamentary Tripartite Committee argues that in order to grow with economic recovery,
reform and development in a post-conflict situation, the country on a micro-scale must value the
importance of the following indispensable components of the New Road Map:
1. Diversity in unity through virtues of interdependence
2. Legitimacy, ownership, legality and sustainability of community structures.
It was earlier stated that the Solomon Islands society is a heterogeneous one. This means to say
that even on the smallest unit there are diversities in norms, values and practices. It must be said
from the outset that these diversities must not be seen as sources of disunity, nor are they
weapons for future conflicts, but rather acceptance and appreciation of our differences through
media of independence is the cornerstone of engaging communities in a post-conflict situation.
For this reason, one could confidently say that engaging communities in a post-conflict situation is
directly related to fights of achieving improved livelihood and reducing poverty in the country.
12
It must not be overlooked that re-enforcement of the cords of national unity depend very much on
the legalisation of community structures. Community structures, in this regards, are legitimate
entities that need to be legalised.
It is also a known fact that the processes of legalising community structures would strengthen the
sense of owning economic recovery, reform and development in the country, hence in the long
term lead to the presence of sustainable law and order and permanent peace.
Community Support Programme
The Community Support Programme (CSP), formerly know as Community Peace and
Restoration Fund (CPRF), is an AusAID support program that channels direct assistance to
communities in the country.
It could be argued that, in order to make a lasting difference to the lives of community members in
the country, CSP assistance must be channelled through legalised community entities and not
just makeshift communities. Makeshift communities, for that matter, are ones that are formed just
to qualify for aid assistance. They are not only illegitimate but are also ‘here today and gone
tomorrow’.
Japanese Grassroots Projects
The Japanese Grassroots Project provides grants, in terms of financial and technical assistance,
by the Japanese Government to community-based initiatives. In most cases, political projects that
either really do not exist or exist only on paper come to the attention of the management of
grassroots projects.
As such, the existence of active forms of community engagement and channelling of aid
assistance to legalised, legitimate community structures is crucial to sustaining law and order and
establishing permanent peace in the country.
European Union micro-projects
The European Union (EU) has been providing grant assistance to micro-projects in social
services and income-generating sectors. This grant assistance is directed mostly to community
and family-based ventures.
13
However, observations had it that in most cases so-called ‘communities’ and loose-knit ‘families’’
assemble only to attract funding from the EU. Once the fund is disbursed, the communities and
families disintegrate and the project disappears.
As such, values of community engagement in the success of micro-projects could not be
underestimated in a post-conflict Solomon Islands society.
Republic of China (ROC)/Solomon Islands Government (SIG) Micro Projects
The
ROC/SIG
Micro
Projects
Scheme
is
a
joint
initiative
by
ROC
and
the
SIG. It caters for micro-projects for grassroots development in productive and social service
sectors. However, the guidelines of the project dictate “all project proposals towards this scheme
should have the endorsement of respective Members of Parliament”.4
The political sensitivity of this scheme makes it open to abuse, hence the scheme is highly
insensitive to values of community engagement in a post-conflict situation. It could be said that
the scheme promotes political supremacy at the expense of community development.
Bottom-up approach to development planning
It was stated earlier that NDPs, which were previously produced by colonial administrators,
lacked ownership by Indigenous islanders. Furthermore, it was also observed that implementation
of these NDPs led to unbalanced and inequitable development in the country. Also evident in the
process was the destruction of legitimate community-based structures and the end result was
development of Honiara and provincial centres at the expense of marginalised resource owners.
This eventually led to the occurrence of a five-year ethnic conflict.
To this end, it is appropriate that mechanisms of engaging communities involve processes of
village-based development planning, ward-based development planning, constituency-based
development planning, province-based development planning and nation-based development
planning. In this regard, it must be said that Solomon Islands society is an aggregate of villages,
wards, constituencies and provinces.
To this end, SIG has adopted a policy on bottom-up approach to development planning. This
approach should ensure broad-based development, which is founded on principles of community
engagement and demands immediate formulation of village, ward, constituency, province and
national development plans.
4
ROC/SIG Micro Projects 2005, General Guidelines of the Scheme.
14
Bottom-up approach to budget formulation
At the same time, it was also found that previous Recurrent and Development Budget Estimates,
which were done not only by colonial administrators but also by succeeding governments, had led
to the development of an urban-based private sector, which was not only narrow in concentration
but also small in size, hence it could not absorb potentials of expanding the commercial economy
into the domains of a dominant subsistence sector.
Critical in this regard is a review of traditional practices of budget formulation with views of
asserting budget ownership. Ownership of budget could be demonstrated in two groups:
1. First is through the processes of engaging communities by way of bottom up consultations
and people-centred budgeting or by means of participatory methods of budgeting
2. Second is by way of contributions of the government to the country’s development budget
estimates.
To this end, SIG has adopted a policy on bottom-up approach to budget formulation. By this
method, it is envisaged that principles of engaging communities would be used to entail
constituency, provincial and national consultations. This process would be a bonus to the well
positioned Annual SIG/Donor Consultations.
At the same time, it must be highlighted that for the first time in the history of the country; SIG is
contributing a recurrent surplus of $15 million from the previous year towards the Approved
Development Estimates for 2005. For the country, in terms of conventional budgeting, this is a
bonus for engaging communities in a post-conflict situation.
Sustainable delivery of services
The report Long Term Measures For Sustainable Service Delivery: A Critical Analysis Of The
Capacity of The Country to Deliver Services After the Departure of RAMSI, by the Service
Delivery Taskforce of the Solomon Islands, identified service delivery by the government as
belonging to three categories:
1. Essential goods and services, where the involvement of government in their delivery is
considered essential to avoid a monopoly situation or inadequate provision caused by the
mechanism of demand and supply if left to be determined by forces of the free market
2. Services that are commercial in nature, whether essential or non-essential in nature, which
could be appropriately corporatised or privatised depending on their nature of activities
3. Goods and services that are social, recreational and religious in nature, which could be
effectively delivered through the churches, NGOs and other social organisations.
15
What is certain is the notion that sustainable delivery of service is intrinsically related to economic
performance of the country and on the implementation of development programs by implementing
agencies. Crucial players on both accounts are SIG and the people of the Solomon Islands.
In this regard, government has a duty to ensure that the investment environment in the country is
conducive to attract genuine foreign investments and that the active participation of Solomon
Islanders to develop the huge potentials of the country is essential for aspirations of nation
building.
As such, engaging communities by way of active private sector development could lead to an
increase in government revenue so as to sustain service delivery in the long run.
Conclusions
The disengagement of communities, whether in the context of social, cultural, economical or
political platform, is detrimental to the development of the country. This observation is very much
portrayed in the 13 May 2005 writings of the ‘Malaita Separatist Movement (MSM)’.5
When referring to Hon. Robin Moli, the premier for Malaita Province, the MSM said:
“…why don’t’ you arrange and talk with us and find out what are our complains. Why don’t
you voice out the many complains made by Malaita people for sometime…who do you
stand as Premier of Malaita Province to represent”.6
When referring to the Hon. Prime Minister of Solomon Islands, they said:
“…you never listen to us…there is no time for us to solve anything in Melanesian ways
anymore…”.7
These complaints indicate the frustrations of a certain group of Solomon Islanders who have not
participated in efforts of ‘engaging communities’ or have been neglected by societal development.
It shows beyond reasonable doubt that the essence of engaging communities is crucial to
balanced development in a post-conflict Solomon Islands society.
5
Malaita Separatist Movement is a newly-formed organisation that supports seceding of Malaita
Province from the rest of the Solomon Islands.
6
Malaita Separatist Movement, 13 May 2005, p. 1.
7
Malaita Separatist Movement, 13 May 2005, p. 2.
16
References
Fraenkel J 2004, The Manipulation Of Custom: From Uprising To Intervention In Solomon
Islands, Victoria University Press, Wellington.
Growing With Economic Recovery, Reform And Development In Solomon Islands: The New
Road Map – A Bottom Up Perspective, 2004, Report of the Parliamentary Tripartite Taskforce of
Solomon Islands, Office of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Honiara.
Long-Term Measures For Sustainable Service Delivery: A Critical Analysis Of The Capacity Of
The Country To Deliver Services After The Departure Of RAMSI, 2003, Report of the Services
Sub Taskforce of Solomon Islands, Office of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Honiara.
National Coalition Government For Peace, Unity And Restoration: Programme Of Action,
Policies, Strategies And Target 2002–2005, 2002, Office of the Prime Minister and Cabinet,
Honiara.
National Economic Recovery, Reform And Development Plan 2003–2006: Strategic And Action
Framework, 2003, Ministry of National Reform and Planning, Honiara.
Sanga K F & Walker K D 2005, Apem Moa Solomon Islands Leadership, Institute for Research
and Development in Maori and Pacific Education, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington.
Solomon Islands: Rebuilding An Island Economy, 2004, Department of Foreign Affairs, Economic
Analytical Unit, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra.
Solomon Islands Government 2002, Report On The 1999 Population And Housing Census:
Analysis, Statistics Office, Honiara.
The New Base: Road Map To Economic Recovery, Development And Nation Building In Solomon
Islands, 2003, Report of the Economic Sub Taskforce of Solomon Islands, Office of the Prime
Minister and Cabinet, Honiara.
Wainright E 2003, ‘Responding To State Failure – The Case Of Australia And Solomon Islands’,
Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 57, no. 3, Canberra.
17
Appendix 1. Acronyms and abbreviations
AIM
Association of Independent Members
BSIP
British Solomon Islands Protectorate
CPRF
Community Peace and Restoration Fund
CSI
Cross of Solomon Islands
CSP
Community Support Programme
EU
European Union
GRA
Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army
IDP
Internally Displaced Peoples
MEF
Malaita Eagle Force
NCG
National Coalition Government
NDP
National Development Plan
NERRDP
National Economic Recovery, Reform and Development Plan
OBE
Officer of British Empire
PAP
Peoples Alliance Party
POA
Programme Of Action
RAMSI
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
RIPEL
Russell Islands Plantation Estates Limited
ROC
Republic Of Korea
RSIP
Royal Solomon Islands Police
SIG
Solomon Islands Government
SIPL
Solomon Islands Plantation Limited
TPA
Townsville Peace Agreement
MSM
Malaita Separatist Movement
18