Colonial War and the Democratic Peace
Author(s): Hilde Ravlo, Nils Petter Gleditsch, Han Dorussen
Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Aug., 2003), pp. 520-548
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ColonialWar and the DemocraticPeace
HILDERAVLO
Departmentof Political Science
VanderbiltUniversity,Nashville
NILS PE'II'ERGLEDITSCH
InternationalPeace ResearchInstitute,Oslo (PRIO)
HAN DORUSSEN
Departmentof Government
Universityof Essex
Proponentsof the democraticpeace havebeen criticizedfor failingto discuss colonial wars.Democratic
countrieshave repeatedlyfought such wars, which critics hold to be incompatiblewith democraticpeace
theory.Three reasons are suggested to explain why colonial wars do not invalidatethe democraticpeace
argument.First, althoughdemocraciesrarely,if ever, fight one another,they participatein war as much as
nondemocracies.Thus, mixed political dyads have the greatestpropensityfor war.If nonstateadversaries
arecommonlyperceivedto be nondemocratic,democraciesshouldfightcolonial warsmorefrequently.Second,the natureof colonial conflicthas changedovertime.The relationshipbetweendemocracyandcolonial
waris examinedin colonial, imperialist,andpostcolonialperiods.Finally,a correctassessmentof the democraticpeace argumentneedsto rely on a multivariatemodel.Witha suitableset of controlvariables,the positive relationshipbetween war and democracydisappears.We also observe that in the post-WorldWarII
period,democraciesfightcolonial warsless frequentlythannon-democracies.We surmisethatthis mightbe
relatedto changes in the perceptionof non-Europeanpeoples.
Keywords: democraticpeace; colonial war; imperialistcolonization; extrasystemicwar; postcolonial
period
THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE
Democraciesrarely,if ever, fight one another(Gleditschand Hegre 1997; Russett
1993). They almostneverexperiencecivil waror seriousinternalviolence (Hegreet al.
2001), and they generally do not engage in genocide or other extremehumanrights
AUTHORS'NOTE: The articledrawson Ravlo's (1999) thesis at the NorwegianUniversityof Science
and Technology,Trondheim(NTNU). Ravlo's work was supportedby a grantto the InternationalPeace
ResearchInstitute(PRIO)and NTNU from the NorwegianMinistryof Defense. Workon this articlewas
also supportedby grantsfromthe ResearchCouncilof Norwayandthe WorldBank.We aregratefulto Neal
Beck, MatsHammarstrom,JonathonMoses, JohnOneal,RichardTucker,Mariande Vooght,andtwo anonymous refereesfor theircomments.HavardHegrehelped with the data,andNaimaMouhlebassistedin the
final editing. The data used in our analyses are available at www.prio.no/cwp/datasets.asp and
www.yale.edu/unsy/jcr/jcrdata.htm.
JOURNAL
OFCONFLICT
Vol.47 No.4, August2003520-548
RESOLUTION,
DOI:10.1177/0022002703254295
? 2003SagePublications
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Ravlo et al. / COLONIALWARAND DEMOCRATICPEACE
521
violations (Rummel 1995). Indeed, democracyhas been characterizedas a general
methodof nonviolentconflict resolution(Rummel 1997). However,most studieshave
found thatdemocraciesparticipatein interstatewaras frequentlyas nondemocracies,
andpolitically mixed dyads are usually foundto be the most hazardous.Democracies
rarelystartnew, armedconflicts, and increasinglyit is being arguedthatdemocracies
are more peaceful overall than autocracies(Russettand Starr2000, 94ff.).
A numberof challengeshavebeen issued to the idea of a democraticpeace. Realists
havearguedthatthe democraticpeace propositionholds only for the cold warera(e.g.,
Gowa 1999), an argumentthatloses force as the post-cold warperiodkeeps accumulatingmorepeacefuldemocratic-dyadyears.It has also been arguedthatthe processof
democratizationis dangerous(MansfieldandSnyder1995), butthe best evidenceindicates that the danger of violence-whether external or internal-lies in political
change more generally. The perils of transitionare eventually outweighed by the
peaceful impact of a higher level of stable democracy (Wardand Gleditsch 1998;
Hegre et al. 2001). Recent surveys (Russettand Oneal 2001; Russettand Starr2000)
portraythe democraticpeace argumentas havingbeen strengthenedby the manychallenges and responses.
THE CHALLENGE OF COLONIAL WAR
One importantchallenge to democraticpeace theorythathas not been extensively
studiedconcernsthe role of democraciesin colonial wars. A few studies have examined the democraticpeace in premoder societies (Ember,Ember,and Russett 1992;
Robinson2001; RussettandAntholis 1992;Weart1998), buteven in these studies,little attentionis paid to colonial relationships.
Reiter and Stam (2002, 151) observe that colonial or imperial wars fought by
democraciesprovide "particularlycompelling evidence againstthe normativeexplanation"for the democraticpeace. Democraticnorms of peaceful conflict resolution
should apply most stronglytowardobviously weakerstates and societies.
Theessentialpartsof thenormsexplanation
arguethatdemocracies
engageinwarsoutof
fearof exploitation
states.However,theinitiationof warsof empire
by nondemocratic
interestsandinfluenceat theexpanseof
againstweakerstatesto expanddemocracy's
weakersocietiesis inexplicablefromthe liberalnormsperspective.(ReiterandStam
2002, 151)
Reiterand Stam (2002) arguethatdemocraticallyelected political elites have found it
quiteeasy to obtainconsent fromthe generalpublic for imperialistwars.In such wars
againstrelativelyweak and technologically unsophisticatedopponents,the elite and
the generalpublic expect an easy victory,andthe targetis portrayedas raciallyor ethnically different.
BarkawiandLaffey (2001, 2) arguethat"theclaims for the pacific natureof liberal
democracyareeurocentric."Mann(2001, 71) claims thatdemocraticcolonial regimes
suppressedthe democraticambitionsarisingin the colonies, attributingthis to a view
that"thoseexcludedarenot actuallyseen as eligible to be consideredfree individuals."
522
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
Ethnocidewas practicedon the pre-Columbianpopulationin the UnitedStatesandon
the aboriginesin Australia,who were seen as "incapableof acquiringcivilization,"
"half-breeds,"and "renegades.""Liberalismwas based on the simple exclusion of
most collective groups living in the country from the status of the free individual"
(p. 73). Mannalso arguesthatthe Europeanscommittedmass murder"againstnative
peoples who were usually democraticallyorganized"(p. 72). FourU.S. presidents"reveredas democrats-were also great ethnic cleansers"(Mann2001, 74). George
WashingtonlikenednativeAmericansto wolves, "bothbeing beasts of prey,tho' they
differ in shape." Jefferson and Jackson also advocated extermination of native
Americans,and even TheodoreRoosevelt thoughttheir extermination"was as ultimately beneficial as it was inevitable"(p. 75).
Henderson(2002, 82-83), who regardsthe democraticpeace as an illusion, finds
that the founding fathers of the democratic peace, such as Immanuel Kant and
WoodrowWilson, held racist views and advocated a "Herrenvolkdemocracy."He
notes that the battle deaths of the extrasystemicactorsare not includedin the Correlates of War(COW)dataandattributesthis to ideological bias in the recordingof history and compilationof governmentrecords.
In a singularlyvitriolic attackon democraticpeace theory,Haas (1995) arguesthat
it is precisely democracies that have made colonial conquests and fought wars to
preventthe liberationof the colonies. Excluding colonial war from the study of the
democraticpeace excludes some of the bloodiest wars fought by democracies(Haas
1995, 7).
to dealonlywith"coherent,"
and"stable"
whenthese
"mature,"
democracies,
Preferring
varying regimes prevent coherence, maturity,and stability abroad,is clearly
anattemptto askdarker-skinned
ethnocentric,
peoplesto go to thebackof thebuswhile
seriousresearchis in progress.(Haas1995,14)
A relatedcriticism raised by Forsythe(1992), among others, is that democracies
have frequentlyintervenedcovertlyagainstelected governments(such as Iranin 1953
or Guatemalain 1954). Some of these governmentscannot be classified as mature
democracies,and the battledeathshave generallybeen too few to classify these conflicts as wars. Forsythe neverthelessnotes that one possible interpretation(argued
stronglyby Hunt 1987) is thatsuch interventionsinto the affairsof othercountriesare
motivatedby "an informalideology of US superiority,racism, and anti-revolution"
(p. 393). James and Mitchell (1995, 92), citing covert action by democraciesagainst
countriessuch as Iran,Guatemala,and Chile, arguethatrelativelyweak democracies
thatseek changesin structuraldependencyarelikely to be vulnerableto outsideefforts
towarddestabilization.Hermannand Kegley (1998) have also speculatedaboutsuch
motives for interventionsundertakenby democracies,andGaltung(1996) has characterized democracies as arrogant,missionary,and belligerent. Covert action against
otherdemocraciesis anotherreasonwhy Reiterand Stam (2002, 150, 159-62) see the
normative explanation for the foreign policy behavior of democracies as a
"caricature."
Even writerssympatheticto the democraticpeace have noted the tendencyof liberaldemocraciesto participatein colonial wars.Doyle (1983b, 322), who views liber-
Ravlo et al. / COLONIALWARAND DEMOCRATICPEACE
523
alism as a "strikingsuccess" in creatinga zone of peace among liberal states, argues
that"liberalismhas been equally strikingas a failurein guidingforeignpolicy outside
the liberalworld."This failureis not incidental;the very samecharacteristics"thatpromote peace among liberal societies can exacerbate conflicts between liberal and
nonliberalsocieties" (pp. 324-25). Thus, liberal ideological crusadescame to justify
liberalimperialism.Gleditschand Hegre (1997, 297) note the tendencyfor democracies to engage in colonial conquest,militaryintervention,andproxywar.Weart(1998,
239) concedes the existence of democraticimperialism.Russett (1993, 34) observes
thatmanydemocracieshavefoughtwarsto acquireorhold colonies or to retaincontrol
of states formallyindependentbut within the rangeof their spheresof influence. Yet,
he views this as more of an anomaly.'
There is very little systematic empirical analysis of colonial war. Doyle (1983a,
1983b) undertookone of the first systematic studies of the dyadic democraticpeace,
butregardingliberalrelationsto nonliberalstates,he merelynoted (in a footnotecommenting on Rummel 1983) that the extensive history of liberal imperialismhad led
him to differ with Rummel on the monadicdemocraticpeace, that is, the question of
whether democracies are more peaceful generally. Chan (1984, 642ff.), in a more
extended rebuttalto Rummel, analyzed the monadic democraticpeace proposition
using COWdata,variouslyincludingand excluding "extrasystemicwars"(i.e., colonial and imperialwars).2He found the monadicproposition"muchmore likely to be
contradicted"if the extrasystemicwars were takeninto account.The only systematic
multivariatestudywas carriedout by Henderson(2002). Forthe periodbetween 1946
and 1992, he founddemocraticcountriesto be moreinvolvedin interstatewarbut less
in extrasystemicwar.He also foundthatWesterncountrieswere morebelligerentand,
among these, the democraciesin particular.
In this article,we take up these challenges to the democraticpeace, particularlyto
the normativeexplanationfor it. Given a lack of datafor the dependentterritories,we
areunableto evaluatethe dyadicversionof the democraticpeace argumentin relation
to extrasystemicwar. Henderson(2002, 80) notes that some African scholars have
documentedthat severalAfrican societies had indigenousrepresentativeinstitutions
and therefore,presumably,should have been protectedby the democraticpeace from
colonial warfare.However,the existence of such institutionsis a far cry from documentingdemocraticproceduresas in the Polity or FreedomHouse indicators.In our
own study, we prefer to stick to the monadic level, but we carefully distinguish
between the implicationsof dyadic and monadic analyses. In a sense, this is a more
stringenttest of the democraticpeace because most scholarshave found little difference in the interstatewar participationof democracies. Using COW data over the
period from 1816 to 1992, we find that,indeed, most of the extrasystemicwars have
1. Some of this criticismappearsto be directedless at democraciesin generalandmoreat the policies
andattitudesof majorEuropeanpowers andthe United States-in particular,U.S. behaviorduringthe cold
war.This distinctionwould not matterif all these majorpowerswere democraticandwere the only democracies in the world. However,this is not the case.
2. An extrasystemicwaris any warthatincludesan independentstateanda peripheralpoliticalentity.
From here on, we use the Correlatesof War(COW)terminology.Extrasystemicwars do not cover covert
militaryoperations,andso-called "proxywars"areattributedto the mainbelligerentsinsteadof alleged supportersor instigatorsof the violence.
524
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
been foughtby democracies.Bivariateanalysis shows a positiverelationshipbetween
democracyand participationin extrasystemicwar.This finding is significantfor the
periodas a whole as well as for two subperiods.The implicationsof these findingsfor
the democraticpeace argumentare, however,not straightforward.It may simply be
thatnonstateactorswere generallyperceivedas nondemocratic.Moreover,the positive relationshipis not robust. With a reasonableset of control variables,we show
democracyto generallyhave a negativerelationshipwith extrasystemicwarparticipation. Democracynot only has a statisticallysignificanteffect butalso reduceswarparticipationsubstantiallyfor most cases.
DEMOCRATIC PEACE AND EXTRASYSTEMIC ACTORS
If we could measurethe degree of democracyof an extrasystemicactor,we would
expect extrasystemicwar to be negativelycorrelatedwith democracyin the dyad. In
other words, democraciesare not supposed to wage war on democraticnonstateor
extrasystemicactors. At the same time, nondemocraticextrasystemicactors should
fight democraticsystem membersmore frequentlythannondemocraticsystem members.The problemis thatwe haveno way to assess the regimetype of nonsystemmembers. The two majordatabaseson regimetype, Polity III (JaggersandGurr1995) and
Polyarchy (Vanhanen2000), contain data almost exclusively for fully independent
states.Althoughourtest of the relationshipbetweendemocracyandextrasystemicwar
remains at the monadic level, we need not make any assumptionsabout a monadic
democraticpeace in general. However,in this case, we have to make an assumption
aboutthe regime type of the extrasystemicactors.
Let us make the naive and simple (butnot altogetherimplausible)assumptionthat
all nonsystem members are nondemocraciesor are perceived as such. Then, if the
mainstreampositionin the studyof the democraticpeace governmentwere correct,we
would expect nonsystem membersto find themselves more frequentlyat war with
democraticsystem membersthanwith nondemocraticsystem members.This follows
simply from the observationthatmixed dyads are more proneto war.In otherwords,
underthe assumptionthatextrasystemicactorsare nondemocratic,democracyin the
system member should be positively correlatedwith extrasystemicwar. The same
argumentappliesas long as nondemocraciesarein the majorityamongthe actorsoutside the interstatesystem. Lookingat it fromthe pointof view of system members,we
shall call this "theungenerousassumption"abouttheiropponents.Russett(1993, 34)
seems to share this assumptionor at least assume that democraticcolonial powers
sharedit. He assertsthat,in extrasystemicwars,democraciesfoughtagainstpeople on
the assumptionthat they did not have institutionsof self-government.Many indigenous peoples were not consideredcapable of having land rights because they were
hunter-gatherers,uncivilized, and too few in number (Reynolds 1996). They were
availablenot only for expandingempiresbut also for the benefits of modernmaterial
civilization and Westernprinciplesof democracy.Against this background,colonial
war is no longer an anomalybut is almost to be expected.
Ravlo et al. / COLONIALWARAND DEMOCRATICPEACE
525
TABLE 1
DemocraticPeace and ExtrasystemicWar
ExtrasystemicActors
Assumption
Frequencyof ExtrasystemicWar
Mostly democratic
Proportionallydemocratic
Mostly nondemocratic
Generous
None
Ungenerous
Less for democraticsystem members
No correlationwith democracy
More for democraticsystem members
If we make the equally naive and simple assumptionthat all extrasystemicactors
are democraticor are perceived to be (we call this "the generous assumption"),we
shouldexpectdemocraticsystemmembershardlyeverto engage in extrasystemicwar.
On the other hand, the extrasystemicactors would still be forming mixed political
dyads with nondemocraticsystem members.Thus, therewould still be extrasystemic
war,but it would be negativelycorrelatedwith the level of democracyin the system
member.
If the extrasystemicactorsare divided between democraciesand nondemocracies
in the same proportion as system members, then we should expect the rate of
extrasystemicwar participationto be the same between democraticand nondemocraticsystem members.Thus, in this intermediatecase, thereshouldbe no correlation
between democracy in the system member and participationin extrasystemicwar.
Table 1 sets out our threealternativehypothesesrelatingextrasystemicdemocracyto
extrasystemicwar.
We expect the ungenerousassumptionto be the most realistic,at least for the period
beforeWorldWarII. Ourpreferenceis basedonly partiallyon ajudgmentof the actual
level of democracyin premodernsocieties. More important,we arguethat,at least in
the pre-WorldWarII period,therewas a widespreadandstronglyheld belief thatthese
societies were-or even had to be-nondemocratic. To a large extent, these beliefs
were self-reinforcing.Because the opposing party was not recognized as a state, it
failed to achieve the full range of institutionsthat the democratic system member
would recognize as democratic.Regardless,a positive relationshipbetween democracyin the system memberandparticipationin extrasystemicwarshouldnot come as a
surprise.
COLONIES AND EMPIRES
Colonialism-defined as the conquest and control of land and goods-is not a
European invention but an old and pervasive feature of human history. The vast
Roman,Mongol, Chinese,andAztec empiressubjugateda largenumberof people and
a varietyof ethnic groups (Loomba 1998, 4). However,in the period covered by our
study,Europeancountrieswere the most active colonial actors.3
3. The history of colonialism has been documentedextensively. We have relied mainly on Ferro
(1997), PalmerandColton (1971), andWoodruff(1989). Forthe purposesof ourstudy,thereareonly minor
discrepanciesbetween the works of these scholars.
526
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
This period encompasses the rise and fall of Europeanimperialismor capitalist
colonialism. Changes in the dominant colonial activity determine the type of
extrasystemicwarwe arelikely to observe.In the earlyyearscoveredby this study(the
colonial period), extrasystemicwars were mainly, but not exclusively, wars of conquest. Later,in the imperialperiod,the colonized areawas expanded,and the control
was solidified. The thirdperiod(the postcolonialperiod)witnessed a rapiddecolonization.We expect thatthe relationshipbetween democracyand extrasystemicwars is
contingenton the historicalperiodbeing studied.To reflect the differentphases in the
historyof colonization,we divide the 180-yearperiodcoveredby the COWdatainto
three subperiods,which we discuss briefly below.
THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1816-1869)
In this period,the acquisitionof far-awaypossessions was based mainlyon private
commercialinterests.To have a colony meant,above all, to have a reliablepartnerfor
tradeat favorableterms.At the beginningof the 19thcentury,the only reallyprofitable
colonies were India and the Indonesianarchipelagofor the British and the Dutch,
respectively.The other Europeanpowers had no large profitablecolonies, but the
memories of colonial rivalrieswere kept alive. In the precedingcenturies,Portugal,
Spain,the Netherlands,andEnglandhad succeededeach otherin exploringthe world
for profitabletraderoutes.Colonialismgenerallymeantthe establishmentof trading
posts in supportof trademonopolies.
Anotherfeatureof the first period was that some settlementcolonies managedto
gain independence.The Spanish and Portugueseempires fell apartduringthe 19th
century.Spainwas preoccupiedwith Europeanmatters,andtheircolonies took up the
fightfor independence.Englandhadbecome anindustrialpowerbuthadlost its American colonies. Consequently,the remainderof the empirebecamemore importantas a
tool to secure the access to marketsand raw materials.
IMPERIALISM: DIVIDING THE WORLD (1870-1945)
In contrastto the early colonialism, imperialistcolonization became a matterof
nationalpolicy.An activecolonial policy seemed a meansto nationalsuccess, a source
of new power,anda role on the worldscene (Betts 1968,49). The asymmetricalpower
relationshipnot only made imperialismpossible; it also made it tempting. Empire
could be acquiredquite cheaply.Most empiresexpandedfrom navalbases or trading
posts acquiredduringthe first colonial phase. The requirementsof industrialization
andthe need for marketsrivaledthe compulsionfor domination-eventually the latter
prevailed. Before too long, nearly all European states joined the competition for
new territories.Withina few decades,they had dividedamongthem almostthe entire
land surfaceof the earth.By the 1930s, Europeanstates, Europeancolonies, and excolonies covered 85% of the world's land territory.Only parts of Arabia, Persia,
Afghanistan,Mongolia,Tibet,China,Siam, andJapannevercame underformalEuropean government(Fieldhouse 1989, 373).
After 1870, the statewas moreinvolvedin the colonial enterprise,andthe economic
ties were much closer. The imperialexpansionproceededin differentforms in differ-
Ravlo et al. / COLONIALWARAND DEMOCRATICPEACE
527
ent partsof the world.Betts (1968, 14) arguesthatexpansionby settlementwas fundamentallydifferentfromcolonial expansion.He also distinguishesbetweencontiguous
and noncontiguousexpansion.Physical distanceusually implied a distinctdifference
between the imperialstateandthe dependentterritorywith respectto governinginstitutions, culture,and society. If the dominatedterritorywas closer to the dominating
power,it was morelikely thatgreaterpoliticalandculturalsimilarityexisted. Contiguous expansionusuallyresultedin absorption,whereasnoncontiguousexpansionmost
often did not. Russia absorbedSiberiaand the Caucasusdespite culturaldissimilarities. The United States succeeded in absorbingnot just territoriesall the way to the
Pacificbutalso AlaskaandHawaii.But therearefew suchexamplesof successfulnoncontiguous expansion.
THE POSTCOLONIAL PERIOD:
TOWARD INDEPENDENCE (1946-1992)
After WorldWarII, most colonies obtainedindependence.At the same time, the
internationalenvironmentchanged from a balance-of-powersystem in Europe to a
world dominatedby the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union.
The colonies in the Americashadmanagedto free themselvesfromEuropeandominancemuchearlier.The leadersof most of these newly independentstateswere European settlers.Only in Haiti had the descendantsof African slaves won theirfreedom.
As a result,the situationfor the indigenouspopulationgenerallydid not changemuch.
Europeansettlersalso won independencein SouthAfrica, but such attemptsfailed in
Rhodesia at the end of the 19th centuryand in Algeria in 1958.
The liberationmovementsat the end of the colonial era,on the otherhand,hadoriginated in new elites among the colonized. The educationprovidedby Christianmissions helped in the emancipationprocess, whereas Buddhist, Hindu, and Islamic
revivals provided focal points for the resistance to Europeandomination. A third
source of influence was communistinternationalism,supportedby the Soviet Union
and laterby Chinaand Cuba.The nationalstruggleagainstimperialismwas regarded
as an essential featureof the internationalproletarianstruggleagainstcapitalism.
Decolonization was not only a result of the strugglefor freedom of the colonized
peoples. In Europe,many intellectualshad for a long time questionedthe moral and
economic wisdom of colonialism (Crawford1993). The post-WorldWarII change in
norms had severalearlierorigins. After WorldWarI, the League of Nations defined
threelevels of mandate,dependingon how quicklythe colonial peoples were expected
to be able to "standby themselves."DuringWorldWarII, the AtlanticChartercalled
for self-determination,althoughthe Britishinitiallyclaimedthatit appliedonly to the
states under the control of Nazi Germany.The United States, now emerging as the
leading world power, opposed traditionalcolonialism and imperialism. A turning
point was reachedwhen Indiagained its independencein 1948. Duringthe Suez crisis
in 1956, the decline of the FrenchandBritishempiresbecame irreversible,andthe rising power of the United States,the USSR, andthird-worldnationalismbecame all the
more evident.
528
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
Colonizationis no longer an importantfeatureof the foreign policy of any state,
althoughmany major powers have retainedmost of their contiguous empire. Most
non-contiguousempireswere dissolved duringthe firsttwo decades following World
War II, creating a large number of independentstates. Numerous small colonies
remain,butthey totalonly about0.1% of the world'spopulation,andmost of them are
reluctantto face independence.The buildingof empiresalso seems to havecome to an
end. In recent years, the trend has been toward secession ratherthan annexation.
Between 1989 and 1999, some 20 countriesbecame independentas a resultof secessions or the dissolution of federal states (Gleditschand Ward1999, 405-10).
DETERMINANTS OF COLONIAL WARFARE
What were the reasons for expansionand the defense of imperialinterests?Even
the staunchest critics of the democratic peace argumentwould hardly claim that
democracywas the only causal factor.Rather,theirclaim is thatit was perhapsa contributinganddefinitelynot an inhibitingfactor.This means,however,thatto assess the
relativeeffect of democracy,we haveto controlfor at least the mainvariablesthatmay
accountfor colonial warfare.Ourambitionis not to constructa fully specified theory
of extrasystemicwar but to study the relationshipbetween war and the democratic
peace. However,we do need to discuss a broadset of relationshipsto establisha reasonableset of controlvariables.Inparticular,we arelooking for variablesthatcould be
responsiblefor a spuriousrelationshipwith our main explanatoryvariable.
Majorpower status and conflict involvement. All types of involvementin armed
conflict arecostly. A state with a largereconomy is more capableto fight warsin distant places. Often, only the major powers are capable of engaging regularly in
extrasystemicwars. Majorpower status,moreover,is not only an indicationof possessing the necessaryabilityto fight a war.Majorpowersmay feel the need to engage
or intervene in extrasystemicwars to maintainthe existing internationalorder.An
empire secures access to resources,which either enhancethe state's chances of economic expansion or provide resources to fight a costly war against any adversary
(Snyder1991, 52). To quoteReiterandStam(2002, 148), "Publicsof greatpowersare
morelikely to consentto warundera largerrangeof circumstances,recognizingthata
greatpower has more extended securityintereststhandoes a minorpower."
Alliances. A common"realist"explanationfor the dyadicdemocraticpeace is that
democracies are joined in alliances that represent their common interest. At the
monadiclevel, mattersbecome a bit more complicated.One would assumethatstates
join alliancesto increasetheirsecurity.In a defensepact,a statecanrely on the allies to
come to its assistancein case of an attack.On the otherhand,if an ally is attacked,a
defense pact can cause a stateto be involvedin a conflict thatit would not havejoined
otherwise. From a balance-of-powerperspective,Walt (1985, 33) argues that states
tend to sign alliance agreementswhen they perceivea securitythreat.Thus, the number of alliancesmay reflect a state'sconflict potential(GleditschandHegre 1998, 21).
Ravlo et al. / COLONIALWARAND DEMOCRATICPEACE
529
However,an allianceis only a deterrentif allies can be reliedon. Failingto flex its muscle in any conflict (includingextrasystemicconflicts) could lessen a country'scredibility as an alliance partner.Reiter and Stam (2002, 149) see alliances as a "literal
expression of public consent"to the possibility of going to war. We expect alliance
membershipto significantlyenhancethe probabilityof extrasystemicwar.
Colonialpossessions. Having a colony is in itself neithera necessary nor a sufficient conditionfor fightingextrasystemicwars.To wage an extrasystemicwar,a state
can eitherhave dependentareasor an ambitionto acquiresuch areas.Nevertheless,an
alreadyacquiredcolonial possession must be expected to affect the participationin
extrasystemicwar.Havingmorecolonies increasesthe numberof possible adversaries
or troublespots. Snyder(1991, 3) arguesthata statewith a largenumberof colonies is
also more likely to engage in colonial war because such a stateis more likely to fear
that the loss of one areamay triggerefforts towardindependencein otherpartsof its
empire.4
RESEARCH DESIGN
The unit of analysis in this study is the state-year.All independent states are
includedfor the periodfrom 1816 to 1992. Using the state-yearas the unit of analysis
makes it possible to control for the fact that some states have been membersof the
internationalsystem for a longer period and thus have had more opportunityto get
involved in wars (Chan 1984, 623). The dataanalyzedin this studyconsist of 11,309
cases.
We use the dataon extrasystemicwarin the COWdatabase.The firstpublishededition of the data set (Small and Singer 1982) reports51 extrasystemicwars for the
period from 1816 to 1980. The newer edition (Singer and Small 1994) contains 134
wars up to 1992. The expansionof the list is not just due to the inclusion of 12 more
years but also results from a relaxation of the coding criteria.For these wars, the
thresholdcriterionof 1,000 battledeathsno longerhas to be met in a single year.The
battle deathsare still, however,countedonly for the system member,not for the nonmember adversary.According to the COW data, 28 states have participatedin
extrasystemicwar. This includes all the greatpowers, with the exception of Japan.6
As noted, we have divided our time period into three subperiodsin an attemptto
controlfor importantdifferencesin the internationalenvironment.The colonial period
4. But not all colonial powersfightcolonial wars;Haiti,SouthAfrica,Australia,Japan,New Zealand,
Israel, and Denmarkhave had dependentareas withoutwaging war on them accordingto COW criteria.
5. These statesareincludedin AppendixA, which gives the numberof warsfoughtby each stateand
whetherthey were imperialor colonial wars.
6. Severalscholarshave arguedthatfrom the late 17thcentury,Japanwas at least as expansionistas
the Europeanstates(Ferro1997, 103; Snyder 1991, 151). Japanis not includedin the COWdatauntil 1860,
excluding some of the early Japaneseadvances.Otheradvancesresultedin interstatewars with European
statesor China.Japaneseexpansionismin the 1930s andearly 1940s is countedas interstatewar(mostly as
partof WorldWarII). In a morerecentversionof the COWdata,Japanis representedwith one extrasystemic
war(Sarkees2000). Wepreferto use the 1994 editionof the COWdatabecausethe coding rulesof the 2000
datahave not yet been fully documented.
530
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
10
98'0
E
6-
54
0
...............................................................................................................................
1818
1843
1868
1893
1918
1943
1968
Year
Figure 1:
Number of Ongoing Extrasystemic Wars per Year (1816-1992)
coversfrom 1816 to 1869, with 125 state-yearsof extrasystemicwar(6.9%of all stateyears in thatsubperiod).The imperialistperiodbetween 1870 and 1945 includes 155
state-yearswith extrasystemicwar (4.3%).Finally,the postcolonialperiodfrom 1946
to 1992 includes 135 state-yearsof extrasystemicwar (2.3%). Figure 1 shows thatin
nearly all years, an extrasystemicwar was being fought (with the exception of the
WorldWarII period). It also shows thatin many years, more than one extrasystemic
war was going on. However, few countries have regularly fought more than one
extrasystemicwar in a same year.
All warsincludedin the COWdatabaserequirethe participationof at least one system member.System membership,in turn,requiresa degreeof outsiderecognitionof
the state. Priorto 1920, system membershipis operationalizedas having diplomatic
relationswith BritainandFrance.This inherentlyEurope-centeredview of thingsmay
underestimatethe warfareof otherpoliticalentitiesin the earlierperiods.On the other
hand,manyrecentextrasystemicwarswere foughtby poorminorpowers(e.g., Ethiopia andSomalia).Using the COWdatamightskew the resultsagainstfindingpeaceful
behaviorby democraciesin earlierperiods, whereas the results for the most recent
periodcould be influencedby some long warsfoughtby non-Europeanminorpowers.
Yet,we havechosento use the datawithoutmakinganychanges.The COW 1994 database is probablythe best one available.Ratherthanperformingad hoc changes,a revision should be guided by a thoroughreconsiderationof the criteria.
In our analysis, we use bivariatecorrelationand multivariatenonlinear(Poisson)
regression.To assess the substantiveand notjust statisticalrelevanceof our findings,
we have also calculatedthe effects of the independentvariables.The effects were calculatedby changinga given independentvariablefrom its minimumto its maximum
valuewhile holdingthe otherindependentvariablesat theirmean.To assess the impact
of interactionbetweendemocracyandbeing a Europeanstate,we havedeterminedthe
effect of the independentvariablescomparingEuropeanwith non-Europeanstates.7
7. The effects were estimated with the help of Clarify (in Stata);see King, Tomz, and Wittenberg
(2000) and Tomz, Wittenberg,and King (1999).
Ravlo et al. / COLONIALWARAND DEMOCRATICPEACE
531
Bremer (1992, 320) has arguedstrongly for the need to distinguishbetween the
onset and incidence of war.He arguesthatdifferentprocesses govern the startof the
warandits continuation.His view is not sharedby Blainey(1988, x), who arguesthat
thebeginningof wars,theprolonging
of wars,theendingof warsandtheprolonging
or
of periodsof peaceall sharethesamecausalframework....Thesamefactors
shortening
arevitalin understanding
in understanding
eachstagein thesequelof warandpeace.
Oneal andRussett(1999, 428) also takethe view that"forseveralreasons,researchers
should be concerned with all years in which states are involved in a conflict."This
belief is basedon the assumptionthatnationalleadersfrequentlyreevaluatea decision
to use force. Maintaininga conflict thusreflectsthe same mix of domesticpolitics, the
availability of military and economic resources, and internationalalignments that
shapedthe decision to go to war in the first place.
ApartfromBremer's(1992) theoreticalargument,studyingthe onset of warrather
than the incidence of war can also be defended as a way to reduce the problem of
autocorrelation.When only studyingthe first year of a war,the dependencebetween
state-yearsof war is eliminated.However,deleting years of continuingwar from the
dataonly remediesa partof the problembecause peace also tends to persistfrom one
year to another(Raknerudand Hegre 1997; Chan 1997, 73). Reducingthe numberof
warevents also makesit moredifficultto obtainstatisticallysignificantresults.Of the
417 state-yearswith incidence of extrasystemicwar in this study, only 140 contain
onsets of war.Therefore,we havedecidedto use the incidenceof extrasystemicwaras
our dependentvariable.
In technicalterms,our studyrequiresan analysisof time-seriescross-sectiondata.
Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) argue convincingly for the inclusion of temporal
dummy variablesas controls for temporaldependency.8An equivalentalternativeis
the inclusion of so-called cubic splines-an approachalso suggested by Beck, Katz,
and Tucker.An advantageof using the cubic splines is that they estimate a smooth
baselinehazardrate.In otherwords,the probabilityof an extrasystematicconflict for a
countryis assumedto decline consistentlyas the numberof yearswithoutsuchconflict
increases.Because we have no reasonto assumethatthe hazardof a conflict increases
aftera certainnumberof years, it is appropriateto use a smooth baseline hazardrate.
The cubic splines were createdusing the BTSCS programin Stata(Tucker1999).
OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES
In one of the firstmultivariateanalysesof its kind,Bremer(1992) madeuse of seven
predictorsto dyadicinterstatewar:geographicalproximity,powerparity,majorpower
status,alliance,regimetype, level of development,anddegreeof militarism.In a study
8. We tested for the existence of temporaldependencein our databy includinga set of 18 temporal
dummypeace-yearvariables.A standardlikelihoodratiotest of the hypothesisthatthe setjointly equaled0
had to be rejectedfor the whole period as well as for each of the subperiods.
532
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
of the monadicdemocraticpeace, GleditschandHegre(1998) used Bremer'sanalysis
to derivea set of controlvariablesat the nationlevel. We follow theirdesign here but
limit ourselves to three of the variablesdue to the natureof extrasystemicwar.9
The dependentvariable-extrasystemic war. The dependentvariableis the numberof extrasystemicwarsa stateis involvedin duringa given year.Formost statesand
years, the variableeither takes the value 0 or 1. However,some states (most notably
GreatBritain)areoccasionally involvedin morethanone extrasystemicwar simultaneously.Empirically,the variablefollows very closely a Poisson distribution(with X,
0.049). Less thana quarterof the waryearsinvolvedmorethanone extrasystemicwar
for any state, and no state has ever fought more than four wars simultaneously.?1
The measure somewhat blurs the difference between short and long wars. For
instance,the Belgian war (1830-1831) lasted only 2 months,butbecauseit went from
one year to the next, its three participantsare assigned a total of 6 state-yearsof
extrasystemicwar.
Independentvariables. The most importantindependentvariableis regime type.
Manystudiesof the democraticpeace have used categoricalmeasuresof regimetype.
Chan (1997, 71), for instance, arguesthat a dichotomousmeasurebetterreflects the
perceived attributesstate leaders give to their counterparts.Some scholars, such as
Dixon (1994), use a thirdvalue, "anocracy,"for a polity thatis neitherdemocraticnor
autocratic.Hegreet al. (2001) andothersuse the full rangeof the Polity 21-pointscale
of democracyminus autocracy.
Weuse the democracyandautocracyindexesfromthe Polity IIIddata(McLaughlin
et al. 1998) for all independentstates.FollowingJaggersandGurr(1995), we subtract
the autocracyscores fromthe democracyscores, so the resultingindex variesbetween
-10 (full autocracy)to 10 (full democracy).If democracyis an importantforce for
peace, we expect differencesnot only between democraciesand nondemocraciesbut
also between states with differentdegrees of democracy.
Nonviolent norms and institutionalconstraintshave been suggested as possible
explanationsof the democraticpeace. However,it has provendifficultto distinguish
betweenthe normativeandconsentrationales.ReiterandStam(2002, 144-63) suggest
that democraticinvolvementin extrasystemicwars underminesthe normativeexplanationfor the democraticpeace, whereasit is compatiblewiththe consentexplanation,
at least under certain circumstances.We have tried to take both explanationsinto
account,but we only assess their relativemeritsindirectly.
Maoz andRussett(1993) suggest thatnormscan be judged by the political stability
of the polity or, preferably,by the degreeto which it experiencesviolent internalconflict. Data limitationsrequireus to focus on political stabilityto evaluatethe importance of democraticnorms.We have coded a countryas a stabledemocracyif at least
9. The monadicnatureor our study excluded the use of geographicalproximityand power parity.
Degree of militarismwas excluded because of data limitations.
10. Ourfindingsarerobustwith respectto the choice of Poisson or logistic regression.We decidedto
use all informationcontainedin the dependentvariable.
Ravlo et al. / COLONIALWARAND DEMOCRATICPEACE
533
10 years have passed since the polity became democratic.1 States that were democraticwhen theyenteredthe internationalsystemarecoded as nonstablefor the first 10
years.Some stateslose theirstatusas membersof the internationalsystemfor a limited
period, an example being Norway duringthe Germanoccupationin WorldWarII.
Such countriesare coded as stable democraciesfrom the first year of reentryif they
were in thatcategorypriorto the interruption.Both stablenondemocraciesandunstable polities arecoded 0. The variableis thusaninteractionterm,combiningdemocracy
and stabilityin one measure.Because the stable democracyvariableis highly correlated with democracy,we have used it only as an alternativeoperationalizationof the
democracyvariable.
We measureinstitutionalconstraintsby a componentof the Polity index, a 7-point
scale rangingfromunlimitedexecutiveauthorityto executivesubordination.Because
this variableis highly correlatedwith the democracyindex (GleditschandWard1997),
we use it as a substitutefor the democracyvariableratherthan as a supplement.
Controlvariables. Ourdiscussionof colonialismabovehas shownthatin the modern era, Europeanstates were originally the main colonizers and later also the main
imperialiststates. In the period covered by this study, Europeanrulers felt, almost
withoutexception,the urgeto competefor new colonies anddependencies.Forexample, in 1885, Congo becamethe personalpossession of King Leopoldof Belgium. Following his deathin 1908, the Belgians foundthemselvesthe reluctantheirs of an African colony. Therefore,we use Europeanstates as a dummycontrolvariable.The lust
for colonies and the empire affected virtuallyall Europeanstates regardlessof size,
majorpowerstatus,or othercapabilitymeasures.It did not matterwhetherthese states
were majorpowers or alreadyhad colonies; they were all tryingto get a piece of the
new territories. Democracy may possibly dampen this imperial spirit; we have
includedan interactionterm (Europeandemocracy)to see if this is the case.
The Europeanstateswere significantlymoredemocraticthannon-Europeanstates
duringthe imperialistand postcolonialperiods. However,non-Europeanstates were
on averagemoredemocraticin the colonial subperiod(althoughneithergroupof states
could be consideredon averageto be democratic).The findingsfor the earlyperiodare
clearly determinedby the level of democracyin the United States.
Reiterand Stam (2002, 148-51) relatethe willingness of the generalpublic to consent to war to a broad definition of the national interest, higher levels of external
threats,anda likely,quick, andlow-cost victory.They arguethatdemocracyis only an
inhibitingfactor if political elites find it difficult to obtain consent. Their argument
suggests, first,thatwe need to controlfor these factors.But it also suggests an avenue
to assess the relativeimportanceof the normativeandconsentexplanationsof the democraticpeace. After controllingfor the relevantconsent variables,any remainingeffect of democracyshould be attributedto democraticnormsof peaceful resolutionof
disputes.
11. The stabledemocracyvariablerequiresa dichotomousdemocracyvariable.For this purpose,we
have used the value of +3 as the cutoff on the democracy-autocracyscale.
534
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
We generallyfollow the measurementsfor consent suggested by Reiter and Stam
(2002). Majorpowers have more extended securityintereststhan minorpowers. We
use the majorpower variablefrom the COW projectdata set.12 Externalthreatsare
measuredby alliancemembership.The COWdatabaseidentifiesthreetypes of formal
alliances (Singer and Small 1969), but we include only defense pacts in our analysis.
States are coded with the number of alliance membership in the given year.
Nonaggression and neutrality pacts are the other types of formal alliances.
Nonaggressionpacts usually involve potentialenemies and are largely irrelevantfor
extrasystemic wars (Raknerud and Hegre 1997, 394). Neutrality pacts are also
unlikelyto affect the probabilityof extrasystemicwarbecause they do not dependon
the credibilityof militaryassistance.
To measurethe level of anticipatedpower advantage,we use the log of urbanization. The datacome from the COWproject'snationalcapabilitydatabase(Singerand
Small 1993). Urbanizationdata are fairly highly correlatedwith other measures of
economic developmentand presentthe most complete series for the full time period.
Althoughthis measurehas some weaknesses,it allows the measurementof economic
activities that take place outside the marketplaceand are not included in the formal
economy.In AppendixC, we assess the robustnessof our resultsfor alternativemeasuresof economic development-namely, energyconsumption(fromCOWcapabilities data)and real gross domestic product(GDP) per capita(from Russettand Oneal
2001) for periodsfor which these data are available.
The numberof colonies is calculatedon an annualbasis using data in Gleditsch
(1988) as a startingpoint and supplementedwith informationfrom variousreference
works.The colonies areincludedat the startof the time periodor fromthe time when a
colony is established.The yearthe colony is establishedis enteredin the database,and
the year the colony obtainedindependenceis coded as the firstyear of independence.
This coding scheme does not account for areas that are still dependenton a system
member.We made this decision because it is difficult to account for all dependent
areas.Thereare areasthat,by formalagreement,form a partof a system member,as
Tibet is a partof China. Tibetanswho want independencechallenge this agreement.
Thus, one can regardTibetas a Chinese colony with a greatconflict potential.On the
otherhand,some annexationshave become an integralpartof system members,such
as the southwesternUnited States or Russian Siberia. Thus, some colonies have
become inseparableparts of system members, whereas some dependenciesremain
conflict areas even though they are based on formal agreementsratherthan violent
occupationor annexation.One could of course include as dependenciesthose areas
thatarestill contested,butthis wouldraisethe problemof how largethe independence
movementmustbe for the situationto be definedas contested.Hawaiihas a movement
for independence,as does Brittany.Moreover,we wouldface a selectionproblemif we
excludedareasthathavebeen dependenciesin the pastbutarenow regardedas inseparablefroma systemmemberor peacefuldependencies.Because it is virtuallyimpossible to make surethatall relevantdependenciesareincluded,we have chosen to focus
12. In AppendixB, we assess the robustnessof ourresultsby replacingthe majorpowervariablewith
dummies for the country-yearsin which specific countrieshad majorpower status.
Ravlo et al. / COLONIALWARAND DEMOCRATICPEACE
535
TABLE2
Democracyand the Incidenceof ExtrasystemicWar,1816-1992 (%)
Period
Democratic Countries'
Share of All Nation-Yearsa
Colonial subperiod
Imperialsubperiod
Postcolonial subperiod
Whole period
Democratic Countries'Share
of All Nation-Yearswith Wara Correlation
9.0
32.8
37.7
31.8
24.0
56.4
25.0
36.0
0.06**
0.07***
-0.04***
-0.01
NOTE: Pearson'sr.
a. Dichotomous democracymeasureusing +3 as the cutoff on the democracy-autocracyscale.
**Significantat the .05 level. ***Significantat the .01 level.
on those dependenciesthathave laterbecome an independentmemberof the international system.
Finally,we use a directmeasureof conflict involvementas a single controlvariable
for participationin a civil war,an interstatewar,or a militarizedinternationaldispute.
Accordingto the COWdata,less than 10%of the state-yearsare affectedby civil war
or interstatewar, whereas more than 30% of the state-yearsexperience a dispute. A
state-yearscores positively on conflict involvementif the state is involved in one or
more conflicts otherthanthe extrasystemicwar.In 34.6%of the state-years,a stateis
involvedin otherconflicts. Ourexpectationsfor the conflict involvementvariableare
ambiguous.On one hand,conflict involvementdrainsresourcespotentiallyavailable
for extrasystemicconflicts. On the other hand, a colonizer distractedby domestic
problemsor securityissues presentsa clear opportunityfor liberationmovements.
RESULTS
BIVARIATEANALYSIS
Because most of the discussion of democraciesand colonial war reviewed above
has been in implicit bivariateterms, we reportbriefly our bivariateanalysis before
moving on to the multivariateresults.Table2 tests the "naive"observationthatdemocracies aremorelikely to takepartin extrasystemicwars.Comparedwith theirshareof
state-years,we find thatdemocraciesare indeed more involved in extrasystemicwar.
This is truefor the firsttwo subperiodsand for the entireperiodsince the Congressof
Vienna. As discussed earlier, this observation is compatible with the democratic
peace, with the ungenerousassumptionthatmost extrasystemicactorsare nondemocratic.Only in the postcolonialperiodaredemocraciesless involvedin extrasystemic
war relativeto their shareof state-years.
We also reportbivariatecorrelations.Thereis a positive and significantcorrelation
between democracy and extrasystemic war in the colonial and imperial periods.
Democracyis, however,negativelycorrelatedwith the incidenceof extrasystemicwar
536
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
TABLE3
Incidenceof ExtrasystemicWar,MultivariatePoisson Analyses
Subperiods
Variables
WholePeriod
-2.891*** (.236)
Constant
-0.153*** (.025)
Democracy
1.173*** (.221)
European
Europeandemocracy 0.118***(.027)
0.625*** (.105)
Otherconflicts
0.390*** (.140)
Majorpower
-0.034
Alliances
(.046)
Numberof colonies 0.056*** (.007)
0.287*** (.049)
Urbanization(log)
-0.530*** (.032)
Peace-years
-0.002*** (.000)
Cubic spline la
0.000** (.000)
Cubic spline 2a
-0.000*** (.000)
Cubic spline 3a
Log-likelihood
ratio (df)
2,275.23 (12)
.53
Pseudo-R2
Number
10,131
Colonial
(1816-1869)
Imperial
(1870-1945)
Postcolonial
(1946-1992)
-2.945*** (.657)
-0.152** (.073)
0.515
(.769)
0.115
(.086)
0.340* (.185)
1.057*** (.371)
-0.010
(.109)
0.100*** (.019)
0.185
(.165)
-0.525*** (.089)
-0.005*** (.002)
-0.003** (.001)
0.001
(.001)
-3.344*** (.393)
-0.099** (.041)
1.152*** (.333)
0.111** (.044)
0.540*** (.180)
0.767*** (.251)
-0.322*** (.116)
0.003
(.008)
0.360*** (.130)
-0.492*** (.061)
-0.003*** (.000)
0.002*** (.000)
-0.000
(.000)
-2.967*** (.408)
-0.207*** (.043)
1.343*** (.377)
0.109** (.048)
1.106*** (.208)
0.469* (.281)
-0.261*** (.010)
0.069*** (.017)
0.153* (.087)
-1.428*** (.166)
-0.015*** (.003)
0.010*** (.002)
-0.002* (.001)
508.64 (12)
.49
1,524
626.84 (12)
.46
3,308
1184.23
.64
5,299
NOTE: Unstandardizedcoefficients from Poisson regression,with standarderrorsin parentheses.
a. Coefficients of peace-yearscubic splines segments.
*Significantat the .1 level. **Significantat the .05 level. ***Significantat the .01 level.
after 1945. For the period as a whole, there is no significant relationshipbetween
democracyandconflict involvement.Thus, we do not find a strongand uniformrelationshipbetween the two variables.However,most findings so far tend to supportthe
notion that democraciesare more active in extrasystemicwar than nondemocracies,
except in the postcolonialperiod.
ANALYSIS
MULTIVARIATE
Because many of the control variables can be shown to correlate significantly with
involvement in extrasystemic wars as well, we should expect that the introduction of
controls would alter the picture significantly. Table 3 gives the results of the multivariate Poisson analysis for the involvement in extrasystemic wars.13
13. Poisson is a maximum likelihood regression appropriatewhen the dependent variable is a
nonnegative count variable following a Poisson distribution.Heterogeneity or contagion may cause
overdispersionof the cases (i.e., morevariationthanwould be expectedfroma simple Poisson process).To
accountfor this possibility,negativebinomialmodels were estimatedas well. However,therewas no indication of overdispersion;in each model, it could not be rejectedthata = 0, suggestingthattemporaldependency has sufficientlybeen takencare of.
Ravlo et al. / COLONIALWARAND DEMOCRATICPEACE
537
Whenusing multivariateanalysis,the role of democracyappearsin a new light. We
generally find a negative (and significant) relationship between democracy and
extrasystemicwar.An importantcaveatis thatthe negativeeffect of democracyis partially (and, for the imperialperiod, even completely) offset for Europeanstates, as
revealed by the positive sign of the Europeandemocracyinteractionterm. We will
assess the impactof the interactionbetweenEuropeanstatesanddemocracymoreprecisely when we considerthe substantiveeffects in Table4.
Forthe colonial period,thereis no relationshipbetweenbeing a Europeanstateand
being involved in extrasystemicwar. In other periods, there is a significantpositive
relationship, indicating that European states were indeed more involved in
extrasystemicwar thannon-Europeanstates.
Majorpower statusand urbanizationgenerallyincreasethe likelihood of involvementin extrasystemicwars.A broadnationalinterestandanticipatedpoweradvantage
may thus indeed generatepublic consent for war, as suggested by Reiter and Stam
(2002). Alliances are, however, generally negatively related to extrasystemicwars.
This suggests that alliances may not signal public consent for involvement in
extrasystemicwars.
Table 3 shows that major powers are much more likely to be involved in
extrasystemicwar.Consequently,some of the majorpowers (most likely GreatBritain, France,or the United States)mighthave largelydeterminedourfindings.We createddummyvariablesfor the yearsa specific statewas a majorpower(e.g., the United
Kingdom dummy scores 1 for all years, whereas the United States dummy scores 1
from 1899) and reranour analyses. The results are given in Appendix B. Our main
findings are quiterobust.The democracyvariableis no longer significantin the colonial period but becomes significantin the imperialperiod. The Europeanvariableis
also somewhat affected, but this is no surprisewhen country dummies for several
European countries are included. France and the United States are always more
involved in extrasystemicwar than we would expect from the rest of the model. In
summary,we have no reasonto be particularlyconcernedaboutthe influence of specific countries.
In AppendixC, we assess the robustnessof ourfindingsfor othermeasurementsof
economic developmentthanurbanization.Because of missing data,we can only look
at the imperialandpostcolonialsubperiods.In the imperialperiod,we still lose about
half of our observations.Not unexpectedly,it becomes more difficultto attainsignificant coefficients.Even so, ourfindingssuggest thatthe findingsfor urbanizationneed
to be treatedwith caution. Energy consumptionand real GDP are not significantly
related to extrasystemic conflict involvement in most models. In the postcolonial
period, real GDP is significantlybut negativelyrelatedto conflict involvement.The
findings for the otherindependentvariablesare, however,robust.
Turningto the othercontrolvariables,we find thatthe numberof colonies is related
to increasedinvolvementin extrasystemicwars. We also find a consistentlypositive
and significant relationshipbetween extrasystemicwar and other conflict involvement. The peace-years variable (with the cubic splines) indicate that the hazardof
extrasystemicwar involvementis indeed declining when the numberof peace years
increases.14
538
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
TABLE4
Effect on the Incidenceof ExtrasystemicWar,MultivariatePoisson Analyses
Subperiods
Variables
(Baseline)
Democracy
Otherconflicts
Majorpower
Alliances
Numberof
Colonies
Urbanization
Geographic
Area
Non-European
European
Non-European
European
Non-European
European
Non-European
European
Non-European
European
Non-European
European
Non-European
European
WholePeriod
0.005
0.007
-94.90a
-49.31a
86.51
86.80
48.80
47.49
-13.88
-21.25
27.23
96.72
297.94
368.50a
Colonial
(1816-1869)
0.012
0.012
-88.07
-44.59
41.61
41.33
_b
188.82
0.15
12.19
111.47
256.73
74.39
113.49
Imperial
(1870-1945)
0.004
0.015
-84.28
28.08
70.75
70.64
51.81
118.35
-60.05
-88.81a
6.49
27.06
326.39
270.57
Postcolonial
(1946-1992)
0.002
0.005
-97.96a
-83.76
49.60
204.44
65.72
60.75
-69.90
-85.57
6.17
1270.08a
99.48
89.25
NOTE: Effect is the percentagechange in expected incidence of extrasystemicwar, based on Poisson regression,whenthe independentvariablechangesfromminimumto maximumvaluedeterminedwhile keeping the otherrelevantvariablesat theirmean.Mean,minimum,andmaximumvalues areconditionalon geographicarea.
a. Distinct 95% confidence intervalsof expected value given minimumand maximumvalues.
b. No non-Europeanmajorpowers.
Coefficients of nonlinearregression,like Poisson regression,may provide a misleading impressionof the substantiveeffect of the variousindependentvariables.In
Table4, we presentthe substantiveeffect of democracyandothercontrolvariablesfor
the involvementin extrasystemicwars. The effects are the percentagechange of war
involvementif a specific independentvariablechanges from its minimumto maximumvalue.We havecalculatedthe effects for Europeanandnon-Europeanstatesseparately.15The baseline values show that European states were more likely to be
involvedin extrasystemicwars.We note also thatthe value of expectedinvolvementis
very low.
14. The cubic splines are also an appropriate way to take care of time dependency (or
autocorrelation).Brandtet al. (2000) discuss variousapproachesto modelingtime-seriesevent count data.
Theirargumentsuggests thatour Poisson model with peace-yearscorrectionmay be less efficient thanthe
Poisson exponentiallyweighted moving average(PEWMA)model. Our approachis, however, still quite
standardand widely used. Any bias in our model, moreover,goes againstfinding significantcoefficients.
15. The effects arecalculatedby changingthe relevantindependentvariablefromminimumto maximumvalue, whereasthe otherindependentvariablesarekeptattheirmean.Mean,minimum,andmaximum
values are conditionalon geographicarea. For Europeanstates, the effect of democracyis calculatedby
changing simultaneouslythe values of democracyand Europeandemocracy.
Ravlo et al. / COLONIALWARAND DEMOCRATICPEACE
539
Table 4 shows, first of all, that democracy had a substantialnegative effect on
involvement in extrasystemic war for both Europeanand non-Europeanstates for
nearly all periods. The effect is, however, generally about twice as strong for nonEuropeanas for Europeanstates. There are two importantexceptions. First, in the
imperial period (1870-1945), democracy actually increased involvement in
extrasystemicwars for Europeanstates. Second, in the postcolonial period (19461992), the negative effect of democracywas about equally strong for Europeanand
non-Europeanstates. The restrainingimpactof democracyis largely consistent with
the findingsin Henderson(2002) for the periodsince 1946. However,we do not replicate Henderson'sfindingof less restraintamongWesternstatesandWesterndemocracies in particular.In contrast,we find that democracysimilarlyconstrainsEuropean
and non-Europeanstates.'6
Using datacoveringthe whole period,Europeanas well as non-Europeandemocracies areclearlydistinctfromnondemocracies.The impactof urbanizationis, however,
unmistakablythe largest,whereasthe effect of democracyis comparableto the impact
of the othercontrolvariables.In the colonial period,the numberof colonies andmajor
power statushave the largestimpact,but the effect of democracyis still sizable (and
comparable to urbanizationfor non-Europeanstates). In the imperial period, as
alreadynoted,democracyreducesconflict involvementonly for non-Europeanstates.
In this period,urbanizationonce morehas the largestimpact,whereasalliance significantlyreducesconflict involvementfor Europeanstates.In the postcolonialperiod,the
process of decolonizationnotablyaffected conflict involvementfor Europeanstates.
Non-European democracies are significantly distinct from non-European
nondemocracies,but the size of the democracy effect is very similar to European
states.
Robustnessof the democracyvariable. To furtherassess the impactof democracy,
we takea second look at the substantiveeffect of democracymeasuredin variousways
in Table5. As noted previously,democracyhas a largely negativeeffect in the postWorldWarII subperiodas well as for the periodas a whole. We find some differences
using alternativedemocracy measures. Stable democracies did not fight a single
extrasystemicwar in the colonial period.In the otherperiods,stable democraciesare
not significantlydistinctfrom unstabledemocraciesand nondemocracies.The effect
of the stabledemocracyvariableis also smallerthanthatof the democracyscale. The
implicationwould seem to be thateither stabilitydoes not accuratelymeasuredemocraticnorms or democraticnormsare not very important.The effects of institutional
constraintsaregenerallycomparableto the effects of the democracyvariable.Institutional constraintshave mainly a negative effect on war propensity.An important
exception is that during the imperial period (1870-1945) for European states,
16. Thereare some technicaldifferencesbetween our analysesandthose in Henderson(2002). First,
we compareEuropeanwith non-Europeanstates,whereasHendersoncomparesWesternwith non-Western
civilization. Second, we explicitly compare the effect of democracy for both sets of states, whereas
Hendersonanalyses the impactof the democracy-civilizationinteractionin isolation. Finally, we base our
conclusions on substantiveeffects as well as statisticalsignificance, whereasHendersonrelies entirely on
statisticalsignificance.
540
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
TABLE5
Effect on the Incidenceof ExtrasystemicWarunder
VariousDemocracyScales, MultivariatePoisson Analysis
Subperiods
Variables
Democracy
Geographic
Area
Non-European
European
Stable democracy
Non-European
European
Institutionalconstraints Non-European
European
WholePeriod
Colonial
(1816-1869)
Imperial
(1870-1945)
Postcolonial
(1946-1992
-94.90a
-49.31a
-27.592
-27.742
-83.60a
-31.44
-88.07 (.012) -84.28 (.004)
-44.59 (.012) 28.08 (.015)
b
28.68 (.004)
b
4.80 (.012)
-43.27 (.015) -69.63 (.004)
66.13(.011)
-68.75(.011)
-97.96a (.002)
-83.76 (.005)
-51.25C (.003)
-52.75c (.007)
-82.25 (.004)
-82.84 (.005)
(.005)
(.007)
(.008)
(.007)
(.007)
(.007)
NOTE: The effects were calculatedusing the samecontrolvariablesas in the multivariatePoisson analysis
above.The controlvariablesdid not change direction,andthe magnitudeof the coefficients andthe significance levels experiencedonly minor changes. Effect is the percentagechange in expected incidence of
extrasystemicwar,based on Poisson regression,when the independentvariablechanges from minimumto
maximumvalue determinedwhile keeping the otherrelevantvariablesat theirmean.Mean,minimum,and
maximumvalues are conditionalon geographicarea.Baseline value given between brackets.
a. Distinct 95% confidence intervalsof expected value given minimumand maximumvalues.
b. No stable democracywith extrasystemicwar.
c. Interactiontermbetween stabledemocracyandEuropeancountryexcludedbecauseof multicollinearity
problem.
democraticinstitutionsseem to have a relativelylargepositiveeffect on extrasystemic
war involvement.
To inspectfor possible multicollinearity,we ranordinaryleast square(OLS)regressions for each independentvariableon all otherindependentvariables.As expected,
the highestR2was foundfor the variablesinvolvingthe interactionterm.Nevertheless,
the R2for democracyregressedon the otherindependentvariablesremainedacceptable: .49 for the whole period, .65 for the colonial period, .62 for the imperialperiod,
and .41 for the postcolonialperiod.In most models, moreover,therewere no indications suggesting multicollinearityin the data.17
CONCLUSIONS
In contrastwith a commonclaim in the literature,being democraticdoes not imply
moreinvolvementin colonial war.We generallyfind thatdemocracyhas had an inhibiting effect on extrasystemicwarinvolvement.Claimsto the contraryarebasedon failing to distinguishthe effect of democracyfrom othercausal factors.It is, however,a
simplificationof the democraticpeace argumentto hold that democracyis the only
pacifying factorand thatits effect has to be equally strongin all historicalperiods.In
17. Whenevertherewas suspicionof multicollinearity(e.g., in the models with the stabledemocracy
variable and occasionally when the major power country dummies were used), the variables causing
multicollinearitywere omitted.
Ravlo et al. / COLONIALWARAND DEMOCRATICPEACE
541
substantiveterms,the pacifyingeffect of democracyhas been modest,particularlyfor
Europeanstates.This makesit even morenecessaryto carefullyspecify the causaland
temporalfactorsinfluencingthe likelihood of extrasystemicconflict. A more careful
specificationalso reducesthe need to rely on a prioriassumptionsaboutthe natureof
the nonsystemic actorsinvolved in these conflicts.
Because we have found evidence for the existence of a democraticpeace also with
regardto extrasystemicwars,it is appropriateto evaluatewhethera normativeor institutional (or consent) interpretationis more relevant.Our main conclusion would be
thatit is very difficult, if not almost impossible, to distinguishbetween the two interpretations.But the evidence presentedhere suggests thatthe historyof imperialisticor
colonial wars does not imply that a norms-basedinterpretationshould be discarded.
Most important,we find that a pacifying effect of democracyremainseven aftercontrolling for factors that influence the ease of attainingpublic consent for the use of
force. To recap,democracywas significantin ourmodels thatcontrolledfor capabilities, externalthreatperception,andbroadersecurityinterests.However,we also found
thatin these models, institutionalconstraintsseem to be morerelevantthandemocratic
stability.
We have been unable to account explicitly for the racistjustification of imperial
wars. As Reiter and Stam (2002, 152) argue,"Whatmakes imperialwars especially
disturbingto the liberalconscience is thatthey demonstratealso thatit is easierto generatepublic consent if the targetis raciallyor ethnicallydifferentfrom the attacker."
We have found that the pacifying effect of democracy applies especially to nonEuropeanstates.ForEuropeanstates,democracyemerges as a significantfactoronly
in the postcolonialperiodor since WorldWarII.18In the imperialperiod(1870-1945),
Europeandemocracieswere actuallymore involved in extrasystemicwars.
However,these findings can still be reconciled with a norms-basedexplanation.
AfterWorldWarII, the normsregardingcolonial rule changedmarkedly,anddecolonizationbecame one of the centralfeaturesof internationalrelations(Huth 1996, 61).
Universalstandardsof humanrightsbecame an integralpartof democraticnormsin
this period.As late as the 1930s, the superiorityof "thewhite race"was more or less
takenfor grantedin wide circles in the West.In the postcolonialperiod,althoughracism certainlypersisted,stateracismwentinto a steepdecline. The one statethattriedto
move against the trendand openly institutionalizeracism, South Africa, became an
internationalpariah.The adoptionof the UniversalDeclarationof HumanRights in
1948 andthe 1960 Declarationon the Grantingof Independenceto ColonialCountries
18. A contrastingview of the postcolonial periodemphasizes thatWesternand other majorpowers
have engaged in neo-imperialistforeign policies, and colonial and imperialistwars have been replacedby
covertmilitaryactionand"proxywars."Accordingly,the diminishingimportanceof the Europeanvariable
would thus merely reflect a shift from imperialistto such neo-imperialpolicies not covered by our data.
Much of this criticismis generallyleveled againstthe United States, obviously not a Europeanstate. Furthermore,we see no obviousreasonsto assumethatdemocraciesaremoreproneto supportcovertactionsor
proxywarsthannondemocracies.Duringthe cold war,both the United Statesand Soviet Union used covert
action and proxy wars to yield influence. Clearly,the questionwhetherdemocraciesare more or less neoimperialistis ultimately an empiricalone. Withoutsystematicallycollected data about covert action and
proxy wars, thereis little we can conclude at this stage.
542
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
andPeoples testify to this majorchangein the globalnormativestructure.By 1970, the
United Nations had labeled colonialism a crime.
A basic assumptionfor democracy-and thusfor the democraticpeace-is thatall
humanbeings areconsideredequal.This was not the case for the inhabitantsof the colonies. Attemptsat religiousconversionsuggestedthatindigenouspeoples of the colonies were regardedas at least potential equals. As economic goals became more
important,the indigenouspopulationswere treatedmoreharshlyandwith less respect
(Ferro1997, 32). In extremecases, such as Tasmaniain the 19thcentury,virtuallythe
entire indigenous population was exterminated. Significantly, some scientists
regardedthe Tasmaniansas a missing link betweenhumansandapes (Diamond 1993,
278-80). The social Darwinismof the late 19th centurybecame a moraljustification
for exploitationand inequality.We do not disputethatin this period,elites must have
found it easier to generatepublic consent for imperialistwars,but this mainlyreflects
the failure to extend democraticnorms to non-Westernpeople. In other words, the
norms-andconsent-basedexplanationsof the democraticpeace areindistinguishable.
WorldWarII was in some ways a waragainstan extremeversionof the racistmentality.The universalnormsadoptedby the victorsprovideda visible sign thatnormsof
fundamentalinequalitywere no longerthoughtof asjust. Crawford(1993, 53) refersto
"along-termtrendtowardthe humanizationof the other."Russett(1993, 34-35) refers
to the periodof colonial expansionas an era when the ethnocentricviews of the European colonizers automaticallyassumed that the people who were colonized did not
have democraticinstitutions.Decolonization occurredwhen colonial governments
lost confidence in their normativeright to rule. This change seems to be reflected in
our findings. Democracyprovedin the end to be a restrainingforce in extrasystemic
warfare.
Ravlo et al. / COLONIALWARAND DEMOCRATICPEACE
APPENDIX A
System MembersthatHave FoughtExtrasystemicWars
Country
GreatBritain
France
Turkey/OttomanEmpire
Russia
Spain
China
Netherlands
Austria-Hungary
Argentina
Germany
Italy
Portugal
Ethiopia
Cuba
India
Iraq
Mexico1
United States
Philippines1
Peru
Egypt
Yugoslavia
Belgium
Somalia
Iran
Indonesia
Morocco
Mauritania
Total numberof wars
Colonial War
25
13
12
5
7
4
4
3
2
2
1
3
Imperial War
Total
17
12
3
7
1
2
1
42
25
15
12
8
6
5
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
149
1
1
2
3
2
2
2
1
84
SOURCE: Singer and Small (1994).
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
65
543
544
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
APPENDIXB
Incidenceof ExtrasystemicWar,
MultivariateAnalyses, CountryDummies
Subperiods
Variables
Constant
Democracy
European
Europeandemocracy
Otherconflicts
Alliances
Numberof colonies
Urbanization(log)
Peace-years
Cubic spline la
Cubic spline 2a'
Cubic spline 3a
b
Austria-Hungary
Chinab
Franceb
Germanyb
Italyb
Japanb
Russia/USSRb
United Kingdomb
United Statesb
Log-likelihood
ratio (df)
Pseudo-R2
Number
WholePeriod
-3.321*** (.287)
-~0.193***(.031)
1.398*** (.277)
0. 132*** (.034)
0.603*** (.106)
-0.013
(.048)
0.025*** (.008)
0.324*** (.053)
-0.518*** (.032)
-0.001*** (.000)
0.001*** (.000)
-0.000*** (.000)
-0.193
(.523)
-0.035
(.422)
0.779*** (.185)
0.130
(.514)
-0.172
(.339)
Colonial
(1816-1869)
-3.011***
-0.073
0.213
0.059
0.251
0.065
0.082***
0.405**
-0.505'*'*
-0.006***
0.003**
-0.001I
0.600
2,308.12 (19)
.53
10,131
Postcolonial
(1946-1992)
-5.244*** (.936)
-0.294*** (.l01)
2.987*** (.927)
0.260** (.104)
0.516*** (.183)
-0.467** (.140)
0.050** (.021)
0.377** (.159)
-0.459*** (.061)
-0.003*** (.001)
0.002*** (.001)
-0.000
(.000)
-0.430 (1.027)
-3.046*** (.414)
-0.214*** (.043)
0.538
(.492)
0.042
(.059)
0.995*** (.207)
-0.140
(.090)
0.077*** (.025)
0.195** (.088)
-1.389*** (.164)
-0.014*** (.002)
0.0l0*** (.002)
-~0.002* (.001)
___
1.288*** (.449)
_d
d
-c
0.748*
0.434
0.377
1.108** (.555)
-0.407
(.843)
__C
519.72
(15)
.50
1,524
(.391)
(.537)
(.419)
-0.128
(.429)
1.995***(.672)
-C
C
_d
_c
d
0.063
(.235)
0.104
(.274)
3.266*** (.739)
(.641)
(.082)
(.751)
(.095)
(.186)
(.109)
(.031)
(.206)
(.088)
(.002)
(.001)
(.001)
(.682)
Imperial
(1870-1945)
-0.323
(.490)
-0.789
(.803)
5.927***(1.968)
655.38
(18)
.48
3,308
_cS
d
0.699
(.919)
d
1,205.88 (14)
.66
5,299
NOTE: Unstandardizedcoefficients from Poisson regression,with standarderrorsin parentheses.
a. Coefficientsof peace-yearscubic splines segments.
b. Only for those years when countryhad Correlatesof Warmajorpower status.
c. No majorpower statusin the subperiod.
d. Multicollinearityproblem,variabledeleted.
*Significantat the .1 level. **Significantat the .05 level. ***Significantat the .01 level.
Ravlo et al. / COLONIALWARAND DEMOCRATICPEACE
545
APPENDIX
C
Incidence of ExtrasystemicWar,
MultivariatePoisson Analyses, AlternativeModels
Model 3
Model 2
imperial
(1870-1945)
Postcolonial
(1946-1992)
0.170 (1.751)
-0.018
(.046)
0.485
(.359)
0.040
(.048)
0.300
(.240)
0.913*** (.345)
-0.372** (.148)
0.015
(.009)
1.039 (1.022)
-0.206*** (.055)
2.489*** (.530)
0.156** (.061)
0.848*** (.222)
0.029
(.304)
-0.239** (.104)
0.049** (.018)
-0.269
(.236)
(log)
Energyconsumption
per capita (log)
Peace years
-0.514*** (.078)
-0.003*** (.001)
Cubic spline Ia
0.002*** (.001)
Cubic spline 2a
Cubic spline 3a
-0.000
(.000)
Log-likelihood
ratio (dJ)
345.10 (12)
Pseudo-R2
.43
Number
1,631
-0.470*** (.139)
Variables
Constant
Democracy
European
Europeandemocracy
Otherconflicts
Majorpower
Alliances
Numberof colonies
Real gross domestic
productper capita
1.305***
-0.014***
0.009***
-0.002
(.159)
(.003)
(.002)
(.001)
1,052.74 (12)
.68
4,410
Imperial
(1870-]945)
Postcolonial
(1946-1992)
-1.885*** (.371)
-0.O81* (.042)
0.377
(.320)
O.099** (.042)
0.523*** (.186)
0.895*** (.266)
-0.283** (.116)
0.009
(.008)
-2.742*** (.391)
-0.207*** (.043)
1.713*** (.399)
0.131*** (.049)
1.232*** (.202)
0.316
(.289)
-0.264*** (.098)
0.055** (.017)
0.062
(.088)
-0.499*** (.063)
-0.003*** (.001)
0.002*** (.000)
-0.000
(.000)
-0.053
(.055)
-1.456*** (i6)
-0.015*** (.003)
0.010*** (.002)
-0.002** (.001)
509.32 (12)
.42
2,257
1,186.18 (12)
.65
5,174
NOTE: Unstandardizedcoefficients from Poisson regression,with standarderrorsin parentheses.
*Significantat the .1 level. **Significantat the .05 level. ***significant at the .01 level.
a. Coefficients of peace-yearscubic splines segments.
546
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
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