AD-A240 943
-
AIR WAR COLLEGE
RESEARCH REPORT
A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE GENERALSHIP
OF
GENERAL DOUGLAS MacARTHUR AS THEATRE
IN THE PACIFIC DURING
COMMANDER
WORLD WAR II
S
DTIC
FLECTE
OCT 0 2 1991
LIEUTENANT COLONEL JEFFREY
--
E.
FURBANK,
USA
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blipe
beiiet'&
1ship ot
r-'rt 1-LA' As Flies t re C ocrman d e r
Illa c.(
f i c dur i ng Wolo1d War
II
by
~Jeff Frey
E. F urban k
Li (2Lten~ant
Colonel,
USA
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EXECLJTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE:
A Criitical
Analysis of
Doug las MacArthur
duringq
AUTHOR:
World
Jeffrey
Dougjlas
West
Pacific
between
focuse-:s on
performance,
retaking of
the Philippines
Country,
qucsLionable personal
over,
MacArthur
Cr\iticism
and
for, the
and his
and
for
is
divided
in
the Dutch East
driven
the defense of
by strict
When he allowed
the nation.
on
in
Indies.
motives.
riot
MacArthur's
the
applying
operations
was seduced by
generalship plummeted
him.
insisting
for
MacArthutr
-iii-
the South
inconsistency
his
General
of
lapses in
and envelopment
and
of
those who attack
hopeless plan
the simple old soldier,
Honor,
to take
the reasons
of bypassing
thaii being
II.
MacArthutr
the Philippines,
USA
as Commander
hIs questionable motives
principle
recapture
War,
his
Colonel,
on the performance
tenure
World
specifically
the Philippines,
Duty,
in
those who praise
This paper
his
during his
Theatre
the Pacific
in
War II
have commented
MacArthur
of General
as Theatre Commander
Furban ck, Lieutenant
E.
Many critics
the Generalship
to
Rather,
ideals
"hubr-is"
of
and
-these factors
because he was serving
-2
BIOGRAPHICAL
Colonel
Lieutenant
States
Military
Massachusetts
Artillery
in
English
1976
Advanced
and Seneral
comm~tnd
Staff
and staff
including
He
in
command
been the
Headcquar ters,
Chief
DA,
Systems.
to
is
from
He received
in
on
the
1st
Germany
the General
In
43-Lrd
the Chief
his
last
ADA
Colonel Furbank
1990.
-iv-
and South Korea.
Military
at
FRG,
and been
two assignments,
a
the
of Public
he
and Executive
for High Altitude
is
of
and overseas,
(PATRIOT),
TRADOC Systems Manager
class of
variety
Staff
Defense Command,
Office of
Lin,
a
the United States
of
Secretary of
D.C.
Army Command
the United States
the faculty
Master
the Air Defense
positions
in
a
the University of
He has served. in
Lieutenant
War College,
1969.
graduate of
a
the United
graduating with a
College.
Washington
the
June,
attended
Course and the United States
32nd Army Air
was Commandei, of
Officer
in
Literature
and
of Media Relations,
Affairs,
Furbank
of two batteries
has also served
Academy,
E.
West Point,
Bachelor of Science degree
of Arts degree
SKETCH
Jeffrey
Academy at
-
Missile
graduate of the Air-
T'ABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
CHAPTER
ii
DISCLAIMER ...........................
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY ....................
BIOGRAPHICAL
iii
SKETCH ..................
iv
I
INTRODUCTION .........................
I
II
MACARTHUR
5
III
HERITAGE ...................
MACARrHUR'S
IV
V
VI
DEFENSE PLAN ..............
A FLAWED PLAN LEADS TO DISASTER ......
FIGHTING A LOSING
BATTLE ................
.
14
16
I SHALL RETURN .......................
24
VII
BACK TO THE PHILIPPINES ..............
27
VIII
PHILIPPINES RECAPTURED ..................
33
CONCLUSION ...........................
35
IX
CHAPTER
I
INTRODUCTION
the most recent
MacArthur."
Honor,
was a
receiving
seven Silver, Stars and the Medal
the nickname
yet he also earned
Pacific
visiting
leader, one would
for,
outside his
best military
envelopment
dramatic
anywhere,
largely aloof
of
strategist
and bypassin3
landing
for not
in
Korea,
soldiers
and those
He was arguably America's
the twentieth
schemes
the epitome of
anytime and do anything
from his
circle.
inner, official
Inchon
Doug"
him and thought he was
follow,
yet he remained
"Dugout
of
for extended periods of time.
battlefields
Many close to him revered
a
man of endless contradictions,
MacArthur was repeatedly decorated
arid extremes.
for bravery,
"the reader will
(Svii)
Douglas MacArthur
contraasts
objective
admiring and despising
alternately
probably find himself
the notable
balanced and
but i.s James admits.
analysis of MacArthur,
skewed
and best work on MacArthur by D.
James provides a
Clayton James.
with
these extremes,
to one or the other, of
exception of
of MacArthur has been
treatment
official
Unforturnately,
to
weaknesses.
heroic mytha or, condemn glaring
perpetuate
most choosing
of MacArthur,
treatment
their
in
are divided
Critics
history.
military
American
in
figures
controversial
the most
one of
is
the Army Douglas MacArthur
of
General
in
century,
the Pacific,
yet he appeared
devising
and the
sluggish
and
hesiitant durtin.j
Uhe defense ol
the
'Philippinev in
1941,
and
acted contr-ar.y to his own pt-inciples when he insisted on
r'eca'FLtur'ins
Al1
1944-1945.
He demanded
of the Philippines and Dutch Easit Indies in
loyalty
from his subor-dinates,
openly and r'epeatedly criticized
yet
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the Pr'esident.
MacAr'tthur
remains
is
larqely
if
difficult,
a char'actert
larSer' than life,
an enigma.
He, defies
not
impossible,
about hifi q3eneralship
that
in
thought
interviewing
it
possible
personaliLy.
contradictions
petrformance
theatre
addresses
the
for out, nation's>
complex
but will
in
reasons behind his
militar-y
James states
none
character
or
Wor-ld
in
War
the reasons
MacArthur's
II.
pet-formance
A study
is
any serious
essential
student
of militar'y historty.
William Manche.stetr
Caesar,.
MacArtthutr
calls
Manchester- coined
as an American
Douglas MacAtrthur
the metaphor' largely
empertort
with par-allels
an American
to portray
to the famous
Roman general.
"MacArthur, was
like
Julius
egotistical,
willful.
with sepvile
aides-de-camp;
Caesar-
bold,
aloof,
The two generals surrounded
remained
is
conclusfions
investigate
leaders and for
it
presume tv do what
and extr-emes
commandet-
and
associates,
study does not
to do,
for the apparent
that
1). Clayton
probe his
This
other-s have been unable
as a
to come to any finite
MacArtthut's closest
(6,vii)
legend who
categor'ization,
or character.
to fully
a
lon9 abroad,
austere,
themselves
one
as
pr'ucuu•.J
growth;
unparallelecAd
leading capt ive peoples
th., other, as, Shc)qurn,
a)rid
spectacularly
loved histor'y;
and reigned
fearless;
in
were fiercely
grandiose and
as benevolent
autocrats."
however,,
that
MacArthur's
Greecae,
not Rome.
(14,6)
Manchester
real parallel
with Caesar- has its
is "hubris,"
the hNro's fatal
rtesults
which
served
fatils to recorgnize,
in
his
the Roman
chang.3ed
democratic:
that
change siSnalled
motivations,
the
the war
live
up
MacA(rthur's
tendency to
daroC•Er,-Lus
a
a
s-ns
of his
myth of
infallibility,
tried
infallibility
and w'rong
in
and
hero.
throughout
problems had
was the r:ight onae.
He-: often
It
di:ýmissed
this
of
e.,plains
3
that
terms were a
he could solve
only one solution
was
and
inconceivable
corlstr~uctiVE
personal attacl::s rather than ob,•jective
rejection
and his
absolute
He was confident
hi$ solu~tion
Perhaps
MacArthur'% career
the myth arid
own
thal. all
his
personal
to the legend.
combination.
rationalizingr
the Empire.
genius and courageous
define, rigtht
could be irori,3.
Ironically,
created
any problem,
(16,219)
This
complex mii, of eyo,
to believe
emperor,
as its
later
to a dictatorship.
and power.
intellectual
he began
to
is
to the ,,ar
iJf an
Tragically,
a general,
republic
"hubris"
phobias
prior
legend
Cae~sar who nobly
downfall.
as
It
Greek tragedy,
the demise of both Caesar and
MacArthur's
successes
in
tragic flaw in
ultimate
Republic
roots
advice,
thait
that
he
opposition
as
thereby
otherwise sound alternatives.
why he surrounded
himself
with
a
staf+
hiiim anything
gave
than
other'
input
all
fi ltered
catrefully
tha1t4
what
to him and
he wanted
however,
over--reliance
on his own judgment and abilities,
inrgn'es-i
to proIseIcute
to hear.
These
tlh
wýAt
btAl.ed
on
and his
personal
and
tather than purely military motives that reflected
political
MacArthur 's
"hubrls. "
Tliis "hubrits"
battlefieilc
failture in
a foorty-two yeat, military career,
defeat
in
this personal
profuLi:•sion,Al
judgmernt
that
led to MacArthur's
first
failure.
It
cloudud hisi
for the remainder of the war to the
hiu pers-onal
his
He subsequently became obsessed
the khilippines.
with ert-a-aing
ext•,nt
his
wac MacAr'thu•t's' overcon4.idence,
it
.fatults asido,
Wi 11
rarely
Fjoal of- retiaking
the Philippines
became m(e-e important than national military strategy.
4
CHAF'TE(R
I I
THE MACARTHUR
Had
it
not been for, World War,
cgenerals.
1934,
M.AcArthur" did,
Dougla.
His dt-ive and
up
live
MacArthur
Govertnor
Supremt?
Medal
public
thouzand
(16,219)
of Columbia.
in
youn•est
officer,
at age nineteen,
to attain
Genri-r-4al
and Mili
iitarv
flouLg1 ,aL
distinguished
ancestost,.
ti
'h.t'my,Ultimately
Governror
of
the
as he .followed
He gr',aduated from
in
in
the
the
4von the
was the
the rank
to setre
'Philippines,
footsteps
of
with
Commanding
2,4-27)
(16,
j
was
5st as
of his
famous
Military
Captain of the Corps of
the highest academic
54
of
His father
the United States
1903 as First
to
His qtrandfather'
being appointed
MaC.Ar' thur''t5 mI tciOr-ic car'eer
Cadets and with one of
a
ancient
the Civil War-,
mind continued
Army,
Academy at West Point
been
attempt
justice
Missiornary Ridge
in
carteer.
He had
yezrs of
Honor" at
di stiriction
in
him by hizs f,.mily.
left
an associate
the Distrtict
the Unionr
military
was his
life
of
in
the Atrmy
of
brilliant
Hi.ghlandi.
Wioiniand
Court of
colow.e-l
LM?
in
fr'om a
the Scottish
of
Staff
he did well.
of excellence
wa• de-cended
at
wart'ior-s
was
ambition
to the÷ legacy
gr-eatest
job or" mission.
success at uvery
total
Douglas
one of America's
a
of
the culmination
marked
Ever-ything
and Korea,
he reLit-ed as Chief of
When
it
II
today be considetred
masht
MacArthutr
HERITAGE
records
in
Academy
hitor-y.
Au a juniot' officutr
Philippinu.
and Mexico.
for- the Rainbow
he saw combat action
As a colonel
Division in
War-ld Wat,
Division
in
Division
64rid Division Commander,.
I arid
France as Brigade Commander,
awat-d&i -for- gqa 11anlt rv\
two Distinquithed
Distinguihed
Sn,'vicU Moda]
as Supeintendent
he modern]-:ed
and
During
of
Service Crossws,
the.. United States
the cut-rriculum.
Court Marti.l
to vote for- acquittal.
As Chief
depr-ession yeatrs.
Thus beforue
fantastic
career virttually
ser'ving out his
his
own
sLills
In
1941
as a
it
to success.
men atrc %educed by succuess,
e:ception
iior
Hit;,tor,y
of
Staff of the
the Artmy
first
bomb on
completed
in
a
the Philippines.
He had experienced
vias only reasonable
professional
to
failur-e and was quietly
retirtement ais Field Marshal
MacArtthur Ots accustomed
nothing else.
According
Mitchell's
the
had already
devoid of
the
(16,47-50)
the Japanese ever, dropped
Douglas MacArrthur
After
Academy,
valiantly to prepserve -funding f•r•
the difficult
Pearl Harbor.
the
Military
kt. Billy
during
more
earn anq sievun
he was the only otficer
he ftouht
the
the war he earned
most acr:ounts,
At-my,
in
later- as Assistant
cind two P'urple Heart-s.
and rtestrLctut'E'd
the
the concept
setved
than auny othvr uoffxicr,
Silver, SL~rs,
war,
he deviued
in
soldier.
and MacArthur
for him to trust
Even the most modest
was neither
an
modest.
wad
the people who make•
relaticns3hips of
time and space.
be considered
such context.
in
6
history
are
dtriven by
All events and decisions must
Having
served as Chief
of
Staff
of
the Army,
understood
it; was only natural
the nature and
officerýs who would hold
politics
of
key positions
as Eisenhower and Marshall,
the case of Eisenhower,
for MacArthur
were
affairs,
junior
had even worked
often having nothing
the two had engaged in
MacArthur was Chief of
asked Roosevelt
matters.
of
The President
explain how,
self-confident
from MacArthur's
events prior
of
the
MacArthur
the legend during
II
would seek
the war.
7
such
in
-for the General.
from long
to do with military
at the White House
"Douglas
when
MacArthur
to me you are a symbol
(20,124)
during
These facts
the war",
perspective,
least
key decisionmakers
to World War
and
Franklin Roosevelt
and believe himself at
the s.perior,
legend,
replied,
behavior
II,
the General's advice on civilian
of America."
MacArthur's
to MacArthur,
On one such occasion,
why he wanted
the conscience
justify
Staff.
Many of the
during World War
MacArthur was well acquainted with
conversations,
the job.
to believe he
had brought
do not
but they do
he might be
the equal,
in
Washington.
if
not
If
MacArthur power and
to regain the power, and perpetuate
CHAPTER III
MACARTHUR'S DEFENSE PLAN
"Effective this date [27 July 19411
there is
hereby
constituted a command desi~gnateld as the Unrited States Army
bhe Far East.
Forces in
This command will
forces of the Commonwealth of the
Philippine Department,
Philippi nest
include the
called into the set-vice of the Armed
Forces of
the
United States for the period of the existin9 Emergency and such
other forces as may be designated
United States Army Forces in
in
manila,
Philippine
You
Islands.
[MacArthur]
the
are hereby
United States Army Forces in
(13,109)
Even the most ardent MacArthur critic
professionally
Headquarters of
the Far East will be established
designated as Commanding General,
the Far East."
to it.
the General
would concede that
never tasted defeat either
peace prior to December 1941.
war or
in
On the other hand even the most
strident MacArthur fan must admit that his actions
in
connection with the defense of the Philippines at the outbreak
of World War II
-s
rank as perhaps MacArthur's worst performance
a military officer.
have fallen eventually,
theatre,
Quite probably
the Philippines would
regardless of any action taken in
without reinforcements and resupply.
B
However,
it
is
the defense plan MacArthur
absolutely c-ertain
that
so poorly e.•ecuted
hastened
the defeat
United States
and
forces.
Filipino
As Field
Marshal
unable to do much
the Philippines,
of
-to improve
forces in
the year-s prior
resources
and commitment
him Commander,
reevaluating
USAFFE,
to 1941
basically
for war with Japan.
Philippines
with
outnumbered
defender.
objectives
were
forces and
resources
That
iC
the War Departtment
MacArthur- wanted
the Japanese
of
on
and
the islands.
It
was
War, Plan Or-ange,
for, defending
Filipino
forces
key ter,-ain
plan
the
in
theatre
defenses on
which
made sense.
but realistic,
a
Rainbow 5 was
Therefore,
strategy
the
in
light
favored
the
Its
of the actual
available.
After completin9
MacArthur deemed
and
Manila Bay by establishing
limited
limited,
of
the President appointed
Rainbow 5.
and
the Bataan peninsula. (15,150)
on defending
lack
for defense of
5 called
United States
Filipino
began reviewing
predecessor,
Rainbow
and focused on retaining
predicated
After
was called
as its
had been
the United States
he seriously
war plan
the same
because of a
from both
existinc9 war plans
The cl.rrent
MacArthur
the defense posture of
governments. (20,4-5,
Philippine
half
of
devised and
his
review of
inadequate.
in
favor
to defend
the beaches
Luzon by withdra'ing
9
in
He immediately
of his
all
Rainbow 5
of
rather
own
October,
began
lobbyin.g
more comprehensive
the Philippines
than concede
to defensive
terrain
1941,
plan.
by opposing
the nortihern
on
the Bataan
peninsula as called
to make his
plaii work,
forces to 200,000,
He believed
Japanese
for in
forces being
more to one,
strategy,
over-ambitious
concentrating
deploying
his
limited
them throughout
the North Luzon Force,
Force.
a
rapio
(2(),16-16)
substantial
Neither was likely
training
divisions
least
had
the archipelaqgo
in
Luzon Force,
military
support from
addition
and
the United States.
less,
to the actual
not more U.S.
100,000 men assigned
to raising,
Both were a
When MacArthur
defeating
first
arrived
10
soldiers,
and
existing
readiness
the Japanese
on the
MacArthur needed
gamble at
in
to
and poorly
equipping,
up to basic combat
these deficiencies
for
plan was dependent on
another, 100,000 Filipino
to be brought
opted
and the Mindanao
capability
had received
The almost
its
three commands:
and both were contrary
In
To correct
and resources.
was grandiose--
force of
MacArthur
quickly to have any chance of
Leaches.
however,
Reserve Divisions were untrained
(13,594)
at
Japanese
forces on Bataan,
1940-1941.
e'xisting Filipino
a potential
Instead of
The Philippines
support during
by as many
and unrealistic.
Filipino
in
any
was based on United
vastly outnumbered
the South
in
increases
situation.
to repel
To succeed MacArthur's
improvement
equipped.
facing
Filipino
ten Reserve Divisions. (7,595)
Rainbow 5 strategy
MacArthur's
objectives
in
forces
expanding
these forces would be sufficient
States and Filipino
300,0 00.
To get sufficient
MacArrthur envisioned
organized
invasion.
as three or
Rainbow 5.
best.
the Philippines,
he
time
projected
it
take him until
would
with an Army that
Philippines
(2,423)
Islands.
proposing his
justification,
since
the contrary.
Filipino
and supplies
serious
tools,
Jones,
Atmy said
said his
quite proficient
seemed
Wainwright stated
that
patrolling."
(7,600)
what
half
months
General
all
they had
of active
Clifford
Filipinos
previously --
or steel
"most of
all."
rifle
did
learned during
duty."
who had had
General
to
Albert
the Philippine
officers.
(7,
(7,600)
found
they
General
600)
training
were
that
"was
in
and scouting
the Filipino
reservists
their
of
stints
According
five
and
and a
men --
months of
to be able to do only two
five
to Brigadier
31st Division enlisted
half
and
previous
"his
a
Jones
their, men
marksmanship
"rarely
helmets
but beyond
As MacArthur had
Bluemel,
seemed
that
at
in
practice mobilizations,
recall
"There were no
as staff
pre-mobilization
particularly
There was a
above the grade of captain
properly
training
equipment
field.
Brigadier
close order drill,
to have had no
inadequate,
officers
reported
in
suggested
the field
the 51st Division of
of functioning
instructors
the
(7,599)
no Filipino
were capable
in
gas masks,
soldiers."
that
from
and blankets.
raincoats,
who commanded
without
was totally
lacked the essential
to function
shortage of clothes
issue to Filipino
M.
readiness reports
soldiers
forces would
he claimed his
This new estimate
necessary
entrenching
plan,
and
USAFFE,
After- takin.g over as Commander,
1942.
the
would be capable of defending
revised defense
be ready by early
1946 to provide the
traininq
things well:
11
|
M
!1"
! N! !
!
!
I
.•:
M
-;
-
-
when an officer
one,
voice,
jump up and
day.
(7,600)
'"
MacrA-thur's
optimistic
salute;
goal
repelling
the Japanese
intentioned,
but his
on
reasonable,
The time
capability
to execute
as Ma(c(Ar'thur'
did,
The Joint
is
1941,
a
The plan
was approved
influence.
short
(8,595)
Shortly
.Slowing repor-t
responded
I were
is
it,
and changed
a
plan
that
is
told
approved
had
little
To do
otherwise,
MacArthur's plan on 7
the attack
on Pearl Harbor.
because of MacArthur's
the Joint
Chiefs
especially
that
aviation,
of the concept
of
28,
command's
1941,
such a
ready for, any eventuality."
(7,609)
12
defense,
hera_? arta
mission."
MacAr-thur
report that
Ironically,
sent a
Marshall
"The Secretary
to receive your
wide
now makes
of Philippine
readiness.
that
insistence
"The
defense forces
to accomplish
as to his
highly pleased
a
the
after the plan was approved,
on November
and
after
not before.
and composition
to be sufficient
the Philippines
to a plan
to alter
lar-gely
the broadenin9
believed
all
He gr-ossly
readiness
month before
He had
and the str-ength
defending
Staff
scope of enemy operations,
imperative
was overly
irrec.5ponsible.
Chiefs of
November,
loud
by facts or demonstr-ated
str•ategy
hope of success.
exists
readiness
i.gnored reality.
combat
conservative
a
the beaches may have been well
plan
over-estimated Filipino
of
in
to demand 3 meals per,
of Filipino
and unsubstantiated
MacArthur's
attention
the other-,
assessment
ability.
and
to yell
appeared,
of
War, and
your- command
in
a
few
weekb
the plan
the battle
that
Mac(rthUt'
and thousands
fought
so hard
of Americans
for
would
and Filipinos
lose him
their
1 i yes.
Pushing so hard
weaknesses,
war
that
is
were
the
for his
plan,
first of
a series
his
part--
others
a
fix
readiness
their
them.
MacArthur
of Filipino
fighting
capacity
he boasted
already
he really
thought
would
-hat
also
Oriental
"fail
attempt
(2,423)
that
credit
I-ave time to
Time Magazine
an
attack
of
five
least
billion
In
May,
divisions
that
are
suggests
"He
the lessons of Gallipoli,
a
coast defended
predicted
a
half
dollars."
that
the
-those who feared a
logic of
13
by
such an
million
men as
(2,423)
he was the only American who understood
that
the
"the
would attack.
against
MacArthur
"at
that
even evidence
studying
article
(7,583)
twelve Filipino
the Japanese
the enemy
and argued
to fully
he would
John Hersey
to
Maybe he
"completely underestimates
and upwards
believed
job.
readiness
a
on
to admit
that
no enemy after
would cost
Perhaps
commented
believed
modern weapons."
casualties
thought
There is
the
an unwillingness
to do the
looks sound;
ever again
attack
but
(7,584)
never
the future.
reflected
to correspondent
trained."
obvious
lapses throughout
of the Philippine Ar-my."
Philippine situation
its
and perspective--
unable
weaknesses,
critical
1941
in
loss of objectivity
that he had been
realized
of
to hound MacArthur
overstatin.q Filipino
considering
Japanese
He
the
attack
the Japanese mind."
(2,423)
CHAPTER IV
A FLAWED PLAN LEADS TO DISASTER
When mobilized
to
live
to fight
MacArthur
had counted rn
completely mobilized
subordinate units
strength.
by
the Filipino
never
artillery
was scheduled
withdrawin9
to Bataan,
11th Division's
75mm guns,
Many factors
readiness.
consistent
December,
artillery
but
(7,608)
program
opting instead
And
lastly,
1939-1941,
MacArthur's
In
July,
the Philippine
the U.S.
regiment did not
was
Army's
long-range policy
assembly
to subsidize
that
lack of
Army and Navy Board had never pursued a
the Philippines."
the event of war.
it
regiment
as the division
the Philippine National
in
field
case was typical:
to the Philippine
course or" established
from
their
(7,609)
contributed
"The Joint
the defense of
Most
and even then had only 60% of its
guns."
and eighteen
attacked.
into combat without
1300 man field
late
riot one had been
more than 50%-70% authorized
with twenty-four
go into action until
paper,
ten Filipino
attained
went
to have a
Of the
the Japanese
"The
regiment.
Army failed
the time
Most divisions
manpower
1941,
up to MacArthur's expectations.
divisions
equipped
in
mission even
President Quezon
de-emphasized
for a
Department
the nominal
14
neutralist
had
failed
support
and
the defense
policy
1940 the War Department
Army as MacArthur
Philippine
regarding
directed
failed
requested.
to give
by the
War Depar.tment.
"The
invasion
(',7, 609)
plan v.haciil
would be
foJ.l1owed
came would be neither- fish
MacAr-thur's
planned
'last
ditch'
when tile Japanese
nor- fovwl,
stand on
neither
the beaches
Or-ange and Rainbow plans for, immediate withdrawal
of all
forces to the Bataan-Cortv'e gidor, 'citadel' defenEse."
Obviously,
Ma•Ar-thur-
Philippirme A-umy's
held acc:ountable
the execution
succeedinBg.
wjas not solely r-esponsible
lack
of preparedness.
for, the ,dilitary
of a
plan
The pflan
that never- had
was his.
15
the
gr'ound
(7,609)
for the
However,
collapse that
nor
he must be
resulted
any chance of
frtom
CHAPTER V
FIGHTING
"MacArthur's
that
the beaiches.i
impossible
if
they were. "
MacArthur
his
the USAFFE
awakened
he writes
His rationale
military
was
in
with America's
adequate warnnirtj
is
field
Commanders
inight have been
ten
times
lar9er
than
consiatent
with his
opinions.
He had
anti
on Pearl
impression
a
serious
Harbor.
was that
setback."
In
the
(13,117)
Harbor was America's strongest
"Its
best aircraft
9arrison was a mighty
on strongly
a i rcraft
defended
batteries,
4ields,
backed
by our
117)
on the side
would not
first
suffer-ed
that
a Commander of MacArthur's
impression based
err
3.40 AM Sunday morning December 8,
"My
have arrived
commander-.
Japanese
at
the Pacific.
inconceivable
experience could
first
cost'
forces had Leen
Pearl
systems,
(13,
Pacific Fleet."
was a
that
that
position
It
at all
the Japanese attack
miSht well have
Japanese
3 to his
(7,603)
was told of
memoirs
one,
order of December
must- 'be held
he wE.•
When
A LOSING BATTLE
belief
at
such a conclusion,
on fragmentary
reports.
of
preparedness.
But
in
the
repeatedly
infallibility
and publicly
invade the Philippines
16
even
if
it
Prudent
it
is
of his
pronounced
and
that
the
lacked the power
to take arl
thi
bias
aside any personal
have any chance of
success,
12:2() P.M.,
December 8,
Harbor, and eight
bombers were destroyed
the F'-40
from Clark,
squadron-hours,
of
MacArthur's
air
Both squadrons
force had been cut
control
of the Fatr East Air Force,
portion
of
the Air- Force being
with MacArthur.
He
that
otrder,
proper precautions had
Brereton
command's
and
destroyed
MacArthur's
B-17's were
caught on
17
miles
half
In
few
a
a
without
tactical
for
a
large
on the ground rests
any sentse of urgency,
or followed
been taken
forty
(8,4)
the major blame
never demonstrated
communicated any direct
in
Drereton exercised
MG Lewis H.
Although
the majority of
the P-40 fighter
on the ground.
fight.
Zero
of B-17 heavy
Iba Field,
demolished
also was caught
that
on
had been notified
on the ground along with
airplanes
Japanese
But at
the attack
Japanese bombers and
at
and
air supremacy
total
MacArtbur
later
to
the Philippines
forces and convoys.
hours after
Ten minutes
fighter's.
a
arrogance
combined
nine hours after
1941,
Clark Field.
attacked
fighters
he needed
flights
three
for
preparing
the defense of
invasion
to interdict
would have put
nothing.
plan for
the ability
the attack,
the face of events
in
instead,
did virtually
and
For MacAt-thur"s
of
even
favor, of 9uickly
in
MacArthur,
worse-case scenartia.
Pearl
This perfsonal bias
Any responsible commander
to the contrary.
with paralysis
conclusion
his
influetnced
obviously
th(e Pacif it:.
in
U.S.
for
accuunts differ
the ground.
up to assure
its
himself
survival.
as
to why the
Brererton
claimed
that he had asked Sutherland,
permission
to bomb
Formrosa. (8,7)
forwarded
the Japanese
MacArthur
to him,
(8,8)
corroborated,
but
Sutherland
thia-t Breterton
occasions
that
Sutherland
Formosan
in
a
after
these
stated,
"I
he
to gr'ound
the
attacking
a
in
les.ono.
beach
his
Yet MacArthur
First,
a
the ground."
by
at
the proposed
day with
commander
was not
importance
borders
on dereliction
of
of Staff,
on
duty.
George
that
precluded
an
modern weapons,
forces
Turkish
MacArthur
enemy
-From
and so he
to defend
between
cadre--
had
the beaches.
Gallipoli
troops were well
Geriiian professional
to
(E,6)
recall
the differences
18
only to be told
that
such
operations,
by
be documented
know how MacArthur happened
to deploy his
overlooked
led by skilled
that
of Gallipoli
plan
the Philippines.
contact
borders
don't
defended
1941,
Army Chief
planes qet caught on
likely
two separate
ever discussed
matter of
attacks,
juLst
is
be
to see him. (6,7)
MacAArthur phoned lrereton
say that
that
it
it
too busy
Such neglect
Swithhing
well
can
very admission
the unbelievable.
elected
real
or had any per'sonal
involved
believed
men,
of 8 December,
the
cannot
both were honorable
morning
personally
his
conversations
on
Yet
let
alleged
MacArthur- was
harbor,
he would have rejected
had,
to see MacArthur
Brereton.
Two weeks
it
did try
denied
Takao
for
that no such request was
It
that
raid
at
roadblock.
Mac-Arthur
Marshall
the
t5ome accounts
Although
11:00,
was
if
These
since
vhipping
claimed
and that
as foolhardy.
that
MacArthur's Chief uf Staff
trained
Filipino
and
and
soldiers
and officerm,_-=
opted
to concedo
tactical
surprise
the coast;
MacArthur
Third,
in
in
1941 air
power
recognize this
terrain
cliffs
at
weaapons meant
the key.
was
ch,r.A,,E or
Gallipoli
favored
ot the water's
mountains
in
edge
interior;
the
Wainwrisht's
of beach.
4t'00 mi]ss. (7, 6OC'.5)
the natural
obstacle
that
Predictably,
divisions
overrun. (2, 28)
invasion
readiness
the coastline
when the Japanese
the Filipino
the initial
North Luzon
None of
Force of four
over 600 miles
MacArthu•r
Japanese
finally
defending
air
came on
posture and
its
attacks
the 21st
ability
19
at
shoreline
Gallipoli
invaded
in
the beaches
had almost
was
this
of
the invader.
the coast of
The South Luzon Force of two divisions
for'
and
was
was.
late
December,
were quickly
two weeks from the
Clark
steep
impenetrable
favored
along
the
rugged,
with
was responsible for defending
r't,ýhpcniribl
to
Finally,
backed up by almost
almosti
divisions
landing
and machine guns;
artillery
land anywhere
so
inevitable.
defeat
the defender,
to
Filipino
Being
to make mutual
the Philippines
islands.
sites.
ignore .it.
The enemy could choose
7,000
into three
MacArthur either' failed
chose to
in
on any part
to any concerted
fruom each other as
1915 modern
forces
landings
landin.y
impossible and piecemeal
reinforcement
the Turks
their,
forces
possible
would be inferior
and be 5o separated
to
divided Filipino
separate forces to cover all
divided each force
Second,
and position
locations so they could react
strategic
a+
were poorly trained.
Iba before
to reevaluate his
to execute his
time of
the
command's
defense plan.
In
spite ou
the destruction of half of his air power and the
withdrtiwal
clung
of
to his
view
would work;
yet
Sutherland
frceýC
naval
hili
that
privately
essenti.al
for
logistical
full
two days
the War Department
supplies
being
shipped
was
to depots near
reverse direction
captured;
and
the
vast
faced continuu•U
Caught
in
hold
indecisiveness,
Corr*-ýj Ido-r.
,.%nd
'oTn
Field
comqariderci
stores,
some uven ow-ned
equipment and
until
was too
late.
After
N'Jovember,
for, Bataan were
in
the process of
the beaches.
lacked
Some had
impossible
Much
a
arrived;
means
of
to
had already
transport
been
and
(2,30-31)
two operation
of
plans and compounded
supplies
.got to Bataan
food
attempted
Japi.Anese
20
December,
(14,28)
.4allcniý oF c.asoline had
by
23
in
riev,"r
million
(8,.-1)
it
the critical
large quantitis
or
plan
interdiction.
uii tl-v punritula
ujut.
detir.t'yed
remainder
:ir
personnel,
supplies.
the middle of
by MacArthur's
to
redirect
routed,
to War Plan Orange
was now virtually
It
to
(0,27).
were being
to Bataan
order,,
plan
the.t his
Bataan.
divisions
MacArthur's'
earmarked
•n tralsit.
to
invasion had beSun.
approved
previously
Quezon
immediately
south
gave the
publicly
the 8th hw confided
withdrawing
thu
When he finally
as
to revert
support
after
MacArthur
would hold and his
Filipino
refused
develop contingencies
later,
later, to President
reports that
stubbornly
wek
as early
Would have to withdraw
MacArthur
some
a
the Filipino's
four days
and
Despite
a
ot'c:eii
had to be
to confiscate
fir•-s;
but,
necessary
and
to
be
abandoned.
local
food
because of
be uted by Filipino
civilians,
9quartermaster officers
sources,
Quezon
froim Presidcent
pal it ical prussur•'
then
it.
to purchase rice
from
tried
again because of pressure
to Philippine
law,
which
it
was purchased.
sacrificed
the welfare
and lives
along with
its
to resist.
ability
military
mission.
Enough rice
soldiers
on Bataan
for years,
Instead on 5 January
half
rations.
MacArthur
Official
U.S.
revert
his
memoirs MacArthur
vital
"I
have always
decision
of
What he apparently never
switching
hoti
to his
litis
Former U.S.
it
created
al
has forces on
concludes
factor
for his
lieutenant with
of Staff,
the 57th
21
forced
forces and prolonging
it
to
the
not only as the most
but
in
was that his
its
of' resources
General
corollary
(13,127)
insistence
c:onfusion and was based on his
Army Chief
that
decision
decisive of the war."
estimate.
his
got there.
plan so close to the anticipated
and overly optimistic
then a
takes credit
realized
of
(8,37)
regarded
the most
sight
any other single
the Philippine campaign
consequences one of
command
to have fed his
Army history
to War Plan Orange as savin.g
campaign.
his
lost
was available
the end of resistance on Bataan."
In
in
He clearly
but none of
in
thus blatantly
of the men
of food probably more than
"lack
from the province
MacArthur had to place
(1,64)
According
from Quezon.
not be moved
(8,33)
local
from doing so by MacArthur's
headquarters,
could
later
USAFFE
MacArthur prohibited
but again were prevented
rice
they might
that
on
beginning
inaccuLrate
and capabilities.
Harold K.
Infantry Regiment,
of
Johnson,
has said
that
MacAr-thur's
judgment that
beach
should
The defense
first
have been corrected
of the Philippines
professional
defeat
performance was flawed
optimistic
estimates
indecisiveness.
that
defense plan was "a
It
an attack by
in
of General
began
the Japanese
result
forces were caught napping.
his
it
came
rigid adherence
to a
its
He staked his
inception.
was right,
the Japanese not
the earliest
MacArthur
would be different.
additional
Filipino
supplies
for
in
the contrary,
ignore the hand
prematurtely,
MaCAr'thurt
succeed,
until
before
its
flawed
from
that he
1942 which was
time to get
train
and
defense.
they are dealt.
was unlucky.
the cappability existed
advocate because
that
it
their
MacArthur
to a
as
But history
Commanders make
and others
equip his
of supplies
MacArthur
and shift
22
with his
perhaps history
the redistribution
irresponsible.
deluded himself
became
April,
and rehearse his
he was dealt
As a
reputation
said they could,
and must play the hand
inability
him wrong.
Some might argue that
he was
to believe
was fundamentally
complete
plan,
and
It concluded
from the United States,
his
kind.
isolation,
and his
professional
His
overly
could be successful.
attacked
had
arrogance,
He might have had enough
divisions,
was not
luck
plan that
but events proved
Had
called
it
(8,36)
Douglas MacArthur.
was possible
that
in
thus marks the
unwillingness
to believe
when
1941-1942
goals,
with his
error
much earlierr."
by overconfidence,
and unrealistic
tragic
it
own
chose
strategy
to carry
On
out.
his
plan would
was his
idea,
and
to
subsequently never' critically
viability.
He blamed
Washinnjton
obsessed
ot" objectively
defeat on
[i is
and nevtnr accepted
for, the remr;ainder
and retaking
of
the Philippines.
23i
his
lack
examined
of support
own culpability.
its
-from
He became
the war with vindicating
himself
CHAPTER VI
"I
"I
came
SHALL RETURN"
through
and
I shall
General
From the
his
darincj
refused
the phrase
on.
on Europe
priority.
of U.S.
first.
interests
This
fundamental
would crnt;t:Lnu-
throughout
culmiratin
the Gene-rial 's
MacArthur'S
and specifically
the result
the
thrust
reasons for
relief
of personal
in
of
motivations
24
that
in
that
Asia was the
receive
between
MacArthur
foreign policy
for the next decade,
believing
the reconquest
(2,424)
the defeat
therefore,
of U.S.
He
as the war went
Strategy
difference
the war and
Return.
stayed."
believed
and should,
regardin.9
in
it
National
He instead
and Washington
8j
to We Shall
would personally avenge
regardless
to U.S. fuLtutr-e
first
the Philippines
good one but asked
And so I Shall Return,
MacArthur
after
of War Information
a
it
Australia
I would become more pronounced
the Philippines,
key
Return3
to change
in
retaking
"The office
[I Shall
permission.
Douglas
focused
quest.
permission
The emphasis on
arrived
from Corregidor,
personal
MacArthur's
Douglas MacArthur
day MacArthur
escape
became his
thought
first
return."
Korea.
Asia should
the Philippines,
than
objective
be first,
were more
analysis.
to retire
decided
his
of
time bolstered
the Philippines were
When
Asian
after the war" and
during
often
in
policy makers,
Philippines
for long periods
it
was not
behind
planned
He would
insist
before
on and
the very
motives,
which at
interest
with his military
country.
insisting
the accumulations
to
Much of
the Philippines
his planning
this
for the next two and on.e-half
and
civilian
on Japan."
(12,215)
of the
Personal
conflicts
least
were serious
duty,
explain some otherwise
25
and
firmly held
"achieve the liberation
the attack
some
his Manila penthouse
in
with senior military
conflict
just
motives for
to return
there.
life
These were
adopted
was his
the war years was shaped by
(12,215)
intention."
years,
reesume
had
8,000 volumes and
"MacArthut'
lifetime.
strategy
left
of over
library
it
not selfish
He had
liberation.
a personal
if
for
backdrop
(18,214-215)
lost,
To MacArthur
land.
had personal,
He clearly
of a
repay."
to
tropical
fertile
sel-G-image.
often uncertain
his
gifts he was determined
on its
The Filipinos
imagination.
romantic
distant
a
the archipelago had provided
beauty of
were home to
"The
years there.
his happiest
He spent
MacArthur'.
The Philippines
there. (12,1b5)
and had
career,
his
islands throughout
with the
there.
establii--.:ed
there,
career
his military
MacArthur had begunI
ties
to Asia and the
His father had been Commanding General
Philippines.
close
wished to
he desperately
stron.g ties
MacArthur had
Second,
rectify.
which
for MacArthur
defeat
persc:nal
the Philippines was a
in
defeat
as noted earlier,
First,
of
inexplicable
performance
in
contradictions
for
the rest
of
26
MacA4rthut-'s
the war-.
decisions
and
CHAFTER VII
BACK TO THE PHILIPPINES
MacArthur began his
Philippines
basei;;
by establishing
in
strategic
contemplates
utilizing
assisted
by
massive strokes
casualties
be taken,
for storming
hoppinqg'
is
which
frontal
which will
of course
for
the
of Australia
from
possible.
is
certainly
require
begin his
The Papuan
the past."
to popular belief,
offensive
campaign
operations
was in
reality
27
Key points
such will
now
in
of
heavy
must
ubviate the
enemy possession.
losses and slow progress is
as soon and
as cheaply as
for solution,
for- max<imum application,
in
involved.
islands
with extravagant
never won
and
is
pushing back
with the consequent
be
of
power supported
the gradual
wise choice of
the mass
New conditions
Contrary
only main objectives,
pressure
but a
Theatre
the very opposite of what
not my idea of how to end the war
Wars are
defense
the Pacific
aqainst
This
hopping'
the enemy by direct
require
to retake
and air-ground striking
the fleet.
'island
'Island
forward
a
conception
surprise
termed
strategy
New Guine:.
"My
need
offensive
new and
and new weapons
imaginative
methods.
(19,134)
however,
by adhering
MacArthur
to this
nothing more
did not
concept.
than a
series
of costly fr'ontal assaults,
campaign
was
MacArthur
lengthy and extremely
to his
credit
gradually changed
though
he actually
the technique
that,"It
mind on
opposed
his
future
the practical
their
lines
ain't'--that
fr'om this
operations.'
(8,335)
of
and
the way,
retaking
points
a.Lmoust
of Staff,
vision,
'hit
force
MacArthur,
in
and began
look::ing
stated
them
for
and
that
it
strength.
It
securing
was
the
that
his
not Japan.
there,
to the Philippines
and
he resorted
to
real
frontal
as
estate
assaults
the archipelago.
MacArtthur's
him of
strategy
his
focused
on
at
to attack
ways
later
was
however,
of
bypa sing
objective.
The
who did not suffer- from MacArthur's
correctly
and adopt
em where they
Strategy
points
deprived
he was
guided my movements
strong
of
Rabaul,
and even
and neutralize
bypa-sing
inch
power,
the system of
him
every
He
MacArthur
to
The
But
strategy
tc get
but once
Ircrni:5J ly,
this
were designed
quickly as possible,
along
of
deception
was the Philippines,
efforts
air
strong points
and strategic
Buna."
mistake.
for
economy of
The problem with
His
casualties.
of
supply...
and
tactical
of
of tlacArthUr's
flexibility
objective
need
time forward
The major' feature
in
this
application
by cuttin.g
objective.
the
"Bloody
operations.
to bypass Japanese
permitted
from
in
the bypassing
warfare...
substituted
high
the potential
in
was
learned
his
to appreciate
quick
culminating
28
Japan as
at
Joint
personal
the ultimate
Japan
strong
Chiefs
tunnel
objective
the earliest
possible
thus end the war sooner.
time and
"Althoucyh
by early
could begin,
the invasion
the Philippines before
to reconquer
necessary
both militarily
1944 the U.S.
wisdom and
this
of Staff were questioning
bombar-dment
the air
the home
iil
aends.
"
In
In
a
describes
March,
plan
"He blEtW up and
obli.gations
reacti
of
'those
gentlemen
were people
information,
to my mind,
to
on
route
through
Admiral
made an oration of some
the Philippines,
of
to
Formosa.
Nimitz
like himself and myself,
to do their
were succeeding
the
sacred
his
then a
told him that
criticism
the JCS
who,
with more
best
for the country
admirably."
*29
on
the 17 million people--blood
Washington'...I
were trying
in
rival
King,
length
by American people--and
in
the
on1:
there--redemption
his soul•--deserted
his
and resoUrces,
personnel,
Naval Operations,
of LI:)ypassin.9
on
of bypassing
he met with Nimitz,
1944
for an alternate
MacArthur's
impossibility
to the main attack
opposed any thought
to Chief of
letter
that
bare from which
preliminary
the Pacific theatre for mission,
discuss Nimitz'
Chiefs
(12,216)
MacArthur" violently
Philippines.
Joint
sug•gestin.9
Formosa might prove to be a more effective
launch
was
it
that
maintained
consistently
MacArthur
(19,136)
and,
On
bypass
17 JLI e
MacA•rthutr
the Philippines arid
was unsound.
It
would
lack support
to any move on Formo.a.
considerations
or'der- to cut
a base
went on
arlUimen t.
for our
to appeal
"It
is
a
decision
Philippines...would
citizens
of
the r-econluest
considerzations
to overrule
MacAt-thur
asked
on 28 July was summoned
President
Roosevelt
The confet'ence
was a
against MacArthur
to
sides of the
unsupported
I
feel also that
of
the
r-eactions among
the
(20,122)
abruptly replied.
-eelings
and
"purely military"
for, the relief
cause extremely adverse
the Philippines
alloW our personal
the
where outr
the campaign
in
(20, 121)
by the enemy."(20,121)
Marshall
of
the south
and moral
territory,
the United States."
On 24 June,
Undaunted,
advance."
to the political
to eliminate
bases prior
"putrely military
to
did not rely on
American
for-ces were destrtoyed
air
aviation,
reoccupation of the Philippines
furtherc
MacfArthur
land-based
that
to
on Formosa directly
to establish
the enemy's communications
However',
and
ýrom
He str-eTsed
demand the
that any attempt
launch an attack
would have to be taken
and Luzon
secure
cabled Mar'shall
and
we must be careful
to present
to Pearl
not to
Harbor
one.
for a
conference
with
Pacific strategy.
The cards were stacked
since the JCS had tentatively
For-mosa option before he arrived.
"(20, 123)
his views personally and
arid the JCS to settle
30
to
Philippine political
our .great objective....
dramatic
"With regard
MacArthur
approved the
thus had
to
convinlce the P'r-utuiderit
option again¶$t
of the soundness
his
thu advice of
of
his
Philippine
,senior military
advisers.
(20, i23)
Ac=counts
of
eloquen~t,
but he
argument
a ga~inst
took
"I
I
'placed the re~al
a~bandon~ing
the opportunity
Philippines
in
thu conference. portray MacArthur•
irn
first
stated
ha~d
of what
Weu 1W
probably not only have
f•elt
The President
made
Ma~cArt•hur- had a short
which time, he told
and
of war to continue
register
to abandon
the
H
but
New Guinea•
a
lea~ve
of
at
that,
its
and Australia.
second
I
time wouild not
the conference
"if
with
but
your decisi~on
millions
in
agony" and despair--I'd
resentment
be so aroused
against
at
be
of wards of
internees
their-
later
Roo~sevelt
Amer'ican
people would
31
thereby
25
no decision
languish
complete
we couild have
the Philippines
(2,
and
as a major- blunder,
and Corregidor gar-risons anid
toward
thousan•ds
dar-e say the American
He also
r'elieve the Philippines.
to
to do so,
Bataan
the President
to
regar-ded
pr'ivato conver-sation
the P'hilippines
United States
decision
the Philippines
be condoned or" for-given.
would
the will
saved
to sacr-ifice
I
effor't
the enemy's advance
that
bypass
all
the way to reinforce
stopped
(20,124)
place.
abandoning
that
the•
"the mor'al
. .on
P'hilippines."
the
to criticize
wa.s also critica:l
originally
opened
the
emphasii.
at his most
you at
and
that
to}
the,
pr'isoners
they
the polls
thits fall."
(20,125)
Roui:-velt
"We will
r•eplied,
Carry ouLt yOUr- ekiSttinH
M.CA-thuL"
ar-gumentc$
to win his
so subt 1t
and Commanrder--.n--Chief
formi
4urCIl-
floated
time
One
might
and
waz
election
Republican
potential
as a
a not
candidate
then arSue
Formosa strategy
attacked
it
there
the end
that
evidence
was militarily
as such,
samie conclusion,
is
his
and that
defeat
possible
MacAt'thur 's case neither- his
Although
for
that
32
the means,
means wer-e
suggests
unsound,
that
his
of Japan.
justified
end nor his
that
the
MacArthur
the JCS eventually came to that
pr-imary motive cleat'ly
than military.
if
tor, using such tactics
forgive MacA&'thur
Perhaps one could
other'
hia chulin
past decisions
about
the upcoming
had been the ear-liest
objective
pure.
openly criticized
sinice M.4nAr-thur`,.a name had be~en
:.4 b lackinia ii
som•.e
and political
(8,408)
president.
in
And may God pr'otect you."
He had
ccat.
His admonition about
policy.
but
plans .
had used str-ong moral
(20, 125)
of command
bypass the Philippines.
not
seems
to have been
CHAPTER VIII
RECAPTURED BUT AT WHAT PRICE
PHILIP
IFPINES
(In
the PhilipFpines or- to move against
Dutch East
1945
February-,
States
been
In
Indies.
intentions.
plan,
respectively,
leave
the two
early
as
Without
takinri
Si;xth
his
MiacAr thur
the oper-tion
Army had
Japanese-held
of
dispatch
Philippine
three Sixth
of
error
Oboe
than
the vine."
(9,26)
t•ie
of Northern Luzon.
the Sixth Army was
and at other strong
time the J3CS
1
after
points,
inally
the fact and
the southern
campaign.
the Eighth Army to
Army divisions
had a
The Japanese
and attempted to defend
33
As
to use his
the
(9,28)
the
islands south of Luzon and his
on Luzon operations."(9,28)
MacArthur's
co|itrol
but completed
all
had
"rather
had decided
was long
it
however,
the Philippines south of Luzon
Manila
by
the order.
"MacArthur's
tran•fer
the res~t of
loss:?es around
gave
author'ized
MacArthur
Army had
on
to wilt
the
in
Victor Plan and his
that
of
the
the United
MacArthur',
frcn the JCS and while
appro'val
heavy
Eighth
island groupin!gtz
to ta':ke
the remainder
that
would do exactly
that
September, 1944,
as son(:)r, as
(9,28)
wojrking on his
independently
Eighth Army
the British
to conduct
to retake
the Yalta Conference
at
the JCS assured
no such
had
fact
MacArthur
given approval
They had not
the Luzori' operation.
rest o-f
the JCS authotrized
1944,
3 October
impact
crippling
had not
repeated
the beaches.
*i
in
a defense
9 Januat'y,
246 Janual''v.
elec, ted
troc•ps
in
tesuitin9r
March
1.,
3rd.
the Japane5e
166)
In
the
happened
had
major, fight
did not
1600 KIA.
lasted
for- Manila
theirt
from February 23rd
the U.S.
in
is
to
:ay what
the kig.hth Mr4my not been pulled
But
on Luzon.
have per'mission
it
is
fair-
his own policy of
would have
away +reom
MacAt'thur
and
He also
.j'ossly
Luzon.
lastly,
no opet-ation should be so trivialized
it
includes
its
commander's bitrthday as part
34
and
isolating
the resistance on
garr'isons.
And
the
to the south,
bypassing
underestimatecd
and of
ruins
to say that
to conduct the attack
to
1,010 KIA,
lost
100,000 had been
difficult
in
deteln-,c,
was vir'tually
The city
and
bir'thday on
by his
an estimated
It
attack violated
this
fight
Gulf o:n
J.Apaner.e Army and Navy
to anchor
that
a bloody battle
(12,169)
killed.
the c::ity
would quickly fall
the city
0, ('-)
But over'
to use
800,000 people,
its
to capture
at Lingayen
on Lu.:on
thoucght Manila
MacArthur
for'ming
inter'ior, strong points,
After, landin5j
depth,
made ever-y effor't
fact
to
withdrawn
they had
Instead,
of
its
that
timetable.
IX
CHAPTER
CONCLUSION
As the war pr'ogr'essed
MacAt-thur''s
to active duty
r-eputation
figure
in
as a
had been
twenty-three
self-confidence
confidence
grew like
became a
weakness.
became overconfidence
and then
became infallihility.
against
largely
ignored warnings of
the United States or
its
the
as a general
A str~englth
MacArthur
in
and optimism.
a cancer
In
territories
in
the Far East,
the most part he dismissed
intelligence
Washington.
the Japanese attack he scuttled
workable but conservative
.grandiose
didn't
scheme
that depended
intent.
and directives
defense plan
1941,
imminent Japanese attack
such was the Japanese
to
into
Self-confidence
because he did not believe
Just prior
so
at every sta~ge of hi5 career,
and with success had come recognition,
"hubr-is. "
the greatest living
and perhaps
He had been successful
Tragically that
recently
but with the
MacArthur
for- forty-two yearts,
officer.
went
that
His genius was widely accepted;
By 1941,
to
with r'eqgard
He began the wtr, just
from retirement,
At-my.
cour-age.
developed
theatre commander
Far East expert
the U.S.
too was his
military
as a
and unchallenged.
unchecked
recalled
per'for'mance
a pattern
in
favor
on resources,
For,
from
a
of his own
troops and time he
have.
He was awarded
defense of
the Medal ot Honor- for
the Philippines,
but
35
in
actuality
his efforts
left
in
Cor'rtegidor, a
defnated
commander,
primarily
rapid collapse.
its
and personally
Unacc.ustomed
to ever
personal
honor and adopted homeland, at
obsessed
w-ith retakinq
objectivity,
narrowed
with his peers
Chiefs of
in
strategy
the Papuan
envelopment
regarding
learned
strategy.
retake
costing countless
he had
it,
left
it
(9,31)
the JCS took a
it.
been
in
became
clouded
his
the Joint
the President of
When
Army
page from
conflicted,
the best interests
many more
but
Japan and
as he had done
to "nullify
previous
Borneo because
or send
it
of
pressure
home."(9,31)
to Japan more quickly,
and moral
his personal
he did not,
of National
36
a
than would have been
on the vine,"
on political
suited
in
Philippines,
the advance against
combat
to an
MacArthur's book and suggested
to .et
it
instead
to get
objective--the
in
in
assaults
was not always
religiously
the Australians
bypct'::ssinq
it
it
frontal
switched
strategy
He used
by fighting
the Philippines
'Ihen
that
to "wither
vehemently argued against
used
and even
credit
perhaps
on him to "use the First
Thus
in
mistakes of
delaying
lives,
He allowed
envelopments"
bypas:sing
superiors
to his
personal
once there abandoned
When
This obsession
D.C.,
However,
his
elsewhere.
his
early
campaign and
position
if
MacArthur
the prosecution of national
from
vigor.
lost
stak::e,
with his
-foc:us and often placed him at odds
Washington,
applied with equal
to
failing,
theatre operations.
and
MacArthur
in
his
Islands.
the Pacific,
Staff in
the United States
the
responsib'le for
goals,
even when
Strategy.
he
grounds.
Macu,.'thur
it
may have
"It
is
and Pentagon contemplating
South,
pattern
in
June
of
1950,
MacArthur's
strategic
the first
nine months of
the last
The seeds of
and strategy
He blamed Washington
tense
an almost
performance
After
with unquestioned
Washington,
he had
facts
authority
Command Authority,
the Philippines,
little
become an American
in
his opinions,
or events proved
years as virtual
'37
Korea were sewn
rarely admitted
His actions
and
and during
and personal
paranoid persecution
five
war
in
bullied
for abandoning
we-they atmosphere.
predictable.
toward his
(9,30-31)
political,
even when
behavior
between
attitude
throu.gh the National
issue,
the
of them had begun
the Korean conflict."
sucessfully
of
[MacArthur's)
of the Pacific
He seldom compromised and
wrong on an
a
stages
range of military,
twisting.
invasion
there were similarities
MacArthur's
MacArthur
using a full
his
concepts arid his
during
the Pacific.
Korean
Perhaps some
1951 that
superiors
developed
recall
did not
five years befor.e.
to notice by April
policies
the North
the White House
in
the decisionmakers
that
tragic
complex
in
Korea
emperor
interference
Caesar.
arm
to being
him to be.
and
which created
were
of Japan,
from
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40
His Rendezvous with