MANAGING GREAT POWERS IN THE POST COLD WAR WORLD: OLD RULES, NEW
GAME? THE CASE OF THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR
Jorge Lasmar1
The way great powers interact with each other (great power management - gpm) is
certainly being impacted by the on-going structural changes caused by the end of the Cold
War. Additionally, the Global War on Terror (GWoT) also casts doubts on how the great
powers should manage their relations with one another. But does the GWoT, or the dissent
caused by it, impact how great powers manage their relations with one another? Is it
possible to pinpoint any impact of the GWoT on the values, norms and rules of gpm
individually, detaching it from the historical context of the end of the bipolarity?
In order to answer these questions and thereby identify any significant transformation in
the social meaning of gpm, this paper will investigate the shifts in the perceived values,
norms, identities and practices of the great powers to determine whether the GWoT brings
any new meaning to this primary institution.2 The analysis will therefore use English School
methodology to: 1) distinguish between systemic structural changes wrought by the
demise of the former USSR on the one hand and those that can be attributed to the GWoT
on the other (i.e. the creational environment); 2) probe whether any changes are
discernable in the meaning of the norms of gpm (i.e. the material content); and finally 3)
understand how the procedures, practices and principles of the great powers under the
GWoT delineates new norms of gpm in an interstate society marked by a misalignment
between social reality and the values and norms that inform this institution (i.e. the
operationalisation of gpm).
1. The Creational Environment
1
PhD candidate at the London School of Economics and Lecturer in International Relations at PUC Minas
(Brazil). I would like to thank Professor Barry Buzan, Professor Cornelia Navari and Dr. Rashmi Singh for their
exhaustive comments on earlier versions of this paper. Any shortcomings are, of course, entirely my own. A
version of this paper has been submitted for publication at the Cambridge Review of International Affairs.
2
For an in depth study of institutional change see Holsti (2004). The model applied in this paper was inspired
by Holsti’s original treatment of this subject and therefore also adopts his categories of change, i.e.: change as
novelty or replacement; change as addition/subtraction; change as increased/decreased complexity; change
as transformation; change as reversion, and finally; change as obsolescence (Holsti 2004:12-18).
1
Investigating the impact of the GWoT upon the creational environment of gpm is not an
easy task. Indeed, to examine this issue one has to first understand the transformational
significant changes brought about by end of the-Cold War in order to distinguish between
systemic structural changes wrought by the demise of the former USSR on the one hand
and those that can be attributed to the GWoT on the other. Only then will we be able to
understand the misalignment that has occurred between the norms of gpm and post-Cold
War social reality. This misalignment is significant because it compounds the uncertainty in
the creational environment of gpm and thereby enables the GWoT to act as a policy of
normative organisation that in turn constructs a new understanding of both great powers
and gpm in international society.
Secondly, one also has to understand the social consequences of attempting to macrosecuritise Salafi terrorist networks in the post-9/11 world when investigating the impact of
the GWoT upon the creational environment of gpm. These terrorist networks represent a
non-state, ‘non-territorially contained’ collective identity. States have traditionally resisted
recognising such collective identities, as they exist outside the realm of interstate society.
However, the GWoT represents a change in this trend in that for the first time states are
directly formulating systematic norms and policies that address these non-state collective
identities. In formulating policies and shaping institutional norms addressing these threats
states confer upon these collective identities both social meaning and symbolic
significance, thereby transforming them into a non-territorial security risk. In turn, the
management of this risk becomes a role that must be fulfilled especially by the great
powers of interstate society. As identities and roles are mutually constitutive any shift in
one impacts and transforms the other. In short then, the GWoT creates conditions
whereby the management of transnational violence becomes another defining element of
the great power identity.
Thus, both these elements, i.e. (i) the misalignment between norms and social reality and
(ii) the framing of Salafi terrorist networks as a non-territorial security risk are analysed indepth below:
2
The misalignment between norms and reality – or the disarrangement between
power and social normative structures
During the Cold War, the creational environment of gpm was informed by an
understanding which constructed the world as being both materially and socially bipolar. In
other words, state interaction was heavily marked by norms and values of a gpm that was
influenced by the existence of two bitterly opposed nuclear superpowers. These two foes
also symbolised two rival sets of values i.e., capitalism and socialism. The consolidation of
such a collective understanding constructed a social structure of enemies that not only
propelled the behaviour of both superpowers (and their allies) but also shaped their
identities (Buzan 2004b). In other words, if one accepts Wendt’s proposition that the
meaning of polarity can differ with the social structure(s) that inform(s) it, then one also
implicitly accepts that the norms, values and rules of primary institutions are concomitantly
informed by social structures (Wendt 1999; Buzan 2004a). This is clearly evident during
the period of the Cold War where the operationalisation of gpm values and norms clearly
followed the social structure of enemies. The policy of mutually assured destruction
(MAD), the politically motivated use of veto powers in the UN Security Council or the many
military interventions by both sides of the conflict dyad are all clear examples of how the
social structure of enemies not only informed this operationalisation but was, in turn, also
influenced by it. Thus, interactions between the two superpowers were predominantly
motivated by calculus and/or coercion and constructed within a social structure of enemies
(See Buzan 2004b). Secondary institutions were also shaped accordingly. Therefore, the
institution of gpm created norms and procedures that mediated relations amongst states
by concretely codifying agreed patterns of interaction and creating mechanisms of social
control that reflected – while at the same time as constructing - the rival/enmity social
structure.
However, with the end of the Cold War, the capacity of the norms and values of gpm to
carry out their mediation function underwent a deep crisis of meaning not only because of
the uncontested end of material bipolarity, but also due to the demise of the social
structure of enemies as the key guiding principle of interaction amongst great powers. In
fact, the patterns of interaction(s) between states as they emerged after the end of the
Cold War have strongly challenged academic theories about polarity and gpm (Buzan
2004b). The behaviour of great powers towards each other during the process of re-
3
socialisation did not fully confirm what was prescribed by the prevalent neorealist tradition
and hence puzzled the academic community. Indeed, the post-Cold War international
environment was neither marked by the consolidation of a single hyperpower3 capable of
dominating the whole system (in accordance with the realist understanding of unipolarity)
nor did the remaining great powers balance against this single hegemon (in accordance
with the realist understanding of the). As the following analysis of the operationalisation of
gpm will demonstrate, Buzan is correct when he states that the interaction amongst great
powers was less problematic than the academic conundrums created by the misalignment
between reality and theory (Buzan 2004b:35). In fact, the interaction amongst great
powers since the end of the Cold War represents a re-negotiation of their identities and
roles in the post-Cold War world and is yet to attain its final form. At the same time, the
creational environment of gpm is marked by the ‘ghost’ of bipolarity and all that it
represents.
The GWoT then impacts this new creational environment by functioning as a policy of
normative organisation. The unilateral behaviour adopted by the world’s sole superpower
in the GWoT is not a novelty but it does propel both the consolidation of new identities and
the institutionalisation of new roles within interstate society. Moreover, in amplifying the
political and military gap between states the GWoT also compounds the existing hierarchy
in interstate society. Nevertheless, the unilateral behaviour of the sole superpower and the
disagreements generated by it also demonstrate that the collective identities that the
GWoT is attempting to construct are thus far shallowly internalised and therefore unstable.
All this then serves to generate an environment of uncertainty and instability and seems to
indicate that changes in gpm will only acquire a more permanent form if, and when, the
GWoT becomes socially perceived as symbolising the new de facto meaning of
unipolarity. If this does indeed happen, the resultant change will be both sustainable and
hugely significant. Despite what seems to be a denial on part of the states in interstate
society, thus far facts do suggest an undeniable movement towards the development of a
new social meaning of unipolarity.
3
In this paper, we will adopt the following definitions to distinguish between various actors in interstate society:
Superpower – states that are “capable of, and also exercise, global military, [economic], and political reach
(Buzan 2004b:69); Great Powers – states that “are responded to by others on the basis of system-level
calculations, as well as regional ones” (Buzan 2004b:69-70); Regional Powers – states that “define the polarity
of any given regional security complex” (Buzan, 2004b:71). Note that to qualify as a superpower the states
“need to see themselves, and be accepted by others in rhetoric and behaviour, as having this rank” (Buzan
2004b:69). We will also use the term hyperpower to theoretically and critically designate the pretension of a
state as possessing the capability of unilaterally dominating the whole system. See Buzan, (2004b:69) and
Dunne (2003:303-320).
4
Terrorist networks as non-territorial security risks and the problem of non-state
transnational violence
Since the Peace of Westphalia, the norms, rules and practices of gpm have been
consolidated within an essentially interstate international society. In fact, as Dunne
observes, “as far as the moral purpose of international society is concerned, it is worth
underlining the fact that, from its inception, it was ‘not just a society of sovereign states but
a society for sovereign states” (Dunne 2003:306).4 In international society, gpm and its
derivate primary institutions essentially evolved in order to regulate interstate relations in
an environment where states are seen as the sole legitimised holders of the monopoly of
the use of force and, as such, the key players in international society. Thus, states have
been frequently perceived as the main threat to both themselves and to international order.
Likewise, providing security has over time become a key element of the states’ identity. As
Bellamy and McDonald remind us “being perceived as providing security is central to the
state’s reason for being” (2004:309). In this sense, gpm norms and rules have evolved
mainly to regulate the behaviour of states and thus have constructed what is essentially an
interstate society. Within this interstate society, the special role of great powers is based
upon their greater capacity to employ violence, provide security and promote
transformational structural changes. The GWoT however pushes states to address
another form of violence which is neither state-based nor state-generated, i.e.
transnational terrorism. In engaging with this threat through the GWoT, interstate society
explicitly recognises that it needs both not only to address it but also to create new norms
to provide security in what is an increasingly uncertain and fluid environment. At the same
time and as will be detailed in the remainder of this section, it is this very recognition (of
the need to address this form of non-territorially contained violence in order to preserve
interstate society) which transforms this non-territorial security risk into an issue of gpm.
Despite the fact that various transnational threats have long been matters of state concern
(for example, piracy in the high seas), it is the GWoT that has succeeded in portraying the
management of transnational terrorism (and violence in general) as a risk that should be
incorporated within the pre-existing functions and processes of gpm. Indeed the manner in
4
See also Watson (1992).
5
which the GWoT rhetoric is constructed renders it immensely capable of justifying such an
expansion in the processes of gpm and concurrently the necessity of great powers to
address this impending risk. According to this rhetoric: transnational terrorism directly
opposes the primary institutions of Western international society, it undermines the
capacity of super and great powers to physically defend themselves against armed
violence, and its unpredictable character exposes the failure of super and great powers to
provide their citizens with security.5
As such, against the backdrop of the crisis of meaning outlined in the section above, the
events triggered by the September 11 attacks present gpm with a series of problems in
that they cannot really be addressed by the existing norms of gpm (balance of power,
traditional war amongst great powers, etc) and neither can the uncivil non-state
perpetrators be addressed within the consolidating post-Cold War social structure of
friends/rivals.6 Thus, the GWoT highlights the emergence of a new environment where
globalisation not only facilitates interstate cooperation but also paves the road towards
new vulnerabilities and risks. Such risks are created not only by the states’ perception that
transnational processes increasingly impact interstate society but also by the subsequent
implementation of state policies that are specifically designed to respond to these very
processes. Pandemic diseases, climate change and environmental degradation,
transnational crimes and terrorism are all examples of transnational threats that have
always existed but which only recently are being perceived as posing a risk (and an ever
increasing one at that) to interstate society.
In addition, the development of social and material technologies serve to enhance the
awareness that states are increasingly more vulnerable to a series of interlinked threats
and crises. The states’ vulnerability to these threats and crises is in large part due to the
eminently state-centric character of both the normative and operational processes of the
5
It must be noted that the terrorist threat to the physical survival of states is much more a constructed
discourse than a feasible reality. Even in the face of a non-state perpetrated CBRN attack the scale of damage
inflicted upon a state would not be enough to threaten the overall physical existence of most states. See Robin
M. Frost (2005). Of course, the social, political and humanitarian consequences of such an attack would
certainly be devastating and might even propel a political collapse of the state and/or a loss of legitimacy. Also,
see President Bush’s speech to the UN General Assembly immediately after the attacks of September 11.
6
It is interesting to note how the new political agenda introduced by the GWoT is a double-edged sword. Thus,
on the one hand, while the US failure to tackle the transnational terrorist threat would deeply undermine its
leadership role, on the other hand, the Salafi Jihadist threat also simultaneously presents states in international
society with the unique opportunity to exert their leadership, enhance their role as security providers and
reaffirm their status as great or super powers.
6
institutions of interstate society. Therefore, at least in terms of transnational violence, not
only are states normatively unequipped to deal with transnational processes, but the
increased complexity and reach of transnational processes and the politics designed to
respond to them also serve to inject a greater degree of uncertainty into international
politics. The awareness of this uncertainty and the increasing vulnerability of states to
transnational processes seem to be explicitly recognised as a security and gpm issue in
documents after September 11.7
The new social reality of this environment constructs a change in the states’ rationality and
values that in turn inform its policies towards these ‘threats’ (Rasmussen 2006). In this
process of policy formulation, transnational ‘threats’ become transnational ‘risks’ primarily
through states’ recognising that transnational violence and other uncivil processes cannot
be permanently defeated but that the effects of these processes can be managed. Within
this scenario, the perception that the management of transnational violence and other
transnational threats is, in addition to the management of traditional inter-state violence, a
crucial part of the role of super and great powers is one that is increasingly gaining ground.
In other words, while these transnational threats have always existed and have also been
perceived by states as ‘threats’ before, the novelty of the GWoT lies in the fact that it
places the management of transnational terrorism as a high priority task in the super/great
power agenda. This prioritisation contributes towards an unprecedented institutionalisation
of transnational terrorism management. The act of waging the GWoT serves to construct
the perception that transnational terrorism is a serious risk that needs to be addressed and
managed by the super and great powers. At the same time and as outlined below, the
capacity to address and manage transnational violence at a global level also becomes one
of the constitutive elements of being a superpower.
The choice of a non-state actor as the object of a hyper-securitization attempt and the very
scale of such an attempt constitutes a new social environment. In fact, as Buzan outlines:
“The contrast with the Cold War was very striking. […] The postSeptember 11 securitisation focused on neither an alternative
superpower nor an alternative ideology, but on the chaos power of
embittered and alienated minorities, along with a handful of pariah
governments, and their ability to exploit the openness, the
technology, and in some places the inequality, unfairness and
7
A good example is the USNDS (2008:4-5).
7
failed states generated by the Western system of political
economy” (Buzan 2004b:175).
This new environment in which both state and non-state threats have to be addressed by
the norms of gpm creates a two level social structure within which the gpm processes
operate.8 In relation to inter-state interactions, gpm processes follow the social structure of
friends/rivals that have been in place since the end of the Cold War.9 With regard to
relations between states and transnational terrorists, the GWoT clearly shapes the latter
as a negative identity10 vis-à-vis that of the state and consequently establishes, at another
level, a totally different pattern of interaction, which is that of a social structure of enemies.
In fact, as the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair declared, “there is no compromise
possible with such people, no meeting of minds, no point of understanding with such
terror. Just a choice: defeat it or be defeated by it. And defeat we must” (2001:§5).
References to this two-level social structure can be found in various GWoT documents.
For instance, the US National Security Strategy states that: “The struggle against militant
Islamic radicalism is the great ideological conflict of the early years of the 21st century and
finds the great powers all on the same side – opposing the terrorists. This circumstance
differs profoundly from the ideological struggles of the 20th century, which saw the great
powers divided by ideology as well as by national interest” (2006:36).
Within the state-terrorist social structure, the latter (i.e. the terrorists) are perceived as
being highly unpredictable, extremely complex, and deeply interconnected with other
uncivil transnational activities. Terrorists are also linked with multifaceted issues that cut
across various sectors. But most importantly, it is part of the state narrative to construct
the terrorist ideology and actions as threats that possess the capability to overcome
geographic barriers much more easily than any other traditional military threats. Thus, by
constructing this narrative and adopting policies to fight this threat, the states confer a
strong symbolic meaning to transnational terrorism. Since one of the tasks of gpm is to
maintain order in Western international society and as transnational threats are seen to
threaten this very society, the management of transnational terrorism by great powers
becomes a functional requisite of gpm.11
8
For multiple level identities and identity policies in security issues see Booth (2007:135-136; 139-140).
See Buzan (2004b)
10
Negative identities are those which are “formed against each other”, (Buzan 2004b:19).
11
These threats do not, however, substitute traditional threats. Rather they tend to co-exist. Thus Buzan’s
statement that (...) most political and military threats travel more easily over short distances than over long
ones, [and thus] insecurity is often associated with proximity” remains valid (Buzan et al. 1998:11).
9
8
On the basis of the above, the creational environment of gpm has clearly been marked by
significant changes that originate from both endogenous and exogenous causes. The end
of the Cold War (an exogenous cause) triggered what is an unfinished normative
rearrangement of gpm and created a unique environment in which the hyper-securitisation
of transnational actors by the GWoT (an endogenous cause) is currently in the process of
transforming the creational environment of gpm. Therefore, the GWoT helps make sense
of the unipolar system we live in by clearly outlining the social structure the sole
superpower wants to build. At the same time, gpm, by incorporating both transnational
violence and non-state identities in its processes, is also expanding its functional
requisites. The incorporation of transnational violence and non-state identities into
processes of gpm suggests that there is a transformation in the normative meaning of the
primary institution caused by an extension of its processes and the resultant construction
of a new social structure (i.e. a social structure in which states and transnational terrorist
groups interact). This combination of unfinished normative rearrangements with the
inclusion of transnational violence and non-state identities suggests an increased
complexity in the environment of gpm. There is then an increasing recognition of the dire
need to create inter-state processes that are capable of managing transnational violence
so as to defend the states’ traditional monopoly of violence. As such, the process of
managing transnational violence is becoming one of the key functional requisites of gpm
while also becoming one of the many social components necessary for being recognised
as a superpower.
2. Material content
Since the end of the Cold War changes are indeed occurring in the material content of
gpm. Two main changes in its material content can be identified and highlighted: firstly, an
obsolescence of the balance of power norm, and secondly; the institutionalisation of new
norms of gpm which are specifically aimed at regulating the management of transnational
violence. In the first case, the difficulty lies in separating what are essentially heavily
entangled sources of impact, i.e. in identifying which normative changes are created by the
end of the Cold War and which are undeniably generated by the GWoT. In case of the
latter, the challenge lies in trying to understand that the transformations in the creational
9
environment of gpm greatly increase the normative complexity of this institution by
incorporating a new set of processes that in turn create a new social structure and
consequently push for the construction of a new normative system to regulate it. Both
these normative transformations are immensely significant and impact the very identity of
super and great powers. As such, the section below probes how the end of the Cold War
prompted a negative heuristic of the balance of power norm and how the GWoT
contributes to this process of obsolescence. The next section will in turn investigate how
the GWoT triggers the incorporation of transnational processes into the institution of gpm
thereby subsequently contributing to the construction new norms and rules in interstate
society.
Normative subtraction and obsolescence: negative heuristics in the norm of general
balance of power
In international society, the general balance of power12 is one of the key normative
components of the primary institution of gpm.13 This norm has traditionally been
understood as an institutionalised pattern of behaviour in which states (mainly great
powers) counterbalance each other in order to avoid the rise of a hegemon capable of
dominating the international system alone (Little 2007:4). Since one of the main functional
requisites of gpm is to avoid conflict amongst the great powers (Bull 1977:201) the norm of
a general balance of power is traditionally seen as being one of its most fundamental
components. The balance of power is seen as having a fundamental character because it
“provide[s] the conditions under which the system of states can endure” (Bull 1977:201).
However, seen as a primary institution, the material content of balance of power goes far
beyond mere norms of preserving the autonomy of great powers. The institutionalisation of
norms promoting a contrived balance of power reveals the great powers’ desire to
maintain and preserve the existing status quo of interstate society at any given time.
Consequently, the existence of the balance of power norm “reflect[s] the existence of a
12
According to Bull, “we must distinguish the general balance of power that is the absence of a preponderant
power in the international system as a whole, from a local or particular balance of power, in one area or
segment of the system” (Bull 1977:98).
13
Bull (1977). It may be noted that the general balance of power can be studied both as a primary institution of
international society as well as a norm. This paper focuses upon balance of power as a norm within the
primary institution of gpm.
10
collective commitment to the survival of such a society” (Little 2007:135). In other words,
the material content of balance of power reflects a self-conscious effort to preserve the
order and identities existent within a certain international society. In turn, the international
society itself is constructed and shaped by the existence of such norms. The deeply
entrenched understanding of polarity within a balance of power framework is a key
example of how this norm structures international society.
Historically in European international society the institution of gpm operated in accordance
with balance of power norms and values that sought not only to avoid the supremacy of a
single hegemon but also to protect, perpetuate and expand Western values and
institutions. In fact, Wight goes as far as to state that “[t]he Concert of Europe was in origin
and essence a common agreement on the principle of balance of power” (1966:154). As
Little highlights, Bull also sees gpm as a self-conscious desire on part of the great powers
to preserve (European) international society. This is exactly the feature that distinguishes
the European balance of power from balances of power in other contexts (Little 2007:148;
Wight 1966:132-148). In turn, it is this specific general balance of power that then also
becomes a key feature of European international society. However, the end of the Cold
War and the concomitant changes it engendered in the social context and structure of
international society prompted deep changes in this long-established norm of a general
balance of power.14
The end of the bipolarity brought about a significant change in the material content of gpm,
i.e., the change was significant enough to impact the existing “structure of shared
knowledge” about balance of power. According to Wendt, “structural change depends on
changing a system of expectations that may be mutually reinforcing” (Wendt 1995:80).
This indeed seems to hold true in the aftermath of the Cold War. The general expectation,
at least in most academic circles, was that the “unipolar moment” at the close of the Cold
War would trigger a balancing against the remaining superpower.15 However, the interstate
society in which gpm is currently embedded does not seem to have experienced a
contrived general balance of power at a global level. Furthermore, there are many
14
It must be noted that the specific rules of the balance of power as applied by states have greatly varied over
time. However, the general norm of a balance of power, understood as institutionalised patterns of behaviour in
which states (mainly great powers) counterbalance each other in order to avoid the rise of a hegemon capable
of dominating the international system alone, has persisted over time. It is the latter which is the focus of this
paper.
15
A notable exception is the Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST). For an early discussion on HST see
(Grunberg 1990; McKeown 1983; Milner, Snyder 1988; Snidel 1985; Strange 1987, 1988).
11
indications that the general balance of power has in fact experienced a negative heuristic,
i.e. there has been a reduction in its capacity to mediate social reality. Indeed, one can
locate more and more examples of how the norm of a general balance of power is not
driving actors’ behaviour.
Globally, in interstate society, great powers seem to have accepted the post Cold War
social structure as being one mainly framed as a social structure of friends/rivals. Likewise,
the increasing importance of regional subsystems/societies within interstate society
increasingly confers more importance to a contrived regional balance of power over a
global one. Additionally, available empirical evidence demonstrates that no concerted,
long-standing efforts to counter the US hegemony in a hard balancing seem to be in play.
Also, the enhanced military coordination among members of European Union; and
Chinese and Russian bandwagoning with the US upon the latter’s invasion of Afghanistan
and declaration of the GWoT are some of the most recent, and puzzling, actions in the
international system. All of these recent examples amply demonstrate not only the
widespread acceptance of a social structure of friends but also an acknowledgement of US
supremacy in interstate society (Brooks & Wohlforth 2005:72-108). Such actions clearly
reflect that over time fewer states find it necessary to institutionalise a contrived (hard)
general balance of power. In fact, these examples plainly reveal that there is a process of
shrinkage in the cognitive borders of this norm leading to a steady negative heuristic that
seems to indicate its obsolescence. These examples also points towards a negative
heuristics in its academic power of explanation: Wohlforth and Brooks go as far as to state
that “balance of power theory has no utility in explaining great power relations in this world”
(2005:106).16 Thus, the post Cold War social reality in itself seems to be constructing deep
changes in the material content of gpm. These changes represent a transformation of the
old structure of shared knowledge due to a deep misalignment between the expectations,
based on old understandings, and the system of expectations formed, which is not only
shaped by but also shapes the new social reality. This new system of expectations is thus
informed by the perception that there is an obsolescence of the general balance of power
norm as an instrument of gpm.
16
For a recent review of academic understandings of the role of balance of power within the English School,
see Little (2007).
12
In a sense, the GWoT is explicitly designed to project and legitimise a specific role and
identity for the United States. The GWoT communicates that the United States is invested
with an unparalleled power that enables it to act as the sole superpower in the interstate
system. In other words, the GWoT not only permits the US to effectively demonstrate that
it outranks the remaining great powers in interstate society but also enables it to create a
new system of expectations. Indeed, such ‘message’ is explicitly stated in the very first
page of the National Security Strategy 2002:
“The United States possesses unprecedented— and unequalled—
strength and influence in the world. Sustained by faith in the
principles of liberty, and the value of a free society, this position
comes with unparalleled responsibilities, obligations, and
opportunity. The great strength of this nation must be used to
promote a balance of power that favors freedom” (USNSS
2002:1).
Thus, it is clear from the documents and practices of the GWoT that the US is keen to
assert a special meaning and role to its hegemony. To this end, the GWoT delineates a
specific behaviour for the superpower and consequently constructs norms and rules that
further reinforce particular expectations about the current unipolarity. In this context of
social transformation in interstate society, the GWoT acts as a catalyst by engendering the
institutionalisation of normative changes in the material content of gpm and, as a result,
altering the social understanding of unipolarity. The GWoT is arguably the most explicit
and concerted attempt made to date by the superpower to consolidate and perpetuate a
particular social understanding of unipolarity. The acceptance of this new social
understanding of unipolarity by interstate society would imply a transformation in the
previous patterns of behaviour and the emergence of new patterns in their stead. This
transformation would suggest that a shift had occurred in the institution of gpm with the
balance of power norm exerting a lesser degree of influence upon the formation of state
preferences and expectations in interstate society. Empirically, this certainly seems to be
the case given the blatant absence of a general balancing against the sole superpower.
This lack of balancing becomes especially relevant and acquires a more prominent
meaning with the GWoT since the latter is one of the most explicit bids for unipolarity in
our time. This absence of balancing even in the face of the GWoT firmly indicates that
norm of a general balance of power is undergoing a process of obsolescence.
13
Both the GWoT discourse and practice attempt to institutionalise certain processes of
interaction and aim to produce, and reproduce, a specific normative design of the
interstate social structure. The macrosecuritisation17 discourse of the GWoT, for example,
attempts to create processes that not only justify a spiralling military expenditure but also
the adoption of policies of intervention and offensive pre-emption. Socially, the acceptance
of these processes would imply the interstate acceptance of a unipolar social structure in
which the United States has the role as a leader not only on the basis of being a victim but
also on the basis of being the only power capable of acting globally (i.e., capable of acting
off-shore). Additionally, the attempt to macrosecuritise a threat that is not originating from
another state creates processes that, in a certain way, help drive out from the international
agenda other issues that could potentially pave the road towards the consolidation of a
social structure of enemies/rivals.18 Thus, counter-intuitively, despite the existent
opposition to US unilateralism in the GWoT, the latter contributes towards both
consolidating a social structure of friends as well as institutionalising a de facto acceptance
of the hierarchical disparity between the sole superpower and the remaining few great
powers in interstate society. In fact, the effort to create processes that produce and
reproduce the social structure of friends amongst the great powers within international
society is explicit in the rhetoric of the GWoT: “we wish to use the opportunity of an
absence of fundamental conflict between great powers to shape the future, and to prevent
the re-emergence of great power rivalry” (USNDS 2008:10).19 However, as seen above,
both American unilateralism and the consolidation of a social structure of friends/rivals in
interstate society is neither a novelty nor can it be directly attributed to the GWoT. What is
‘specific’ about the normative design constructed by the GWoT, and the reaction of other
states to it, is that it emerges as an interstate social structure in which states and great
powers are embedded in norms and institutions that allows them to have only friends and
rivals whereas the sole superpower can have friends, rivals and enemies. By adding
enemies to the superpower equation alone, states and great powers tacitly accept that the
US will act in accordance with its own specific understanding of what constitutes a
superpower and its roles in interstate society. In other words, there is the recognition that
not only will the US continue adopting double standards in its policies (i.e. in this case
17
Buzan and Wæver define macrosecuritisation as “securitisations that speak to referent objects higher than
those at the middle level […] and which aim to incorporate and coordinate multiple lower level securitisations”
(Buzan & Wæver 2009:257).
18
It has been said, for example, that the recent credit crunch can represent an opportunity for the emergence
of a rival/enemy structure with potential new leaders offering alternative economic and financial
models/systems that would challenge values long established by the US. See (USNIC 2008).
19
Similar statements can also be found in the (USNSS 2002:29; 2006:36).
14
supporting multilateral institutions in some instances but acting unilaterally in others), but
also that will act as such because it is the sole superpower.
While the acceptance of these processes in interstate society would be indeed quite
disturbing, unfortunately this is what seems to be happening. There are abundant
examples of public discourses that oppose the GWoT and/or US unilateralism. The
presidential discourses of countries likes France, Russia and China, for example, not only
call for a balancing of the sole superpower but also argue that their own policies are
attempting to reintroduce this multipolarity in interstate society.20 However, despite this
rhetoric, the great powers have still not balanced against the US and neither have they
adopted any serious action against this remaining superpower (Brooks & Wohlforth
2005:74). As Brooks and Wohlforth demonstrate, such discourse tends to be rhetorical
and based upon the domestic popularity of both the ‘balance of power’ myth and the
arguments supporting restraint in US foreign policy (2005:74). Furthermore, Wohlforth
concludes that “no other major power is in a position to follow any policy that depends for
its success on prevailing against the United States in a war or an extended rivalry [and]
none is likely to take any step that might invite the focused enmity of the United States”
(1999:7). Thus, the processes triggered by the GWoT convey the message that there
exists a certain degree of de facto acceptance of an unequal social structure in which the
disparity between the superpower and the remaining states is based not only in the
formers’ material power but also in the fact that the superpower does not fully abide with
the existing social norms and rules as applied to other states.
In this sense, it is understandable why it is easy to find empirical evidence that favours
apparently contradictory arguments. For example, the US intervention in Iraq in absence of
an authorisation by the UN Security Council supports Dunne’s statement that the GWoT
demonstrates that US unilateralism has taken it outside the boundaries of international
society (i.e. that the United States does not feel bound by the existing rules of international
society) (Dunne 2003:308). Simultaneously, the superpower’s double standards and its
efforts to enforce liberal western rules upon various states of international society, while at
the same time creating new rules in order to excuse itself from complying with these very
values, bolsters Kelstrup’s position which states that the US is attempting to legitimise a
more hierarchical form of international society (2004:113-115). On the other hand, Press20
An interesting Chinese work on the military balancing against the US is (Liang, Xiangsui 1999).
15
Barnathan argues that institutions of international society have actually been strengthened
by the GWoT (2004:195-212). This argument follows the Durkheimian logic of social
solidarity where both social tragedies and the transgression of conventional rules actually
serve to promote social solidarity (Durkheim 1990). The wide-scale opposition to US
unilateralism in the GWoT by states, NGOs and public opinion seems to corroborate this
argument as well. Yet these multiple arguments generate what is essentially a false
paradox because primary institutions are a systemic set of norms that mediate reality and
are accordingly capable of accommodating multiple solutions at the same time (Kawaguchi
2003). Thus, despite these seemingly contradictory conclusions the processes triggered
by the GWoT produce in essence a specific normative design of the interstate social
structure in which the duality and double standards of US foreign policy not only construct
and define its own role and identity as a superpower but also become a characteristic trait
of international society and gpm.
However, it has been argued that the principles of a general balance of power are still
being applied, albeit in the alternative form of “soft balancing”. The term “soft balance” was
consolidated by Pape after the US invasion of Iraq as part of the GWoT. It refers to
“actions that do not directly challenge US military preponderance but that use non-military
tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive unilateral US military policies” (Pape
2005:10).21 Thus, according to some authors, a general balance of power is still part of
gpm though in a softer form (Pape 2005; Paul 2005). If such soft balancing is indeed
occurring, the ‘soft’ form in itself would already represent a significant change in the
meaning of balance of power. However, empirical evidence once again points towards the
existence of localised opposition to US foreign policy rather than a concerted collective
‘soft’ effort to undermine US supremacy in the system (Brooks & Wohlforth 2005). In fact,
in substantiating this absence of a concerted contrived general balance of power
Rasmussen states: "no system of alliances currently creates a mechanism of international
obligations that might trigger a war in the way that European Alliances triggered the First
World War" (Rasmussen 2006:1). In any case, even if the argument that the great powers
are engaged in a concerted soft balancing project against the US is true, this would clearly
21
For Paul, “soft-balancing behavior occurs under the following conditions: (1) the hegemon’s power position
and military behavior are of growing concern but do not yet pose a serious challenge to the sovereignty of
second-tier powers; (2) the dominant state is a major source of public goods in both the economic and security
areas that cannot simply be replaced; and (3) the dominant state cannot easily retaliate either because the
balancing efforts of others are not overt or because they do not directly challenge its power position with
military means” (Paul 2005:59).
16
demonstrate a shift in both the material meaning of balance of power and gpm as well as
in the behaviour of states, since the social meaning of the primary institution of gpm and
balancing of power has historically evolved as being based in a ‘hard’ understanding of
polarity.
One final remark is due. The above investigation of the current processes of gpm points
towards an obsolescence in the contrived general balance of power. However, first it is
necessary to remember that the enquiry was centred upon processes that occur at a
global level and, secondly, that these processes refer to the balance of power as a general
norm of the primary institution of gpm. Thus, the conclusion that obsolescence is occurring
is not applicable when referring to mechanical, regional or local balancing. Regional, local
and ‘particular’ balancing still occurs and is institutionalised in different ways in different
regions and contexts, even within framework of the GWoT. For instance, policies of
balancing were implemented at a regional level as part of the counter-insurgency
strategies adopted during the GWoT in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Balancing in Central
Asia during the Afghanistan campaign was a political issue between Russia and the United
States with regard to the American use of airspace and military bases. Likewise, in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, the policy of balancing amongst tribal leaders and warlords
emerged as the preferred strategy of the CIA and balancing actions were widely
implemented at the local level. Additionally, in Iraq, the balancing between Shi’as, Sunnis
and Kurds was also a matter of high concern. Thus, while the mechanics of the balance of
power remain valid and continue to be employed, they certainly do not hold the same
meaning either globally or as a general norm of gpm.
To sum up, the GWoT delineates, in a clearer form, the underlying expectations about the
pattern of interactions between the superpower and great powers. In other words, the
GWoT demarcates what sort of behaviour the interstate society can expect from the sole
superpower, the great powers as well as the remaining states. It is also clearly evident
from the analysis of the GWoT that its processes impact the material content of gpm by
forwarding an “identity politics” that creates at least two distinct social structures: thus on
the one hand it privileges an inequitable social structure of friends/rivals at the inter-state
level while on the other clearly shaping a social structure of enemies with regard to the
terrorist-state relations.
17
Management of transnational violence
As seen above, the addition of new processes aimed at regulating transnational violence
in interstate society greatly increases the normative complexity of gpm. As a consequence,
these processes engender a need to create new norms and rules in order to regulate the
new patterns of interactions and identities that operate under gpm. As a result, the new
norms and rules consolidate new identities that are in the process of being incorporated
within the primary institution of gpm. Moreover, the development of this new normative
system also accentuates the negative heuristics of a general balance of power. This
process of normative genesis causes a negative heuristics in the general balance of power
since the new identities which are incorporated as objects of the norms of gpm (i.e.
transnational terrorists) cannot be balanced or deterred under the established interstate
norms and rules of a contrived general balance of power.
As noted in the examples outlined in the previous section, transnational terrorists groups
can be (and indeed are) materially balanced either through cooperation amongst states or
between states and non-state actors. However, the non-state and unconventional
components of terrorism generate obvious anomalies and pose a keen challenge to the
institutional norms of balance of power. The reality of the GWoT does not fit within the
institutional norms of the balance of power and thus limits its ability to mediate reality. In
other words, the diffuse structure of transnational terrorist organisations and networks
make it very difficult for states to adopt a general balance of power against them. Thus it is
evident that institutionalised balancing is impossible because the assessment of threats is
too imprecise to create the necessary conditions for consolidating clear balance of power
rules. Furthermore, transnational terrorism seeks to disrupt and destroy international
society and its institutions, while one of the main functions/goals of the institution of a
general balance of power is a preservation of the same.22 This dichotomy also contributes
towards limiting the ability of balance of power norms to mediate this new social reality.
The same can be said about Salafi Jihadist intentions to counterbalance the hegemon
since it is clear that these terrorist groups seek to destroy the superpower by ‘bait and
22
As noted above, changes – including the decay of balance of power – can work towards the preservation of
international society, though this does not seem to hold true in the case of Salafi Jihadi transnational terrorism.
18
bleed’ strategies rather than attempting to balance against it in interstate society like other
states traditionally tended to do.
At the same time, the GWoT contributes to shape new norms designed to regulate the
interaction between super and great powers on the one hand, and their interactions with
the transnational terrorist threat on the other. The discourse of the GWoT inextricably
associates the US position as the sole superpower with its unique capability to employ
material and human resources to manage transnational terrorism on a global scale. Under
the banner of the GWoT, the US constructs a new component in the identity of a
superpower whereby the position of a superpower is dependant, amongst other things,
upon both the off-shore capacity to address transnational violence as well as being
excused from complying with existing social norms as they are applied to other states (this
non-compliance in turn also becomes a social norm over time). The GWoT, therefore,
impacts the norms of gpm by creating a series of additional criteria that must be met
before a state can be recognised as a superpower within interstate society.
One could argue, however, that the characterisation of transnational violence management
as a key constitutive element of superpower identity is confined to the particular
circumstances produced by the GWoT. In other words, the GWoT enables the US to adopt
a leadership role because it is the superpower alone which possesses the capacity to
globally manage transnational terrorism in interstate society. However, this also suggests
that the demise of the GWoT would alter these particular circumstances by ending the
macrosecuritisation discourse that seeks to legitimise and sustain the very logic of this
War on Terror. However, and most crucially, this demise would undermine the link forged
between superpower identity and the management of transnational violence. As such, one
could argue that the characterisation of transnational violence management as a key
constitutive element of superpower identity does not really represent a sustainable new
norm of gpm. However, this sustainability can be easily demonstrated by examining
questions regarding both the end-goals and durability of the GWoT. Hence, not only is the
originally stated final objective of the GWoT, i.e. the defeat of all transnational terrorism,23
improbable and unattainable, but the framing of the GWoT within a discourse of
23
A key point to note is the existence of shifting goal-posts in the GWoT. When the US declared the war in
2001 the declared aim was to defeat and end all transnational terrorism. However, over time these aims have
been progressively curtailed and localised and there is a growing acknowledgement in the rhetoric that even
the sole superpower cannot defeat every transnational terrorist group that may exist. See for example the
progressive shift in tone of the State of the Union Addresses from 2001 to 2009.
19
unpredictability also disallows the creation of processes that would categorically achieve
its stated ends. Rather, the GWoT discourse shapes the transnational terrorist threat as a
constant and long-standing risk. Consequently, the discourse progressively shifts from
decisively defeating the threat towards developing processes to manage the risk instead.24
In this sense, the capacity to manage transnational violence as a constitutive element of
the superpower identity transcends the particular circumstances of the GWoT and
becomes an institutionalised, hence sustainable, norm in interstate society.
Over time then, this global and off-shore management capacity becomes one of the
central constitutive elements of gpm. Thus, the material content of gpm undergoes a
process of addition in which the management of transnational violence is added to its
overall goals/functions. The addition of new norms to achieve this goal, however, triggers
yet another process of negative heuristic in the balance of power norm as detailed above.
To sum up then, the incorporation of uncivil non-state actors and transnational violence
into processes of gpm expands its functional requisites and increases its overall
complexity. However, the complexity of gpm is even further enhanced as these expanded
processes create new social structures within gpm. The result is a primary institution that
encompasses at least two social structures – with one being entirely new. The first of
these is the post-Cold War social structure of friends/rivals that exists between states and
shapes interstate society (Buzan 2004b). The second, newer, one is constructed as a
social structure of enemies and exists between states and transnational terrorist groups.
What emerges then is the existence of two levels of identities with two very different sets
of values and norms. While the first is characterised by a strong negative heuristic in the
balance of power norm, the latter incorporates transnational violence management as a
constitutive element of the identity of superpowers and thus creates a new normative
addition in the primary institution of gpm. In short, a significant transformation can be
located in the social meaning of gpm.
3. Operationalisation
24
See for example, State of the Union Addresses, 2001-2009; Congressional Testimonies and Executive
Speeches from the FBI, 2001-2009; and National Defence Strategy and National Security Strategy from the
White House, 2001- 2009.
20
The GWoT is impacting the norms of gpm mainly by delineating a new social
understanding about polarity and the role of superpowers in interstate society. Having said
that, the normative re-configuration of gpm, which was triggered by the ending of the Cold
War and as yet remains unfinished, is constructed not only by the GWoT alone but also on
the basis of how states in international society react to it. In order to properly address this
ongoing process, it is first necessary to recall that states are currently embedded in what is
essentially an environment of normative uncertainty. It is only by acknowledging this
context can we understand how the GWoT shapes the distribution of meaning (i.e. the
systematic normative design) in the norms of gpm.
As seen above, the end of the Cold War wrought changes in various definitive elements of
the structure of international society. As such, the ending of the Cold War represented a
critical transformational change (Jones 1981:17-18) in the social reality of interstate
society. In other words, while primary institutions tend to be both resistant to change and
also possess normative resources for accommodating a certain amount of change,25 the
demise of a superpower represented a drastic transformation in the international
environment and one that could not simply be absorbed by the mere re-interpretation and
application of existing norms of gpm.26 In other words, the transformational power of these
changes was so significant that it created a misalignment between the old norms and
functions of the primary institution on the one hand and the new social reality that emerged
on the other.
Consequently, the end of bi-polarity demanded a re-arrangement in the normative system
of gpm. Therefore, new norms and understandings had to be created in the wake of the
Cold War despite the fact that gpm continued to play an important role as a primary
institution and its function/goals remained unaltered. This transformation in social reality
and the consequent misalignment of this new social reality with the pre-existing normative
content of gpm indicated that an implicit phase of re-socialisation amongst states had
commenced in the post-Cold War period. This re-socialisation sought to address and
correct the misalignment that had emerged with the demise of a bipolar world order.
25
The absorption of change is a normal fact of social life. In fact, according to Kawaguchi the “absorption of
change by means of interpretations contributes to social stability at the same time as it maintains legal stability”
(Kawaguchi 2003:79).
26
Little, for example, notes how Bush’s 2002 National Security Strategy establishes “a narrative that view[s] the
present as a turning point, where the future is going to be different from the past” and highlights that he does
so in order to “show why the balance of power has to be reconstituted in the future” (Little 2007:79).
21
As stated in the previous section, this misalignment between social reality and old norms
diminished the capacity of gpm to mediate reality. In other words, there occurred a
negative heuristic and obsolescence of some old norms of gpm, e.g. as with a general
balance of power. Yet at the same time, new norms were, and continue to be, constructed
as the states in international society interact and attempt to overcome this negative
heuristic and obsolescence. It is in this process of interaction that states attempt to
decipher the new rules of the game and the new social reality. Furthermore, it is the
attempt to learn/construct these new rules that may be characterised as the ‘resocialisation of states’. Thus, we can argue that the sole superpower and remaining great
powers are re-negotiating both their identities and roles by interacting in this new postCold War social reality. Locating this interaction between states as a phase of resocialisation is crucial in that it reveals how new norms and values are constructed and
institutionalised into the primary institution of gpm in the post-Cold War period – a process
which is contributing towards its overall transformation.
Given that the construction and institutionalisation of new norms into gpm is leading
towards its transformation it is crucial to recall how the consolidation/institutionalisation of
new institutional norms (i.e. patterns of behaviour) actually occurs in interstate society. In
the absence of a supranational government or a hyperpower capable of completely
dominating the international system, the consolidation of most norms and values in
interstate society is produced through the direct interaction of states. In other words,
norms and values of gpm are evolved in interstate society primarily through the direct
‘negotiation’ of its normative design and meaning amongst units (i.e. states) which are
recognised as great and super powers. Taking into consideration the English School
understanding that such normative design is mostly evolved, the ‘negotiation’ of meaning
occurs not so much in the sense of a direct negotiation - i.e., states engaging in direct talks
about the subject - but rather through what Thomas Schelling calls “the interplay of
motives and the role of communication, understandings, compromise and restraint”
(1966:1). To sum up then, the negotiation/creation of new norms and values goes through
a process of symbolisation that then shapes the form of these norms and values by
22
abstraction, generalisation and organisation thereby institutionalising them within what is
then a new normative system.27
It seems safe to think that these new collective institutional norms and values are still
shaped directly through the conflicts and negotiations of individual interests that occur
during the interactions amongst the superpower and the remaining individual great
powers. Although the interests of the superpower and great powers and the meaning of
the primary institution do not precisely coincide, the meaning of gpm is still constructed
through consolidated patterns of behaviour, i.e. through the consolidation of direct
interactions between all parties concerned. Thus, these repeated interactions amongst
actors institutionalise the values and patterns of behaviour that consequently form a (new)
normative system, which in turn once again serves to mediates these interactions. This
understanding paves the road towards the counter-intuitive insight that will guide the
analysis below: Much of the work done on the subject tends to read the GWoT as a
coercive alternative to the normal political processes of bargaining and negotiation
between states. However, if one accepts the assumption that states are engaged in a
phase of re-socialisation and institutional normative re-arrangement, then the GWoT
actually figures as process of negotiation within this phase.28
It is also important to understand other steps in the process of institutionalising new norms
in intestate society, i.e., particularly those of generalisation and organisation, in order to
fully comprehend how the GWoT acts as a process of negotiating meaning within a phase
of re-socialisation. As outlined above, norms and values become part of an institution
through a process of socialisation/institutionalisation. Through institutionalisation norms
and values undergo a process of symbolisation that shapes their form through abstraction,
generalisation and organisation. ‘Abstraction’ is defined by Kawaguchi as “the selection of
a unique meaning from the infinite diversity of the real world. That unique meaning serves
as a criterion for determining sameness” (Kawaguchi 2003:73). After this process, norms
and values achieve intersubjectivity by sharing the selected meaning with other referents
(generalisation). Finally, this meaning and significance takes form and mediates behaviour
and relationships by organising norms and values into a unified set of rules (organisation).
27
For details regarding the symbolisation process see Kawaguchi (2003:73); for a treatment of
institutionalisation see Finnemore (1998).
28
A similar point was made earlier by Schelling with regards to the analysis of military actions and the
diplomacy of violence Schelling (1966:16).
23
Accordingly, the norms and values of gpm must be collectively accepted by both the select
club of great powers as well as by interstate society. This process of sharing the selected
meaning of these norms and values with other referents (generalisation) is an essential
step because achieving intersubjectivity is a necessary pre-requisite for formulating the
normative content of a primary institution of interstate society, in this case of gpm. Thus,
the process of institutionalising the norms and values of gpm is a layered process which
occurs in two directions: from a ‘unit to whole’ direction within the great power club; and
from the ‘whole to unit’ direction with regard to the acceptance of these norms, values and
rules by international society. As a result, most norms, values and goals of gpm (i.e.
functional requisites of the institution) are created by the direct clash/negotiation of
individual interests and by any ‘performance and sanction’ social control systems that exist
amongst the great powers in interstate society at any one time.
Great powers are considered ‘great’ not only by the reach of their material power and
resources, but also precisely because they can exercise a strong influence over weaker
actors in interstate society mainly through processes of leadership, authority and coercion.
In part, this power of influence lies in other states in international society recognising the
existent de facto hierarchy within interstate society and accepting the superiority of great
powers and superpowers. Logically then, this also means that other states in interstate
society accept the exclusivist nature of the great power club. Hence changes in the
behaviour of great powers can lead to shifts in shared norms and values in interstate
society. However, and most crucially, these shifts in shared values and norms can become
institutionalised only if there is a general acceptance of the new interpretation/application
of these values and norms. Consequently, it is important to underscore that even when
transformations occur in the behaviour, expectation, values or consciousness of individual
great or superpowers, shared institutionalised norms and values change only if such
transformations are expressed or accepted outwardly by a sufficient number of other
actors, and especially other great powers in the case of gpm. It is through such an
acceptance that the modification of common shared values or norms becomes
institutionalised (if the changes are incorporated by the institution) or causes a negative
heuristics of the institution (if the changes are incorporated de facto by the states but not
by the institution causing shrinkage in both its meaning and mediation capacity).
24
Thus, contrary to common sense, in order to understand the impact of the GWoT on the
institution of gpm one should not solely probe the behaviour of the superpower. The real
impact of the GWoT on this institution resides not so much in the superpower’s much
reported disregard for international norms, neither in the adoption of double-standards in
its foreign policies, but rather in the influence that its behaviour exerts upon the conduct
and decision-making processes of other great powers. As Buzan and others extensively
demonstrate, US’ unilateral actions and double standards, far from being an exclusivity or
novelty of the GWoT, have a long standing record (2004b:166-170). Consequently, what
makes the GWoT so prominent is that it generates within other states the expectation that
unilateralism, coercion and military actions could be employed by the superpower
whenever it deems them necessary.
The conclusion then is that in this context of normative re-socialisation the GWoT is as
much directed against transnational terrorist groups as it is towards states. It is here
important to note that the same set of norms can be understood and applied in different
ways thereby acquiring different meanings depending on the social structure(s) within
which they are embedded. In other words, the ontological meaning of institutional norms
varies with time and social-space. That is also the case with the GWoT. At one level (i.e.
that of the social structure formed between states and transnational terrorist groups) the
policies and actions in place under the GWoT convey a very clear and direct message
about its objective: to defeat transnational terrorism. However, at the inter-state level,
these GWoT policies and actions figure as a subtle ‘bargaining bid’ in the process of
organising the current social meaning of polarity and gpm amongst states. The practices
and policies under the GWoT then underline the United States’ identity as a superpower
and demonstrate how it is prepared to act as such. Consequently, the GWoT serves
persuasively to communicate this understanding to interstate society. In this context, what
makes such communication persuasive to interstate society is the commitment created by
the policies and securitisation discourse of the GWoT that together serve to dramatically
raise the political costs of behaving in any other way.29 In other words, the GWoT projects
and communicates the intentions and roles devised by the sole superpower to other states
in interstate society. It is the manner in which states react to such a projection of identity,
in turn, which implicitly constructs the acceptance or rejection of these terms. This then
29
See Schelling (1956; 1960; 1966).
25
organises and shapes new understandings about the norms of gpm thus defining how the
game is played.
Thus, within the context of the unfinished normative arrangement that was initiated with
the demise of the former USSR, the GWoT figures as a policy of normative organisation by
virtue of imparting meaning to both unipolarity and gpm. Various factors have contributed
to the incomplete nature of the current normative arrangement, including the ambiguity of
US foreign policy as it emerged in the post-Cold War period. This ambiguity emerges
primarily because the United States veers between behaving in a unilateral fashion on the
one hand and taking part in collective action on the other (Buzan 2004b:167-169). In case
of the former it is most obviously behaving as an imperialist power while in the latter
instance it also tends towards adopting a leadership role. Yet this ambiguity has not only
served to construct an environment of uncertainty regarding the role of the US as a
superpower but also seems to suggest that the US is deeply conflicted about whether or
not it is bound by the norms and institutions of international society. Another consequence
of this ambiguity is a keen uncertainty about the current social meaning of polarity and
gpm in interstate society. This implies the absence of a unified set of norms and rules (i.e.
there is a lack of organisation) which can confer a clear social meaning and normative
shape to polarity and gpm as they currently exist. Thus, while the operationalisation of
gpm norms still occurs, these norms have as yet not fully organised the social meaning of
unipolarity in the post-Cold War period.
The unification of institutional norms (i.e. the organisation) entails certain special
procedures that not only shape the identity of these rules and how they are applied in
practice but also dictate what should happen when an actor either follows or breaches
these set of rules. Thus the absence of a clear normative organisation forces states to
question the US’s role in interstate society. In an environment that is shaped by such a
‘crisis of meaning’, the operationalisation of the GWoT offers the US an ideal opportunity
to reform the conventional norms of gpm by not only affirming its own power but also by
attempting to construct, in a top-down direction (i.e., a whole-to-parts direction), its identity
as a hyperpower. Through its attempt to macrosecuritise the terrorist threat, the US in
essence seeks to enforce favourable rules of the game while simultaneously consolidating
its identity to correspond with its self-image of a hyperpower. This macrosecuritisation, if
widely accepted, would allow the US to overcome both the existent mechanisms of social
26
control as well as the norms of interstate society while at the same time enforcing these
very norms upon other states.
The militarised and unilateralist operationalisation of the GWoT clearly communicates that
there is a de facto disparity in the powers and role of a superpower, the great powers, the
regional powers and remaining states. It also informs interstate society that while the
superpower is prepared to enforce multilateral norms and institutions upon other states it is
more than willing to reject them in its turn whenever it deems it necessary to do so. The
GWoT also clearly demonstrates that the sole superpower is both willing and able to act
towards the calculus/coercion end of the spectrum as and when it sees fit. Acts such as
the unauthorised military intervention in Iraq under the banner of the GWoT - when there
was absolutely no evidence of a connection between al Qaeda and the government of
Sadam Hussein - lead one to conclude that such an act was addressed more towards the
states of international society rather then terrorist organisations. The intervention served to
inform interstate society that the superpower would shift from a position of leadership
towards more imperialist behaviour to secure its own interests as and when the need
arose. The same can be said, for instance, in the case of the contrasting post-9/11
counter-terrorism cultures in Europe and the United States. Hence the US chose to frame
the GWoT under the military rubric of counter-terrorism in sharp contrast to the traditional
police rubric that has been historically adopted by the other great powers (Rees & Aldrich
2005). The option of adopting military actions against transnational threats reaffirmed the
capacity of the sole superpower to act on a global scale. This is especially significant when
seen in light of the fact that traditional police actions tend to be more geographically
constrained by jurisdictions and state-centric rules.
Additionally, while part of the GWoT discourse is certainly one of deterrence (i.e. to
discourage by fear any potential terrorist attacks), its pro-active military operationalisation
makes clear that it is also an active policy intended to affirm and communicate specific
values, identities and roles.30 Thus, amidst the long-standing record of US unilateral
actions and within an environment of imperfect consolidation and re-socialisation of gpm
norms, the GWoT emerges as an attempt to bid for a specific normative design of gpm. In
fact, according to Dunne, “a key characteristic of the post-9/11 order is the absence of
effective countervailing institutions against the hyperpower: a situation exacerbated by the
30
For Schelling, the deterrent threat is always passive (1966:70).
27
fact that maintaining such an imbalance has become a goal of US grand strategy”
(2003:315). Thus, the GWoT may be seen as a bid by the superpower not only to
overcome the opposition of other states but also to seek an exemption from following the
norms and rules of primary institutions of international society. Consequently, the GWoT
exerts a symbolic and psychological impact over international society by institutionalising
such behaviour thus further raising the threshold of what is acceptable superpower
behaviour within an interstate social structure of rivals/friends. These actions then also
construct a harsher understanding of unipolarity in an interstate society of friends and
rivals.
As described above, however, a bid can only consolidate new norms and understandings,
if it is accepted by interstate society. Thus, the operationalisation of the GWoT not only
seeks to raise the threshold of acceptable unilateral behaviour but also simultaneously
engages in efforts to preserve the social structure of friends amongst the members of
interstate society. In fact, the National Security Strategy 2006 declares that:
“Our priority is pursuing American interests within cooperative
relationships, particularly with our oldest and closest friends and
allies. At the same time, we must seize the opportunity – unusual
in historical terms – of an absence of fundamental conflict between
the great powers. Another priority, therefore, is preventing the reemergence of the great power rivalries that divided the world in
previous eras. New times demand new approaches, flexible
enough to permit effective action even when there are reasonable
differences of opinions among friends, yet strong enough to
confront the challenges the world faces” (USNSS 2006:35).
This is important because, as Buzan notes, one of the factors that could corrode the
legitimacy of US leadership31 is “US behaviour, and particularly the US playing a game of
rivals and enemies within an international society of friends and rivals, (…) [potentially
triggering] balancing reactions” (2004b:172). Thus, in the face of the failure by international
society to achieve a clear intersubjective meaning for post-Cold War unipolarity, the
operationalisation of the GWoT by the Bush administration arguably acts as a policy of
“incrementalism” (Schelling 1960:170; 1966:66-69) by “testing” and “daring” the degree of
unilateralism and coercion the US can exert in international society without triggering
31
The other factor being “more extreme practices of liberalism” (Buzan 2004b: 171-172).
28
balancing reactions or breaking the social structure of friends. Schelling’s imagery is
supremely evocative:
“Tell a child not to go in the water and he’ll sit on the bank and
submerge his bare feet; he is not yet “in” the water. Acquiesce, and
he’ll stand up; no more of him is in the water than before. Think it
over, and he’ll start wading, not going any deeper; take a moment to
decide whether this is different and he’ll go a little deeper, arguing
that since he goes back and forth it all averages out. Pretty soon we
are calling to him not to swim out of sight, wondering whatever
happened to all our discipline” (Schelling 1966:66-67).
In fact, as Schelling states,
“The resulting international relations often have the character of a
competition in risk taking, characterized not so much by tests of
force as by tests of nerve. Particularly in the relations between
major adversaries (…) issues are decided not by who can bring the
most force to bear in a locality or on a particular issue, but by who
is eventually wiling to bring more force to bear or able to make it
appear that more is forthcoming” (1966:94).
Thus, the GWoT figures as an affirmation of the willingness of the US to act as a
superpower and do what the great powers are allegedly not willing to do: i.e. to take risks
and engage with transnational violence. Such a position is explicitly clear in various
documents.32
Accordingly, if we understand the present moment as a re-socialisation where the norms
of gpm are currently under negotiation, than the behaviour of other states is also crucial for
understanding how successful this bid is. As seen in the previous section, significant
opposition to the US position has been voiced by other states. In fact, the GWoT was
clearly reshaped in 2006 in order to appear less unilateral and in an effort to improve both
transatlantic relations as well as the US’ image around the world. The small but noteworthy
shift in the US position regarding acceptable grounds for pre-emptive strikes is a good
example of this reshaping. However, as mentioned above, the vigorous opposition
discourses voiced by various states have tended to be mere rhetoric. The lack of
balancing or any further concerted opposition to the GWoT combined with the widespread
acceptance of the liberal social structure of friends/rivals indicates that there is an on-going
32
See, for example USNDS (2008); NSS (2002; 2006) and; USNSCT (2006).
29
organisation of new identities and behaviours that is informed by a steeper differentiation
between the superpower, great powers, and other states. In fact, the policies and practices
of states reflect the de facto acceptance of a more complex hierarchical chain of identities
within the institution of gpm. In this new normative arrangement, the GWoT tries to affirm
that there is no space to doubt that the superpower, great powers, regional powers and
other states have markedly different roles and responsibilities within interstate society.
Furthermore, as described in the previous section, the GWoT can be seen as a policy that
tries to consolidate new norms and values of gpm where the ambiguous and erratic
behaviour of the US is what constructs the role and identity of the superpower thereby
becoming, in this process, a fundamental characteristic of international society. The GWoT
has therefore impacted the normative content of gpm by helping shape a clear imperialist
bid for both US identity and a harsher unipolarity. This is because the ‘war on terror’
makes it clear that not only does the US see itself as a hyperpower and that it is willing to
act like one but also that the interstate society implicitly accepts it as such, at least to a
certain degree. Thus the practical response of states to the GWoT is in the process of
constructing a radical transformation of the norms of gpm and in doing so practically reshaping the normative identity of this primary institution.33
CONCLUSION
The GWoT is playing an important role in the normative transformations that are occurring
in the primary institution of gpm in the post-Cold War reality. The demise of a superpower
at the close of the Cold War created a misalignment between the new social reality (i.e.,
the creational environment) and the capacity of some old norms of gpm to mediate this
reality. Such transformation is significant since this environment created a context of
normative uncertainty in which the GWoT propelled both the consolidation of new identities
and new roles within interstate society. Additionally, the GWoT altered the creational
environment of gpm by pushing the great powers towards addressing a non-state form of
violence and identity, and, in doing so created a two-level social structure within gpm.
Thus, a process of normative addition can be located within what has been historically a
33
In Holsti’s typology, transformation occurs when the institution’s functions/goals change but its norms and
principles remain the same, but this is a case where the goals/functions of the institution are kept the same, but
its normative content significantly changes. (Holsti 2004:16).
30
state-centric primary institution. This combination of unfinished normative rearrangements
with the inclusion of transnational violence and non-state identities suggests an increased
complexity in the environment of gpm.
At the material level, two main changes were identified and highlighted. Firstly, there was
an obsolescence of the balance of power norm as an instrument of gpm and secondly,
new norms of gpm were seen to be institutionalised in order to address transnational
violence. The effect of such obsolescence and addition was the consolidation of at least
two distinct social structures within gpm: one that privileged an inequitable social structure
of friends/rivals amongst states; and another which shaped a social structure of enemies
with regard to the terrorist-state relations. Another consequence of the GWoT in this
process is that the capacity of managing transnational violence globally and off-shore is
increasingly becoming one of the central constitutive elements of being a great power.
Thus it was demonstrated how these transformations are greatly increasing the normative
complexity of gpm. In short, a significant transformation and increased complexity can be
located in the social meaning of gpm.
Finally, the operationalisation of the GWoT was located as a subtle ‘bargaining bid’ in the
process of organising the current social meaning of polarity and gpm amongst states. The
GWoT was seen to decisively contribute towards creating a new system of expectations by
projecting and legitimising a specific role and identity for the superpower. Thus, the
evidence suggests that the states’ reaction(s) to the GWoT signifies a certain degree of de
facto acceptance of an unequal social structure in interstate society where the apparent
ambiguity in US foreign policy then not only constructs and defines its role and identity as
a superpower but also becomes a characteristic trait of international society and gpm.
Therefore, the operationalisation of the GWoT was seen to delineate, in a clearer form, the
underlying expectations about the pattern of interactions between the superpower and
great powers. Consequently, the GWoT exerts a symbolic and psychological impact over
international society by institutionalising not only a specific meaning of unipolarity but also
further raising the threshold of what is acceptable behaviour on part of the superpower
within an interstate social structure of rivals/friends.
Overall then the obsolesce of the norm of a general balance of power deeply affects the
primary institution of gpm since traditionally “the management by the great powers of their
31
relations with one another involves, first and foremost, the actions they may take to
preserve the general balance of power” (Bull 1977:201). Nevertheless, the obsolescence
of this key norm does not necessarily imply the negative heuristic of the institution, but
rather its transformation through the addition new processes and the organisation of new
patterns of interaction amongst great powers in face of a new social reality. Thus, it can be
decisively concluded there is both a transformation and an increased complexity in the
norms, values, rules and principles of the primary institution of gpm.
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