S&S Quarterly, Inc.
Guilford Press
The 1953 Coup in Iran
Author(s): Ervand Abrahamian
Source: Science & Society, Vol. 65, No. 2 (Summer, 2001), pp. 182-215
Published by: Guilford Press
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Vol. 65, No. 2, Summer2001, 182-215
Science& Society,
The 1953 Coup in Iran*
ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN
ABSTRACT:TheNewYorkTimesrecently
leakeda CIA reporton the
1953American-British
overthrow
ofMossadeq,Iran'sPrimeMinister.It billed the reportas a secrethistoryof the secretcoup, and
treateditas an invaluablesubstitute
forthe U. S. filesthatremain
inaccessible.But a reconstruction
of the coup fromothersources,
especiallyfromdie archivesoftheBritishForeignOffice,indicates
thatthisreportishighlysanitized.Itglossesoversuchsensitive
issues
as the crucialparticipationof the U. S. ambassadorin the actual
theroleofU. S. military
oflocal
overthrow;
advisers;theharnessing
Nazisand Muslimterrorists;
and theuse ofassassinations
todestabilize thegovernment.
Whatis more,itplacesthecoup in thecontext
theCold WarradierthanthatoftheAnglo-Iranian
oil crisis- a classiccaseofnationalism
in theThirdWorld."
clashingwithimperialism
"Matterscame to a head in Augustwhen,forthreedays,
seemedtobe the
Mossadeq,backedbythecommunist
party,
irresistible
dictator
ofIran.One seniordiplomat
evenadvised
thatweshouldsnuggleup tohim. . . butfortunately,
theloyof
the
and
the
fear
of
the
communism
saved
alty
army
day."
- President
Eisenhower
Sources
IS EASIERFORA CAMELtopassthrough
theeyeofa needle
thanfora historian
togainaccesstotheCIAarchives
on the1953
in
Iran.
These
archives
remain
inaccessible
eventhoughhalf
coup
* I would like to thankthe ProfessionalStaff
of NewYork
Congressand the CityUniversity
fora travelgrantin 1982 to carryout researchin London on the Anglo-Iranianoil crisis
of 1951-53. 1 would also like to thankEric Hooglund forcomments,and Hamid Ahmadi,
HedayatollahMatin-Daiariand Sina Saidi forusefulsource materials.
182
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THE COUP IN IRAN
183
haspassed,thePahlavidynasty
hasfallen,theColdWarhas
a century
have
and
fromothercovert
most
materials
ended,
participants died,
actions,suchas Guatemala,havebeen released.Whatis more,an
Orderfrom1995instructs
to"auExecutive
government
departments
In
documents
after
the
25
tomatically"
declassify
years.
early1990s,
on Iranon
theCIAsoughtmoretimetoreleasethe1953documents
In thelate
to
these
files.
thegroundsit lackedfunds catalog
bulky
it claimedthesesamefilescould notbe released
1990s,however,
in theearly1960s.1
becausetheyhad beendestroyed
"unknowingly''
in
a
CIA reporton the
when
The mystery
2000
deepened April
for
surfacedafterlyingdormant 45 years.It apcoup inexplicably
in TheNewYork
in summary
Times(April16,2000);then
pearedfirst
form
on
the
web
siteofthesamenewspaper;
inan expurgated
80-page
and thenin a lessexpurgated169-pageformon anotherwebsite
ofPreEntitled"Overthrow
(htt://cryptome.org/cia-iran-all.htm.).
in 1954byDonald
mierMossadeqofIran,"thereportwaswritten
Wilber,a CIA operativeinvolvedin thecoup. It wascommissioned
andwasdesignedas a handbookfor
Division,
bytheCIA'sHistorical
notonlyin
futurecoups.Itsintendedaudiencewasseniorofficials
WhiteHouse,
theCIA,butalso in thePentagon,StateDepartment,
and SenateForeignRelationsCommittee.
Thisdocumentquicklyattainedthestatureofan authoritative
inbilleditas "thesecrethistory"
text.The Times
disclosing
"pivotal
ofthecoup"(April20 andJune
and "theinnerworkings
formation"
first
detailed
11, 2000). The LondonGuardian
depicteditas the"very
accountoftheepisode"(April17,2000).Similarly,
U. S. government
- an NGO formedto declassify
offiArchive
theNationalSecurity
an
"after-action
cialdocuments haileditas "extremely
important,"
withagentson the
and interviews
reportfromagencycable traffic
in
Iran"
(www.gwu.edu/nsarchiv).
ground
TruethereportwaswritThisaurashouldraisesomequestions.
sources- thedispatches
buttherealprimary
theevent,
tensoonafter
betweenWashington,
London,and Teheran- remainunavailable.
buttheeventsandpriTrue,thereportwaswritten
bya participants;
Thus
theColdWaroverhiseyes.
through
marysourcesarefiltered
1 For discussionsconcerningthesedocumentssee T. Weiner,"CIA Is Slow to Tell EarlyCold
War Secrets,"NewYorkTimes,
April,8, 1996; "CIA DestroyedFileson 1953 Iran Coup," New
YorkTimes,
May29, 1997; "CIA,BreakingPromises,PutsOffRelease ofCold WarFiles,"New
YorkTimes,
February1997,9-10, 22-23.
Perspectives,
July15, 1998; W. Kimball,"Classified!,"
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184
SCIENCE & SOCIETY
shadowstheoil crisis,and theroleof theCIA dwarfs
thatof MI6.
the
did
not
mean
Wilberdid
was
but
this
True, report confidential;
notexercise
In
Wilber
a
commissioned
history,
self-censorship.
writing
wascarefulnottodwellon thePentagonand theStateDepartment.
Itisone thingtofocuson theroleoftheCIAin thecoup- afterall,
theagencyis supposedto carryoutsuchactions.It is anotherthing
to describeambassadors
and military
advisersactively
participating
in theoverthrow
oftheirhostgovernments.
itis one thing
Similarly,
toadmitthattheCIAdistributed
fundeddemon"grey
propaganda,"
and
officers
to
outthecoup.
strations,
tricks," urged
played"dirty
carry
ItisanotherthingtoadmitthattheCIAworkedthrough
localNazis,
andhada directroleinkidnappings,
andmass
torture,
assassinations,
street
This
CIA
archives
on
Iran
unlike
the
killings. mayexplainwhy
thoseon Guatemala- remainunavailable.In Iran,theU. S. role
wasdirect;in placeslikeGuatemala,
itwasmostly
indirect.
Althoughthe originalCIA materialsremaininaccessible,the
mainpiecesof the 1953puzzlecan be put togetherfromdiverse
sources:fromBritishForeignOfficearchivesin thePublicRecord
Officein London (althoughsanitized,thesearchivescontainover
1000fileson Iran,including
from
ofU. S. documents);
photocopies
memoirswritten
Iranians
the
1979
revolution
numerous
(after
by
nationalist
andleftwing
officers
cameforth
withtheirreminiscences)
;
fromtwooralhistory
with
leftists
(Ahmadi,1985-95),
projects(one
theotherwithmembersof theold elite (Ladjevardi,1993)); from
accounts
written
Roosevelt
(Kermit
( 1979),
bythetwokeycoupplanners
theCIA head oftheventure,
and MontagueWoodehouse,hiscounin theBritish
MI6 (Woodehouse,1982)); and fromscrapsof
terpart
information
to
droppedbylesserCIAand MI6 operatives,
especially
academicresearchers
suchas MarkGasiorowski
(1979) and Stephen
Domi (2000).Thisarticleintendstouse thesesourcestoreconstruct
thecoup.
OriginsoftheOil Crisis(1948-51)
The originsofthecoupgo backtotheAnglo-Iranian
oil crisisof
1951-53,which,in turn,goesbackto theabortive
petroleum
negotiations
at theend ofWorldWarII. In 1948,themajlis(parliament)
rejecteda 1945Sovietproposalforan oil concessionin thenorthern
eventhoughtheagreement
provinces
gaveIranequalsharesinprof-
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THE COUP IN IRAN
185
anddistribution.
TheBritish
ofFuelwarned
its,management,
Ministry
theForeignOffice:
The strengthof Britishoil lies in the factthatwe hold concessionsall over
theworld,in whichwe are ourselvesdevelopingthe oil and controllingits
distribution
and disposal.It would weaken our positionifcountriesbegan
to developtheirownoil. IfPersiabegan to developher ownoil in thenorth,
itmightnot be verylong beforeshe wouldwantto do thisin thesouthalso.
We should not encourage them to develop theirown oil. (FO 37i/Persia
1945/45443.)
whohad emerged
MohammadMossadeq,a patrician
politician
voiceofnationalaspirations,
as the"incorruptible"
vehemently
opposed theSovietofferon thegroundsitwouldincreaseMoscow's
offa newstampedeofWestern
influencein thenorthand trigger
He
in therestofthecountry.
concession-hunters
seekingcontracts
of Iran.
warnedthattheend resultwouldbe thedismemberment
to the
themajlisrejecteda Supplement
Evenmoreimportant,
Oil Company.By1949-50,
withtheAnglo-Iranian
1933Agreement
thesecondlargest
theAIOC had in Irantheworld'slargestrefinery,
It
third
and
the
of
crude
largestoil reserves.
petroleum,
exporter
in
taxes
million
with
British
the
24
poundssterling
Treasury
provided
and92 millionpoundsinforeign
exchange;supplied85% ofthefuel
needsoftheBritish
navy;and gaveAIOC 75% ofitsannualprofits.
inEnglandaswellas toinvestments
Muchofthiswenttoshareholders
Indonesia.
and
in Kuwait,
Iraq,
- negotiated
insecret- offered
TheSupplementary
Agreement
fromfour
toincreaseIran'sroyalties
toolate.Itoffered
Irantoolittle,
rise
would
of
the
Iran's
share
tosixshillings
ton;
company
profits
per
from17 to 24%. Iran,citinga recentAmerican-Venezuelan
Agreethat
tooktheposition
however,
ment,hadsought50%.The company,
mission."It had
fortheAIOC's "civilizing
Iranshouldbe grateful
intoflourishing
"deserts"
in
converted
sums
invested
Iran,
generous
for
Iranians- and
of
them
over
created
70,000
75,000jobs
towns,
as
such
amenities
had provided"peoplewith
swimming
pools"(FO
it refusedto setdeadlineson
371/Persia1951/91604).Moreover,
earlierpromisesto promoteIraniansto technical-managerial
positionson thegroundsthatfewhad the"skills"neededforsuch"responsible"positions(FO 377/Persia1951/91449).
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186
SCIENCE äf SOCIETY
thecompany
failedtoaddressmanyofIran'sother
Furthermore,
duration
of
contract(itranuntil1992);thepaythe
the
complaints:
mentofroyalties
in pounds(thistiedIranto thesterling
area); the
thesale ofoil
sale ofoil to theBritish
discounts;
navyat substantial
costs
to Iranat worldmarketpricesratherthanat localproduction
to
books
differed
the
refusal
(they
substantially);
open up company
to Iranianauditors;theburningof naturalgas insteadofpipingit
town
forlocalconsumption;
andtherunning
ofAbadanas a company
wherestoresand clubsroutinely
discriminated
the
"natives."
against
colonialpowermaWhatis more,thecompany
wasseenas a typical
ministers
and
the
host
nipulating
government,
bymaking unmaking
as wellas governors,
mayors,
armycommanders,
policeheads,majlis
of
local
tribal
chiefs.
and,
course,
deputies,
MaxThornburg,
a StandardOil executive
broughtin as a consultantto theIraniangovernment,
recommended
rejectionof the
on thegroundsitwasnotbasedon the
Supplementary
Agreement
so obscurely
and so ambiguously
50/50principleand was"drafted
it (FO 248/Perthatno one in theworld"couldpossibly
understand
sia 1951/1530).The AIOC publicly
insistedthatthe50/50suggestionwasimpractical
difficult
to calculate
becauseitwas"extremely
a division
but
told
the
British
cabinet
that
such
profits," privately
wouldbe "uneconomical,
and
astronomical"
absurd,
(FO 371/Versia 1949/1531).In a bluntconversation
the
withtheIranianpremier,
Britishambassador,Sir FrancisShepherd,declaredthatIranwas
and the"onlythingthecompanymightbe willing
to
being"greedy"
add to theseconcessions
of
wasperhapsthefreemedicaltreatment
certainhysterical
deputieswhocontinuedto denouncetheSuppleto be
(FO 377/Persia1950/1512).In refusing
mentary
Agreement"
theoil company
as wellas theBritish
flexible,
government
expected
Irantogiveway- or,atleast,tocomebackwithnewproposals.
Few
in Londonexpectedoutright
even
Thornnationalization, though
toWashington,
warnedthatBritish
burg,on hisreturn
intransigence
wasfuelingthecampaignforsucha dangeroustakeover(FO 248/
Persia1951/1527).
In rejecting
theSupplementary
themajlisnationalAgreement,
izedtheoilindustry
andelectedMossadeqas premier
on thegrounds
he wastheonlycandidateeagerto implement
thisnationalization
law.On taking
inApril1951,Mossadeqpromised
office
faircompenset
a
and invitedBritish
sation, up NationalIranianOil Company,
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THE COUP IN IRAN
187
toworkforthenewauthority.
employees
Although
Mossadeq'ssupthe
porters, NationalFront,numberedonlya handfulin themajlis,
theycouldswaytheotherdeputiesbecausefewwishedto be identifiedwiththeAIOC.
admitted
thatMossadeqhad"captured
the
Shepherd
begrudgingly
of
the
and
that
"the
1951/1514)
imagination
people"(FO 24S/Persia
Frontwereplaying
National
a chordwhichawokestrong
echoesamong
manyclassesofPersians"(FO 377/Persia1951/91521).His Charge
d'Affaires
added:"ThePremieris able to controlparliamentary
and
of
his
because
(FO 248/
publicopinionmainly
personalpopularity"
Persia1951/1514).Earlyin thecrisiswhenMossadeqpaid a visitto
theUnitedStates,
a StateDepartment
briefinformed
Trumanthatthe
minister
was
the
of
the
and
prime
by majority
"supported
population"
was"alert,"
and
informed"
"well
"affable,"
"honest,"
(Declassi"witty,"
1975/WhiteHouse/Doc.780).Trumanwasadvisedto
fiedDocuments/
stirtheconversation
intogeneralities
aboutcommunism,
American
in oil,and U. S. goodwilltowardIran.In a post-mortem
"disinterest"
- ofcourse,onlyin
ofthewholecrisis,theU. S. Embassy
admitted
confidential
notes thatMossadeq,the"demi-god,"
stillhada "hold
on publicopinion,""symbolized
thenationalist
ideal,"andcasta long
shadowoverhissuccessors
a
(FO 377/Persia
1953/104573).
Similarly,
Office
"In
stated:
terms
of
class
the
warfare,
Foreign
post-mortem
movement
ledbyMusaddiqwasa revolutionary
driveofthethreelower
classesagainsttheupperclassandtheBritish
with
whowereidentified
thatclass"(FO 377/Persia1957/127074).
Premier
Mossadeq(April1951-August1953)
theBritish
had beenslowtosee thecomingofnationAlthough
were
to
butdown-to-earth
alization,
they
quick drawthreehard-nosed
conclusions:
was
serious
about
strivfirst,
nationalization,
Mossadeq
could
second,Britain
ingforfullIraniancontrolovertheoilindustry;
notpermit
Irantoattainthiscontrol;third,
theonlywayBritain
could
its
vital
interests
was
removal.
London
safeguard
through
Mossadeq's
stucktotheseconclusionthrough
thickand thinuntilMossadeqwas
overthrown
28 monthslater.
The British
assessment
wasthatthecoreissueforMossadeqwas
- i.e.,controlover
notincreasedroyalties,
butnationalsovereignty
and distribution
ofoil. For Mossadeq,Iran
extraction,
production,
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188
SCIENCE àf SOCIETY
wouldattainrealindependence
theremovalofBritish
onlythrough
domination
overitsoilindustry.
Previous
politicians,
Mossadeqoften
remindedthepublic,had undermined
nationalsovereignty
bygivto theGreatPowers.He wouldmake
ingouteconomicconcessions
Iranindependent
themsuchconcessions.
He addedthat
bydenying
theGreatPowers,assuredtheirrivalswerenotgetting
advantages,
wouldrespectIraniansovereignty.
He termed
this"thepolicyofnegativeequilibrium,"
as opposedtothatof"positive
favored
equilibrium"
to
allied
or
the
United
States
Britain,
Russia,
bypoliticians
Germany,
1950).
(Key-Ostovan,
WhiletheBritish
realizedIranwantedcontrol,
itwas
government
adamantthiscontrolshouldnotbe relinquished at least,notto
Iran.Itwaswilling
topressure
AIOC tosharea concession
withother
to
enter
a
consortium
with
the
so-called
"seven
sisters."
companies
Butunderno circumstances
wasitwillingto giveIranfinalsayover
howmuchoil toproduce,whentoproduceit,andwheretosellit.If
Iranhad thispower,itcouldinfluence
worldpricesand evenchoose
tokeepoilunderground
forfuture
generations,
sellingonlywhatwas
neededtobuyessential
A
Office
memo
statedbluntly:
goods. Foreign
"Whatever
newarrangements
we arriveat,theyshouldbe suchthat
wekeepeffective
controloftheassets.. . . Wecanbe flexible
inprofor partnership,
butnotin theissueofcontrol"
its,administration,
theMinistry
ofFuelwarned
(PO 377/Persia1951/91470).Similarly,
theU. S. StateDepartment:
wouldbe content
toseetheindustry
ata lowlevelwithMusaddiq
running
outforeign
Thisraises
a problem:
thesecurity
ofthefree
world
management.
isdependent
onlargequantities
ofoilfrom
MiddleEastern
Ifthe
sources.
attitude
inIranspreads
toSaudiArabiaorIraq,thewholestructure
may
breakdownalongwithourability
todefend
ourselves.
Thedanger
ofbuyona reduced
scalehas,therefore,
danwith
ingoilproduced
potentialities
(FO372/Persia
1951/98608.)
gerousrepercussions.
"Control"
is therecurring
themein ForeignOfficememos,even
the
term
It apthough
rarelyappearedin publicpronouncements.
enteredthefraythinking
pearedso rarelythattheAmericans
they
couldbrokera more"equitable"concession.
historiLikewise,
many
ans ofthecrisishavefallenintothetrapofthinking
a compromise
could havebeen reachedifone side,namelyMossadeq,had been
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THE COUP IN IRAN
189
But the Britishgovernmentneverfellinto this
more forthcoming.2
realized
the verybeginningthat thiswas a zero-sum
It
from
trap.
Either
Iran
obtained
control;or it did not. Mossadeq knew
struggle.
the same.
admittedBritaincouldacceptevena 60/40deal
Shepherdprivately
so longas it"retainedcontrol"(R)37i/Persia 1951/91606).He added:
at all to meethim. . . . We
"It seemsveryunlikelywe can do anything
mustkeep effective
control.We haveexploreda numberofdevicesby
whichwe could disguisethishardfactbutfoundnothingthatwasnot
foreven the Persiansto aceithertoo dangerousor too transparent
The
TreasuiyDepartmentrecomcept" (FO 37i/Persia1951/19606).
mended concessionson peripheralmattersbut firmnessof the vital
issue of "control":"Throughoutthe crisisthe PersianPrimeMinister
has been absolutelyconsistent.There can be no doubt whatsoever
a Nationand foremost
abouthisfundamental
objective.... He is first
alist"(FO37i/Persia 1951/91606).The ForeignOfficespelledout the
core issuein thesewordsto the StateDepartment:
intoPersianhands.
wouldbe toputcontrol
ofnationalization
Thefirst
effect
SeenfromtheUnitedKingdompointofviewthepresentproblemwasnot
solelyone ofthefateofa majorasset.It concernsthemajorassetwhichwe
Controlofthatassetisofsupremeimporholdin thefieldofrawmaterials.
ofthatassetto
tance.The pointhasalreadybeenmadeoftheimportance
butin the
and to our rearmament
ourbalanceofpayments
programme,
loss
of
our
the
of
bilateral
this, onlymajorrawmatenegotiations
sphere
Moreincalculable
have
cumulative
and
would
rial,
well-nigh
repercussions.
world
between
the
Western
of
interests
assume
an
it
is
false
to
over,
identity
andPersiaoverhowmuchoilshouldbe producedand towhomitwouldbe
exThe Persianscouldgetall theoil and foreign
soldand on whatterms.
For
all
these
reasons
the
from
much
reduced
need
operations.
changethey
involved.
hastokeepcontroloftherealresources
UnitedKingdom
Finally,
andpublicfeelinginEngland
thatParliamentary
thereistheconsideration
effective
controlof
wouldnotreadily
accepta positionwherewesurrender
an assetofsuchmagnitude.
(FO 377/Persia1951/91471.)
The thirdconclusion the Britishdrewwas thatthe crisiscould
end onlywiththe removalof Mossadeq fromthe scene. In the very
firstweek Mossadeq was elected premier,the Britishgovernment
2 The main worksare: Elwell-Sutton,1955; Lytle,1987; Bill and Louis, 1988; Elm, 1992;
Bamberg,1994; Farmanfarmaian,1997; and Heiss, 1997.
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190
SCIENCE àf SOCIETY
claimedthathe wasmerely
wave"and thatconridinga "temporary
cessionswouldonly"buttress"
him(FO248/Persia
. The
1951/38229)
Minister
assured
Dean
Truman's
of
Acheson,
Foreign
Secretary State,
thatMossadeqwouldnotlastlong,thatweakening
himwouldnot
riska communist
andthata "badagreement
wouldbeworse
takeover,
thanno agreement"
(FO 372/Persia1951/38229).
AnnLambton- deanofPersianstudiesinEnglandandformer
and
pressattachéin Teheran- spokestrongly
againstsettlement
insteadrecommended
thesystematic
of
"undermining"Mossadeq(FO
377/Persia1951/91609).The ForeignOfficereportedthatshe reweshouldcompeatedheremphatic"no"to thequestion"whether
Sheinsisted
promise."
Mossadeqwouldfallif"wekeptsteadynerves,"
and recommendedthattheAmericansshouldbe persuadedthat
settlement
wasimpossible.She added Americanshad neitherthe
northe"psychological
tounderstand
Iran.Simi"experience"
insight"
should"simmer"
foras long
larly,Shepherdsuggested
negotiations
as possibleuntila newgovernment
appearedin Teheran(FO 371/
Persia1951/91606):"Wecouldleavetheproposalson thetablefor
another
topickup.Wecouldpromptly
withdraw
thestaff
government
fromAbadanand oil fields.. . . Thiswouldmeanhisdownfall.
The
view
is
that
the
a
to
make
is
to
administer
Embassy
onlyway
progress
severeshockand to mustera firmfrontto Mussadiq'snegative
and
feminine
tactics"(FO 377/Persia1951/91580).
Thissummedup British
policytowardMossadeq- withsome
Atfirst,
theBritish
improvizations.
expectedMossadeqtocollapseof
hisownaccord;afterall,recentadministrations
inTeheranhad typilasted
ten
months.
Whenthisexpectation
did notmaterically
only
alize,theyactively
urgedtheshah,themajlis,and thesenateto removehim.Whenthese,in turn,failed,theytriedto destabilize
him
- through
economicpressures,
and
subsipropagandacampaigns,
diesto theopposition.
Finally,
theyturnedto theUnitedStatesand
harnessedtheCIA.
Whileawaiting
insisted
withmuch
Mossadeq'sdemise,theBritish
fanfare
were
more
than
to
"reasonable
they
willing accept
compromise."But,infact,theywerenegotiating
inbad faiththroughout
the
crisis:beginning
withtheHarrimanMissioninJuly1951 (Truman
sentAverell
Harriman
as hisspecialrepresentative
tobrokera deal);
with
the
Stokes
Mission
in
Richard
Stokes,the
continuing
August(Sir
LordPrivy
was
sentto Teheranto negotiate
on behalfofboth
Seal,
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THE COUP IN IRAN
191
withthedisfurther
AIOC and theLabourgovernment)
; continuing
in theautumnof
cussionsin theUN, theHague,and Washington
and
attheStateDepartment
1951;andendingwithmorediscussions
theWorldBankin 1953.ThosewhotookBritish
pressreleasesatface
failedbecauseof Iranianintransivaluebelievedthenegotiations
In
York
Timescoverarticleon theCIA
the
recent
New
gence. fact,
colWilber'sclaimthatthesenegotiations
reportrepeatsverbatim
of
because
16,
2000).
Mossadeq(April
lapsedentirely
reveala different
Confidential
British
memos,however,
picture.
ofnationalization
couldbe
StokestoldtheCabinetthatthe"principle
hadjustnationalized
a
accepted"- afterall,hisLabourgovernment
in England.Buthe stressed
thatin "thisparticular
seriesofindustries
case it could notbe genuineand practical"(FO 377/Persia1951/
shouldpublicly
91596).He addedthatBritain
acceptnationalization
In
he admitted
AIOC control. private
butinsiston clausesretaining
whileretainor facadeofnationalization
he wouldacceptthe"flavor
371
of
control"
substance
the
/Persia
1951/91471).
(FO
Duringthe
ing
the
issue
to
British
tried
the
Harriman
talks,
byconceding"aufudge
the
talks,
(iiö57i/Persia1951/1772).
DuringtheWashington
thority"
itknewtheothersidewouldreject
Office
proposals
putforward
Foreign
settlement
in ordertosabotagea "highly
(FO377/Perembarrassing"
of
Fuel
stated:
the
sia 1951/91603).
Likewise, Ministry
thatweshallbeable
orisreplaced,
itisjustpossible
IfDr.Musaddiq
resigns
moreon
out
and
work
nationalization
from
togetaway
something
outright
offer
be
to
.
.
.
It
would
thelinesofa partnership.
greater
certainlydangerous
bedone
inPersia.
ofoiloperations
realcontrol
might
Although
something
thatthePersians
wemustnotforget
toputmoreofa facadeonthesetup,
that
our
whenthey
arenotso farwrong
are,infact,
merely
say
proposals
inotherclothing.
1951/91587.)
(FO37i/Persia
dressing
upAIOCcontrol
lobbiedaggrestheBritish
outthenegotiations,
Whiledragging
withthe
much
effort
This
did
not
in
States.
the
United
require
sively
oil companies.Thesecompaniesmayhavefavoredthe50/50prinabhorredthenotionofnationalization.
Earlyin
ciple,butcertainly
thecrisistheBritishambassadorin Washington
reportedthatthe
concerned
about
were
American
"probablerepercussions
companies
in theirareas,includingLatinAmericaand Indonesia":"In these
hasbeenmoreon thelinesofourown
theirthinking
circumstances,
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192
SCIENCE àf SOCIETY
basiccontention,
confortheUK tomaintain
i.e.,thatitis necessary
trol"(FO 57i/Persia1951/91470).The Minister
forFuelnotedthat
RoyalDutchShellwasas concernedaboutthe"issueofcontrol"as
Oil ofNewJersey
andSoconyVacuumwere
AIOC,andthatStandard
their
best
to
convince
the
State
thatifnational"doing
Department
izationpaysoffin Persiait wouldhavedisastrous
effects
on their
concessions."
He assuredAIOC thatthe"bigAmericancompanies
do notsee it in theirinterests
to cometo an agreement
withIran"
(FO 37i/Persia1951/91610).
TheBritish
even
attheUN reported
thatHarriman,
representative
beforehisTeheranmission,
hadbeenpersuaded
American
by
companies thattoo manyconcessionswouldbe dangerousto "otheroil
producingcountries"(FO 377/Persia1951/91610).On hisreturn
Harriman
assuredtheBritish
that"an agreement
withMusaddiqwas
notpossible,"
to bring
and thetwopowersneededtoworktogether
abouta "changeofgovernment"
in Teheran(FO 577/Persia1951/
Office
and
discussions
between
theForeign
91472/91591
) . Inhigh-level
theStateDepartment,
thelatter
reassured
thatthey
endorsed
theformer
In
theirpolicyof"maintaining
control"(FO 577/Persia
1951/91471).
inIranwas
thetwoconcludedthatthe"situation
discussions,
follow-up
that
would
not
serious";
becomingincreasingly
relinquish
Mossadeq
thathisgovernment
was"essentially
a badgovernment";
and
"control";
thattheShahshouldbe "encouraged
to replacehimwitha general."
The meeting
setup a jointexploratory
themiligroupto "appraise"
situation
and
the
of
the
the
Shah"
of
the
to
tary
"question
loyalty generals
This
in
was
held
(/Ü37i/Persia
1952,
1952/98608). meeting
February
elevenmonths
beforeEisenhower
replacedTrumanbutthreemonths
afterChurchill
theLabourgovernment.
supplanted
The British
alsowageda propagandacampaign.
Theyrequested
theBBC todoubleitsPersian-language
andrequestedthe
programs,
ofitsuncooperative
in Teheranwitha special
replacement
reporter
wasto be
who,underno circumstances,
permanent
correspondent,
Professor
L. P. Elwell-Sutton,
a former
attaché
now
press
perceived
3The Britas beingpro-Iranian
(FO 37J/Persia
1951/91584/91536).
3 Throughout the 1950s, the Foreign Officepersuaded the Iranian governmentto keep
ProfessorElwell-Sutton
out of Iran on the groundshe was "anti-British,
anti-colonial,and
anti-Shah"(F.O. 577/Persia 1957/127074). Soon afterthe coup, Elwell-Sutton
wrotePersian Oil,a rare book in thatit was sympatheticto Mossadeq. No university
nor commercial press in England would touch it. It was published byLawrenceand Wishart.
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THE COUP IN IRAN
193
and Americannewspapers.
ishalso plantedarticlesin majorBritish
the
Observer
Characteristically,
profiledMossadeqas a "Robespierre
head"imperviand a "tragicFrankenstein"
witha "gigantic
fanatic"
ous to "commonsense"but"obsessedwithone xenophobicidea"
(May10, 1951). Timedescribehimas a "timid"manwhocouldbe"brave"when"emotionally
aroused"byhis"marcomedangerously
tyrdom
complex"(August22, 1951).
inpassingthat
noteintheForeignOffice
mentions
A handwritten
wassendingtothepressattachéinWashington
theTeheranEmbassy
fortheBBC."Itadded
ofsuitable
"asteady
poisontoovenomous
supply
was"making
thatWashington
gooduseofthispoison"(FO 248/Persia
deanofAmerican
1951/1528).4DrewPearson- thevenerable
jourPostthatHosseinFatemi,
in theWashington
nalism- claimedfalsely
severaltimesformisaphad beenconvicted
Iran'sForeignMinister,
Do Americans
offundsand courttampering.
want,he
propriation
the
such a crookto continue"masterminding
askedrhetorically,
decidewhether
"Thismanwilleventually
wholeMiddleEastoilcrisis?":
- or possibly,
we go intoWorldWar
whether
we haveoil rationing
to
wastempted
III" (July11,1951).The pressattachéinWashington
therumorthatMossadeq"indulged
thepublicbyspreading
"horrify"
in
248/Persm
1951/1527).
freely opium"(FO
thatthe
assuredothers,as wellas themselves,
Britishofficials
of
that
buta noisybunch malcontents";
NationalFrontwas"nothing
"eccentric,"
Mossadeq a "wilyOriental" was"wild,""erratic,"
"dema"dictatorial,"
"absurd,"
"fanatical,"
"gangster-like,"
"crazy,"
and
and
obstinate"; that
gogic,""inflammatory," "single-mindedly
"unandheadstrong,"
"tiresome
Iranianswerebynature"child-like,"
and unstable,"
"volatile
"sentimentally
mystiwillingtoacceptfacts,"
and
and
common
reason
listen
to
to
sense,"
cal,""unprepared
"swayed
content"
devoidofpositive
1951/98593/
(FO37//Persia
byemotions
"AComparison
Between
entitled
document
. In a printed
1772/1527)
sein General,"Shepherdinformed
Persianand AsianNationalism
wasnot
thatIraniannationalism
in theotherministries
niorofficials
hand":"thesalvation
neededa "guiding
and desperately
"authentic"
a
Power(rather
ofPersiawouldbe a twenty
by foreign
yearoccupation
liketheoccupationofHaitibytheUnitedStates)"(FO 371/Persia
4 For an excellentanalysisof how theAmericanmedia portrayedMossadeq, see W. Dormán
and M. Farhang,1987.
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194
SCIENCEàf SOCIETY
1951/91464). He added that Mossadeq was "cunning," "slippery,"
"completely unscrupulous," "shortwith bandy legs," "looks like a cab
horse," "diffusesa slight reek of opium," and is "clearly unbalanced"
since he shuns the titleExcellency,refusesto use the ministerialmotor
car, and, as finalclincher,has a "daughter in a mental home in Switzerland" (FO 377/Persia 1951/91459) . Another printed memo fromthe
British Embassy in Teheran theorized:
MostIraniansare introverts.
Their imaginationis strongand theynaturally
turnto the agreeable side of things- theylove poetryand discussion,parofabstractideas. Theiremotionsare strongand easilyaroused.But
ticularly
theycontinuallyfailto testtheirimaginationsagainstrealityand to subordinatetheiremotionsto reason.Theylack commonsense and theabilityto
differentiate
emotion fromfacts.Their well-knownmendacityis rathera
carelessnessto the truththana deliberatechoice of falsehood.This excess
ofimaginationand distasteforfactsleads to an inability
to go conscientiously
into detail.Often,not findingtheworldto theirdreams,theyrelapse into
indolence and do not persevere.This tendencyis exaggeratedbythe fatalism of theirreligion.They are intenselyindividualistic,
more in the sense
of pursuingtheirpersonalinterestthan in the noble one of wishingto do
thingson theirown withouthelp. Nearlyall classeshave a passion forpersonal gain and are readyto do mostthingsformoney.Theylack social conscienceand are unreadvtosubordinatepersonalinterests
to communalones.
are
vain
and
and
to
admit
to
themselves
thatthey
conceited,
They
unwilling
can be in thewrong.Theyare alwaysreadyto blame otherpeople. (FO 371/
Persia 1951/91460.)
Theseracialdiatribes
shouldnotbe mistaken
as therealreason
forthebreakdown
in negotiations,
as somein cultural
studieswould
- or thesideproduct- of
haveit.Theyweremerely
thereflection
thatbreakdown.
The rootreasonwastheBritish
realization
theyhad
fundamental
conflicts
withIranovercontrol.In otherwords,theimbutbecauseoftheclash
passecamenotbecauseofracialprejudices
ofeconomicinterests
betweenimperialism
and nationalism.
Whileawaiting
the
British
increasedeconomic
Mossadeq'sfall,
on
Iran.
froze
Iran's
assets
in London.They
pressures
They
sterling
forbadetheexportofoil equipmentto Iran.Theylobbiedin Washingtonagainstaid toIran- especially
againsta $25millionloanfrom
theExport-Import
Bank.TheypersuadedAIOC employeesnotto
workforIran;to makesureall resignedtheyinformed
themtheir
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THE COUP IN IRAN
195
intosterling.
salarieswouldnotbe convertible
Despitethelossofthis
Iran
to
the
Abadan
and themain
refinery
personnel, managed keep
also persuadedothersnotto buythis
oil wellsrunning.
The British
thefewtankers
to sue anywhodid,and intercepted
oil,threatened
thattriedtobreaktheembargo.
Thisembargowaseasytoimplement
oftheworld'stankers
ownedbythemajor
sincethevastmajority
weife
on
had
to
survive
an
"oil-less
It
oil companies.5
Iran,thus,
economy."
salafrozedevelopment
money;cutgovernment
projects;borrowed
ries;and printedpapermoneyto meetimmediate
expenses.
Britain
andIranreachedan impassebymidThestruggle
between
Britain
had failedto engineer
1952.For,despiteall ofthepressures,
aswellas the
becausethemajlisdeputies,
mainly
Mossadeq'sdismissal,
thepublic.
ofopenlyantagonizing
andtheshah,werefearful
senators
inJuly1$52.Secondedbythe
madeone moreattempt
The British
in thetwo
UnitedStates,theyurgedtheshahand theirsupporters
to AhmadQavam,a
to offerthepremiership
housesofparliament
veteranpolitician,
who,foryears,had opposeçlMossadeq'sforeign
policy.
The wholescheme,however,
turnedintoa bloodyfiasco
quickly
Tir(July21). Appealingto tjhepublic,Mossadeq
knownas Siyeh-e
wasaboutto bethandedback to the
the
oil industry
that
charged
in politicsthrough
hismaBritish
and thattheshahwasinterfering
he
the
forces.
armed
Citing constitution, argued
nipulationof the
should
thepremier
thatthemonarchshouldreignnotrule,and thjat
as wellas thewarminishavethepowertoappointthechiefsofstaff
and theneventually
fromtheNationalFront:
first
ter.Largecrowds,
into
clashedwith
came
TudehParty,
thestreets,
fromthecommunist
andafterthreedaysofbloodshed,
thearmy,
forcedtheshahnotonly
to recallMossadeqbutalso to givehimthewa|rministry
portfolio.
A dayafterthecrisis,theBritish
complained
ChargeD'Affaires
thattheshahhad "lostnerve"eventhoughthearmyhad kept"discipline"and thecasualtieshad been fewerthan20 dead and 200 in
later,thesamedipjured (FO 371/Persia1952/98602).Buttwodaiys
in theprovinces
weremuchmore
thatthe"disorders
lomatadmitted
over
had
that
crowds
severethanwe suspected,"
taken
Isfahan,and
and 155Pana395wereAmerican,
5 In 1951theworldhad 1500tankers:
2J4Norwegian,
manian- almostall ownedbythebigoil companies.
Only¡10wereownedbytheSoviets
and theEastEuropeans{F.O.377/Persia1951/91597).
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196
SCIENCE & SOCIETY
thatthedead therealonereached200 (K)577/Persia1952/98602).
He stressed
thata "coupis nownecessary
sinceMusaddiq'smegalomaniaisnowverging
on mentalinstability
andhe hastobe humored
likea fractious
child."He further
stressedthatLoyHenderson,the
American
nowconcurred
that"onlya coupd'etat"could
ambassador,
savethesituation:
so
themobas thesource
has
flattered
"Musaddiq
ofhispowerthathe has,I fear,madeitimpossible
fora successor
to
ousthimbynormalconstitutional
methods"(FO 37i/Persia1952/
likemuchoftheTrumanadminis98602).Untilthen,Henderson,
had favoredusingeconomicpressuresand constitutional
tration,
meansto removeMossadeq.
The dayaftertheJuly21,1952bloodshed,
theBritish
WarOffice
its
in
attaché
Teheran
with
the
telegraphed military
following
urgent
themoodin thearmedforces;
in theeventofa
theirloyalty
inquiries:
theirability
tocarry
"sharpclashbetweentheShahandGovernment";
outa coupd'etat;andtheir
possible
coupleaders(FO371/Persia1952/
attachéwhoearlierhad reported
thatuniforms
98602).The military
weresounpopular
in
were
on
of
the
streets
Teheran,
they spat
promptly
repliedwithfourprospective
coup leaders- includingGeneral
FazlullahZahedi.He notedwithreliefthatMossadeq'spolicyofcurinfluence
andretiring
136seniorofficers
hadalienated
tailing
military
thetopbrass(FO 377/Persia
1952/98638).
He alsoemphasized
thatthe"coupwouldhavetobe inthename
oftheShah."Thosefamiliar
withthereports
ofthemilitary
attaché
did notneed further
elaboration.
Eversinceascendingthethrone,
- muchas
theshahhad cultivated
thearmedforcesmeticulously
hisfatherhad done. He had takenpersonalinterest
in all matters
and maneuvers;
uniforms,
barracks,
military,
includinginspections,
lobbiedformoremilitary
and
modern
arms;jealously
expenditures
senior
to
the
war
guarded
appointments
ministry,
generalstaff,
army,
and,mostimportant
gendarmerie,
police,and military
intelligence;
of all, had personally
vettedpromotions
abovetherankof major,
suchbrigades
especiallyin thearmoredtankbrigades.Obviously,
- eitheragainstor forhim.
wouldbe criticalin anycoup attempt
The American
notedthataftertheJuly1952bloodbaththe
embassy
Shahcontinuedto havethepersonal"loyalty"
ofmanyofficers
even
and no
thoughhe had lostthepowerto makeseniorappointments
fromthechiefsofstaff,
longerreceived
weekly
reports
police,gendarand
merie, military
(FO 377/Persia1953/104601).
intelligence
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THE COUP IN IRAN
197
fortheCoup
Preparations
British
a majorboostwithEisenhower's
hopesfora coupreceived
unlikeitspreelectionin November1952.The newadministration,
nor
inoverthrowing
showedno compunction
decessor,
governments,
in beingidentified
withtheoil companies.It also beganwithsome
withthecrisissincebothJohnFosterDulles,the
personalfamiliarity
AllenDulles,DirectoroftheCIA,
ofState,and hisbrother
Secretary
in
firm
theAIOC in the
a
law
werelong-time
representing
partners
UnitedStates(Domi, 2000,581).
Threeweeksafterhiselectionand fiveweeksbeforehisinaugumetwithAnthony
Eisenhower
Eden,Churchill's
ration,
ForeignSecA
MI6
"Persian
week
to
discuss
the
later,
Question."
pursued
retary,
theCIA chief
thesamequestionin LondonwithKermitRoosevelt,
invited
Eisenhower
fortheMiddleEast.Soon afterhisinauguration,
Eden to theWhiteHouse to "findmoreimaginative
ways"ofsolving
theproblem(Ruehsen,1993,474). Accordingto theWilberdocument,thisgavetheCIAand MI6a greenlighttowage"justwar."The
camewitha blueprint
namedOperationBoot;theAmericans
British
in 1948againsttheTudehnamedBedamn;
camewitha projectstarted
and expandedintoTRAJAX.
thetwoplanswereconsolidated
They
inLondon,theninCyprus
withitsgoodcomsetup headquarters
first
linksto Englandand Iran.The finalplansweresigned
munication
with
onJuly11.Roosevelt,
onJuly1,and byEisenhower
byChurchill
no knowledge
ofPersianandlittleofIran,wasappointed"fieldcommander";he could travelin Iranwithoutbeingrecognized;as an
and as grandson
he had easyaccessto theU. S. embassy;
American
Roosevelt
he would
and nephewofFranklin
ofTheodoreRoosevelt
be listenedto bytheshahas thevoiceoftheAmerican
president.
tothewholeventure.
valuablecontributions
The British
brought
Iranhands.TheseincludedLanePayman,
First,
theyhadexperienced
thereclusive
diplomatin chargeoftheIrandeskat theForeignOfficesincethelate 1930s.In 1952theshahcomplainedthatPayman
1941abdication.
Otherswere
hisfather's
had personally
engineered
inPersian,
whohadbeen
an oldMI6handfluent
NormanDarbyshire,
Wheeler
inIranformuchofWorldWarII; ColonelGeoffrey
stationed
whohad been in and outofIransincethe1920sand had servedas
RobinZaehner,
fortherecentoil negotiations;
themaininterpreter
wholaterbecame
thepressattachéand experton Islamicmysticism
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198
SCIENCE äf SOCIETY
theOxfordProfessor
ofEasternReligionand Ethics;and,ofcourse,
Professor
LambtoninLondonwhocontinued
toinsistthatMossadeq
inTeheran,wasnot
mustbe overthrown.
MI6
chief
the
Woodehouse,
an Iranexpertbuthad muchcloak-and-dagger
fromthe
experience
GreekCivilWar.
had an informal
network
withinthearmed
Second,theBritish
forces.Datingfromthewar,thisnetwork
wasformed
ofconservative
officers
fromaristocratic
families:
GeneralHassanArfa,
Brigamostly
dierTeimourBakhtiyar,
ColonelHedayatollah
Gilanshah,
and,most
ofall,ColonelHassanAkhavi,
whoforyearshadbeenchief
important
of military
This
network
intelligence.
mostlythroughColonel
Akhavi promoteditsownmembers,
sidelinedleftists
fromsensitiveposts,and kepttheBritish
informed
aboutmilitary
matters,
parThustheMI6
aboutthepoliticalleaningsoffellowofficers.
ticularly
hadcompiledan impressive
"Who'sWho,"something
military
sorely
missedattheCIA.According
toWilber,
muchoftheMI6-CIApreparationsin Londoninvolvedstudying
thesepersonality
The
reports.
one clearlessonWilberdrewfromthewholeexperience
wasthatif
theCIAwasto pulloffsuchcoupselsewhere,
ithad tofirst
compile
In hisownwords,ithad to collectdeitsownmilitary
biographies.
tailedpersonalinformation,
"however
to knowexactly
"who
trivial,"
him
theofficer
what
makes
who
his
friends
etc."
is,
tick,
are,
in highplaces:ErnstPerron,the
had"friends"
Third,theBritish
Shah'schildhoodfriend
fromSwitzerland
(Perronlivedpermanently
in theroyalpalace); SoleimanBehbudi,thechiefofcourtprotocol;
a Zoroastrian
fromDelhiwhoworkedin TeheShapourReporter,
ranas CounselortotheIndianEmbassy,
as specialcorrespondent
to
theLondonTimes,
and as EnglishtutortoQueen Soraya(soonafter
thecoup he wasknighted);
MohammadBehbahani,the
Ayatollah
son ofa famousclericwhohad led the1905Revolution;
and,most
visibleofall,Sayyid
the
head
of
the
ZiyaTabatabai,
openlypro-British
NationalWillParty.SayyidZiyahad startedhiscareeras an Angloin the 1921coup,and served
philejournalistin 1919,participated
as
minister
before
briefly prime
beingexiledbyReza Shah. Since
his
to
the
oftenhadbeenpushedbythe
1941, candidacy
premiership
British
buthad been blockedbytheshahwhofearedhis
embassy,
ambitions.
theshahhadweekly
withhim
1953,
however,
By
meetings
- mainlyto soundouthispro-British
views.
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THE COUP IN IRAN
199
Fourth,theBritishhad contactsin lessvisiblebutequallyvital
Theseincludedsomechiefs
BoirAhmadi,
oftheBakhtiyari,
positions.
Arab
tribes(theBakhtiyaris
Khamseh,Moqaddam,and
Zolfoghari,
alone couldmobilizeover10,000armedmen).Thesecontactsalso
- Dad
includedtheeditorsofat leastthreevociferous
newspapers
,Atesh
(Fire),andForman
(Order)- amithethreeRashidian
(Justice)
British
whoimported
brothers
goodsandfinancedtheNationalWill
embassy
praisedthemas "loy&Pand "truefriends"
Party(theBritish
whokepta keen"eyefora businesschance")(FO 371/Persia1955/
had usefulcontactsin theba114811).The Rashidiansthemselves
nicknamed
Sha'ban Bimokh(Brainless),
zaar:withSha'banJafari,
themostdangerousgangleader;withguildeldersamongbutchers,
and withmiddleand sugarloaf-makers;
bakers,confectioners,
the
conservative!
with
clerics
associated
Mojahedin-eIslam
ranking
Islam(FO 24S/Persia1952/38572).
and theterroristic
Fedayyan-e
thattheRashidians
funrteled
Woodhouseestimates
everymonthat
and newspato theseclerics,
least10,000poundssterling
politicians,
editors.
per
Finally,theBritishhad been approachedbyGeneralZahedi,
as earlyas October1951.Zahedi
Interior
Minister,
Mossadeq'sfirst
a largefolas
the
best
himself
coupcandidatebyboasting
presented
he
did
havea
this
in
the
Although provedhollow,
military.
lowing
inhad
been
like
someofwhom, himself,
fewmilitary
supporters,
He alsohad
ternedduringthewarforhavinglinkstoNaziGermany.
mostofwhose
adherentsamongtheRetiredOfficers
Association,
had been recently
members
purged.
Zahedi'smainstrength,
however,
wingofthe
layin thereligious
NationalFront:Ayatollah
Kashani,theleadingcleric
Abul-Qassem
and
movement
inthenationalist
(Kashani Zahedihadbeeninterned
GonataShamseddin
inthesameBritish
campduringthewar); Seyyid
MuzafIslam;andthreevocaldeputies,
badi,headoftheMojahedin-e
Haerizadeh.In 1952,the
farBaqai,HosseinMakki,andAbul-Hassan
secular
and
the
between
'vingsoftheNational
religious
relationship
issues:theinterpretation
Fronthad strainedovera hostofsensitive
bazaartaxes,sale of alcoholic
of Quraniclaws,women'ssuffrage,
to theministohighoffices,
and appointments
especially
beverages,
TheBritish
triesofjusticeandeducation.
thus,
embassy, keptintouch
as wellas Sayyid
Zahedi
withtheseunlikely
Ziyaand
through
figures
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200
SCIENCE & SOCIETY
theRashidians
1952/986021951/1528;
FO37i/Persia
(FO248/Persm
These
ties
led
Iran
Alice
the
Zaehner
to
to
98603).
Through
equate
Glass
He
could
have
noted
that
(Woodehouse,1982,114).
Looking
theBritish
had foundthemselves
In May1952,
strangebed-fellows.
Zaehnerreported:6
Theinterview
endedwithan impassioned
oftheShah's
defense
byPerron
"astute"
He
claimed
that
Shah
had
in
the
succeeded
Kashani,
policy.
detaching
Makki
andBaqaifrom
andthatthanks
totheShahtheNational
Musaddiq
Front
hadpractically
ceasedtoexist.I didnotdispute
thisbutwouldput
onrecord
thatthedetaching
ofKashani
andMakki
wasduetoquiteother
andthatthesefactors
werecreated
anddirected
factors,
bythebrothers
Rashidian.
2^/Persia
(FO
1952/38572.)
TheAmericans,
tothecoupplanstheirown
meanwhile,
brought
assets- themostimportant
the
being embassy
compound.The embecame
crucial
after
October
when
1952
bassy
Mossadeq,citingBritishinterference
inIran,brokediplomatic
relations
withLondon.The
ForeignOfficecalculatedthatpersonnelwithdiplomaticstatusin
theU. S. embassy
numbered59,comparedto 21 in theSoviet,9 in
theFrench,and 21 in itsownembassy
beforethediplomatic
break
The
contained
(FO 37i/Persia1952/98606).
compoundobviously
CIA officials
withtheusualcoversas cultural,
press,labor,and commercialattachés.The Americans
also had 123 military
advisersasto
the
Iranian
and
377/Persia
1952/
(FO
signed
army gendermerie
These
both
in
started
were
led
General
missions,
1942,
98638).
by
RobertMcClure,an experton "psychological
warfare"
whohad rebeen rushedtoIranfromKorea.Theseadvisers
werein daily
cently
contactwithfieldofficers,
tank
commanders.
Since1946,
especially
thePentagonhad been sendinga steadystreamoftanksto Iran.In
1952alone,itdelivered
and tooktoAmericafortrain42 Shermans,
as
as
300
officers
377/Persia
(FO
1953/104572).The eming many
was
to
in
that
even
officers
1952
bassy happy report
by
handpicked
theMossadeqadministration
"amiable
toAmerican
advisers"
proved
. In preparing
forthecoup,McClureand
(FO377/Persia
1952/9859)
- evenBrigadier
hiscolleaguessoundedoutkeyofficers
Taqi Riyahi,
chiefofstaff(Nejati,1986,371).
Mossadeq'strusted
6 R. Zaehner,MeetingwithPerron,F.O. 24S/Persia1952/38572.
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THE COUP IN IRAN
201
The CIA's mainIran expertwasWilber.Oftendescribedas a
secretserviceofficer
spy,"he was,in fact,a professional
"gentleman
in
out
Middle
East
since
the1930sunder
had
and
of
the
who
traveled
arthistorian,
andexperton forged
variousdisguises archaeologist,
the
nearelimination
of
success
had
been
His
manuscripts. previous
thefamousPersianpoetLahutilivingin Moscow.Wilberhad forged
andpublished
his"memoirs"
them,claiming
theyhadbeensmuggled
Stalin'sparanoia.
outofRussia.Lahutihad beenluckyto survive
in TeherannamedRichard
The CIAalsohad a youngoperative
ofpoliticalscienceat
fellowand laterprofessor
Cottam.A Fulbright
notonly
Cottamcollectedinformation
ofPittsburgh,
theUniversity
EmsharedwiththeBritish
on theTudeh whichhe generously
lar
and
the
Toilers
but
also
on
right
Party
Arya(Aryan)
Baqai's
bassy
ofIran) (FO248/
Workers
andSUMKA(NationalSocialist
Party
Party
outdideachotherinmim. Thesetwomini-parties
Persia1952/1517)
ickingthe Nazis,especiallyin denouncingJewsand communists.
withZahediduringWorldWarII.
Theirleadershad been interned
newsCottamalsowrotearticlesthatwereplantedin thesubsidized
convicted
Fatemi
was
a
claimed
One
such
embezzler,
piece
papers.
as wellas
a well-known
homosexual,and a convertto Christianity
Bahaism.Thiswouldhaveearnedhimat leastthreedeathsentences
Islam
theFedayyan-e
Notsurprisingly,
intheeyesoffundamentalists.
The CIAwas
him(FO 377/Persia1953/104566).
triedto assassinate
in MossadeqsomeformofJewish
in finding
alsointerested
ancestry
1987,284).
(Gasiorowski,
localagents:ColonelAbbas
The CIAhadatleastfourimportant
"BoscoeBrothers."
the
so-called
and
Ehsam
Lankarani,
Farzanegan;
fromWashinghadjustreturned
a deskofficer,
ColonelFarzanegan,
Comtonwherehe hadreceiveda crashcourseon covertoperations.
knew
most
field
officers
to theGeneralStaff,
missioned
Farzanegan
witha drugproblem.
in Teheran.Lankaraniwasa Tudeh activist
Althoughnotin thepartyleadership,he came froma prominent
revoofbeinga daredevil
andenjoyedthereputation
family
religious
The
the
In
he
was
other
words,
perfectagent
provocateur.
lutionary.
most
and
were
as
named
Wilber
Boscoes,
simply Keyvani Jalali,
by
wasa reporter
and AliJalali.The former
Farrukh
Keyvani
probably
fortheDailyTelegraph
and a stringer
forEtteWat
1993,
(Bozorgmehr,
of
latter
was
the
The
188,190,209).
editor-publisherthejournalIran
to theTaj SportsClubas well
Thesetwohad connections
Parastan.
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202
SCIENCE & SOCIETY
as to weightlifters,
lutis(thugs),and chaqukeshan
(knifewielders)
associated
withtraditional
of
zurkhaneks
(houses strength).
TheyfunneledCIAfundsnotonlyintotheirownpapersbutalsointoKeyhan,
Mellat-eIran,Mellat-eMa, Aram,Setareh-e
Islam,and Asiay-e
Javanan.
RooseveltmentionsthattheCIA had promptedtheBoscoesto attacka Tudehrallyon thedayHarrimanarrivedin TeheraninJuly
1951.Whathe does notmentionis thattheattackresultedin heavy
casualtiesand wasinstigated
thelocalNazis.
through
the
CIA
links
with
thereligiouselementsofthe
Finally,
forged
NationalFront.In November1951,theBritishChargeD'Affaires
reportedthatKashanihad "putoutvariousfeelersand established
contactwiththeU. S. embassy
as wellas theShah" (FO 37i/Persia
1951/91465).The ForeignOfficeheardfromothersourcesthat
secretfundsfromtheAmericans
Baqai'sToilersPart)wasreceiving
In
the
weekofthecoup,theCIAchanCFO377/Persia
1951/91609).
neledso muchthrough
theclericsthattheterm"Behbahani
dollars"
and
the
black
market
value
of
the
dollar
fell
gainedcurrency,
byas
muchas third(Love,1960,40).
In preparing
forthecoup,theCIA and MI6 workedcloselyto
stiffen
theshah'sresolve.
toassurehimboth
Theysenttopemissaries
thatthecoup wasfeasibleand thattwopowerswerefully
behindit.
ColonelAkhavi,
theformer
chiefofmilitary
gavehima
intelligence,
listofkeyofficers
to
Princess
his
Ashraf, forceful
willing participate.
returned
homefromSwitzerland
atAllenDulles'behest,consister,
from
London
and Washington.
Roosevelt
veying
personalmessages
himself
into
the
a
of
number
times
to
smuggled
palace
bringpersonal
assurances
fromEisenhower.
NormanSchwarzSimilarly,
Brigadier
whohadheadedtheAmerican
from
mission
tothegendarmerie
kopf,
1942until1949,visited
TeheraninearlyAugusttorepeatthesesame
assurances.
He also tooktheopportunity
to see manyofhisformer
no
doubt
to
make
sure
threw
theirweightbehindthe
trainees,
they
coup.
theBritish
andtheAmericans
ascribedtheshah'shesiAlthough
tationtohis"Hamlet-like"
he
had
reasonsforhesitation.
personality,
He wantedfullassurancesthatkeyofficers
wouldsupporthim.He
alsowantedfirmcommitments
thatthecoup wouldbe followed
up
withlarge-scale
American
aidanda face-saving
In 1949,
oilagreement.
after
an assassination
on him,he hadcarriedouta mini-coup
attempt
the
and
himself,
revising constitution,
bolstering
royalprerogatives,
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THE COUP IN IRAN
203
hadheld
muchoftheopposition,
onlytofindtheAmericans
arresting
hadoffered
backon aidandtheBritish
theembarrassing
SupplemenThe TRAJAX
taryAgreement.
plansincludednotonlypromisesof
fromtheBritaid,"butalsowritten
guarantees
"adequateAmerican
in a spiritofgood
ishthattheywould"reachan earlyoil agreement
theshahwantedassurances
thatZahediwould
willandequity."
Finally,
threat.
Zahedioffered
tosignhisownundatedletnotposea future
terof resignation
(FO37i/Persia1953/104564).Havingobtained
theshahlenthisnameto thecoup - withone
thesereassurances,
He declinedto signtheroyaldecreedismissreservation.
significant
In case offailure,
he wantedplauas
ingMossadeq primeminister.
- which
Wilberhad to forgetheroyalsignature
sibledeniability.
meansthelegalcoverforthecoupwasitselfbogus.7
TheCoup
andtheUnitedStates
Inthemonths
leadinguptothecoup,Britain
whatWilberdescribesas a "warofnerves"and "massive
intensified
weakenthe Mossadeq
propagandacampaigndesignedto further
itas "fain anywaypossible."Thisinvolvedportraying
government
the
Islam,"
communists,"
"threatening
"creating
publicdisorvoring
and
to
der,""giving
politicians," "deliberately
power unscrupulous
to economicdisorder."
Eisenhower,
according
leadingthecountry
to Time,announcedAmericawasnotwillingto buyIranianoil or
extendeconomicaid so longas Mossadeqrefusedto resolvethedisdescribedthisas
20,1953).The U. S. embassy
putewithBritain(July
"oneofa seriesofshocktreatments"
(FO 377/Persia104572).
to propaganda
The destabilizing
campaignwas not restricted
to
the
tribes.
Lessquietly,
were
activities.
droppedquietly
Weapons
linkedto Zahediand
an armedgang- formedofretiredofficers
Mossadeq's
Baqai - kidnappedGeneralMohammadAfshartous,
chiefofpolice(Sarreshteh,
1994,37-85).A fewdayslater,hisbadly
toColonelNasiritheShahsignedthedethataccording
7 In theCIAmemo,Wilberwrites
In a concreeat theurgingofQueenSoraya,butaddsthat"thiscan notbe confirmed."
thathe himself
had
withmein 1969,Wilberleftmewiththedistinct
versation
impression
waspostponedbytwo
Thismayexplainwhythefirst
coupattempt
forgedthesignature.
and a mixupwiththe
claimsthedelaywasdue to Iranianincompetence
days.Roosevelt
decreein theroyalpalace.Butitcouldhavebeendue to thedecreebeingflownoutto
ofMossadeq'shome,theoriginaldecree
theransacking
forWilbertosign.After
Cyprus
conveniently
disappeared.
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204
SCIENCE & SOCIETY
tortured
bodywasdumpedoutsideTeheran.Thiswasa majorblow
to thegovernment.
It provedthateventhepolicechiefwasvulnerin
even
downtown
Teheran.It senta clearwarningto other
able,
officers.
Itcreatedan auraofacuteinstability.
Anditprompted
rumors
thatotherswereon a hitlist.WhenMossadeqcanceledpublicapbusinessfromhis
pearancesand insteadcarriedout government
he
the
Western
media
claimed
was
residence,
beingparanoidand
A noteattheForeignOfficestatedambiguously:
melodramatic.
'You
it
that
the
comwell
consider
desirable
to
about
the
story
might
put
munists
are plotting
to plant
againstMusaddiq'slife,and are trying
theresponsibility
ontotheBritish"
(/0377/Persia1952/9859).
Along
similar
bombedthehomeofa prominent
cleric,and
lines,Lankarani
sentleaflets
toothersin thenameoftheTudehheralding
theimminentdawnofa bright
new"atheistic"
This
some,
republic. frightened
future
leadersoftheIslamicRepublic(Kianuri,
1992,252).
including
Wilberalsowrites
wereplantedin Western
thatsuitablearticles
and
then
in
Publications
such
Iranian
papers
replanted
newspapers.
as Newsweek
raisedthehue and crythatthecountry
wason theedge
offalling
intothecommunist
abyss(August10,1953).Theyclaimed
thattheTudehhadinfiltrated
theNationalFront;thatleadingmem- namely,
bersofthegovernment
Fatemi,Abdol-Ali
Lofti,theJus- weresecret
ticeMinister,
andMehdiAzar,theEducationMinister
thatMossadeqwasabouttomakea dealwiththeSovifellow-travelers;
ets;and thatifhe did notdo so theTudehwaspoisedto launchan
armedinsurrection.
thecrisis,the"communist
Throughout
danger"wasmoreofa
rhetorical
devicethana realissue- i.e.,itwaspartofthecold-war
discourse.The British
and Americangovernments
knewMossadeq
wasas distrustful
oftheSovietUnionas oftheWest.In fact,theyoften
toeachotherabouthis"neutralism."
complained
Theyknewperfectly
wellthatthe so-called"fellow-travelers"
werestaunchnationalists
(afterthecoupsomeofthemobtainedrefugein theUnitedStates).
Theyalso knewthattheTudeh,eventhoughthelargestpolitical
wasin no positiontoseizepower(F0 37i/Persia1952/
organization,
1981/CIA/
98597;K)371/Persia1953/104573;
Documents/
Declassified
Doc 276). Despite20,000membersand 110,000sympathizers,
the
Tudehwasno matchforthearmedtribesand the129,000-man
miliWhatis more,theBritish
andAmericans
had enoughinsideintary.
formation
tobe confident
thattheparty
hadno planstoinitiate
armed
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THE COUP IN IRAN
205
insurrection.
Atthebeginning
ofthecrisiswhentheTrumanadministration
wasundertheimpression
a compromise
waspossible,
Acheson
if
had stressed
thecommunist
and
warned
danger
Mossadeqwasnot
helpedtheTudehwouldtakeover(FO 37i/Persia1051/1530).The
hadretorted
thattheTudehwasnorealthreat
Office
(FO371/
Foreign
Persia1952/98608).But,in August1953,whentheForeignOffice
claimthattheTudehwas
administration's
echoed theEisenhower
thattherewasno suchcomabouttotakeover,Achesonnowretorted
Acheson
washonestenoughto
munist
1979,
88).
(Roosevelt,
danger
admitthattheissueoftheTudehwasa smokescreen.
The planforthecoup itself
wasstrikingly
simple.In themiddle
ofthe700thecommander
ColonelNehmatollah
ofonenight,
Nasiri,
and
manImperialGuards,wasto takeone armoredcar,sixofficers
in
the
chief
one
clear
arrest
ofsoldiers,
twotruck-loads
and,
swoop,
ofstaff
and theleadingministers,
manyofwhomshareda homein
northern
Teherannear the Imperialbarracks.Nasiriwas thento
to
proceed Mossadeq'sresidenceand deliverhimtheroyaldecree
him.Ifhe refusedto abide bythedecree,Nasiriwasto
dismissing
ofImperialGuards
anothercontingent
him
arrest too.Meanwhile,
wastocutthephonelinestothebazaarand takeoverthemaincomofthechiefsofstaff.
centeras wellas theheadquarters
munications
Atthesametime,Zahediwastoheada tankconvoyto theradiostationwherehe wouldreadtheroyaldecreenaminghimpremier.
wasexpected.Mossadeqwasprotectedbythe
Littleresistance
Guards.Althoughofficered
armed
Customs
byColonelAli
lightly
of
and
a
nationalist
a
staunch
Danari,
nephew Mossadeq,theseguards
command
of GeneralMohammadDaftari,
wereundertheoverall
wassecretly
tiesto theprimeminister,
who,despitehisownfamily
Akhavi
had
is
McClure
and
What
with
the
more,
royalists.
cooperating
in
those
most
of
the
tank
over
won
commanders,
especially
quietly
later
in
Teheran.
One
officer
barracks
northern
Sultanabad
thelarge
adwrotethatin thedaysleadingup to thecoup American
military
thebarracks,
visited
andFarzandegan
aswellas ColonelsAkhavi
visers
blocto a
thatMossadeqwastheonlystumbling
tellingcommanders
to
the
oil settlement
favorable
coup
(Nejati,1999,81). According
wouldwakeup in themorningwitha
plans,Mossadeqsupporters
wereexpectedto stayhome- esKashanisupporters
faitaccompli
Behbahanihad obtainedfromGrandAyapeciallysinceAyatollah
a
new
tollahBoroujerdi
fatua(decree)againstcommunism.
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206
SCIENCE àf SOCIETY
In casetheTudehandremaining
members
oftheNationalFront
- theIranParty,
Sevom
theMellat-e
IranParty,
andtheNiru-ye
(Third
confident
of
came
into
the
the
were
streets, coupplanners
Force)
inTeheran,four the
them.Ofthefivebrigades
stationed
crushing
and the
FirstMountain,theSecondMountain,theFirstArmored,
command
ofroySecondArmored
were
under
the
direct
Brigades
alists.Onlyone - theThirdMountainBrigade- wascommanded
ColonelEzatollahMumtaz.Butevenhissecond-inbya nationalist,
commandwasin theroyalist
July1952,Brigadier
Riyahi,
camp.After
thechiefofstaff,
had placedthesefivebrigades
underthecommand
- mostofwhom,likehimself,
ofnationalists
tothe
weresympathetic
Butmost
IranParty
French
academies.
andhadgraduated
from
military
of thefieldcommandshad remainedin royalist
handstrainedin
America
and Britain.
as wellas theshah,hadbeenassured
Roosevelt,
and
thatmostofthe40 linecommandColonels
Akhavi
by
Farzanegan
ersin Teheranwouldsupportthecoup.Mumtaz'sThirdMountain
muchresistance
sinceitwasan inBrigadewasnotexpectedto offer
In
the
event
it
did
the
could
so,
fantry
contingent.
unlikely
royalists
in
counton tankreinforcements
rushed
from
Kermanshah
being
by
ColonelBakhtiyar
andfromRashtbyColonelValiallahQarani.Wilber
boaststhattheCIAdidnotspend"onecent"topurchase
theseofficers.
To givethecoupa veneerofpopularsupport,
theRashidians
and
theBoscoebrothers
weretogatherinthebazaarmembers
ofSUMKA,
fromtheTagClub,as wellas lutis,
Islam,athletes
Aryaand Fedayan-e
and
from
the
red
Thismotley
crew
thugs, hanger-ons
lightdistricts.
wastoproceedtotheradiostation,
on
the
the
loot
homes
of
and,
way,
cabinetministers
as wellas theoffices
ofpro-Mossadeq
organizations.
Attheradiostation,
weretobejoinedbytruckloads
offarmhands
they
in
the
from
and
General
Arfa'sestates
brought by army
Sayyid
Ziya's
outsideTeheran.In otherwords,themainfunction
ofthecrowdwas
toprovidethecoupwithacoustical
side-effects.
Theplanwasputintoeffect
inthelatehoursofAugust15 (Davarwenthaywire
whenan ImperialGuard- most
Pana,1979). Itquickly
a secretTudehmember- tippedoffhisparty
leaderswho
probably
in turntippedoffMossadeq.8Riyahi,
thechiefofstaff,
rushedrein8 The Tudeh had twomemberswithinthe ImperialGuards:MajorAbdul-SamadKhair-Khah
and Major Mehdi Homayuni.For the possiblerole of thesetwoin preventing
thecoup, see
1980,278-79; Kianuri,1992,264-66; Amir-Khosravi,
1996,526-27; Khosrowpana,
Javanshir,
1998, 241-73.
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THE COUP IN IRAN
207
to thepremier'sresidencefromtheThirdMountain
forcements
- havingarrested
Nasiriarrivedthereat midnight
When
Brigade.
ministers
he
was
notonlybythe
Fatemiand twoother
confronted
Guardsbutalsobyinfantry
Customs
troopsbackedwithheavyarmor.
InsteadofNasiriarresting
Mossadeq,Mossadeqhad Nasiriarrested.
also
dismissed
the
decreeas a fake,arguingthattheshah
Mossadeq
could not havesignedit sincehe did not have theconstitutional
to removeprimeministers.
authority
afterthefiasco,Riyahiroundedup theobvioussusImmediately
officers
fromtheImperialGuards(including
the
inadvertently
pects:
thosewhohad savedtheday);Perronand Behbudifromthepalace;
ColonelAkhavi;
BaqaiandMakkifromthemajlis;andGeneralNader
Buttheywereall
Association.
Officers
from
Batmangelich theRetired
totakeresidence
Akhavi
was
even
in
permitted
placed low-securityjails;
ill.
he
did
was
in a hospitalon thegrounds
however,
seriously Riyahi,
anda fullbattalion
outside
theradiostation,
managetoplacethreetanks
thepremier's
three
tanks
outside
with
theThirdMountain
from
Brigade
sense
ofsecua
false
the
Thesemeasures
residence.
gave government
his
on
the
shah
fled
On hearingofthefiasco,
plane
single-engine
rity.
in Cyprus
toBaghdad.The coupplanners
gaveup in desperation.
a newplan.He eventhreatButinTeheranRoosevelt
improvised
talk(Dorril,2000,592).
ened to killanyoneindulgingin defeatist
the
four
Underthenewplan,
royalist
brigadeswouldcarryout the
whiletankreinforceas wellas occupythestrategic
arrests
positions,
mentswouldstartrollingtowardTeheranfromRashtand Kermanfrom
shah.Butforthefourroyalist
brigadesto obtainammunition
off
a
countermove
without
and
sparking
closelyguardeddepots
hituponan ingeniousidea: Mossadeqwouldbe
Roosevelt
reaction,
intocallingin thebrigadeshimself.
hoodwinked
Wilber,as wellas
Rooseveltand Woodhouse,leavethismostinnovative
aspectofthe
amAmerican
to
the
so
as
not
implicate
coup outoftheiraccounts
on August19.
bassador.The newplanwasputintoeffect
Twodaysearlier- on August17 - Hendersonhad requested
afterthebotchedatwithMossadeq.Immediately
an urgentmeeting
a
to
Teheran
on
back
had
rushed
plane.
specialmilitary
tempt,he
He had beenabsentfor11 weeksin parttohelpplanthecoupfrom
overthrow
abroad,andinparttobe outofsightwhentheanticipated
occurred.At theairport,he wasgreetedbyMossadeq'sson and a
ofmilitary
guards.Mossadeq'ssonwastheretokeeplines
contingent
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208
SCIENCE & SOCIETY
theambassador
from
opentotheUnitedStates;theguardstoprotect
crowds
the
streets
the
angry
roaming
denouncing shah,callingfora
and
down
republic, pulling
royalstatues.Althoughmostof these
demonstrations
werespontaneousreactionsagainsttheattempted
some
were
and the
coup,
organizedbyLankarani,theRashidians,
Boscoebrothers.
to
these
burned
down
the
According Wilber,
agents
offices
oftheMellat-eIranPartyand lootedstoresin downtown
Teheran- all in thenameoftheTudehParty.
Hendersonhad hisprivatemeetingwithMossadeqin thelate
afternoon
ofAugust18.A shortand misleading
ofthisinsummary
terview
wassentto theStateDepartment
But
byHendersonhimself.
a farmoredetailedone appearedin an uncharacteristically
informativepiece in Time.9
HendersonbeganbyhintingthatWashington
wasnotsurewhether
Mossadeqwasstillthelawfulprimeminister.
countered
that
Mossadeq
accordingto theconstitution
parliament
hadtheauthority
toelectpremiers,
he wouldremain
and,therefore,
so untilthenextparliament
convened:he stressed
elections
fora new
would
be
in
held
the
immediate
future.
parliament
HendersoncontinuedbywarningthatIrancouldnotpossibly
whilecrowdsroamedthestreets
expectU. S. sympathy
threatening
American
and
He
'Yankee
Go
Home!"
threatened
property shouting
- embassy
toevacuateallAmericans
staff
as wellas womenand children- unlessfirmandpromptactionwastakentoestablish
lawand
order.Thissoundedlikean ultimatum:
ifsuchactionwasnottaken
theUnitedStateswouldcease recognizing
Mossadeqas thelawful
head ofgovernment.
Henderson
heldoutthe
Conversely,
implicitly
if
such
action
was
taken
the
United
States
would
consider
promise
further
In Henderson'spresence,Mossadeqtelephoned
assistance.
themilitary
ofTeheranand orderedhimto use necessary
governor
forceto clear the streets.Timecommentedthat"thingsbegan to
afterthisinterview,"
and thatMossadeq's"fatal
happenimmediately
mistake"
wasthisunleashing
ofthearmy(August31, 1953)
not
banned
streetdemonstrations
butalso apMossadeq
only
General
Daf
his
who
was
withthe
tari, nephew
pointed
secretly
working
9 "IranMob, RiotfortheirShah," Time,August31, 1953. OnlyHendersoncould haveleaked
thisinformation
about his privateinterview
withMossadeq. In his officialreportto Washington,he played down his ultimatum.See U. S. Embassy,"The Ambassador'sInterview
withMossadiq,"in F.O. ?77/Persia1953/104570.Henderson's privatepapersconfirmthe
longer unofficialversionas reportedin Time.See Ruehsen, 1993, 479-80, 486.
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THE COUP IN IRAN
209
chiefofpoliceas wellas military
ofTeheran.The
coupists,
governor
National
as
well
as
the
Tudeh
to
form
a
united
asked
Front,
front,
eager
theirsupporters
tostayoffthestreets.
The U. S. embassy
telegraphed
thatMossadeqhimself
had orderedthearmyintothe
Washington
In a post-mortem
streets
on thecoup,
(FO 371/Persia1953/104570).
theBritish
remarked
that
"orders
to
break
embassy
Mossadeq's
updemonstrations
in hisdownfall"
wasinstrumental
(FO 377/Persia1953/
theForeignOffice,commenting
on a sanitized
104572).Similarly,
U. S. embassy
stressed
the
that
"crucial
in thewhole
moment"
report,
crisis
camewhenMossadeqsentthearmy
intothestreets
(FO371/Persia
1953/104572).
ThusAugust19 beganwithMossadeqsupporters
avoidingthe
streets
whiletheroyalist
as
well
as
the
brigades,
policeand gendarmoved
into
the
heart
of
the
with
orders
fromthegovmerie,
city
ernmentitselfto establishlawand order.Mostcrucialof all, the
FirstArmoredBrigadereadilyobtainedfueland ammunition
for
its32 tanksfromthequatermaster
attheSultanabadbarracks.
MeanThirdMountainBrigaderemainedin barwhile,thepro-Mossadeq
confident
that
these
werefortheprotecracks,
troopmovements
tionofthegovernment
itself.
Once in thecity,theroyalist
brigades
the
the
swiftly
implemented originalcoupplan.Theyoccupied main
communication
centerand theradiostation;cut telephonelines
to thebazaar and theThirdMountainBrigade;releasedroyalist
(theImperialGuardsas wellas gangleadersand thekillers
prisoners
ofAfshartous);
and arrestedthechiefofstaff
and someoftheleadministers.
ing
Atthesametime,troopsescorted
a motley
crewas itmovedfrom
southern
Teheranburning
theoffices
offiveorganizations
andeight
Not
Western
were
too
newspapers. surprisingly,
journalists
busyto
these
"true
of
the
One
such
photograph
representatives public."
jourin passingthatthe"royalist
nalistmentioned
crowd"- armedwith
clubs- numbered
lessthan500andswelledto3000onlybecauseof
thearrival
ofsoldiers,
and gendarmes(Marigold,1953).
policemen,
Anothercalledit a "grotesqueprocession"(Harkness,1954). The
crowdalso mayhavecontainedsomeKashanisupporters;
an Iraqi
return,
diplomatreportedthattheshah,a dayafterhistriumphant
tookthe"unprecedented
of
on
Kashani
at
his
house
and
step calling
him
for
his
in
the
restoration
of
the
monarthanking
cooperation
chy"(FO 371/Persia1953/104571).
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210
SCIENCE àf SOCIETY
Thefinalactcameintheafternoon
as 27 Sherman
tanksbesieged
residence
defended
Colonel
Mumtaz's
battalionand
Mossadeq's
by
histhreetanks.The battlelastedthreehoursand leftmuchofthe
buildingin ruins.Duringthesiege,Tudehleadersoffered
helpbut
declined
a
either
because
he
had
realistic
assessment
Mossadeq
oftheircapability,
or becausehe stillbelievedin Henderson(evenat
histrialhe didnotpublicly
blametheUnitedStates).Mossadeqmay
also haveactedas he did becausehe did notwantfurther
violence;
thosetrappedwithhimreportedthathe refusedto appeal evento
hisNationalFront.10
One minister
explainedthathe wantedtoavoid
civilwarat all costsbecauseitcouldhaveled to a British
and Soviet
of Iran (Ladjevardi,1993,"Interview
withMehdiAzar").
partition
to
the
New
York
Times
who
According
reporter, wason thescene
the
in
the
casualties
thepitchedbattleoutsidethe
throughout coup,
Premier's
hometotaled100woundedand300dead (August
20,1953).
Time
estimate
1953).ButArnaudde Burchgavea similar
(August31,
then
for
and latereditoroftheWashNewsweek
grace,
correspondent
arrived
on
the
scene
a
week
laterto claimthatonly63
Times,
ington
had died in "thispublicrevulsion"
againstMossadeq (August31,
theChristian
Science
Monitor
claimedthata "popular
1953).Similarly,
had
occurred
because
the
Shah
was
"liberal,"
uprising"
"progressive,"
and a "truechampionofreform"
whileMossadeqhad been "nihilisand "indulgedin an orgyofmobrule"(Septemtic,""anti-foreign"
ber 21-22,1953). Of course,thefewpaperspublishedin Teheran
avoidedcasualty
and insteadwaxedeloquenton how"patrifigures
oticpeople"fromthebazaar,thepoorsouthern
and "even
districts,
fromneighboring
had
into
central
villages" enthusiastically
poured
Teheranto expresstheirundying
devotionto theirShah.
The dusthad notyetsettledbeforeEisenhowertolda White
Houseaudiencethatthepatriotic
withthepublichad
armytogether
"savedtheday"becauseoftheirrevulsion
and
againstcommunism
loveforthemonarchy
Documents/
1978/WhiteHouse/
(Declassified
Doc 318). Thissetthetoneforthreedecades- especially
foracademics
with"insideknowledge."
PeterAvery,
inPersianatCambridge
Lecturer
claimedthe"tidehad turned"againstMossadeqentirely
University,
- histantrums,
becauseofhisownshortcomings
flirtations
withthe
10 Forevidenceof theTudehofferto help,see FO 57i/Persia1957/127075;
Davar-Pana,
1979;Kianuri,1992,27(>-79.
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THE COUP IN IRAN
211
to compromise
methods,
and,ofcourse,inability
Tudeh,dictatorial
Professor
of
withBritain(Avery,
1965,416-19).GeorgeLenczowski,
PoliticalScienceat Berkeley,
arguedthat"dedicated"civilians
offoreigntroops"- had "preserved"
theintervention
the
"without
to
remove
the
"discountry's
"independence"
byfighting
heroically
Cottam
sidentpremier"
1979,443,451,465) . Similarly,
(Lenczowski,
- evenafterhisdisenchantment
withtheCIAand theshah- maina "spontaneous
tainedthatAugust19 had been predominantly
upand
"disillusionfear
of
communism
the
reflecting country's
rising"
ment"withMossadeq(Cottam,1964,224-29).
Aftermath
oftheoil industry.
thedenationalization
The coup inaugurated
a
ofmajor
to
consortium
The newgovernment
gavea concession
theNationalIranianOil Companyremained
companies.In theory,
in charge,but in realitythisconsortium
gainedfullcontrolover
ofoil. In this
and
distribution
refining,
production,
management,
Oil
to
the
shares
went
of
40% controlling
consortium,
Anglo-Iranian
Company,renamedBritishPetroleum;14% to itsallyRoyalShell
voteto theBritish);40% to a groupofAmeri(thusgivingmajority
and theremaining
canfirms;
6% wentto theFrenchstatecompany.
to
was
The consortium
give50% of profitsto Iran. In thewords
wasfoundthat"gave
"a formula"
ofthenewBritish
ChargeD'Affaires,
thecontroltheyconsideredessential"(FO 371/Pertheconsortium
theUnitedStates
sia1954/114805). To makethedealmorepalatable,
million
rushedin Sepof
in
aid
on
sentIran$40 million
top $28
deliveredthedayafterthecoup.
and $5 millionsecretly
tember,
Immean eraofpoliticalrepression.
The coupalsoinaugurated
his
closest
arrested
the
the
after
Mossadeq,
military
coup,
diately
The figure
climbedtoover
andsome1200Tudehactivists.
ministers,
4000byAugust1954whenarmyintelligence,
helpedbytheCIA,unthearmed
oftheTudehwithin
of520members
anorganization
covered
This
forces(Zibayi,1955-57;Military
Governor,
1956).
impressiveledsometowonderwhytheTudehhadnotforestalled
lookingfigure
overall
to themilitary's
thecoup.In fact,thetotalwassmallrelative
non-commissioned
and
commissioned
of
over
51,000
15,000
figure
officers
(FO 371 /Persia1950/82356).Whatis more,thevastmajorand offiinstructors,
ityofthe520 werecadets,doctors,engineers,
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2 12
SCIENCE & SOCIETY
intheprovinces.
cersinthepolice,gendarmerie,
andinfantry,
mostly
inTein
the
tank
were
and
two
had
commands
26
Only
cavalry, only
heran(onehelpeddefendMossadeq'sresidence
andtheotherfought
outsidetheradiostation)(Mohammedi,
1993-95,1999).
The newregime,
on thewhole,dealtleniently
withtheNational
Frontbutharshly
withtheTudeh.Mossadeqas wellas mostofhis
ministers
andtrusted
sentences.
officers
weregiventhree-year
military
Mossadeq'smuchpublicizedtrialproveda majorembarrassment;
himon trial,he managedtoput
insteadofthemilitary
courtputting
thecourton trial.Of hisministers,
onlyFatemiwasexecuted;after
thefailedcoup attempt,
he had calledfortheestablishment
ofa reintheTudehunderAugust19,he hadtakenshelter
public,andafter
and
had
for
a
Tudeh-National
Front
alliance.
ground
pushed
Harshtreatment
wasmetedouttotheTudeh.Between1953and
to death11 ofitsmembers;
executed31;
1958,theregimetortured
condemnedto deathanother52 (theirsentenceswerecommuted
to lifeimprisonment);
condemnedanother92 to lifewithhardlafromone to 15years.Accordbor;and gavehundredstermsvarying
to
British
American
and
thefirst
executions
were
ing
embassy
reports,
butthelateroneswerekeptsecretbegivenmuch"gorypublicity,"
cause of "publicrevulsion,"
becauseof the"bravado"and "uncomdefiance"
ofthosefacingdeath,becauseofthereluctance
promising
offiring
to
shoot
ofall,because
and,mostimportant
squads
straight,
of"widespread
the
suspicion"thattheUnitedStateshad pressured
shahintosuch"un-Persian"
behavior(FO 377/Persia1954/104805;
1975 /CIA/Doc 309A).
Documents/
Declassified
Thesesuspicions
werewellfounded.
TheForeign
Office
explained
thatthemagnitude
oftherepression
wasdue tothe"desiretoimpress
theU. S. government
fromwhichso muchis expected"(FO 377/Persia 1953/104573).
In a detailedstudy
on theTudeh,theU. S. embassy
that
massive
would
breakitandsocioeconomic
argued only
repression
wouldhavelittleeffect,
sincemostparty
members
were
improvements
eitheremployedprofessionals
or relatively
workers
well-paid
factory
The reportproposed"suppression
for
(FO377/Persia
1953/104573).
sometimetocomeon thesameprinciple
thata brokenlegis placed
in a castto preventharmful
movement
untilthefracture
has been
Itaddedominously:
"Thenotionthatcommunism
healthily
rejoined."
feedson suppression
is itself
communist
inspired."
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THE COUP IN IRAN
213
failed
Theoriginal
TRAJAX
planhadwarnedthatiftheoperation
- CIAjargonfor
a major"blowback"
theUnitedStatescouldsuffer
relations
and expuldamage- in theformofa breakin diplomatic
Of course,thecoup succeededand no such
sionofall Americans.
Butifanyoftheoriginalplannersarestillalive
"blowback"
occurred.
werefarmore
welladmitthatthelong-term
consequences
theymight
Thecouptarred
America
withtheBritish
brush:beingperdisastrous.
ceivedas the"colonialpower,"a perceptionthatcreateddeep disthat
trustbetweenIranand UnitedStates.It setup a dictatorship
in
the
cofand
It
a
nail
becameincreasingly
unpopular corrupt. put
it
to
the
finofthesamemonarchy
imperial
linking
byinseparably
itwiththeshah,the
thearmybyidentifying
powers.It discredited
thesecularparties- boththeTudeh
CIA,and theMI6.Itdestroyed
and theNationalFront- and so pavedthewayfortheemergence
ofKhomeini'sreligiousopposition.The "neutralist"
Mossadeqwas
Khomeini.
The Mossadeqmoveexchangedforthe"fundamentalist"
evenbutthesameliberation
mentfailedtobringnationalliberation;
The
Khomeini
movement.
the
in
of
the
came
coup's
shape
tually
on Iranianculturewasequallydeep:thesuspicionthatsinisimprint
thatonlyforce
hands"controlled
ter"foreign
Iran;andtheconviction
of 1953.In short,thecoup strucka hard
couldforestall
repetition
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In
blowat liberalism
as wellas at socialismand secularnationalism.
1981- on the14thanniversary
ofMossadeq'sdeath- AliKhamenei,
thena relatively
unknown
Khomeinidiscipleand nowLeaderofthe
IslamicRepublic,declared:"Weare notliberals,likeAllende(and
out."Suchattitudes
continueto
Mossadeq)whomtheCIAcan snuff
casta longshadowon contemporary
Iran.
BaruchCollege/CUNY
1 7 Lexington
Avenue
New York,NY 10010
edu
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cuny.
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