THE FIRST CHECHEN WAR
ANDRES EDUARDO FERNANDEZ OSORIO1
HIGHER SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
FACULTY OF WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
CIVIL WARS: CAUSES, DYNAMICS, TERMINATION
MOSCOW
15 DECEMBER 2013
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Beneficiario COLFUTURO 2011
Andres Eduardo Fernandez Osorio
Civil wars: causes, dynamics, termination
Introduction
During the past decades, one of the most significant discussions in social and political science
about different forms of political violence has been related to the study of civil wars. In recent
years, there has been an increasing interest in determining their causes in order to prevent
their outbreak. However, a major problem is that many scholars differ over the constitutive
elements of civil wars and they have failed to provide a unified definition of what a civil war
is. The case of Chechnya, for instance, has been under the scrutiny of a multitude of experts
and international organisations looking forward to understanding the rationale behind one of
the bloodiest conflicts of the twentieth century. As a result, many books have been written and
several policy pieces have been offered to both sides – the Russian Federation and the
Chechen Republic – but the results have been less fruitful than expected.
This essay aims to analyse the First Chechen War (1994-1996) as a fundamental conflict that
boosted the resentments between the parties. Although it is not an extensive compilation, it
aims to summarise the main elements around the onset of the war by collecting the main ideas
published by the academic community. First, it will describe the origins of the conflict,
including elements and situations that affected the dynamics of the war. Second, it will
analyse why this case should be considered as a civil war by discussing its characteristics.
Third, it will summarise some relevant theories of how civil wars start. Fourth, it will analyse
the First Chechen War in light of the civil war onset theories provided. Finally, insights will
be offered for future discussion on the topic.
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Civil wars: causes, dynamics, termination
The First Chechen War
Origins of the conflict
The roots of the conflict between Chechens and Russia may be traced back to the 1790s, when
the Tsarist Army expanded its operations south trough the Caspian and Black seas; this
provoked the gathering of several dispersed clans with different religious beliefs and without
a unified identity. These clans, or taips, the most basic and relevant social structure of the
region, united despite its differences around a single resistance spirit against an invasion that
has continued up to the present day, thereby helping to shape the concept of a Chechen
nationality. This enmity toward the Soviets and then Russia has been progressively
exacerbated by the fact that the Chechens have a culture that glorifies independency and
weapons, with strong codes of honour that often lead to blood vendettas (Williams, 2000,
p.103; Russell, 2005, p.104). These traditions have generally been misunderstood by the
USSR and Russia, and have therefore been presented as proof of rebellion, insurgency, and
terrorism.
As the Tsarist Empire became the USSR, the Soviets unsuccessfully tried to manage the
belligerency of the Chechens, who were an obstacle for Soviet policy and ambition in the
Caucasus. Only through the deportation of thousands of Chechens in 1944 was the resistance
defeated; Chechens were wiped of the map; practically none were left in Chechnya, and the
Chechen-Ingushetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) was dissolved on March
7, 1944 (Zürcher, 2009, p.28). Chechnya was repopulated with Russian settlers, occupying
former Chechen properties and lands and establishing a pro-Soviet system and institutions. In
1957, when the ASSR was restored and Nikita Khrushchev authorised the return of Chechens
to their lands (Russell, 2005, p.103), the deportees realised that their former lands were
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Civil wars: causes, dynamics, termination
occupied by Russians and that Chechen identity had become synonymous with
“uncivilisation”. In addition, Soviet discrimination against Chechens continued, as Chechen
national culture had to be ignored in order for Chechens to comply with Socialist ideals. A
growing stereotype around Chechen culture and its traditions helped to demonise Chechens,
comparing them with thieves and bandits (Russell, 2005, p.104) and maximising Chechen
anti-Soviet feelings, which had increased during deportation. Once again, suffering and
common needs helped to shape a common identity around a Chechen nationality fighting
against oppression, an idea that supported the secessionist movement and afterwards the first
Chechen war against the Russian Federation in 1994.
The ethno federalist approach used by the USSR, designed for the territorialisation of
ethnicity through “administrative units with a defined titular nation” (Zürcher, 2009, p.23)
such as the Chechen-Ingushetian ASSR, served to provide a solution to the USSR for three
challenges. These were the arranging of a territorial authority, the linkage of weakened
nations into a common state and the achievement of an internal and external legitimacy
(Zürcher, 2009, p.24). However, this was not sufficient for Chechen needs. Historical
grievances, discrimination and the demonization of the Chechen identity, along with the
memory of deportation, served as the ingredients for a dormant violence that was waiting for
an opportunity to re-emerge.
During the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviets insisted on integrating Chechnya into the political
system, but natives of the region and local leaders were given little importance and even less
power in the ASSR. Chechen resentment was kept intact as ethnic Russians controlled the
political, economic and military institutions in the region, forcing Chechens to endure the
situation. Meanwhile, an opportunity for independence presented itself. The prospect emerged
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Civil wars: causes, dynamics, termination
as the USSR began to break up; in 1990, Chechnya declared its independency, looking
forward to receiving its independence from the emerging Russian Federation. However,
Moscow refused to recognise Chechnya’s independence and the Chechens, driven by illusions
and euphoria, failed to realise the seriousness of the situation. Air-Force General Dzokhar
Dudayev, one of the most important figures for the Chechens, backed the idea of a Chechen
rebellion; after being elected the first president of Chechnya (also known to Chechens as
Ichkeria), his first decree was to proclaim the independence of Chechnya (Szajkowski, 1995a,
p.233). The new elected parliament granted him all the power necessary to defend the
sovereignty, independence and self-determination of a Chechnya threatened by Russia,
thereby resurrecting old grievances in the Chechen collective memory, as Russians were
considered responsible for carrying out atrocities against Chechens (Williams, 2000, p.105).
The necessity for defending Chechnya merged with an economic crisis brought on by the
failure of President Dudayev’s policies propitiating conditions for an increasing black market
of weapons and organised crime, even worse than in what remained of the former USSR.
Chechens’ doubts about Moscow’s policy towards Chechen independency became clear when
in 1994, a coup d’état ordered by Russian president Boris Yeltsin unsuccessfully tried to
overthrow President Dudayev out of Grozny (Szajkowski, 1995a, p.233). Moscow’s reaction
to this incident included an ultimatum to all separatist factions in Chechnya, ordering them to
disarm and surrender. When the government in Grozny refused, Yeltsin ordered the Russian
army to restore constitutional order by force, thereby officially starting the First Chechen War
on 11 December 1994.
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A Civil war or simply a violent conflict?
The violence in Chechnya since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 has generally been
characterised internationally as a war by politicians, scholars and journalists. However, the
Russian Government has instead associated it with terrorists, separatists and fundamentalist
movements, leading to a global debate about the nature of the conflict. Although there is no
unique definition of civil war, is it possible to enumerate several distinctive elements that may
help to analyse violent conflicts. In this case, the First Chechen War might be typified as a
civil war, as it complies with several common elements as follows. First, it was an open
armed conflict within a single country: the Russian Federation. Despite Chechnya’s selfproclaimed independency, at the time of the war, Chechnya was still an official part of the
Russian Federation and all the registered clashes were fought in Russian soil. Second, it was a
violent conflict with a significant number of deaths on each side, surpassing the threshold of
at least 1,000 deaths per year and with continuity of the clashes being present. As presented
by the Correlates of War (COW)2 project, battle-related combatant fatalities in Chechnya
suffered by both sides during 1994-1996 exceeded 11,000, with more than 1,000 deaths over
its course and with a yearly average of at least 3,600 deaths. This meets Fearon and Laitin’s
(2003, p.76)3, Fearon’s (2004, pp.279-280) and Sambanis’ (2004b, pp.820-825) constitutive
2
Data available at: <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/>.
3
Fearon and Laitin’s criteria for identification of Civil Wars includes violent conflicts that “(1) Involved fighting
between agents of (or claimants to) a state and organized, nonstate groups who sought either to take control of a
government, to take power in a region, or to use violence to change government policies. (2) The conflict killed
at least 1,000 over its course, with a yearly average of at least 100. (3) At least 100 were killed on both sides
(including civilians attacked by rebels). The last condition is intended to rule out massacres where there is no
organized or effective opposition. (4) The start year is the first year in which 100 were killed or in which a
violent event occurred that was followed by a sequence of actions that came to satisfy the primary criteria. (5) If
a main party to the conflict drops out, we code a new war start if the fighting continues (e.g., Somalia gets
anewcivil war after Siad Barre is defeated in 1991). (6)War ends are coded by observation of a victory,
wholesale demobilization, truce, or peace agreement followed by at least two years of peace. (7) Involvement by
foreign troops does not disqualify a case as a civil war for us, provided the other criteria are satisfied. (8)We
code multiple wars in a country when distinct rebel groups with distinct objectives are fighting a coherent
central state on distinct fronts with little or no explicit coordination. (9) If a state seeks to incorporate and
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Civil wars: causes, dynamics, termination
elements of a civil war as they relate to the number of victims. In addition, such figures for
dead and wounded personnel suggest that both sides were organised and capable of
continuous warfare, supporting Sambanis’ (2004a, p.261) definition of civil war, which
includes the capability of the groups involved in mounting effective resistance against each
other.
Third, two main larger sides – one involving the Russian government – with some degree of
centrally organised fighters and fighting participated in the First Chechen War. The main
reason was political, i.e., the independence of Chechnya and the control of its territory. On the
one side, the Russian Federation had relatively homogenous troops with an average of 40,000
soldiers led by Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation, General Pavel Grachev, the
Defence Minister, General Anatoly Kulikov, Commander of the Interior Troops and General
Gennady Troshev, commander of the joint group of federal forces. On the other side, the
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, with an average of 15,000 troops, had a dissimilar assortment
of organisations mainly led by it first president, General Dzokhar Dudayev and Colonel Aslan
Maskhadov, but also by paramilitary and militia commanders such as Shamil Basayev and Ibn
Al-Khattab, both popular leaders of the rebellion. Although the religious background of
Chechens is Islam, the First Chechen War was a secular conflict, related more to nationalist
ideals rather than religious beliefs. To this extent, Zürcher (2009, p.3) suggests how often the
violence in the Caucasus was driven more as a business than a nationalist cause: “organizers
of violence typically meandered back and forth between politically motivated and
economically motivated violence. In both cases, they framed their actions as a struggle in the
name of the nation. During this period, a new type of violent political entrepreneur evolved:
the patriot-businessman”.
govern territory that is not a recognized state, we consider it a “civil war” only if the fighting continues after the
state begins to govern the territory (thus, Indonesia/East Timor 1975, yes, and India/Hyderabad 1947, no)”.
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The First Chechen War also meets the criteria suggested by Fearon and Laitin (2003, p.76) to
be classified as a civil war, as the fighting involved agents of a state and an organised nonstate group that tried to take control in the region of Chechnya, using violence to change
government policies. These propositions are further supported by the theory of Freedman
(1994, cited in Kennedy-Pipe and Jones, 1998, p.1) when he argues that “a conflict does not
take on the characteristics of a civil war until an attempt is made to take over the basic
functions of the state”. As the new state – the Russian Federation – and its institutions lacked
the capabilities to solve serious problems and respond to the needs of Chechnya due to the
rapid disintegration of the USSR, Chechens were forced to find better options for
guaranteeing stability in the region. This is backed by Zürcher (2009, p.ix) when listing the
elements of the collapse of the USSR, which increased the opportunities for nationalist elites
to capture the state and the nationalist secession: “the institutional legacy of Soviet
ethnofederalism, which predetermined ethnic cleavages [and] the lack of state capacities in
the newly emerging states, which led to serious commitment problems”. Additionally, further
elements of collapse were “the weakness of the elites in the newly independent states, which
led them to tolerate or even actively sponsor entrepreneurs of violence [and] their failure to
re-impose state control over entrepreneurs of violence, which derailed the consolidation of
statehood and paved the way for new waves of violence”.
Chechnya: an ethnic civil war?
It is difficult to thoroughly determine the meaning of 'ethnic war', as fighting between the
groups involved and the state does not usually represent all members of an ethnic group,
thereby conditioning the validity of the universality of the term. Similarly, the concept of civil
war cannot express the real dimension of an ethnic war, as the differences relating to a
common background (religious, linguistic, nationalist, historical) are not enough either to
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Civil wars: causes, dynamics, termination
describe the wide variety of conflicts or to classify them. This is possible only by adding the
element of irreconcilable cultural differences between groups, which has led the clash of
civilisations throughout history, and which supports the validity of the concept of ethnic war.
By including an ethnic identity, a factor that is “visible” and “sticky” (Sambanis, 2006, p.2), it
is possible to expand the comprehension about the causes, onset and termination of civil wars
as it relates to the sense of group differences and self-determination amongst rebels.
As previously stated, the ethnic federalism formulated by the former Soviet Union and the
historical grievances had an important role in the creation of the causal conditions and
stereotypes that led the Chechen territory and its population into a continuous insurrection
against every symbol of Soviet and Russian dominance. Nevertheless, could it be reasonable
to code the First Chechen War as an ethnic civil war? Sambanis (2006, p.15) suggests that the
concept of ethnic war is a valid category for analysis, because it improves the definition of
civil war by channelling “the emotions, ideology, passions, and other interests that lead to
civil war”. Hughes (2001, p.20) argues that despite the historical grievances of the Chechens
against the Russians, the real importance of the ethnic factor within the war has been
oversized and “while mutual antipathy between peoples can be fuelled by historical memory
… often, however, bloody pasts can also make for strong alliances”. Furthermore, Hughes
(2001, p.22) concludes that ethnicity had limited importance in the onset of the war,
suggesting that
[B]y the time of the 1989 census Chechen society was dominated by
younger generations, who were thoroughly Sovietised, urbanised (about
half the population lived in towns, and one third of the population lived in
Grozny, where about 55 per cent identified themselves as Slav), and
secularised. By the late Soviet period Chechnya was among the least
religious and most stable parts of the country, and few young Chechens
would have preferred the drums of the zikr over the Beatles.
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Similarly, Cornell (1998, p.60) suggests that ethnicity and especially religion was not a
decisive factor in the conflicts in the Caucasus, concluding that “the role of religion has been
restricted to being one of the determinants of ethnic identity. The lack of appeal of religion,
despite its potential utility in a conflict situation for the purpose of rallying the faithful, is
related to the legacy of 70 years of Soviet atheism, which obviously seems to have reduced
the role of religion in individual and social life among all peoples of the former Soviet
Union”. However, Szajkowski (1995b, p.234) suggests that Chechen ethical identity was a
logical response to “the consequent inability of the Russian authorities to develop a viable
nationality policy which would allow genuine devolution of power to the constituent parts of
the Russian Federation”. Similarly, Russell (2005, pp.105-106) and Williams (2000, pp.101104) agree in assigning an ethnical connotation to the war due to the demonization of the
Chechens, general discrimination and the lack of equal opportunities within the local
government that fuelled a permanent struggle against the Russian establishment by employing
a nationalist narrative.
The onset of civil wars – explanatory theories
There are three main explanatory theories of how civil wars start and these provide a useful
but still imperfect rationalisation of the causes of violence. First, an explanation focusing on
governance suggests that civil wars start because of the inconformity of a population with a
current government that had violated their rights or that does not satisfy their needs. However,
as governments are very often incapable of providing comprehensive solutions to their
citizens and despite people’s frustration, opposition to bad governments and its policies is
generally made by democratic and participative means and not by violent actions; as such, the
onset of a civil war under a governance explanation should be supported by another rationale.
The lack of political opportunities to oppose a government’s policies might offer a possible
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Civil wars: causes, dynamics, termination
alternative explanation; however, the costs associated with fighting against the government
are something not many are ready to assume. Collier and the World Bank (2003, p.56) backs
this theory when summarising the cost of violent opposition:
[M]ost political opposition does not require substantial finance for the
organization to be effective. Most participation is voluntary and part-time,
and activities do not require a lot of expensive inputs. By contrast, a private
military organization is a costly operation. It must meet a payroll, because
most members are full-time and therefore dependent on the organization
for their material needs, and it must be able to purchase a good deal of
imported military equipment.
Mueller (2000, pp.53-57) suggests four stages (takeover, carnival, revenge and occupation)
that might represent how ethnic wars can be seen as banal, because they are not spontaneous
acts, but instead well planned and long thought out conflicts driven by political forces or
ideologists that count on weak or permissive police/military forces. The government
explanation offers a plausible approach to explain the existence of civil wars, but nonetheless
fails to clarify why the occurrence of civil wars is so low when compared with the numerous
grievances and non-conformity of people around the world.
Second, an explanation concerning greed suggests that civil wars start because of the
possibility of enrichment through violence. It is clear that rebel movements require funding to
purchase military equipment, to motivate leaders and to pay for the ethics of soldiers if no
volunteers are available. Depending on the situation of the rebels, this funding may come
from other governments or supporters, via a shadow economy, by simple taxation to locals,
through the exploitation of natural resources, by a black market of available means or by
simple criminal actions. However, the existence of value resources such as diamonds,
narcotics or oil hinders the possibility of peace. As suggested by King (2001, p.525) regarding
the concept of frozen conflicts, former conflicts have become defacto countries within an
equilibrium. If groups consider that they can obtain better assets via prolonged fighting rather
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Civil wars: causes, dynamics, termination
than by negotiations, they are more likely to continue fighting. This hypothesis is backed by
Collier and the World Bank (2003, p.60) when stating that “statistically, secessionist
rebellions are considerably more likely if the country has valuable natural resources”, as well
as by Zürcher (2009, p.45) when suggesting that “doubling per capita income approximately
halves the risk of rebellion”.
Third, an insurgency explanation suggests that civil wars start because of the inconformity of
a population with current or historical grievances that have not been successfully solved
through democratic means. Zürcher (2009, p.44) provides six common factors of civil wars as
increasing the risk for war: low economic development, a lack of administrative capacities,
the opportunity of funding for the rebellion, the existence of recent wars, a complex ethnic
environment and favourable terrain for rebellion. When an insurgent movement has gained
respect from the locals and the government, and begin solving the problems that they have
been fighting for, it progressively creates an addiction to the power of the weapons that have
solved their grievances. Hence, unless real solutions are offered, no insurgent movement will
agree to surrender its arms.
When analysing the case of Chechnya, it is difficult to determine a specific explanatory theory
for the onset of the First Chechen War. Instead, a mixed theory can be elaborated by
integrating elements from the main three approaches. The governance explanation theory can
possibly be applied in Chechnya, as Chechens suffered from historical grievances because of
their ethnic background and from receiving poor support from the Soviet/Russian government
in terms of fulfilling their needs. This, along with collective memory and hatred towards the
system forced the Chechens to look for a better political option. The solution was an
imminent necessity for autonomy, independence and self-determination that grew over a
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period of years. The usual perception of the war in Chechnya has been associated with
guerrilla warfare and erratic terrorist attacks on Russian targets fuelled by Islamic
fundamentalism. However, the reality is that the conflict began in 1991 as a political struggle
for the recognition of fundamental rights to Chechens. Zürcher (2009, pp.80-81) suggests
several decisive factors for maintaining Chechen revolution alive: first, the lack of a Chechen
political segment among local institutions – largely controlled by Russians – contributed to
the distrust of the Russian government and thus the necessity for a new political regime
harmonised with local requirements. Second, the existence of resolute leaders, who employed
nationalism to support the secession from Russia, thereby providing an answer to the
collective conscience and its needs. Finally, the demographic dominance of the Chechens
(73%) over the Russians (23%), which permitted the maintaining of common goals
throughout the revolution.
The greed explanation theory is possibly applicable to the case of Chechnya because the
country's destroyed economy drove Chechens to find sources of personal subsistence and
funding for the revolution. Dash (2000, p.1517) describes the situation as follows:
[W]hen the expectations of the rebels were belied and diplomatic support
did not follow, the rebels engaged themselves in sabotage and drained out
oil from the pipeline passing through the heart of Chechnya. They
succeeded in insulating Chechnya from Russia for a period of time. It was
precisely during this free-for-all period in Chechnya that religious zealots,
drug peddlers and money launderers penetrated Chechnya and sowed the
seeds of anarchy which Russia found difficult to tackle.
Some of the more common sources of funding included help from a shadow economy, profits
from oil extraction and exporting and ransom payments for hostages (Zürcher, 2009, p.120).
Despite the lack of significant natural resources in the region, Chechnya flourished with the
help of a shadow economy based on smuggling and the trade of Soviet-made weapons,
usually stolen from local army warehouses. Mathers (1999, p.103) explains that Chechnya
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Civil wars: causes, dynamics, termination
posed a threat to Russia due to “illegality, crime and a general lack of order ... Dudayev's
Chechnya was a hotbed of lawlessness and a major centre for the illicit trade in weapons and
drugs”.
The insurgency explanation theory can possibly be applied to Chechnya as the weakness of
the emerging Russian Federation and its institutions could not meet Chechens needs. The
analysis of Chechnya’s political panorama prior to the First Chechen War provided by
Hayden (1999, pp.23-25) suggests that “secessionist Chechens and the federal government
deteriorated to the point of no return bringing about violent armed conflict”. This means that
no other possibility but that of insurgency and rebellion against the Russian Federation were
left to Chechens as a means for fighting for their ideals. The insurgency theory can be used in
combination with the post-Soviet scripts suggested by Zürcher (2009, pp.209-210): first, the
perception script for both sides, as the large cultural distance between the groups increased the
potential for conflict. Both sides had mutually negative perceptions of each other, diminishing
the possibilities of a negotiated solution. Second, the grievance script, as violence was the
reaction against oppression through political, economic and cultural discrimination against
groups. Third, the opportunity script, as the existence of lootable resources helped to fund the
rebellion, but also extended the military actions of each side.
In sum, the case of Chechnya during the First Chechen War still requires numerous aspects to
be studied. For Moscow, it was a legitimate war to protect the integrity of the Russian
Federation based on its constitution; for Grozny, however, it was a confirmation of the
necessity for self-determination and independence from a nation that did not understand its
needs. To date, a solution to the conflict remains to be found and historical grievances are still
being solved with violence.
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Conclusions
This essay analysed the rationale behind the First Chechen War, not by providing a detailed
recollection of events, but by studying the most relevant insights and opinions offered by
scholars. Historical differences and grievances were shown as the causes leading to
misunderstanding between two nations that have shared a common space. The Republic of
Chechnya was a battlefield between 1994 and 1996, during the First Chechen War and after.
Despite thousands of lives being lost, no clear prospects for the nation's future was obtained.
The analysis of the literature in this area showed a relevant grievance regarding to the
demonization of and discrimination against Chechen traditions, and a lack of equal
opportunities within Chechnya’s the local government. This fuelled a permanent struggle
against the Russian establishment using a nationalist narrative, thereby being identifiable as
an ethnic conflict. The common explanatory theories for the start of civil wars fit the Chechen
case; however, further discussion is needed to better understand the role of collective Chechen
memory in the search for an end to the conflict. Only through a sensitive and holistic
understanding of the particularities concerning both sides can an effective policy be designed
for ending the violence.
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