An Uncertain Relationship: The United States, Taiwan and the Taiwan Relations Act
Author(s): Steven M. Goldstein and Randall Schriver
Reviewed work(s):
Source: The China Quarterly, No. 165, Taiwan in the 20th Century (Mar., 2001), pp. 147-172
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An Uncertain Relationship:The United
States, Taiwan and the Taiwan Relations
Act*
Steven M. Goldstein and Randall Schriver
The UnitedStateshas separatemutualsecuritytreatieswith Japanandthe
Republic of Korea which provide for stationingAmericanforces and
have establishedproceduresfor close co-operation.These alliancesconstitutethe keystone of the Americansecurityposition in East Asia and,
possibly, the triggerfor futureinvolvementin the area.
Yet since the early 1990s these formalallianceshave been overshadowed by a relationshipbased not on a treaty,but ratheron an act of
Congress - the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979. This domestic
legislation provides neither for the stationingof Americantroops on
Taiwan nor for military co-ordination.Nevertheless,it figured prominently when, in March 1996, the Clintonadministrationsoughtto deter
the People's Republicof China (PRC) from disruptingTaiwan'spresidentialelectionsby dispatchingthe largestnaval force to be deployedin
the regionsince the VietnamWar.These events focusedattentionon this
normalizationof relalegislationpassed afterthe Carteradministration's
tions with the PRC. At that time, there was considerableCongressional
self-congratulation
regardingits legislationof a foreign policy commitment and its centralrole in enforcingthat commitment.
Nevertheless,afterwards,the impactof the TRA has been a matterof
debate. Some regard it as a virtual treaty while others depict it as
providing for little more than what was already present in existing
legislationor the Constitution.Some praiseit as a key to the securityof
Taiwanover the past20 yearswhile otherssee its progressiveweakening.
This discussionjoins the debatethroughan analysisof the originsof the
act; its evolutionarycourse since 1979; and the differingimpactswhich
it has had on the PRC/Taiwanpolicy of the United States.
The TaiwanRelationsAct: Origins,Ambiguitiesand Opportunities
The TRA:assuringTaiwan'ssecurity?The originsof the TRA were in
the legislationsubmittedby the Carteradministration
(S.245) intendedto
maintain"commercial,culturaland other relationswith the people on
Taiwanon an unofficialbasis."'This was technicallegislationconcerned
largelywith maintainingthe statusof "thepeopleon Taiwan"as a foreign
state underAmericanlaw and providingfor the creationof a non-profit
* The authorswish to thankMarthaJohnsonand Nada Tomisovafor their research
assistance.Specialthanksto NancyHearstof theFairbankCenterat HarvardUniversitywho
providedher usualperceptiveeditorialandcriticalinput.
1. For a text of this bill see United States Congress,Senate, Committeeon Foreign
Relations, Taiwan: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations (hereafter Taiwan:
Hearings),96thCongress,5,6,7,8,21and22 February1979(Washington,D.C.:Government
PrintingOffice, 1979), pp. 3-10.
? The ChinaQuarterly,2001
148
The ChinaQuarterly
institution,the American Institute in Taiwan, to representAmerican
interests.
Congressionalaction beyond this legislationwas inevitable,however.
The mannerin which normalizationhad takenplace (therewas virtually
no consultationwith Congressdespitethe demandsof powerfulmembers,
such as SenatorRobertDole, that the Senate be consulted before the
administration
madeany changesto the treatywith Taiwan)as well as its
substance(the terminationof the treatyandthe failureto securea pledge
for a peaceful resolutionfrom Beijing) assuredthat a broad coalition
would emerge in supportof adding a securitycomponentto the legislation. It was also a diverse coalition driven by motives rangingfrom
pro-Taiwan,anti-communistsentiments,to supportfor normalizationbut
with concerns over the impact of the treaty terminationon American
credibility,to anger over the mannerin which the decision had been
made.2Indeed, one authorhas suggested that Congressionaldetermination to draft its own legislationhad more to do with the mannerin
which normalizationwas carriedout than with its substance.3
President Carter warned that he would reserve the right to veto
legislation contraryto normalization.Administrationspokespeopleargued that language assuring Taiwan's security was unnecessary.The
United Stateshad made its interestin "peacefulresolution"clear:use of
forcewoulddamagePRCeconomicties with the West,Beijinglackedthe
capacityto invade the island and Taiwan would maintainits defensive
capabilitiesbecause of Americanarms sales.4
Congresswas not impressed.The leadingresponsewas a proposedjoint
resolutionintroducedby EdwardKennedyandAlanCranstonin the Senate
andLesterWolff in the House.SenatorKennedyarguedthatthe sponsors
hopedthata "legislativepackage"wouldemergewhichwouldprovidefor
"substantivecontinuityin the vital securitysphere... on unofficialterms"
in the same manneras administration
legislationprovidedfor such conticulturalandotherrelations."Suchcontinuity,he was
nuityin "commercial,
confident,could be achieved in a mannerthat was "consistentwith"
normalization;did not establishofficial relationswith Taiwan;required
Congressionalparticipation;and did not commit the United States "to
The goal was to "dono
specificactionsunderhypotheticalcircumstances."
more nor less thanour existing securitycommitments."5
2. Robert G. Sutter, The China Quandary: Domestic Determinants of U.S. Policy,
1972-1982 (Boulder:WestviewPress, 1983), pp 5-7.
3. Victoria Marie Kraft, The U.S. Constitution and Foreign Policy: Terminating the
TaiwanTreaty(New York:GreenwoodPress, 1991), pp. 150-51.
4. This paragraphis based on the testimonyof the administration's
lead witnesses at
Committee
Congressionalhearings.See UnitedStatesCongress,Houseof Representatives,
onForeignAffairs,Subcommittee
on AsianandPacificAffairs,Implementation
of theTaiwan
Relations Act: Issues and Concerns (hereafter Implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act),
96th Congress,First Session, 14 and 15 February1979 (Washington,D.C.: Government
PrintingOffice, 1979), pp. 11-61.
5. Lester L. Wolff and David Simon (eds.), Legislative History of the Taiwan Relations
Act: An Analytic Compilation with Documents on Subsequent Developments (Jamaica, NY:
AmericanAssociationfor Chinese Studies, 1982), pp. 1-2. See also Alan Cranston's
statement,ibid. pp. 3-4.
The TaiwanRelationsAct
This proposal,with its contradictory
goals of preservingbotha security
commitmentto Taiwan and normalizedrelationswith Beijing, set the
parametersof subsequentlegislation.The solutionto the contradictionlay
in the wording of the commitmentin article five of the 1954 Mutual
Defense Treaty:
Each Partyrecognizesthat an armedattackin the WesternPacificArea directed
of eachof the Partieswouldbe dangerousto its own peaceand
againstthe territories
with
safetyanddeclaresthatit wouldact to meetthe commondangerin accordance
its constitutional
processes.6
Undoubtedly many members of Congress were surprised to find that this
treaty was - like most others to which the United States was a party - not
an automatic commitment. This language would be the most important
element in achieving Kennedy's goals as well as the presidential acceptance.
The final wording of the TRA recast much of this language in a lengthy
and convoluted form.
"... peaceandstabilityin the [WesternPacific]areaarein the political,security,
and economicinterestsof the United States, and are mattersof international
concern";
* "any effort to determinethe futureof Taiwanby other than peacefulmeans,
includingby boycottsor embargoes[wouldbe considered]a threatto the peace
andsecurityof theWesternPacificareaandof graveconcernto theUnitedStates";
* theUnitedStateswould"maintain
thecapacityto resistanyresortto forceor other
formsof coercionthatwouldjeopardizethe security,or the social or economic
system,of the peopleof Taiwan";and
* the Presidentwas to "informthe Congresspromptlyof any threatto the security
or the socialor economicsystemof the peopleon Taiwanandany dangerto the
interestsof the UnitedStatesarisingtherefrom,"
while "the Presidentand the
withconstitutional
Congressshalldetermine,in accordance
processes,appropriate
actionby the UnitedStatesin responseto any suchdanger."7
*
What was omitted was the earlier language which identified an attack on
Taiwan as a danger to the "peace and security" of the United States. An
attemptto preservethis sense by substitutingthe phrase"to the security
interestsof' for "of grave concernto" narrowlyfailed.8
The sentimentto keep the language ambiguouswas driven by very
different concerns which included the fear of entrapmentby Taiwan
in a cross-straitconfrontation;the importanceof normalization;a sense
that in the event of a crisis, Americaninterestshad to be considered
6. "Textof mutualdefensetreatybetweentheUnitedStatesof Americaandthe Republic
of China," in United States Congress, Senate, Oversight of the Taiwan Relations Act:
Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations (hereafter Oversight), 96th Congress,
FirstSession, 15 November1979 (Washington,D.C.: GovernmentPrintingOffice, 1980),
p. 137.
7. Wolff and Simon, Legislative History of the Taiwan Relations Act, pp. 288-89.
8. Yufan Hao, Dilemma and Decision: An Organizational Perspective on American
Policy Making(Berkeley:Instituteof East Asian Studies,Universityof California,1987),
pp. 167-68 and Congressional Record-Senate, 8 March 1971, p. 4316.
149
150
The ChinaQuarterly
in relationto the relationshipswith Japanand South Korea;and a worry
that too open a commitmentto Taiwan would enhance the "imperial
presidency."9
Indicationsin the legislativehistory of what might happenif Taiwan
were attackedare vague. Althoughone influentialDemocratarguedthat
the bill left "no room for doubtthatit is the official policy to oppose ...
[a] militaryattack,"his colleagueswere not sure.1oThe reportaccompanying the Houseversiondeclaredthatthe legislationsimply"makesclear
thatthereshouldbe a promptresponseby the UnitedStates,"but did not
attemptto specify what the particularcircumstancesor responsemight
be." The Senatereportwent further,acknowledgingthattheremight be
"a decision to do nothing."12
The othersecuritycomponentgraftedon to the administration's
legislation related to the sale of "defensive arms." Congress responded
scepticallyto the executivepledge made at the time of normalizationto
continuesales of defensive weaponsto Taiwan.13A legislativebasis for
such sales was seen as a complementto the securityclauses.14Thus,the
TRA stipulatedthat Taiwanwould be provided:
... suchdefensearticlesanddefenseservicesin suchquantityas maybe necessary
to maintaina sufficientself-defensecapability... [and that] the Presidentand
thenatureandquantityof suchdefensearticlesandservices
Congressshalldetermine
based solely upon theirjudgmentof the needs of Taiwan,in accordancewith
of Taiwan'sdefenseneeds shall
proceduresestablishedby law. Suchdetermination
includereviewby UnitedStatesmilitaryauthorities
in connectionwithrecommendations to the Presidentandthe Congress.15
Amendmentsto forbid the Presidentfrom consideringthe views of
Beijing in deciding future sales to Taiwan and to specify, by name,
weaponsto be sold to Taiwanfailed.'6
Two issues - the definitionof "defensiveweapons"and the mannerin
which such weaponswould be procured- were resolvedusing the Arms
ExportControlAct which was includedin the TRA by the referenceto
sales "accordingto proceduresestablishedby law.""7This was intended
to maintaincontinuityin the processby whichthe ROCpurchasedarms.'8
However,it also weakenedCongressionalinfluenceby puttingit in the
passivepositionof approvingor rejectingarmssales proposalsput before
9. Hao, Dilemma and Decision, p. 135.
10. Wolff and Simon, Legislative History of the Taiwan Relations Act, p. 22.
11. Ibid.p. 17.
12. Ibid.pp. 141-42.
13. Hao, Dilemmaand Decision,pp. 139-140.
14. Fora convenientsummaryof Congressionalstatementscorroborating
thesepoints,see
Wolff and Simon, Legislative History of the Taiwan Relations Act, pp. 92-103 and 117-149.
15. "TaiwanRelationsAct,"in ibid. p. 289.
16. Ibid.pp. 93, 95, 97 and 100.
17. Ibid.pp. 102, 124, 125, 133 and 135-38.
18. Ibid.pp. 118-19.
The TaiwanRelationsAct
it.19 Robert Dole's amendmentrequiringthe Presidentnot simply to
reportarms sales to Taiwanbut also to report"... the statusof all such
requestsfor armsfrom the Taipei authorities"also failed.20
The TRA:assertingcongressionalprerogative.In 1979 Congresswas
legislating the TRA in the shadow of the VietnamWar. There was a
lingering determinationto assert Congress's prerogativevis-a-vis an
"imperialpresidency."Moreover,as the legislativeprocessprogressed,a
sense of pride of ownershipin the act also developed. One member
declared that the TRA was "our own creation ... This is Congress
OtherssuggestedthatCongressnow
assertingitself in foreign affairs."21
had special responsibilityfor the island.22
Thus one mighthave expectedCongressto establishstrongprovisions
requiringconsultation.SenatorJosephBiden had arguedthatthe purpose
of the legislation was not to assure Taiwan but to assure presidential
consultationwith Congress.23
However,therewas no guidanceregarding
the natureof consultationnor of sanctionson a presidentwho refused.24
Oversightwas relatedto consultation.Expressionsof its importancewere
ubiquitousin the debates.25However, the act containsmodest wording
whereby the presidentwould report on the implementationof the act
during its first three years and inform Congress of any agreementto
which the AmericanInstitutein Taiwanwas a party.
The contrastbetween legislation on consultationand oversight and
the fierce rhetoricof debate is consistentwith the argumentsof those
who stress the limitations on Congressionalactivism on any issue
relating to foreign policy. Specifically, they point to Congress's lack
of information,the weakness of the oversight mechanismas well as
the heavy weight of historicalprecedent,constitutionalprerogativeand
legislationwhich favourspresidentialpower. In additionthey also point
to Congress's institutionalunwillingnessto take responsibilityfor an
area that entails great risks but brings little benefit for members
concerned with their constituents' needs. Congress, it has been
argued,even in the post-Vietnamera, has madestrongrhetoricalcommitments, but providedfew substantivemechanismsfor implementationor
19. Hao,Dilemmaand Decision,pp. 194-95, andRichardBush, "Helpingthe Republic
of China defend itself," in Ramon H. Myers (ed.), A Unique Relationship: The United States
and the Republic of China Under the Taiwan Relations Act (Stanford:The Hoover Institution
Press, 1989), pp. 79-118.
20. Congressional Record-Senate, 7 March 1979, pp. 4099-4100.
21. Washington Post, 9 March 1979. Hao, Dilemma and Decision, makes a similar point.
22. Forexample,JohnDanforthsuggestedthatsincethe administration
hadprojectedthe
America'sresponsibilitytowardsTaiwan,it was "nowon our
appearanceof "abrogating"
shouldersin Congressto assumethis responsibility."
SenateForeignRelationsCommittee,
Taiwan: Hearings, pp. 416-17 and 427.
23. Ibid.pp. 383-85.
24. Thisis a centralthesisof Bush'ssuperb"HelpingtheRepublicof Chinadefenditself,"
pp. 79-118.
25. Cited in Hao, Dilemma and Decision, p. 193.
151
152
The ChinaQuarterly
follow-up.26Still, the natureof the TRA can not be explainedsimply as
institutionalshirking.It also resulted from the political circumstances
surroundingthe act.
The TRA was the work of an ambivalentand divided Congressthat
could realisticallyreach overwhelmingagreementon the importanceof
doing something to respond to an affront to its institutionalpride.
Membersof the DemocraticParty,then in the majority,were generally
sympatheticto normalization.Some chose to view the TRA as a commitment to defendTaiwan.However,the legislationwas primarilyan effort
to save face on the consultationissue and present the impressionof
continuedAmericancommitment.
Congress and the presidentwere pursuingparallel strategies.27The
president,realizingthat it would be politically impossible to sever all
relationswith Taiwan,chose to use unilateralstatementsto preservea
semblanceof a continuedcommitmentto Taiwan.Congresswent further,
creatingthe TRA which maintainedenoughof a commitmentto Taiwan
to satisfy concerns regardingthe abandonmentof an "old ally," but
remainedgeneralenoughto securewide Congressionalsupport,avoid a
veto and not provokeBeijing.The TRA thus did not simplyrepresentan
exampleof Congressionalshirking.Like the president,Congresssought
to straddlethe politicallyunacceptableeither/orchoice thatwas the only
definitive solution to PRC demands. In short, the ambiguity in the
Americanrelationshipwith Taiwan,whichmanyin Congresswouldlater
condemn,was an integralpartof the TRA's politicallogic andthe key to
its passage with bipartisansupport.
Nevertheless,the discrepancybetweenthis intentand the wordsof the
TRA remained.The act was an assertionof Congressionalprerogative
which grew out of an inter-branchconflict. Should such conflict reemerge,the act wouldbe a naturalchoice for reassertingthatprerogative.
However ambiguous,its languagecould still justify a securityrelationship with Taiwanand a majorCongressionalrole in managingit. This
solution to improved relations with the PRC could easily become a
problemin securingfurtherimprovement.
The TaiwanRelationsAct, 1979-1994: An UncertainMandate
1979-82: Congressionalactivismor executivedominance?Or both?
Soon afterthe passageof the TRA a Senatereportassertedthatthe Carter
administrationwas adheringto the legislation it had submitted,rather
26. Barbara Hinckley, Less than Meets the Eye: Foreign Policy Making and the Myth of
the AssertiveCongress(Chicago:The Universityof ChicagoPress, 1994), p. ix. See also
Stephen R. Weissman, A Culture of Deference: Congress's Failure of Leadership in Foreign
Policy (New York:Basic Books, 1995).
27. In his Dilemma and Decision, Yufan Hao makes the relationshipbetween the
two branchesthe central thesis of his study. This discussion has benefitedfrom his
analysis.
The TaiwanRelationsAct
thanto that which had become law.28This seems to have been the case
especially with regardto arms sales where there was minimalconsultation.29When RonaldReaganwas elected presidentin 1980, this issue
quicklycame to a head. Duringthe campaignReaganhad used the TRA
to legitimize his criticism of the Carter administrationand his own
pro-Taiwanrhetoric.The act, he maintained,was the "law of the land"
and he pledgedto "enforceit."30With Reagan'selection, it seemed that
the TRA would realize the intentionsof its more conservativeCongressionalsupporters.
However,in January1982, despiteCongressionalcomplaintsregarding
lack of consultation,Taiwan'srequestfor an advancedfighterplane was
denied.31In August 1982, the United States and the PRC announceda
joint communiqueon the subject of arms sales to Taiwan. In it the
Americanside stated
that it does not seek to carry out a long-termpolicy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its
arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitativeor in quantitativeterms,
the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic
relationsbetween the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually
its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution. In so
stating the United States acknowledges China's consistent position regarding the
thorough settlement of this issue.32
The Congressionalresponsewas bipartisanoutrage.33Once again Congress had played a secondaryrole in an executive decision touchingon
the TRA.
Still Congress- more accuratelythe Senate- was neitherinattentive
nor deferentialto the executive.Most of the originaldraftersof the TRA
were still in office. The determinationto protect Congressionalprerogativesremained.The fact the Senatehad a Republicanmajoritywhen
the 1982 communiqu6was announcedcertainly moderatedreaction.
However, the tone of the hearings on the communiqu6was set by
Democrat John Glenn who charged that the administrationhad
"discarded"the frameworkof the TRA by agreeing to wording that
suggesteda phasingout of arms sales and set levels for their quantity.
Most of all, the Senate was angeredby the fact that PRC pressurehad
clearlyinfluencedAmericanpolicy towardsTaiwan- despitethe intentof
the TRA.34
28. Congressional Record-Senate, 1 July 1980, p. 18208.
29. RobertSutter,"TheTaiwanRelationsAct and the UnitedStatesChinapolicy,"in
Myers, A Unique Relationship, pp. 61-62.
30. The New York Times, 26 August 1980.
31. Washington Post, 13 January 1982.
32. Wolff and Simon, Legislative History of the Taiwan Relations Act, pp. 312-13.
33. The New York Times, 18 August 1972 and Wolff and Simon, Legislative History of
the Taiwan Relations Act, pp. 326-29.
34. UnitedStatesCongress,Senate,Committeeon ForeignAffairs,U.S.Policy Towards
Chinaand Taiwan,97th Congress,Second Session, 17 August 1982 (Washington,D.C.:
GovernmentPrintingOffice, 1982), pp. 1-5.
153
154
The ChinaQuarterly
In response,the Reaganadministration"clarified"certainelementsin
the communiqu6,suggestingthatarmssales couldbe increasedin a crisis;
thatthe futurelevel of armssales wouldbe adjustedfor inflation;thatthe
transferof defencetechnologywas not includedin calculatingsales; that
Taiwan had been given assurances (the "six assurances")regarding
American policy; and that weapons systems would be replaced by
modem - not outdated- technology.35
Another Senatorialinterventiontook note of this apparentshift in
policy, but focused on procedure.In early autumn 1982, the Senate
Subcommitteeon Separationof Powers conducteda study that assessed
the compatibilityof the communiqu6with the TRA froma Constitutional
perspective.This study proceededfrom the assumptionthat if the communiqu6was not consistentwith the TRA, then this would present"a
primafacie case of failureby the Presidentto execute faithfullythe laws
of the UnitedStates"- presumablyan impeachableoffence. It concluded
that although the "apparent meaning" of U.S. statements was
"inconsistentwith the policy set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act,"
subsequent "statements and actions by the administration"were
"generallyconsistentwith the act."36
These early developmentsdemonstratedthe vulnerabilityof the solution to normalization.The PRC was becomingimpatientwith the very
limiteddistancethatWashingtonhadputbetweenitself andTaiwan.And,
once again, in seeking to preservethe earliermomentum,the executive
was exploringways to increase that distance. However, the TRA was
makingthis difficult.The 1982 interventionssuggestedthatthe act could
providelegal authorityfor a Congresswhich, guided by partisanand/or
policy differences,soughtto limit presidentialattemptsto improverelations with the mainland.
1983 to 1994: Congressionalpassivity and the roots of change. The
fact thatany furtherdevelopmentof the potentialcontradictionsin United
States policy towards the PRC did not develop at this time was due
largelyto Americanpoliticsandthe environmentin Asia. At home,China
policy had entereda period of bipartisanship.Sino-Americanrelations
were in a honeymoonphase, and cross-straitrelationswere moving in a
positive direction as economic, cultural and even political relations
slowly developed. In this context the TRA seemed very unimportant.
The most obvious indicatorof this is statistical.Fromthe 98th Congress (1983-84) until the 101st Congress (1989-90), the TRA was
35. Thesix assuranceswerethattheUnitedStates"pledged(1) notto set a dateforending
armssalesto Taiwan,(2) notto holdpriorconsultationwithBeijingon armssales to Taiwan,
(3) not to play any mediatoryrole betweenBeijing andTaipei,(4) not to alterits position
regardingTaiwan'ssovereignty,and(6) not to exertpressureon Taipeito enternegotiations
with Beijing." Hao, Dilemma and Decision, pp. 276-78.
36. United States Congress. Senate, Committeeon the Judiciary,Subcommitteeon
Separation of Powers, Taiwan Communique and Separation of Powers (Washington, D.C.:
GovernmentPrintingOffice, 1983), pp. 5-6 and 18.
The TaiwanRelationsAct
mentionedonly five times in legislationor resolutionsintroducedin either
house.37 Only two of these were relatedto securityissues and only one
to a specific issue: to requirethat the Secretaryof State submitannual
reportson the implementationof the TRA.This failedamendmentwas an
atypicalact of Congressionalactivism.38Overall,memberswere largely
passive, merelyinsertinginto the recordpost-factoreportsof armssales
to the island.39
Action on Taiwanwas restrictedlargelyto the usual diet of advocacy
legislation(such as thatTaiwannot be expelledfromthe Asian Development Bank); proposalsto enhance economic relations;and statements
in praise of Taiwan'seconomic progress.4Congressionalattentionwas
also focused on domestic developmentsin Taiwan. Before the lifting
of martiallaw in 1987, Congressionalliberals had criticized authoritarianrule on Taiwan.Thereafter,they praiseddemocratizationon the
island.41
The June 1989 events at Tiananmenand PresidentGeorge Bush's
responsewere the catalystsfor a new roundof activismon the Taiwan
issue duringthe 101st(1989-90) and 102nd(1991-92) congresses.Hopes
for change of the PRC's authoritariansystem had been dashed. The
economic prosperityand democratizationof Taiwan provided a new
rationalefor those in Congresswho promotedU.S.-Taiwanrelationsas
well as for those Democratswho saw Bush's policies as fodder for
partisanpolitics.42
Still, unlike duringthe 1979-82 period, the legislative mandatecontainedwithinthe TRA itself playeda relativelyminorrole. Referencesto
it were largely absent in floor debates (a mere 24 references) and
completelyabsentin proposedlegislation(excludingresolutions)during
37. These tabulationsare drawn from THOMAS,the Libraryof Congress's online
referenceservicefor Congressionaldocuments.
38. HouseAmendment307, 99th Congress,and CongressionalRecord-Senate,11 July
1985, pp. 18583-87.
39. Therewas a joint resolutionproposedto prohibitthe sale of avionicskits to the PRC
unlessadvancedaircraftwere sold to Taiwan.It died in committee.HouseJointResolution
592, 99th Congress.For examplesof the arms sales reportssee, CongressionalRecordSenate, 18 July 1983, pp. 19681 and ibid. 19 February1985, pp. 2513-14.
40. House ConcurrentResolution 120, 98th Congress;Senate Resolution 137, 98th
Congress,House Resolution5563, 100thCongress;and CongressionalRecord-Senate,1
May 1984, p. 10487.
41. CompareSenateConcurrentResolution38 and House ConcurrentResolution344,
98th Congress,as well as SenateConcurrentResolutions70, 121 and House Concurrent
Resolution49, 99th Congresswith CongressionalRecord-Senate,30 September1986, p.
27429 and Congressional Record-House, 3 October 1986, pp. 28673-4.
42. See for example,CongressionalRecord,28 July 1989,p. E2728, ibid. 19 September
1989, p. E3089, House ConcurrentResolution 233, 101st Congress, Congressional
Record-Senate,26 March1990,p. S3161,ibid.20 May 1991,pp.S6154-55 andibid.19May
1992,pp.S6891-92. Foranexcellentoutlineof actionstakenby Congressfrom1989to 1999
see Yann-hueiSong, "Theseconddecadeof the TaiwanRelationsAct: U.S. Congressional
involvement in the implementationof the law," paper preparedfor the International
Conferenceon UnitedStates-TaiwanRelations:20 Yearsafterthe TaiwanRelationsAct,
Taipei,Taiwan,9-10 April1999.Thediscussionwhichfollowshasbenefitedmuchfromthis
comprehensivepaper.
155
156
The ChinaQuarterly
the 101st and 102ndcongresses(1989-92).43There were few assertions
of a right to share the policy-makingprerogativewith the executive or
attemptsto oversee its actions.44
During the 1992 campaignBill Clinton harshlycriticized President
Bush's Chinapolicy. Whenhe took office, Clintondecidedto respondto
Congressionaldemandsto link MFN with an improvementof the human
rightssituationin the PRC. However,growingpressurefrom the Senate
to enhancethe relationshipwith Taiwanfurthercomplicatedthe situation.
As one State Departmentofficial put it: "How can we get Congressoff
our backs?"45The answerwas a review of Taiwanpolicy which some in
Congresssaw as an opportunityto strengthenthe TRA andUnitedStates'
relationswith Taiwan.
This activism was furtherstimulatedby two events. The first was a
stopoverin Hawaii by PresidentLee Teng-huiduring which the State
Departmentgrantedpermissionfor an overnightstay if he did not leave
the airport.Lee refused,spendingthe eveningon the plane.Congresswas
outragedand, with the forthcomingTaiwanpolicy review in mind, there
was a flourish of proposed legislation regardingvisits by Taiwanese
officials.46The secondwas the announcementof the resultsof the Clinton
administration'sTaiwan policy review which, in the eyes of many in
Congress,unjustifiablylimited relationswith Taiwan.47
There was a sharp reaction in the Senate to these events. Senator
Charles Robb, chair of the Senate Subcommitteeon East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, remindedadministrationwitnesses that the management
of relations with Taiwan was a shared "responsibilitybetween the
Congressand the executivebranch... Congressis by law more actively
involved in the conductof relationswith Taiwanthanothercountriesin
the world."48
This assertion,madeby a Democrat,suggesteda reawakening of legislativeprerogative.
Confrontationin the TaiwanStrait and TRARedux:1993-2000
A changedcontext.In 1993 "unofficial"representativesfrom the PRC
and Taiwanmet in Singapore.By early 1995 it seemed that improved
43. Examplesof the relativelyinnocuousreferencescan be foundin House Concurrent
Resolution210, 102ndCongress,FirstSessionandHouseConcurrent
Resolution193, 102nd
Congress,FirstSession.The statisticsare derivedfromthe searchenginein THOMAS.
44. ThefactthatPresidentGeorgeBush'sdecision,announcedin September1992,to end
the nearlydecade-oldstalemateon the issue of advancedfighteraircraftby selling F-16s to
Taiwan (an apparentviolation of the 1982 communique)was made largely without
involvementclearlyillustratesthis.Fordetaileddiscussionof thisdecision,see
Congressional
Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China: An Investigative History (New York:
PublicAffairs, 1999),pp. 376-79.
45. Jim Mann, About Face: A History ofAmerica's Curious Relationship with China,from
Nixon to Clinton(New York:AlfredA. Knopf, 1999), p. 321.
46. Fora listingof the proposedlegislationsee Song, "Theseconddecadeof the Taiwan
RelationsAct,"p. 51.
47. Mann, About Face, p. 319.
48. "Hearingof theEastAsianandPacificAffairsSubcommittee,"
FederalNewsService,
27 September1994.
The TaiwanRelationsAct
relationswere a possibility.However,in May of thatyear, as a resultof
Congressionalpressure,a visa was grantedto PresidentLee Teng-huito
attenda class reunionin the UnitedStates.The mainlanddemonstrated
its
When
tests.
similar
displeasureby stagingmilitaryexercises and missile
actionswere takenin the midstof Taiwan'spresidentialelectionsin early
1996, the UnitedStatesdispatchedtwo aircraftcarriergroupsto the area.
The immediatedanger of armed confrontationpassed, but cross-strait
relationslurched,for the next fouryears,betweenstalematednegotiations
and signs of renewedcrisis.
From 1993 to 1996, Sino-Americanrelationsstumbledfrom controversy to controversy.The militaryexercises of 1996 spurredthe Clinton
administrationto end the confrontationalcycle with the PRC. Over the
next four years, it workedto improverelationswith a PRC leadership
increasingly focused on the necessity of realizing reunificationand
suspiciousthat Americansupportwas encouragingTaipei's resistance.
Cross-straitrelationsbecame the principalfactor complicatingadministrationefforts to "engage"China.
In the UnitedStatesdomesticpolitics were transformedby the Repubtone of the
lican Congressionalvictory. The stridentanti-administration
new leadershipafter 1995 set the stage for a bitterpartisaninter-branch
confrontation.The conservative Republican leadershipjoined liberal
humanrights advocates(many from the DemocraticParty)to createan
atmospheredeeply distrustfulof Clinton initiatives.This mood gained
strengthfrom, but also fed, charges that Beijing meddledin American
politics, stole weapons technology, and was buildingweapons systems
capableof threateningTaiwanand the United States.
In sum, from 1995 to 2000 a concatenationof events, both internationaland domestic, changed the context for Washington'sTaiwan/
PRC policy. Seeking to improve relations, the Clinton administration
faced PRC demandsto demonstratethat it did not encourageseparatist
sentimentsin Taiwan.As the administration
soughtto distanceitself from
the island, a partisanCongress,sceptical of the policy of engagement,
acted to "balance"the Clintonpolicy by enhancingthe Americanrelationshipwith Taiwan.
In January 1996, Taiwan
Turningpoint: the 1996 confrontation.49
movedto centrestage.As indicationsgrew thatBeijingwouldexpressits
dissatisfactionwith the forthcomingpresidentialelection on Taiwan,
therewere calls fromCongressfor Americanaction.'5On 7 February,the
SenateSubcommitteeon East Asian and PacificAffairsheld hearingsto
which it invited AssistantSecretaryof State WinstonLord and Deputy
AssistantSecretaryof Defense KurtCampbell.
49. Ouranalysisof this eventhasbenefitedgreatlyfromconversationswithRobertRoss.
See his "The 1995-1996 TaiwanStraitconfrontation:
coercion,credibility,and the use of
force," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000).
50. CongressionalRecord,24 January1996, pp. 338-40 and 25 January1996, p. E88.
157
158
The ChinaQuarterly
Questionersfocused on the ambiguityregardinga United States response in the event of militaryconfrontationand the administration's
failure to consult Congress during the July 1995 militaryexercises.51
Administrationwitnesses respondedby using the terms of the TRA to
minimizelegislative activism.WinstonLord noted that since a military
could not
"threat"to Taiwanhad not yet materialized,the administration
make an unambiguousstatementregardingthe defence of Taiwanas the
TRA requiredprecedentconsultationwith Congressonce such a threat
existed.In this respect,he asserted"there'sno ambiguity,in my view, in
the minds of either Taiwan or Beijing or anyone else, that we would
respondin close consultationwith Congressto threatsto Taiwan."52
When, in March, the PRC announcedits first round of military
exercises,Congressfocused on the issues of ambiguityand consultation.
Initially,separateresolutionswere introducedin the Senate(S. Con. Res.
43) and the House (H. Con. Res. 148) invoking the TRA. As the
legislative process proceeded,differencesbetween the two resolutions
became evident.
The House resolution,taken up first, was concernedmore with prescribinga responseto the confrontationthanestablishingthe necessityof
consultation.Withreferenceto the TRA, it assertedthatthe "senseof the
Congress"favouredspecificactionsby the UnitedStateswhich included:
maintainingAmericanmilitarycapacityto resist any "resortto force or
otherformsof coercion"thatthreatenedthe securityof Taiwan;establishing a naval presence to keep sea lanes open "in and near the Taiwan
Straits";supplyingdefensive armsto Taiwan;and, "in accordancewith
the Taiwan RelationsAct and the constitutionalprocess of the United
States,"assistingin the island's defence against"invasion,missile attack
or blockade"by the PRC.53
The languageof this final stipulationwent beyondthe languageof the
TRA which was, in RepresentativeLee Hamilton'swords, intended"to
give the United States maximum flexibility in dealing with Chinese
threatsto Taiwan."This resolution,he argued,appeared"to push American policy furtherthanit has ever gone beforein a quarterof a century"
towards a "commitmentto defend Taiwan."54The House, dissatisfied
with ambiguouslanguage,was seekingto move the TRA - andAmerican
policy - in the directionof a de facto mutualdefence treaty.Still, the
debate that accompaniedthe passage of the resolution remained as
ambiguousas the act itself regardingAmericanaction.While the House
wantedactionto be takenin defenceof Taiwan,therewas no single view
of what that action might be.55
51. "Hearingsof the Subcommitteeon East Asian and Pacific Affairs on Taiwan's
Security,"FederalNews Service,7 February1999.
52. Ibid.
53. House ConcurrentResolution148, 104thCongress,2nd Session.
54. Congressional Record-House, 19 March 1996, p. 2343.
55. One of the sponsors,BenjaminGilman,who had arguedthat it was necessaryfor
Congressto act as the presidentwouldnot, suggestedthatthe clause did not "necessarily
[mean]sendingforces, it would meantryingto provideessentialmaterialand supportto
The TaiwanRelationsAct
In the final vote takenon 19 March,the measurepassed 369 to 14 in
the House with strongbipartisansupport.When the resolutionreached
the Senateit was recast.All but one of the calls for actionthatexistedin
the House resolution were dropped - and that one was radically
The emphasisin the Senatewas on theproceduralstipulations
changed.56
of the TRA, particularlythe importanceof consultationwith Congress
should an "actualthreat"develop.57The Senate vote (97-0) represented
morean effortto protectinstitutionalprerogativethanto formulatepolicy
prescriptions.It is likely thatthe wordsand actionsof the administration,
which had less impacton the House vote, were importantfactorsin the
Senate's orientation.
WhenLordand Campbelltestifiedbeforethe House for a secondtime
on 14 March,the Clintonadministration
had alreadytakenunprecedented
actions to addressthe crisis atmospherein the strait. On 7 March, a
visiting Chinese official had been informedof Americanconcerns in
languagedrawnfrom the TRA. When Chinesemissile firingscontinued,
it was announcedthree days later that two aircraftcarrierbattle groups
would be orderedto the area. The next day, 11 March, the Chinese
announcedthe end of missile tests. Althougha tense atmospherewould
persist through the presidentialelections of 23 March, the mainland
militarythreatwas clearlypassing.51
This new environmentchangedadministration
strategy.Earlier,Campbell and Lord sought to minimize the possibility of escalation due to
inflammatoryrhetoricor Congressionalmeddling. On 14 March,they
soughtto deterthe PRC from precipitousaction and the Congressfrom
passingresolutionsthat mightreignitea crisis. Both continuedto justify
not invokingthe TRA by the fact that a "threat"did not exist. But this
time they quoted extensively from the TRA and its legislative history,
pledging fealty to its consultationprovisions.
Therewas also far less evasionregardingan Americanresponseshould
a conflict breakout. Recognizingthe need to "stampout the Energizer
Bunny of 'strategicambiguity'"(Lord'swords),both, althoughinsisting
thatthe intentof the TRA was not to makea specificcommitment,came
close to doing so. Campbellspoke of "strategicclarity"and "tactical
ambiguity";that is that Washingtonwould take action, althoughthe
natureof that action was open-ended.Lordwent further,notingthat the
PRC had been remindedof the termsof the TRA and thatthe "message
footnote continued
Taiwanin the event they were being invaded."The othersponsor,GeraldSolomon,spoke
moreaffirmatively,arguingthatthe U.S. "oughtto defendthemagainstthatattack."Doug
Bereuter,a staunchadvocateof endingambiguity,useda phrasemorecommonin thedebate,
"to assist"in the defenceof Taiwan.Ibid.pp. 2343-44 and 2347.
56. This was the call to supplydefensivearmsto Taiwanwhichbecamein the Senatea
call for the presidentto "re-examinethe natureandquantityof defensivearmsandservices
that may be necessaryto enableTaiwanto maintainself-defensecapability."See Senate
Amendment3562, CongressionalRecord,26 March1996, p. S2622.
57. Ibid.
58. See Tyler,A GreatWall,pp. 32-36.
159
160
The ChinaQuarterly
is clear.A resortto force with respectto Taiwanwould directlyinvolve
Americannationalinterestsand would carrygrave risks.""59
Lord's invocation of "Americannationalinterests"was similarto languagerejected
in 1979 and was the strongeststatementby any administrationto date.
The administrationclearly "pre-empted... Congressionalaction"in
March1996.6 However,its statementson strategicambiguitywere based
less on the administration'sdesire eitherto suit policy to Congressional
preferencesor to signala changein Taiwanpolicy thanto send a message
of deterrenceto Beijing. When policy changed to one of enhanced
engagement,it would returnto a position of strategicambiguity.61In
Congressthe commitmentto end strategicambiguityremained,particularly within the Republicanmajorityin the House of Representatives
where the rhetoricof the "Republicanrevolution"was most critical of
administration
policy.
The straitconfrontationwas a turningpoint in the Clintonadministration's policy towardsthe PRC. Congresshad been placatedand China
deterred;but these successes were costly. The security aspects of the
TRA had been given unprecedentedpublic exposure and credibility
because of the dispatchof the carriergroups.The role of the Congress
was highlighted and the president's opponents there now had an
improvedinstrumentwith whichto intervene.It wouldnot be long before
they did so. The occasion was the renewalof Sino-Americansummitry.
In October1997 PresidentJiangZeminvisitedthe U.S. andin June 1998,
PresidentClinton made a return visit to China. As the Washington
summitneared,generalresolutionswere introducedin Congresscalling
upon the president "to make clear" to Jiang the commitment to
the security of Taiwan mandatedby the TRA and the expectation
that cross-straitdifferenceswould be resolved peacefully. More pointedly, the House passed legislation by a vote of 301-116 calling for
Defense Departmentstudies regardingthe provision of anti-ballistic
missile systems to Taiwanand Taiwan'spossible inclusionin a theatrewide system- an obviousattemptto complicaterapprochement
with the
PRC.62
The response to the June summit was more focused because the
presidentmadea publiceffortto distancethe UnitedStatesfromTaiwan.
When he articulatedthe "threenoes," Congress was mobilized.63For
59. "HouseInternational
on AsiaandPacificHearing
RelationsCommittee,Subcommittee
re: MilitaryStabilityin the TaiwanStraits,"FederalNews Service, 14 March1996.
60. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Review, 23 March 1996.
61. Indeed,by late Marchtherewere reportsin the press thatthe executive-legislative
consensuswas comingapart.WashingtonPost, 20 March1996.
62. For examplesof the resolutions,see "HouseResolution225" (9 September1997),
"HouseResolution252" (29 September1997), "HouseConcurrentResolution178" (28
October1997), and"SenateConcurrent
Resolution57" (27 October1997).The legislation
on ballisticmissile systemswas HouseResolution2386. It was sent to the Senate,whereit
died.
63. No supportfor Taiwanindependence,no supportfor "twoChinas"or one Chinaand
one Taiwan,andno supportforTaiwan'smembershipin anyinternational
bodythatrequires
statusof statehood.
The TaiwanRelationsAct
Clinton's opponents this was a glaring example of an appeasement
policy, while supportersexpresseduneasinessover an apparentnarrowing
of the options for resolutionof cross-straitdifferences.6This situation
was exacerbatedby yet anotheraccusationof a failureto consult.Priorto
the president'svisit, rumourshad circulatedthathe plannedsome action
- perhapsa fourthcommunique- that would adverselyaffect Taiwan's
interests.As membersof the administration
were called beforeCongress
to testify beforethe visit, they were askedrepeatedlyif therewould be a
change in policy relatedto Taiwan.Both at the cabinetlevel and at the
staff level, administrationrepresentativesassured Congress that there
would be no such change.
Enter the Pentagon. In February 1999 Congress received two
reports from the Departmentof Defense that had been mandatedin
1998. In one, the Pentagon submitted a feasibility study for the
"architecture"
of a missile defence for Taiwan.In the second, a report
regardingthe militarybalance in the Taiwan Strait,the Pentagonestimated that a steady growth in PRC capabilities(especially increased
missile deploymenton the coast opposite Taiwan) would soon pose a
serious threatto the island. These reportsreachedCongressjust as the
administration
decision regardingarmssales to Taiwanin the following
yearenteredits finalstagesandthe 20th anniversaryof the passageof the
TRA approached.65
The tack that the Congressionalleadershiptook after 1999 in respect
to "balancing"the administration'sTaiwan/PRCpolicy was shapedby
these circumstances.Congressionalfocus shifted to arms sales as a
leverage point for enhancingits influenceand, by doing so, the president's critics gaineda valuable,albeit tacit, ally. By 1999, the Pentagon
was ready to play a more assertiverole in shapingTaiwanpolicy. This
stance was, in part, a result of Congressional"pull."Reports on the
militarybalance had been mandatedby legislation and the subsequent
focus on armssales increasedpressurefromCongressfor informationand
advice. These demandswould not be ignoredas the ongoing appropriations process placed a premiumon good legislativerelations.
However,therewas also bureaucratic"push."By the mid-1990sthere
was increasingconcernin the Pentagonregardingthe growthof Chinese
military power.66Many felt that the nature of the relationshipwith
Taiwan needed reorientationin orderto strengthenAmerica's strategic
position. Congressionalactivism would serve this goal even as it increasedthe prominenceof the Departmentof Defense in an arms sales
64. For example, compare the statementof SenatorCraig Thomas (Congressional
Record, p. S7916) and Lee Hamilton (Congressional Record, p. H58888).
65. Departmentof Defense, "Thesecuritysituationin the TaiwanStrait,"26 February
1999 and"Reportto Congresson theatermissile defensearchitecture
optionsfor the AsiaPacificregions."Accordingto ChinaNewsAgency,29 April1999,thelatterreportwasmade
availableto Congressin a classifiedformin February1999.
66. Jim Manndiscussesthis in his AboutFace, pp. 332-33.
161
162
The ChinaQuarterly
processpreviouslydominatedby the Departmentof State and the White
House.
Before the confrontationof 1996 there had been a robust relationship with Taiwancentredaroundthe foreign militarysales programme.
Since 1988, Taiwan had consistently ranked as America's second or
third largest arms customer in dollar terms, and the single largest
customerin Asia, well ahead of treaty allies Japan,South Korea and
Australia.Taiwan's purchaseshad covered a wide spectrumincluding
air defence systems, frigates, ship-to-shipmissiles, tanks and armed
helicopters.
Politicalconsiderationssignificantlyshapedthe natureof these sales.
Taiwan'sofficialsoften soughtarmsas a symbolicindicatorof American
support,attachingless significance to the ability of their military to
absorbdiverseweaponssystemsor to integratetheminto a single defence
strategy.The UnitedStates,seekingto avoidprovokingthe PRC, sharply
restrictedany dealings with Taiwanthat might suggest steps towardsa
renewedmilitaryalliance.The Americanside strictlylimitedwhat could
be sold. For example, a narrow definition of "defensive"had been
maintainedby all administrations,excludingcertaindefensive weapons
(submarines,for example) with possible offensive uses. Items such as
sharedearly warningsystemsthat might involve interactionbetweenthe
Taiwanand Americanmilitarieswere also excluded.
Moreover,the UnitedStatesgovernmentplacedlimitationson the rank
and purpose of visits of U.S. officials to Taiwan. American military
had to be on missionsrelatedto the foreignmilitarysales
representatives
programmeand be an 0-6 (Colonel or Navy Captain)or below. For
civilian counterpartsin the Defense Department,the upperlimit was the
GS-15 rank, with the result that officials responsiblefor formulating
securitypolicy for the Asia-Pacificregion could not visit Taiwan.Additionally, it was a matterof U.S. policy to limit the exchangesbetween
military professionalsresponsible for operationalmatters in order to
assurethe PRC that the TRA was not a functionalalliance.This policy
includedprofessionalseminardiscussionsor joint militaryexercises and
training.One result of this was that while the TRA tasked the U.S.
militarywith maintaining"the capacityto resist any resort to force or
coercion"in the areaandthe Commander-in-Chief
of U.S. PacificForces
had an operationalplan for a Taiwan Straitcontingency,it was a plan
basedon little knowledgeof Taiwandefenceplanningand no significant
pre-crisisinteractionbetweenthe two militaries.
The events of 1995-96 caused some in the Pentagonto rethinkthe
relationship.Beijing, it seemed, had the will, and was developing the
militaryability,to use militaryforce to secureits aims vis-a-vis Taiwan.
Of greaterconsequence,when the U.S. deployed two aircraftcarrier
groups,it becameimmediatelyclearthatpoorchannelsof communication
and a high degree of unfamiliaritywould pose serious problems
if fighting were to break out. Communicationsthat went through a
small, overworkedstaff at the AmericanInstitutein Taiwan, and their
equally taxed counterpartswithin the Taipei Economic and Cultural
The TaiwanRelationsAct
RepresentativeOffice, were inadequate.67The Departmentof Defense
was, thus, ready in 1999-2000 to assume a more assertiverole in the
making of decisions regardinghow the TRA should be interpretedand
implemented.
The president "engages"and Congress "enhances."The impact of
the February1999 Departmentof Defense report on the cross-strait
balanceas well as this convergenceof interestswere reflectedprimarily
in two ways. The first was a more pro-activeand tacticallyastuteeffort
by some membersof Congressto influencethe annualreview of U.S.
arms sales to Taiwan. Citing TRA language that "the Presidentand
Congressshall determinethe natureandquantityof such defensearticles
and servicesbased solely upon theirjudgmentof the needs of Taiwan,"
HouseForeignAffairsCommitteeChairmanGilmandemandedin a letter
to the presidentin March1998 thathe be briefedon the administration's
decisionsbeforeTaiwanwas informedof the final outcome.The administrationrefused the request stating that it would continue to follow
normalproceduresfor notifyingCongressof all proposedforeignmilitary
sales.
In the following year Gilmanand his staff adopteda more aggressive
(and arguablymore effective) approach.They asked for and received
briefingson the armsreview process.Equippedwith a betterunderstanding of the critical decision nodes in the process, the House Foreign
Affairs Committeestaff closely trackedthe 1999 review process. With
the help of willing collaboratorsat the Pentagon, they were able to
determinewhich systems that Taiwanhad requestedwere "close calls"
for release and the subject of intense inter-agencydebate. With this
information,Gilmanand othermembersintervenedin the decisionswith
greaterprecision.
For example,in a letterto the presidentin spring 1999, Gilmanagain
cited TRA language,noting that the law requiresTaiwanbe "provided
defense articlesand defense services in such quantityas may be necessary for sufficientself-defensecapability."Gilmandemandedthe release
of a specific system - ground-basedearly warningradar- that he knew
was then the subjectof disagreementbetweenthe Pentagonandthe State
Department(Pentagonsupportingrelease,Stateopposing).Gilmanthreatened to halt all armstransfersglobally if the situationwas not resolved
favourably.Less than a week later, the administrationgave Taiwan
conditionalapprovalto purchasesuch a system.
The othermajorimpactwas reflectedin the resolutionsintroducedin
both the House and Senate recognizingthe two decades of the TRA.
Noting thatthe PRCarmsbuild-upnot only threatenedTaiwan'ssecurity
but also "UnitedStates interestsin the Asia-Pacificregion,"they called
67. As one seniordefence official from the United Statesremarked,"we were almost
withTaiwanin conflict,andwe knewfarless aboutthemthan
standingshoulder-to-shoulder
we knew aboutthe PRC,"while a Taiwanofficialnotedafterthe crisis thatTaipeidid not
evenhavea phonebooklistingcommercialphonenumbersforindividualsattheUnitedStates
PacificCommandin Hawaii.
163
164
The ChinaQuarterly
uponCongressandthe presidentto exercisetheirsharedresponsibilityto
receive "recommendations"from the "military authorities"and to
"determinethe natureandquantityof whatTaiwan'slegitimateneeds are
for its self-defense."68
On 24 March, SenatorJesse Helms submittedthe Taiwan Security
EnhancementAct (TSEA) in the Senate and on 18 May Representative
Tom DeLay did the same in the House.This act convertedthe hortatory,
generalqualityof the earlierresolutionsinto legislativeform. It was the
most ambitiousattemptto use the TRA to secureCongressionalinfluence
over U.S.-Taiwanrelations.
After expressingthe "sense of the Congress"that the Secretaryof
Defense reserve positions for the Taiwan military at training and
educationalfacilities and that the Secretaryof State take into account
Taiwan's "special status"in military sales and provide "timely access
to price and availability data" for defence items, it continued with
stipulationsdirecting:
* The possible enhancementof staff at the AmericanInstitutein Taiwan to facilitate
arms exports as well as reportsby the presidentto Congress after arms talks with
Taiwan that detailed what had been requestedby the island's military;the "defense
needs assertedby Taiwan";and a detailed account of the fate of each request, the
rationale for the decision taken and the level at which that decision was taken;
* That it would "violatethe intent of Congress"as legislated in the TRA to take into
account any considerationother than Taiwan's needs (i.e., the 1982 communique
or "any other similar executive agreement");
* That the "Secretary of Defense in consultation, with the Secretary of State"
develop "operationaltraining and exchanges for personnel between the armed
forces of the United States and the armed forces of Taiwan for work in threat
analysis, doctrine, force planning, operationalmethods and other areas. The plan
shall provide for exchanges of officers up to and including general and flag officers
in the grade of 0-10";
* That the Secretaryof Defense reporton that plan within 180 days and implement
it within 30 days of such report;
* That "secure direct communications"be established between the Taiwan military
and the United States Pacific Command;
* That the "Presidentis authorizedto make available to Taiwan at reasonablecost"
a long list of itemized military systems including the Aegis system.69
Hearings on the TSEA were held in the Senate in August 1999 and in the
House in September.However,the legislationthatemergedfromthe full
House committee in October and passed by a vote of 341-70 on 1
February2000 had been significantlychanged.70
68. See "SenateConcurrent
Resolution17"(11 March1999), CongressionalRecord,p.
S2605 and"HouseConcurrent
Resolution56" (17 March1999),ibid.p. H1531.Theformer
was passedon 12 April1999 andthe latteron 23 March1999.The quotationsarefromthe
Houseresolution.
69. "HouseResolution1838,"18 May 1999.
70. United StatesCongress.House of Representatives,Committeeon ForeignAffairs,
Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, Report 106-423, 106th Congress, First Session, 28
October1999, pp. 5-6.
The TaiwanRelationsAct
There were two categoriesof changes. The first was the removalof
sections identifying specific weapons systems "authorized"for sale to
Taiwan.Instead,wordingwas added requiringannualDefense Departmentreportsto Congresson the "securitysituationin the TaiwanStrait"
as well as on the U.S. ability "to respond successfully to a major
contingencyin the Asia-Pacificregion where the United States interests
on Taiwanareat risk."71The secondchangewas the introductionof three
new paragraphsinto the findings section of the legislation which
identifiedthe ambiguityin the Americancommitmentas the causefor the
crises of 1995-96, and addedthat it would be
... in the nationalinterestfor the UnitedStatesto eliminateambiguityandconvey
with claritycontinuedUnitedStatessupportfor Taiwan,its peopleandtheirability
to maintaintheirdemocracyfree fromcoercionandtheirsocietyfree fromthe use
of force againstthem.72
This language, consistent with past Congressional efforts, was also
related to developments in cross-strait relations as the TSEA was being
considered.
In July 1999, on the eve of the second high-level meeting between
mainlandand Taiwan representatives,PresidentLee Teng-hui asserted
that relationswith the mainlandwere "special state-to-staterelations."
Beijing angrilypostponedthe meeting and chargedLee with supporting
independence.Although Lee was criticized by some supporters,Congressional focus was on the harsh PRC rhetoric. This rhetoric became
sharper when, at the end of the year, Chen Shui-bian, a former independence advocate, emerged as a viable presidential candidate. Although
Beijing eventuallyrefrainedfrom a repeatof 1996, its statementsbecame
increasinglyhostile as the Marchelections approached.After Chen was
elected, there were serious concerns regarding renewed conflict in the
strait.
At the same time, President Clinton's efforts to engage the PRC
reacheda criticaljuncture.The two sides were negotiatingthe conditions
for China's entry into the World TradeOrganization.In the autumnof
1999 a Sino-U.S.agreementwas reachedto open the mainlandto greater
trade and investment. By the spring of 2000, the administration was
taking the first steps towards implementing this agreement by seeking
Congressional approval of permanent normal trade relations status
(PNTR, previously known as most-favoured nation status) for Beijing.
In the past, whenever the administration sought to improve relations
with the PRC while Beijing's threat to Taiwan grew, there was renewed
Congressional activism and a consequent increase in inter-branchconflict.
This was the case with the TSEA as its sponsors worked to draw on their
broad base of support both within Congress and without to use the act to
71. Ibid. pp. 3-4.
72. This was apparentlyat the insistenceof RepresentativeDoug Bereuter.See "U.S.
RepresentativeBenjaminGilman (R-NY) holds markup:Washington,D.C.," Federal
Document Clearing House Political Transcripts, 29 October 1999, p. 8.
165
166
The ChinaQuarterly
deter the PRC from interferingin the Taiwan elections. One targetof
Congressionalefforts was the Departmentof Defense.
In the Pentagon,some defence plannerswere becoming increasingly
concerned regardinga PRC arms build-up accompaniedby growing
anti-Americanrhetoric. This required a reconsiderationof American
strategyin the area as well as a focus on Taiwan's eroding defensive
edge. Statementsby Defense Departmentofficials to PRC officials that
the natureand quantityof armssales to Taiwanwould be determinedby
Beijing's build-upsuggestedthatthe island's defensivecapabilities(that
is, the result of Taipei's choice and deploymentof Americanweapons
systems)were becominga crucialelementin the Pentagon'scalculations
of United States' capabilitiesin the area. Finally, as the possibility of
American interventionin the area grew, so did concerns regarding
deficienciesin co-ordinationwith Taiwan'smilitary.
Overlapbetweenthe goals of Congressand those of the Pentagonwas
demonstratedby the testimony of Departmentof Defense officials at
Congressionalhearings.73While all were carefulnot to contradictadministrationpolicy openly, there were also suggestions of an inclination
towardsa less restrictivedefinitionof defensiveweapons;an eagernessto
play a strongerrole in the process by which Taiwannot only obtained
weapons but also trainedits users and integratedthem in the island's
force structureand strategy;and supportfor enhancedco-operationwith
the Taiwanmilitary.74
Privateinteractionswere more complex. Internally,the Pentagondecided on a public strategyof "supportthe spirit of the act" but not its
actualpassage.Manyofficialsrecognizedthatthe TSEA could be useful
in promotingtheir own bureaucraticinterests.It was hoped that raising
the spectreof Congressionalmeddlingmight spuran otherwisereluctant
StateDepartmentandWhiteHouse into supportingthe Pentagon'sgoals.
Thus, Congressionalpressurewas used by the Departmentof Defense as
a sourceof leveragein inter-agencydisputes.In some cases, this led to
outrightcollusionbetweenCongressand the Pentagonat the staff level.
Pentagonstaff reviewed the TSEA in draft form before it was made
for comment.The same Departofficially availableto the administration
ment of Defense staff made recommendationsfor changes to the draft
(some of which were accepted)basedon the perceivedhelp to be derived
from the bill in inter-agencybattles.They continuedto "coach"Capitol
Hill staff throughits hearingsand in its correspondencewith the admin-
the 20th anniversaryof the TRAin
73. Thesewerethe Senatehearingscommemorating
March1999 (AssistantSecretaryof Defense FranklinD. Kramertestifying)as well as the
Senatehearingsin Augustandthe Househearingsin September(DeputyAssistantSecretary
KurtCampbelltestifying).
74. United States Congress,Senate. Committeeon ForeignRelations,UnitedStatesTaiwan Relations: The20th Anniversary of the Taiwan RelationsAct, 106th Congress, Second
Session, 25 March1999, pp. 16-28. "U.S. [sic] Jesse Helms (R-NC)holds hearingon the
security of Taiwan; Washington, D.C.," Federal Document Clearing House, Inc., pp. 13-31
and "U.S. RepresentativeDoug Bereuter(R-NE) holds hearingson Taiwanand China:
Washington,D.C.,"ibid., 15 September1999, pp. 25-36.
The TaiwanRelationsAct
istration.The Pentagonwas not shy in suggestingthe types of questions
CapitolHill should be asking officials at the State Departmentand the
NationalSecurityCouncilon Taiwanpolicy matters.
Yet therewere limits to these sharedinterests.Identificationof specific
weapons systems to be made "available"to the island were coolly
received in the Pentagon.This would impinge on the prerogativesof
professionalmilitaryplanners,encourageTaiwan'stendencyto use political criteriafor purchasesandfurtherpoliticizethe processin Washington.
Finally,the Defense Departmentwas more constrainedthanCongressin
its ability to defy the executive.The redraftingof the TSEA seemed, in
part,to be an attemptto amelioratesome of these concerns.
However,it was also intendedto gain the supportof those Democrats
who were ready to back legislation which supportedTaiwan, but not
criticizethe president.This was done by omittingthe section authorizing
decisions,but
specificweaponssystems(a responseto pastadministration
also of doubtfulconstitutionality)while insertingthe wordingon ambiguity and the maintenanceof Americanmilitarycapability.
Ironically, the attitudeof the Clinton administrationwhich judged
Congressionalinterferenceas a majorobstacleto improvingU.S.-China
relationsthrougha delicateperiodmay have increasedbipartisansupport.
The administrationworked not only to defeat the TSEA, but also to
insulate the pending considerationof arms sales from Congressional
meddling."By the time of the finalvote in February2000, supportfor the
to
TSEAhadbecomefor manyas muchan expressionof a determination
defendCongressionalprerogativeas it was of a determinationto defend
Taiwan.76
However, while the administrationsnub was a crucial element in
gainingbipartisansupportfor the revised TSEA, it was only marginally
relatedto the timing of its introductionin the House more than three
monthsafter it was reportedout of committee.More significantin this
respectwas the impactof the two contradictorythemesdiscussedearlier:
growing concern over the PRC's hostile response to the elections in
Taiwanand the effort to secure closer economic ties with Beijing. The
75. In the Augusthearings,SenatorJosephBiden,an administration
supporter,criticized
this strategy.He pointedto "alackof trust"as thebasisfor the TSEA.He attemptedto gain
assurancesfromadministration
witnessesthatconsultationwithCongresspriorto armssales
would be increased.Inter-branchrelations ("up-street-down-street
relations")were as
importantas cross-straitrelations.He warnedthatif they were not attendedto, the "boss"
(SenatorJesseHelms)was"goingto win."See, "U.S.[sic]JesseHelms(R-NC)holdshearing
on the securityof Taiwan,Washington,D.C.,"p. 19. This was a somewhatgratuitousact as
Congresswas probablybeing kept abreastby Taiwanof their requests.For example,a
Congressionaldelegationhadbeenbriefedwhenit visitedTaiwanin February.Washington
Times,8 February2000.
76. It is thusno accidentthatwhentheypresentedthe revisedTSEAfor a finalvote both
the Chairmanof the HouseForeignAffairsCommittee(BenjaminGilman)andthe ranking
Democraticmember(Sam Gejdenson)emphasizedits importanceas an expressionof
Congressionalresponsibility.CongressionalRecord-House,1 February2000, p. HI114.It
should,however,be notedthatsomeprominentDemocratssuchas TomLantosof California
opposed this legislationas unnecessaryand provocative.This, of course, was also the
administrationposition. "U.S. RepresentativeBenjaminGilman (R-NY) holds markup:
Washington,D.C.,"pp. 10-12.
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role of Congressregardingthe firstthemewas consistentwithpasttrends.
The TSEA was broughtto the House floor in late January2000 to deter
the PRC. Its sponsorsintendedits passage, as well as the stipulations
containedwithin the bill, to be, like the dispatchof the aircraftcarrier
groupsfour years earlier,an unambiguoussignal of Americancommitment.77The Congressionalrole in respectto the secondthemeintroduced
a new elementinto the dynamicin executive-legislativerelationsregarding Taiwan/PRCpolicy.
In the past, Congress,using the TRA, had playedthe role of a spoiler
in efforts to improverelationswith Beijing. Presidentialefforts to enhance engagementby accommodatingmainlandsensitivities regarding
the Taiwan issue almost inevitably stimulatedCongressionalefforts to
aggravatethem.In 1999-2000, even as they followed this same strategy,
the president'sopponentswere timingthe legislativecourseof the TSEA
to accommodate,and not frustrate,administrationefforts to gain the
PRC's admissionto the WorldTradeOrganization,a matterof concern
to key Republicanconstituencies.And so, in October1999, the very same
leadershipthatpromotedthe TSEAdespitewarningsthatit wouldworsen
relationswith the PRCtableda full-housevote as WorldTradeOrganization negotiationsreacheda delicatestage.78Similarly,the timingof the 1
February2000 vote was, in part, motivated by the need to provide
"politicalcover"for representativeswho were soon to vote positivelyon
PNTR.
A similarconnectionis foundin the subsequentfate of the TSEAin the
Senate.Despite concernregardingpossible PRC actionin the run-upto,
andthen aftermathof, the Taiwanelections,the TSEA was not placedon
the Senate calendarimmediatelyafter House passage. Furtheraction
might unnecessarilyprovoke the PRC. However, in mid-April,as the
administration
was in the finalstagesof the armssales process,the TSEA
was placedon the Senatecalendar.Congressionalpressurewas strongfor
the inclusion of the Aegis system (a possible platformfor the island's
futureparticipationin a theatremissile defenceprogramme)as a sign of
supportfor Taiwanand a responseto the PRC. A letterto the president
from SenatorTrent Lott - timed to coincide with the administration's
final internaldeliberationson arms sales - urgedrelease of the ships to
Taiwan, and cautioned that failure to make the system available to
77. Theneedto endstrategicambiguityis a recurringthemeof almostall thosewho spoke
in the final debate on the TSEA. See CongressionalRecord-House,1 February2000,
pp. H103-121. See WashingtonPost, 2 February2000. Afterthe elections,SenatorRobert
Torrecillinotedthata purposeof the TSEAwas to "discourageBeijingfrominterferingin
the elections.WashingtonPost, 27 April2000.
78. In the committeediscussion,DouglasBeureuternotedthathe haddone "everything
I couldto delay"theTSEAandthatpartof themotivationbehindthechangesin thelegislation
was to avoidgivingthe PRCan excuseto scuttlethe WTOagreement."U.S.Representative
BenjaminGilman(R-NY)holdsmarkup:Washington,D.C.,"p. 9. Newspaperaccountsnoted
thatBereuterwas a representative
fromNebraskawhichhadmuchto gain fromPRCentry
intoWTOin termsof grainsales.However,whilethereweredivisionswithintheRepublican
Party,the vote was apparentlypostponeddue to pressurefrom the businesscommunity
Post, 3 October1999and2 November1999andThe
expressingsimilarconcerns.Washington
Washington Times, 2 February 2000.
The TaiwanRelationsAct
Taiwanwouldnegativelyaffectthe prospectsfor PNTRpassage.Tabling
the TSEA (bolstered by such warnings) was meant to warn of the
consequencesthat might flow from a refusalto sell the ships. Nevertheless, the Aegis was omittedfromthe armspackageannouncedat the end
of April 2000.79 Despite angry reactionsfrom Senate majorityleader
TrentLott and SenatorJesse Helms, the Republicanleadershipdecided
againstan immediatevote - althoughLott noted coyly that it could be
broughtup at any time.8o
The most importantreasonsfor this postponementwere a disinclination furtherto incite China's leaders and signals that the newly elected
leadershipin Taiwandid not favourpassageof the legislationat thattime.
However, there were also reportsthat introductionof the TSEA might
become a complicatingfactorin the finalstages of PNTRpassage.81The
Senateput aside a majoreffortto "balance"the policy of engagementin
orderto clear the way for a keystonein that same policy.
This analysisof the evolutionof the TRA thus ends on a paradoxical
note. On the one hand,duringthe 1990s Congressincreasinglyexercised
the potentialauthorityfound in the TRA to intervenein the makingof
Taiwan/PRCpolicy. On the otherhand,the TSEA, which in 1999-2000
seemed to be a dramaticculminationof that process, ended with what
appearedto be a resoundingwhimper.
Has the TRA, after more than 20 years of Congressionalstruggle,
proven that it can do little to enhance either the commitmentof the
United States to Taiwan or the influenceof Congressin securingthat
commitment?Or, like other pieces of Congressionallegislation,has its
significancebeen less than one might conclude from the rhetoric,yet
more thanone might deducefrom the Congressionalinterventionstaken
in its name?
Conclusion
The assertion that the post-1972 Sino-American rapprochement
founderedon the events of 1989-91 is acceptedwisdom. The events at
Tiananmen,it is argued, increased Beijing's concerns regardingthe
corrosiveeffects of internationalcontacteven as it underminedAmerican
hopes that these contacts would transformthe PRC. The demise of
communismin the West over the next two yearsis saidto have weakened
the relationship'sstrategicrationaleand furthersubstantiatedthe American belief thatunapologeticcommunistleadersin Beijing were defyinga
trendof world democratization.The inabilityto reconstruct- or to find
a substitutefor - these two bases of rapprochement
is thus establishedas
the root cause of the subsequentunsteadyrelationship.This analysis
suggests that a thirdfactor should also be considered:the re-emergence
and metamorphosisof the Taiwanissue.
79. Washington Post, 18 April 2000.
80. Ibid. and The New York Times, 28 April 2000.
81. The Washington Times, 19 April 2000 and The New York Times, 28 April 2000.
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This issue had frustratedattemptsby PresidentsNixon and Ford to
make progressin the Sino-Americanrelationshipafter 1972. By the end
of the Nixon administration,Beijing was insisting that a severing of
militaryanddiplomaticrelationswith Taiwanwas the essentialprecondition for any furtherprogressin the relationship.However, neither the
Nixon nor the Ford administrationcould meet this demand.Although
establishingdiplomaticrelations with the PRC had domestic political
support,so did the commitmentto Taiwan.Moreover,in the wake of the
failurein Vietnam,PresidentsNixon and Fordwere determinedto avoid
actionsthat would cast doubton Americancredibility.
Both presidentswere thus trappedin a cross-straitconundrum.While
it was clearthatpoliticalrealitywas such thatany furtherprogressin the
relationshipwith the PRC requiredthat the statusquo in relationswith
Taiwanbe maintained,it was equallyclearthata changein thatstatusquo
was the necessary prerequisitefor Beijing's agreementto any further
progress.
As argued in this article, the process of normalizingrelations with
Chinain 1979 was in form an attemptto eliminatethat conundrum,but
in substance an effort to work within it. President Carter and the
Congressionaldraftersof the TRA sought to arriveat a formulafor a
minimal commitmentto Taiwan that would meet both the administration's domesticpoliticalrequirements
andthe conditionsset by the PRC.82
Normalizationhad not resolvedthe conundrum;it evadedit. The PRC
leadershipremaineddissatisfiedwith continuingAmericanarmssales and
the treaty-likewordingof the TRA. Many membersof Congress,mostly
Republicansbut also Democrats,were displeased with the nature of
supportexpressed for Taiwan and narrowlymissed inserting stronger
language.The bases of normalizationwere thus extremelyfragile and
would crackunderthe cumulativestressesof 21 years.
The TRA bearsmuch of the responsibilityfor these stresses.This was
an intenselypoliticaland ambiguouspiece of legislationshapedin form
conflictand in substanceby the balancebetweenthe two
by inter-branch
branchesas well as that within Congress.The centralfindingis that the
TRA has, over the past 21 years,takenon differentcolourationsdepending on the natureof these factors.83To arguethat it is the equivalentof
a treatyor that it has assuredthe securityof Taiwansince its passageis
to ignore this dependentand variablequality. Similarly,to argue that
United States's actions since 1979 have representeda retreatfrom its
originalcommitmentsis to miss entirelythe ambiguityof those commitments.
This final argumenthas an additionalshortcoming.It seeks to assess
the impactof the TRA by deductionsdrawnfrom actions or statements
- in otherwords from what was done. Thereis, of course, anotherway
82. YufanHao'scentralthesisconcernsthis divisionof labourbetweenthe executiveand
the legislative.However,our view of the resultis somewhatmorepessimisticthanhis. See
Decision and Dilemma.
83. This dependentqualitywas a centralargumentof Kraft,The U.S. Constitutionand
Foreign Policy: Terminating the Taiwan Treaty.
The TaiwanRelationsAct
of judgingthatimpact;fromthe perspectiveof whatwas not done.Action
by Congress,particularlyin foreign affairs,is most frequentlyrestrictive
ratherthandirective.While it can rarelymandatea specificactionby the
executive, Congresscan set permissiveboundaries.How effective those
boundarieswill be, of course,varies by issue and, most importantly,by
the legislativebasis for Congressionalaction.84
It is here that the true significanceof the TRA can be found. The
resurfacingof the Taiwanissue in Sino-Americanrelationshas been the
result of the confluenceof domestic and internationalfactors. The reemergenceof the cross-straitconundrumas the specificdilemmanarrowing Americanoptions in resolvingthe Taiwanissue has been the direct
result of Congressionalaction motivated by the complex mixture of
partisanpolitics, institutionalpride and ideologicaldifferencesdescribed
above. By 2000 the cumulativeeffect of these actions was to raise the
level of supportfor Taiwanto the point thatit representedthe statusquo
in the Americanpositionthathadto be maintainedas betterrelationswith
the PRC were explored.Yet, as was the case earlier,it is changein this
status quo that Beijing is demandingas a conditionof betterrelations.
Here is the significanceof the TRA for Americanpolicy. Since 1996 it
has emergedas a powerfullegislativeinstrumentfor the settingof foreign
policy boundariesby Congress.
To some degree,the act's effectivenessis the resultof its very nature.
Unlike the usualdiet of Congressionalactionon foreignaffairs,it is "the
law of the land."Such a statushas permittedmembersof Congressto
declareit as the "legal standard"againstwhich to judge Taiwanpolicy;
has led at least one Congressionalcommitteeto suggest that a president
might be held constitutionallyaccountablefor not upholdingit; and can
providethe legitimacyfor the efforts of sympatheticindividualsin the
defence bureaucracyto justify supportfor Congress'sefforts.
However, perhapsmost important,as is often the case in American
politics, rhetoric, when presented often enough and loudly enough,
becomesreality.Since 1996, the TRA has figuredprominentlyin United
StatesPRC/Taiwanpolicy. Althoughit did not providethe legal basis for
the dispatchof naval forces to the area,its legitimacywas enhancedby
the actionsof both Congressand the executive at thattime. In the years
that followed, Congresswidely cited the legislationas the basis for its
own actions and, more generally,as an obligationof the United States.
The resultof this has been to socializea new generationof Congressional
membersin the elementsthatoriginallylay at the heartof the legislation:
Congress'sprerogativesandits specialrelationshipwith Taiwan.Finally,
since 1996, the provisionsof the act have contributedto the enhancement
alliancethathas
of Congressionalinfluencethroughthe tacitbureaucratic
been formed with the defence establishmentand the informalnetworks
and consultativeprocedureswhich have resulted.The cumulativeeffect
84. This is a commonthemeraisedby those who have studiedthe role of Congressin
foreignaffairs.
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of all these factorshas been to give credibilityto the rhetoricof the TRA
and to the influenceof Congressin definingits terms.
Of course, as this discussion has shown, dependenceon exogenous
variablesthat have contributedto the greaterinfluenceof the TRA can
also weaken it. It remains, at its core, an ambiguousdocumentwith
serious operationalflaws. This is certainlyindicatedby the mannerin
which political cross-currentsrelatedto the PNTR influencedthe TSEA
in 1999-2000. Futurechanges in the political and generationalcomposition of Congressas well as the WhiteHouse, the natureof inter-branch
relationsand perceivedAmericanprioritiesin Asia are the more fundamentalfactorsthat will shape the futurerole of the TRA. Congressdid
indeed create a "uniquerelationship"in 1979, but it has also been an
uncertainone.