The US-­‐Cuban Relationship in the 21st Century From Foe to Friend? By Lotte Lambrecht Promotor: Prof. Dr. Ken Kennard Commissary: Master Thesis submitted for the obtainment of the academic degree of Master of Arts in American Studies Academic period 2014-­‐2015 Word Count: 16.306 (not including bibliopgraphy, footnotes and abstract) “Perhaps it is idealistic of me, but I never accepted the universal prerogatives of the United States. I never accepted, and never will accept, the existence of a different law and different rules for small countries and big countries.” – Fidel Castro “History never really says goodbye. History says, see you later” -­‐ Eduardo Galeano “The United States never remembers and Latin America never forgets” -­‐ Latin American saying 2 Abstract On December 17th 2014, it was announced that the United States government would engage in diplomatic negotiations with Cuba. These negotiations would address reopening full diplomatic and commercial ties between the two neighbouring countries. This announcement came after more than 50 years of diplomatic and commercial blocking of the Caribbean island. In this thesis, an answer is sought to the question ‘Why has the Obama administration finally succeeded in breaking the diplomatic standstill between Cuba and the United States?”. It is argued that three American interests, namely security, domestic political and economic interests, have led and influenced the U.S.-­‐Cuban relationship throughout the years. It is changes within these interests, provoked by a change in context, and the willingness to protect these interests that have influenced the change in American policy. This is reflected in the three first factors that have influenced the change in American policy towards Cuba, namely the changing role of Cuban Americans in the American political system, the rebalancing of security and commercial interests and the new relationship with Latin America. Furthermore, a fourth factor is added, being the current economic and political changes going on within Cuban society. To conclude this dissertation, sketches are made for the future of these negotiations and the Cuban-­‐American relationship after the conclusion of the current negotiations. 3 Foreword Considering this is my second thesis, I had the incorrect thought that things would run more smoothly. Yet, I was once again confronted with my significant lack of organizational skills. But I was also confronted with the never-­‐ending support of my closest family and friends. Firstly, I would like to thank my parents, who have given me the opportunity to pursue my second master degree. I am fully aware, that without their support, mentally and financially, I would never have made it. Furthermore, I would like to thank all of my friends, Laura, Annelies, Marlies, Sien, Fien, Lieke, Matthew, Jan and Rosie for supporting me and proofreading my thesis. You are all little treasures and I will keep you hidden forever in the treasure box that is called my little tiny heart. Thirdly, I also want to thank the professors of this program, for introducing me into all the different aspects of the United States. Special thanks go to professor Ken Kennard, who supported me throughout the writing of this thesis and was able to endure my nagging about Latin America and Cuba. And lastly, I want to thank my former enemy and current best friend Jeroen. Thank god it didn’t take us fifty years to realize what a good pair we could form. -­‐
Ghent – 25-­‐05-­‐2015 4 Table of Contents Abstract 3 4 Table of Contents 5 Introduction 6-­‐8 9-­‐19 US and Cuba Pre Revolution: Governed from a Distance 9-­‐15 U.S.-­‐Cuban Relations post Revolution: Foreword Part I: US and Cuba Pre Revolution and Post Revolution 15-­‐18 Different President, Same Policy 15-­‐20 Conclusion 18-­‐19 Part II: The Times They Are A-­‐Changin’ 20-­‐41
20 The Changing Role of Cuban-­‐Americans 21-­‐28 Obama and Change: the Cuban Case Evaporation of the Cold War: Rebalancing of American interests 29-­‐31 A New Start with Latin America 32-­‐37 Cuba Se Mueve 38-­‐40 Conclusion 41 Part III: The Future of the Cuban-­‐American relationship 42-­‐50 42-­‐45 The Current Negotiations and their Future Cuba’s and U.S. rapprochement: Both can have their Cake, and eat it too? 46-­‐50 Part IV: Conclusion 51-­‐52 Bibliography 53-­‐61 Attachments 62 5 Introduction On December 17th 2014, the United States released the three last members of the Cuban Five 1 . These three Cuban spies were swapped with Cuba for the imprisoned US intelligence asset Rolando Sarraff Trujillo2 and the captive USAID contractor Alan P. Gross3. Following this swap, both American president Barack Obama and his Cuban counterpart Raúl Castro surprised both the American public and the world by announcing that the two countries would reengage in official diplomatic negotiations. This reopening was combined with other changes in the political and economical field, such as taking Cuba off of the America’s State sponsor of terrorism list 4 . The announcement came after a year and a half of negotiations between the U.S. and Cuba. These negotiations were hosted by Canada and the Vatican City. Pope Francis, of 1 The Cuban Five, also known as the Miami five, were five Cuban spies who were supposed to infiltrate into several Cuban-­‐American interestgroups, such as the Cuban American National Foundation. They were caught and arrested in Maimi and emprisoned by the US without trail on September 22, 1998. The first of the Cuban Five was released in 2011, the second one in 2014, and eventually the three remaining members on December 17th 2014. 2 Rolando Sarraff Trujillo’s name was kept secret during the announcement. He was jailed since 1995, for spying on behalf of the CIA (Buncombe, January 1st 2015). 3 Alan P. Gross was arrested in 2009 in Havana. He was caught smuggling satellite phones and communication devices to the Jewish community on the island. This was part of the USAID program ‘Cuban Democracy and Contingency Planning Program’. He was incarcerated in a prison in Havana (Kornbluh, 2014; Francis, Hudson & Dreazen, December 17, 2014). 4 Further changes are (1) An American embassy in Havana will be opened, (2) General licenses to travel for following reasons will be opened: public performances, workshops and athletic competitions, support for the Cuban people including human rights work, humanitarian work, private foundations and institutes, information dissemination, travel related to export of authorized products. (4) Open up financial relations: US institutions will be able to open acocunts at Cuban financial institutions, travelers to Cuba will be allowed to use American credit and debit cards, United States entities in third countries will be allowed to engage in transactions and meetings with Cuban individuals in third countries, certain items that support the Cuban private sector will be allowed for export, including certaing building materials and agricultural equipment, certain items that support telecommunicatiosn in Cuba will be allowed for export an companies will be allowed to establish related infrastructure, licensed American travelers will be able to import 400$ wordt of goods (5) Remittances to any Cuban national for humanitarian needs will be raised from 500$ per quarter to 2000$ per quarter, licenses for people who provide remittance forwarding services will no longer be required (Parlaplano, December 17 2014). 6 Argentina, played an important part in safeguarding the negotiations and received special thanks of both leaders for his important diplomatic role. The recent announcement of both leaders has been heralded as groundbreaking and defined as an important new step in the tarnished Cuban-­‐American relationship. The direct cause of the Cuban-­‐American rupture was the Cuban Revolution that commenced in 1956 and triumphed in 1959. The Revolution was, just like the rapprochement now, a radical change in the Cuban-­‐American relationship. It ended the American political and economic hegemony in Cuba and transformed Cuban society profoundly. Put into the context of the Cold War and the bipolarity that entrapped the world, the Revolution quickly gained a communist stamp, which further distanced both countries. Soon afterwards, Cuba set the stage for one of the biggest moments of crisis in the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The neighbouring countries adopted an attitude of diplomatic silence, political boycotts and aggressive public rhetoric. The U.S. also introduced a financial and economic blockade that isolated Cuba in large part and continues until this very day. The blockade became even more severe with the Helms-­‐
Burton legislation introduced by president Bill Clinton. However, this official diplomatic silence does not mean that there has not been contact at all between the two opponents. William LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh write in their book ‘Back Channel to Cuba: the secret negotiations between Havana and Washington’ (2014) that the U.S. and Cuba have always engaged in diplomatic talks behind the scenes, guarded from the American public. No matter how tense relations were between the two countries, administrations from Kennedy until Clinton have engaged in these talks. The most successful attempt in reinstating the Cuban-­‐American relationship was made by Democratic and one term president Jimmy Carter (1977-­‐1981) (LeoGrande & Kornbluh, 2014). But just like presidents before and after him, the US-­‐Cuban diplomatic relationship was not reopened. So why did Obama manage, after all the failed attempts of ten previous administrations, to reopen the diplomatic relationship? What has changed in both Cuban and American society that has led to the unfreezing of this relationship? What are the reasons? These questions will be the starting point of this dissertation. In order to start an analysis about this relationship, it seems indispensible that an educated insight into the current relationship between both countries has to be preceded by a clear and comprehensible summary of the Cuban-­‐American relationship from the 1700s until the Obama Administration. Since a purely historical overview would not be interesting for this dissertation’s content, focus is put on the interplay 7 between and influence of three American interests that have led, in our opinion, U.S. Cuban policy throughout the years. These are security, economic and domestic political interests. In the second part, answers are being sought for the main research question in this dissertation: “Why has the Obama administration finally succeeded in breaking the diplomatic standstill between Cuba and the United States?”. We will argue that the interests mentioned above are still determining Cuban-­‐American ties. This is reflected in the four factors that seemed to have had a significant influence on the reopening of Cuban-­‐American ties. Firstly, the key role and influence of the Cuban-­‐American community on American domestic politics, has evaporated to a certain degree. This has altered domestic imperatives. Secondly, the disappearance of the Cold War has transformed American interests. Security interests have been transforming and decreasing in importance while commercial interests have made a comeback. Thirdly, the United States seeks a new relationship with Latin America. Moving the problem of Cuba out of the way is central to this quest. Fourthly, the internal political and economic changes within Cuba invited the United States to re-­‐establish diplomatic relations. In the fourth and last chapter, a closer look will be given to the current negotiations and the progress made. Furthermore, some scenarios for the future of the Cuban-­‐American relation will be made, as far feasible. For this part, the author’s opinion is reflected. 8 Part I: US and Cuba Pre Revolution and Post Revolution To be able to gain a better insight into the current relationship between the United States and Cuba, it is important to look at the history of their relationship. This oversight will contain four parts, the relationship between the two nation-­‐states before the Cuban Revolution, the relationship after the Cuban Revolution and the change in policy during the Obama Administration. Main focus points will be three interests of the United States in Cuba, economic, security and domestic political interests. U.S. and Cuba Pre Revolution: Governed from a Distance In his book ‘Beneath the United States’ (1998), author Lars Schoultz writes that U.S. policy towards Latin America has been defined by three interests: “the need to protect U.S. security, the desire to accommodate the demands of U.S. domestic politics, and the drive to promote U.S. economic development” (Schoultz, 1998, p. 367). Cuba, being part of Latin America, has not been an exception on this rule, to the contrary. The island was extremely interesting for American security interests, since it gave access to the greater Caribbean basin and the Gulf of Mexico (Perez Jr., 1988, Rumbaut & Rumbaut, 1997, Schoultz, 1998). From a commercial point of view, the island possessed a lot of natural resources that could be exploited and it could form an interesting export market for U.S. businesses. These interests were strengthened by the geographical proximity of the two nation-­‐states. A 90-­‐mile sea strip, named the Florida Straits, separates both nation-­‐
states while at the same time ties them together (Matthews, 1975; Gunn, 1993; Perez Jr., 1994). Because of this proximity and these defining interests, domestic political actors started embracing the idea of annexing Cuba. Considering this proximity, John Quincy Adams perceived the island as ‘a natural appendage’ of the United States and Thomas Jefferson thought Cuba could form “the most interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of states” while referring to the strategic advantages of such an addition (Rumbaut & Rumbaut, 2007, p. 133). This annexionist idea was in accordance with the expansionist ambitions of the young nation-­‐state. Annexing Cuba seemed part of the realization of the Manifest Destiny idea that ruled American minds from the nineteenth century onwards (Webster, 1983; Millet, 1969; Deere, 1989). The idea gained additional impetus with the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine, which was evoked during president Monroe’s State of the Union of 1823 (Pearce, 1985). Yet, the annexation of 9 Cuba was never accomplished because of other domestic reasons5 that prevailed in importance and the repeated refusal of Spain to relinquish its last Latin American territory. After several failed attempts at annexing Cuba, the U.S. started construing Spanish sovereignty, which was weak, as essential to its interests: “The United States thus reconciled itself to continued Spanish sovereignty over Cuba and, indeed, resolved to defend Spanish rule as an adequate if temporary substitute for annexation. The presence of a weak Spain in decline (…), without the means or the motives to challenge U.S. interests, was a tolerable alternative to U.S. control” (Pérez Jr., 1998, p. 5). Stability of Spanish sovereignty over Cuba would guarantee the preservation of American economic and security interests on the island. No other country was allowed to overtake power over Cuba. Neither were Cuban nationalist forces acceptable, so close to American borders. This partly explains the lack of American support in the Ten Years’ War (1868-­‐1878), Cuba’s first struggle for independence (Gunn, 1993; Pérez Jr., 1998). Meanwhile, the United States did manage to exert control over the island to a certain extent. It did this by deeply engaging in Cuba’s economy and making it dependent from the United States. This process began to take shape during the 1700s via illicit trading contracts between Cubans and Americans. Slowly but surely, the United States began to replace the Spanish as Cuba’s main export market: “In 1860, Cuba sent 62 per cent of its exports to the United States and only 3 per cent to Spain” (Brenner, 1998, p. 6). These commercial links got deepened throughout the following decades, most notably during times of crisis in Cuban society. After the Ten Years’ War for example, Cuba saw a severe decline in sugar production. The loss of foreign markets6, decrease in sugar prices and increase in Cuban taxes led to deep economic and social malaise on the island. The 5 The question of Cuba was deeply integrated into the North vs. South divide in the U.S.. After all, the Cuban economic system was entirely based on slavery, just like the system of the Southern states. Annexing Cuba would the addition of an extra slave state. This was reason enough for Northeners to oppose the addition of Cuba to American territory. F. Ex. When the Buchanan administration wanted to acquire Cuba from Spain, he came to face heavy opposition. Acquiring new territories was regarded as troublesome, considering the fragile domestic situation the colonies found themselves in. Furthermore, annexing Cuba was often met with cultural and racist counterarguments. Cubans were perceived as hispanicos and catholics, who would never be able to understand Americans laws and way of life (Pérez Jr., 1998; Schoultz, 1998) 6 Other Latin American countries such as Argentina and Peru were increasing their sugar production. In the United States, experimentation took place with cane and beet sugar. European countries increased their sugar production via beet sugar (Pérez Jr, 1998). 10 United States used this as an opportunity to deepen its economic presence on the island. From the late 1880s onwards, the U.S. brought on new capital and invested in railways, which led to the renaissance of the Cuban sugar industry. But this foreign investment also meant a decline in Cuban ownership over production (Pérez Jr., 1998). U.S. economic imperialism was also stimulated by domestic factors, such as the 1894 economic crisis, which stimulated the search for new consuming markets, a part that suited Cuba (Gunn, 1993). The same scenario occurred during the American occupation of the island after the Spanish-­‐American War of 1898. Legislation that favoured trade between the two countries was passed, such as the tariff reciprocity bill7. When the Cuban Revolution commenced in 1956, U.S. economic interests in Cuba had decreased. But the yearlong American economic presence had nonetheless created an economic system that was highly dependent on the United States’ goodwill. U.S. presence had created an American-­‐minded economic elite, which controlled the Cuban economy in large part. With the arrival of the Cuban War of Independence, the United States finally saw an opportunity to control the island politically. On April 29, 1894, the Cubans started their last struggle for independence from the Spanish Kingdom, which saw its power severely weakened by its incapacity of controlling the continuing political and economic unrest on the island. Motivated by the gradual disappearance of Spanish rule and worried about what consequences the continuing unrest and the instalment of a revolutionary government might have on American interests, intervention was considered. To some, like President McKinley, annexing the island was a desired option, but this was once again impeded because of competing domestic interests. The Teller Amendment8, which prohibited the addition of the island after the end of the Spanish-­‐American War, was attached to the Declaration of War. By signing the Joint Resolution on April 20th 1898, 7 The tarriff reciprocity bill was approved by American congress in 1903. American goods in Cuba were chepear in comparison to products of other countries. Cuba also got privileged access to American markets (Schoultz, 1998). 8 The Teller Amendment was proposed by Colorado Senator Henry Teller, who feared severe competition of the Cuban sugar industry for the beet sugar production in his state. The text of the amendment was the following: “(…)thereby disclaims any disposition of intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people” (Ricard, 1998; Pérez Jr., 1986; Schoultz, 1998) 11 war9 against the Spanish officially began five days later, on April 25th 1898. The Cuban War of Independence was morphed into the Spanish-­‐American War. In the long run, this would have severe consequences for American hegemony over the island, which we will consider later. Although annexationism was prohibited, the U.S. did install a military government that occupied and controlled the island politically until 1902. It was essentially a copy “of the Spanish regime, the prewar pattern of arbitrary rule, however conciliatory and paternal, continued” (Millet, 1968, p. 30). The United States eventually left the island on May 20th 1902, but not without institutionalizing their grip over Cuba. The newly independent nation-­‐state was obliged to add the Platt Amendment10 to their constitution11, which would continue American supervision over Cuban domestic affairs (Guerra y Sanchez, 1961; Gunn, 1992; Ricard, 1998; Pérez Jr. 1998). This amendment implied that the U.S. had the right to intervene in Cuban affairs whenever it was deemed necessary: ‘for the preservation of Cuban independence and the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty” (Dominguez, 1978; Gunn, 1993). The Amendment also gave right to the Americans to use the Guantanamo naval base, which lasts until this very day. The Platt Amendment can be interpreted as an example of the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary 12 in practice and secured the 9 The official reason for entering the war was the explosion of the battleship Maine, which killed 250 american soldiers. The battleship was located in the harbor of Havana to protect American industrial property. “Fueled by sensational articles in Hearst’s New York Journal, a war frenzy developed in the United States” (Brenner, 1986). 10 “The U.S. government retained the right to intervene in Cuban affairs in the name of protecting life, property and libety. The Cuban government could not enter into treaties without without U.S. consent. The U.S. government gained claims to land and naval bases deemed necessary for security. Subsequent Cuuban authorities could not overturn the prior actions of the U.S. occupying government without U.S. consent. The Cuban government also plegded to continue certain public works projects began during the occupation. Finally, the Cuban government could not incur debts that called for funds beyond ordinary annual revenues (Blake, 2005, pp. 248-­‐
249). 11 The Platt Amendment was already passed by US Congress before the Cubans knew about the existence of the amendment (Appleman Williams, 1968). 12 The Roosevelt Corollary was created in 1904 by president Theodore Roosevelt after the Venezuelan Crisis and is seen as an attachment and broadening of the Monroe Doctrine. He announced the Corollary during his State of Union: “Chronic wrongdoing.... may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United State to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however 12 ‘special’ relationship between Cuba and the United States. Instead of true independence, Cuba became once again a client state and a colonized country (Matthews, 1975; Guerra y Sanchez, 1961; Pérez Jr., 1994, 1998). The political system in Cuba was extremely unstable: “After independence in 1902 (…) Cuba saw a succession of generally undistinguished presidencies – some 10 in all, not counting interim or acting presidents – with occasional armed interventions on the part of the US and two US-­‐supported dictatorships, those of Machado and Batista” (Rumbaut & Rumbaut, 2009, p. 85). With the help of the Platt Amendment, the United States invaded Cuba on three different occasions, most notably in 1906 until 1909 13 , in 1912 14 and in 1917 15 (Appleman Williams, 1969; Mitchell, 1972). With the arrival of the Roosevelt Administration and its ‘Good Neighbour Policy’, the 1933 Sergeant’s Revolution and the progressive Grau administration in Cuba, the Platt Amendment was repealed in that same year. In theory, this ended the hegemonic relationship between the U.S. and Cuba. In reality, the influence of the U.S. was far from over. The United States managed to maintain political control over Cuba through the persona of Fulgencio Batista. He became the stronghold within Cuba’s political system and was able to protect American interests in Cuba. As army general he had ruled the country from 1940 until 1944 and seized power once again in 1952 (Brenner, 1988; Pérez Jr., 1988; Schoultz, 1998). By its interference in the Cuban War of Independence, the subsequent occupation of the island and the Platt Amendment, the U.S. had created an American-­‐minded, corrupt political elite. reluctantly in flagrant cases of such wrong doing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power” Pérez Jr, 1998, p. 109). 13 The occupation from 1906 until 1909 came into being because of the Guerrita de Agosto, which broke out in August 1906. Reason for this uprising was the re-­‐election of Cuba’s first president Tomas Estrada Palma. He was re-­‐elected in December 1905 amidst rumours of electoral fraud. The strong liberal party, who lost the elections, rose up violently against the president and his administration. Incapable of controlling the protest, Estrada Palma asked for help from the United States. They responded swiftly and intervened. Estrada Palma resigned as president and a new military government under the governorship of Judge Charles Magoon of Nebraska, was instated. (Pérez Jr., 1986; Dominguez, 1978; Ricard, 1998) 14 In 1912, a Negro Rebellion or ‘Levantamiento Armado de los Independenties de Color’ took place in Cuba. It was violently surpressed by the Cuban and American army. 15 In 1917, another revolt broke. President Mario Garcia Menocal won reelection after fraudulous elections. Once again it was the Liberal party who revolted. The United States reacted with public support for the conservative president. This evolved into an intervention of American marines in order to protect American property. 13 Cuba’s political and economic dependency meant control and security for the United States, but it was also the main source of frustration for Cuban nationalists. The hegemony of American interests in the U.S.-­‐Cuban relationship eventually created a major backlash in 1957, when the Cuban Revolution broke out, which would transform the relationship completely until now. Nationalist sentiment was deeply rooted in Cuban history. Like in all other Latin American countries during the nineteenth century, nationalist anticolonial movements blossomed in Cuba. Cuba had been part of the Spanish empire since its discovery in 1492. As mentioned before, the island’s first attempt at gaining independence and self-­‐
determination came with the Ten Years’ War (1868-­‐1878). Protest started in Oriente, in the east of the country, but failed at defeating the Spanish. Lack of organization and support from other countries had led to a defeat of the anticolonial movement. Yet, violent upheaval and unrest did not disappear and Cuban independistas kept on struggling (Millet, 1968). On April 29, 1894, Cuban nationalists declared war ot the Spanish. The United States eventually entered the war in 1898, and turned the long awaited Cuban struggle for independence into the Spanish-­‐American War. With this decision the predictions of José Marti and other nationalists, who feared an intervention of Cuba’s big neighbour, became reality (Perez Jr., 1988; Rumbaut & Rumbaut, 2007). The subsequent American occupation of the island, the introduction of the Platt Amendment, three American interventions between 1906 and 1921 and the continuing American economic and political influence over the country, increased frustrations among the Cuban population: “Cubans had achieved self-­‐government without self-­‐
determination and independence without sovereignty” (Perez Jr., 1986, p. 57). Aside the occasional national uprising, the next great move was provoked by the July 26 Movement, led by young revolutionary and nationalist Fidel Castro. He was deeply influenced by the writings of José Marti and Simon Bolivar and was heavily anti-­‐
American. This anti-­‐Americanism had become part of the nationalist narrative after the American intervention into the Cuban War of Independence (Hennessy, 1963). The official U.S. reaction was to support Batista in order to protect their interests, but when this administration turned increasingly violent the U.S. saw itself determined to take distance from the dictator16 Furthermore, a large part of the army defected to the 16 U.S. Congress passed an act that prohibited all export of weapons to the Batista Regime (Brenner, 1988). 14 rebels and, because of the continued guerrilla fights, the Cuban economy shrunk significantly. This led to the downfall of the Batista regime. On January 1st, 1959, Batista fled to Santo Domingo. The Cuban Revolution had conquered the nation (Brenner, 1988; Foran, 2009). U.S.-­‐Cuban Relations post Revolution: Different President, Same Policy The victory of the Cuban Revolution in 1959 led to a shock reaction within the American political scene. Castro was determined to end the influence of the United States within Cuba. This went against all American interests and the relationship between both countries started deteriorating quickly. This process was accelerated by the Cold War context in which the Revolution took place. Castro was not a communist when he started the revolution: “Marxism-­‐Leninism into which the Castro regime gravitated is an attribute of the Cuban Revolution, not its essence” (Matthews, 1975). But he was not afraid to negotiate with the Soviet Union and China. The American government was highly suspicious towards these moves, and feared a Cuban alliance with the Soviet Union. Such a scenario would pose an enormous menace to American security interests, seeing the close geographical connection between the two nation-­‐states. After a meeting with Vice President Richard Nixon in March 1959, Castro was labelled a communist. While the Eisenhower administration was hesitant about these allegations, Castro appeared to affirm his communist stance by replacing his moderate ministers by more radically-­‐oriented ones (Bonsal, 1967; LeoGrande & Kornbluh, 2014). From a commercial point of view, American interests in Cuba were also threatened and disappearing. Castro nationalized several U.S. companies and redistributed land owned by American companies. These reforms led to a reduction of the sugar quota by the U.S. and created “A tit-­‐for-­‐tat chain that ended in the suspension of diplomatic relations and trade between the two countries and a hostility that would divide the international community” (Oseija, 2006, p. 34). In accordance with the Truman Doctrine, containment would become the buzzword in U.S.-­‐Cuban relations for the coming fifty years. Security interests became increasingly decisive in U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba. Diplomatic relations were broken up in January 1961 and Castro defined Cuba as a socialist state on April 16th 1961. The next day, an overt American military attempt to overthrow the Castro regime took place on Cuban soil in the Bay of Pigs. The plan had been developed during the Eisenhower Administration but was executed in the first months of the Kennedy Administration. The operation failed and in effect consolidated the Castro regime and drove Cuba further into the arms of the USSR, who became the official 15 sponsor of the Cuban Revolution. The Revolution was pushed into the shackles of the Cold War, which was further exemplified by the Missile Crisis of 1962 (Dominguez, LeoGrande, 1982; Rumbaut & Rumbaut, 2003; LeoGrande & Kornbluh? 2014). As Secretary of State Berle said “Castro’s success in communising Cuba and converting it into a satellite of the Soviet Union had reduced the Monroe Doctrine to a faded scrap of paper” (Pérez Jr., 2002, p. 234). From 1961 onwards, ten successive U.S. governments, whether it be democratic or republican, have applied a similar policy towards Cuba: ousting the Castro communist government from power. After the failure of the Bay of Pigs and the agreement with the Soviets after the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, the United States steered away from all overt military intervention in Cuba17. Economic isolation became the main approach in trying to achieve the decline of the Castro government. This was combined with covert actions, such as Operation Mongoose, “a massive, multifaceted campaign of overt diplomatic and economic pressure to isolate and impoverish the island, and covert paramilitary operations to overthrow the Cuban government” (LeoGrande & Kornbluh, 2014, p. 43). This war included multiple attempts at assassinating Castro and sabotaging Cuban agriculture by destroying sugar crops (Brenner, 1988). Despite this enduring economic boycott, the United States and Cuba did remain in contact. Even under the Kennedy administration, attempts at reconciling with the Cuban government have been made. Furthermore, the two countries have cooperated on a number of issues throughout the years, such as migration and disaster relief. But never has an American president been willing or been able to restart official diplomatic negotiations (Dominguez, 2010; LeoGrande & Kornbluh, 2014). This status quo in American policy can be blamed on the dominating role of security and domestic political interests in creating policy towards the island during the Cold War. Because of the nationalization of several American companies and the subsequent U.S. embargo, U.S. economic interests in Cuba had disappeared completely and did not play a part anymore in creating American policy towards the island. As said before, the communist influence of the Soviet Union and Cuba’s active foreign policy outside of the hemisphere, which will be discussed later in this dissertation, posed a considerable threat to U.S. security interests. American policy towards Cuba was based upon these interests. For example, despite a 17 In his article ‘Fear and Loathing of Fidel Castro: Sources of U.S. Policy Toward Cuba’ (2002) Louis Pérez Jr. Identifies the reasons of why the U.S. has not engaged militarily in Cuba. 16 period of warmer ties between the two countries under the Carter Administration18, attempts of opening full diplomatic relations failed because of the Cuban intervention in Angola (LeoGrande & Kornbluh, 2014; Kornbluh, 2015) Furthermore, from the 1980s onwards, domestic interests started playing a growing part in maintaining U.S. policy towards Cuba. These domestic interests took the upper hand in American Cuban policy after the end of the Cold War. In 1990, the Soviet Union and the international communist system disintegrated and dismantled. With the communist threat gone, it would have been logical to remove the Cuban embargo since it was mainly instated because of the communist threat of the island: “The historic rationale for sanctions ended the moment the United States proclaimed the Cold War won” (Perez Jr., 2002, p. 227). The containment of communism had become unnecessary. However, ousting Castro from power continued to be the main objective in American policy towards Cuba. It seemed logical to many American officials that because of the dismantling of the Soviet bloc and with it Cuba’s main trading partners and sponsors, Cuban economy would crumble and with it the Castro regime. The Bush Sr., Clinton and Bush Jr. administration kept applying economic punitive approaches towards Cuba. Bush Sr. passed the Torricelli Bill or the Cuban Democracy Act19. Clinton took it even further. He talked about ‘bringing down the hammer’ on the Castro Regime and signed the Helms Burton20 or LIBERTAD act in 1996, which tightened the Cuban embargo once again and cemented it into legislation (Dominguez, 1997; Pérez Jr., 2002). This approach was favoured and 18 During this period of warmer diplomatic relations, both countries opened ‘Interest sections’ in 1977 in Washington and Havana. The role of an interest section is very similar to a embassy; however, it was not named an embassy because official diplomatic relations between the two countries were lacking (LeoGrande & Kornbluh; 2014; Archibold, May 21st 2015). 19 During the Bush Sr. Administration (1989-­‐1993), the Toricelli Bill was passed. Robert Torricelli, who submitted the legislative roposal, was quite clear in his objectives: “My objective is to wreak havoc in Cuba… My task is to bring down Fidel Castro.” (Pérez Jr., 2002, p. 247). 20 The Helms-­‐Burton law “allows nationals (including naturalised Cuban-­‐Americans) to sue foreigners for damages in U.S. courts if the foreigners ‘traffic’ in property confiscated by Castro’s government.” This traffic includes investments in Cuba and goods produced on this confiscated property. This law tried to discourage other nationstates to invest in Cuba. Furthermore, the law also included provisions to “reduce U.S. contributions to any intenrational financial institution that makes loans to Cuba, and reduce U.S. economic assistance to any country that aids Cuba’s effort to build a nuclear power plant, or aids Cuba in exchange for access to military installations” (LeoGrande, 1997, p. 212). The Helms-­‐Burton law turned previous economic sanctions on Cuba into law. Previously these sanctions were based on executive orders (LeoGrande, 1998). 17 supported by the Cuban-­‐American community and their politicians and lobby-­‐groups. They mostly opposed any loosening of sanctions towards Cuba, because of their profound anti-­‐Castroism. The role of this community in U.S. Cuban policy will be discussed more in detail in the next chapter of this dissertation. In order to be able to maintain the logic of these new economic sanctions, human and civil rights and democracy became the new focus points in Cuban policy. The Bush Sr. administration set new conditions for negotiations. In order to start diplomatic talks it was demanded that Cuba moved towards an electoral democracy and reform its economic system into a market-­‐oriented capitalist system (Rumbaut & Rumbaut, 2007; Azpuru & Shaw, 2010, Kornbluh & LeoGrande, 2014). Next to increasing economic pressure, the American government increased American presence on the island and took several soft power measures: “(…) establishing U.S. news bureaus in Havana, permitting U.S. nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to work in Cuba, authorizing USAID funding to promote democracy, and easing restrictions on Cuban American travel, as well as educational, religious, and academic travel” (Kornbluh & LeoGrande, 2014, p. 300-­‐301). Conclusion This summary of the Cuban-­‐American relationship, starting in the 1700s and ending with the Bush Jr. Administration, illustrates that the Cuban-­‐American relationship and U.S. policy towards the island have been defined by an interplay between three main American interests; being economic, security and domestic political interests. These interests changed and switched mutual positions in time because of changes in context. For example, economic interests towards Cuba disappeared being a decisive factor in U.S. policy towards Cuba during the Cold War, while these interests played an important role in U.S. policy during the nineteenth century. Another example is the influence of domestic political interests. During the nineteenth and twentieth century, domestic political forces competed against each other, impeding the annexation of the island, while during and after the Cold War competition between domestic political interests was absent and followed the lead of one group, the Cuban-­‐American community. The United States also tried to protect these interests at all time. This was exemplified by the introduction of the Platt Amendment into the Cuban constitution in 1902. 18 The hegemony of American interests in this relation between the two neighbours eventually took its toll through the Cuban Revolution of 1957, which meant the effective end of American influence in Cuba. In the next part of this dissertation, we are going to argue that the decision of the Obama administration to re-­‐establish diplomatic ties with Cuba is partly a product of changes in these defining interests, caused by a changing context. Furthermore, we will also consider the changes and reforms within Cuba. It seems indispensable to include the changes within the island in order to understand the overhaul in American foreign policy. 19 Part II: The Times They are a-­‐Changin’ We consider that the recent change in the American approach to Cuba is the consequence of four elements, being the changing role of Cuban-­‐Americans in the American political system, the changed post-­‐Cold War interests of the United States in Cuba, the U.S.’s new relationship with Latin America and the changes and reforms within Cuba. Obama and Change: The Cuban Case During his campaign for the nomination of Democratic presidential candidate and later on during his presidential campaign, Obama mentioned that change in American policy towards Cuba was needed and that the United States had “engaged in a failed policy for over fifty years” (Fernandes, 2009; LeoGrande & Kornbluh, 2014). After his election, Obama made quick change in Cuban-­‐American relations, removing previous restrictions on travel and remittances to the island and opening up the possibility of investments on the island. But, Obama kept the main focus of previous administrations: open diplomatic negotiations would have to be preceded by transitioning the Cuban political system towards a representative democracy. The prosiminng start seemed to derail quickly when USAID-­‐contractor Allen Gross was arrested in Havana in 2009. He was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment (Alzugaray, 2012). Nonetheless, Cuba and the United States started secret negotiations in 2013 under the name of ‘Operation Ardila’. Eventually on December 17th 2014, Obama and Castro announced the Cuban-­‐American thaw to their citizens and the world. Obama emphasized the failure of the economic embargo intended to change the Castro government: “I do not believe we can keep doing the same thing for over five decades and expect a different result” (Obama, December 17th 2015). 20 Domestic politics: Changing Role of Cuban Americans One factor that has played a leading role in creating and maintaining policy towards Cuba is the Cuban American exile community: “Since the Revolution in 1959, the Cuban diaspora has been the frontier of relations between Cuba and the United States” (Pear, 2014, p. 4). The geographical proximity of the United States assured Cubans of exile close to their home country. The exile community developed from the nineteenth century onwards and grew substantially during the Ten Years’ War between Cuba and Spain. Immigration subsided towards the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. With the arrival of the Castro regime, thousands of Cubans fled to the United States. Some have defined this period ‘The Golden Age’ of the Cuban exodus (Dominguez, 1992; Henken, 2005). Most of these first exiles were supporters of the Batista regime, nicknamed ‘Batistianos’, and closely connected or part of the Cuban political and economic elite, whose own political and economic interests were inherently linked to those of the United States. This group had privileged distinct socio-­‐
economic characteristics, such as a high education level and a prosperous financial situation. The middle and industrial class, merchants and manufacturers soon followed. The first wave of exiles had one thing in common: “Upon their arrival in the United States, the initial wave was driven by one all-­‐consuming objective: to return to Cuba after toppling Castro’s revolutionary government” (Gonzalez-­‐Pando, 1997, p. 52). This vehement anti-­‐Castro sentiment and the conviction that it was only a matter of time before the Cuban Revolution would disintegrate, led exiles to see themselves not as immigrants but as the true representatives of Cuba. The American government also encouraged Cuban immigration. It was used as a foreign policy means in two ways. Firstly, the United States construed that massive migration from the island would undermine the credibility and legitimacy of the Castro government. The United States proved itself as a welcoming host to everybody who wanted to escape the repression of the communist Cuban government: “(…) immigration from Cuba reaffirmed the moral worth of the United States as a country willing to receive those yearning for freedom. (…) Cubans were “voting with their feet” in favour of the political system in the United States (…). Immigration was a tool in the ideological Cold War with Cuba” (Dominguez, 1990, p. 153). Cubans arriving on American shores were granted several benefits. For example, Cuban immigrants did not require a visa to enter and live in the U.S.. Congress also passed several acts in order to assist Cuban 21 immigrants with economic aid 21 (Gonzalez-­‐Pando, 1997; Travieso-­‐Diaz, 1998). The disappearance of the Cuban middle-­‐class from the island meant also the disappearance of skilled and intelligent workers. With that, the U.S. hoped to increase economic distress within Cuba. But the U.S. had no eye for the unintended consequences of this ‘brain drain’. In essence, it meant that those who formed the strongest opposition against the Castro regime fled the country first. It robbed Cuba from its anti-­‐Castro intelligentsia and part of its civil society; the ones who were most able to stimulate change within the country’s political system. As a result of this lack of international protest, the Castro regime would only become more consolidated (Dominguez, 1990; Perez Jr., 2002). Secondly, stimulating Cuban immigration to the United States also had a strategic motivation. The U.S. reasoned that the Cuban exiles could be used as a military force. This resulted in the Bay of Pigs invasion. A CIA trained militia of Cuban exiles, named Brigade 2506, executed this plan on April 17th 1961. With their invasion, the militia had hoped to provoke a popular uprising in Cuba against Castro. But this did not occur, because of the widespread approval of the Castro regime and the violent nature of the intervention. On April 19th, the exile militia was defeated and more than twelve hundred exiles were imprisoned. This sobering defeat and subsequent promise of Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 to the Soviet Union to never invade Cuba again in exchange for the removal of Russian missiles from the island, effectively aborted all options of another overt military invasion (Brenner, 1998; Dominguez, 1990; Perez Jr., 2002; McWilliams & Piotrowski, 2009; LeoGrande & Kornbluh, 2014). Nonetheless, the United States continued its ideological warfare and kept stimulating immigration. After the Bay of Pigs and Kennedy’s promise, Cuban exiles became disillusioned about their future prospects of returning to their homeland any time soon. This manifested itself in domestic politics. The Cuban-­‐American community became a politically vocal minority: “Despite being a largely first-­‐generation community, they have one of the highest naturalization, voter registration and political participation rates of any group arriving in the latter half of the twentieth century”. Most of this Cuban-­‐American group aligned with the Republican Party. This has three main reasons. Firstly, most a large 21 One example is the Cuban Adjustment Act, passed under the Johnson Government in 1966. This act stipulates “to facilitate a legal status for Cuban citizens who arrived in U.S. territory, passed inspection by the immigration authorities, and waited one year without working to apply for residency. Contraty to a widespread myth, the law does not require all Cubans tob e gratned residency automatically; it merely makes them “eligible” to request this status. The authorities decide whether or not to grant residency upon review of each case.” (FIU, May 5th 2015). 22 portion of the Cuban-­‐American community set up their own business. This, combined with the socio-­‐economic background of most Cuban-­‐Americans attracted them to the Republican Party, which opposed a high tax rate and strong government intervention (Girard, Grenier and Gladwin, 2010). Secondly, the Republican Party is and has always been very strongly anti-­‐communist, while the Democratic Party was believed to be more open and acceptable towards communist regimes. Thirdly, the Democratic Party was burdened with the disastrous legacy of the failed Bay of Pigs invasion that took place under the Kennedy Administration (Girard, Grenier and Gladwin, 2010; Bishin & Klofstad, 2011). The alignment offered a differing characteristic from other Latino immigrants (Bishin et al., 2008; Bishin & Klofstad, 2011). The political motivation and integration of Cuban-­‐Americans was facilitated and increased by their beneficial socio-­‐economic background, their vehement anti-­‐
Castroism, anti-­‐communism and the benevolent treatment by the American government. The Cuban-­‐American exile community also did not steer away from violence. During the 1970s and 1980s, Cuban-­‐American organizations such as Omega 7 and Alpha 66 committed terrorist attacks against dialogueros’22, their businesses and Cuban embassies. Cuban-­‐American exile terrorism did not confine itself inside the borders of the United States, but was for example also very common in Puerto Rico (Garcia, 1988; Pear, 2014; Quiroga, 2014). Different opinions about how to handle the Castro regime, which were definitely present in the Cuban-­‐American community, were not tolerated (Garcia, 1998; Bishin et al. 2008; Pear, 2014). This climate lasted well into the 1990s. A Human Right Watch Report from 1994 concluded that only a narrow range of speech was acceptable, and views that go beyond these boundaries may be dangerous to the speaker (Human Rights Watch Report, 1994). This anti-­‐Castro sentiment was crystalized politically from the 1980s onwards. Cuban-­‐
American politicians represented the Cuban community on federal, state and local level, which differed them from the rest of the Latino Community (FIU Report July 2011, May 5th 2015): “During the 1980s, more than a quarter of the Dade County electorate was represented by Cuban-­‐Americans” (Perez Jr., 2011). Most of these Cuban-­‐American candidates were and are Republican. Cuban-­‐Americans also have a higher participation rate than other Hispanics. According to a 2012-­‐poll, executed by Pew Research Center, 67 per cent of all eligible Cuban-­‐Americans voted. This contrasts with the 48 per cent 22 ‘Dialogueros’ was the nickname of Cuban immigrants in the US who favoured starting up a dialogue with the Castro government. 23 average participation rate within the Hispanic community (Pew Research Center, May 18th 2015). Furthermore, several Cuban-­‐American interest groups and political action committees were founded. The most influential of these groups has been the Cuban-­‐American National Foundation, founded in July 1981 by Bay of Pigs veteran Jorge Mas Canosa. This conservative and anti-­‐Castro organization was founded with help of the Reagan Administration. Its goal is “the re-­‐establishment of freedom and democracy in Cuba” (CANF Website, May 4th 2015). Via their political action committee ‘Free Cuba’, the organization funded candidates with a rigid anti-­‐Castro attitude and lobbied for anti-­‐
Cuban legislation. Robert Torricelli for example, the chairman of the House Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs during the Bush Sr. administration and a close friend of Mas Canosa, received massive campaign donations from the CANF. In 1992, he proposed the Torricelli bill, which tightened the Cuban embargo even more (Kornbluh & LeoGrande, 2014). An element that added to the influence and importance of Cuban-­‐Americans and their votes was their location. Most Cuban immigrants relocated to Florida. Currently an estimated two million Cubans are living in the United States, of which 1,286,325 in Florida. Miami, the capital of Florida, is nicknamed by some as ‘The Capital of the Caribbean’, because of its large number of Cuban-­‐Americans and other Hispanics. Florida was and is an important battleground state for both Republicans and Democrats. The state elects 27 representatives and two senators. This also means that Florida has 29 votes in the United States Electoral College, who chose the U.S. president. This is the fourth highest number in the American electoral system (McHugh, Miyares & Skop, 1997; Perez Jr., 2014). “No one responsible for U.S. foreign policy would have paid these immigrant asylum seekers much attention if they had settled in Wyoming, which has two senators and one representative and therefore three votes in the Electoral College” (Schoultz, 2009, p. 563). The influence of Cuban-­‐Americans in the American political system and the importance of the Cuban-­‐American vote forms a large part of the explanation of why the United States has sustained its isolating policy towards Cuba throughout the years. Certainly after the Cold War, with the disappearance of security interests, the Cuban-­‐American community and the domestic political interests were the most important factor in deciding over American policy towards Cuba. The influence a change in Cuban policy could have on national elections and the future of the country was enormous. The incentives for the Republican Party, for whom Cuban-­‐Americans in Florida formed the 24 electoral backbone, were virtually non-­‐existent. This was the same for the Democratic Party. Both parties tried to please the Cuban-­‐American community by not altering American policy towards the country ensuring themselves of the possibility of winning Florida during elections. This is illustrated by the shifts both president Bush Sr. and president Clinton made during their administrations. At first, Bush Sr. opposed the Torricelli Bill, but when confronted with presidential candidate Bill Clinton sustaining the bill, Bush Sr. changed his mind on the issue and sustained it as well. The bill was passed during his last months as president. Four years later, a similar shift occurred during the Clinton administration. Clinton initially opposed the Helms-­‐Burton legislation. The legislation included an article in which it was possible for American nationals and the American government to prosecute other non-­‐American companies for investing in Cuba. This could provoke severe repercussions from other nation-­‐states. But on February 24, 1996, the Cuban army shot down two American planes. They were spreading anti-­‐Castro leaflets over the island. With his eye on the coming presidential elections in November, Clinton endorsed the bill and Congress passed it on March 6, 1996 (LeoGrande, 1998; LeoGrande & Kornbluh, 2014). The passing of the Helms-­‐
Burton legislation illustrated the extent to which domestic political interests mattered in developing Cuban policy. After the Cold War, Cuba had transformed from a foreign policy issue into a domestic issue. Up until the Helms-­‐Burton law, the Cuban embargo was based on executive orders from the U.S. president. Helms-­‐Burton cemented the Cuban embargo into legislation and effectively passed power over the Cuba case from President to Congress (LeoGrande, 1997; Brenner, Haney & Vanderbush, 2002; LeoGrande & Kornbluh, 2014). When Barack Obama announced the Cuban-­‐American thaw, enthusiasm in Congress prevailed. But there was also criticism, mainly coming from Cuban-­‐American senators, such as Republican senator and presidential candidate Ted Cruz from Texas, Republican senator Marco Rubio from Florida and Democratic senator Robert Menendez from New Jersey. All three were disappointed by the changes made by the Obama administration (BBC, December 18, 2014). This criticism of Cuban-­‐American officials contrasts heavily with the opinion of the Cuban-­‐American community. A 2014-­‐poll, executed by the Florida International University, indicated that some 68 per cent of Cuban-­‐Americans favoured the re-­‐establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba (FIU Website, April 16th 2015). This opinion has greatly changed over the last twenty years. In 1993, 87 per cent of the Cuban community favoured increasing pressure on the Castro government. Asked in 2008 if the embargo should be maintained 25 only 45 per cent of the Cuban American respondents supported to maintain it (FIU Report July, 2011, May 5th 2015). This overhaul is mainly due to significant changes that have taken place within the Cuban-­‐American community, which have led to a change in Cuban American voting behaviour. Firstly, the socio-­‐economic background and the motivation of Cuban immigrants changed significantly throughout the years. Bishin & Kofstad (2011) mark a breaking point with the Mariel boatlift of 198023. This event led to the influx of a different kind of Cuban immigrants. While the first immigrants fled the country for political reasons, post-­‐Mariel immigrants were mostly motivated by economic reasons. These immigrants hold not the same grudge towards the Castro government as the first exiles. This leads to a more open attitude towards the Castro government. This is backed by the Florida International University poll executed in 2014. The percentages clearly indicate that immigrants, who left Cuba after 1980 favoured the re-­‐establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, whilst the majority of the immigrants who left before 1980 opposed this24. Furthermore, because of the more modest socio-­‐economic background of these new immigrants and the absence of anti-­‐Castroism, recent immigrants are less inclined to vote for the Republican Party. Secondly, the change in Cuban-­‐American opinion and voting behaviour is also correlated with a change in demographics. Most of the first generation immigrants have passed away and with them the strong anti-­‐Castro tide within the community. This is also 23 On April 20 1980, Fidel Castro announced that Cubans who wanted to emigrate to the United States were free to leave the country from the port of Mariel. The reasons for this announcement were plenty. Firstly, the Cuban economy went through a deep recession and there was serious lack of consumer goods. Secondly, in 1979, Castro had allowed Cuban-­‐Americans to enter the country to visit their family. Most of the visitors brought gifts which confronted Cubans with the supposed wealth of their immigrated relatives. These two events led to frustration under the Cuban population and the increase of attempts to leave the country by illegal means such as attacking the Peruvian embassy and the hijacking of Cuban boats. The American government did not oppose the hijackings and was supportive of the attempts made by Cubans to leave the country. This created enormous frustration with the Cuban government, who eventually decided to open Cuban borders. An estimated 125,000 immigrants arrived at American shores between May and September 1980 (Card, 1990; LeoGrande & Kornbluh, 2014) 24 In the category ‘1959-­‐1964’ 47% favored the reopening of diplomatic relations. For the category ‘1965-­‐1973’ this percentage shrinks to 40%. In the category ‘1974-­‐1980’ 49% favors the re-­‐establishment against 51% opposing. For the category ‘1981-­‐1994’, this percentage topples. 65% favors the re-­‐establishment against 35 % opposing it. For the Cuban immigrants that left the country between 1995-­‐2014, 80 % favors re-­‐opening diplomatic ties. 26 reflected in the results of the FIU poll. 59 per cent of the category ’65 and older’ opposed the reopening opposed the reopening of diplomatic relations25 (FIU, April 24th 2015). Younger generations of Cuban-­‐Americans also have different political affiliations than their parents and grandparents. They are more inclined to vote for the Democratic Party than the Republican Party. This general realignment with the Democratic Party was represented in a 2014-­‐poll of Pew Research Center. Asked about their party affiliation, 47 per cent of Cuban registered voters affiliated with the Democratic Party. This is a decrease with the percentage in 2004. The percentage for affiliation with the Democratic Party has doubled in ten years, increasing from 22 per cent to 44 per cent (Pew Research Center, May 14th 2015). This change in party-­‐affiliation was also noticeable during the two most recent presidential elections. In 2008, Obama could count on 35 per cent of the Cuban-­‐
American votes. In 2012, this percentage increased to 48 per cent, which was the highest percentage ever for a Democratic candidate (Pew Research Center, May 13th 2015). The moderation in Cuban-­‐American opinions about how to handle the Castro government is also reflected within the CANF: “The foundation’s own journey from extremism to relative moderation reflected the political evolution of its constituency” (Kornbluh & LeoGrande, 2014, p. 368). Furthermore, the power of lobby groups like the CANF and political action committees like ‘Free Cuba’ and its successor U.S. Cuba Democracy Political Action Committee has weakened, certainly after the death of founder Jorge Mas Canosa in 1997. The organization was also linked to Cuban American terrorists, which heavily damaged its influence in Capitol Hill. On top of that, the organization has seen new lobbying contenders in U.S. Cuban policy, who are lobbying on behalf of the interests of commercial businesses and religious institutions. (Brenner, Haney & Vanderbush, 2002). The influence of these new groups on the change in American policy will be discussed in the following part. The last element that has undermined the power of the Cuban-­‐American community are the changes within Florida’s population. The influx of other Hispanic immigrants and their subsequent entrance into Florida’s electorate has decreased the value of the Cuban-­‐American votes significantly. Puerto Ricans are set to overtake the Cuban-­‐
American community as the largest Hispanic community in Florida. 25 88% of the 18-­‐29 category favored reopening diplomatic relations. 78% of the 30-­‐44 category favored reopening diplomatic relations and 64 percent of the 45-­‐64 category (FIU website, April 16th 2015). 27 Not only Cuban-­‐Americans are increasingly favouring the re-­‐establishment of diplomatic ties between the two nation-­‐states. Americans in general have a positive opinion about this change. Recent polls of Pew Research Center showed that 63 per cent of Americans agree with the Obama decision to renew diplomatic relations with Cuba against 28 per cent opposing it. Furthermore, 66 per cent of the Americans agree with ending the trade embargo and 28 per cent opposing the end of this policy (Pew Research Center, January 16 2015). “Fifty years of failure for the policy of hostility toward Cuba is not, in itself, sufficient reason to change it when there are significant domestic political costs (…)” (Kornbluh & LeoGrande, 2014, p. 413). Because of the Cuban-­‐American shift towards the Democratic Party, the gradual disappearance of firm anti-­‐Castroism within the Cuban-­‐American community, the influx of new immigrants with a different socio-­‐economic background and the loss of power held by Cuban-­‐American interest groups, domestic political costs for changing American policy have decreased significantly. It seems highly improbable that anybody, except Cuban-­‐Americans, would cast a vote based on change in Cuban policy (LeoGrande interview, 2015). These changes in domestic political interests have given the Obama administration an opportunity for change, without risking severe repercussions for his party in the coming presidential elections. 28 The Metamorphosis of Security Interests, the Comeback of Commercial Interests The Cuban Revolution was kicked off in a specific timeframe in world history, the Cold War. Although the end of the Cold War and the significant change in context did not lead to a change in American policy towards Cuba, it has had some indirect effects on other factors that have been decisive in recent developments in the Cuban-­‐American relationship, particularly on American interests in Cuba. As reviewed in the historic overview, the United States has always been attracted to Cuba, and by extension the Caribbean, because of the significant role of the region for American commercial and security interests. As Rumbaut & Rumbaut (2007) write: “From the time of Jefferson and Adams to the July 2006 commission report, the real interests have been the same: strategic location, land resources markets, and inexpensive labour, albeit with such variations as access to good beaches, casinos and prostitution“ (Rumbaut & Rumbaut, 2007, p. 145). With the arrival of the Cold War, strategic interests became more central in American foreign policy. Cuba formed no exception. After the Cuban Revolution, the island became a threat to American security interests: “The one indisputable fact is that by 1960 Washington saw Cuba as a security threat. The protection of economic interests subsequently became relatively insignificant, while the rollback of communism became the overarching interest underlying U.S. policy” (Schoultz, 2009, p. 563). The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 illustrated how big a threat Cuba could form for American security interests. These were further threatened by the active foreign policy of Cuba during the Cold War. The regime supported several nationalist movements throughout Latin American and Africa. For example, the country supported the Algerian Revolution and trained guerrilla troops in Bolivia in the 1960s. This active internationalism was one of the causes why attempts at re-­‐establishing diplomatic relations during the Ford and Carter Administrations with the island failed. Cuba was actively supporting the MPLA26 in its struggle for independence from Portugal during the Angolan War of Independence and during the subsequent Angolan Civil War. This was unacceptable for the U.S. and one of the preconditions to restart negotiations was the retreat of Cuban troops from Angola. Castro refused (Kornbluh & LeoGrande, 2014; Kornbluh, 2014; Hayden, 2015). With the disappearance of the Cold War, the security threat formed by Cuba has subsided significantly. Containment of communism was no longer necessary and Cuba 26 The MPLA or the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola, was the main anticolonial party within Angola (Kornbluh & LeoGrande, 2014). 29 reduced its international military presence to zero. This change in interests was reiterated in a New York Times-­‐interview with president Barack Obama: “(…) there aren’t many risks for us. It’s a tiny little country. It’s not one that threatens our core security interests (…)” (Friedman, April 5th 2015). One aspect that could be considered a threat to U.S. security interests is the growing influence of non-­‐hemispheric nation-­‐
states, like Russia and China, in Cuba. But at this moment, this influence is mainly trade-­‐
related (Sullivan, April 23rd 2015). To the contrary, engaging Cuba might be beneficial for American security interests. The two countries would be able to work together on several security issues, such as terrorism. Cuba has already engaged in the struggle against terrorism by condemning terrorist attacks and bolstering its antiterrorism laws. Furthermore, Cuba can form an asset in the U.S. struggle against narcotics: “its extensive shoreline and geographic location make it susceptible to narcotics smuggling operations” (Sullivan, April, 23rd 205, p. 46). The end of the Cold War has also provoked the comeback of American commercial interests in Cuba. As said before, Cuba was very important for American economic interests from the 1700s onwards. With the Cuban Revolution, American commercial interests disappeared because of two reasons. Firstly, because of the nationalizations of American businesses and property by the Cuban government and secondly, because of the embargo that was imposed by the U.S. government. With the end of the Cold War, an increase in commercial interests can be once again noted. Pressure of commercial lobby groups as USA*Engage27, founded in 1998, which encourage engagement and trade with rival nations, has steadily been increasing since the end of the Cold War. There have been some commercial breakthroughs since the beginning of the 1990s. For example, U.S. commercial medical export to Cuba is allowed since the beginning of the 1990s. In 2000, Congress passed the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act, pressurized by the agro-­‐industry. This allowed the export of medical and agricultural products to Cuba for humanitarian reasons (Amnesty International, 2009). This made the U.S. “for most years since 2002, (...) Cuba’s largest supplier of agricultural products” (Sullivan, April 23, 2015). 27 “USA*Engage is a coalition of businesses, agriculture groups and tarde associations working to promote the benefits of U.S. engagement abroad and educate the public about the ineffectiveness of unilateral economic foreign policy sanctions “(usaengage.org, May 17th 2015). 30 With the recent shift in relations, the Obama administration has added several other openings in the U.S. embargo. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has welcomed these changes. Nonetheless the institution also emphasized that the embargo continues to be an important impediment for full-­‐blown commercial ties between the two countries and is costing U.S. industry an estimated loss between 1,2 billion to 3,5 billion dollar a year (Hanson, Batton & Ealey, 2013). Furthermore, other countries have been increasing their investments in Cuba over the past years. Despite the Helms-­‐Burton law “approximately 4500 companies from over 100 countries import to, export from, provide services to or have investments within Cuba” (Linciome, December 23rd 2014). The interest of other nation-­‐states to invest in Cuba has only increased since the December 17th-­‐announcement of Cuba and the U.S.. This clearly indicates that before, most countries were afraid of reprisals of the U.S. government. It is frustrating for U.S. businesses to see how other countries are setting up trade relations and signing trade deals with a market that could be U.S. dominated without the embargo. Certainly with the gradual opening up of a Cuban private sector, Cuba is more than ever interesting for American investors. The country also forms an interesting new consumer market and has a cheap but skilled and educated labour force; thanks to the free education every Cuban is entitled to (Euromonitor International, 2013). The influence of the lobby groups on the U.S. Congress and Senate is already noticeable. In March 2015 for example, ‘The Freedom to Export to Cuba’-­‐act was proposed by a bipartisan group of U.S. senators. Also in March this year, an agricultural delegation visited Cuba (Frank & Trotta, March 2 2015). It is very likely that this commercial lobbying is only going to increase in the future. April 2015, it was announced that a new lobby group ‘Engage Cuba’ would be founded in May 2015. The Wall Street Journal described the new player in Cuban policy as “a new non-­‐profit advocacy group” that will “lobby Congress to repeal the ban against doing business in or travelling to the island nation (…)” (Wall Street Journal, Apri 16th 2015). The lobby group is bipartisan, including members of the Democratic as well as the Republican Party 28 and will represent several U.S. businesses. It can be expected that these commercial interests will play a decisive role in the Cuban-­‐American relationship in the future and will continue to battle the Cuban embargo. 28 The group will include, among others, a former official of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and a former top aide of Republican Senator Mitch McConnell (Wall Street Journal, April 16th 2015). 31 Foreign policy: New Start with Latin America The second element that has played a part in Obama’s decision to re-­‐establish diplomatic relations with Cuba is the changing relationship between the United States and Latin America and the consequences of this change for American interests in the region. One of the goals of the new Cuban policy is “to renew our leadership in the Americas” (White House Website, May 5th 2015). This leadership has been the role of the U.S. ever since the announcement of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. Under this doctrine, by which the U.S. proclaimed that no other power would be allowed to meddle in their ‘backyard’, Latin America has been the subject of paternalistic and aggressive American policy, based on the Western Hemisphere Idea29. Policies such as the Dollar Diplomacy of President Taft and Gunboat Diplomacy or Big Stick Policy of President Roosevelt were all based on the ‘hegemonic presumption’, as Abraham Lowenthal (1976) described it, of the United States towards the region. After the Second World War, “Washington’s influence throughout Latin America… grew to unprecedented dimensions” (Lowenthal, 1976, p. 204). Economically and politically, the ties between the United States and Latin America were stronger than ever. Attempts were made at institutionalizing these ties, by founding the Organization of American States in 1948 and the Inter-­‐American Development Bank in 1959 and by signing of the Inter-­‐American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Lowenthal, 1976; Schoultz, 1998). From the end of the 1940s onwards, “the entire region was seen in Washington as an essential ally in the emerging bipolar balance of power (…)” (Schoultz, 2011, p. 369). The position of Latin America in the Cold War was reassured with an OAS resolution that was adopted in April 1954 and in which international communism was barred in the Hemisphere (Lowenthal, 1976). From the Cuban Revolution in 1959 onwards, Cuba has played a symbolic, yet central role in American foreign policy towards the region. Although American interventions in Latin American countries had been occurring regularly since the nineteenth century, U.S. policy became particularly focused on preventing further ‘communist contamination’ and a repetition of the Cuban scenario throughout the region (Hsiang, 2003). “In its subsequent (after the Cuban Revolution) conduct of the key aspects of its policy towards Latin America, the U.S. government often behaved as if it were under the spell of 29 The Western Hemishpere Idea is “the idea that thecountries of the region have a special relationship toward one another that sets them apart from the rest of the world” (Lowenthal, 1976, p. 208). 32 ideological demons” (Dominguez, 1999, p. 33). The U.S. undermined several leftist and nationalist regimes throughout the region by organizing and backing coups and supporting dictatorial regimes. One example is the coup committed on the Allende administration in Chile in 1973, which brought dictator Pinochet to power (Lowenthal, 1976; Lowenthal, 2012). The anti-­‐communist battle in Latin America has also led to the introduction of ‘Alliance for Progress’30 program during the Kennedy Administration, continuing the pattern of paternalistic policies and deepening its institutional, economic and political influence within the region. Furthermore, most Latin-­‐American countries followed – pressured or not – the example of the U.S. and suspended their diplomatic and commercial relations with the Castro government. Cuba was excluded from the OAS in 21 January 1962. A resolution was passed that concluded which prohibited having ties with Cuba for all countries in the hemisphere. Mexico was the only state that refused to sign the bill. With the signing of this resolution, Cuba was excluded from intra-­‐American political system (Schoultz, 1998). After the Cold War, attempts were made by the post-­‐Cold War administrations to renew and re-­‐engage in the Latin American relationship by refocusing American policy towards Latin America in terms of economic partnership, counterterrorism and the ‘war on drugs’. Bush tried this in 2000, by hailing “A New Century of the Americas” (BBC, 2001; Hsiang, 2003; Buve, 2005; Fuentes & Aravena, 2006). But Latin America quickly disappeared from the U.S.’s list of foreign policy priorities. Quickly after his announcement, Bush had to deal with the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent War of Terror (Hakim, 2006). While the United States was occupied with the Middle East, Latin America experienced a lot of changes during the first fifteen years of the twentieth century and started setting its own course into the future. This was noticeable in four different areas. 30 The Alliance For Progress was implemented on March 13, 1961. The Program can be interpreted as a Latin American version of the Marshall Plan. Its main objective was to increase the social and economic conditions of Latin American countries, in order to stir them away from communist threat and lead them to democratic reform: “The agenda of the Alliance for Progress included programs for agrarian reform, tax revision, accelerated urban and rural housing development, health and sanitation improvement, and the elimination of illiteracy. The Alliance for Progress also called for national development plans designed to produce fair wages, stable prices, greater integration of the Latin American countries, and a per capita growth rate of 2.5 percent of a year” (Powaski, 1997, p. 137). The program was an utter failure, reaching non of its stipulated goals (Powaski, 1997; McWilliams & Piotrowski, 2009). 33 Firstly, several leftist leaning leaders, differing from extreme leftist to moderate social democrats, were democratically elected in countries such as Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Venezuela. This rise in leftist leaning politics can partly be blamed on the failure of the Washington Consensus, which led to extreme poverty in most of the Latin American countries (Castaneda, 2006; LeoGrande, 2007; Rumbaut & Rumbaut, 2007). Some of these leftist leaders, like current Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, once were members of guerrilla groups that the United States combatted during the Cold War (Ravsberg, September 11 2014). Certain Latin American leaders, such as the in 2013 deceased Hugo Chavez, his successor Nicolas Maduro, Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa and Bolivian president Evo Morales, are known for their anti-­‐American discourse, and admiration for the Cuban system. This had led to resurgence in anti-­‐
American rhetoric in Latin America. Often these leaders refer to the Cuban embargo as an example of the imperialist nature of the United States (Rumbaut & Rumbaut, 2009, pp. 84-­‐98). Most of the new Latin American countries were also not afraid of re-­‐establishing and expanding their relations with U.S. rivals as Cuba, Russia and Iran and ‘are reaching out, politically and commercially in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Middle East, often pursuing interests and policies independent of – and even contrary to-­‐ those of the United States” (Lowenthal, 2012, p. 5). Although the ‘pink tide’ has been weakening over the last few years, most countries attain the more American-­‐independent stance. This newfound political independence has led to a surge in regional organizations, which the United States does not take part in. Examples of these regional initiatives are UNASUR31, MERCOSUR32 and ALBA33. Although there is discussion as to what extent these organizations have been effective in reaching their objectives, they have sent a clear signal to the United States that their presence was not a condition for collective 31 UNASUR or Union de Naciones Suramericanos was founded in 2008 by regional power Brasil. It is an organisation which concentrates on hemispheric themes like security, money, infrastructure and defense. Members are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chili, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Guyana and Suriname (Dabène, 2010). 32 MERCOSUR or ‘Mercado Comun del Cono Sur’ is an economic organisation between Argentina, Brasil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia and Venezuela. It was founded in 1991 (Dabène, 2010). 33 ALBA or ‘Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos Americans’ was founded by Hugo Chavez. It does not span all the Latin American countries, only the most leftist ones, which are Antingua en Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Venezuela . It is mostly an ideological union and a project of previous Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez. The organization has started disintegrating after the death of Chavez (Hakim, 2014). 34 policymaking in the region. Certainly ALBA, founded by Hugo Chavez, was a collection of countries that defied American presence in their countries and leaned on Anti-­‐American rhetoric. Also in other organisations, such as CELAC 34 , which is seen as a viable alternative to the American dominated OAS, the United States are not accepted as a member. Cuba on the other hand is (Shifter, 2012). Thirdly, between 2003 and 2007, most Southern American countries experienced an economic boom: “Latin American economies had either been relatively well governed (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru) or had been cushioned by surpluses acquired thanks to commodity booms (Argentina, Venezuela)” (Dominguez, 2010). The biggest increases were noticeable in Brazil, Chile and Peru (Briscoe, 2013; Kaplan, 2013). This economic increase has attracted economic investments of non-­‐hemispheric actors such as Russia, China, South Africa, Europe and Iran. While Russia and Iran have been connecting with the most extreme leftist government in the region, China has deepening economic ties with almost every country in the region (Figueiredo, 2007). The presence of these new actors within the hemispheric orbit might be the most disturbing to Washington. New investors, like China, are much more attractive to the current Latin American leaders. While the United States in these past years has concentrated on security issues, which are of lesser interest to the Latin American governments, the Chinese government provided Latin American countries with what they most craved: investments and a discourse of shared interests, such as a multipolar world (Ratliff, 2009). As a consequence of these changes, the United States sees itself confronted with an increasingly anti-­‐American backyard that is trying to create a new future, in which the role of the US and the ‘special relationship’ is kept as small as possible. The Obama administration recognized the loss of American influence in the region on an OAS summit in November 2013. Secretary of State John Kerry declared, “The era of the Monroe Doctrine is over” (Kerry, 2013). The entrance of non-­‐hemispheric actors and the creation of new regional organizations of which the U.S. is left out of threaten American 34 CELAC or ‘Comunidad des Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribenos’ was founded in December 2011. It includes all nation-­‐states of the Hemisphere, with the exception of Canada and the United States. Its goal is “to advance the gradual process of regional intergration, unity and carefully balancing political, economic and social and cultural diversity in Latin America and the Caribbean (…) CELAC has helped to deepen respectful dialogue among all countries in the region in areas such as social development, education, nuclear disarmament, family farming, culture, finance, engergy and the environment” (celacinternational.org; May 17th 2015). 35 economic and security interests, two interests that have led U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America since the beginning of the nineteenth century (Schoultz, 1998; Figuieredo, 2007). Furthermore, the growing distance between the two continents comes at a time when one of the most important domestic political issues at the moment is illegal immigration from Latin America. To address this issue, cooperation with Latin American countries is vital. The United States government, which perceives Latin America still as its sphere of influence, desperately needs to readdress these changes in order to protect its interests. Part of the solution lies in the Cuba situation. The continuing American boycott of Cuba has been widely contested throughout the region since the 1970s (Kornbluh & LeoGrande, 2014). As long as Cuba is being left out of the OAS, which is still the most important regional organization in the Hemisphere, and Washington continues its contested embargo, it appears as though the Cold War and the ideological obsession of the U.S. with Cuba have not yet disappeared. The strong stance previous administrations took towards Cuba, reminded other Latin American countries of the imperialism the United States displayed throughout the years in the region (Buve, 2005). Ignoring the island had and has severe consequences for American interests in the region and declines its opportunities of establishing a viable relation with the rest of the region. Washington based think tank Council on Foreign Relation states the following in a 2008 report: “By ignoring and isolating certain nations in our hemisphere, the United States reduces its own influence in these countries and precludes dialogue through which mutual interests can be addressed (…)” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2008). The lack of support by Latin American nation-­‐states for U.S. policy was illustrated during the last Summits of the Americas35 and General Assemblies of the OAS36. While Obama’s first Summit of the Americas in 2009 in Trinidad and Tobago was considered a success, a summit agreement was not released, since some countries, did not agree with the continuation of the U.S. embargo against Cuba (Fernandes, 2009; 35 The Summit of the Americas in which “the Heads of State and Government of the Western Hemisphere have gathered periodically to discuss common themes and seek solutions and develop a shared vision for the future development of the region, be it economic, social or political in nature(…). The Organization serves as the technical secretariat of the Summits process.” . The Summits are organized on an irregular basis (OAS website, May 16th 2015). 36 “The General Assembly is the supreme organ of the Organization of American States and comprises the delegations of all the member states”. This General Assembly is held once a year So far, forty-­‐four sessions have been held (OAS website, May 16th 2015). 36 Meyer, March 24th, 2015). This protest reached its peak during Obama’s second Summit of the Americas in 2012, which was held in the Colombian city Cartagena. Every nation-­‐
state that attended the country, except Canada and the United States, insisted on the readmission of Cuba in the Summit, even close allies like Colombia and Brazil. Discussions were often caught, as Obama said “in a time warp, going back to the 1950s and gunboat diplomacy and Yankees and the Cold War” (MSNBC, April 15th 2012). Some Latin American officials, like Bolivia’s foreign minister, threatened that no future Summits would be organized if these would not include Cuba. A large portion of the other Latin American states backed this statement (Bajak & Sequera, April 30th 2012). Panama, who would organize the Seventh Summit of the Americas in 2015, issued a statement that it would invite Cuba to attend. The U.S. government initially opposed the attendance of Cuba, referring to the Inter-­‐American Democratic Charter that was adopted during the Third Summit of the Americas in 2001, which stated that every country represented by the OAS should be a democracy and should respect rule of law (Cardenas, September 12 2014). American opposition against Cuba’s presence on the Summit disappeared when the United States and Cuba eventually announced the new thaw in their relationship on December 17th 2014. Latin American leaders were unanimously positive about this development. Even Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro, admitted that “we must recognize this valiant and historically necessary gesture by President Barack Obama” (NPR, December 18th 2014). The announcement by the two countries was sealed with a handshake between Obama and Castro on the Seventh Summit of the Americas, held in April 2015. It was depicted as a symbolic moment that should reflect the end of U.S. imperialistic involvement in the region and a fresh start with Cuba in particular and Latin America in general. Obama repeated this discourse during the Summit: “The days in which our agenda in this hemisphere presumed that the United States could meddle with impunity, those days are past.” (BBC, April 11th 2015). It remains to be seen to what extent this move will effectively improve U.S.-­‐Latin American relations. More is needed to effectively move towards a U.S.-­‐Latin American relationship based on reciprocity and mutual respect. But for the time being, the U.S.-­‐Cuban thaw has given Obama a surge of popularity throughout the region, muted anti-­‐American rhetoric and has safeguarded future cooperation with the continent and with that, its interests in the region. 37 Cuba se Mueve: political and economic changes in Cuba Although American interests have played crucial roles in the changing of American Cuban policy, it is impossible to look at the current thaw without giving a look at the political and economic changes going on within Cuba. Cuba’s main incentive for starting diplomatic negotiations is economic and political survival. Fidel Castro has led Cuba from 1959 onwards. From 1959 until 1971, he ruled the country by decree. In 1971, the Communist Party became the only official party in the country and Castro assumed presidency. On July 31, 2006, Fidel Castro, the absolute leader of Cuba, relinquished provisional presidential power to his younger brother Raul Castro, due to illness. Raul was officially elected as ‘Presidente del Consejo de Estado y del Consejo de Ministros’ on February 24th 2008. In the meantime, Raul announced that he would be leaving office in 2018. His successor will be Miguel Canel-­‐Diaz, the current vice-­‐president (Habel, 2009; Rodriguez Archavelata, 2009). Burdened with preparing the country for the post-­‐Castro transition, Castro realized that lifting the U.S. embargo and re-­‐opening diplomatic ties were essential for the economic stability of the country. The repeal of the U.S. embargo is a perquisite for Cuba’s economic survival. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, Cuba lost its main trading partner and financial partner. This was no less than a disaster for the island. The existence of the USSR was essential for the economic health of the country: “For thirty years they made possible the survival of the Revolution” (Rumbaut & Rumbaut, 2007). Imports, of which 75 per cent was sent to the Soviet Union and another 15 per cent to the Eastern European countries, has dropped to almost nothing. In January 1991, Cuba received the last economic subsidies by the Russians (Dominguez, 2004). This collapse combined with the U.S. embargo and previous mistakes made by the Castro government have been detrimental for Cuba’s economic health. The intensifying economic crisis led Fidel to proclaim “El periodo especial in tiempos de paz” or ‘Special period in peacetime” in the summer of 1990. Cuban economy was trying to attract foreign investments coming from nations in Latin America, Europe and Asia. Investments were mostly made in the tourist sector. Furthermore, the dollar was introduced into Cuba’s currency system (Robert & Kuttruff, 2007). The Revolution survived because of these reforms, but the Cuban economy never attained its pre-­‐1990 level. Cuba tried to surf the leftist wave that overflowed Latin America in the beginning of the 21st century. This translated itself in extensive bilateral relations with Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela. This bilateral cooperation between the two 38 countries got established in 1999 by the signing of the ‘Integral Cooperation Agreement,’ in which Venezuelan oil was traded for Cuban doctors. For the time being, this agreement pushed the need for new drastic economic reforms (New York Times, December 14th 2014). When Raul Castro acceded to power, a change in economic narrative was noticeable. In a 2008 speech, Castro emphasized the need for a ‘different kind of communism: “Socialism means social justice and equality, but equality of rights and opportunities, not of income. Equality is not egalitarianism. The latter, in the end, is also the vagrant” (Ratliff, 2009). In a 2010-­‐speech Castro summarized Cuba’s situation boldly: “We reform, or we sink” (Sweig & Bustamante, 2013). In 2011, the ‘Actualization of the Cuban social and economic model’37 was introduced (Alzugaray, 2012). This plan tried to deeply reform the workings of the Cuban state and economy and wanted create economic growth while combining it with equity, the central aspect of Cuba’s social system. The changes include the gradual allowance of self-­‐employment and non-­‐agricultural production, expansion of cooperatives and the laying off of unnecessary state-­‐employees. New foreign investments were attracted. For example, the Mariel Harbour will be renovated under leadership of the Brazilian corporation Odebrecht. With that renovation “Cuba is hoping to position itself as a major shipping hub in the Caribbean” (Sweig & Bustamante, 2013). But all in all, the results of these measures have been meagre. Cuba’s economic growth amounted to only 1 per cent in 2014 (Rathbone, May 21st, 2015). An additional incentive to open up towards the United States is the difficult internal domestic situation of Venezuela. Castro realizes that, with the decline in Venezuela’s political and economic stability, it is also increasingly difficult for Venezuela to provide Cuba from oil. Cuba’s fate would be once again tied to the economic survival of another country. It is in Cuba’s best interest to avoid such a situation (Sweig & Bustamante, 2013; Rathbone, May 21st 2015). Furthermore, the Cuban economic situation is also threatened by a natural cause. Because of its geographical location, Cuba is prone to hurricanes. In 2008 for example, Hurricane Ike destroyed the homes of 200,000 Cubans and destroyed the crops (BBC, September 16th 2008). Another factor is that, despite new investments in Cuba, long-­‐term advantages for the country’s economy are capped by the enduring U.S. embargo. Added to that is the argument that “in the long run, the United States remains a vital natural market for Cuban products and services” (Sweig & Bustamante, 2013). 37 The official name is “Actualizacion del modelo de funcionamiento economico y social” (Triana Cordovi, 2012). 39 Raul Castro understood this message and reached out to the United States on several occasions since his accession to power in 2006. Although Fidel Castro made multiple attempts during his presidency to open diplomatic negotiations with the United States, he never did it as publicly as his brother. Furthermore anti –American sentiment is not as prominent in Raul Castro’s speeches. He is willing to look for a solution for Cuba’s internal problems, even if that includes a rapprochement with the U.S. Castro realizes that an opening to the United States will definitely benefit Cuba’s economic growth. It will also provide the next Cuban post-­‐Castro administration with more stability (Kornbluh & LeoGrande, 2014). Fidel Castro has not hidden his scepticism towards the U.S.-­‐Cuban rapprochement. In an interview with Granma, the newspaper of the Cuban Communist Party, he stated that he does not reject peaceful resolutions to problems but ‘does not trust the United States policy’ (Reuters, January 27th 2015). It is safe to assume that the change in leadership from Fidel to Raul has definitely been decisive in the rapprochement. However this economic change is not combined with grand political change within the country. The Cuban political system in general is characterized by its relative stability. The power transition from Fidel to Raul went without any internal upheaval (Sullivan, July 31st, 2014). Since his accession to power he has introduced modest changes in Cuba’s political system such as reducing the number of members in the Political Bureau and the Party’s Central Committee was reduced and the replacement of older members by new ones. Furthermore, it was decided that a time limit of twice five years was put on top positions in the party and the government (The Independent, April 17th 2011). An opening up to the United States will definitely benefit Cuba’s economic growth and develop its economic system. Whether this will be combined with political changes remains to be seen. For the time being, the answer is no. In the third part of this dissertation, we are concentrating more deeply on what Cuban future might look like after the reinstatement of diplomatic and trade relations with the United States. 40 Conclusion In this part of our dissertation, we have identified the four main factors that have induced the Obama administration into re-­‐opening diplomatic negotiations with Cuba. The first three incentives were based on changes in U.S. interests and the protection of these interests. This is a continuation of our main these; namely that Cuban policy is directed and influenced by three American interests; security, economic and domestic political interests. Changes in the economic interests of Cuba and change in Cuban leadership have also played a role. 41 Part III: The Future of the Cuban-­‐American Relation For the last part of this dissertation, we consider some of the issues that are being discussed during the current negotiations and the future of these negotiations. Furthermore, some sketches for the future of the U.S.-­‐Cuban relationship after the reinstatement of full diplomatic ties and lift of the Cuban embargo will be made. The Current Negotiations and their Future The official negotiations between the United States and Cuba commenced in Havana in January 2015. “The process is proceeding, albeit slowly’ according to Jorge I. Dominguez. The first conversations that took place between the two nation-­‐states were about immigration, the issue that has bound both countries together these past decades, and the officialising of an U.S. Embassy in Havana and a Cuban embassy in Washington. William LeoGrande said that the issues that have to be tackled are plentiful and sensitive (LeoGrande, 2015). Firstly, one of the main discussion points during these negotiations is the place of Cuba on the American list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, already has been tackled. Cuba was on the list since 1982 because it provided exile for terrorists of the Basque terrorist group ETA and the Colombian FARC. Being placed on this list meant that the country was facing additional financial and military sanctions38. But in its annual report, the State Department declared that Cuba had not engaged in sponsoring terrorism (Country Reports on Terrorism 2013; May 5th 2015). Obama’s decision to take Cuba off of the list was based hereupon. The decision has received support and criticism, mainly from the Cuban-­‐American senators Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz and Bob Menendez (Oleaga, April 15th 2015). But all in all, the reaction of Congress has been very mild. Obama did not need 38 The countries which are on the State sponsors of terrorism list have following laws: section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act and section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act. The prohibitions imposed on countries on the state sponsors of terrorism list are the following: (1) A ban on arms-­‐related export and sales, (2) Limits on the exports of dual-­‐use items, or commercial products that can also be used for military purposes, (3) Prohibitions on economic assistance and (4) Financial and other restrictions, including a requirement that the U.S. oppose loans to these countries from the World Bank and other international financial institutions (Al Jazeera, April 15th 2015; State Department Website, April 16th 2015). These sanctions also made it more difficult for the American interests section in Havana to function normally 42 support from Congress for his decision, but Congress had the right for 45 days to introduce new legislation that would impede the removal of Cuba from the list. Congress decided not to oppose Obama’s decision. The removal of Cuba of the list will probably romote cooperation between both countries on different safety issues like counternarcotics and counterterrorism (LeoGrande, December 19th 2015). Obama did not need support from Congress for this decision, but Congress did have 45 days to introduce new legislation that can impede this decision of Obama. Congress decided not to pursue this. This decision mainly contested by the Cuban-­‐American senators, Bob Menendez, Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio (Oleaga, April 15th 2015). A second important issue that has to be faced during the current negotiations is the demand of financial compensations by both the American and the Cuban government. The Foreign Claim Settlement Commission, an American government agency, has collected some 5,913 claims of businesses whose property has been nationalized by the Cuban government during the first years of the Revolution. These claims total an amount of seven billion dollars. The negotiations about these claims have been stalled since September 27th, 1960 (Sullivan, April 23rd 2015). The Cuban government at the same time, wants compensation for the damage, both economic and human, the U.S. embargo has caused for the Cubans (Cordoba & Wiessenstein, January 28th 2015). Thirdly, the question of the Guantanamo Naval Base is also pending. In 1903, the Cuban-­‐
American treaty, not to be confused with the Platt Amendment, was signed. This treaty, which is a lease of property, designated Cuba to lease certain pieces of land of its territory, most notably the lands around Guantanamo naval base. In 1934, this document was repealed together with the Platt Amendment, but was replaced with a Lease Agreement, which stipulated that the U.S. government was allowed to lease the Guantanamo property in perpetuity. The agreement states that the two parties have to give their consent on abrogating the agreement. If one of the two parties does not give its permission, the agreement cannot be repealed. In the U.S., control over Guantanamo is founded in the ‘Naval Station Guantanamo Bay Protection Act’, which states that the President has to notify the Congress if he wants to end the lease. Congress needs to approve this executive action (Sullivan, April 23rd 2015; Cordoba & Weissenstein, January 28th 2015) The U.S. is unlikely to relinquish control over Guantanamo any time soon, seeing the base still has strategic importance because of its geographical location. 43 Yet, these strategic interests have decreased over the past years (McKenna, May 13th 2015). But the main splitting point between the United States and Cuba is still the economic embargo, which has been and still is the centrepiece of American foreign policy towards Cuba. During his announcement of the thaw, Castro urged the U.S. to lift the embargo, a message he has repeated on the Summit of the Americas in April (BBC, December 18th 2015; Herschfeld & Archibold, April 11th 2015). But the embargo is based on several laws and treaties39 and was cemented into legislation by the Helms-­‐Burton Act of 1996, also known as the LIBERTAD-­‐act. Because of this, President Obama needs approval of Congress to reverse the economic embargo. It cannot be repealed through an executive action. For the time being, it seems highly improbable that Congress, which has been in the hands of the Republican Party since the 2014 mid-­‐term elections, would allow Obama to lift the embargo. Certainly Cuban-­‐American senators, whether they are Republican or Democrat, are highly opposed against the turn in U.S. policy taken by the Obama Administration. Yet, as seen in the second part of this dissertation, since 2000 openings have been made in ‘el bloqueo’. It is also highly probable that lobbying by bipartisan, commercial funded PAC’s, as ‘Engage Cuba’, will increase lobbying efforts in the near future and will play an important role during the 2016 Presidential elections. Their lobby work could lead to the eventual lift of the Cuban embargo. Because of the wide range of issues and their difficulty, it is very likely that negotiations between Cuba and the United States will continue into the next post-­‐Obama administration, starting January 2017 The fruitful continuation of these negotiations after the Obama Administration will depend on two factors. Firstly, the next president of the Untied States will have an important say in the continuation of the negotiations. The openings that have already been made since December 17th are executive orders. This means that the next president is able to reverse these. The same logic applies for the negotiations. Their future is not assured. Currently, four important Republican names have entered the race for the Oval Office, of which are two Cuban Americans. All four have different opinions regarding the re-­‐
establishment of Cuban-­‐American ties. 39 The embargo rests on the following regulations: Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, section 5(b), Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 620(a), Cuba Assets Control Regulations of 1963, Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, also known as the Torricelli Act; Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, also known as the Helms-­‐Burton Act; the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (Amnesty International, 2009). 44 Senator Marco Rubio, a first-­‐generation Cuban immigrant and the second one to enter the Republican race, has openly criticized the change towards Cuba. It seems probable that, if Rubio gets elected, negotiations might slow down. At this moment, Rubio also has considerable power over Cuban policy. In his function of chair of the Western Hemisphere subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he can boycott, or at least seriously impede, the appointment of an ambassador to Cuba and the re-­‐
opening of an American embassy in Havana (Adams, December 19th 2014; LeoGrande, December 19th 2014). Ted Cruz, also Republican, second generation Cuban-­‐American and running for the Republican nomination of presidential candidate, has equally criticized the re-­‐
establishment of relations, naming it “a tragic mistake. Just like the administration did with Iran right when the administration was feeling the maximum pain it throws them an economic lifeline and continues the brutal repression and dictatorship of the Castro brothers” (Bordelon, December 17th 2015). To Cruz’s opinion, the embargo has been most effective, since it was able to “limit the impact and harm of Cuba” (Bordelon, ecember 17th 2015). Rand Paul on the other hand, also running for the Republican nomination, has backed Obama on his Cuba decision and named it ‘probably a good idea’. (Bordelon, December 18th 2014). Another possible Republican candidate is Jeb Bush. Bush does not support the decision of the Obama Administration, saying it undermines U.S. credibility (Debenedetti, December 17th 2015). For the Democratic Party, both candidates, Hillary Clinton and Senator Bernie Sanders, are sustaining the Cuban policy of the Obama administration. After the announcement of the thaw, Sanders issued a statement in which he applauded the decision of president Obama (Sanders.state.gov, May 5th 2015). It is very unlikely that, without major incidents, one of these two would change the course of the negotiations. It seems probable, that if either Rubio or Cruz gets elected to become the 43st president of the United States, there is a real chance that negotiations might slow down. But this depends from a second factor. If the current administration manages to make enough progress, it will be harder for the new president to reverse the results of the negotiations. All in all, the chances that the Cuba policy will become a big issue in the 2016 presidential race are quite slim. The only ones who might cast a vote on this issue are Cuban-­‐Americans, and as we have seen before in this dissertation, a growing group of this community does not oppose negotiations with the Castro regime any longer (LeoGrande, 2015). 45 Cuba’s and U.S. rapprochement: both can have their cake, and eat it, too? What will the eventual consequences be of a possible opening of diplomatic ties and a lift of the Cuban embargo? In this part, we will illustrate and analyse the risks, benefits, and downsides for both parties as they renew their relationship. For the United States, there are seemingly no downsides to this rapprochement. Firstly, American security interests are no longer threatened by Cuba as they were during the Cold War. To the contrary, Cuba might benefit the U.S.’s security interests. The island could provide assistance in the War on Terror and the battle against narcotics and the illegal drug-­‐trade. Secondly, the Cuban-­‐American rapprochement might provoke a better, more efficient and stable relationship with Latin America, which has been in tatters since the advent of the twenty-­‐first century. The region has assumed a more American-­‐independent path and is not likely to refrain from that in the near future. But with the Cuban question out of the way, cooperation with the United States might become more possible and acceptable. As said before, criticism against the Cuban economic and diplomatic blocking by the United States has been increasing in the region. This criticism reached a boiling point in the last Summit of the Americas, after which virtually every Latin American nation-­‐state refused to attend another Summit of the Americas if Cuba was not invited. The United States has been able to avoid this further breakdown of diplomatic cooperation by reopening diplomatic talks with Cuba. Also, because of this thaw, anti-­‐American leaders in the region, like Nicolas Maduro and Evo Morales, are partly robbed of their ammunition. In their anti-­‐American speeches, the continuing embargo of Cuba by the United States formed the ultimate example of American neo-­‐
imperialism. Over the last years, the leftist wave in Latin America has seen its power decrease, because of internal economic and political problems. Losing Cuba, the anti-­‐
American symbol par excellence, might further undermine their legitimacy. One might suggest that Venezuela, with its strong anti-­‐American stance and the American diplomatic sanctions that have been imposed on the country in December 2014, might be the new Cuba, but Latin American countries are very critical of this nation-­‐state and realize that most problems the Venezuelans struggle with are home-­‐grown. Thirdly, the greatest benefits for the United States might lie in the economic realm of the relationship. U.S. businesses and the agro-­‐industry have expressed their interest in the 46 Cuban market since the end of the Cold War. As said before, in 2000 some loopholes were created in the embargo but the general tendency of blocking out Cuba was not halted. With the announcement of the Obama administration, trade relations can increase but the Cuban embargo, which can only be repealed by Congress, remains in place. As reviewed before, new lobby groups are increasing pressure on U.S. Congress to lift the embargo. If this would eventually happen, American businesses could profit greatly from this new consumer and resources market close to their shores. The main problem the American government might face regarding its decisions on Cuba is internal political opposition. The Republican Party in general is more cautious towards the decisions made by the Obama Administration on Cuba. Also, Cuban-­‐
Americans from both parties, like Robert Menendez and Ted Cruz, might provide profound opposition. But with the changing attitudes within the Cuban-­‐American community, the decrease in importance of the Cuban-­‐American vote and the increasing pressure of anti-­‐U.S. embargo lobby groups, this protest might die out rapidly. The lack of disinterest and opposition to the Obama decisions concerning Cuba can already be noted in the absent protest of Congress against the removal of the island from the American State Sponsors of Terrorism list. This contrasts heavily with the general scepticism of Congress on decisions made by the Obama administration on other foreign policy affairs, like the Iranian nuclear deal. What is in it for Cuba? An open relationship with the United States will undoubtedly benefit the Cuban economy -­‐ benefits it desperately needs if it wants to break its negative economic circle of the past twenty-­‐five years and wants to survive. The Cuban private sector that is still in its infancy could profit greatly from new trade opportunities with the U.S. Furthermore, it will increase access for Cuban citizens to medicines and food supplies. It can also provide the next administration, the first without a Castro standing at the helm, with stability, and guarantee the survival of Cuba. But in contrast to the United States, more possible downsides could appear for Cuban society in the long term. First, there is an apparent menace for Cuba’s social system. As said before, during the Cold War years Cuba has managed to build a society, albeit poor, in which equality of its citizens stood central. Since the advent of the Cuban Revolution this equality has been the internal glue of Cuban society. The disappearance of the Soviet Bloc has threatened this internal glue, but has not erased it. With their reforms of the last twenty years, Fidel 47 and Raúl Castro made sure to safeguard Cuba’s social system. But their changes have provoked an income gap between Cubans working in the tourist sector, with its easy access to dollars and Cubans working for the government. This income gap will probably grow with the growth of the private sector, which is mainly tourist related, and the transformation towards a capitalist system. If the expected economic growth would only benefit a certain part of Cuban society, how will the Cuban people react? And will the new Cuban government, without the symbolic Castro family in its ranks, have the legitimacy and capacity to face these new societal problems? Secondly, the further strengthening of the private sector is not only a menace for the internal cohesion of Cuban society, but also for the stability of the Cuban political system. As we have seen, the Cuban political system is widely supported throughout the island and the U.S. embargo has not been able to cause instability within the Cuban political system, quite to the contrary. It has mainly affected the daily lives of normal Cubans, but not that of the Cuban political elite. Next to its social system, the U.S. embargo has also fulfilled the role of social glue in Cuban society. Throughout the years, the United States has been a scapegoat, whether rightfully so or not, for Cuba’s economic problems. But there is a general understanding, even admitted by Castro himself, that misconducts of the Cuban government are also part of the explanation of Cuba’s economic troubles (Kornbluh & LeoGrande, 2014). With the disappearance of this easy explanation of Cuba’s internal troubles, a growing middle class, and the disappearance of the symbolic Castro generation, dissident voices might increase. These have been present throughout the history of the Castro regime, but were, and are, mostly silenced violently by the Cuban government. If this call for political change would take place, it will be supported by the United States, who still wants to provoke democratic reform in the country. This last issue reflects the main contradiction in these negotiations. Cuba has engaged in these discussions to assure its own survival. For the United States, the ostensible goal is democratization, but it is economic interest that is primary, through which democratization would follow. This signifies a return to the U.S.’s Nineteenth Century interests in Cuba. The island will undoubtedly be dragged into the American economic orbit, seeing its geographical location. But via this economic expansion, the U.S. hopes to emancipate the Cuban middle class and empower dissident voices that can undermine the Cuban government. Also, with the nearing post-­‐Castro transition, the U.S. will probably try to influence this transition and lead it on a more democratized route. This democratization does not have to be a bad thing. It could be that the United States tries 48 to lead the Cuban political system towards more democratization, whilst respecting its national sovereignty and independence. But this possible scenario is being contradicted by history. As seen in the past decades, democratization of other nation-­‐states by the United States is mostly combined with the instalment of an American friendly government. But an American friendly government does not necessarily put the problems and grievances of its own population up front. Neither does it guarantee an increase in the respect for human and civil rights. This has been the case in the 1970s during the Pinochet dictatorship, and in 1950s Iran. And, as seen in the first historic part of this dissertation, this has certainly been true for Cuba from 1898 onwards. If history repeats itself 2018, the year in which Raúl Castro resigns might be a new 1898 for the U.S. in which it is able to influence Cuba politically once again. This instalment of an American friendly government is not a perquisite for American economic interests. In China for example, trade relations were opened in the 1970s and its communist political system is still in place. But this is less likely in the case of Cuba, seeing its geographical proximity and the large history of American expansionism and desire of annexing Cuba . Will the United States be able to resist its urge of turning the Cuban government into an American friendly government, which protects its economic interests, like it did in the beginning of the twentieth century? Context has of course changed. The chances that Cuba will revisit its position as client state of the U.S., like it was in the nineteenth century, are slim. The island has trade relations with countries from all over the world. Furthermore, the island does have the advantage of support of the other Latin American countries, which will not stir away from criticizing the United States, seeing their more independent stance. As for now, the Cuban government takes its own pace in the negotiations and has managed some significant breakthroughs, like its removal from the State Sponsor List of Terrorism and change in the U.S.’s democracy programs. The Americans have been respectful towards Cuban grievances during the negotiation process. But as these will go on beyond the Obama Administration and a Republican might assume presidential power in 2016, negotiations might take on a different, more polarized path. But all in all, the risks for Cuba in reopening diplomatic ties are much greater than they are for the United States, seeing the analyses above and the big differences in power between the two nation-­‐
states. It will take a lot of effort of the Cuban government to lead the negotiations in accordance with their preferences and to run things to their liking after the opening of diplomatic and trade relations. 49 As we can see from these predictions, the main interests, being security, economic and domestic political interests – only strengthened by the geographical location of both countries -­‐will continue to influence the U.S.-­‐Cuban relationship. The interplay of these interests will decide the future of the Cuban-­‐American relationship and how much it their new relationship will resemble their pre-­‐revolutionary one. 50 Part IV: Conclusion In this dissertation, an answer was sought to the question “Why has the Obama administration finally succeeded in breaking the diplomatic standstill between Cuba and the United States?”. This dissertation started with the main these that American economic, domestic political and security interests have defined the Cuban-­‐American relationship from the start. This assertion has been the central leading role in the historical overview that was provided in the first part of this dissertation. Seeing the geographical proximity of the two nation-­‐states, Cuba was very important for American economic and security interests. After the Cuban War of independence and the Spanish-­‐American War, the United States let their own political and economic interests prevail over Cuban self-­‐
determination and independence. The U.S. however seemed to have underestimated power and frustration, caused by the American intervention of 1898, of the Cuban nationalist movement. With the Cuban Revolution, Cuba finally managed to drag itself out of the American orbit and obtain self-­‐determination, which had been much sought and fought for. With American economic interests in the United States practically amputated, the United States let security interests and domestic political interests prevail. This caused the maintenance of isolationist U.S. policy towards the island. Obama managed to overturn this fifty years old policy. Why? We argue that contextual changes have influenced and changed the three main American interests, being economic, security and domestic political interests, which have always been decisive in American policy towards Cuba. These changes have led to the Cuban-­‐American thaw. Firstly, domestic political interests have changed. The influence on domestic politics by the Cuban-­‐American exile community, which was led by a very vocal anti-­‐Castro elite, has seen its influence on American policy decline. The main reason for this influx of a new ‘sort’ of Cuban immigrant into the U.S., the decline in the worth of the Cuban-­‐
American vote in the state of Florida, caused by the major influx of other Latin-­‐American immigrants and the gradual, natural disappearance of anti-­‐Castroism in the community. Secondly, with the disappearance of the Cold War narrative, American interests in Cuba have altered. Security interests have transformed and its importance has decreased. Commercial interests have increased in importance, which is partly a return to the nineteenth century relationship between Cuba and the United States. 51 Thirdly, the relationship with Latin America, in which Cuba plays a symbolic but important part, has severely changed since the end of the twentieth century. This shift in the relationship has been caused by the economic development of Latin America, the engagement with new trading partners such as China, Russia and Iran, the appearance of a ‘pink tide’ and the foundation of several regional organizations. This independent move of Latin America has been a threat to American security and economic interests. Furthermore, the immigration crisis that the U.S. has been experiencing demands cooperation with Latin America. In order to address these interests and solve problems, the case of Cuba had to be moved out of the way, if only for symbolic reasons. Accepting Cuba was one of the main points of friction between both parties, which led to immobility in cooperation. Fourthly, change would not have been possible if Cuba was not open for it. With the disappearance of Fidel Castro and the rise of Raúl, economic and political changes have taken place within the country. Each of these factors has played a role in the change of American policy. They are not equally important but nonetheless equally essential. It remains to be seen if these American interests will once again take the lead in the Cuban-­‐American relationship, like they did in the nineteenth century. 52 Bibliography Adams, G. (December 19th 2014). The Liberal Fallacy of the Cuba Deal. Accessed on May 5th 2015 on http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/19/the-­‐liberal-­‐fallacy-­‐of-­‐the-­‐cuba-­‐deal-­‐
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1986. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 61 Attachments Attachment 1: Map Of Cuba 62