THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS AND THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPI NE
ISLANDS
B.II
EtlfILIANO LAZARO \' MINA "
r.
DEFINITION AND DISTINCTION
A. Definition
I think it highly imporlanl" in a science so vast and intri·
cate as. the law, to empl oy terms in a flhtl l'p. illc i sin~, technical
defin ition to pl'event confu~ion and bewilderment.
The phl'ase "Stare Decisis" from the Latin ve rb "sto"
whi ch means "to be quiet" and the word (lecisltm, "settled thing,"
if; a Latin maxim conveying t he idea of the policy of some coul1;s
to abide by 0 1' adhere to decided case!;. It is t he abbl'e\' iated
express ion of the Latin maxim "Sta l'e Deei siR et non quieta mo ·
vere" which means ';lo adhere to clecid'ed cases and not to
di!'ltlll'b settled Quest ion s."
When a point 01' quest ion propel'i),
decided in a pre\'ious case comes rlga i)) in litigation, it was
deemed advi sable and more convenient to adopt the op inion and
tourse of I'eal';oning of t he judge l'endel'inl~ the fOl'mer decision ,'
It is a maxim, meaning, to adhere to pl'ecedent5, and not to
unsettled things which are establis h ed . ~
The doctrine, in general. i!'i to the eff,~ct that where a poin t
has been once settled by decision it forms, a precedent which is
not aftenvards to be departed from. "
B. Distil/ctio!!."!
Stare Decisis differs fro m Res Adjudicata. The former
relates chiefly to law; the latter to facts.' The doctrine of reg
adjudicata bean; upon parties, and others privy to the immediat.e parties, alld restrains them from liliU'ating anew s uch matteI'S as hm'e previously been drawn into contl'ovel's), between
them 01' those representing them, and ha.\'"e been allthol'itatively
decided by a competent COlll'to" One case can make up the doc·
trine of res adjudicata; several ~se" that of stul'e deci~is. FOI'
• LL.B., Univ'!l"! it)' of the Philil'piu'!s.
, Bouvier's L;l\\' Dictional'Y, p. 1028.
' COI'PUS Jul"is, Vol. 58, p. 13 18.
Ruling CIl.!!(> Law, Vol. 7, II, 1000.
'Same v. Same 34 Mich, 21 1.
Packet Co. \' . Sickl.:s, 5 Wal lace G!l2.
TH~
DOCTRINE OF S TAH E DECI S I S
·lu5
unlike I'es adjudieat.a, which may I'efer to a single caUtie of action
or defense determined by a final judgment,· stare dec i s i ~ I'efers
to t.he law o r the pl'illciple applied in the past and which may be
controlling on future cases altho ~llch cases may al'ise f'1'om different callse~ of action or defenses and involving di fferent pal'ties.
Sta l'e Decisis also diffe]'s from Obiter Di ctum. The latter
j "l llot a decision 1" and therefore cannot in any way be the basis
of st.a l·e decisi s which always connote a decision in aJI senses
of the term. Obiter dicta are not controlling in decisions of the
Supreme Court. - Where a question pas~es the court "sub si ·
lcncio", the case is not binding upon the court and will not pr eclude it from later passing upon its validity where the question
is properly t'aisoo.o The reason for this is well stated by Ch ief
Justice Marshall in these wOI'ds: " The question actually before
lhe court is investigated with car e, and considered in its full
extent; other principles, which may serve to illustrate it, a r e
co nsidered in their relation to the case decided, but their possible
bearing ill all othE' I' CMes if' seldom completely investigated'. " '"
On the other hand, the rule is almost universal for the court:;; to
udhel'e to the doctrinc of stare decisis. It .is an adjudicated
qllef'ltion and the subject of its COITectness is a sealed book. "
Sbu'e Decisis may also be di stingui shed fl'om jeopardy, In
w; much as the plea of once in jeopardy is the res adjudicata of
the cri minul case,l ~ it should possess the same distinctions which
the doctl"ine of res adjudicata bea r s to stare decisis. The mean ing of jeopardy is, that a party shall not be tl'ied a second time
f!)l' the samE:' offense artel' he nas been once convicted or ac quitted of the offen sc charged by the verdict of the jury and
j udgment has passed lhereon for or against him. '1
n.
ANALYSIS OF TilE DOCTIONE OF SnRE
DEC ISIS
A. Sfalemn..i uf the DOCt1·i,lR.
The rule of stare deci sis is the authority of judicial deci",iOns as precedent. in s ubsequent litigations." The pl'inciple of
" " an ~~l cc t, Rt's Adjuflicuw. Vo l. 1. !I. ~.
1 W t.l\s, The Doetl' jill! of Res A<ljudicata &. Stur€< Deci sis. )1. 527 .
' Uy Po ,'. CoJlecto!" of Cu~tO!ll~, 34 Phil. 15:t
" "" cGil'!" v. Hllnliltoll &. Abl'CU, 30 Phil. 568.
,. i\lBl"bul"), \'. i\hUJi SOIl, 2 Law Edition , (;0.
" Seal" v. Mi tchell. 5 Cal. 4(13.
" Alb".-t. Law (jf Criminal P r llccdUl'C, fl. 180.
" Story 1111 the Constitu.tioll , 51h Edition, St!c. 17,:j7 .
.. Suthcrlal1(l, Statu tory Constl'uciion, 2nd F.:d .• Vol. Z, 1'. 8D8.
P H ILIPP I NE LA W JOURNAL
precedent is sometimes c~lled the doctrine of stare decisis.'" The
doctrine is s hortly th is: T h~\t a deci sion by a court of competent
jtll'isdiction of a point of law lying so squarely in the pathway
of judichli judgment that the ca1-ie could not be adjudged without
deciding it, is not only binding upon the parties to t he cause in
judgment but the point so decided. becomes, until it is l'eversea
fII" overruled, evidence of what. the law is in like cases. which
the cou rts are bound to follow, not only in cases precisely like
the one which was (j r st determined but also in those. which,
however different in their origin 01' special circumstances, stand,
or are cons ider ed to ~ta l1d, upon the sa me principles. ' u After a
legal principle has t hus been well settled, it becomes <l binding
rule, to be applied in all case,:,; of II similar natu re. "
B. iVa/m'r
(/lId
COllct'pf of rhe Doctrill(>
The doctrine is not founded upon n mere \'Ute of practice,
changeable at t he p!casu I'e of th e courts, but upon the solid basis
of justice, and vitally ::tnd essentially affects the rights and inlerests of defendants. It is a ,oule applicable to all questions of
law, whether declaring n pdnciple of common law or the const ruction of a stat.ute. A rleliberate deci sion on a point of law
giYen in a case becomes authority in other like cases; it is then
lhe highest ev i(lence of what the law is applicabl e to the subject:
:t should be followed unlt:'~s ,'evc'osed Ly a s uperior court or
changed by the legislature, lIllless the law was manifestly misunderstood or misapplied in the case decided: and even then,
llftel' long adherence to that error, it ma ~r become fixed and incapable of j ud icial cOlTection.'
It js a fundament: .. l la w that a pl'ecedent must be a concIu"ion, a decision in a cause; and not a proceSl> of reasoning, an
illll st l'ation, 01' analogy .f. The member of a court often agree
in a decision, but differ decided ly a~ to the reaSODS and prillc-ipJes by which their minds have been led to a common conelu~io n . If the major pn~ mise, which is the law of the case. may
ce stated in several forms. and is stated diffe,'entiy by diJrerent
memben; of the COlll't who join in the conclusion, t his diversity
will impai,' the force of ]J,·ececlent. A judicial decision should
be l'egal'(led as conclusive, not only on Ute points presented in
.. GambQa, Elementary Law, p. l:t
" Ibid ., citing .Jud~e Ditk.n, pp. 1:1-1 L
" WiJl i.~~u n , Some TClldenciE:S in the La w, II. l~:).
" Sutherland, Statutory CIJI\~tl·\ICtio!1, 2nd E: d .. Vol, .:!. pp. IWI:\·!I,
•• W E:Jt~, T he Doctrine of Res Adjtldicata & Stare Decisis. p. 530.
THE DOCTR I NE OF STARE DECISIS
407
~rgumel1t and ex pressly decided . but also of every other proposition nece~sa l' il :v in volved in I'eachi ng the condusion expressed. ~o
The rule is :;ta re decisis, not stal'e opinioniblLS 0 1' even sta.n :
,esplm.:f'is . Opi nions are not legaliy I'equin:d in most states
llnd in these, a decision without an opinion m ay none the less be
binding. The opinion may not logically lead to the decision at
all. The re may be ot her and better reaso m~ for t he decision
than those in the op ini on. There may be sev'~ ral and even con·
h'adictOl'Y opinions. In all t hese situations. the decision is as
"bindi ng" as it \vas before. Opinions have only a force ca ll ed
authority which derive it from the personality and cha racter
of the judge, from the standing of the t r ibu:nal, and from the
inherent qualities of the o pinion. ~ '
C. GnnmdH of the A l6tho,, .ify of the D oott'ille
Th e ope ration of pl'ecedents is based on the legal pres umpt ion of the correctness of jltd ic ial decisions. It is an application
of the maxi m, Res jlldiCflta pro 'V lll'it(tie accipitu1·. A matter
once formally decided is decided once 1'01' all. The cou r ts will
listen to n o a llegation that they have been mistaken nOl' will
they open fl. mattel' once litigated and determined. That which
has been delivered in judgment must be t llk(!n for establi!\hed
tJ'uth. For in all pI'obability it is true in fact, a nd even if not,
it is expedient that it should be held as true none the less.
When, the refore, 11 question has been jud icially considered and
an s\vel'ed, it mu st be answered in t he same way in all subsequent cases in which the same questio n again nrises. Only thru
this l'ule ca n that consistency of judicial decision be obtained,
which ilt e!\sential to the admini stration of ju st.icc. '~ By thi s
reliance in the la w is attained. ~~
A precedent therefore, is a judicial decision which contains
ill itself a principle.
This underlying pri nciple is often termed
the ,.r£lin cleride11di whi ch alone has the force -of law a s r egards
t.he wor ld at large.
D. I mpu'rt{tt)C fl (unt Re{tHIJIlS oj Ihl' J) oct"' hlc
The policy of the doctri ne is Lo give uniformity, certainty.
and stability to t he law ;111 (1 above all to afford the citizen n
.. Suthcdand, Stalutol'Y Const.ruction , 2nd Ed., Vo l. 2, pp. 908-9,
" Max Rad in. 33 Califol'nia Law Review, Feb. 19<13 .
.,. Sal mond. J urisprudence, 7th Edition, p. 198.
,. Halcomb ". Bonnell. 32 M ich . 8.
PHILIPPI N~
408
LAW J OU RNAL
pl'om pt and speedy a:dminLs ll'alion o f justice. An absQlute dist hi ~ d octrine would ne ce~.'l arily lead to chaos and confusion, a nd lea"c the law liS uncer tain and undevel oped at the
regat'd of
(m el as well as in t he beginning. 1 '
T he legal ground on whic h this practice is now s uppor ted
is that long continu ed usage flll'!li ~ hes a contemporan eolls COJ1which must pl'evail ovel' the mere techn ical import of
wOrds. t '
Fo)" it i:; an establis hed 1'\I!e to abide by former precedellts,
where t he !'lame poi nts com e again in li t igati on: afl well a s to keep
the sc., le of justice even and ::;teady, and not liable to waver
with every new judge's opin ion; as al so because the law in that
ea.'iC being sole mnl y declared and determined, what before Waf>
unce rta in , ,mc\ pel'hap:; indifferent , has now become a permanent rule which is not in the bl'east. of an y subsequent judge to
:llte,' 01' va)'y from acconting to his own pri vate judgment, but
acconling to th<' kn ow n laws and Cllstom s of the land,,; not delegated to pronounce a new Jaw but to maintain and expound
the ol d one ."" 1t s hould I'equil'e. ever.\" controlling consideratiOlU; to induce any court to bre"k down H fo rme r decisi on, and
Jay again the foundat ion>: of the law."' F or t hi s maxim is tI
fu ndament.al co ncept in the organization of evcr ~' jlwal society. ~"
~· t ructioll
E. CIM8e!) nj P1·ecede·ut.<;
PI'ececlents ma~' be declarator y. one which i ~ merely lhe
ilJ)plication of an already exist ing rule of law ; or 3n ol"iginal
precedenl, one which creates and applies a lIew nile. In the
for mel' case, the l'u le iF- applied hecause it is already law; in the
l:~tter case, it i " \:lw fo r the future beca use it is now applied.
The legal authority of each is exactly the sa ll1 e. '~
Precedent~ are fll r t hel' di vis ible into authoritative and pt'.r:<\Iush·e. These two classe" differ in I'especl of th e kind of inference which they exel'ci~e upon the fu t ure course of t he admini:'.U'ati on of ju:-\tice, An il lllh OJ· jlati ve precedent j i' one wh ich
.Judges must foli o\\' rcgllrdJl!'i o f their Lelie fs 01" cf!nvicti om; . 11
i$ bindi ng upon them anc! ext\udes thei r judicial di scretion. P(' l" ...
•,
..
"
'
'"
W l11iam v. Go,.ney, 1014 indiana , ~1'! 3 .
Sutherland. Statutor), Construuion, 2nd Ed .. Vol. 2. p .• j!),! .
Blacksto ne, Laws; of E ngland , 4t h Ed. , V ol. 1, pp_ 62-63.
H oga tt. v . Bingaman, 7 H ow (Miss) 569.
Blar: k, Th .. Law of .J udgme nt, Vo!' 2, P. 599.
Salmond, J U)'i s pl"ud unce, 7t h E di tion, pp. 18 ~-18!l.
THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DE:e IS IS
".uasj,'e, when the judges a r e under no obligation to follow, altho
the~r may attach weight and merit to them as may be walTanted.
fieneratly, decisions of s lIperio)' courts are authoritative; those
of lower courts, merely persuasive.'"
Authoritative precedcnti; al'e of two kinds: either absolute
or conditional. In the first case. the decision is unconditionally
followed without Question however unreasonable or erroneous it
ma~' be considered to be.
It has a legal claim Lo implicit and
unquestioning obedience. In the seco nd case, the precedent po!";;esses merely conditional authority when the courls pOSs~f'.s It C~ I' ­
tain limited POWC I' of disregarding itY
F. Appficalim! olld Effect ()f the Doctri'le
The following rule", are generally l'ecog-nized for the application of precedents : (a) Each COllrt i>; bound by the ,dec.i,,;oll
of COllrt!< above it : (b) Any l'elevant judgment of any coun is :J
:-.tl'ong argument entitled to respectful consideration; (c) a judgJIlent is authol'itative only all to its I'nfi() decidendi; (d) a pl'e,
('~dent is not abrogated by lapse of ti me: (e) Ancient precede nt"
are not. in pr actice, commonly applicable to modern cirCllm~tances,
These rules are practical and of sa lutary effect,'"
There is a distinction in the application of the principle 01
~iare decisis between question ~ which co ncern practice OJ" thOM'
rules of conduct which have a me re present importance, and
those which affect the validity <tlld control the construction of
c'ontr acts 01' r ules of property, A;; to the former. legal preced~ lIt s are fo llowed unless they are manifestly wrong, As to tl1c
latter, they are followed with mOL'e persistenc,,,,~~
No absolute rule can be gh'en as to when stare decis is iii.
imperative, so much (iepends on the particular case in which it
nlay be invoked, It mll ::;t be said however, that COIIl'ts al'e not
required in the exer cise of thei r wide judicial 'd iscI"et lon, to over,
turn principles which have been considered and acted upon as
con ect, and thereby disturb contract", and property, and involv{'
everything in in explicable confusion . There al'e que"tion~ where
ihe decision do not constitute a bUl'liness rule, and where a change
would invalidate no busin ess transactions conducted upon the
faith of the adjudication. As a n iIIush'atlon, lake ,a Cl.l.-;e involving pel'sonal liberty: a pHrt~' I'e~trained of his liberty claim,«
~
Ibid., p, HIt.
' Ibid., p. 192 .
... Allen, Law in the "'lak ing, 2nu Edition, p. 20~1 .
.. Sl.Ith(,I·land, Stlltutot'y COII!,Ll'u~til>n, 2nd Ed., Vol. ::!
p. 8fl9.
PHILIPPINE LAW JO URNA L
to be discha L'ged under some constitutional provision; the court
erroneously decides again~t him ; the same question arises again,
To change such a decision would destroy no rights acquired in
the past; it would only give bette I' protection in the future , The
I'tlaxim in such a case would be entitled to but very little weight.
:md mere regard for stabilit.y ought not to be allowed to prevent
a morc perfect admini stration of justice. But when a decision
relates to certain modes of doing bllsinei'ls, which business enters
lal'gely into the transactions of the people, and a change of decision must necessari ly in valioate everything done in the mode
pl'escl'ibed by the first, then, when a decision has once been made
and acted upon for an,Y considel'able length of time, the maxim
becomes imperative, and no court is at liberty to chunge,Jt
They are rules of property on which t he repose of tne countr y
depends; titles acquired under the pl'oceedings of courts of com ·
petent jurisdiction mu st be deemed invi olable in collateral action
or none can kn Ow what i:, his own.·" From t hence, it is the
sacred duty of a court to adhere to s uch decisions on property
unless there are the most convincing and overwhelm ing reasons
for overruling them.3c That judge who, from petty vanity, a nd
fo r the sake of s howing himself more wise and learned than his
predecessors. would overturn a rule ,.... hich f or years had settled
t he rights of property s hould be regarded as t he com m Oll enemy
of mankind, and l unworthy of the high trust that had been con·
fided to him ,31 There would be no reliance wher e precedents
would be nothing more than a precarious temporary security."
C, Limit«tiOllS of the /Joct1'ill€
The doctrin e of stare decisis is not altogether absolute
infl exible, In some instances it can be set aside. But even
;n s uch cases the s ubsequent judges do not pretend to make a
new law, but to vindicate the old olle from mi srepresentation.
For if it be found that the fOI'mer decision is manifestly abs urd
or unjust. it is declared, not that such a statement was a bad la w,
but tha t what is not reason is not law. In that case, the interpretation becomes the spi rit of the old 18\\,.1" In order th at Ii.
court is justified in di sr egal'ding a conditi onally author,i tative
(\1'
... Sutherland, St.at.uto l·Y Co nstl'uction , 2nd ~:(l.. VII!. 2, 1111. 102·3.
~ Grignon 's LeSSL't' v. Astor, 2 Howal·d ~ -I 3.
~ Lindsay v. Li ndsny, ..\7 I ndiana 286.
WE' lch v, Sullivun, 8 Cal. J88.
A Hibu V. COlll'US, 81 C:II. 402 .
.. Blackstone, Laws of Enitlund, -Ilh Ed iti(!n , VoJ. 1, p. 1)2.
THE DOCTRINE OF STAR E DECISIS
pl'ecedent, two conditions must be fulfilled, In the first place.
the decision must be a wmng decision, that is, contrary to law.
when there is already in existence an established rille of law on
the point in question, and the decision fails to conform to ·it. In
the second place, the decision must be a wrong decision, that is,
wrong being contrary to reason. When there is no settled law
to declare and follow, the courts may make law fOl' the occasion,
and in so doing, it is their duty to follow reason, and so far
as they fail to do 80, their decisions are wr ong, and the principles involved in them are defective authority. Unreasonable ness
ia one of the vice:; of a precedent no less than of a custom and
of certain fOI'ms of subordinate legislation, H
Authori ties agree that there are indeed good r easo ns why
the doctrine of stare decisis should not be so rigidly applied t:o
the constitutional a!l to othel' laws, In cases of purely private
import, the chief desideratum is that the law I'emain certain,
and, therefore, where ;1 l'Ule nas been judicially decla l'ed and
private l'ights created thereunder, the courts will not, €.xcept
in the clear est case!) of e nol', depart from the doctri ne of star e
deci sis, 'Vhen, however, public interests are involved. and espe~
tially when the question is one of constitutional construction,
t he matter is otherwise," In the formel' case, mis takes may be
conected either by the higher COUlt 01' by legislation, while in
j'he latter case there ii' no method of cOl'I'ection available except
thyu the ovel'l'uling of a misUlken decision and judgment,' ~ in
aJl cases, a departure from constitutional interpretat,ions must
be with grave j'easong,'" However, ther e are two iP'ounds of
Justification in departing from even a single decision which has
become a general nile of propel'ty, namely; (a) the nece"sity
of preventing continued injustice; and (b) the necessity of vin~
dicating clear and obvious principles of law,·' And so, even if
a rule of property is established by a series of decisions, resulting, however, in a dangel'ouS precedent of monopoly, and in
effect setting aside a wholesome provision in the constitut ion
designed to i5uppress sLlch abuse of the rights of j)I'operty, the
rule thus established, may properly be abrogated, by ovelTulillg
the decisions under which it gl'ew LIP to so dangerous , and over..
"
"
"
"
Salmond, Jm'ispl'ud encc, 7th Edition, pp, lfl3-1!l-l,
WillOughby, Constitutional La w, p, 52,
,
l'Iiatth('ws, The Amel'ican Cons titutional System , p, 15~.
Black, Constitutional L aw , p, 81, 3rd Edition,
l. ion v, Burtis!!, 20 J ohns 487,
PHI LIP PINE: LAW JO URNAL
whelming an influence in contravention of public policy,'" ~o
also, any error may be co n ected when no substantial in jUl1' is
to be expected! from the change, or when the evi ls of adherence
are manifestly gre,ater than those of departm'e, 1n this case,
the consideration is the e \'entual result-s,'"
Anot her limitation should nlso be born in mind, The doctrine of star e decisis, is only applicable, in its full force, within
the tenilol'ial jurisdiction of the courts making the decision.
:-ince t he re alone can such dec isions be "egarded as having esrabiished any rules. Rulings made llllder a similar legal systE>m
t'lsewhere may be cited and r especter! fa ,' their reasons. but al'e
not necessarily to be accepted as guides . except in so far as those
reasons commend themseh-es to the judicial mind . Great Bri·
tain an d the thir teen sta tes had each substantially the sa me syste m of comnwll Jaw origi nally. and a decision now by Olle of the
". ighe r courts of Grea t Britain as to wh at the common law is
upon every point is cel'taitlly entiUed to great \'es pecl in any
of the states, though not necessal'i ly to be accepted m; hinding
fluthori ty any more than the deci~ion in anyone of the other
states upon the same poin ty
H,
C/'itici,~n1-';
on Ihe J)fJcll'ine
Some of the ob,jections put forth by cl'itics against the applicati on of the doctrine of ~t<\re decisis are:
Firstly, case law is law made by judges and not b}' the people. It shou1d be noticed, however . t.hat in all constitutions of
all modern states, provisions exist. ass uring t.he impartiality ann
integl"ity of t he judges on pain of removal. The judge must
con sider the requirements of fai r dealing, even at the expense
of popul ar disapproval. Altho the fact remains that case Ja\\"
is the product of judges and not by the people, yet it is not so
much a defect but a characteristic of it.~·
Secondly. case law cannot refOl'm t he law by abolition of
unwanted ,·u les. It can on ly add an increasing number of ex·
cept!ons to ex iE;ting r ules, thus increasing the com pl e..xity of a
lega l system,
Thirdly. as Bentham objected, case law is "dog law" ill that
t he infringer of rule only becomes consciolls of his errOl" aftel'
.. San Fl"anc.isco \'. S. V. W, W, 48, Cal. 509,
"' Well!;. The Doc~dne of R ell Adjudicata &- Stal"(" D~t·i~i.~ , p, 576.
"Cooley, Constitutio nal Limitations, 7th Ed" II. 85,
" K eelon. Elem, Principles of J ul"ispl"udenet!, Jlp. 68-69.
T H E DOCTRINE OF STARE DECI S IS
the infringement has t a.ken place. and so, in some cases at least
he would enjo~' no (lpporlllnity whatever of avoiding wrong ,
doing, ,~
Lastly, it s hould be noticed that not everything contained
in a judicial decision is in strictne!:s a binding ~ource of law, but
only so much as is necessary for the formation of a decision by
t he judge upon the facts before hm . ~'o
COtll't~ h!\ve been restive under the angry criticism to which
lhey have been s lIbjeded and' have J'eacted in one of th r ee ways :
either by defiantly maintaint ing stare decis is, by painfully I'a~
tionalizing it, or by boldly rejecting it. It often happens, furth~
er, that the defiant maintenance and bold reject ion al'e both
merely SC I'ee lli' behind which COL1rts in fact <1'0 the opposite of
what they decla re, ~!
HI. STATUS OF T HE DOCTRINE OF STA Rt: DECISIS IN
VAR IOUS JU RISDICTION
A. RO llHtn J uri.'{J)/-ude1IcI'
Tn the Roman sy:;tem, precedents most cel·tain ly were not
binding until the t ime of Augustus , but the righlusually known
:IS j11.,) l'eR p011(le1urf. confcned upon certai n eminent jl11'jsts.
seems to have made the precedents embodying their replieR bindillg. Justi ni a n h imself expressly forbade any "inter pretation"
or hi s legislation , judicial 01' otherwise, and altho this I'egu l a ~
Hon proved im possible in practice, precedents wer e never regard~
t:d as binding und'e r the Jater Empire. :'~
B. SOI/lf'l Conl,i, /(, jIf,,", hlri.slJ1'IU/(,IICC
I n Ger ma ny. during the l\ liddle Ages, there was con1'ider·
.. ble de\'e!opment of ca1'C law, but t.his :"ouree. in more recent
times; ha R been allowed 10 fall largely out of usc. Tn Fnlllce,
judicin) decisi on>, al'e not regarded a!> binding; t he Civil Code
express ly forbids the use of pl'ecedents , the idea in thi" case
being obviou!ily the l'i ame a.'i Justinian's-thl.\t the code s hould
be the sole authori tative source of )aw :'~ The codes of P r ussia
<lnd AnstI'ia expl'esi<ly pruvide that judgment shall not have t he
fc; r ce of law. Altho the codes of Ital~' and Belgium are si lent
" Ibid .. p. 69 .
.. Ibid., p. 69.
"lax Radin, California Law Review, Feb, 1933,
.. Keeton, Elem. Prin. of Jurispruden<:e. p. 66.
Ibi!., p, 66,
PHILIPPINE LAW JO U RNA L
on the point. their tendency is that pl'eviolis decis ions are in~
:;iructive but not allthorit"ltive. "
Spain does not seem to adhere to stare decisis. Before
J312, the function of the jud ic iHl'Y was to apply the plai n words
llf t he law to cases pl'esented before them,
The judges \Ve r'e
fC01'bidden to, give opinions and in case.'; of doubtful nature they
were to consu lt the king who will settle t he matte r once for all.$S
But by the enactment of the Constitution of 1812, the Spanish
courts were reo rgan ized and t he Supreme Cou r t was given the
power to review by means of the "l'ecli l'so de l1ulidad" a ll
ca ses, civi l and c riminal. decided by infer ior courts. But this
practice wa:. abolished hy t he Ro.val Decree of J une 23. 1778,
Later, the practice of re\'iew W H S aga in revived by t he "Enjuit'lamiento Mc.I'cantil" wh ich required the mel'ca ntil tribunals to
lllsel't in their decisions the ground:! whether of law 01' fac t upon
which their detel'min ations were based . Th is pract,ice was fol.
lowed by the other court~ of the kingdom by vir t ue of the Royal
Decr ee of November 4, 1838. Then came the "Ley de Enjuicia.
miento" of 1856 which provided among other things that all deci ·
l'\ i on~ handed down by all court s s hall distinctly state the grounds
upon which t.hey are based. and t hat all such decisions mU f:.t be
published in t.he " Gazeta de IH adl'id" . III spite of this legal prO\'i~ion the judges contin ued t.o decide cases according to the peculiarities and ci rcumstances without turning back to what had
been (lecided before: lawyers did l not til1d read y and practical
help fr om what were published in t he gazette and for that rea·
son the de\'elopment of the law of precedent \\'a~ retarded,
This historical account point s pla inly to the fa ct that nO
J'orcc was given to pl'e\'iotl" decisions as gui d ing precedents in
Spain. And this is best proved by c iting Al1.icle 6 of lhe
Spanish Civil Code which m'l kes n o mention of judicial decisions
;):< one of the sou rces of law and therefore t he con trolling facto]'
III the di sposition of a case,
This omission prompted the learned
commentator, Sa nchez Roman t o co mment that "thel'e ill :'111 appa rent lack of logic in the draft ing" of t ht! Spa nish Civil Code. ~~
Thi s is to be expected becau~e Spanish jlll'ispl'uclence is based
upon the Civil La w of Rome which disr egards previous deci ·
;: iolls COl' present adjud ications.
~. Holland, Ju risprudence, pp. 68-69.
·· Ordenan7.8 de Alcala, Book I, Title 28 .
... Sanchez R oman, Treatise on the Civil Code, Vol. 2, ' p. c7~,
TtlF. DOCTR I NE OF STARE DECIS IS
C, E110lish htri.'{l)1'{ule-nce
The hi story of the Common Law reven[s that in enriy times
the pl'acticE' of deciding ca,o:es by precedents was unknown to
the English judges, Later, howeyel', fo r r easons of convenience
and expediency, they allowed litigant!:; to cite c.a:;es in court to
l1upport theil' l'espcctive claims, This pl'actice began during the
reign of Edward I altho the decisions were :;tated by Lord Hale
to be "less than law, though greater evidence ther eof than the
opinion of any private person." W Bracton'8 use of cases is by
Way of illustration merely; the Yearbooks collect togethel' cases
(01' reference and study because they wel'e .intel'esting.
By the
seventeenth century, anel at the time of Coke, precedents have
become fu lJ y binding. The era of Lord Mansfield with hi s spe·
cially tmined juries may be said to mark the Gold~n Age of
English Case Law. At this per iod, pl'ece(l ent is indubitably the
most importaut ~OUl'ce of English law, At the present time,
precedents are aR fu!),\' binding as at any period in their history. but their importance aR a source of law has been consider·
ably diminished! thru the enormous increase of legislation, ~~
Bu t while this iR truc, courts r emain tied to t he rule of precedents.
D. Ame1'iculI Jurispl'udence.
The policy of the ear ly American cOllrts with r egard to
previous decision was the same as t.hat of the Bl'itish courts at.
that time andl was followcd without qualification fo r -y ea r s ann
:vea rs du ri ng the English sovereignty over the American colonies, However, the declarati on of in dependence of the colonies
marked a completely new era in American jurisprudence, Since
t hen, thel'c .o,;eem to be a tendency in American courts to deviate
from the "iew;.: of Briti sh courts and had relaxed the doctrine
of stare deci sis. On t his point, Chief Justice Marshall sa id:
'; The inter pretation of British statutes adopted in the States
are not with absolute authority , lf the British courts vary
thei r constl'uctiol1 of a statute which is common to both coun·
tries, we do not hold ourselves bound to flu ctuate with lhem." ;,~
Deci sions of the United Sbltes Supreme Court as to ques·
tions which al'e federal in natur e are bindillg upon all co urts in
the United States, wllethel' Jedel'al or state COUl'ts., But in
cases not aris.ing fr om the construction of the constitution, laws,
" Holland, Jurisprudence, p. 69 .
•• Keeton, EJem. Prin. of J urisprud£'nce, Pr>o G6·67,
,. CBtheal1. V. Robin ~on, 5 P et . 280.
416
PH/L1PPI:-':E LAW JuURNAL
.tne! treat.ie,. of the tederal government, the decis ion .., of till'
Sup,-eme Court of the L-nited State~ fire not bindi ng upon the
supl'('me courtR qf the :<everaJ States of the Union as precedcnts,"" The l'ule in courts of coordinate jurisdiction consti
lutint-! IJtlt it i'.ingle Ry:< tcm ji'. !h:it a decision in one sha\! be can
lroiling in the other, until l'eyer:<ed b.\' the appellate court. I
Without the aiel nf th l~ federal constitution <ind the iegi!51atioll
of ('ungl'cs!':, n?gl1l<iting the interstate eHed (,I' lJublic acts, ,'ecor ds. I'l.nd ,1udicial proceedinJ,t;;, the judgment' and decrees of
each Stille would be regarded a" for eign judgments in the COUl't::;
of e"pr.\' other :;tale and their effect would have to bf' determined by the pl·inciples of international la\\-. by lhe preponder'Ulc€' of judicial npinions, a l' by :-such other cOIl15ider:.lt.iOll a !; al'e
infiuenl hll in fixin g the s tatui'. of judicial rccor ds brought from
foreign land:-. ·J But decision:,; of Slate ,:upreme COlll't:; are
bindin g lIjlOll inferior courts of t he sa me State.'"
IV, STAr:!!: DECISIS !~ P HIl.!I' PI:o.JE ,rURI~/,RllOENCE
A. Lf'~J,d S!II tl',o of the Ph ililmiul!.,<
_\ ... wa':! "<tOlLed by J u.:; tite ~ralC'olm: There is in the Philippine lsland:-; a unique legal :'i.\':-tem, ill which the two great
:-:,treams of the law t he civil . the legacy of Rome to Spain, com ilJg from the West. and the common, the inheritance of lhe
Cnited Slate" from Great Britain, applied by American written la\\'.~. coming' fl'om the Ea:-:I have met and b lended_'"
Our civil I;{\\' i!'l mo:<tl...- of ~pani~h ol'igin: QlIt' pl'ocedllral
la\\,:-; aI'€' altogether American, I n the interpl'etati on of the:.:c
la\\-s we re;;;urt to theil' :>ulI l'ce (d Origill and adopt ~i lllilar i[ not
ab.'O(lhltel.\' identical construction . For it i:'1 n general rule thnt
whel e :.! Sta te adopt,. a "tatulr d a nothe r State:; , it adopt .. ;11:::0
the cunsu'uction placed nil l!l:tt ::latute by the ClJlll'i ,;; of the
Slates, be('<:llse it is r cgnnled a~ 11 conc1l1:; i\-e pl't''''t1mption thaT
the legi.:;iatllr€. in pa"Rin~ the act, knew what con.';tl'llCtion had
Itt'ell placed UlJon it by the court,.; of the State whf't1ce it \Va."
horrowed:' 'l'hu~, OUl' ('mllt~ al'~ hound by the !'uling..; of the
StlJH'eme COUl't o f the Ullited State:; in C(Ill!'ll'uing and applying
:-;tatut.Ol-Y ellnct.mell t$ m()delled upon ur l;ol'l'uwed from Engli sh
,., B e!ehl~I' ". ChamiKol's :,;j Cal. 1;;15 .
• ~1I:i\hllT8y " . G(H'I'cy lOG Fet!' 11.
... Tay/oJ' v, B>l l'l'"n, li4 A!!l{'Ylcan DcCil'IOll:;; 28L
"" Wi ggin!! Pen's C .... '-. Chic:n((, Rd. ('0" ] J Fer!. :UH .
.. Guml)o ll , E k'ml,nt:u'y Law, II. :l2. citing .Justice i\Iuk ... lm.
'" Berni" v. n .ehe,·, I l{un~os, 2018,
THE DOCTlHNE: OF S T .\HJ.; DEnS1S
117
an d American or iginal:;.' " That a doctrine establit;hed b)' Amerif'an .Jurisprudence, not cont\'adicted b~.. Spani~h J lIl'i:<,pruc\el\c~,
will be accepted h,v the Sup reme Cuu!'C"" And abo, in the ah·
:::~ n ce of local la\\', the deei~iotl 01' the S upreme Cou r t of the
l 'nited States based upon general principle" of commercial IttW
il.re binding upon the Supr eme Court of the Philippine Tsht nd s,'"
Wit h thi s state. of ou r legal ;.;y!'lem where two di ffe rent
jul'is pl'udence al'e equall y cont]'olling, it i ~ difficult to make a
general conclusion as t(1 w hat is the !'>tatll,:: of the doctrine of
£,tal'e decis i ::; in OUI' iUl'i::;dictlOn. Before ventul'ing fo!' an anS\\'e ]', it will be advisable to ]'e\-]ew the few cases on sta]'C rle_
!'isis decided by OUI' ;.;upl'eme CC!II't. Afte)' that. th p reade)'
,;ha ll , I hope, have 1'1. better ;md more plHlI,;ihle ]'cve!ation than
min e, a s to the attitude u1 ou r Supreme Court with respect to
the doetl'ine now under CO!lsid('ration,
B.
( a)
S()11/1'
f{ IU'1U:r(! ,
Philippi., f' C".<;c Oil Stal'e Decisis
Stll',,1 & Cn . t', lllli/J/m (',,/l eel m' of ('IIHtIlO/lo.; _
12 Phil. J7,-T he pl a intiff,; imported cel'hlin cotton gnocj:.: in
these Isla nd",; in 1906 upon which the Co\lcctOl' of Customs imposed a dll ty of 18 "i- pel' ki lo accol'ding to Article 11 7 of the
;.a l'iff laws, pIll ::' <. SlIl'ta x of 30'r, The plaintiff cOlltendecl
that the sm'tax could not be legally imposed upon hi~ goodi'i bee,llse thai part of Article 117 pro\-jcling for all additional surtax , ]'efers to texti!e~ stamped, pr;nted, 01' manufactu rcd with
d,ved yam a nd not to textilf'S wh ich al'e plain and wilhout
nj[U)' es,
Th e defendant. 011 the othcThand contende(1 thnt the
contr al'Y interpretation was followed sine!! :\o\'. 12, ]901 and
l ilerefol'e ought not to be dep~\lle ~ fl'C'm , Thc cc ntention flf thf'
plnintiff did not prosper in th e Court of First Instance and sO
he appealed but the Supreme COllrt HLl~tained the vic\\' of th e·
;uwer, sayi ng: "It i::; a I'lile es-tablished in the interpl'etation
(If' Custom laws that when:' the re ha:- been a long acquie.5CellCe ill
a regulation by which the right of part ie" 1'0]' yen I'" have he:>!1
riete l'm ined and <ldjusted, !"ur:h intel'pretatiml ~hoLlld be followed
in the a bsence of the mo ~t cogent nnd pCI'l'>ual'>ive !'CafHHl;;; to thl?
contrary. "
(b) J1ollf(l))O C, 1I/,'>1I/tl) (;(1/"/ .. l.! Phil. ,' .:i'4.-This ca"r
cHllcd fo r the construction of an Act of Congl'eils regardi ng till::
... Cuyugan v. Sant(ls, 34 Phil. WO,
• Aldez \'. Gay, 7 Phil. 268 .
... Bt'~' a ll, Loud on Co, v. Amel'icHn BUllk, 7 Phil. 255,
rHIL IPPI NF. LAW .JOURNAL
so·called "Manglares" in the Phi1ippine~. The Supreme Court
~ave t he following construction: "Under the uncel·tain 311d
somewhat unsatisfactory cond ition of the law, the custom had
grow n up of converting "Ma ngla"es" and nipa lands into fisheries which became a common feature of settlements a long the
coast and at the same time of the change of sovereignty constituted one of the most productive industries of the Islands, the
abrogation of which custom. would destroy vested rights and
cause a public disaster. 1n our opi nion it was the object of
Congress not to work such a result, but on the contrary, in furtherance of t he pUl'po ~es of the Treaty of Paris to recognize
l!nd safeguard such p"()pe ,'ty."
(c) McGilT 1' . H(J tJ~i(lol/. 30 Phil. 568.-This was a case
;n which the const itutionality of Act 1627 of the Ph ilippine legisl atul'e was jnvol\'ed. This Act was previouslr applied and
followed by the Supreme COUl't itself, but its illegality was
never raised before. The Supr eme Court disrega rding aU previous decis ioll l':' declared tbe Act to be unconstitutional because
it said, that t he question of' constitutionality was passed Hsub
silencio".
(d) In the M atf.c·r fit tll(' Involwd(l1"!1 hmo/veney of Rafael
/-'(')'/wndez, G. R. No . .'J8398.-The issue in this case is whether
or not the claims of 1he Philippin e Trllst Company and Smith.
Rell and Company, Ltd .. in its capacity a~ trustee of the propertie::: of t he San Ni co\:.li' iron Works, Ltd. , pl'esented in the Involuntary insolvency proecedings of Rafael Fernandez, should
be ci<lssifi(!d as OI'dilulI'Y or prefcn·ed. A resolution of the is!me in tUI'Il depends on an an~wel' to the question of whether or
1I 0t claim s not classified a" pn~fel'l'ed under the Insolvency Law,
gclin a specia l right of priority un de ,· t he Civil Code. Th is quesLion has all'end.\' been decided in a fOl'mer case. Involuntal'Y
In.solvency of Mariano Vehl ~("o & Co., 1930, XXIX O. G. 2868,
\vhei'e it wa~ held that the p,'eiel'entilli l'ight of the civil law
shou ld be trcatcd ag approximately equivalent to the lien of
the I llsol"ene~' Lnw :mel that the :>taf.utory pI'eferenccs furnished
bl.' the Civil C/Jdc were not dcstroyed by the Imiolvency Law.
I ~ spite of the decision in lhat Vela..;co ca)o;e, the Supreme Court
in the p"csent case disl'egal'Cied it, holding that claims not clas;.;ifierl as pl'eferred uncleI' the Insolvency Law cannot be thus
classified with the aid of the Civil Code and gain no special
right of priority under the In solvency Law which is exclusively
t'ontl'olling.
'rUE DOCTR INE OF' STARE DECl Sls
-'11\)
The Court stated fu r ther: "Is the Court with new membet'·
ship compelled to follow blindly the doctrine of the Velasco
case? The rule of stare decisis is entitled to respect. Stability in t he law, pl1rticularly in the business field, js desirable.
But .idolatrous reverence for precedent, simply as pJ'ecedent.
no longer ru les, More important t han anything else is that the
cou rt shoul d be right. And particularly is it not wise to su bOJ'dinate legal t'eaSOll to case law uno by so doing perpetuate
eITO I' when it is brought to mind that the views now expressed
conform in principle to the original and' that since the first de·
cision to t he contrary was set forth there has existed a respectable opinion of non-conformity in the Court. Tndeed, on at
least on one occasion has the court bt'oken away f rom t he l'C\-amped doctrine, while even in the last case.in point t he COU l't
was as evenly divided as it was possible to be andl still reach a
decision," (Pel' lVlalcolm, with J ustices Santos , Hull, Vickers,
Butte, nnd Diaz concurring, Justices Imperial, Villa-Real, alld
AVanceiia, dissented fl'om the dec ision),
V, CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION
The doctrine of stare decis is is the authority of judicini decisions as precedents in su bsequent litigations. To afford to
the citi ze n a sound administration of justice is the just.ification
of its existence, Ce l-tainly, stability , and symmetry in any system of jurisprudence al'e the necessary r esu lts of its application, But the r ule is not inflexible; it may be di sr egarded when
the evils of adherence a re manifestly greater than those of de"
partu re, Thus, d'e cisiolls on constitutional question are mor e
liable to changes than decisions on property rights.
Common taw countrie~ have venerated the doctrin e; civilluw
countr ies have shown disrespect fOJ' it, In Philippin e jurisprudence, t he status of the doctrine of stare decisis is uncertain .
Ou r Sup l'eme COLlrt had applied the doctr ine in th e paRt altho
recent cases ha ve been decided in the contnll'Y,
The writer suggests that om' hi gh tribunal set certain fixed
ldndmarks .in t heil' decisions, approaching correctness, though
not per fection, of com'Re f or the deter mination af.\ to when the
doctrine of stare decisis should appl y. A provision in t he constitution h; not necessary , But a cO ll sistellt and well · defined
attitude on the part of the court is indispensable,