PRESIDENTIAL CONDITIONAL AGENDA SETTING
IN THE FORMER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
By
George Tsebelis
and
Tatiana Rizova
UCLA
Version: April 2005
This paper was presented at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the European Consortium of Political Research.
1
PRESIDENTIAL CONDITIONAL AGENDA SETTING IN THE FORMER
COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
Abstract
Nine out of twenty-seven presidents in the former communist world have the power to amend
vetoed legislation. These presidential powers in the former Soviet Bloc have not been given
adequate attention in the comparative politics literature. We analyze veto procedures in the excommunist region (27 countries) and argue that amendatory veto power enhances presidential
powers in legislative decision-making. The findings are particularly important in light of the fact
that one of the goals of constitutional design in Eastern and Central Europe was to curtail rather
than boost presidential authority.
2
PRESIDENTIAL CONDITIONAL AGENDA SETTING IN THE FORMER
COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
Presidential veto powers have been studied both at the theoretical1 and at the empirical2
level. Several authors have also used veto powers to compare the influence of Presidents across
political systems.3 However, one significant procedural advantage has escaped scholarly
scrutiny: the ability to make positive suggestions to vetoed bills. This omission can be explained
by the fact that the most studied president (the one of the US) has no such powers. We argue that
the effects of this omission are serious. Even in the frequently studied Latin American
democracies, this omission generates significant misclassifications of the institutions of different
countries, as well as mistaken expectations about the policy impact of different Presidents
(Tsebelis and Alemán 2005). Similarly, the ability to make positive amendments to Congress
initiatives has not been studied in former Communist countries. Presidents in a third of these
countries, even in Latvia, where the President’s veto can be overridden by a simple
parliamentary majority, have the power to make amendatory “observations.” Presidential
observations are positive changes introduced in a particular bill after final passage by the
legislature. These new amendments are returned to the legislature for one final round. In most
countries, amendatory observations require a simple majority to be accepted, but in the case of
1
Thomas H. Hammond and Gary J. Miller, "The Core of the Constitution", American Political Science Review 81
(1987), 1155-74; Charles M. Cameron, Veto Bargaining (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Keith
Krehbiel, Pivotal Politics (Chicago: Chicago UP 1998)
2
Nolan McCarty and Keith T. Poole, “Veto Power and Legislation: An Empirical Analysis of Executive and
Legislative Bargaining from 1961 to 1986”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 11 (1995), 282-312.
Robert J. Spitzer, The Presidential Veto: Touchstone of the American Presidency, (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988).
3
Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral
Dynamics, (Cambridge University Press, 1992); Lee Kendall Metcalf, “Measuring Presidential Power”,
Comparative Political Studies 33(2000), 661-685. Timothy Frye, “A Politics of Institutional Choice: PostCommunist Presidencies”, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 30 No. 5, October 1997; James McGregor. “The
3
Kazakhstan, they are enacted automatically unless a qualified majority of both legislative
chambers votes to reject them. Our argument is that this understudied prerogative of Presidents is
a form of “conditional agenda setting power” 4 that is, it enables the President to introduce a last
proposal that can mitigate unwanted features of the parliamentary bill as long as it carries enough
support to prevent modification or rejection. If, however, the President makes a proposal
unacceptable to the legislature, the initiative reverts to the legislature and the power of
amendatory observations is eliminated.
Amendatory observations structure executive-legislative relations in ways notably
different from the archetypical block veto in place in the United States. The new literature on
East European political institutions has not paid any attention to this difference. In his study of
institutional choice in the ex-communist countries, Timothy Frye develops an index of
presidential powers, which includes 27 presidential powers.5 The index does not include
conditional agenda-setting power, which a third of the presidents in the former Soviet Bloc hold.
In a study of constitutions and economic reform, Joel Hellman develops an index based on work
by McGregor (1994)6 and Lucky (1993-1994).7 Hellman’s index does not include conditional
agenda-setting powers of the presidents either, while McGregor’s index excludes the former
Soviet countries. The correlation between our index and Frye’s is 0.52 (based on 19 cases). The
correlation between our index and Hellman’s is 0.64 (based on 19 cases). The correlation
Presidency in East Central Europe. RFE/RL Research Report, 3(2) (1994): 23-31; Christian Lucky. “Tables of
Presidential Power” East European Constitutional Review, Fall 1993 2(4), 3(1): 81-94.
4
George Tsebelis, “The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda-Setter”, American Political
Science Review 88 (1994), 128-42.
5
Timothy Frye, “A Politics of Institutional Choice: Post-Communist Presidencies”, Comparative Political Studies,
Vol. 30 No. 5, October 1997: 548 See Appendix B for a list of presidential powers included in the index. The index
includes appointment powers, decree powers, and emergency powers but it excludes ceremonial powers.
6
James McGregor. “The Presidency in East Central Europe. RFE/RL Research Report, 3(2) (1994): 23-31. This
index is based on presidential ceremonial powers, appointment powers, and political powers.
4
between our index and McGregor’s is -0.18 (based on 10 cases).8 These three indices have been
used by scholars to study changes in presidential powers and the political economy of
constitutional change, yet all three of them disregard an important presidential prerogative in the
region.
This is not a matter of adding one more piece of information (no matter how important)
to already existing indexes. Our approach is based on a very different philosophy: instead of
adding heterogeneous pieces of information (like whether the President can appoint the
government, or ambassadors, or judges, call referendums or elections, participate in government
meetings, etc. we focus on legislative production, and find out how important is the Presidential
contribution to policies. We do that by focusing on the institutional details of the interaction
between Presidents and Legislatures. The result is on the one hand low correlations with existing
indexes, and on the other, specific meaning of the index we produce: and institutional measure of
the importance of Presidents in the production of new policies.9
The paper is organized in three sections. First, we follow Tsebelis and Alemán (2005)
and compare the typical block veto with the power to make amendatory observations in a
stylized way. Second, we analyze veto rules in 27 former communist countries. This results into
an index of Presidential powers on ordinary legislation that is significantly different from
7
Christian Lucky. “Tables of Presidential Power” East European Constitutional Review, Fall 1993 2(4), 3(1): 81-94.
This scale is similar to Frye’s but it does not include the powers of the prime minister if there is no president, and
offers a different weighting of the powers.
8
The biggest discrepancies between our classification on the one hand, and Hellman’s and Frye’s on the other, are
in the cases of Poland, Romania, and Latvia. Poland and Romania both receive high scores on Frye’s and Hellman’s
scale and low scores in our scale. Latvia, on the other hand, receives a high score on our scale and a low score on
Frye’s and Hellman’s. The reason for these differences is the fact that the Polish President can convene cabinet
meetings, appoint judges, and call referendums, none of which are part of our index. The Romanian President can
address the parliament with messages and appoint public servants. The Latvian President does not have any of the
appointment powers the Polish and the Romanian Presidents do. Thus, Latvia typically scores low on the
conventional scales of presidential powers.
9
Tsebelis (2002) has argued that besides the institutional there are positional components in agenda setting, and
agenda setters become more powerful the less veto players there are, and the more centrally located they are among
them. We are not dealing with these issues here.
5
previous studies for two reasons. First, because we focus on the specific procedures used for the
adoption of ordinary legislation as opposed to all policymaking decisions. Second, because we
include the rules revolving around presidential conditional agenda setting (whether a simple or
qualified majority is needed to sustain or overturn it, and whether the default alternative is the
entire bill, the status quo, or the bill without the parts objected to by the President). The final
section presents empirical cases to show how the theoretical analysis of the first two sections is
corroborated by the legislative experience of former communist countries.
1. Veto versus Amendatory Observations
Tsebelis and Alemán compare the effects of block veto with amendatory observations
and come to the conclusion that the second empowers Presidents much more than the first. We
will follow their analysis with examples from ex-communist countries. Let us study the effects of
two typical cases: The first will be a presidential block veto (also called “package” or “absolute”
veto), and the second the power to make amendatory observations that require simple or
qualified majorities to be overturned. Archetypical countries for these procedures would be the
Czech Republic and Hungary (or the United States) on the one hand, and Belarus and Ukraine on
the other. This section will provide the theoretical reasons for the classification of former
communist countries in groups with different institutional characteristics which will be the basis
of our index of Presidential powers presented in the next section.
1.1 Block Veto
Under the familiar block veto the legislature makes a legislative proposal to the President,
who then has the right to reject it. If the proposal is vetoed, the legislature can override the
6
President if a qualified majority Q (e.g., 3/5 in the case of Poland) votes to insist on the original
bill. What does this power enable the President to do?
[Figure 1, about here]
Figure 1 provides a visual answer to this question. The figure shows the status quo (SQ),
and the set of alternatives that defeat the status quo by a majority (the winset of the status quo
W(SQ)). In addition we present the set of alternatives that can defeat the status quo by a qualified
majority Q (the qualified majority of the status quo Q(SQ)). While the winset of the status quo
exists almost always, there is no guarantee that the qualified majority winset of the status quo
will not be empty. Indeed, there may not be alternatives that command a qualified majority of
votes in their favor against the status quo.
If Congress proposes a bill in the set (W(SQ) - Q(SQ)), the President can veto it, and the
veto will be sustained, because there are not enough votes to override it. If, on the other hand,
Congress proposes an outcome inside Q(SQ), the presidential veto (if exercised) cannot be
sustained. If the set Q(SQ) is empty, then the President can successfully veto any Congressional
initiative. This would be the case in a country where the President has the solid support of
enough legislators to prevent any override attempt (e.g., at least 2/5 in Poland). In conclusion,
presidential block veto can restrict legislative outcomes inside the Q(SQ) area. However, the
President cannot select the point that he would prefer among the Q(SQ) points – the set of
alternatives that a qualified majority prefers over the status quo. For example in Figure 1 the
President (P) cannot avoid outcome X (despite the fact that he prefers SQ over it), regardless of
whether he vetoes the bill or not. Congress preserves the role of sole proponent of legislation,
and the President’s action is purely negative.
7
1.2 The Power of Amendatory Observations
Let us now assume that the President can introduce amendatory observations (that is add
or delete anything from the bill proposed by the legislature), and this revised version of the bill
stands unless overridden by a qualified majority. This situation is significantly different from the
veto power analyzed before, at least in two respects. First, the set from which the President can
select his modified proposal may be wider than W(SQ), and second, the President can select
from among all the available points the one he prefers the most.
[Figure 2, about here]
Figure 2 helps us visualize the situation. The legislature proposes bill B that is located
within the winset of the status quo W(SQ). This bill can be defeated by a set of points that belong
to the winset of B (W(B)). However, the President does not need select among these points. He
merely needs to select from among the wider set of points NQ(B), the alternatives that cannot be
overridden by the parliamentary bill B. Indeed, if the required majority for an override is 3/5, the
President needs the support of only 2/5 of the members of the legislature to have his proposal
prevail. So, the President can select from among the points in NQ(B) the one that he prefers the
most (point Y in Figure 2). This procedure is not an imaginary institutional setting used for
expositional purposes; it is the set of decisionmaking rules in Georgia (with 3/5 override) and
Ukraine and Kazakhstan (with a 2/3 override). In these two countries after the override deadline
is over the amendatory observations introduced by the President are automatically enacted into
law.
But even when institutions do not require a qualified but a simple majority for
amendatory observation to be overridden, and even if the implicit comparison is not only with B
but also with the status quo SQ (as is the case in Latvia) the President can still make significant
8
improvements. In this case, the President would be able to propose a point Y’ in the intersection
of the winsets of B and SQ (W(B)∩W(SQ)). If the override were a qualified majority and the
new version had to beat the status quo, the President could still make an improvement by
returning proposal Y’’ in the intersection of W(SQ) and NQ(B). Amendatory observations
continue to be a useful Presidential tool even when they have to beat the parliamentary proposal
and the default alternative by a simple majority, an advantage generally unnoticed in the
literature on Latin American political institutions.
Presidents are advantaged by their ability to introduce amendatory observations even
when there is complete information about the actors’ preferences. Under complete information,
the legislature will anticipate these outcomes and, as long as they beat SQ, and incorporate the
related changes in the original bill, thereby preventing a veto. Under incomplete information that
is, if the legislature makes any other proposal, the President will introduce his/her observations
and they will be accepted, unless because of incomplete information on his part he chooses
outcomes that are outside NQ(B) or the intersections W(B)∩W(SQ) or NQ(B)∩W(SQ) – the
different feasible sets according to the rules. In comparison to Figure 1, we can see the difference
that amendatory observations make. In the first case a President with the classic bloc veto
restricts outcomes within Q(SQ); in the second, the President selects a most preferred outcome
out of a variety of options. Which outcome is selected depends on override thresholds; who
makes the winning proposal depends on whether there is complete or incomplete information.
However, no matter what the rules are and no matter whether there is complete or incomplete
information the power to make amendatory observations gives the President more discretion than
the block veto (and qualified majority override).
9
Consequently, there are two major differences between the better-studied block veto that
can be overridden by qualified majority and the amendatory veto that can be overridden by the
same majority. In the first case, the President simply reduces the initiatives of the legislature
from W(SQ) to Q(SQ), while in the second, the President can take the initiative and propose a
modified bill that is better for the legislature to accept than to modify. Note that the second
power is more significant than the first. Because Q(SQ) ⊆ W(SQ) ⊆ NQ(SQ), a President with
the right to introduce amendatory observations not only can select, but has a larger area to select
from than under block veto, and this holds not only in the extreme case of the qualified majority
requirement, but also in the actual case of a simple majority. The fact that under complete
information the legislature will make a proposal to the President does not affect our argument:
the power to introduce amendatory observations to vetoed bills gives Presidents greater
discretion to shape legislative outcomes than the typical block veto. This institutional authority to
propose and have the proposal accepted under easier conditions than modified has been called
conditional agenda setting, because if the President goes too far in his proposal he will have his
observation overruled.10 This would be the case if the President (P) in Figure 2 proposed his own
ideal point.
The requirement of a qualified majority vote in order to overrule presidential
observations simply widens the set of alternatives that beat the original parliamentary bill. What
needs to be underlined is that even when a simple majority is the override threshold, the
President can still select from among a wide set of options (the winset of the Bill proposed to
him by the legislature, and the winset of the status quo). The advantage of a presidential veto
10
George Tsebelis, “The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda-Setter,” American Political
Science Review, 88:1 (1994): 128-142.
10
subject to majority override, which we emphasize, stands in contrast to the conventional wisdom
on veto powers.
The agenda setting power that we studied is “conditional” on the President’s ability to
make a winning counter-proposal after being unable to reach the associated outcome through
anticipated reactions.
2. Veto Procedures
This section surveys veto procedures in Eastern Europe and the successor countries of the
USSR. Rules regulating the executive veto are written in all post-communist countries’
constitutions and in many cases organic laws, legislative codes, common practice and
constitutional rulings have clarified some of the details of the steps involved. The process of data
collection is challenging for the following reasons. First, the constitutional documents of most
countries are quite vague on the issue of Presidential veto powers. It is not surprising that
conditional agenda-setting in the region has gone unnoticed and has not been studied to date.
Second, even legal experts in these countries are occasionally at a loss in interpreting the legal
texts. Third, there is a fundamental linguistic challenge in collecting the necessary data for this
project, for the democratic transitions erected a Tower of Babel of sorts. Given that Russian is no
longer the lingua franca in the region, we have had to deal with documents in numerous
languages, such as Belarusian, Russian, and Ukrainian in studying conditional agenda-setting in
the former Soviet Union.11 Our study sheds new light on the powers of Presidents in the former
Soviet Bloc, for we demonstrate that the powers of many Presidents have been underestimated
and misclassified. Our universe of cases is intrinsically interesting because we identify eight
11
cases of Presidents in parliamentary systems who have veto powers.12 Sometimes these veto
powers are purely formal: the President asks the Parliament to reconsider and his request can be
rejected by a simple majority as in the cases of Estonia and Hungary. This is similar to the right
of the President of the French V Republic (no book reports him as having the power to veto).
Sometimes, however, there is a slight constitutional tilt in favor of the president’s objection. A
higher majority is required to overrule him: either an absolute majority (of members) is required
as in the cases of Macedonia, Albania, and the Czech Republic, or a quorum requirement is
added as in the case of Poland. In all these cases, these requirements are equivalent to some
qualified majority of votes against the President’s action. We have classified the different
countries on the basis of how stringent these requirements are.
Veto rules in the former communist countries can be grouped in six different types.13 The
first group involves nine countries where the President only has block veto: Estonia, Hungary,
Moldova, Macedonia, Albania, the Czech Republic, Romania, Belarus, Poland, and Azerbaijan14.
Constitutions in these countries require only simple legislative majorities to override a
presidential veto. The Estonian President can return legislation for reconsideration in the
Parliament (unicameral). If the original bill receives one half of the parliamentary votes, the
President has to promulgate the law.15 In Hungary the President can return a law to the
11
In some cases, we had to compare different official translations of the documents to verify the accuracy of the
data.
12
Albania (art. 87 of the Albanian Constitution); Estonia (art. 79 of the Estonian Constitution); Hungary (art. 29B);
Macedonia (art. 67); Czech Republic (art. 58); Latvia (art. 35); Lithuania (art. 29A).
13
The Presidents of four of the twenty-seven countries under consideration do not have veto power. These are the
Presidents of Bosnia and Hercegovina (1995), Croatia (1990, 2004), Serbia and Montenegro (2002), and Slovenia
(1991, 1997). Note that all of these countries are former Yugoslav states. Two factors, which could explain the lack
of Presidential veto powers in these cases, are their experience with ethnic conflict and the involvement of
international institutions in the constitution drafting process.
14
We should note that most studies of post-communist political institutions focus on this group of countries. This
fact could be another explanation why Presidential conditional agenda-setting in the region has eluded scholarly
attention.
15
Unlike the Moldovan and Hungarian Presidents, the Estonian President can only propose constitutional
amendments. He cannot propose ordinary legislation.
12
Parliament (unicameral) within 15 days, or within 5 days if the Speaker of the Parliament
requests that the issue be accorded urgency. The President16 has to promulgate the law if one half
of the MPs17 (quorum=1/2 members) vote in favor of their previous decision. If the President
finds a matter unconstitutional, he can refer it to the Constitutional Court for consideration. In
Moldova the President can return laws for reconsideration by the Parliament (unicameral). If the
an organic law gathers one half of the votes of all members present in a given session on at least
two ballots (only one ballot for ordinary laws), then the President has to promulgate the law
within two weeks.18 In Macedonia the President can veto a bill, which can be overridden by one
half of all members of the Assembly (unicameral). In Albania the President can return a law to
the Assembly (unicameral) only once. If half of the Assembly members sustain their previous
decision, the President’s veto is overridden and the he has to promulgate it within 20 days. In the
Czech Republic the President has the right to return an adopted law, with the exception of a
constitutional law, within 15 days of its advancement. If one half of the members of the Chamber
of Deputies (lower chamber) vote against the rejected bill, the President has to promulgate the
law. In Romania the President can return a bill for reconsideration to the Parliament. If
Parliament (bicameral) sustains its previous decision with 1/2 of the legislative vote
(quorum=1/2 of members; 1/2 of the members for organic laws), the President has to promulgate
the law within 20 days.19 The Polish President also has block veto power. He can return
legislation for reconsideration with his objections. If the original bill is sustained by a 3/5 vote
(quorum=1/2 of the members) of the House of Representatives (lower chamber), the President
shall promulgate it within 7 days. The President can also refer a bill to the Constitutional Court
16
The Hungarian President does not have conditional agenda-setting power but he does have agenda-setting power,
per article 25 of the Hungarian Constitution (2003).
17
The rule is 2/3 of the votes (quorum=1/2 of members) for constitutional amendments.
18
The Moldovan President has agenda-setting power, just like the Hungarian President.
13
to adjudicate whether it is in line with the constitution.20 Belarus is one of our more interesting
cases since there has been a significant institutional change in Presidential veto powers. The
Belarusian President only had block veto according to the 1994 Constitution. The 1996
Constitution introduced a second legislative chamber, downsized the lower legislative chamber,
and gave the President conditional agenda-setting power. According to the first Belarusian
Constitution, the President could return legislation for reconsideration by the Supreme Soviet.
His veto could be overturned by 2/3 of the votes of the full legislative complement. The Azeri
President has to enact any returned law which has been supported by a 3/4 majority of the
legislature (unicameral) within 56 days. The stylized game implied by these rules appears as
diagram #1 in the appendix. The President (P) can accept the bill (B) or veto it (B), and then the
Legislature (L) can override or nothing is enacted (∅).
The second group is represented by Bulgaria, where the President has block and partial
veto as well as the ability to promulgate the non-objected parts of the bill. The veto has to be
exercised within 7 days of parliamentary passage. The override majority is 1/2 of all members of
the National Assembly (no deadline specified). The stylized game generated by these rules
appears in diagram # 2.
The third group is represented by Armenia and Georgia. The Armenian President can
return the bill with his proposals. If his proposals are accepted by 1/2 of the votes, the President
has to promulgate the bill within 21 days. If the proposals are not accepted, the parliamentary bill
has to be voted again and is considered adopted if it receives the support of 1/2 of the legislators
present in a given session. The Georgian President can exercise block veto and introduce
amendatory observations with the status quo as the default alternative. If the Parliament
19
20
The Romanian President does not have the right to propose legislation.
The Polish President is also an agenda-setter.
14
(unicameral) accepts the President’s amendments to the vetoed bill with a simple majority, the
President has to promulgate it within 7 days. If the Parliament rejects the President’s
amendments, the bill has to be voted again on the floor. If the Parliament sustains its previous
decision with a vote of 3/5 of the total number of deputies (organic laws) and with a vote of 2/3
of all MPs (ordinary laws), the President has to promulgate the parliamentary bill within 7 days.
These procedures are summarized in diagram # 3.
The fourth procedure is in place in Belarus (1996). The 1996 Belarusian Constitution
introduced both the power of amendatory observation and a second legislative chamber.21 The
President can veto the bill in its entirety or introduce amendatory observations within 5 days of
parliamentary passage. If the law is supported by the House of Representatives by a majority of
no less than 2/3 of the votes of the full complement, it is forwarded along with the President’s
objections, to the Senate within 5 days. The Senate must review it a second time within 20 days.
The law has to be approved by a majority of no less than 2/3 of the votes of the full complement
of the Senate. The two chambers also vote on the amendments submitted by the President.
Before the decisions of the two chambers are issued, the President signs the law and goes into
effect with the exception of those parts the President has objected to. This procedure is shown in
diagram # 4.
The fifth procedure is in place in Latvia, Lithuania, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and
Kazakhstan. Presidents in these countries have block veto and the power to introduce
amendatory observations, but unlike others, the presidential version of the bill becomes enacted
unless the legislature overrides by a qualified majority in the cases of the Central Asian countries
and simple majority in the cases of Latvia (unicameral) and Lithuania (unicameral). In the cases
21
One third of the members of the upper chamber are presidential appointees. Unless there are defectors among
these appointed members, a presidential amendatory observation cannot be rejected.
15
of Kyrgyzstan (bicameral) and Uzbekistan (bicameral), the Presidents amendments are accepted
unless 2/3 of the members of the full complement of both legislative chambers vote against them.
In the case of Kazakhstan (1995), the President’s amendments become enacted unless 2/3 of the
full complement in both chambers opposes the Presidential veto. This is highly significant in that
it gives the President the power to make a last legislative counter-proposal that can only by
overridden by a qualified majority in the legislature. This procedure is shown in diagram # 5 in
the appendix.
The sixth procedure is exemplified by the case of Ukraine. In this case, the President can
either sign the bill or veto it. If the veto is overridden with a 2/3 majority of all members of the
Parliament, the President has to promulgate the parliamentary bill. If the bill is not overridden,
then the President’s amendments have to be voted in the Parliament. They are considered
adopted if 1/2 of the members of parliament supports them. If the President’s amendments do not
garner the necessary votes, the law is returned for reconsideration to the Parliament. The
President can then exercise his veto power over and over again. The interesting twist in the case
of Ukraine is the fact that the vote on the President’s veto and the vote on his amendments are
sequential. This procedure is shown in diagram #6.
We have now presented the details of the veto procedures in place in 23 former
communist countries.22 How much can the President achieve under each institutional structure?
The results for each country are summarized in table 1. They reflect the interaction presented in
the game trees previously shown. The third column indicates whether the President has
conditional agenda setting power (i.e., the tight to introduce amendatory observations to vetoed
bills) and the last column specifies the outcome given our theoretical discussion and procedural
22
We have been unable to find sufficient data on the cases of Russia, Slovakia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan to
date.
16
survey. Countries are ordered according to the discretion granted to the President. Veto powers
in the former communist countries range from block veto to block veto with amendatory
observation. We have also ranked Presidential powers in ascending order according to the
override rule (simple or qualified majority and quorum rules).
[Table 1, about here]
In many former communist countries veto rules are accompanied by the rights to make
amendments, so they endow Presidents with much more than negative power. They provide them
with positive agenda power at a crucial stage in the lawmaking process. In the next section we
present the histories of three vetoes to illustrate the advantages and constraints fostered by the
different rules.
3. Veto Powers and Lawmaking
Our analysis has emphasized the powers of the President in the passage of ordinary
legislation. We specified the possible outcomes for each country given such powerful yet
unnoticed procedural weaponry. This section presents the histories of three legislative vetoes to
illustrate the actual interaction of executives and legislatures under different rules. The first story
comes from Belarus before the introduction of the President’s power of amendatory legislation
and the creation of an upper legislative chamber. It illustrates the limitations the Belarusian
President faced under the institutional procedures in the 1994 Constitution (diagram #1). The
second story comes from Latvia.23 It illustrates how the ability of the Latvian President to
propose alternatives to the parliamentary bill enhances her veto power (diagram #5). The third
case is that of Ukraine. The default alternative in this case is also the President’s proposal, but
23
The President of Latvia is indirectly elected by the Saeima.
17
this time the vote is sequential. The Parliament has to override the veto first and then vote on the
President’s proposals (diagram #6).
Belarus
The Law on General Voting (Referendum) of the Republic of Belarus
According to the 1994 Constitution of the Republic of Belarus, the President has the
power to veto a bill, which can be overridden by a majority of at least two thirds of the members
of the Supreme Soviet. Under this constitution, the President did not have the right to make
amendments to bills he had vetoed. The President of Belarus wielded his veto power on
numerous occasions.
In 1996 Alyaksandr Lukashenka24 vetoed amendments to the “Law on General Voting
(Referendum) of the Republic of Belarus.” The two proposals for amendment submitted by the
Committee on Statehood and Local Self-Government were approved by the Supreme Soviet but
attracted acute criticism on behalf of the President. The committee suggested that article 8 of the
law should be amended to allow observers to engage in any activity that does not violate laws
and civil order. The amendment also put the government in charge of providing citizens and the
mass media equal opportunity to engage in agitation activities in favor or against any issue put to
a referendum. Article 31.6 originally stipulated that if citizens are unable to cast a ballot in a
referendum, they will be provided a portable ballot box and be given the opportunity to vote
beyond the polling station. The amended version of the text prohibited the transportation of
ballot boxes but did allow the transportation of citizens to the polling station. The President
24
President Lukashenka is a non-partisan politician. He was initially elected as a member of parliament in 1990
from the Communists for Democracy party. In 1994 he was elected to his first term in office as President of the
Republic of Belarus.
18
vetoed the amendment of article 8 on the grounds that it did not specify a mechanism for
providing equal opportunity for agitation for or against a referendum issue.
In 1996, the Belarusian Supreme Soviet consisted of representatives of five major
political parties – Accord (24% of the legislative seats), the Agrarian Party (18%), the Belarusian
Communist Party (17%), Labor Union (7%), Civic Action (7%) and ten independents. President
Lukashenka traditionally received support by the representatives of Accord25, the Agrarian Party
(AP) and the Belarusian Communist Party (BCP), the main successor to the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union (KPSS) in Belarus. Thus, most of the time President Lukashenka commanded
the legislative support of nearly 3/5 of the Supreme Soviet.26
At first blush, the contention over these two articles in the law on general voting might
seem trivial. It is important, however, to view it in the larger political context of Belarus.
Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who has been occupying the office of President of Belarus since 1994,
has successfully circumvented the Supreme Soviet on many occasions by putting a law to the
vote in a referendum. Less than a month after the Supreme Soviet failed to muster the 2/3
majority it needed to override the President’s veto on “The Law on General Voting,” the
President put his proposed version for a new constitution to the vote in a referendum. The new
constitutional law significantly expanded the legislative and political powers of the President.
The constitution also mandated a significant reduction in the size of the lower legislative
chamber (from 260 to 110) and established an upper legislative chamber, one third of whose
members are presidential appointees. There has been a significant change in the Presidential veto
powers with the introduction of the new constitution. The President now has the power to delete
25
Accord is not a political party but merely an agglomeration of MPs who support President Lukashenka.
East European Legislative Monitor, October 1996, Vol. I no. 4, no. 5 and no. 6 The EELM is a publication of the
Constitutional and Legislative Policy Institute (currently known as the Justice Initiative of the Open Society
Institute).
26
19
text from a piece of legislation. Unless overridden by 2/3 of the members of both legislative
chambers, the bill is accepted without the deletions proposed by the President. This
constitutional change significantly enhances the legislative powers of the Belarusian President
(the reader can verify that in Table 1 Belarus moves from group 1 to group 4).
Latvia
The State Language Law
Our legislative story from Latvia is an example of case #5.27 According to article 71 of
the Latvian Constitution28 and “The Rules of Procedure” of the Saeima,29 the Latvian President
can return legislation to the Saeima for further deliberation. Unless the President herself proposes
amendments to the bill, other agents with the constitutional right to initiate legislation submit
legislative proposals for the amendment of the vetoed bill. These other agents are legislators, the
Prime Minister, cabinet members, and the parliamentary secretaries of the ministries.30 As of
January 14, 2005 the two democratically elected Latvian Presidents had exercised their right to
veto legislation 41 times since transition to democracy. President Guntis Ulmanis has vetoed
legislation 17 times, whereas Mrs. Vaira Vike-Freiberga has used the veto 24 times. The Saeima
did not take into account objections in two of Mr. Ulmanis’s vetoes and one of Mrs. VikeFreiberga’s vetoes.31
27
See table on Conditional Agenda Setting in Post-communist Countries.
The official English translation of the Latvian Constitution is available at the website of the Latvian Saeima
http://www.saeima.lv/Likumdosana_eng/likumdosana_satversme.html Last viewed on March 31, 2005. The
English translation of “Rules of Procedure” of the Saeima is also available on the Saeima website
http://www.saeima.lv/Likumdosana_eng/likumdosana_kart_rullis.html Last viewed on March 31, 2005.
29
The Latvian Saeima (Parliament) is a unicameral legislature with a membership of 100 legislators. All legislators
are elected for a four-year term by proportional representation.
30
Personal communication with Ms. Sandra Kukule, Legal Advisor to the President of Latvia, 01/14/2005.
31
Personal communication with Ms. Sandra Kukule, Legal Advisor to the Latvian President. January 14, 2005.
28
20
On July 14, 1999, less than a month after becoming the second post-communist Latvian
President-elect32, Vaira Vike-Freiberga vetoed the controversial State Language Law.33 The law
regulates the use of the Latvian language both in private life and state affairs and was originally
approved by the Latvian Saeima by a huge margin of 73 to 16. It is important to view this
important piece of legislation in the larger context of inter-ethnic relations in Latvia. As a
member-state of the Soviet Union, Latvia’s people were subjected to Soviet russification policies
between 1939 and 1989, which reduced the proportion of ethnic Latvians from 73% to 52 %.34
After Latvia seceded from the Soviet Union, the Latvian government initiated a latvianization
campaign. The most important manifestation of this campaign is the strict “State Language Law”
and the draft “Citizenship Law,” which were debated in the Saeima. Crowds of ethnic Russians
took to the streets of Riga, Latvia’s capital city, protesting against a language law that sought to
assimilate the country’s large Russian population.35
The President vetoed the bill noting problems and inconsistencies in it, and proposing the
following five amendments.36 First, per article 2 (2), the law regulates the use of the language in
disseminating information in the private sector, “only to the extent that this information is related
to legitimate public interest.” Second, per article 11 (2), public events organized by private
persons and organizations can be held in languages other than the state language. However, the
Cabinet of Ministers can adopt regulations to establish exceptions to this article. Third, per
32
In accordance with the Latvian Constitution, the Latvian President is elected by a majority vote of the Parliament.
President Vike-Freiberga was re-elected to serve a second term in 2003.
33
When she assumed the post of President, Mrs. Vike-Freiberga faced pressure from numerous international
organizations to refuse the promulgation of the State Language Law and propose amendments to it.
34
The data were taken from the extensive database of the U.S. English Foundation, a Washington, D.C. nongovernment organization which conducts language research worldwide. http://www.us-english.org/ Last viewed on
April 1, 2005.
35
Currently about 40% of the Latvian people speak Russian as their native language. In Steven C. Johnson, “ExSoviet Republics Rediscover Nearly Lost Languages”
http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/russia/stories/language.revival/ Viewed on April 1, 2005.
36
Huang, Mel. “A Hot Summer in Riga” Central Europe Review, Vol. 1, No. 5, July 26, 1999.
21
article 17, films intended for pre-school age children no longer have to be dubbed. They can be
shown with the original sound track, subtitled in Latvian. Fourth, per article 20, the Cabinet of
Ministers can permit the use of foreign languages in stamps, letterhead, and seals. Fifth, per
article 21, the Cabinet of Ministers can allow the use of foreign languages such as Russian,
German, English, etc. in providing information to the public by the state, the municipalities, and
other public institutions.37 The Saeima passed these amendments with 52 votes in favor and 26
votes against. The main opposition to the President’s objections came from the Fatherland and
Freedom Party38 (FPP or Tevzemei un Brivibai) – a party with a nationalist conservative agenda.
The FFP opposed any changes to the July 1999 version of the law. At the time, along with the
conservative People’s Party (Tautas partija) and the liberal union Latvia’s Way (“Latvijas celš”),
the FFP was one of the three coalition partners in the Latvian cabinet. Even though linguistic
experts had warned that the amendments “will result in the eventual displacement of the Latvian
language,”39 most parliamentarians went along with the amendments because they brought the
law into compliance with the standards of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, and the European Commission. In accordance with
article 8 (3) of the law, state employees should be able to speak Latvian only to the “extent
necessary for the performance of their professional duties.” The old version of the law required
that they be proficient in the language.
Two years after the promulgation of the State Language Law, in January 2002, President
Vike-Freiberga introduced amendments to the Election Law, which struck the requirement that a
“candidate running for the Saeima must possess the highest level of fluency in the state
37
The English translation of the “State Language Law” is available at http://www.usenglish.org/foundation/research/olp/viewLegislation.asp?CID=47&LID=65 Viewed April 1, 2005.
38
Constitutional Watch, East European Constitutional Review. Vol. 9, no. 1-2, Winter/Spring 2000. Available at
http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol9num_onehalf/constitutionwatch/latvia.html Last viewed on April 1, 2005.
22
language.”40 The amendments were supported by 70 parliamentarians and opposed to by 17
parliamentarians. As in the State Language Law debates, most of the opposition came from the
members of the Fatherland and Freedom Party, which had allied with the Latvian National
Independence Movement Union (LNNK) earlier. The chairman of the FFP-LNNK coalition
Maris Grinblats argued that “there are no legal or psychological preconditions for dropping the
requirement that deputies have a full command of the state language.” He said that the
amendments would weaken the position of the Latvian language, “while public servants,
students, and pupils would be sent a signal that they could stop learning the state language.”41
Ukraine
The Customs Code
According to the 1996 Constitution of Ukraine, the President has the power to propose or
veto legislation. A presidential veto can be overridden by a 2/3 majority of the full complement
of the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Assembly). In our classification, the Ukraine has the most
powerful presidency of the 23 post communist countries we discuss. Unlike some of the other
former Soviet republics, Ukraine has a unicameral legislature. Upon vetoing legislation, the
Ukrainian President can pursue three different avenues to influence the subsequent legislative
process. He can propose amendments to articles in the law he disagrees with, charge his
administration with this task, or delegate to a legislative committee. To our knowledge, the
Ukrainian President has exercised at least two of these three options to guide the course of
39
Ibid.
“Latvian Parliament Backs Amendments to Election Law” Transitions Online May 3, 2002. Transitions Online is
an electronic publication that provides comprehensive English-language coverage of all 28 former communist
countries. It is supported by the Open Society Institute (OSI) and the Media Development Loan Fund (MDLF).
Available for subscription at http://www.tol.cz/
41
“Proposed Amendments to Latvian Election Law Raise Objections” Transitions Online January 21, 2002.
40
23
legislation after vetoing it.42 If the veto is sustained, the bill returns to the Rada for further
deliberation. The President can exercise his right to veto the bill as many times as he wants to. If
the veto is not sustained, then the President’s amendments return to the Rada and are put to a last
vote on the floor. The Rada can vote each one of the proposals up or down.
Upon vetoing the Customs Code43 on March 4, 2002, the Ukrainian President made fortyseven remarks and proposals for changes to the code. His proposals concerned the authority of
the customs service and the application of the code, and included suggestions both for the
exclusion of articles from the code and changing the text of certain articles. The Ukrainian
President proposed the exclusion of chapters 46 and 48 from the code regulating the customs
duties, customs tariff of Ukraine, duty rates, their types and establishing procedure. He argued
for the exclusion of articles 235, 236, 245, chapter 56 and section XV of the code regulating the
taxation of imported and exported goods as well as the exclusion of chapter 36 which guides the
creation, functioning, and liquidation of special customs zones. The President proposed changing
the wording of article 1 of the code. Article 1 makes references to the Civil Code, which had not
come into force at the time. This observation concerns the procedure of trafficking goods, which
contain objects of intellectual property through the customs territory of Ukraine. President
Kuchma proposed the exclusion of articles 355, 356, 394, 395, 411, 416-419, 420-426 because
they relate to execution of operational investigation activity, inquests and pre-trial investigations.
Furthermore, the made proposals to change article 366 (terms for confiscating certain goods),
articles 367, 269, 370, 374, 377, 378, 384, 386-393 (types of penalties), and article 388 which
stipulates liabilities for transgressions not specified by the Code. Last but not least, the President
42
Sarah Birch has studied the legislative-executive interactions of the Ukrainian Election Law. The President
delegated his power to amend legislation to a legislative committee. Sarah Birch, Elections and Democratization in
Ukraine. London: Macmillan Press, 2000.
24
proposed changing articles 432, 434, 438, 439, 440, 441, 443, 444, 447, 450, 482-486. These
articles specify consideration of cases of infringement of customs rules and the procedure,
execution, and appeal of decisions. All of the President’s proposals were accepted by the Rada.44
Just like President Lukashenka, President Kuchma was initially elected as a
parliamentary representative running under the label of the Inter-Regional Bloc.45 The
Verkhovna Rada is home to many political parties. Ukraine’s political parties are grouped quite
nicely in ideological clusters on the L-R dimension. In 1998 four left parties were able to win
seats to the Rada and took control of 38% of the seats. The biggest left party is that of the
Communists who occupied 27% of the parliamentary seats. The center of the L-R spectrum was
occupied by ten smaller parties. Four of these parties number anywhere between 17 and 29
deputies, and six of them are much smaller, numbering between one and eight deputies. The
centrist parties hold approximately 23% of the legislative seats. The right parties collectively
control approximately 13% of the seats. At the time the Rada had 116 independents. With the
presence of a plethora of political parties in the Ukrainian parliament, the President has many
opportunities to forge alliances, which can help him get his legislative proposals passed.46 In the
case of the customs code, all presidential legislative proposals were accepted and were
incorporated into the new law.
4. Conclusion
43
“Mitnii Kodeks Ukraini” (Ukraine Customs Code) Full document in Ukrainian is available at
http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=92%2D15 Last viewed April 6, 2005.
44
“Parliament Weekly” #9, Publication of the Ukrainian Legislative Database, available at
http://www.welcometo.kiev.ua/pls/ili/docs/PARLIAMENTS_WEEKLY/BULLETIN%209.HTML Last viewed
April 6, 2005. Parliament Weekly is a legislative summary prepared by the independent Institute of Legal
Information.
45
The Inter-regional Bloc was an electoral coalition of centrist parties. Kuchma and several other parliamentary
candidates used the party as a personal electoral machine in the 1994 parliamentary elections. The bloc had
disappeared by the legislative elections of 1998.
46
Birch, Sarah. Elections and Democratization in Ukraine. London: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 2000.
25
This paper has examined the diverse veto procedures employed in the former communist
countries. The analysis shows that differences in institutional detail matter and emphasizes the
advantages of presidential amendatory observations. This procedure is the institutional basis of
presidential agenda setting powers and has so far escaped scholarly scrutiny.
Contrary to the conventional view, veto power in many former communist countries is
escorted with amendment ability, so presidents may have both negative and positive power. The
games implied by the different rules reveal how far Presidents can go and show why the ability
to make positive suggestions to vetoed bills allows the President wider discretion than the more
familiar block veto. This article shows why the power to introduce amendatory observations is a
fundamental prerogative of one third of the President in ex-communist countries even if they can
be overridden by a majority vote. These findings lead us to reassess prior evaluations of
Presidential power in the former communist countries that tend to give considerable weight to
override thresholds but ignore the right to make amendatory observations. Although we have
found plenty of anecdotal evidence that shows Presidents use this prerogative frequently with
substantive policy effects, a systematic cross-country study of veto incidence has yet to be
performed. The empirical cases we presented corroborate the influence of amendatory
observations and allow us to see how these prerogatives affect real legislation.
26
FIGURE 1
BLOCK VETO
Presidents with block veto can restrict outcomes from W(SQ) to Q(SQ)
P
SQ
Q(SQ)
W(SQ)
X
27
FIGURE 2
AMENDATORY OBSERVATION
Presidents with the power to make amendatory observations can
select their preferred point from the set allowed by the rules
SQ
W(SQ)
B
W(B)
Y'
Y''
NQ(B)
Y
.
P
28
Diagram
#
Amendatory
observation?
Bosnia & Hercegovina (1995)
Exec
type
1
No - no veto
Feasible Set and
Outcome
B ∈ W(SQ)
Croatia (1990, 2004)
1
No - no veto
B∈
Serbia & Montenegro (2002)
1
No - no veto
Slovenia (1991, 1997)
1
No - no veto
1
Estonia (1992)
1
No - block veto
>1/2 votes
SQ
1
Hungary (1989, 1997, 2003)
1
No - block veto
>1/2 votes
SQ
1
Moldova (1994, 2000)
1
No - block veto
>1/2 votes
SQ
Macedonia (1991, 1992)
1
No - block veto
>1/2 members
SQ
Albania (1991, 1998)
1
No - block veto
>1/2 members
SQ
Czech Republic (1992)
1
No - block veto
>1/2 members
SQ
Romania (1991)
2
No - block veto
>1/2 members
SQ
1
Poland (1992, 1997)
2
No –block veto
≥3/5 votes (Q=1/2 members)
SQ
1
Belarus (1994)
3
No - block veto
≥2/3 members
SQ
1
Azerbaijan (1995)
3
No - block veto
≥3/4 of votes
SQ
Bulgaria (1991, 2003, 2005)
1/2
No - partial veto
>1/2 members
X
Yes
>1/2 votes
SQ
Yes
≥3/5 members; 2/3 members
( const.)
SQ
Yes
≥2/3 members of both chambers
X
1
1
1
1
2
Country
Override requirement
Default
3
3
Armenia (1995)
3
3
Georgia (1991, 1995)
3
4
Belarus (1996)
5
Latvia (1992, 1998, 2002)
1
Yes
>1/2 votes
Y
5
Lithuania (1992, 2004)
2
Yes
>1/2 members
Y
5
Kazakhstan (1993)
3
Yes
≥2/3 members
Y
5
Kyrgyzstan (1993)
3
Yes
≥2/3 members of both chambers
Y
Uzbekistan (1992)
3
Yes
≥2/3 members of both chambers
Y
Kazakhstan (1995)
3
Yes
≥2/3 members of both chambers
Y
Ukraine (1996)
2
Yes
≥2/3 members
Y
5
5
6
W(SQ)
B ∈ W(SQ)
B ∈ W(SQ)
B ∈ W(SQ) = B
B ∈ W(SQ) = B
B ∈ W(SQ) = B
B ∈ Q(SQ) = B
B ∈ Q(SQ) = B
B ∈ Q(SQ) = B
B ∈ Q(SQ) = B
B ∈ Q(SQ) = B
B ∈ Q(SQ) = B
B ∈ Q(SQ) = B
X ∈ W(B) = X
Y ∈ W(B) ∩ W(SQ) =
Y
Y ∈ NQ(B)
∩ W(SQ) = Y
Y ∈ NQ(B) ∩ W(X)
=Y
Y ∈ W(B) = Y
Y ∈ NQ(B) = Y
Y ∈ NQ(B) = Y
Y ∈ NQ(B) = Y
Y ∈ NQ(B) = Y
Y ∈ NQ(B) = Y
Y ∈ NQ(B) = Y
Table 1. Conditional Agenda-Setting in the Former Communist Countries.
Exec Type= Executive Type 1=Parliamentary 2=Semi-presidential 3= Presidential
Note: Bulgaria’s first two presidents were elected by the Assembly. Since then all Presidents have been directly elected by the people.
29
APPENDIX
VETO DIAGRAMS
(23 Former Communist Countries)
Let,
P
L
B
SQ
X
Y
=
=
=
=
=
=
President
Legislature
Bill as originally passed by the Legislature
Status quo (No bill)
Vetoed Bill =
Bill minus the parts deleted by the President
Observed Bill =
Bill with substitutions made in the President’s veto
Diagram #1
Countries: Albania, Azerbaijan, Belarus (1994), Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Macedonia,
Moldova, Romania, Poland
Override rules: 1/2 votes (Estonia, Belarus, Hungary, Moldova); 1/2 members (Macedonia,
Albania, Czech Republic, Romania); 3/5 votes (Poland); 3/4 votes (Azerbaijan)
Block Veto
P
Sign
Veto
L
B
Override
B
Default
SQ
Sources: Albania (Albanian Constitution, art. 85); Azerbaijan (Azerbaijan Constitution, art. 110);
Belarus (1994) (Belarus Constitution, art. 100 (20); Czech Republic (Czech Constitution, art. 50
and personal communication with anonymous Czech legal expert); Estonia (Estonian
Constitution, art. 107 and personal communication with Ms. Mall Gramberg, legal advisor to the
Estonian President) Hungary (Hungarian Constitution, art. 26); Macedonia (Macedonian
Constitution, art. 75 and personal communication with Mrs. Renata Trenevska-Deskovska, legal
advisor to the Macedonian President); Moldova (Moldovan Constitution, art. 93); Romania
30
(Romanian Constitution, art. 77); Poland (Polish Constitution, art. 118.5 and personal
communication with Mr. Waldemar Wołpiuk, constitutional scholar at the Polish Academy of
Sciences.)
31
Diagram #2
Countries: Bulgaria
Block and Partial Veto (with partial enactment as default)
Override rule: 1/2 members
P
Sign
Veto
Partial Veto
B
L
Override
B
L
Default
SQ
Override
B
Default
X
Sources: Bulgarian Constitution, art. 101, Procedural Act of the Bulgarian National Assembly,
art. 73 (5) and (6), personal communication with Ms. Zdravka Mladenova, legal advisor at the
Bulgarian Ministry of Education.
32
Diagram #3
Countries: Armenia, Georgia
Block Veto and Amendatory Observation (with SQ as default)
Override rule: 1/2 votes (Armenia); 3/5 members (Georgia)
P
Sign
Veto
Amend
B
L
Override
B
L
Default
SQ
Reject
Accept
Y
L
Reject
B
Default
SQ
Sources: Armenia (Armenian Constitution, art. 55); Georgia (Georgian Constitution, art. 68)
33
Diagram #4
Countries: Belarus (1996)
Override rule: 2/3 members of both chambers
P
Sign
Veto
L
B
Override
B
Default
X
Source: Belarus Constitution, art. 100 and personal communication with anonymous Belarusian
legal expert.
34
Diagram #5
Countries: Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan (1993, 1995), Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan
Override rules: 1/2 votes (Latvia), Lithuania (1/2 members), Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan (2/3 members)
Block Veto and Amendatory Observation (with amended bill as default)
P
Sign
Veto
Amend bill
B
L
Override
B
L
Default
SQ
Override
B
Default
Y
Sources: Latvia (Latvian Constitution, art. 71 and personal communication with Ms. Sandra
Kukule, legal advisor to the Latvian President); Lithuania (Lithuanian Constitution, art. 71),
Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyz Constitution, art. 46 (5B), Kazakhstan (Kazakh Constitution, art. 78),
Uzbekistan (Uzbek Constitution, art. 93 (14))
35
Diagram #6
Country: Ukraine
Override rule: 2/3 members
P
Sign
Veto with amendments
L
B
Override
Not
L
B
Reject
Accept
SQ
Y
Sources: Ukrainian Constitution (art. 94) and personal communication with Mr. Sergey Gromov,
legal expert at Newlegal (Ukrainian Law Firm).
If B∉Q(SQ) then Y∈W(B)
If B∈Q(SQ) then Y∈ W(SQ)∩W(B) iff legislature votes strategically NOT to override
36
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