North American Philosophical Publications
Is There a Duty to Die for Humanity?: Humanitarian Intervention, Military Service and
Political Obligation
Author(s): Michael L. Gross
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Public Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jul., 2008), pp. 213-229
Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical Publications
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Public Affairs Quarterly
Volume22, Number3, July2008
IS THEREA DUTY TO DIE FOR HUMANITY?:
HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION,MILITARY
SERVICEAND POLITICAL OBLIGATION
MichaelL. Gross
theAllied refusalto bombtherail
considerations
notwithstanding,
lines runningto Auschwitzhas metwithharshcriticism.Surely,theAllies
couldhavesparedthefewplanesnecessarytodamageordestroythedeathcamps
tensofthousands.BombingAuschwitzwouldhavebeen
thatwereexterminating
victimsof
a humanitarian
gesture,designedto save thelives of noncombatant
value. Potentialgainsweregreat:to save
warcrimesbutof littleor no strategic
thousandsfromgenocideonlyfewneedrisktheirlives.So, we argue,theAllies
incurreda primafacie obligationto save innocentlives. No less an argument
inactionin Rwandaand Darfur.
condemnsmilitary
forcesforthesake
touse theirmilitary
Butifstatesandarmieshaveanobligation
of
in
line
die
the
whatofthesoldierwhomight
ofhumanity,
duty?Is therethesame
toriskone's life
thatthereis,generally,
dutytoriskone's lifeanddie forhumanity
on theUnitedStates'
forthestate?Manypeoplethinkthereis not.Commenting
was unequivocal.
missiontostabilizeSomaliain 1993,SamuelHuntington
ill-fated
he writes,"thatmembers
andpoliticallyindefensible,"
"Itis morallyunjustifiable
Somalisfromkillingone another.
oftheArmedForcesshouldbe killedtoprevent
missionswhichinvolvepossible
shouldonlybe givenmilitary
. . . The military
and are directedagainsta
interests
combatwhentheyadvancenationalsecurity
Underlying
oppositiontowarsofhumanitarenemyoftheUnitedStates."1
foreign
of national
and theprotection
to self-defense
is thecommitment
ian intervention
forusingarmedforce.In theabsencevitalmilitary,
as thesolejustification
interests
no statemayriskthelivesofitssoldiers.
interests
nationalor strategic
also warsofnationaldefense,the
intervention
Wereall warsofhumanitarian
easy to settle.If conquestionof riskingsoldiers'liveswouldthenbe relatively
international
ensures
armed
force
with
abuses
human
massive
peace
rights
fronting
and
removes
from
and prosperity,
terrorism,
fomenting
preventsrogueregimes
thatmayimpingeuponthe
theincentiveforlarge-scaleand suddenemigration
can piggybackon
intervention
then
humanitarian
stabilityof peacefulnations,
In such cases, theUN mayeven ask its membersto conwarsof self-defense.
213
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214
PUBLIC AFFAIRS QUARTERLY
tribute
"armedforces,assistance,and facilities. . . necessaryforthepurposeof
international
maintaining
peace and security(UN Charter,
ChapterVII, Article
The
source
of
an
individual
soldier's
to
risk
his lifeand perhaps
43).2
obligation
die in theseventures
is notanchoredinbeneficence,
thatis,thedutytoaid others,
butin defense,thatis, thedutyto protectoneselfand one's state.
theUnitedNationshasgonea stepfurther.
however,
Recently,
Confronting
past
inactioninthefaceofgenocideandethniccleansing,the2005 UN WorldSummit
resolvedtotakemilitary
action"shouldpeacefulmeansbe inadequateandnational
authorities
are manifestly
failingto protecttheirpopulationsfromgenocide,war
ethnic
and
The rightof intervention
crimes,
cleansing crimesagainsthumanity."3
is notsweeping.Mindfulofcriticsconcernedabouttheinability
to articulate
legal
normsormoralprinciples
ofintervention
ina waythatwillnotleadtorampant
abuse,
theUN summitwas carefulto confinemilitary
intervention
to preventing
gross
humanrightsabuse (and notmerelyto fosterregimechangeor democratization).
At thesame time,thesummitagreement
demandswide international
consensus
forintervention
actionby a singlestate).Nevertheless,
this
(ratherthanunilateral
is a remarkable
sea changeforitundermines
thesanctity
ofstatesovereignty
when
statesfailto meettheminimalobligationstheyowe theircitizens.
How thiseventually
playsoutremainstobe seen,butitsharpenstheproblem
of humanitarian
intervention.
Whenhumanitarian
intervention
intertwines
with
a nation'svitalinterests,
therewill be littlecompunction
aboutriskingthelives
of membersof itsarmedforces.But whentheUN calls on a nationto contribute
forcesforpurelyhumanitarian
therewill be roomto ask aboutthe
intervention,
pricea nation'ssoldiersshouldpay forthewelfareofothers."Rescuingothers,"
writesFernandoTesón,"willalwaysbe onerous,butifwe denythemoraldutyand
ofjusticein politicalaffairs,
legal rightto do so, we denynotonlythecentrality
butalso thecommonhumanity
thatbindsus all.4Tesón is correct.Rightsdo not
existwithouttheconcomitant
obligationto secureand protectthem.If theidea
of universalhumanrightsis to have anybiteat all, thensomeone,somewhere
has theobligationto defendthosewhofaceegregiousinjustice.Ifa person'sown
cannotdo it,thenthedutyfallsto thosewho can. The big question
government
is, however,just how oneroustheirdutyto rescueshouldbe. Here, supporters
declaresAllenBuchanan"carriesa
hedge."Ourdutyto respect[human]rights,"
presumptive
dutyto helpensurethatall personscan live in conditionsin which
theirbasic rightsare respected,at least ifwe can do so withoutexcessivecosts
to ourselves."5Buchanan'squalifyingclause goes to theheartof theproblem.
If humanitarian
intervention
imposesa dutyon democraticstatesthatthey"owe
to victimsof internalcrisesand crimes"as StanleyHoffmann
demands,6then
mustbearthecost of
someone,namelythesoldiersof thestatethatintervenes,
otherhumanbeingsfromgenocide,enslavement,
ethniccleansingand
protecting
wantonrapeandmurder.
Thesecostsarenottrivialbecausesomesoldierswilldie.
But unlesswe are preparedto assumethem,humanitarian
intervention
will fail.
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IS THERE A DUTY TO DIE FOR HUMANITY?
215
thatone may
Buildingon the assumption,whichI will pursueno further,
liberal
of
to
anchor
each state's
invoke
universal,
cogently
principles justice
it
should
across
the
be
clear
that
thesesame
to
human
rights
globe,
duty protect
for
the
individual
of those
do
not
members
easily providegrounds
arguments
statesto risktheirown lives to fulfillthesame duty.Death or severeinjury,by
certainlycountas excessivecost thatno individualcan be comanydefinition,
pelled to bear.Here we face whatJohnLango has called the"moralparadox"
intervention:
"even if it is obligatoryfora state(collectively)
of humanitarian
to intervene,
it can stillonlybe supererogatory
(individually)forits citizens."7
Low costs,greatbenefitsand theprospectof relativelyfewcasualtiesobligate
thestateto intercede.High costs and theprospectof death,on theotherhand,
releaseeach citizenfromtheverysame duty.
bold atThe inabilityto resolvethisparadoxsuccessfullycan onlyundercut
intervention.
What
remains
of
the
state's
on
humanitarian
to
take
obligation
tempts
to tenderaid if thosewho mustfulfillthestate'sdutiesare underno obligation
to act?The first
partofthediscussionaddressesthisquestionbybuildingon two
uncontroversial
obligations:theobligationto aid thosein distressand
relatively
theobligationto die forthestate.The firstasks whetherbeneficent
rescue,that
is, thegeneraldutyto aid others,offersanygroundsforan obligationto die for
others.The shortanswerappearsto be no: no one is requiredto givehis lifeto
some measureof "inconsave anotherfromharm.One maybe obligedto suffer
more.
venience"butneveranything
On theotherhand,fewquestiona citizen'sdutytoriskhisorherlifeand,ifneed
be, die,forthestate.Thisraisesthesecondquestion:Does thegeneralobligation
intoan obligationto die defending
to die in defenseofthestatetranslate
helpless
answer
is
no.
The
the
short
citizensofrepressive
too,
Here,
obligationto
regimes?
individuals
incuras citizens.And,
dieforthestateis butoneofthemanyobligations
each limitsa citizen's
whilethereare manytheoriesto anchortheseobligations,
obligationtothewelfareofthestatetowhichhebelongs.8Noneobligatesa citizen
harmon behalfofthoselivingbeyondhis borders.
to suffer
substantial
those
beyondourownbordersrequiressomemajormaneuvering.
Embracing
This is thesubjectofthesecondpartofthediscussion.Advocatesofcontractual
theoriesof politicalobligation,forexample,mustthinkin termsof a universal
Howcontractthatpullsin everymemberofthehumanrace as an equal partner.
and cannotsustain
ever,contracttheorydoes notadaptwell to cosmopolitanism
on thebehalfofotherslivingbeyondone's ownstate.
anyobligationto intervene
must
As a result,some suggestthatsoldierswho fightin thenameof humanity
do whentheytakeon thejob of
consenttoriskingtheirlives,justas policeofficers
thathumanitarian
intervention
law andorder.Itis no accident,therefore,
ensuring
and thatits mostardentadvocatesagree
is oftencomparedto law enforcement
thatonlyvolunteerforcescan compriseits forces.In thiscontext,however,the
becomes nothingmorethana professionalobligation
dutyto die forhumanity
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216
PUBLIC AFFAIRS QUARTERLY
How
counterintuitive.
Thisis strangely
anda farcryfromthedutyofcitizenship.
can a state'sobligationtoassistvictimsofmassivehumanrightsabusereston the
actionsofitsmembers?Certainly,
voluntary
personsmayobligatethemselvesto
die forothers,butthisleaves thestatein theprecariouspositionofbeingunable
to fulfillitsinternational
obligationsifno one volunteers.
- broadening
orappealingforvolunteers
thesocialcontract
Neithersolution
Because contracttheoryand
intervention.
resolvestheparadoxof humanitarian
thereareno
of
welfare
and
first
to
the
volunteerism
security theindividual,
speak
themselves.
to
intervene
if
bear
no
intervention
individuals
for
state
duty
grounds
foundersbecause no singleindividualhas
Humanitarian
therefore,
intervention,
to resolvetheparadox
Instead,anyattempt
anyobligationto die forhumanity.
perspective.
requiresthatwe look at theentireproblemfroma muchdifferent
This is the subjectof the finalsection.Looking firstat collectiveobligations,
thosethata stateor societytakeson beforeit considersthecost fromanyindiwe beginto see firmgroundsforan individualobligationto
vidualperspective,
aid otherswhenindividualcosts may be high.This includestheobligationto
riskdyingforhumanity.
Beneficent Rescue: The Duty to Aid Others
ifhe cando it
Everymanis boundto assistthosewhohaveneedofassistance,
- Bentham9
himself
tosensibleinconvenience.
without
exposing
When costs are low, the moralobligationto undertake"easy" rescueis so
more
intuitively
compellingthatBenthamfailstojustifythisclaimwithanything
Sensible
thana fewtrivialexamplesaboutburninghatsand drowningdrunks.10
inconvenience,
however,does not get us veryfar.Allowingindividualsto opt
out of aidingotherswhencosts exceed thesensiblecannotanchorthedutyof
if soldiersmay lose theirlives. Looking for
armedhumanitarian
intervention
more
some
advocatesappeal to morestringent
"perfect"
something
demanding,
moralduties.Perfectdutiescan requirethatwe actto preservejusticeand/orremovesuchimpediments
as hungerand despotismthatinfringe
upontherespect
in
need
have
a claim against
Moral
and freedomeverypersondeserves.
agents
A perfect
thosewhocan provideaid andsecurity.11
dutyalso raisesthestakesand
whileit "cannotbe so drasticas to requirethesacrificeof all a person'sprojects
... it can requirethe rescuerto undergoconsiderableinconvenienceshortof
fundamental
Althoughperfectdutiesraise
changesin the fabricof his life."12
thebarbydemanding"considerable"ratherthan"sensible"inconvenience,
they
cannotcompelindividualstogivetheirlivestoaid others.Dutiestootherscannot
requireone to neglectdutiesto oneself.
is tackedontothe
Once morethansomemodestmeasureof "inconvenience"
intervention
is
no
to
humanitarian
rescue,
longereasy.Thatis, itis
duty
military
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IS THERE A DUTY TO DIE FOR HUMANITY?
217
no longereasy forindividuals.But whataboutstates?Surelya fewlives lostis
reasonablefromthestate'sperspective.
Yet,unableto demandthatcitizensrisk
intervention
no matterhow
theirlives,the statecannotconsiderhumanitarian
actionendangersand howmanylivesitmaysave. To see why
fewlivesmilitary
thatis, materialaid toimpoverished
thisis so, considernonmilitary
intervention,
it
nations.Whena prosperousstatestandsbeforecrushingthirdworldpoverty,
willfixa figureitthinksis reasonableandofferforeignaid. Thisfigureis reasonable foreveryonebecause itis also reasonableforanyone.If individualsare not
thestatedemands,theneach person
overburdened
by thefinancialcontribution
incurstheobligationof easy rescue.Problemswill arisenotbecause theburden
is too greatbutbecause itmaybe too light.Whenaskedto makesmallcontribuindividualsmayquestionthe
affectworldpoverty,
tionsthatwillnotsignificantly
impactof theirsupport.Withno rationalincentiveto workfora valuablegood,
of the
rescueefforts
mayfail.This leaves nationsto use thecoerciveauthority
law to enforcetheobligationto aid others.But as nationsgreasethewheelsof
whatis essentiallyeach individual'sobligacollectiveaction,theyareenforcing
tionto offereasy aid. The stateitselfhas no obligationto rescue,butitscitizens
do. In thiscase, thecollectivedutydrawsdirectlyfromthemoraldutyof each
individualto aid others.
These same arguments,
however,cannoteasilydefendtheobligationto offer
of thosewho mustprovideit.Althoughtheloss
kill
some
that
will
aid
military
fewlivesmaylook reasonableto thestate,theburdenis onerousto
ofrelatively
some.Whencostsareunreasonableto some,theyare unreasonableforall. This
is thecruxof theintervention
paradox.Withouttheobligationto risktheirlives
forothers,thereis no roomto compelan individualto tenderassistancebeyond
reasonablematerialaid. Easy rescuedoes nottranslateintothedutyto riskdyOnce enlistedorconscripted,
however,citizensturnedsoldiers
ingforhumanity.
lives forothers.Mightthisalso
risk
their
are compelledto "do theirduty"and
includeriskingtheirlivesforhumanity?
Dying for Humanity and Dying for the State
Can liberalstateseverobligatetheircitizensto go to warand risktheirlives?
MichaelWalzercandidlyconcludestheycannot."Indeed,"he writes,"thegreat
advantageofliberalsocietymaysimplybe this:thatno one can be askedtodie for
not
withthestateforpersonal,
One contracts
publicreasonsonbehalfofthestate."13
leavitslegitimacy,
thereby
collective,
Havingtodieforthestaterepudiates
security.
from
themselves
disassociate
and
contract
of
the
bonds
break
free
to
individuals
ing
todieforthestate,
thestate'scoercivepower.Ifthereareno groundsforindividuals
no groundsto demandtheyrisktheirlivesforhumanity.
thentherearecertainly
Revivingtheobligationto die forthestatedemandsa moreexpansiveviewof
andobligations.Hobbes,forexample,appealstothe"instituindividualinterests
as he calls uponmemberstodefenditwiththeirlives,
tionofthecommonwealth"
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218
PUBLIC AFFAIRS QUARTERLY
in favorof a
individualinterests
ifnecessary.14
Rousseau,of course,transcends
shared,collectivevisionof theGeneralWill thatindividualswill risktheirlives
to defend.Rawlsianagents,too,areinclinedto defendthestateand accepta fair
as thebestwaytoprotecttheirvitalinterests.15
Moreover,
systemofconscription
rationalagentswellunderstand
thatthestateandcommunity
providetheidentity,
fellowfeelingandmutualsupportnecessaryfora fullandmeaningful
existence.
Surely,thesetoo are worthriskingone's lifefor.
In all thesecases, thereis a strongbond betweenthosewho die and those
whomtheydie for,a bondthatflourishes,
at best,to theedge of thenation-state
and thenseemsto disappear.The state,therefore,
marksthelimitof a person's
no
dutytoriskhislife.Hobbesis occupiedwiththedefenseofthecommonwealth;
to thatendcouldpossiblyobligatean individual
thatdoes notcontribute
activity
to riskhis life.While Rousseau offersus a visionof an emergingsuperpersonalitythatreachedits grandestformin GeneralWill,he could notpushbeyond
nationalbordersto embraceall of humankind
withina universal,cosmopolitan
order.On thecontrary,
Rousseau placed greatemphasison thesmallcity-state
and could notimagineeducatinggood citizenswithoutthereligious,historical
and linguistictiesthatbindthemto one another.16
Similarly,parochialtiesand
difficult
traditions
infusemoderntheoriesofcontract
thatmakeitextraordinarily
to anchormutualobligationsin anything
Citizens
the
nation-state.
beyond
may
die on behalfof theirstate,butare unwilling,in fact,unable,to risktheirlives
foranything
more.Ifthestaterepresents
a naturalstoppingpointforthepolitical
obligationto riskone's life,thenit is impossibleto conceiveof anyobligation
to riskdyingforhumanity.
At best,thereis onlytheobligationto riskone's life
whenhumanitarian
intervention
also protectsthesecurity
ofone's ownstate.But
ifroguestatesthreaten
no one buttheirown citizens,thenthebestwe can do is
to recruitvolunteers
to stopthem.
Volunteering
for Humanitarian Intervention
Volunteering
replacesa state-imposed
obligationwithonethatis self-imposed
humanitarian
intervention
without
theworry
thereby
allowingstatestoundertake
ofimposingundueriskon particular
individuals.Justas police officers
and firerisk
their
lives
to
serve
and
other
members
of their
fighters
voluntarily
protect
volunteer
humanitarian
forcesacceptsimilarriskstodefendcitizens
community,
offoreigncountries.
concludesBuchanan,"themoraljustification
for
Therefore,
armedhumanitarian
intervention
neednotdependupontheproblematic
supporting
assumptionthatriskingourlivesdoes notcountas an excessivecost.So, even,if
it is truethatthenaturaldutyofjusticedoes notrequireus to riskviolentdeath
forthesakeofprotecting
otherpersons'basic humanrights,
itstillobligatesus to
institutions
for
armed
intervention
... so longas theseinstitutions
support
only
entaila riskof violentdeathforthosewho acceptit voluntarily."17
For similar
to manhumanitarian
forces.18
reasons,Tesón also calls forvolunteers
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IS THERE A DUTY TO DIE FOR HUMANITY?
219
In thecontextthatTesónandBuchanandescribe,theobligationtoriskdeathor
obligationthatcomeswith
injuryis a nota politicalobligationbuta professional
and
vocationthatpoliceofficers,
theparticular
firefighters soldierschoose.Yetlaw
arenotanalogous.Whilehumanitarian
andhumanitarian
intervention
enforcement
is going
intervention
remainsa contentious
subjectofdebate,anysocial contract
and whilevolunteersare
to makefirmprovisionsforpolice and fireprotection,
volunteerforces,no nation
desirable,theyare notnecessary.Lackingsufficient
to asaboutusingtroops,whetherenlistedor conscripted,
has secondthoughts
in a publicemergency.
These troops
officialsorfirefighters
sistlaw enforcement
need not consent.More broadlyspeaking,one can certainlyimaginea group
dutieson a
individualswho simplyassignpolice or firefighting
of contracting
The reasonis simple:police and fire
basis orbylotifno one volunteers.
rotating
arepublicgoodsthatall membersofsocietyexpectthestatetoprovide.
protection
volunteer
andreceiveadequate
Fairnessdemandsthateitherpoliceorfirefighters
distributes
theburdenequally;
in
that
a
or
are
way
conscripted
compensation,
to
nothingallows thestateto sidestepits obligation protectits citizensshould
no one volunteer.
However,thisis preciselywhatwould happenif insufficient
The statehas no obligationto
intervention.
numbersvolunteerforhumanitarian
as Buchanansuggests,
fails.
enlistment
when
forces
Rather,
voluntary
conscript
thestatehas onlyan obligationto supportthosewho have alreadyagreedto asrisk.If nonedoes, thestate'sobligationcollapses.
sumesubstantial
a peculiarobligation
intervention
Humanitarian
that,atbest,
therefore,
remains,
role,butcannotcompelthemtoactwhenindividuals
places statesina supporting
no state
refusetobearthecostofriskingtheirlives.Dependingonlyon volunteers,
the
to
fires
or
enforce
it
does
as
for
others
to
citizens
its
fight
fight
mayconscript
law.This meansthatamongnationswhosearmedforcesdependprimarily
upon
Poland,Greece,orIsrael),nonehas grounds
conscriptforces(suchas Germany,
theirobligationto undertake
to commititstroopsto humanitarian
intervention;
armies(such
volunteer
aid nevergetsofftheground.Statesfielding
humanitarian
as theUS, UK, France,or Italy),on theotherhand,will see theirobligationto
forserviceor iftheyare unableto
numbersvolunteer
aid crumbleifinsufficient
service.One mayreasonablyask
forms
of
for
all
volunteers
their
military
deploy
forhumanitarian
volunteer
for
Americansoldiers, example,
whether
dutywhen
oftheUnitedStatesagainst
theyswearto "supportand defendtheConstitution
all enemies,
foreignand domestic."Thereis nothinghereto suggestthatsoldiers
agree to fightagainstforeignarmiesthatdo not threatenAmericansecurity.
to humanitarian
who consentspecifically
Withoutvolunteers
duties,stateshave
no choicebutto refusetheirinternational
obligations.
In thefinalanalysis,it is impossibleto anchortheobligationto die forthose
It is
beyondourstatein thesame obligationto die thatwe owe ourcompatriots.
to
risk
their
for
individuals
to
lives,
consenting
upon
depend
problematic
equally
numbersvolunteer.
thecollectiveobligationwheninsufficient
thisundermines
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220
PUBLIC AFFAIRS QUARTERLY
ifcollective
Morethana paradox,
there
is a deepandirreconcilable
inconsistency
of
or
behavior
obligations
obligations
dependuponsupererogatory
professional
on
individuals.
that
we
focus
first
collecthe
Instead,
resolving paradoxrequires
tiveobligations
andonlythenonindividual
duties.
Overcoming State Boundaries: The Lure of Cosmopolitanism
becauseit
Theobligation
toaid others
atthecostofourverylivesfounders
Thevehicle
cannot
crossthedividebetween
individual
andcollective
obligation.
forcrossing
overthrives
on contracts,
threats
andpublicgoodssuch
incipient
face
as national
defense
thatdo notmaterialize
whenthosejustovertheborder
in
merciless
the
answer
some
to
lies
persecution.
attempt pushbeyond
Perhaps
theindividual/collective
thatbedevilsthisproblem.
mindset
Here,Christopher
Kutzoffers
a framework
ofrescuethatmayeasetheproblem
andhelpestablish
foran obligation
todieforhumanity.19
Kutz,tobe sure,onlydescribes
grounds
a caseofeasyrescue.Whether
rescuemustnecessarily
remain
easyormayultiembrace
is
the
hand.
at
sacrifices, question
mately
supreme
DyingforOthers:LookingBeyondtheStateand Individuals
Kutzenvisionstwoarbitrary
nationalboundaries,
Deliberately
eschewing
the
Blue
and
the
in
the
TheBlue
desert
Red,separated
groups,
bysomedistance.
its
water
bandits.
smaller
than
the
loses
all
to
Red,
group,significantly
Noting
thatRed can replenish
Blue's waterat littlecostto each individual
member,
Kutzsuggests
thatRedincursa collective
toaidBluethattranscends
obligation
eachRedmember's
individual
moralobligation.
therelationship
Characterizing
between
thetwogroupsas notsimplya "network
ofobligations
each
running
toeach,"as itis customary
toconstrue
Kutz
instead
describes
a
claim
of
rescue,
eachmember
oftheendangered
the
as
a
whole.
groupagainst rescuing
group
Thisbecomesapparent
as onethinks
abouta singlenon-cooperating
Red.While
other
Redsmaycomplain
Redhasnotfulfilled
thatthenon-cooperating
hisduty
towardthem,Blue findsthatRed,as a whole,has metitsobligation,
"They?
writes
call
for
of
individual
Kutz,"answered
defections,
my
help."20
Regardless
Redhasmettheclaimofevery
Blue.Withthisintuition,
Kutzhopestoovercome
theproblem
thathasplaguedus all along,namely,
anindividualistic
conception
ofobligations
that"deniestheagencyofall byfocusing
ontheagencyofeach."
Kutz'splanis toground
individual
incollective
a stark
obligations
obligations,
ofthewaywehavebeenconsidering
reversal
thedutytorescue."Fromthiscollective
fallsout
Kutz,"anindividual
obligation,"
explains
participatory
obligation
as anelement
ofpractical
If
we
are
to
our
collective
reasoning:
satisfy
obligation,
thenI oughttodo mypart."21
Thisargument
addresses
theintervention
a
paradoxdirectly
byfirst
positing
collective
andonlythenderiving
anindividual
toaidothers.
obligation
obligation
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IS THERE A DUTY TO DIE FOR HUMANITY?
221
of thecollectiveobligation,it is important
to understand
To see thesignificance
formsofrescue:thosethatindividuals
thattherearetwoverydifferent
can achieve
aloneandthosethatrequirecollectiveaction.Savinga drowning
childis a case of
individual
rescue.The sameis trueofBentham'sexamples.Here,onepersonalone
toactwhenthecostis reasoncanachievegreatgoodand,as such,hasanobligation
tothinkthata collectiveobligationsimplyaggregates
able.Itis a mistake,
however,
collapses.
manyindividualobligationsso thatifthelatterfail,theformer
Whenmorethanone personis necessaryto effectrescue,as is oftenthecase,
theemphasisshiftsto whatonlya groupcan do. It makeslittlesenseto startwith
an individual'sobligationbecause,quite often,no individualalone can rescue
anyone.He is powerlessno matterwhatsacrificehe is willingto make.If ought
actalone,
impliescan,and in manycases ofrescueno individualcan effectively
thenthereis no roomto speakof an individualobligationto rescue,at leastnot
individualscan make
On theotherhand,a groupwithmanycooperating
initially.
andaccomplishconsiderablegood whenitsmembersworktogether.
a difference
This capacityforsuccessfulcollectiveactiondictatesthe sharedobligationto
aid thosein distress.Meetingthisobligationdemandsthatthegroupmobilize
thecriticalmassnecessaryforaction.The groupmayagreeto ask forvolunteers
to realize thatits collectiveobligationdoes notdisappearif
butit is important
As a result,thegroupmay also adopt a coercive,but
thereare no volunteers.
to
the
scheme
recruit
fair,
manpowernecessaryto meetitscollectiveobligation
are neithermorallynorpractically
therefore,
Volunteers,
(such as conscription).
intervention.
necessaryto meetthecollectivedutyof humanitarian
face thethreat
Yet remember
thatsoldierstakingpartin armedintervention
ofmortalharmandthatthecase just describedis onlyone ofeasyrescue.It only
demandsthatReds give up watertheycan live without.But can Reds also be
fromcollective
askedtorisktheirlives?In otherwords,can we use theargument
wantto say,namely,thatif a state
obligationto say whatmanyinterventionists
intervention
thenits citizenshave
has an obligationto undertakehumanitarian
theobligationto risktheirlivesforhumanity?
forcesattackBlue thatonlyRed can repel.
Considernow thatoverwhelming
Red liveswill doubtlesslybe lostifRed comes to Blue's aid. Contrastthiswith
an attacksolelyon Red, one thatplaces thelivesof Red membersat riskas they
cometothedefenseofothermembersoftheirgroup.WhatareRed's obligations
in theserespectivecases? If Red alone is attacked,defensebecomesa collective
good and individualReds who do notcooperate(thatis, do notanswerthecall
to armsand risktheirlives) imperiltheentiregroup.If theRed groupis small
enoughso thatthefailureof a singleindividualto cooperatewill clearlydoom
is suicidal.If, on theother
no one will freeride,forfree-riding
groupefforts,
is relatively
hand,thegroupis so largethateach Red feelsthathis contribution
thenRed will haveto coercefreeriders.Too manyfreeriderswill
insignificant,
endangera largegroupjustas a singlefreeriderdoomsthesmallgroup.In either
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222
PUBLIC AFFAIRS QUARTERLY
case, everymemberof thegrouphas an obligationto riskhis or herlife,forthis
is theonlyway to ensureone's own survival.Can we also obligateReds to risk
theirlivesforBlue?
Red can staveoffan attackand rescue Blue withfew casualties.Thereis,
a collectiveobligationtowardthesmallergroupthatcan onlybe met
therefore,
if manyReds participate.
Each Blue has a claim rightagainstRed as a whole.
Reds havean obligationtogetthejob donetogether.
Blue willnotcareifone Red
failsto cooperateor anotherloses his life.Instead,Blues will thankRed collectivelyiftheycan save Blue (or mostBlues). And,mostlikely,Red can. So, then,
as Kutz concludes,does each of us recognizean "obligationto do our partsof
together
helpingtheBlues?" Ifthesourceofourindividualobligationlies in our
thatwe havea collectiveobligationthatcannotgetofftheground
understanding
unlesswe all cooperatethentheanswerappearstobe yes."Collectiveobligations,"
explainsKutz,"are thesharedobligationsof individualswho regardthemselves
as boundto collaboratein meetingtheindividualclaimsagainstthem."22
The forceof collectiveobligationsstandsoutas we look againatAuschwitz.
There is a worldof difference
betweena commanderwho says to his pilots,
we havean opportunity
to attacktheraillinesfeedingthisinfamous
"Gentlemen,
value
The
has
no
butwe can savemanylives.However,some
camp.
target
strategic
Andonewho
ofyouwilllose yourlivesinthismission.Do I haveanyvolunteers?"
more
material
thanany
we've
more
more
and
men,
says,"Gentlemen,
money,
got
armyon earthandwe can use a smallportionofourresourcesto save manylives
theraillinesfeedingthisinfamouscamp.Casualtieswill be light."
by attacking
In thefirstcase, theobligationstartswiththeindividualpilot.It also endsthere
ifno one volunteers.
In thesecondcase, thecapabilitiesof thegroupdictatethe
sharedobligationto aid thosein distress.No one needbe askedto volunteer.
A similarsituationmayariseinDarfur.In 2007,theUN approveda combined
AfricanUnion/UNforceto supportthe implementation
of the DarfurPeace
Agreement.23
peace and
Emphasizingits mandateto maintain"international
security"theUN resolutionspeaks moreto vitalnationalinterestsand political stabilitythanto humanitarian
needs. But humanitarian
concernsringloud
whenadvocatesof military
intervention
call upontheUS and NATO to develop
contingency
plans to secureand/orevacuaterefugeecamps shouldSudan start
number
slaughtering
refugees.24
Clearly,suchplans wouldrequirea significant
of troopsto protectthelivesof refugees.The military
value,ifany,of diverting
themto safetywould pale besides the
troopsto protectrefugeesand transport
value of savingthe lives of manyinnocentpeople. Such a missionwould be
largelya humanitarian
gesture.
Whatare ourmoralobligationsin thiscase? In lightoftheforegoing
discusto emphasizeour obligations.Thereis no roomto speak,at
sion,itis important
leastinitially,
ofmyobligationsorthoseof anyone individual.No singleperson
could possiblyprotectrefugeesfromwell-armedSudanese forces,no matter
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IS THERE A DUTY TO DIE FOR HUMANITY?
223
howmuchhewaswillingtoriskhislife.Unabletoeffect
anychangealone,he
thecooperation
ofothers.
toactwithout
On theotherhand,it
hasnoobligation
andequippedsoldierscould,working
is clearthata largegroupofwell-armed
ofrefugees.
andrescuea largenumber
Whena group,
transport
together,
protect,
anobligation
toact.This
considerable
good,itincurs
sufficiently
large,canattain
is sharedbymembers
oftheentiregroupwithout
whomcollective
obligation
willfail.
obligation
thatReds(orpilotsorsoldiers)
faceinthesecasesarises
Theshared
obligation
cost
theclaimsoftheweakergroupandthereasonable
from
tworelated
factors:
Reds
aid
Blue
and
ofrescue.By working
(orcampinmates) keepthe
together,
are linked.Blue claimsobligateRed collectively
costdown.The twofactors
individual
Redstoward
oneanother.
whiletheneedtoholddowncostsobligates
ifcostsbecometoohigh,cooperation
torescuedissipates
Becausetheobligation
rescuebutalso to keepthecostsof
notonlyto achievesuccessful
is essential
within
moral
bounds.
Redswilldie,butclosecooperation
the
meeting obligation
canhelpallaytheriskthateachRedfaces.
andwidespread
participation
we nolonger
thatyieldindividual
Armedwithcollective
duties,
obligations
do not
Collectiveobligations
intervention.
facetheparadoxof humanitarian
no group
mustgivetheirlives.Nevertheless,
whensomeindividuals
attenuate
nowshifts
aidwhencostsarehigh.Theemphasis
totender
facestheobligation
consider
reasonable
nation
would
a
What
cost
toa different
powerful
question:
thisburden
andhowshoulditdistribute
amongitscitizens?
ReasonableCostsofIntervention:
LookingBeyondSensibleInconvenience
assesstotender
consider
their
As individual
aid,their
obligation
bystanders
thatitis not
Bentham
riskis subjective.
mentofreasonable
mayhavepretended
a
from
a puddleorextinguish
failure
topulla drunk
a person's
whenheridicules
toanswerthecallofdutywouldtry
firewhenwateris athand,butanyone
failing
aidwasnotas easyas first
thatoffering
others
toconvince
appears.
Anynumber
butthepointis thatanyreasonable
is imaginable,
circumstances
ofmitigating
thedutytorescue.Alternato deflate
is sufficient
ofinconvenience
perception
rescuer
insistsitis easy,then
buta would-be
ifrescueappearsdifficult,
tively,
itself.
toaidreasserts
theobligation
A group
toideaofcollective
oncewereturn
is helpful
Thisinsight
obligation.
costs
whether
tohelp,be itRed,theUS orNATO,mustdetermine
ina position
torescue
tosacrifice
someofitsmembers
itis willing
andwhether
arereasonable
Thisis analogous
toinditointervene.
Ifso,thegroupis obligated
manyothers.
toextend
aidwhentherisk,as
whofindthemselves
vidualbystanders
obligated
from
costsproceeds
reasonable
Theprocessofassessing
seeit,isreasonable.
they
first
A
collective
must
decide
evaluation.
and
deliberation
implementation
through
ofmassivehuman
indefense
ofvictims
n casualties
thatitis willingtotolerate
when
lessthanvital
about
costs
deliberate
as
members
abuses
might
just
rights
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224
PUBLIC AFFAIRS QUARTERLY
nationalinterests
areat stake.Ithas beensaid,forexample,thattheIsraelipublic
was willingtotoleratethedeathsof25 soldiersannuallyto sustaintheirpresence
in SouthernLebanonin the 1990s,just as theAmericanpubliccurrently
seems
to
tolerate
the
of
to
maintain
US
in
deaths
900
soldiers
willing
annually
policy Iraq
andAfghanistan.
Toleranceforlossesinhumanitarian
missionscan vary.Boththe
US andUN leftSomalia whenlosses wererelatively
50 and
light,approximately
150 fatalities,
between1992 and 1995. These losses,however,had
respectively,
to be magnified
of fighting
a limitedmilitary
by thefutility
operationto restore
orderin a failedstate.Whenintervention
more
successful,thepublicwill
provês
toleratesimilarorhigherlosses and showgreatersupportforhumanitarian
interventionthanpoliticalleaderssometimesappreciate.25
The 250 fatalitiesamong
UN andNATO led forcesin Bosnia (1992-1996) provokedlittlepublicoutcry.26
hazardous
weretakingon an increasingly
By 2007, NATO forcesinAfghanistan
roleinthefighting
thereandalthoughthepublic'sreactionremainstobe gauged,
theEU continuesto focussquarelyon humanitarian
intervention
as itplansforce
for
the
future
With
the
UN
Summit
one
2005
(below).
deployments
Agreement,
mightexpectsimilarcontingency
plansamongUN members.
Publicresponseto theseeventswill dependupontheactuallosses thatinterveningforcessufferand thesuccess theyachieve.In some cases, thecoststhe
publicwill tolerateemergefroma processof activeconsent:publicdebate,the
electoralprocess,legislativedeliberation,
social actionandjudicial activism.In
othercases, generalapathyandlackofdiscussionmayreflect
tacitconsentwhile
to exceedreasonablecostsrousepublicindignation.
Neitherprocessof
attempts
in interconsentcan be construedas volunteering.
Those citizensparticipating
ventionforcesmighteasilycomprisea "silent"andpoliticallyinactivemajority,
or have votedagainstlegislatorssupporting
intervention
or have been
military
minorswhenpolicymakersdecidedto go to war.
Reasonablecostsremainhighlysubjective.It is nota calculationof simple
of risking900 lives to save 1000. Rather,it appearsto be a functionof
utility,
relativecosts and risks.The intervening
groupwill surelylose lives,but will
some
when
human
a)
considering
sacrificing
rightsabusesaregreatandthegroup
can accomplishconsiderablegood by intervening,
b) thenumberof livesat risk
is smallrelativeto thesize ofthegroupand c) theriskto anyindividualmember
is tolerably
low.As nationsconsiderhumanitarian
thegood a nation
intervention,
seeks and thelives it will riskare thesubjectof constantdebateand réévaluation.None of thenumbersis hardand fast.Nevertheless,
humanitarian
military
aid imposesbuilt-inrestrictions.
First,themilitaryhas an absolutedutynotto
exceedthecostthebodypoliticimposes.Thereis no roomto appeal to military
in
necessityorreasonofstateto securegreaterresourcesortoescalatehostilities
a waythatmightbringgreatercasualties.Once itappearsnecessaryto mobilize
additionalresourcesto safeguarda persecutedpeople's humanrights,thebody
mustagainconsider
nation,notthemilitary
politicoftheintervening
exclusively,
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IS THERE A DUTY TO DIE FOR HUMANITY?
225
costs.Warsofhumanitarian
intervention
areunlikewarsofnational
reasonable
limitthenumber
oflivesa nationwillrisk
wherefewconstraints
self-defense
initsdefense.
warsofhumanitarian
intervention
demandthatthestatedistribute
Moreover,
forcessomecitizens
tobeara disproportioncostsfairly.
War,byitsverynature,
oweittooneanother
not
ateshareoftheburden.
Nevertheless,
groupmembers
thosewhorisktheirlives.Fairnessdemandsas proportionate
a
to overburden
oftheriskas possible.In Kutz'sexample,eachRed contributes
a
distribution
ofsacrificing
oneormore
smallamount
ofwatertoaidBlue.No onewouldthink
and
it
to
Blue.
all
their
water
Since
lives
arenot
individuals
bytaking
giving
ofriskcanbe distributed
inthesamewaythatwateris,onlytheburden
divisible
theriskandreducing
meansspreading
theodds
"Morefairly"
moreorlessfairly.
willdie.
thatthoseendangered,
i.e.,soldiers,
fromothers.
Contherisktosome,demands
greater
participation
Reducing
to
I
how
is
effect
of
noted
the
cooperationobligatory
sidering obligations Reds,
rescueonlyrequires
thecritical
rescueandtoholdcostsdown.Whileeffective
toholddownandfairly
successful
theobligation
totrigger
massnecessary
action,
muchmore.Distributing
the
warsdemands
thecostsofhumanitarian
distribute
to reducetheriskofdeath
themeansnecessary
burdenof warfairly
requires
with
of operations
soldiersandrotating
troopsfromthetheatre
byprotecting
to
harm.
risk
lessen
to
their
increased
Reducing by
exposure deadly
frequency
ontheground
ortours
twiceas manysoldiers
demands
forexample,
50 percent,
still.Obviously,
thereare
ofdutyhalfas long.Doingbothcutstheriskfurther
is a
intervention
butthepointis thathumanitarian
thatefficiency
limits
imposes,
infusion
ofresources
a considerable
thatdemands
form
ofarmedconflict
beyond
tosimply
whatis necessary
"getthejob done."
common
tomilitheideaofnecessity
toreduceriskbroadens
Theimperative
and
leaders
defense,
mayface
military political
taryethics.In warsofnational
their
toaccomplish
morelivesthannecessary
forsacrificing
criticism
legitimate
toreducetherisksoldiers
however,
goals.Theyfacenospecialobligation,
military
is unable
toprotect
vitalinterests
arescarce.Ifa nationfighting
faceifresources
to
oftroopsandequipment
number
to sparemorethantheminimal
necessary
to
be
forced
bear
those
sent
to
then
securea particular
may
veryhigh
fight
goal,
intervention
cannotmakethisdemandonsoldiers.
costs.A warofhumanitarian
the
thatthestatemayriskno morelivesthannecessary,
Apartfromstipulating
cannot
the
statemustalsoholddowntheriskeachsoldierfaces.Ifa nation
bring
intervention.
levelsthenitmaynotundertake
costsdowntoreasonable
Mitigatarmytomobilizetheforcesnecessary
ingcostsmayeasilyrequirea conscript
a first,
andnota last
A conscripted
toreducerisktosoldiers.
armyis,therefore,
warsofhumanitarian
measurethatstatesshouldturntoas theyconsider
resort
Fromtheperspective
of
orderofthinking.
ourearlier
Thisreverses
intervention.
othermustcomprise
individual
forces;
voluntary
intervening
troops
obligations,
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226
PUBLIC AFFAIRS QUARTERLY
wise,thereis no waytojustifytheirobligationtorisktheirlivesforothers.Froma
ifa nation
collectiveperspective,
a conscriptarmydeservescarefulconsideration
intervention.
is to meetthepracticaland moraldemandsof humanitarian
theproblematic
The EU's EuropeanSecurityand DefensePolicyillustrates
role of conscriptarmiesin humanitarian
intervention.
Envisioningtheneed to
projectforcebeyondthatrequiredfornationaldefense,theEU laid plans fora
60,000 man EuropeanRapid ResponseForce whose principledutiescomprise
"humanitarian
andrescuetasks"(Petersberg
Declaration,1992,II:4).27Forsome
in 2000, conscription
observerswriting
was thebiggestobstacletotheestablishmentof a rapidresponseforcebecause "forpoliticalreasons,conscriptsin most
As a result,humanicountries
can onlybe deployedforcollectiveself-defense."28
tarianintervention
wouldrequirevolunteers.
By 2004, however,EU forceswere
Macedonia
missionsinBosnia-Herzegovina,
humanitarian
successfully
fulfilling
and theDemocraticRepublicof Congo. In spiteof theirmodestscale- 1800
plantroopswenttoprotect
refugeesintheCongoin2003,forexample- military
nersbeganto understand
thatan effective
responseforcewouldrequire60,000
combatsoldiersand therefore
a pool of 150,000to 200,000 troops.Withinitial
plansto raiseonly100,000troops,wherewouldtheextrapersonnelcome from?
armiesbut,atthesametime,
Plannerscertainly
advocatedexpandingprofessional
can thisshortfall
also realizedthatthe"onlyifmemberstatesadaptconscription
authors
of a five-year
be remedied."29
conclude
the
"Deployabilitycapabilities,"
reviewoftheEU's defensepolicy,"shouldbe enhancedas legalbarriers
limiting
theavailabilityof conscriptsare lifted."30
The obstaclesthatlimitthe role of conscriptsare thosediscussedhere all
along.Onlynationaldefensecan obligateindividualstorisktheirlives;anything
else requiresvolunteers.In practice,however,relianceon volunteering,
thatis,
on individuallyimposedobligations,breaksdown.Facinginsufficient
numbers
of volunteers,
EU nationsmust"adapt"conscription
to undertake
humanitarian
intervention.
Thatis, theywillhavetoreleaseconscripts
fordutiesthatmayhave
littleor nothingto do withnationaldefense.Underlying
theEU's determination
is operationalnecessity:withoutconscriptedtroops,EU nationscannotfulfill
theircollectiveobligationto rescuevictimsof genocideor ethniccleansing.But
can do morethanmeetoperationaldemands.If 200,000 signifies
conscription
thenumbernecessaryto getthejob done,theargument
presentedherecalls for
evenlargernumbersoftroopsto ease theburdenofrisk.Otherwise,theEU runs
theriskofincurring
unreasonablecostsandmightagainface"political"pressure
to use itstroopssolelyfornationaldefense.
theirdecisionto go to warwhentheydeem
Apartfromfairlyimplementing
costs reasonable,nationsmustalso thinkaboutceasingmilitaryactivitywhen
costsbecometoohigh.Whena nationcan no longerintervene
atreasonablecosts
aid does makesubjectpopulationsconsiderably
worseoffthan
(and withdrawing
beforeintervention),
themoraldutyto intervene
as
diminishes,
just itdoes when
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IS THERE A DUTY TO DIE FOR HUMANITY?
227
financialresourcesto extendmaterial
a nationno longercommandssufficient
the
assistance.Assessingcostsandutilizingthecourtsandlegislature
to monitor
ofriskamongone's soldiersis imperative
wars
of
distribution
humanitarduring
in a way thatis notnecessary,and mayevenbe harmful,
when
ian intervention
nationalinterestsare at stake.Whateverthemeritsof Cicero's old saw inter
when
armasilentleges(duringwarthelaw is silent),itis onlyworthconsidering
intervention
nationsfightto protectvitalinterests.
Duringwarsof humanitarian
is desirable,ifnotmandatory.
constantpublicmonitoring
Once thecitizensof a wealthy,powerfulnationbelievethattheycan relieve
distressat costs theyconsiderreasonable,theyincura double obligationthat
demandstheyactcollectivelyon behalfofothersand,atthesametime,takecare
to protectthewelfareofthosetheysendto war.It wouldbe a mistake,however,
Whileone
to ask too muchabouttheindividual'sobligationto die forhumanity.
whose
EU
and
tomorrow
the
the
a
world,
entity,
today
mightimagine super-state
membersfeeljoined in contractor fellowfeelingjust as theydo in thenationstate,similarlyintensetiesremainconspicuouslyabsentamongthoserequiring
and thosebest able to provideit.While certainlythe"global civil
intervention
envisionsprovidesthegroundsfora contractual
society"thatStanleyHoffmann
in thiscontextis nownothingbutthe
die
for
to
("humanity"
humanity
obligation
we havetocontent
In themeantime,
statewritlarge),itis,atbest,a distanthope.31
ourselveswitha hardlookatthecollectiveobligationswe imposeuponourselves
simplybecause we are in a positionto help.Once we say that"'weshoulddo it"
because theclaimsagainstus arejust and thecost is reasonable,thenit is time
thatwe set ourselvesto workand makecertainthatwe all sharein theburden
thatmaycost some of us, or ourchildren,theirlives.
University
ofHaifa (Israel)
NOTES
Old Roles,"JointForcesQuarterly
"New Contingencies,
1. Samuel P. Huntington,
(Autumn1993), p. 42.
2. JosephP. Bialke, "UnitedNationsPeace Operations:ApplicableNormsand the
Applicationof theLaw of ArmedConflict,"TheAir Force Law Review,vol. 50, no. 1
(2001), pp. 1-63; JulesLobel and Michael Ratner,"Bypassingthe SecurityCouncil:
to Use Force,Cease-FiresandThe Iraqi InspectionRegime,"
AmbiguousAuthorizations
TheAmericanJournalofInternational
Law, vol.93 (1999), availableathttp://www.lexisCarsten
Stahn,"FutureImplicationof The Iraq Conflict:
nexis.co.uk/lnedemo/malmad;
of theCollectiveWill afterIraq," TheAmericanJournalof International
Enforcement
Law, vol. 97 (2003), availableat http^/www.lexis-nexis.co.uk/lnedemo/malmad.
3. 2005 World SummitOutcome,A/60/L.1,Resolutionof the United Nations
GeneralAssembly,October24, 2005, paragraph139, availableat http://unpanl.un.org/
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
228
PUBLIC AFFAIRSQUARTERLY
1752.pdf.See also Alicia L. Bannon,
intradoc/groups/public/documentsAJN/UNPAN02
toProtect:The UN WorldSummitandtheQuestionofUnilateralism,"
The Responsibility
TheYaleLaw Journal,vol. 115,no. 5 (March2006), pp. 1157-1165; FredericL. Kirgis,
"ASIL InsightInternational
Law: Aspectsofthe2005 WorldSummitOutcomeDocument,"
AmericanSocietyof InternationalLaw (October4, 2005), available at http://www.asil
.org/insights/2005/10/insights051004.html#author.
in J. L.
4. FernandoR Tesón, "The Liberal Case forHumanitarian
Intervention,"
and
PoRobert
O.
Humanitarian
Intervention:
and
Ethical,
Keohane,
Legal
Holzgrefe
liticalDilemmas(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
Press,2003), pp. 93-129, at page
in
In DefenseofInconsistency,"
129. See also ChrisBrown,"SelectiveHumanitarianism:
ed. Deen K. Chatterjeeand Don. E Scheid(Cambridge:
Ethicsand ForeignIntervention,
Press,2003), pp. 31-52.
CambridgeUniversity
Journal
5. AllenBuchanan,"TheInternal
Intervention,"
LegitimacyofHumanitarian
ofPoliticalPhilosophy,vol. 7 (1999), pp. 71-87, emphasisadded.
"Intervention:
ShouldIt Go On, Can It Go On?" inEthicsand
6. StanleyHoffmann,
and
ed.
ForeignIntervention, Chatterjee Scheid,p. 28, emphasisadded.
to StopMass KillingMorally
Intervention
7. JohnLango, "Is ArmedHumanitarian
vol. 15, no. 3 (2001), p. 187.
Obligatory?"PublicAffairsQuarterly,
8. See, forexample,Hugo Adam Bedau, "MilitaryServiceand Moral Obligation,"
Inquiry,vol. 14 (1971), pp. 244-266.
9. JeremyBentham,Specimenof a Penal Code, in Works,vol. 1, ed. J. Bowning
(Edinburgh,1843), p. 164.
10. "A woman'shead-dresscatchesfire:wateris at hand: a man,insteadof assisting to quenchthefire,looks on, and laughsat it.A drunkenman,fallingwithhis face
downwardsintoa puddle,is in dangerof suffocation:
liftinghis head a littleon one side
wouldsave him.Anothermansees thisand letshimlie. Who is therethatin anyofthese
to the
cases would thinkpunishment
misapplied?"(JeremyBentham,An Introduction
PrinciplesofMorals and Legislation[Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1907], chap. 16, para.
19,note 140.
11. MichaelA. Menlowe,"ThePhilosophicalFoundationsoftheDutyto Rescue,"in
TheDutyto Rescue: TheJurisprudence
ofAid,ed. MichaelA. Menlowe andAlexander
McCall Smith(Aldershot,UK: DartmouthPublishing,1993), pp. 5-54; Onora O'Neill,
Constructionsof Reason: Explorationsof Kant's Practical Philosophy(Cambridge:
Press,1989), chap. 12.
CambridgeUniversity
12. ErnestJ.Weinrib,"The Dutyto Rescue,"The Yale Law Journal,vol. 90 (1980),
pp. 290.
13. MichaelWalzer,"The Obligationto Die fortheState,"in Obligations:Essays on
Disobedience,Warand Citizenship(New York:Simonand Shuster,1970).
14. Leviathan21. See also AprilCarter,"Liberalismand theObligationto Military
Service,"PoliticalStudies,vol. 46 (1998), p. 75; JohnEverettDolman,"Obligationand
theCitizenSoldier:MachiavellianVirtueversusHobbesianOrder,"JournalofPolitical
and MilitarySociology,vol. 23 (Winter1995), pp. 191-212.
15. JohnRawls,A TheoryofJustice(Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity
Press,
1972), pp. 380-381.
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IS THERE A DUTY TO DIE FOR HUMANITY?
229
16. PatrickRiley,"Rousseau's GeneralWill,"in TheCambridgeCompaniontoRousPress,2001), pp. 124-153.
seau, ed. PatrickRiley(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
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and Self-Determination:
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in Hu18. FernandoR Tesón, "The Liberal Case forHumanitarianIntervention,"
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Ethical,Legal and PoliticalDilemmas,ed. J.L. Holzgrefeand
RobertO. Keohane(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
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19. Christopher.
Kutz, "The CollectiveWorkof Citizenship,"Legal Theory,vol. 8
471-494.
(2002), pp.
20. Ibid.,p. 488.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. UN Resolution1769 (July3 1, 2007).
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(November29,2005), availableathttp://www.nytimes.eom/2005/l
l/29/opinion/29kristof
"Mr. Bush, Here's a Plan for
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27. PetersbergDeclaration,WesternEuropeanUnion, June19, 1992; available at
19peten.pdf.
http://www.weu.int/documents/9206
forSecu28. FrancoisHeisbourg,EuropeanDefence:MakingitWork(Paris:Institute
rityStudies,WesternEuropeanUnion,2000), pp. 81-82, 85; emphasisadded; available
at http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai42e.pdf.
29. ISS (InstituteforSecurityStudies)Task Force,EuropeanDefense:A Proposal
fora WhitePaper,Reportofan IndependentTaskForce (Paris:EuropeanUnion,2004),
p. 102; availableat http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/wp2004.pdf.
30. Nicole Gnesotto,EU Securityand DefencePolicy: The FirstFive Years(1999forSecurityStudies,EuropeanUnion,2004), p. 124; availableat
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http://www.iss-eu.org/books/5esdpen.pdf.
3 1. Hoffmann,
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