International Journal of Public Opinion Research Vol. 23 No. 2
ß The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The World Association
for Public Opinion Research. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1093/ijpor/edq044 Advance Access publication 14 April 2011
Third-person Effect and Hostile Media Perception
Influences on Voter Attitudes toward Polls in the
2008 U.S. Presidential Election
Ran Wei1, Stella C. Chia2 and Ven-Hwei Lo3
1
School of Journalism & Mass Communications, University of South Carolina Columbia,
SC, USA, 2Department of Media & Communication, City University of
Hong Kong, Kowloon and 3School of Journalism & Communication,
Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, Hong Kong
Abstract
Focusing on the milestone 2008 U.S. Presidential Election, this study explores how
perceived impact of polls is influenced by one’s social comparison groups and perception of media hostility. Results, using survey data of 541 respondents, show that
respondents perceived others as more vulnerable than themselves to the influence of
election polls. Even though all of the published polls consistently indicated Obama’s
lead, some supporters of Obama and opponents of McCain reported that the polls
were in favor of McCain. Most importantly, the third-person perception and the
perceived poll bias were found to be associated with voters’ attitudes toward restrictions on election polls and their intention to engage in campaign discourse.
Modern elections are characterized by the ubiquity of polls. The 2008
Presidential Election in the United States was no exception. It was probably
the most polled election in history with a total of 150 national polls (Bialik,
2009). The ubiquitous election polls have become an integral component of
campaign coverage in the news media (Rhee, 1996; Traugott, 1992). Although
polling has become an institutionalized function and stellar content in news
media in the United States, the American public is ambivalent about election
polls. Past research suggests that Americans’ ambivalent attitudes toward
election polls originate from two types of negative perceptions of polls.
First, voters view polls as having no influence on themselves, but they fear
others may be affected (Pan, Abisaid, Paek, Sun, & Houden, 2005). Such a
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Ran Wei, School of Journalism & Mass
Communications, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC, 29208, USA. E-mail: [email protected]
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self-biased third-person perception (Davison, 1983) results in viewing election
polls as a bad thing (Price & Stroud, 2005). Second, voters tend to believe that
pollsters and news media are biased because pollsters are viewed as attempting
to influence election outcomes (Price & Stroud, 2005). This perception is
particularly pronounced when the candidate opposed by the voters appears
to be in the lead in the polls, a phenomenon characteristic of the hostile media
perception (Vallone, Ross, & Lepper, 1985). However, past research has not
examined the relationship between these two types of voter perception of
election polls and the consequence of such perceptions for voter attitudes
and behavior.
To fill the void, we test how perceived effects of election polls are related
to perceived poll bias by integrating the third-person effect hypothesis and the
hostile media effect. Because both the third-person perception and the hostile
media perception focus on the interrelationships among people’s perception of
media, of oneself, and of others, we make some theoretical propositions to
examine these two types of perception together. The study is valuable because
the third-person perception and the hostile media perception may enhance
each other and consequently produce a joint effect on people’s perception of
media effects. More importantly, the perception has implications for behavioral intentions. We chose the milestone 2008 U.S. Presidential Election as the
study context in which, for the first time, an African American candidate
(Barack Obama for president on the Democratic ticket) was running for the
White House. We will investigate how race and party afflation affect American
voters’ perceptions of the 150 polls and consequences of those perceptions in
their willingness to support censoring election polls and their likelihood to
engage in campaign discourse.
Literature Review and Hypotheses
The Third-person Effect Hypothesis
The third-person effect hypothesis refers to the perceived impact of media on
others relative to oneself. As Davison (1983) proposed, ‘‘people will tend to
overestimate the influence that mass communications have on the attitudes
and behavior of others’’ (p. 3). Numerous studies have documented evidence
validating the third-person hypothesis (Sun, Pan, & Shen, 2008; Paul, Salwen,
& Dupagne, 2000; Perloff, 1993, 1999). Research examining the public view of
the influence of presidential elections polls has shown typical third-person
perception: Surveyed respondents felt no influence of polls on themselves,
but others were believed to be affected (Lavrakas, Presser, Price, &
Traugott, 1998; Price & Stroud, 2005). With a third-person effect framework
to explore the perceptual gap in perceived effects of media reports of opinion
THIRD-PERSON EFFECT OF ELECTION POLLS
171
polls on oneself relative to others, Pan et al. (2005) found the same pattern
others were believed to be impacted by poll stories.
H1: Respondents will perceive polls in the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election to have a
greater impact on others than on themselves.
Social Distance Corollary and the Third-person Perception
The third-person perception tends to enhance in magnitude with increases in
perceived social distance between oneself and comparison others (Cohen,
Mutz, Price, & Gunther, 1988; McLeod, Eveland, & Nathanson, 1997; Wei
& Lo, 2007). Social distance is usually defined as a set of nested social or
geographic levels. Each space in social distance between oneself and others
entails an increase in social or geographic circle and makes others become
increasingly general and abstract. People accordingly perceive greater media
effects on the more general and abstract others (Meirick, 2005). For example,
college students perceive that media effects on others tend to increase as
the ‘‘other’’ grew in generality from ‘‘other students in the same university’’
to ‘‘residents in the same state’’ and then to ‘‘public opinion at large’’ (see
Perloff, 2002 for a review). This ‘‘social distance corollary’’ for third-person
perception (Eveland, Nathanson, Detenber, & McLeod, 1999) hinges on the
assumption that the greater the perceived distance between oneself and others,
the easier it is to assume that others are different from the self (Chia, Lu, &
McLeod, 2004; Perloff, 2002). People tend to perceive that similar others are
less susceptible than different others to media effects (Meirick, 2005). This
argument was also supported in the context of public opinion polls voters
tended to report greater self-other differences of perceived poll effects when
comparison others became more different from the self (Pan et al., 2005).
However, Meirick (2005) argued that the conceptualization of social distance as a set of nested social or geographic levels might not be relevant or
appropriate for contexts in which social groups are seen as opposing one
another. He proposed an alternative definition of social distance that views
social groups as ‘‘adjacent circles—in-groups and out-groups’’ (p. 236). People
tend to perceive that members of out-groups are distant and different from
members of in-groups. As a result, people would report a greater self-other
difference of perceived media effects when the comparison group is the
out-group than the in-group. For example, non-White respondents perceived
that the effects of news depictions of a minority neighborhood on White
others were greater than the corresponding effects on non-White others
(Neuwirth, Frederick, & Mayo, 2002). College women perceived that the effects of idealized body image on male friends were greater than the effects on
female friends (Goodman & Walsh-Childers, 2004). Members of the same
political party were judged as less influenced by campaign ads in an election
than members of a different political party (Duck, Terry, & Hogg 1995).
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The reference group approach to social distance suits political contexts like
elections well because there are always opposing social groups in such a situation (Meirick, 2005). We therefore apply the reference group approach to test
voters’ third-person perception about polls in relation to social distance in the
2008 U.S. Presidential Election. In the U.S. presidential elections, the natural
opposing groups are Democrats and Republicans. A voter tends to identify
other voters of the same party as in-group members, and view voters of
a different party as out-group members. Additionally, in the 2008 U.S.
Presidential Election, race-based opposing groups also existed because there
was a Black candidate. For the first time in history, the U.S. presidential
election became a contest between a non-White and a White candidate (i.e.,
Barack Obama vs. John McCain for president). A voter might differentiate
out-group members from in-group members based on race. Therefore, we
anticipate that the third-person perceptual gap reported by voters would
vary upon voters’ perception of self-other similarity in both dimensions of
party affiliation and race.
The social distance corollary for third-person perception is contingent on
people’s judgments about the desirability of media contexts (Chapin, 2000;
Lambe & McLeod, 2005). Specifically, people tend to perceive that media
effects on dissimilar others or out-group members are greater than media
effects on similar others or in-group members when media messages are socially undesirable. On the other hand, when media messages are socially desirable, people tend to perceive that media effects on dissimilar others or
out-group members are smaller than media effects on similar others or
in-group members (Meirick, 2005). In the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election,
most election polls indicated that the Democratic Black candidate Obama led
in the polls in the last few weeks of the campaign. The closer Election Day
approached, the larger his lead over Republican White candidate McCain grew
(Figure 1). Democratic voters or Black voters were likely to consider the
media polls socially desirable whereas Republican voters or White voters
were likely to consider the media polls socially undesirable (Milavsky, Swift,
Roper, Salant, & Abrams, 1985). Their perception of the effects of election
polls may vary accordingly. To test this, we propose the following set of
hypotheses.
H2a: Republican voters will perceive that the effects of election polls
Democratic voters are greater than the effects on other Republican voters.
H2b: Democratic voters will perceive that the effects of election polls
Republican voters are smaller than the effects on other Democratic voters.
H2c: White voters will perceive that the effects of election polls on Black voters
greater than the effects on other White voters.
H2d: Black voters will perceive that the effects of election polls on White voters
smaller than the effects on other Black voters.
on
on
are
are
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FIGURE 1
Gallup Daily Polls: The 2008 U.S. Presidential Election.
Note: Gallup Daily election tracking reports the percentage of registered voters who say they
would support each candidate if the presidential election were held today. Results based on a
five-day rolling average through November 2 and a 3-day average since September 29, 2008.
Source: http://www.gallup.com/poll/107674/Gallup-Daily-Election-2008.aspx
Hostile Media Perception and Third-person Perception
People’s group identification affects not only their perception of media influence, but also their perception of media bias. Vallone et al. (1985) coined the
term ‘‘hostile media perception’’ to describe the phenomenon in which people
on opposing sides of a controversial issue perceive that the same news coverage is biased in favor of the opposing group (i.e., the out-group) and against
their own group (i.e., the in-group). In their study, Vallone and his colleagues
exposed the same news broadcasts concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict to
pro-Arab and pro-Israel students. They found that both parties, after being
exposed to the news broadcasts, reported that the news coverage was biased in
favor of the opposing side, while non-partisans viewed the same coverage as
distinctly neutral. This finding of hostile media effect received further empirical support in a number of later studies (Christen, Kannaovakun, & Gunther,
2002; Chia, Yong, Wong, & Koh, 2007; Dalton, Beck, & Huckfeldt, 1998;
Gunther & Schmitt, 2004; Matheson & Dursun, 2001).
One-and-a-half decades after Vallone and his colleagues proposed the
hostile media perception, Gunther, Christen, Liebhart, and Chia (2001) expanded the idea into so-called ‘‘relative hostile media effect,’’ suggesting that
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partisans from both ends of a controversial issue would regard the same news
coverage to be at least less agreeable with their own group than with the
opposing group, if not completely against their own group. They conducted
a field experiment, in which they exposed slanted articles to both animal right
activists and primate researchers (half was exposed to articles supportive for
primate research and the other half was exposed to articles against primate
research). They found that partisans for both sides, although recognizing that
the articles were slanted towards a particular side, still perceived that the given
coverage was significantly less agreeable to their own point of view relative to
their opponents’ side. Similar results were reported by a later survey study,
which utilized a representative sample that consisted of general public rather
than only partisans (Gunther & Chia, 2001). The results showed that the
majority of the public in the United States reported that overall news coverage
was unfavorable toward primate research while a sizeable minority reported
that the news coverage was neutral. More importantly, respondents who supported primate research were more likely than those who opposed primate
research to judge the news coverage to be significantly more unfavorable
toward primate research. While hostile media effect occurs only in the context
of neutral news coverage and partisan audiences (Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken,
1994; Perloff, 1989), the relative hostile media effect proved to happen in the
context of news slant favoring one side of an issue and when audiences are the
general public rather than partisans (Gunther et al., 2001).
The 2008 U.S. Presidential Election was ideal for testing the relative
hostile media effect, which does not require neutral news treatment of
issues or only highly involved partisans. As Figure 1 shows, most elections
polls indicated that Obama consistently led the campaign. Most voters would
report that the polls favored Obama and disfavored McCain. But according to
the relative hostile media effect, voters who supported Obama will be less
likely than voters who did not support Obama to perceive that election polls
favored Obama and disfavored McCain. On the other hand, supporters of
McCain will be more likely than voters who did not support McCain to
perceive that election polls favored Obama and disfavored McCain.
H3a: Supporters of Obama are less likely than opponents
that election polls favored Obama.
H3b: Supporters of Obama are less likely than opponents
that election polls disfavored McCain.
H3c: Supporters of McCain are more likely than opponents
that election polls favored Obama.
H3d: Supporters of McCain are more likely than opponents
that election polls disfavored McCain.
of Obama to perceive
of Obama to perceive
of McCain to perceive
of McCain to perceive
People’s perception of hostile media bias is likely to affect their perception
of media influence. When pro-Arab and pro-Israel students in the Vallone
THIRD-PERSON EFFECT OF ELECTION POLLS
175
et al. study (1985) viewed the same newscast as biased against their side, both
sides reported that exposure to the newscast would produce undesirable
influence on others—that is, influence neutral audiences to become more unfavorable toward their own side and to become more sympathetic to the other
side. Similarly, when primate researchers and animal rights activists in an
experiment perceived that slanted media coverage was relatively unfavorable
towards their own side, they reported that public opinion was swayed by the
slanted article and became relatively against their own side (Gunther et al.,
2001). We conclude that when people perceive that media are biased in favor
of the opposing side, they are likely to perceive an undesirable influence of
media. As third-person perception is particularly pronounced in the context of
undesirable media influence (Gunther & Thorson, 1992; Gunther & Mundy,
1993), we hypothesize that people’s perception of media bias is likely to be
positively associated with their third-person perception when they perceive
that media is biased in favor of the opposing side.
Therefore, for supporters of McCain, polls that were perceived as biased
in favor of Obama were hostile. An increase in their perceptions of polls’
biases in favor of Obama is likely to be positively associated with an increase
in the magnitude of third-person perception. This association, however, may
not apply to supporters of Obama, who considered election polls that were in
favor of Obama as benign and desirable. On the other hand, for supporters of
Obama, polls that were perceived as biased in favor of McCain would appear
hostile. An increase in their perception of polls’ biases in favor of McCain
is likely to be positively associated with an increase in the magnitude
of third-person perception (this association may not apply to supporters of
McCain). We therefore propose the following two hypotheses:
H4a: Perceived poll bias in favor of Obama will be correlated more strongly with
third-person perception for supporters of McCain than for supporters of Obama.
H4b: Perceived poll bias in favor of McCain will be correlated more strongly with
third-person perception for supporters of McCain than for supporters of Obama.
Third-person Perception and Behavioral Intention
A biased third-person perception, as Davison (1996) proposed, has behavioral
implications. People tend to act on their perceptions even though the perceptions are subject to errors. As Gunther and Storey (2003) suggested, people
who assume influences of media messages on audiences will adapt their
behavior to correspond to those assumptions. Audience-specific rectifying
behaviors include attempts to restrict messages with a negative influence, to
correct messages with an ambiguous influence, and to amplify messages with a
positive influence (Sun, Shen, & Pan, 2008).
Past studies of the perceived harmful effects of negative media content
focused on public support for restrictions of such content. People who
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overestimated the effect of negative media content on others were found to
likely support media censorship to protect the others (Hoffner & Buchanan,
2002; McLeod et al., 1997; Rojas, Shah, & Faber, 1996; Salwen, 1998; Youn,
Faber, & Shah, 2000). Findings reported in studies of perceived effects of
polls are consistent with the literature. de Vreese and Semetko (2002) revealed
that the more voters were concerned about the influence of polls on the public
in Denmark’s 2000 Euro referendum, the stronger the support for restrictions
on the publication of such polls. The self-other perceptual gap was related to
the likelihood of support for restricting pre-election polls (Price & Stroud,
2005) and banning election projections (Lavrakas, Holley, & Miller, 1991) in
the United States. Thus, we hypothesize that
H5: The third-person perception of election polls will be associated with voters’
likely support for restrictions of election polls.
Recent research expanded the domain of behavioral outcome of the
third-person perception to political and civic participation. Mutz (1989)
found that people’s willingness to speak out on an issue was influenced by
perceptions of other’s opinions. Neuwirth et al. (2002) reported that the joint
effect of first-and third-person perceptions was positively associated with
respondents’ intentions in civil participation such as discussions about elections and voting. Accordingly,
H6: The third-person perception of election polls will be associated with voters’
intention to engage in campaign discourse.
Finally, we propose that voters’ hostile media perception of polls in the
2008 U.S. Presidential Election will also account for their likely support for restrictions of election polls and their intention to engage in campaign discourse.
Individuals’ favorable attitudes toward media censorship often reflect their
intention to penalize the media for doing harm to the subject of the negative
or undesirable communication (Gunther, 1991). They hold pro-censorship
attitudes in order to compensate for the subject of negative communication
and to punish media for circulating undesirable messages (Chia et al., 2004).
This explanation was validated when people felt that the media content disfavored the subject involved in the communication-like defamatory news stories (Gunther, 1991) or videos that exposed the private sex life of public figures
(Chia et al., 2004). Election polls fit such a context as well. When voters perceive that election polls are biased in favor of the candidate to whom they
oppose, they at the same time perceive that the polls disfavor the candidate
whom they support. They are likely to support restrictions of election polls to
penalize the media and to compensate the candidate whom they support.
H7: Voters’ hostile media perception of polls in the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election
will be associated with their likelihood to support restrictions of election polls.
THIRD-PERSON EFFECT OF ELECTION POLLS
177
In addition to supporting media censorship, voters are likely to engage in
some behavior to ‘‘correct’’ the unpopularity that election polls impose on the
candidate whom they support and the popularity that polls impose on the
candidate whom they oppose. When individuals perceive hostile media
bias, they tend to take certain actions to counteract the media coverage.
Rojas (2009) found that a person’s perception of media hostility toward his
or her view predicts the person’s online behaviors that seek to correct what are
seen as potential biases in the public sphere. Hwang, Pan, and Sun (2008) also
found that negative emotions brought by hostile media perception increased
college students’ willingness to engage in discursive activities. We expect that
voters’ perception of election polls’ hostile bias would motivate them to engage
in campaign discourse behavior in order to do justice to the candidate disfavored by media polls.
H8: Voters’ hostile bias perception of polls in the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election
will be associated with their intention to engage in campaign discourse.
Method
A probability sample was used in collecting data for hypothesis testing.
The sample was drawn from a public university in the South-east enrolling
24,000 students. The sample was deemed appropriate because of enthusiasm
in the election among the twenty somethings. Using class as the sampling unit,
the sample was stratified by size of departments. First, departments were
randomly selected from a stratified list of large, medium, and small ones.
After stratification, there were seven large, 37 medium, and 20 small departments. From these 64 departments, two large, five medium, and three small
departments were selected randomly. Then, classes from a stratified list of
large (at least 100 students), medium (50–99), and small (less than 49) classes
in each of the selected departments were selected randomly.
Using this multi-stage sampling procedure, a total of three large, eight
medium, and eight small classes were randomly drawn. The total sample size
was 754. Trained undergraduate students assisted in administering the survey
in a period of two weeks prior to Election Day on November 4, 2008.
Specifically, prior approval was obtained from instructors; when refused, a
replacement class was used. The survey was administered at the beginning
of class. Respondents were assured of anonymity and confidentiality.
Participation was voluntary, no class credit was offered. Among the 754 students in the sample, 541 completed the survey, yielding a response rate of
68.3%. Among the 541 respondents, 46.6% were males. Nearly half (42.4%)
were seniors, followed by sophomores (25.8%), juniors (22.4%), freshmen
(9.0%), and graduate students (0.04%). The average age was 20.9 years
(SD ¼ 2.53, ranging from 18 to 44). In term of race, 82.9% were White,
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9.8% were African-Americans, 2.8% were Asians, and 1.7% were Hispanics.
The key demographics of the sample, namely gender and race, were comparable with the university population. With regard to party affiliation, 37.3%
self-reported themselves as strong or moderate Democrats, 20.5% as
Independent, and 42.2% as strong or moderate Republicans.
Measurement
Perceived effects of election polls on oneself. Respondents were requested to rate how much the polls would affect their voting decision in
the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election. The five-point response categories
included 1 (‘‘no influence at all’’), 2 (‘‘very little influence’’), 3 (‘‘a little
influence’’), 4 (‘‘some influence’’), and 5 (‘‘a great deal of influence’’)
(M ¼ 2.08, SD ¼ 1.20).
Perceived effects of election polls on others. Respondents were asked
to rate how much the polls would affect the voting decision of (a) independent
voters, (b) Democratic voters, and (c) Republican voters. The same 5-point
scale was used. Principal component factor analysis showed that the three
items grouped in a single factor (Eigenvalue ¼ 1.76, accounting for 58.67%
of the variance). They were averaged to create a composite measure of perceived effects of election polls on others (M ¼ 3.00, SD ¼ .86, ¼ .63).
Similarly, respondents were asked to rate how much the polls would affect
the voting decision of (a) White voters (M ¼ 3.08, SD ¼ 1.02) and (b) African
American voters (M ¼ 3.21, SD ¼ 1.22). The two items were used to test H2c
and H2d.
Third-person perception. The difference in scores between perceived
effects of election polls on oneself and others was calculated to measure the
magnitude of third-person perception (M ¼ 0.93, SD ¼ 1.21).
Support of candidates. We asked respondents to report how likely they
would vote for the Democratic ticket or the Republican ticket. Those who
reported that they were somewhat likely, likely or very likely to vote for the
Democratic ticket were coded as supporters of Obama whereas those who
indicated that they were unlikely or very unlikely to vote for Obama were
coded as opponents of Obama. Supporters and opponents of McCain were
constructed in a similar manner.
Perceived election polls bias. Respondents were asked to rate the
extent to which they agreed that media reports of election polls favored
Obama (M ¼ 3.78, SD ¼ 0.83) and the extent to which they agreed that
media election polls favored McCain (M ¼ 2.53, SD ¼ 0.83) on a 5-point
Likert scale including ‘‘strongly disagree,’’ ‘‘disagree,’’ ‘‘neutral,’’ ‘‘agree,’’
and ‘‘strongly agree.’’
Hostile media perception of polls. We used the previous two items to
compute the degree to which voters perceived that election polls were in favor
THIRD-PERSON EFFECT OF ELECTION POLLS
179
of the candidate that they did not support (M ¼ 3.40, SD ¼ 1.03.). Specifically,
we computed the degree to which supporters of McCain perceived that
election polls were in favor of Obama (M ¼ 2.99, SD ¼ 0.90.) and the
degree to which supports of Obama perceived that election polls were in
favor of McCain (M ¼ 3.94, SD ¼ 84.).
Support for restrictions of election polls
Using a 5-point scale including 1 (‘‘very unlikely’’), 2 (‘‘unlikely’’), 3 (‘‘don’t
know/not sure’’), 4 (‘‘likely’’), and 5 ("very likely"), respondents were asked
how likely they would take the following action to limit the impact of polls on
voters in the 2008 presidential election: (a) sign a petition for fair media
reports of election poll results, (b) boycott news organizations that reported
election polls with bias, (c) support legislative action to penalize news organizations that reported election polls unfairly, and (d) support legislative action
to ban unfair reports about election polls. These items were subject to a
principal component factor analysis to assess dimensionality. A single-factor
solution emerged (Eigenvalue ¼ 3.00, accounting for 74.87% of the variance).
The items were combined into a composite measure of support for restrictions
on election polls in the media (M ¼ 2.41, SD ¼ 1.20, ¼ .89).
Campaign discourse engagement
Using the same 5-point scale, respondents were asked to indicate how likely
they would (a) discuss the presidential election polls with others, (b) discuss
the popularity of the presidential candidates with others, (c) seek more information about the polls, (d) and use polls to persuade others to vote for a
candidate. Results of an exploratory factor analysis of the four items confirmed
that they measured a single underlying concept. The one factor solution accounted for 61.07% of the variance (Eigenvalue ¼ 2.44). A composite measure
of campaign discourse engagement was constructed by averaging the four
items (M ¼ 2.84, SD ¼ .85, ¼ .78).
Findings
H1 predicted that respondents would perceive that media reported polls in the
2008 U.S. Presidential Election had greater influence on others than on themselves. To test it, we performed two sets of one-way repeated ANOVA tests
with pair-wise comparisons. One compared voters’ perceptions of poll effects
on oneself to the same voters’ perceptions of poll effects of voters of a different party affiliation, the other compared voters’ perceptions of poll effects
on oneself to the same voters’ perceptions of poll effects on other voters of
different races. Results supported the baseline third-person perception (see
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Table 1
Mean Estimates of Perceived Effects of Election Polls on Oneself and Others (by Party
Affiliation)
Comparison groups
Samples
n
Oneself
All
Democrats
Republicans
537
195
221
2.08 (1.20)
2.17 (1.23)
2.02 (1.16)
Others/Other
Democrats
Others/Other
Republicans
3.12 (1.20)
3.13 (1.12)
3.19 (1.21)
2.88 (1.10)
2.94 (1.08)
2.90 (1.00)
t-values
135.57***
59.62***
69.53***
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. ***p < .001
Table 2
Mean Estimates of Perceived Effects of Election Polls on Oneself and Others (by Race)
Comparison groups
Samples
n
Oneself
All
Whites
Blacks
537
437
52
2.08 (1.20)
2.03 (1.14)
2.31 (1.16)
White voters
Black voters
3.08 (1.19)
3.07 (0.97)
3.16 (1.30)
3.22 (1.21)
3.21 (1.18)
3.23 (1.45)
t-values
199.10***
173.52***
14.72***
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. ***p < .001
Table 1 for party affiliation and Table 2 for race). Pairwise comparisons with
Bonferroni correction showed significant differences between perceived effects
on oneself vs. Democrat supporters t(536) ¼ 16.42 at p < .001 and significant
differences between perceived effects on oneself vs. Republican supporters
t(536) ¼ 13.53, p < .001 (see Table 1). There were also significant differences
between perceived effects on oneself vs. Black voters t(536) ¼ at p < .001 and
significant differences between perceived effects on oneself vs. White voters
t(536) ¼ p < .001 (Table 2). H1 received robust support.
H2a and H2b predicted that Republican voters would perceive that the
effects of election polls on Democrat voters are greater than the effects on
other Republican voters, whereas Democrat voters would perceive that the
effects of election polls on Republican voters are smaller than the effects on
Democrat voters. Again, to test these two hypotheses, we performed two sets
of one-way repeated ANOVA tests with pair-wise comparisons for Republican
voters and Democrat voters respectively. As Table 1 shows, in the Republican
sample, results showed an overall significant difference in perceived poll
effects on the self, other Republicans, and Democrats (Table 1). Pair-wise
comparisons with Bonferroni correction indicated a significant difference between perceived poll effects for oneself vs. other Democrats t(220) ¼ 11.33
THIRD-PERSON EFFECT OF ELECTION POLLS
181
at p < .001; for oneself vs. other Republicans t(220) ¼ 10.61, p < .001 and for
other Democrats vs. other Republicans t(220) ¼ 3.92, p < .001. Republican
supporters tended to believe that election polls had a greater impact on
Democratic supporters than on Republican supporters. H2a was supported.
On the other hand, in the Democratic sample, results showed an overall significant difference in perceived poll effects on the self, other Republicans,
and Democrats (Table 1). Pair-wise comparisons with Bonferroni correction
indicated a significant difference between perceived poll effects for oneself vs.
other Democrats t(194) ¼ 10.77, p < .001; for oneself vs. other Republicans
t(194) ¼ 7.40 at p < .001; for other Democrats vs. other Republicans and
t(195) ¼ 3.08, p < .01. Democratic supporters tended to believe that election
polls had a greater influence on Democratic supporters than on Republican
supporters. H2b was also supported.
H2c and H2d predicted that White voters would perceive that the effect of
election polls on Black voters are greater than the effects on White voters,
whereas Black voters would perceive that the effects of election polls on White
voters are smaller than the effects on other Black voters. We performed two
sets of one-way repeated ANOVA tests with Bonferroni correction for White
voters and Black voters, respectively. As shown in Table 2, in the White
sample, results showed that perceived poll effects on the self are different
from the perceived effects on others. Pairwise comparisons indicated significant differences in perceived media effects for oneself vs. other White voters,
t(436) ¼ 16.76 at p < .001, for oneself vs. Black voters t(436) ¼ 17.77 at
p < .001, and for Black voters vs. White voters (Table 2). White voters tended
to believe that election polls had a greater influence on Black voters than on
other White voters. On the other hand, in the Black voter sample, results
showed significant differences among perceived poll effects on the self and
perceived poll effects on others (Table 2). Pair-wise comparisons indicated
significant differences in perceived poll effects for oneself vs. White voters,
t(51) ¼ 4.47 at p < .001, for oneself vs. other Black voters, t(51) ¼ 5.14 at
p < .001, but not for White voters vs. Black voters t(51) ¼ 0.34 at p > .05.
The difference between perceived effects on White voters and other African
American voters was not significant. H2c was supported, but H2d was not.
H3a and 3b predicted that supporters of Obama would be less likely
than opponents of Obama to perceive that election polls were in favor of
Obama and that election polls were in disfavor of McCain. To test these
two hypotheses, we performed two sets of independent sample t-tests. As
shown in Table 3, results of independent sample t-test showed that supporters
of Obama were less likely than opponents of Obama to perceive that election
polls were biased in favor of Obama, t(526) ¼ 4.26 at p < .001 and that
election polls disfavor of McCain, t(523) ¼ 4.64 at p < .001. H3a and H3b
were both supported. Similarly, H3c and H3d predicted that supporters
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Table 3
Mean Estimates of Perceived Election Polls Bias among Obama Supporters, Obama
Opponents, McCain Supporters, and McCain Opponents
Perceived bias
in favor of
Obama
McCain
Barack Obama
John McCain
Supporter
Opponents
t-value
Supporters
Opponents
t-values
3.64 (0.75)
2.67 (0.79)
3.94 (0.90)
2.34 (0.83)
4.26***
4.64***
3.94 (0.84)
2.38 (0.83)
3.62 (0.77)
2.65 (0.78)
4.56***
3.76***
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. ***p < .001
of McCain would be more likely than opponents of McCain to perceive that
election polls were biased in favor of Obama and that election polls were
biased in disfavor of McCain. We also performed two sets of independent
sample t-tests. Results showed that supporters of McCain were more likely
than McCain opponents to perceive that election polls were favorable toward
Obama, t(524) ¼ 4.56 at p < .001 and that election polls were unfavorable
toward McCain, t(520) ¼ 3.76, p < .001. Both H3c and H3d were supported.
H4a predicted that perceived election poll bias in favor of Obama would
be more strongly correlated with the magnitude of the third-person perception
for supporters of McCain than for supporters of Obama. To test it, we
first examined the partial correlation between perceived election poll bias in
favor of Obama and the magnitude of the third-person perception for supporters of McCain (pr(254) ¼ .25, p < .001) and for supporters of Obama
(pr(273) ¼ .03, n.s.) controlling for respondents’ gender, age, race, party affiliation, and media use. We then conducted a z-test and found that the two
correlation coefficients are significantly different (Z ¼ 2.50, p < .01). H4a was
supported. Similarly, H4b posited that perceived poll bias in favor of McCain
would be correlated more strongly with third-person perception for supporters
of McCain than for supporters of Obama. We examined the partial correlation
between perceived election poll bias in favor of McCain for supporters
of McCain (pr ¼ .23, p < .001) and for supporters of Obama (pr ¼ .02, n.s.).
A z-test showed that the two correlation coefficients are significantly different
too (Z ¼ 2.46, p < .01). H4b was supported.
H5 predicted that the third-person perception of election polls would
predict the likelihood of support for restrictions of such polls. To test it,
two hierarchical regression analyses were performed. The first two blocks of
the equation entered demographics and media use as control variables, followed by perceived election poll bias. The final block entered perceived effects
of election polls on oneself, on others, and the third-person perception. As
Table 4 shows (columns 1 and 2), the third-person perception was positively
related to likelihood to support restrictions of election polls. Interestingly,
perceived effects of election polls on oneself was significantly, but negatively
related to support likelihood, while perceived effects of such polls on others
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THIRD-PERSON EFFECT OF ELECTION POLLS
Table 4
Regression Analyses Predicting Support for Restrictions on News about Election Polls and
Campaign Discourse Engagement
Independent variables
Demographics
Gender (male)
Age
Race (White)
Party affiliation (Democratic)
Party affiliation (Republican)
Adjusted R2
Media use
General media use
Exposure to election polls
Attention to election polls
Incremental adjusted R2
Perceived election poll bias
Perceived poll bias
Incremental adjusted R2
Perceived poll effects
Perceived effects on oneself
Perceived effects on others
Third-person perception
Incremental adjusted R2
Total adjusted R2
Support for restrictions
(n ¼ 449)
Campaign discourse
engagement (n ¼ 450)
.00
.10*
.01
.01
.05
.01
.00
.10*
-.01
.02
-.05
.01
.04
.02
.08
.02
.04
.02
.10
.02
.01
.22***
.33***
.26
.00
.20**
.37***
.26
.26***
.06
.26***
.06
.08y
.00
.08y
.00
-.10*
.05
.01
.08
-.03
.03
.20***
.04
.13**
.14**
.02
.11
.09*
.07y
.01
.06
.03
.03
.15***
.02
.11
.04
.34
.14***
.02
.31
Notes: Beta weights are from final regression equation with all blocks of variables in the model. Variables
recoded as follows: gender (1 ¼ male, 0 ¼ female); race (1 ¼ White; 0 ¼ others).
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; yp < .10
was a significant and positive predictor. These results suggest that the more
polls in the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election were believed to affect others, the
stronger the respondents’ likelihood to take action to restrict them. H5 was
supported.
H6 predicted that the third-person perception of election polls would
predict voter intention to engage in campaign discourse. Two more hierarchical regression analyses were performed to test it. The first two blocks of the
equation entered demographics and media use as control variables. The third
block included perceived election polls bias. The final block entered perceived
effect of election polls on oneself, on others, and the third-person perception.
As shown in Table 4 (columns 3 and 4), the third-person perception was a
significant and negative predictor of likelihood to engage in campaign discourse. That is, the more respondents believed that election polls had influenced themselves, the stronger their intention to seek more information about
the polls and discuss them with others. H6 was supported. Interestingly,
perceived effect of election polls on others was not a significant predictor of
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intention to engage in campaign discourse, but perceived effect of election
polls on oneself was.
H7 stated that voters’ hostile media perception of polls would be associated with their likelihood to support restrictions of election polls. As shown
in Table 4, results of hierarchical regression analysis showed that after controlling for the influences of demographics and three media use variables,
voters’ hostile media perception was a significant and positive predictor
of likelihood of support for restrictions of election polls. H7 was supported.
H8 predicted that voters’ hostile media perception of polls would be associated
with their intention to engage in campaign discourse. As shown in Table 4,
after controlling for the influences of demographics and three media use variables, voters’ hostile media perception of polls was not significantly related to
their intention to engage in campaign discourse. H8 was not supported.
Conclusions and Discussion
In the context of the historical 2008 U.S. Presidential Election, we investigated voters’ third-person perception and the hostile media perception of
polls. Consistent with previous studies (Lavrakas et al., 1998; Pan et al.,
2005; Price & Stroud, 2005), we found that voters perceived others as more
vulnerable than themselves to the influence of election polls. The egocentric
explanation of the third-person perception (Rucinski & Salmon, 1990) fits
here: American voters tend to think that they are smarter and better than
other voters and that they are less vulnerable than other voters to the ‘‘bad’’
influence of numerous election polls.
We examined this self-serving bias in an in-group vs. out-group situation
by proposing that voters would report that the effects of polls on voters of a
different party affiliation or racial group were greater than the effects of polls
on voters of the same party affiliation or racial group. We found support for
these propositions for Republican voters and White voters, but not for
Democratic and Black voters. These findings suggested that the social distance
corollary for the third-person perception is contingent on people’s judgments
about the desirability of media messages. For Democrats and Black voters,
most polls of the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election indicated desirable messages.
The third-person differentials shrank when comparison others belonged to
out-groups. This finding is likely to be a function of self-serving out-group
bias (Hamilton & Trolier, 1986).
We also found evidence of the relative hostile media perception in the
context of election polls. Although most voters perceived that the polls favored
Democratic candidate Obama, supporters of the two candidates—Obama and
McCain—appeared to see and evaluate the election polls differently.
Opponents of Obama or supporters of McCain were more likely than
THIRD-PERSON EFFECT OF ELECTION POLLS
185
supporters of Obama or opponents of McCain to perceive that the election
polls were favorable toward Obama and unfavorable toward McCain.
Supporters of Obama or opponents of McCain were more likely than opponents of Obama or supporters of McCain to perceive that the polls were favorable toward McCain. These findings show that voters’ evaluation of the
bias of election polls may stem less from efforts of pollsters or journalists, but
more from voters’ preference for candidates. Particularly, even though polls
consistently indicated Obama’s lead, some supporters of Obama and opponents
of McCain reported that the polls were in favor of McCain. This finding
suggests that we may expect divergent perceptions from opposing camps no
matter how balanced or biased the polls might be. When the election polls
consistently indicate the lead of one camp’s candidate, supporters on both
sides still see the polls as more hostile to, or less agreeable with, their own
side relative to the way the other group sees it.
Furthermore, we found that voters’ perceived media bias was positively
associated with the third-person perception when the voters perceived that the
media bias was in favor of the candidate to whom they opposed, but not when
the voters perceived that the media bias was in favor of the candidate they
supported. This finding suggested a link between hostile media perception and
the third-person perception. When voters perceive that the media are biased
against their own side, their perceived negativity of media messages increases.
The increase in perceived negativity of media messages is, in turn, positively
associated with third-person perception. This finding shows that not only
comparison groups, but also people’s hostile media perception affects the
self-other perceptual differential. This provides additional support for the
self-serving bias explanation for third-person perception, too. In the voters’
perception, they were smart enough to see the hostile bias of media polls while
others were not. Therefore, they believed that they were aware of the bias in
the election polls, and that they believed that they were able to resist the
influence of polls. They, however, did not have the same faith in others.
Voters’ lack of confidence in others’ ability to resist the influence of polls
led them to likely support restrictions of election polls and engage in campaign
discourse. We found that the third-person perception and the hostile media
perception were correlates of likelihood of support for restrictions of election
polls. The third-person perception correlated with voters’ intention to engage
in campaign discourse. These findings suggest that voters considered censorship as a way to limit the harm of election polls and to penalize the polls for
being biased in favor of the opposing candidate. In addition, they also wanted
to engage in campaign discourse probably to close the gap between perceived
poll effects on the self and on others. These findings provide further support
for paternalism (McLeod et al., 1997; McLeod et al., 2001), which suggests a
practice of treating or governing others in a parental manner. Our study
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH
suggests that to protect others, people would support censorship to limit
others’ rights to have access to media information. People would also
engage in discursive activities with an intention to ‘‘guide’’ people how to
think and what to think. Sun et al. (2008) characterized this intention as
corrective action.
Some limitations call for careful interpretations of the findings. First, we
used cross-sectional survey data. Although the associations proposed in the
hypotheses are supported theoretically and empirically, the results were unable
to fully establish the causal inference. In addition, participants in the survey
may base their judgments of media bias on very different media sources. This
possibility, instead of hostile media perception, may explain why McCain
supporters and Obama supporters were different in their perceptions of election poll bias. However, as Figure 1 shows, most election polls at that time
indicated that Obama commanded the lead. Judgments of media bias on different media sources are likely to be similar. Future studies can use experiments to improve the explanatory power of the predicted causal relations.
Second, the use of a student sample may limit the external validity of the
findings. Future researchers should consider using a representative sample
consisting of voters from different age groups and education levels. A representative sample will allow us to examine how age, education, or other demographic factors moderate voters’ third-person perception and hostile media
perception of election polls.
Like most studies, this study measured perceived influence of polls without further measuring the direction of influence. This is another limitation
because past research suggests that the public tends to have ambivalent views
about polls (Price & Stroud, 2005). As a type of media message, polls can be
viewed as beneficial or harmful (Wei, Lo & Lu, 2010). It would thus be
instructive to explore the perceived positive and negative effects of polls
and how different perceptions influence voter behavioral intention. Finally,
although our study aimed to expand the examination of voters’ behavioral
responses to the third-person perception and hostile media perception, the
actual behaviors of voters were not examined. Rather, their attitudes toward
restriction of polls and their intentions to engage in campaign discourse were
examined. Hence, a caveat.
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Biographical Notes
Ven-Hwei Lo (PhD, University of Missouri, 1985) is a professor in the School of
Journalism & Communication, The Chinese University of Hong Kong. His research
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interests include media effects, news media performance, political communication, and
social impact of the Internet.
Stella C. Chia (PhD, University of Wisconsin, 2003) is an associate professor in the
Department of Media and Communication, City University of Hong Kong. Her
research interests are media effects, public opinion, adolescent behavior, and new
technology.
Ran Wei (PhD, Indiana University, 1995) is the Gonzales Brothers Professor of
Journalism in School of Journalism & Mass Communications, University of South
Carolina, USA. His research interests focus new media, media effects, and advertising
in society.