R22
No. 15-648
In the Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 2015
JEREMY JOSLIN, PETITIONER,
v.
SKYVIEW SCHOOL DISTRICT, RESPONDENT.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTEENTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.
Whether a public school principal may discipline a student for derogatory speech that
subsequently impacts the school environment based on a reasonable forecast of a material
and substantial disruption within the meaning of Tinker.
II.
Whether under the First Amendment a school district has sufficient jurisdiction to
discipline disparaging online, off-campus speech.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................... iv
JURISDICTION STATEMENT .................................................................................................... vi
STATEMENT OF THE CASE........................................................................................................1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ..............................................................................................4
ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................6
I. PETITIONER’S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS WERE NOT VIOLATED BECAUSE
HIS POST CAUSED AN ACTUAL DISRUPTION TO THE SCHOOL
ENVIRONMENT AND IT WAS REASONABLY FORESEEABLE THAT THE
SPEECH WOULD CAUSE A DISRUPTION WITHIN THE MEANING OF TINKER. ........6
A. Principal Chadwick can regulate Petitioner’s post because the speech caused a material
and substantial disruption at Skyview.....................................................................................8
1. Petitioner’s post materially disrupted classwork at Skyview. .............................................8
2. The disruption extended to the broader Skyview community. ............................................9
B. It was reasonably foreseeable that Petitioner’s post would materially and substantially
disrupt Skyview. ...................................................................................................................10
1. Petitioner’s speech was likely to reach campus and come to the attention of school
authorities...........................................................................................................................10
2. Because Petitioner’s post reached campus, contained inflammatory language, and was
sufficiently connected to the school, it was reasonably foreseeable that it would cause
a material and substantial disruption..................................................................................12
a.
Petitioner’s speech physically reached campus and caused disruption. .....................12
b.
The language in Petitioner’s post justified its regulation............................................13
c.
Petitioner’s speech had a substantial nexus to the school. ..........................................14
II. SKYVIEW HAD THE AUTHORITY TO REGULATE PETITIONER’S ONLINE, OFFCAMPUS POST BECAUSE THE INTERNET RENDERS ITS ORIGIN
IRRELEVANT, THERE WAS A STRONG NEXUS TO THE SCHOOL, AND THE
SPEECH WAS OFFENSIVE AND PROFANE. ....................................................................16
A. Schools can regulate student speech that causes an actual or reasonably foreseeable
disruption, regardless of whether it originates on or off campus. .........................................17
ii
1. Tinker focused on the speech’s effect on the school environment, not the platform on
which it was communicated. ..............................................................................................17
2. The location distinction is irrelevant in an age of the Internet and modern
communication. ..................................................................................................................20
B. Even if this Court finds a distinction between on and off-campus speech, Petitioner’s
post had such a substantial nexus to Skyview that it should be considered “on campus”
under the First Amendment. .................................................................................................21
C. Principal Chadwick properly regulated Petitioner’s speech because it was offensive,
profane, and not a “heckler’s veto.”......................................................................................22
1. Petitioner’s post was offensive and profane within the meaning of Fraser. .....................22
2. Principal Chadwick’s regulation of Petitioner’s speech was not a “heckler’s veto.” ........24
D. School administrators should be given wide latitude to determine if student speech will
impact the school environment. ............................................................................................24
1. Courts should defer to school administrators’ decisions to regulate harmful speech. .......25
2. Failure to give school officials the authority to regulate speech will have collateral
consequences throughout the public school system...........................................................26
CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................27
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., No. 12-60264, 2015 WL 4979135
(5th Cir. Aug. 20, 2015) ..................................................................................................... passim
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) ..................................................... passim
Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of Sch. Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 1998) .............................. 7
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.3d 744 (5th Cir. 1966) ...................................................................... 7, 25
D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2011) ................. 9
Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2014)............................. 19, 24
Doninger v. Neihoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011) ............................................................ 11, 13, 19
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988)........................................................ 7, 18
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) ......................................................................................... 24
J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002) ..................... 7, 17, 21, 24
J.S. v. Blue Mtn. Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) ............................................................. 25
Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011) ........................................... passim
LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001) ....................................................... 8, 25
Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) ....................... 14
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) ................................................................................. 7, 18
S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2012).......... 8, 15, 26
Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) .......................................................... passim
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003)......................................................................................... 23
Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007) ............... 11
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) ..................................................................................... 25
iv
MISCELLANEOUS
Amanda Lendhart, Teens, Social Media & Technology, Overview 2015,
Pew Research Center (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/09/teens-socialmedia-technology-2015/ ........................................................................................................... 20
Facts About Bullying, StopBullying.gov (Oct. 14, 2015),
http://www.stopbullying.gov/news/media/facts ....................................................................... 26
v
JURISDICTION STATEMENT
A Formal Statement of Jurisdiction has been omitted in accordance with the Rules of the
Washington College of Law’s Burton D. Wechsler First Amendment Moot Court Competition.
vi
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Summary of the Facts
Jeremy Joslin (“Petitioner”) was a rising eleventh grade student at Skyview High School
(“Skyview”). (Dist. Atl. at 1.) In the fall semester of the 2013-2014 school year, Petitioner
clashed with his English teacher, Ms. Cornelia Vanderweghe (“Ms. Vanderweghe”). (Dist. Atl.
at 2.) Ms. Vanderweghe has had a distinguished career for over twenty years, and has earned
honors for Teacher of the Year on multiple occasions. (Dist. Atl. at 2; 14th Cir. at 2.) Due to
poor performance, Petitioner received a “C” in his English class. (Dist. Atl. at 2; 14th Cir. at 2.)
He responded by attacking Ms. Vanderweghe on Facebook while off campus, posting the
following disparaging and profane language:
Working hard for the grade to stay on track,
Most of my teachers were cool and had my back;
But was a different story in English class;
Had to deal with a mean old ass
This tramp was tripping, out of control
Creativity halted, slowed my roll;
I tried to learn and adapt to her style;
But, she crapped on me all the while;
I know I can write, I got the rhyme,
But she chewed me up on the vine,
Fuck That B----, I’m still great
Don’t need her class to motivate;
I got potential, I’ll be cool
She’s just a dried out old shrew
Living the dream, I will survive
Fuck that B----, I’ll never lose my drive.
(Dist. Atl. at 2-3; 14th Cir. at 3.)
Petitioner had over one thousand friends on Facebook who could view his posts, many of
whom were fellow students at Skyview. (Dist. Atl. at 3.) The post was up for three hours before
being deleted, a sufficient amount of time for Petitioner’s Facebook friends to download the post
and print copies. (14th Cir. at 3.) In fact, several students distributed the printed copies at school
the next day. (Dist. Atl. at 3.) As a result, the post infiltrated classrooms and resulted in one
teacher confiscating a copy and bringing it to the principal, Dr. Theodore Chadwick (“Principal
Chadwick”). (Dist. Atl. at 3.)
Principal Chadwick discussed the post with Ms. Vanderweghe who was concerned that if
Petitioner was not disciplined, it would undermine her ability to maintain order in class. (Dist.
Atl. at 3.) In fact, one student interrupted Ms. Vanderweghe’s class to ask about the post. (Dist.
Atl. at 3.) Another teacher had to spend a significant portion of his Social Studies class
discussing the incident, interrupting his lesson plan. (Dist. Atl. at 3; 14th Cir. at 4.) Moreover,
several teachers submitted affidavits indicating that they had to seize multiple copies of the post
from their classrooms throughout the day. (14th Cir. at 3.)
The post caused a “ripple effect” of misconduct throughout the student body. (14th Cir.
at 4.) In addition to classroom disruption, one student was suspended for cursing at Ms.
2
Vanderweghe in the hallway. (Dist. Atl. at 3.) Another student vandalized the girls’ bathroom,
scratching the words “Vanderweghe sucks” on the wall. (Dist. Atl. at 3.) Indeed, Principal
Chadwick’s decision to suspend Petitioner was in part based on the multiple incidents of student
misconduct resulting from the post. (14th Cir. at 4.)
After discussing the incident with Petitioner, Principal Chadwick imposed a three-day,
in-school suspension. (Dist. Atl. at 3-4.) Petitioner was suspended because he violated two
school policies: the school’s no-disruption policy and its policy prohibiting disrespectful
conduct toward a school official. (Dist. Atl. at 3-4.) Petitioner’s mother agreed that her son
“lampooned a school official,” but nonetheless appealed the punishment to the school board,
arguing that it should be a matter of parental discretion. (Dist. Atl. at 4.) On review, the school
board upheld Principal Chadwick’s decision. (Dist. Atl. at 4.) Ms. Joslin then filed this lawsuit
on behalf of her son, claiming that the school violated his First Amendment rights. (Dist. Atl. at
4.) The school contended that Petitioner’s post substantially disrupted school operation and that
it was impermissibly vulgar, allowing for punishment under existing First Amendment doctrine.
(Dist. Atl. at 4.)
Summary of the Proceedings
The United States District Court for the District of Atlantis improperly held that a
student’s online, off-campus expression, which disparagingly referenced a teacher, is entitled to
constitutional protection under the First Amendment. (Dist. Atl. at 1.)
Petitioner appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth Circuit. The
circuit court correctly found that Principal Chadwick could reasonably forecast that Petitioner’s
online, off-campus expression would disrupt school activities within the meaning of Tinker.
3
(14th Cir. at 9.) It also found that there was a sufficient nexus between Petitioner’s online
expression and the school. (14th Cir. at 7.)
This Court granted certiorari to consider the issues on record.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Principal Chadwick did not violate the First Amendment when he disciplined Petitioner
for his disparaging post. Tinker permits regulation of student speech when that speech is actually
and materially disruptive to the school environment or when it is reasonably foreseeable that
material disruption will ensue. See Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Here,
Petitioner’s post was both actually and foreseeably disruptive to the school community.
Petitioner’s speech caused a material disruption at Skyview. In an effort to dispel
classroom disorder, teachers were forced to address Petitioner’s post instead of adhering to their
lesson plans. Further, the disruptive language initiated a malady of student misconduct in the
school environment, hindering Principal Chadwick’s ability to execute Skyview’s educational
mission.
Even if this Court does not find an actual disruption, Principal Chadwick can still
permissibly regulate Petitioner’s speech because it was reasonably foreseeable that the post
would both reach the school and disrupt the environment therein. The speech was likely to reach
campus because Petitioner described an event involving a school administrator on a widely
accessible social media platform. Further, it was reasonably foreseeable that Petitioner’s post
would materially disrupt the school environment because disruption occurred prior to
Petitioner’s suspension, the post was inherently inflammatory, and a substantial nexus existed
between the post and Skyview.
4
In evaluating whether it is reasonable to anticipate future disruption, some courts
consider the strength of the nexus between the off-campus student speech and the school. In
doing so, courts look to the subject matter of the speech, the platform on which it was
communicated, and its intended audience. Here, all three considerations evidence the strong
connection between the post and the school. Thus, a substantial nexus existed between
Petitioner’s speech and Skyview, making it reasonably foreseeable that the post would materially
interfere with school activities.
Despite an established or foreseeable disruption, some courts have hesitated to sanction a
school’s regulation of student speech if it originated off campus. However, this Court should
officially recognize that Tinker and its progeny apply to speech originating outside of the school.
The advent of the Internet has nullified any distinction between speech originating on and off
campus. In fact, the Tinker Court only focused on the disruptive nature of speech, not where it
was conceived.
While Tinker does not explicitly address online, off-campus student speech, the unique
nature of public schools warrants restricting any speech that undermines the school’s educational
mission. Even though this Court has only had the opportunity to consider the regulation of oncampus speech, Tinker and its progeny are not conceptually inapplicable to off-campus speech.
As such, schools must be able to discipline student speech that adversely and materially affects
the school environment, regardless of where the speech originated.
Even if this Court holds that Tinker does not categorically govern off-campus speech,
Tinker should be applied to speech that has a substantial nexus to the school environment. Here,
this connection is so strong that Principal Chadwick could regulate Petitioner’s speech as if it
originated “on campus.”
5
Once Petitioner’s post is appropriately considered “on campus,” it can also be regulated
pursuant to this Court’s holding in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675
(1986). Under Fraser, schools can regulate student speech that is lewd, offensive, or profane
without a material or foreseeable disruption. Id. at 678. Petitioner’s post was facially offensive
and profane because it referred to Ms. Vanderweghe as a “mean old ass,” a “tramp,” a “dried out
old shrew,” and a “B----.” Further, the post compromised the school’s ability to execute its
educational mission because it encouraged other students to defy school rules and interfered with
the overall operation and discipline at Skyview.
School administrators must be empowered to reasonably forestall disturbance in
academic settings without concern of overstepping their authority. Absent this power, schools
will lack the necessary tools to prevent additional negative consequences such as cyber-bullying.
Further, schools’ regulation of this type of speech does not infringe on traditional notions of
parental authority. For society to preserve students’ access to a quality education and a safe
learning environment, the law must apply traditional First Amendment principles to the changing
nature of student communication.
ARGUMENT
I.
PETITIONER’S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS WERE NOT VIOLATED
BECAUSE HIS POST CAUSED AN ACTUAL DISRUPTION TO THE
SCHOOL ENVIRONMENT AND IT WAS REASONABLY FORESEEABLE
THAT THE SPEECH WOULD CAUSE A DISRUPTION WITHIN THE
MEANING OF TINKER.
Serving as a safeguard in defense of Skyview’s educational mission, Principal Chadwick
properly disciplined Petitioner for his disparaging online speech. Indeed, “conduct by the
student, in class or out of it, which for any reason . . . materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the
6
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.” Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. While this Court has
long recognized that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate,” it has similarly acknowledged the paramount interest of
school officials in preserving an orderly learning environment. Id. at 506. In balancing these
two competing interests, the Tinker Court held that schools may prohibit certain speech that (1)
causes a material or substantial disruption or (2) permits school authorities to reasonably believe
that disruption would occur. Id. at 509, 514.
Since its 1969 decision, this Court has continued to address student speech within public
schools. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685 (addressing lewd, offensive, or profane language);
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988) (regulating school-sponsored
speech); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007) (discussing speech that encourages illegal
drug use). In fact, this Court has consistently recognized the right of administrators to regulate
student speech in public schools.
Recognizing the “special characteristics of the school environment,” courts have held that
a finding of substantial disruption requires “more than some mild distraction or curiosity created
by the speech.” J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 868 (Pa. 2002)
(citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.3d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1966)). However, “complete chaos is not
required for a school district to punish student speech.” Id. (citing Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of Sch.
Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821, 827 (7th Cir. 1998)). The Tinker Court indicated that student
expression is materially and substantially disruptive if it “disrupts classwork” or “interfere[s]
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.” Tinker, 393 U.S.
at 509 (quoting Burnside, 363 F.3d at 749). Here, Petitioner’s speech disrupted classwork at
Skyview, impacted educators’ ability to teach, and ignited an outbreak of misconduct throughout
7
the student body. (14th Cir. at 2-4.) Thus, Petitioner’s speech caused a substantial disruption
and was not protected under the First Amendment.
Even if this Court determines there was no actual disruption, Principal Chadwick still
appropriately suspended Petitioner because it was reasonably foreseeable that the post would
cause a material disruption. Schools need not wait until the disruption actually occurs if they can
demonstrate that the facts on the record would reasonably lead to substantial disruption. See
LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, because Petitioner’s post
described a school event and was pervasively accessible to many students at Skyview, it was
likely to cause substantial disorder. (14th Cir. at 4.) Thus, this Court should find that
Petitioner’s post actually and foreseeably disrupted the environment at Skyview.
A. Principal Chadwick can regulate Petitioner’s post because the speech caused
a material and substantial disruption at Skyview.
Petitioner’s post was materially and substantially disruptive to Skyview because it
adversely affected both classroom activity and the broader school atmosphere. Teachers had to
respond to classroom disruption and discipline students instead of following their planned
curricula. Further, Petitioner’s use of inherently disruptive language provoked student
misconduct outside of the classroom, interfering with the school’s ability to execute its
educational mission.
1. Petitioner’s post materially disrupted classwork at Skyview.
Petitioner’s speech was disruptive within the meaning of Tinker. Speech that inhibits
teachers from controlling their classroom environments is considered materially disruptive. See
S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 778 (8th Cir. 2012)
(interpreting Tinker for the proposition that off-campus speech that disrupts classwork can be
regulated). Here, many teachers reported having difficulty controlling their classrooms because
8
they had to respond to interruptions and seize multiple copies of the post during class. (Dist. Atl.
at 4.) Therefore, Petitioner’s speech materially and substantially disrupted Skyview because it
prevented teachers from maintaining order and discipline in their classrooms.
Relatedly, Petitioner’s speech required that teachers siphon time away from teaching to
respond to non-educational inquiries stemming from the post. Courts consider the time and
effort that teachers devote to remedying the impact of negative student speech on the school in
determining whether there was substantial disorder. See, e.g., D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal
Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 766 (8th Cir. 2011). Here, teachers spent time discussing
Petitioner’s post in class, which interfered with their normal classroom responsibilities. (14th
Cir. at 4.) Thus, because Petitioner’s speech significantly impacted teaching, it was materially
disruptive to the school environment.
2. The disruption extended to the broader Skyview community.
Petitioner’s post provoked student misconduct that interfered with discipline in the
broader school environment. Schools can regulate student speech when it materially and
substantially disrupts school discipline. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509; see also Kowalski v.
Berkeley Cnty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011) (“Experience suggests that unpunished
misbehavior can have a snowballing effect, in some cases resulting in ‘copycat efforts’ by other
students.”). Here, Petitioner’s post caused multiple students to defy school rules; one student
was suspended for cursing at Ms. Vanderweghe in the hallway and another vandalized the girls’
bathroom. (Dist. Atl. at 4.) Indeed, the post had a “ripple effect throughout the student body.”
(Dist. Atl. at 4.) Therefore, Petitioner’s post caused substantial disorder because it resulted in
multiple incidents of student misconduct.
9
Additionally, Petitioner used defamatory and offensive language to describe Ms.
Vanderweghe. Defamatory language that is directed at a member of the school community is
inherently disruptive to the school in that it fosters an attitude of disrespect. See Bell v.
Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., No. 12-60264, 2015 WL 4979135, at *18 (5th Cir. Aug. 20, 2015); see
also Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 574. Here, Petitioner’s speech directly targeted Ms. Vanderweghe by
calling her a “mean old ass,” a “tramp,” a “dried out old shrew,” and repeating “Fuck that B----.”
(Dist. Atl. at 2.) The targeted and disrespectful nature of Petitioner’s speech created substantial
disorder at Skyview, permitting discipline under Tinker.
B. It was reasonably foreseeable that Petitioner’s post would materially and
substantially disrupt Skyview.
Even if this Court finds that Petitioner’s post did not cause an actual disruption, it was
reasonably foreseeable that the speech would lead to a material disruption under Tinker for two
reasons. First, Petitioner’s post was likely to reach campus and come to the attention of school
authorities. Second, given the nature of the speech, it was reasonably foreseeable that it would
cause a disruption once it entered the “schoolhouse gate.”
1. Petitioner’s speech was likely to reach campus and come to the attention of
school authorities.
In considering whether speech will foreseeably disrupt a school environment, courts look
to whether the off-campus speech is likely to reach the school. Here, it was reasonably
foreseeable that Petitioner’s speech would enter the school for three reasons. First, Petitioner
disrespected Ms. Vanderweghe on a widely accessible social media platform. Second,
Petitioner’s speech depicted a school event. Third, the speech targeted a teacher at Skyview.
Together, these three considerations illustrate an enhanced likelihood that the speech would
infiltrate the school environment and have disruptive consequences.
10
It was reasonably foreseeable that Petitioner’s online speech would reach campus
because many of his Facebook friends were students at Skyview. Social media speech that is
widely distributed to students can “reasonably be expected to reach the school.” Kowalski, 652
F.3d at 573; see also Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 3640 (2d Cir. 2007) (explaining that a student’s distribution of Internet speech to only fifteen
people, including several classmates, was “extensive” enough to create a reasonably foreseeable
risk that it would reach school property). Here, Petitioner posted profane language about his
teacher on Facebook, where many of his one thousand friends were also Skyview students. (14th
Cir. at 2.) Therefore, because Petitioner’s post was widely accessible to many members of the
school, it was likely that the speech would reach the school community.
Additionally, because Petitioner’s speech was about a school event, it was reasonably
foreseeable that it would reach Skyview. Online, off-campus speech is likely to reach the school
community if it describes a school incident. See Doninger v. Neihoff, 642 F.3d 334, 348 (2d Cir.
2011) (holding that the student’s online, off-campus speech was regulable because it “directly
pertained to an event at [the school]”). Here, Petitioner’s Facebook post was a response to
receiving a poor grade in his English class. (Dist. Atl. at 2.) Therefore, given the subject matter
of the post, it was reasonably foreseeable that it would reach members of the school community.
Petitioner’s speech was also likely to reach the school environment because it was a
targeted attack on his teacher. Online, off-campus speech is more likely to reach members of the
school community if it depicts a school instructor. See Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36, 40 (holding
that an Instant Messenger icon that specifically targeted and depicted an English teacher was
reasonably likely to reach the school). Here, the subject of Petitioner’s post was his English
teacher who he described as a “mean old ass,” a “tramp,” a “B----,” and a “dried out old shrew.”
11
(Dist. Atl. at 2.) Thus, because Petitioner’s disparaging speech was about his teacher, it was
likely to reach Skyview.
2. Because Petitioner’s post reached campus, contained inflammatory language,
and was sufficiently connected to the school, it was reasonably foreseeable that
it would cause a material and substantial disruption.
It was reasonably foreseeable that Petitioner’s post would disrupt the environment at
Skyview. Because an actual disruption already occurred and the speech was inherently
disruptive, it was likely that the post would materially and substantially disrupt Skyview within
the meaning of Tinker. Further, there was a substantial nexus between Petitioner’s post and the
school, increasing the likelihood that disruption would ensue.
a. Petitioner’s speech physically reached campus and caused disruption.
Petitioner’s speech was likely to disrupt the school environment because the speech made
its way through the “schoolhouse gate.” Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. Online, off-campus speech is
more likely to cause a material and substantial disruption if it physically reaches campus and
comes to the attention of school authorities. See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 574. Students at
Skyview had access to printed copies of Petitioner’s post while at school. (14th Cir. at 8.)
Additionally, Principal Chadwick became aware of the post after its disruption caused a teacher
to bring it to his attention. (14th Cir. at 8.) Thus, because Petitioner’s post physically reached
campus, it was reasonably foreseeable that it would rise to a material disruption.
Not only did Petitioner’s speech reach campus, but it also significantly interfered with the
school’s daily operation, making it foreseeable that Petitioner’s speech would cause a material
and substantial disruption under Tinker. In determining whether student speech will interfere
with the school’s pedagogical mission, courts consider its prior impact on the school,
recognizing that unpunished behavior can have a “snowballing effect.” See, e.g., Kowalski, 652
12
F.3d at 574 (discussing a disparaging MySpace post that encouraged other students to engage in
misconduct at school). Prior to Principal Chadwick’s disciplinary determination, Petitioner’s
post already provoked incidents of cursing and vandalism. (14th Cir. at 8.) This disruption
illustrates the “snowballing effect,” making it foreseeable that Petitioner’s speech would
materially impact the school.
Further, Principal Chadwick’s knowledge of the post is indicative of its significant
impact. When speech has had such a prominent effect on the school community that it reaches
school administrators,1 it can be expected that such speech will materially and substantially
disrupt the school. See Doninger, 642 F.3d at 348 (holding that because “school administrators
eventually became aware of [the student’s blog post] . . . it was reasonably foreseeable that [the]
post would . . . have disruptive consequences [at school]”). Principal Chadwick became aware
of Petitioner’s post after it already interrupted classwork and instigated misconduct throughout
the school. (Dist. Atl. at 3.) Because the initial disturbance brought Petitioner’s post to Principal
Chadwick’s attention, it was reasonably foreseeable that the speech’s impact would worsen
without administrative intervention.
b. The language in Petitioner’s post justified its regulation.
Petitioner used disparaging language to describe Ms. Vanderweghe. Offensive and
malicious speech by one student directed at a teacher encourages a lack of respect among other
students if left unpunished, making material disruption reasonably foreseeable. See Bell, 2015
WL 4979135, at *16-18. Here, Petitioner’s disparaging language provoked “copycat” offensive
language from other students toward Ms. Vanderweghe both inside and outside of the classroom.
1
Certainly, school administrators do not become aware of every insignificant instance of
disruption in the school environment. See Doninger, 642 F.3d at 348. A school administrator’s
knowledge of the disruption is therefore probative of its material and substantial nature. See id.
13
(Dist. Atl. at 2-3.) Therefore, because the substance of Petitioner’s speech was inherently
disruptive and thus caused other students to similarly harass Ms. Vanderweghe, it was
reasonably foreseeable that the post would interfere with the school’s operation.
Moreover, speech can foreseeably cause material and substantial disruption within the
meaning of Tinker despite being non-threatening. Courts have found that schools are not limited
to disciplining students for speech that threatens another member of the school community. See,
e.g., Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 567-69, 574 (holding that a non-threatening MySpace discussion
group about another student posed a reasonably foreseeable risk of disrupting the school
environment and could be regulated). Petitioner’s post, while non-threatening, disparagingly
described his teacher and caused disruption within the school environment. (Dist. Atl. at 2-3;
14th Cir. at 4.) Therefore, even though the speech did not include a threat, it was regulable
because it disrupted the school.
c. Petitioner’s speech had a substantial nexus to the school.
To determine whether it was reasonably foreseeable that speech would materially and
substantially disrupt a school environment, some courts consider whether the speech had a
substantial nexus to the school. See, e.g., Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650
F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2011). A substantial nexus exists when the speech is sufficiently linked to
the school. See id. In determining whether speech is sufficiently linked, courts examine the
subject matter, the platform on which it was communicated, and its intended audience.2 Here, all
2
Other courts look to many of the same factors in determining whether it is reasonably
foreseeable that speech will materially and substantially disrupt a school environment, without
explicitly using the term “substantial nexus.” See, e.g., Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 566 (using the
language “sufficiently connected”). However, the strength of the connection between the speech
and the school is always a factor in determining whether a forecast of material disruption is
reasonable.
14
three considerations weigh in favor of a finding of a substantial nexus. Therefore, a nexus
existed between Petitioner’s speech and the school, making disruption reasonably foreseeable.
The nexus between Petitioner’s speech and the school is evidenced by the content of
Petitioner’s post. Online, off-campus speech harassing a teacher and regarding a school event is
sufficiently connected to the school and therefore poses a reasonable risk of material disruption.
See Bell, 2015 WL 4979135, at *17. Here, Petitioner used offensive and disparaging language to
describe Ms. Vanderweghe after he received a “C” in her class. (Dist. Atl. at 2-3.) Thus, there
was a substantial nexus between Petitioner’s post and the school because it directly targeted Ms.
Vanderweghe and pertained to a school incident.
Petitioner’s speech was also connected to the school because it was widely accessible to
Skyview’s student body. When student speech is posted on social media platforms, it is easily
accessible by fellow students in the school and strengthens the nexus to the school environment.
See Bell, 2015 WL 4979135, at *17. Petitioner posted the offensive speech about Ms.
Vanderweghe on Facebook where many of his classmates had access to the content. (14th Cir. at
3.) Petitioner’s post being readily available to the school community illustrates a strong nexus to
Skyview.
Further, Petitioner intended that his post reach Skyview. Online student speech
discussing school administrators or events demonstrates the speaker’s intent for his speech to
reach the school environment and creates a nexus to the school. See S.J.W., 696 F.3d at 775
(holding that a student blog was “targeted at” the high school because it was about another
student at the school). Here, Petitioner disseminated his offensive speech about Ms.
Vanderweghe on Facebook, where over one thousand friends, including Skyview students, had
access to the content. (14th Cir. at 3.) Petitioner’s post was widely accessible and discussed a
15
teacher, thereby indicating that he intended that his speech reach and impact the school
community. Thus, there was a substantial nexus between Petitioner’s speech and the school
environment because it was directed at a broad audience, about a teacher, and described a school
occurrence.
II.
SKYVIEW HAD THE AUTHORITY TO REGULATE PETITIONER’S
ONLINE, OFF-CAMPUS POST BECAUSE THE INTERNET RENDERS ITS
ORIGIN IRRELEVANT, THERE WAS A STRONG NEXUS TO THE
SCHOOL, AND THE SPEECH WAS OFFENSIVE AND PROFANE.
Skyview appropriately regulated Petitioner’s offensive, off-campus speech in an effort to
maintain an orderly academic setting and promote the school’s functioning. The importance of
fostering a productive learning environment necessitates that school administrators have
jurisdiction to regulate harmful and disparaging language regardless of where it originates. To
hold otherwise would fundamentally interfere with the ability of public school educators to fulfill
their duties.
The dynamic and increasingly pervasive nature of Internet communication warrants
eliminating location as a factor in student First Amendment litigation. Students have collectively
embraced this method of communication, “confounding previously delineated boundaries of
permissible regulations” under Tinker. Bell, 2015 WL 4979135, at *11. As school
administrators and teachers adapt to changing technology, this Court should definitively clarify
that Tinker and its progeny apply to online, off-campus speech.
Even if this Court finds the location distinction relevant, speech that has a substantial
nexus to the school environment should be regulated as if it occurred “on campus.” Here, there
was a sufficient connection between Petitioner’s speech and Skyview. Thus, Principal Chadwick
had jurisdiction to regulate the post as he would any other on-campus speech.
16
Principal Chadwick could additionally regulate Petitioner’s post under Fraser. Fraser
gives schools authority to regulate lewd, profane, and offensive speech, regardless of the level of
disruption. “Punishment for [such] language, including personal attacks . . . fits easily within
Fraser’s upholding of discipline for speech that undermines the basic function of a public
school.” Bethlehem, 807 A.2d at 868. Here, the language in Petitioner’s post was profane and
offensive on its face, satisfying the standard that the Fraser Court originally contemplated.
Accordingly, this Court should hold that Petitioner’s online, off-campus speech was regulable
under both Tinker and Fraser.
A. Schools can regulate student speech that causes an actual or reasonably
foreseeable disruption, regardless of whether it originates on or off campus.
Under existing doctrine, Skyview is able to regulate online, off-campus speech that
causes a material disruption. In the Internet age, any focus on where disruptive speech originates
is of little value. Indeed, the Tinker Court focused on the effect student speech had on the school
environment, not where such speech originated. Therefore, there is no longer a significant
distinction between speech made on and off campus when the speech is posted on social media
platforms.
1. Tinker focused on the speech’s effect on the school environment, not the
platform on which it was communicated.
Though this Court has not explicitly addressed online, off-campus speech, the principles
underlying Tinker are not limited to regulating in-school speech. This Court has never
interpreted Tinker and its progeny to limit a school’s regulatory authority to on-campus speech.
Additionally, the unique considerations of public schools warrant restricting any speech that
undermines a school’s educational mission. Further, schools can regulate student speech that
interferes with school administrators’ ability to fulfill their basic responsibilities.
17
Tinker does not preclude the regulation of off-campus speech. The Tinker Court
established that student speech is not protected when it materially and substantially disrupts, or
foreseeably will disrupt, the school environment. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. Petitioner’s post
actually and foreseeably disrupted Skyview, as it required multiple teachers to depart from their
curriculum to address students’ reactions to the post. See supra Part I. Thus, because the speech
materially interfered with teachers’ ability to control their classrooms, Petitioner’s speech should
not be protected under Tinker.
Moreover, this Court has never had the occasion to address the regulation of online, offcampus speech. Some courts have interpreted this Court’s precedents discussing and analyzing
Tinker to indicate that schools may only regulate on-campus speech. See Bell, 2015 WL
4979135, at *38-41 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (interpreting Tinker and its progeny as limiting a
school’s disciplinary authority to on-campus speech). However, that conclusion is incorrect.
This Court has never examined online, off-campus student expression. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at
685 (regulating lewd, offensive, or profane language); Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 276 (addressing
the school’s ability to control school-sponsored speech); Morse, 551 U.S. at 410 (restricting
speech that encourages illegal drug use). Indeed, this Court has only analyzed Tinker in
reference to on-campus or school-sponsored speech. Thus, any language regarding the limitation
of Tinker’s application to off-campus speech is not controlling here.
Furthermore, the special characteristics of the public school environment permit
restricting speech that undermines the school’s educational mission. Because student speech can
interfere with basic educational obligations, it does not receive the same protection as adult
speech. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682 (holding that “the constitutional rights of students in public
schools are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings” and that they
18
must be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment). Disparaging,
off-campus speech can affect the school environment as significantly as on-campus speech of the
same nature. Consequently, any speech, including Petitioner’s, that undermines the school’s
educational mission by causing a substantial disruption should not be immunized under Tinker.
Additionally, Petitioner’s post prevented school administrators and teachers from
performing their basic duties. School officials can regulate student speech that interferes with
normal classroom and administrative functions. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. As the job of the
modern school administrator grows more complex in response to evolving technology, school
disruption should continue to be the sole determinate of whether administrators can regulate offcampus speech. See Bell, 2015 WL 4979135, at *11. In fact, Petitioner’s online post interrupted
classroom learning and caused other students to defy school rules. (14th Cir. at 3-4.) Thus,
speech that materially disrupts the school and prevents teachers from performing their vital
duties should not be protected under the First Amendment simply because it originated off
campus.
As such, schools can discipline student speech that causes a material and substantial
disruption, regardless of where the speech originated. Territoriality does not define the extent of
an administrator’s authority. See Doninger, 642 F.3d at 347; see also Dariano v. Morgan Hill
Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764, 778 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that “[i]n the school context, the
crucial distinction is the nature of the speech, not the source of it”). Petitioner’s off-campus
speech induced other students to react at school with profane language and destructive behavior.
(Dist. Atl. at 3.) Therefore, Principal Chadwick permissibly regulated Petitioner’s off-campus
post because it caused a material, in-school disruption.
19
2. The location distinction is irrelevant in an age of the Internet and modern
communication.
The Internet renders any distinction between on and off-campus speech meaningless.
Indeed, “[t]he pervasive and omnipresent nature of the Internet has obfuscated the oncampus/off-campus distinction.” Bell, 2015 WL 4979135, at *14; see also Kowalski, 652 F.3d
565 (raising the “metaphysical question” of the location of online speech, and stating that “[the
student] knew that the electronic [post] would be, as it in fact was, published beyond her home”).
Thus, as the line dividing on-campus and off-campus speech has disappeared due to the wide
accessibility of Internet speech, the original location of the speech should not be determinative.
The ubiquitous nature of the Internet strengthens the justification for granting school
administrators the authority to regulate any disruptive speech. According to a recent Pew study,
nearly nine in ten high-school aged teens have access to cellphones or smartphones. See
Amanda Lendhart, Teens, Social Media & Technology, Overview 2015, Pew Research Center
(Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/09/teens-social-media-technology-2015/.
Further, Facebook, the medium Petitioner used to disseminate his message, is the most popular
social networking platform for high school students, with more than seven in ten teens using the
site. See id. Because so many students have personal devices and social media accounts, student
speech made online and off-campus can easily enter and subsequently disrupt the public school
environment.
Further, Petitioner’s post cannot evade regulation simply because it was deleted from the
Internet. Tinker’s holding focused on the disruptive effect of student speech, not the lifespan of
the disputed material. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. Here, even though Petitioner deleted his post
after several hours, his peers had enough time to download the material, print it, and distribute
20
physical copies in school. (Dist. Atl. at 3.) Thus, Petitioner’s post was still punishable even
though it was deleted because it caused a material disruption at Skyview.
B. Even if this Court finds a distinction between on and off-campus speech,
Petitioner’s post had such a substantial nexus to Skyview that it should be
considered “on campus” under the First Amendment.
There was a strong relationship between Petitioner’s speech and Skyview such that this
Court should hold that Principal Chadwick properly regulated the post. In fact, Petitioner’s
speech can be considered “on campus” because of its established connection to the school.
Because Skyview students reacted to Petitioner’s post at school, it can additionally be considered
“on campus” speech.
Should this Court decline to interpret Tinker as categorically applying to all off-campus
activity, Petitioner’s post still merits regulation because of the fundamental connection between
the speech and Skyview. Courts apply Tinker to off-campus speech when a substantial nexus
exists between the speech and the school. See, e.g., Bell, 2015 WL 4979135, at *14, 17.
Petitioner’s speech had a substantial nexus to Skyview because he intentionally directed
information about a school incident to many students on a widely accessibly platform. See supra
Part I.B.2.c. Thus, despite the speech having originated off-campus, Tinker should apply to
Petitioner’s speech because a substantial nexus existed between his post and the school.
Indeed, Petitioner’s speech had such a strong nexus to the school environment that it
should be considered “on campus” for purposes of the First Amendment. When speech about
teachers is aimed at the school community and reaches school property, it becomes inevitable
that it will be discussed therein. See Bethlehem, 807 A.2d at 865. Such speech can be
considered “on-campus,” and thus may be regulated. See id. Here, the post was not only
directed at the school community, but it was also widely accessible online, offline, and in print.
21
(Dist. Atl. at 3.) Therefore, because it was inevitable that Petitioner’s speech would reach the
school environment, it can be considered “on campus” under the First Amendment.
Additionally, Petitioner’s speech was “on-campus” because students reacted to the
speech during school hours. When students access speech and subsequently react to it at school,
the off-campus speech is effectively “on-campus.” See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573. Here,
Skyview students read the post at school, and then reacted with profane language and vandalism.
(Dist. Atl. at 3.) Therefore, Principal Chadwick had the ability to regulate Petitioner’s post as he
would other on-campus speech.
C. Principal Chadwick properly regulated Petitioner’s speech because it was
offensive, profane, and not a “heckler’s veto.”
Beyond the speech’s disruptive nature, Petitioner’s post may be regulated for two
additional reasons. First, Fraser gives schools the power to regulate offensive and profane
speech. Second, this power was not abrogated by an unconstitutional “heckler’s veto.”
1. Petitioner’s post was offensive and profane within the meaning of Fraser.
Once offensive and profane speech is on campus, this Court’s precedent indicates that it
may not receive full constitutional protection. Offensive and profane speech jeopardizes a
school’s ability to execute its educational mission. Thus, Principal Chadwick properly regulated
Petitioner’s post under Fraser.
Petitioner’s speech was effectively and actually on campus, subjecting it to school
regulation. Once online, off-campus speech is considered “in school,” it can be regulated under
Fraser. See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573 (holding that because the student’s online post was
considered in-school speech, its regulation would be permissible as vulgar and lewd speech
under Fraser). Here, Petitioner’s speech was actually on campus because students distributed
printed copies of the post at school. (Dist. Atl. at 3.) Furthermore, students cursed at Ms.
22
Vanderweghe in the halls, defaced school property, and disrupted classroom learning in response
to the post. (Dist. Atl. at 3.) Thus, Principal Chadwick properly regulated this speech pursuant
to Fraser.
Further, if Petitioner’s post is appropriately viewed as “on campus,” precedent compels
that it would not receive First Amendment protection. Comparable political speech, which
would be entitled to the greatest level of First Amendment protection,3 would not be protected in
a school environment. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682 (noting that “Fuck the draft” would not be
protected speech in a school setting due to the vulgarity of the phrase). Here, Petitioner repeated,
“Fuck that B----” throughout his post. (Dist. Atl. at 3.) Consequently, because political speech
employing nearly identical language would not be constitutionally protected in the school
environment, Petitioner’s speech should similarly not receive First Amendment protection.
Petitioner’s speech is not constitutionally protected because it was “offensive” and
“profane.” The First Amendment does not protect offensive, lewd, or profane student speech in
the school environment, regardless of whether it causes a disruption. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at
682. (“It does not follow . . . that simply because the use of an offensive form of expression may
not be prohibited to adults . . . the same latitude must be permitted to children in a public
school.”). Here, Petitioner employed facially demeaning language to describe his English
teacher, calling her “a mean old ass,” a “tramp,” and a “dried out old shrew.” (Dist. Atl. at 3.)
Further, Petitioner used curse words, repeating, “Fuck that B----” throughout the post. (Dist. Atl.
at 3.) Therefore, Petitioner’s speech is not protected because it was both offensive and profane.
Additionally, the First Amendment does not protect Petitioner’s online expression
because it compromised the school’s ability to execute its educational mission. Offensive and
3
Political speech is “at the core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect.” Virginia v.
Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003).
23
profane speech that attacks a teacher prevents the school from fulfilling its academic purpose.
See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682 (stating that it is a highly appropriate function of public school
education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public school classrooms); see also
Bethlehem, 807 A.2d at 868 (holding that a personal attack on a teacher fits easily within
Fraser’s purview because it undermines the basic function of a public school). Here, Petitioner
directly targeted his teacher using several derogatory terms. (Dist. Atl. at 3.) As a result,
Petitioner’s offensive and profane attack on Ms. Vanderweghe is not protected because it
interfered with Skyview’s ability to maintain a respectful learning environment for all students.
2. Principal Chadwick’s regulation of Petitioner’s speech was not a “heckler’s
veto.”
Petitioner was not subject to an unconstitutional “heckler’s veto” as this Court has
previously conceived it. A “heckler’s veto” improperly prohibits speech based on whether it
offends listeners or provokes unrest. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 734 (2000). However,
the “heckler’s veto” prohibition does not apply in the school environment; schools may regulate
disruptive speech regardless of the source that caused the disruption. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at
509, 513; see also Dariano, 767 F.3d at 777-78. Here, Petitioner’s speech disrupted the school
environment by interfering with classwork and provoking misconduct throughout the student
body. (14th Cir. at 3-4.) Thus, Petitioner was not subject to a “heckler’s veto” because the
disruption occurred at school.
D. School administrators should be given wide latitude to determine if student
speech will impact the school environment.
School administrators are best positioned to determine when student speech will
materially and substantially affect the school. As such, a school’s determination regarding a
material disruption warrants deference. Furthermore, the preservation of a safe and quality
24
educational environment requires that administrators be empowered to discipline disruptive
speech.
1. Courts should defer to school administrators’ decisions to regulate harmful
speech.
This Court should defer to Principal Chadwick’s decision to discipline Petitioner’s
speech. Courts defer to school administrators’ disciplinary decisions so long as they are
reasonable. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 328 (1975) (stating that “[t]he system of
public education that has evolved in this Nation relies necessarily upon the discretion and
judgment of school administrators”); see also LaVine, 257 F.3d at 988 (“In the school context,
we have granted educators substantial deference as to what speech is appropriate.”). Discipline
with the purpose of maintaining order and minimizing disruption in a school environment is
reasonable and permissible. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509; see also Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d
744, 748 (5th Cir. 1966) (“Regulations which are essential in maintaining order and discipline on
school property are reasonable.”). Here, Principal Chadwick’s forecast of material disruption
was reasonable. See supra Part I.B. Thus, this Court should defer to and uphold his decision to
regulate Petitioner’s speech.
Further, a school’s authority to regulate student speech does not violate the broad ambit
of parents’ authority to direct their children’s upbringing. A parent’s “liberty interest [ ] is not
absolute,” and there are circumstances in which school administrators may impose regulations to
maintain order that vary from those a parent would employ. See J.S. v. Blue Mtn. Sch. Dist., 650
F.3d 915, 933 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681, 684 (acknowledging that “school
authorities ac[t] in loco parentis” with the authority and indeed the responsibility to “inculcate
the habits and manners of civility”) (citations omitted). Here, Petitioner was suspended after his
speech caused a material disruption to the school community. (14th Cir. at 4.) Thus, the
25
school’s decision was well within the confines of its authority and it did not infringe on parental
substantive due process rights.
2. Failure to give school officials the authority to regulate speech will have
collateral consequences throughout the public school system.
A failure to regulate off-campus speech will have collateral consequences for schools in
other respects. For example, the rise of cyber-bulling among high school students highlights the
need for school administrators to have discretion in regulating harmful, online student speech.
See Facts About Bullying, StopBullying.gov (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.stopbullying.gov/news/
media/facts. Cyber-bullying can have a significant effect on the classroom, as “[t]he
repercussions . . . are serious and sometimes tragic.” See S.J.W., 696 F.3d at 779; Kowalski, 652
F.3d at 567-68, 574 (finding regulable an online, bullying website called “Students Against
Shay’s Herpes” in reference to a fellow student). In fact, in 2015, nearly one in six high school
students suffered from cyber-bullying. See Facts About Bullying, StopBullying.gov (Oct. 14,
2015), http://www.stopbullying.gov/news/media/facts. This modern trend and its harmful effects
require that school administrators be permitted to protect students from online attacks because of
the materially disruptive nature of such behavior.
The importance of creating a safe, quality educational environment for students should
persuade this Court that Petitioner’s disruptive, offensive, and profane speech permitted
discipline. To hold otherwise would compromise the ability of schools to carry out their
important role in “teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.” See
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681. Accordingly, in light of the need to maintain a productive school
environment, this Court should uphold Principal Chadwick’s decision to regulate Petitioner’s
speech.
26
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Respondent respectfully requests that the judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth Circuit be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Attorneys for Respondent
27