Who Equipped Mercenary Troops in Classical Greece?
Author(s): David Whitehead
Source: Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Vol. 40, No. 1 (1991), pp. 105-113
Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4436180
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105
WHO EQUIPPEDMERCENARYTROOPSIN CLASSICALGREECE?
In his recentmonographOutsidersin the GreekCitiesin thefourth centuryB.C.1Paul McKechnie has offeredstudentsof the periodnumerousstimulito thoughtand investigation,on issues
both familiarand novel. In the lattercategoryhe asks, for instance,who it was who provided
mercenarysoldierswith theirarmourand weapons;and afterfive pagesdevotedto the question
he writesas follows:
The conclusion overall must be that there is enough evidence to suggest that personsand
stateswantingto raisean armywouldoften startby collectingarmsand armour,and that when
they raisedmercenariesthey would often - perhapseven usually- equipthem.2
The need to put this (if correct)importantfinding to the test is of some urgency,given the
propensityof scholars'ideas to become schematizedand exaggeratedin the course of their
dissemination.Here indeed one reviewerof Outsidershas alreadyset the processin motion:
'[McKechnielasks who footedthe considerablebill for the mercenary'sarmour.The answeris
that personsand stateswantingto raisean armyof mercenarieshadto buy the armourfirst,and
the mercenariesthemselvesonly after that'.3Dr. McKechnie'sown 'answer',as indicated,is a
good deal less categorical.Nonethelessthe thesis has been profferedand invites a response.
Mine is to endeavourto show, in what follows, that his case is (A) intrinsicallyweak and (B)
neglectfulof evidenceand generalconsiderationswhich tell, explicitlyor implicitly,a different
story.I shall argue,in otherwords,thatthe bodyof evidencewhich he has collectedillustratesa
rarephenomenonratherthan a common or routineone - not least becausethe basicquestion
which he poses is, from several standpoints,too broad.My focus, like his, will be the fourth
century,but I shall also follow his lead in appealingto testimonyfrom outsidethat era when it
seems relevant.
(A) McKechnie'sevidence
We have alreadynoted the moderateway ('often- perhapseven usually')in which McKechnie frames his overall thesis of a distinction,both temporal and operational,between the
acquisitionof armsand of the troopswho wouldwearand use them.This is in facta reflectionof
his discussionas a whole, which, when presentingitems of evidence and indicatinghow he
himself would wish us to interpretthem, is almost excessivelysensitiveto the realizationthat
contraryinterpretationswould be equallypossible.Witnessfor instancehis comments4on two
passagesin Polyaenus:
(i) 4.3.13('AXaccv8po; tpOpdtKtLa
To!; [(pcUyoUML]
cTpaTLolTaL; iVTi &pdKWV
M6WKcV).
I (London 1989)- hereinafterMcKechnie.I refer
also to the following by author'sname
only:
J. K. Anderson,MilitaryTheory'
and Practicein theAge of Xenophon(Berkeleyand Los Angeles
1970)
J. G. P. Best, ThracianPeltastsand theirInfluenceon GreekWarfare(Groningen1969)
G. T. Griffith, TheMercenariesof the HellenisticWorld(Cambridge
1935)
H. W. Parke,GreekMercenarySoldiersfrom the EarliestTimesto the Battle of Ipsus(Oxford
1933)
W. K. Pritchett,TheGreekState at WarIII (Berkeleyand Los Angeles 1979)
2 McKechnie80-85, at 85.
3 Simon Hornblower,TimesHigherEducationSupplement,15September1989(no. 880), 21.
4 McKechnie 84.
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106
This may (or may not) suggestthat he hadgiven them the thoraxesin the firstplace.'Soldiers'
could be either Macedoniansor mercenaries'.
(ii) 3.9.56('hpluptKrTT;tv AK1l7W,96iicvo; &o T6V 7YEj6V V pO6l66Vat KOaXaag TOi5
ToO5 NvclTiOU; t1M tpo5o0icz;
atiTO TcZTOVTWVEcka arn r6tv sit'
ct6n.1 T6 ItpEy4ta, itpoXC4laV
k6X(v. oi gXvitpoXCta6vTEgKccTtGxov
T6g Ravonkia5. 'IpLKp6TTr;&t
wXtoTqtEtayCxtvov
6pkCToU; TOV ?iti TOID TpaxTO7Et6OUItpocrt:TCL?V, 6t6TaV
jietai?Zqicvo5
Tnv 7Epo6oaCiv
tkty4aq
TOi)
ptV i'yE.16Vct;
tK6XaXC
9&VdT(0,
TO6i 8& CTpCTLwTCtg yYUgvoO5
XtlkaCetoO catpaToEt?6oU).'The fact that Iphicratesseizes the men'sarmourbeforedriving
them out of the campmay(or,again,maynot) suggestthatit was not theirown property... The
leastthat can be said is that Iphicratesprobablyfoundthe confiscatedarmouruseful. . .'.
When a scholarinsistsupon providing,himself,so much ammunitionfor shootingdown his
own hypotheses,one feels a bruteto pull the trigger;but in truththe caveatsexpressedhereare
only right and proper.4.3.13,in particular,is virtuallyuseless:undatable;unlocatable,accordingly,within what is knownof the natureand developmentof Alexander'sarmy;5and in any
case,as McKechniehimselfdisarminglyadmits,to be relatedto Macedonianquiteas readilyas
to mercenarytroops.As for 3.9.56,it boastsa date (374) as well as more incidentaldetail, but
even so the appropriateinference to be drawn from the confiscationis not at all clearcut.
McKechniewrites:"Itwould not be quite adequateto say that they were disarmedin orderto
prevent them turning traitorsas their captains had: to make them harmless to his army,
Iphicratesneedonly havetakentheiroffensiveweapons,butin factthey left the camp'stripped'.
Parkeassumesthat the armourwas their own and that the point of the punishmentwas (a) to
preventdesertionto the enemy,(b) to preventmercenariesfromsoldieringuntil theycould buy
new ones.This too is unsatisfactory:
they wouldhave hadto travelseveralhundredmilesto find
an enemy to desert to." In point of fact what Parke overtlyassumes6is that the soldiers
concerned could not have sought alternativeemployment until re-armed.Where he and
McKechnieactuallydiffer is over whetherthis second set of equipment,not the first,would
have been purchasedby ratherthan providedfor the individualsin question.Still,thatis to split
hairs.The real issue is, does any partof this passageindicatethat Iphikrates'actionwas one of
repossessionas opposedto confiscation?Again I can only agreewith McKechniehimself that
his case is not proven. It is certainlytrue to say that if the troops concernedhad wished to
transfertheirallegianceto the particularenemy they had been recruitedto fight,the Egyptians
(see generallyDiod. 15.41-43),thatprospectposedno immediatethreatto Iphikrates'forces;but
it still made sense to prevent(or delay) their becomingan eventualone. In any case, parting
these men from their equipment- defensiveas well as offensive- was prudenton everycount:
keepingthe army up to strength(McKechnie'snotion about the subsequentutilizationof the
armsbeingperfectlyplausible)at the sametime as usefullyconfirmingIphikrates'reputationas
an iron disciplinarian.7
A thirdpassagefrom Polyaenusis also, in my opinion, misconstruedby McKechniebut in a
toE T
toXkirTw.
different way. It is 3.88:'ApXTvog
'Apyriov 6Xka7totouRtvwvT5ocia itctc
5 On which see most recentlyA. B. Bosworth,Conquestand Empire:the reignof Alexander
the Great(Cambridge1988) 259-277. For the hemithorakion,half-corslet,cf. merely Plut.
Moralia596 D (Thebes,379) and Syll.3 421.39-40(Aitolia,c. 270) - neitherof them helpful in
datingor interpretingPolyaenus4.3.13.
6 Parke105-106.
7 See generallyParke77-78; W. K. Pritchett,TheGreekState at WarII (Berkeleyand Los
Angeles 1974)237.
8 Not 4.8, as McKechnie96 n. 41. Lessvenially,he is also oblivious(McKechnie84), it would
seem, to the debate over the date of Archinos' tyranny,third-century(as he believes) or
see on this H. Berve,Die Tyrannisbei den Griechen(Munich 1967)35-36 (cf. 389)
sixth-century:
with 537.
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tTEtEX1Tg
'IV
tpycLo;0LV)V di06EtX1%3Ft&, KCEtV6V
O6tXov LKcYtU
107
TrV nOXtTOV
8t80oq T6
lv -To; 'Apycfiolt e86oypLvov.
7trxat&v6VaijvEcv (b 6vcziaowv -ro%4
&otIS Kcaiyap oS(5og
c
8t U atnaU
iTvTOW6btXa lvog iPpoLTcv, 6niM(ax;
tn?i
iLvoug tzctii1?TOiKou;KCLt
v 'Apyciwv pvpaWi8CKcLttaXXv.HereMcKechniewrites:"Xenoiis a
rV
iuvrcta
6-i6oL)g K1(5
standardword for 'mercenaries',and given the context it does not seem likely here to mean
simply 'aliens' without suggestingthat they were professionalsoldiers... The picture is of
Archinusbeing able to recruitmercenaries(and discontentedpeople from Argos)once he had
armourto supplythem with."9This is too cavalier.Xenosis indeeda standardword- albeit not
before the fourth centuryl0- for a mercenary,but it also displaysa varietyof other, equally
common, meanings,1'and I am far from convincedthat McKechnieis advocatingthe correct
one here.With no assistanceforthcomingfrom the only otherextantsourceon Archinos,schol.
PindarOlympian7.152,the context(both verbaland substantive)of Polyaenus'referenceto his
arming~tvot is, withoutquestion,crucial,and I can only saythaton two countsI myselfassessit
differently.(a) Three of the four groupsmentionedare seen from the perspectiveof the city of
Argos;this might naturallysuggestthatall four are.(b) If the distinctionbetweenlkTOtKOI and
~tvot is indeed the distinctionbetweenaliens regardedby Argosas, respectively,residentand
not (yet) resident,that is a familiarenough distinction.12
At this junctureit is only fairto admitthat the three Polyaenuspassagesreviewedhere so far
are profferedby McKechnieafter, and (implicitly)as subsidiaryback-upto, other instances
which are less easy to argueaway:(I) Kyros,(2) Dionysios1,and (3) Evagoras.
(1) Kyros.A probabilitythat the sheer size of Kyros' (mainly hoplite) mercenaryarmy
necessitatedthe provisionof their equipmentwas adumbratedsome yearsago, in JamesRoy's
authoritativestudyof the personnelinvolved.13Paul McKechnienow drawsattentionto Anabasis 2.5.38,which appearsto confirm this. When, after Kounaxa,Kyros'former friend Ariaios
attemptsto persuadethe Greeksto surrendertheirarms,his argumentis thatthey now belongto
the Great King as they had belongedto his 'slave'Kyros(w5oo yap ctvai (pTll3Lv,
tteitcp
to
Kupou cacv xoD
iivou 8o01XOu).
McKechniediscussesthe passageand its implicationsat
some length,14and is once againcandidaboutthe problemsit raises- not so much (in his eyes)
its relationshipwith 2.1.8,wherean earlierdemandfor the surrenderof the armshad made no
referenceto their ownership,as the more nebulous matterof the interaction,in 2.5.38 itself,
between Greek terminology(and assumptions)and Persian.On this, as he notes, the experts
disagree,15
and I feel no betterqualifiedthan he did to adjudicate.Nevertheless,his statement
that 'if taken at face value, 12.5.38]implies that Cyrus provided armour for all his Greek
mercenaries'cannotbe gainsaid,and I am unableto demonstratethat it should not be so taken.
In any case,even if McKechnie'slesserargumentfell, Roy'sgreaterone would still stand.
9 McKechnie84.
10Thus P.Gauthier,"Lesxenoi dans les textesatheniensde la secondemoitie du Ve siecle av.
J-C",REG84 (1971)44-79, esp. 56-64.
I See in brief D. Whitehead,TheIdeologyof the AthenianMetic,PCPhSsuppl.vol. 4 (1977)
10-11.
12See for instanceIsoc.8.21,Aeschin. 1.195,Aristot.Pol.1326a 18and 21; less clearlyso, Xen.
Hell.5.1.12.
13J. Roy, 'TheMercenariesof Cyrus',Historia16 (1967)287-323, at 310- noting two minor
and explicit exceptions, the Milesian exiles of 1.2.2 and the (mainly) Rhodian slingers of
3.3.16-20.For uniformityof armour,if not necessarilyof weaponry,see 1.2.16.
14 McKechnie81-82.
15See McKechnie81-82 with (esp.) n. 16, citing, on the one hand, J. M. Cook, The Persian
Empire(London1983)132("All men underthe King'srulewere his slaves. . . All propertywas
at his disposal")and, on the other, letters from and conversationswith D. M. Lewis who
emphasizesthe lack of evidencefor at leastthe secondof these assertions.
108
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(2) DionysiosI. Here too McKechnie'sexposition16 is beyondseriouscavil. Alreadybefore
the tyrannyof Dionysios the provisionof arms for Syracusantroops seems to have been a
practicalpossibility(Thuc.6.72.4;Diod. 13.96.1);and the stockpileof equipmentwhichany such
step presupposescannot but have been augmented- if only temporarily- when, in 404, their
new mastercraftilydisarmedhis fellow-citizens.17 McKechniereckonsit "perverseto doubt"
that these armswere promptlyredistributedto the RLGao(p6poVITXJ9o0 which Dionysiosthen
proceededto recruit.Perhapsso. Butin any event, five yearslatercamethe preparationsfor war
againstCarthage,entailingmunitionsmanufacturefor a theoreticaltotalof 154000 men,18 and
here for once mercenariesdo find explicit mention amongstthe intended recipients:witness
Diod. 14.41.4-5,14.43.3,and aboveall 14.43.4,which unequivocallyputsthe 6itkonotit firstand
(for reasons of economy) the hiring second. The point of this has not been lost on earlier
scholars,19and in itself the episodeis one that we can clearlyvisualize.But is it (ceterisparibus)
typicalor exceptional?That remainsto be seen.
(3) Evagoras."In391 Evagorasof Cyprussent envoys to Athens to ask the state for help and
recruitsome mercenaries;peltastequipmentwas providedfor the (relativelyfew) men recruited."Thus McKechnie'ssummary20of the backgroundto Lysias19.21and 43. He might have
madeit clearthat the Athenianstateas such merelyprovidednavaltransport;it wasAristophanes and his friends who paid for the peltastsand their equipment.Still, that arms were only
bought for the men once they had indeed been hired is plainly stated twice over. "As this
expeditionwas on a small scale",McKechnieadds, "it is probablyunfair to assumethat the
provisionof arms was typicalof mercenaryrecruitment."On the scale of the expeditionhe is
probablyright;21but is this relevant,as a point to be cited againstthe typicalityof the episode?I
would myself preferto emphasizethe particularnatureof Evagoras'request,in combiningan
approachto Athens(ratherthananywhereelse) with a request(if such it was)for peltastsrather
than hoplites.Althoughtherewereapparentlytroops,citizenas well as alien, in Athensas early
as c. 430 who could operationallybe designatedpeltastai,22what remainshighly uncertainis
how far in the earlyyears- within which 391 must still be counted- such men providedtheir
own equipmentand how far, like Thrasyllos''peltastesimprovises'of 409, they were sailors
and/or otherskittedout ad hoc.23But the matterof peltastsvs. hoplites,and the differenttypes
of mercenarysoldiergenerally,will be examinedmore directlyin sectionB.
* * *
To roundoff the dossierof particularcasesalreadyreviewedhere,24McKechniebringsforward
16 McKechnie82-83.
17 Diod. 14.10.4;cf., for Dionysios II, 16.9.2 (stockpile; cf. Plut. Timoleon13.3) and 10.1
(disarmament).
18 Diod. 14.41-43.The size of the eventualarmyfell c. 70 000 shortof that (14.47.7).
19 e. g. Parke69:". . . with typicalprudence[Dionysios]providedthe armsfirstand then raised
the mercenaries,so that he might not be payingthem wagesbeforehe was readyto use them in
war."
20 McKechnie84.
21 Ten vesselswere despatched(Lysias19.43;Xen. Hell.4.8.24),which would implya forceof
some 2 000 peltasts if the peltasts doubled as rowers but only c. 200 if, as is more likely
(McKechnie96 n. 35), they werepassengers.
22Thecrucialitem of evidence(ignoredby Best) is IG I360.17-18.See on this and in general
D. W. Bradeen,"An Athenian peltast?",in Phoros:tributeto BenjaminDean Meentt(Locust
ValleyNY 1974)29-35.
23 Xen. Hell. 1.2.1.(The phrase 'peltastesimprovises'is from J. Hatzfeld, Alcibiade(edn. 2,
Paris1951)278, cited by Best41.)See in generalParke48 with n. 2.
24 One couldadd Diod. 17.111.3:
Leosthenesat Tainaronin 324 is secretlypromisedAthenian
money and armsfor the assemblingmercenariesdemobilizedfrom the satrapalarmies.However, the phrasesused both of this (6nt4cv 6&nkmfjo iKav6v EiL;Td; KCCTEItELyOuaCxpcict;)
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109
a final and more general argumentin support of his thesis of routine separationbetween
recruitingmercenariesand arming them. The notion of a standing stockpile of weaponry
available for distribution,whether to citizens or mercenariesor both, is one that we have
encounteredin connection with Dionysios of Syracuse.McKechnie seeks to establish that
classicalAthens too maintainedsuch a stockpile,and that "clearlythe purposeof collectingit
wasto handit out."25Yet sucha purposeis actuallyfar fromclear,as emergesboth fromhis own
brief (but characteristicallyeven-handed)resume of the evidence and, above all, from the
detaileddiscussion,by KendrickPritchett,which he cites.26I cannotpretendto do justiceto this
topic here, but it must be stated that McKechnie's'clearly'does decidedlybeg the question.
Indeed,thatadverbbetraysa modern,secularizedconceptionof the matterwhich mayverywell
be quiteanachronistic.Was(e.g.)the Chalkothekean arsenalas well as a storehousefor votive
dedications?"In a normal armory,one would expect that militarygear was constantlybeing
dispersedas it was neededin warfare.Yet, when a new t4cTaai6; of the Chalkothekewas made
a little after 350/49 B. C. (IG I12 1440.46ff.),we have, so far as can be tested,exactlythe same
items,includingthe shields,as in IG 112 120[33-34:362/1]."27As Pritchettinsists,"interpretation
is complicated",28
and I wouldnot wishto pretendotherwise.No doubtthe complicationswould
be lessenedif we were in a position to differentiatemore securelybetween arms which were
dedicated(e.g. the 300 panopliesdepositedtV Tot; 'ATTIKOIti'pot; by Demosthenesin 425:
Thuc. 3.114.1)and those which were merely stored(e.g. the 1000 shields presentedto the city,
probablyduringthe CorinthianWar,by Pasion(Demosth.45.85),778 of which are listedas still
in store on the akropolismore than twentyyearslater:IG IIF1424a.128-9, 139-40).However,
we are not - overall- in such a position.And as McKechniehimselfconcedes,wherethe intent
(or at leastthe result)of stockpilingmilitaryequipmentwasto 'handit out',the recipientswill
not necessarilyhave been mercenaries.29
Nor, we might add, will the transactionnecessarily
have been temporary.The practice,for example,of presentinga panoplyto the sons of war-dead
is mentionedin the 380s;30and half a centurylatertherewas enough matnel laid by to permit
both extraordinarydonationssuch as the one to the Thebans in 33531and (e.g.) the routine
annualpresentationof shield and spearto second-yearephebes(?Aristot.Ath. Pol. 42.4).
and of the mercenaries'activitiesbefore reachingTainaron(17.111.1:
see below, section B (3))
indicatethat this was supplementalratherthan totalprovision(cf. Griffith 35).
25 McKechnie85.
26 Pritchett240-295,esp. (on Athenian
inventories)255-263.
27 Pritchett257 n. 69; cf. 261 n. 89,
"the fact that a large numberof a particulararticlewas
inventoriedtogetheris no reasonfor assumingthat the objectswere not votive offerings."
28 Pritchett256.
29 For an
era when all troopswere paid,one's definitionof mercenariesmust hinge on their
not beingmembersof the polis or otherorganizationemployingthem (nor, of course,comingin
forceto its aid by dint of treatyobligations).I mustthereforechallengePritchett'scitationof the
third-centuryTeos/Kyrbissostreaty of union (L. and J. Robert, Joumnaldes Savants 1976,
153-235) as evidence "for equipmentprovidedto the soldiersof a garrisonof mercenaries"
(Pritchett259 n. 79):line 19makesit clearthat the 20 men who will each receivea shield,spear,
swordand helmet (line 34) areTeian citizens.
30 Plato Menexenos249 A. Pritchett259 n. 79 cites parallelsfrom Thasos (Pouilloux, Etudes
thasiennes3 (Paris1954)371;cf. McKechnie94 n. 12)and Rhodes(Diod. 20.84.3).
31Diod. 17.8.5;Plut. Demosth.23.1. Both these sources employ phraseologytoo vague to
exclude the possibilitythat the gift was Demosthenes'own, and it is so regardedby (e.g.) G. L.
Cawkwell,'Thecrowningof Demosthenes',CQ 19(1969)163-180,at 174.However,decisionsby
the ekklesia were closely associated(Diod. 17.8.6),and I agree with Pritchett 259 n. 79 in
regardingthis as one of them.
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110
(B) A returnto orthodoxy?
In seekingto showthat mercenaries'often- perhapseven usually'hadto be separatelyarmedby
theiremployers,PaulMcKechnieis questioningan orthodoxywhich,as he pointsout,32is more
implicit than explicit. I believe he is justified, nevertheless,in conveyingthe impressionthat
there isan (unwritten)consensus- holdingthat mercenariesusuallyturnedup with equipment
of their own - on this point. I furtherbelieve that orthodoxy,now that we must recognizeit as
such and determineits validity,is correct.This is partlybecausethe case for (so to speak) its
evidencethat
prosecutionfails to convince,especiallyfor mainlandGreece:no straightforward
were routinelystockpiled,and no instanceof their provisionfromwhich it
armsfor mercenaries
looks safe to generalize.33Butas we shall now see, orthodoxycan be defendedon othergrounds
besides.
(1) The argumentfrom silence
When ancient historiansare confronted(as they so often are) with only scantyevidencefor
phenomenon x but wish nonethelessto claim that it was a widespreadphenomenon,they
regularlyappealto an argumentfromsilence:thatat the time x wastakenfor grantedand so did
not needto be constantlymentioned.Suchan argumentcan often be perfectlylegitimate.In this
instance McKechnie does not expresslymake it, but 1 imagine he would not deny that it
implicitlyunderpinshis case.
How can one countersuch an argument?Not, I feel, by demandingto know why the separate
provisionof armswas evermentioned.That(rhetorical)questionwouldproperlyariseonly if we
werebeinginvitedto believethatthe employersof mercenarytroopsalwaysprovidedthem with
their equipment.A black-and-whitescenarioof that kind would impose the obligation,on its
proponents,of explaining why from time to time phenomenon x did receive a mention.
McKechnie,however,by not strivingto show that mercenariesand their arms nevercameas a
packagedeal,is underno suchobligation;and if he wereto maintainthat in (e.g.)the Dionysios
episodethe separateprovisionof weaponrywasa centralratherthana merelyincidentalfeature,
I for one would not be disposedto protest.
Even so, argumentsfrom silence cut both ways. And a particularlytelling one can take the
form of askingwhy x passesunmentioned- if so it does - in circumstanceswhere its mention
would have been appropriateand expected.
Suchan expectationmustsurelybe createdby,in this instance,Aineiasthe Tactician'sHow to
SurviveunderSiege.Aineias offers unique insightsinto a typical,small Greek city-stateof his
period,the mid-fourthcentury.McKechnieknows this,34and duly invokes Aineias'evidence
where he can, including in his chapteron mercenaries.35Now Aineias takes it utterly for
grantedthat ordinarycities of the type he is cateringfor will employ mercenarytroops, for
internalsecurityif not necessarilyfor externalcampaigning(see esp. 10.7,10.18-19,12.2-13.4,
22.29), and he offers ideas on how to fund this (ch. 13). Yet nothing whatsoeveris said of
providingthem with their equipment;and - moresignificantlystill - his constantconcernwith
arms procurementand control(see esp. 10.7,10.9,and chs. 29-30) conspicuouslyfails to stateor
even hint that the city itself,as opposedto its individualinhabitants,is presidingover stocksof
armsand armour.
It is of coursethe universalityof Aineias'(negative)testimonyin this regardwhichgives it its
32 McKechnie80 with n.
11.
33 It would not even be safe to say that (e.g.) Dionysios always hired men first and then
equippedthem: witness the Messeniansfrom Naupaktoswho join him - and others - after
leavingGreece LTvrT&rv6intov (Diod. 14.34.3).
34 McKechnie27.
35 McKechnie84, 86 (at n. 58), 88 (at n. 77), 92.
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IlI
special importance.Elsewhere,the silence of an ancient writer about the arms-and-armour
aspectof any particularepisode of mercenaryrecruitmentmay seem less eloquent.So here I
would only say that, if a formulationsuch as to.o9p6pwv itXf1og fSpot4e (Diod. 16.28.1,of
Philomelos)provesnothingin any individualcase,the same can less confidentlybe affirmedof
its repetition,with no wordof separatearmsprovision,time and time again.
(2) Variety of troops
"Ofmaterialimprovements",wroteH. W. Parke,"theriseof the mercenarychieflycontributed to the diversityof armament."36
This fact,and its implicationsfor his thesis,is largelyglossed
over by McKechnie,concernedas he is to stress(correctly)that the socioeconomicspectrumof
society from which mercenariescame was a broad one, embracing"the homeless and destitute"37as well as "citydwellingand not unrespectableGreeks"like the Kyreians.38Accordingly
he concentrateson hoplites."Hoplitesin city armiesownedtheir own armour:if such was also
the case in mercenaryarmies,then the poorestor most destituteoutsiderscannot have qualiThis argumentsubsequentlyacquiresa crucialproviso,however:"if mercenariesusually
fied."39
providedtheirown armour,then outsiderswho did not havecapitalassetsto the valueof at least
100 drachmascould only exceptionallyturn to mercenarysoldiering,at least in the hoplite
role."40
Whateverone'sviews aboutthe overallprotasisof this argument,the blanketterm 'mercenary'does seem to call for some refinement.And, as regardsthe kit of troopsotherthan hoplites,
we may surelyenvisageit as being not only cheaper,by and large,than the hoplite'spanoply4l
but also so diverse and specializedas to make it almost axiomaticthat the fightersand their
equipmentwerecommissionedas a totality.Is it reallyconceivable,for instance,that in 428 the
Lesbians,awaitingthe archerswhom they had sent for from the BlackSea, spent that time in
manufacturingor purchasingbows and arrowsfor them?42 And can it really have been the
Atheniansthemselveswho kittedout the 480 Cretanand otherarchersand the (?) 700 Rhodian
slingerswho sailedto Sicily in 415?43
Archersand slingers, it may be held, were merely peripheral.Yet the same view must be
takenof front-linetroopstoo. Hereare two illustrativepassages:
(i) Thuc. 7.27.1:the arrivalin Athens,in 413,of the 1 300 Dioi from Thrace.Thucydideshas
36 Parke 236.
37 McKechnie 79.
38
McKechnie 80; cf. Parke 29.
39 McKechnie 79.
40 McKechnie 80-81 (with my emphasis), providing documentation for the figure at 94 n. 12.
41 This must be true of (defensive) armour if not always of (offensive) arms. Cavalrymen
present a particular problem, not so much in their personal accoutrements (on which see J. K.
Anderson, Ancient Greek Horsemanship (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1961) 140ff.) as in their
horses (for some prices of which see McKechnie 94 n. 12). One answer would be to say, of
mercenaries no less than of citizens, that "cavalrymen had to be quite a bit richer than hoplites"
(McKechnie loc. cit.); note, however, that Xenophon's scheme for adding 200 iiTJTEcIiLvot to the
Athenian cavalry corps included ideas for defraying the cost of their horses (Hipparchikos
9.3-5).
42 Thuc. 3.2.2. (They may or may not be the tITiKoupot mentioned in 3.18.1 and/or 2.) I take
both the To06tat and the clroS to have been bought rather than requisitioned under treaty
obligations.
43Thuc. 6.43 (cf. Nikias in 6.22), with Dover's note on the number 700. For citizen archers
(who surely provided their own gear) in Athens since at least c. 460 see Thuc. 2.13.8 with
Gomme's note; for toXY6uTatt
PkpIpkpotin casualty lists, D. W. Bradeen, "The Athenian casualty lists", CQ 19 (1969) 145-159, at 149 with n. 9. On archers and slingers generally see Griffith
138-139.
112
Miszellen
and the adjectiveis repeatedhere.To
already(2.96.2)appliedto them the term LaXXLpo(p6poL,
or for that
supposethat they had to turn up in Athens before being issued their WLXaLpat,
matterthe rest of the equipmentwhich meritedThucydides'descriptionof them as peltasts44
strainscredulity;and theirbloodthirstyprogressafterleavingAthens(see below,subsection3) is
furthercorroborationthat no such strainis called for.
(ii) Xen. Hell. 4.2.5: Agesilaos'preparations,in 394, to return from Asia Minor to the
CorinthianWar. He offers prizes to whichever lochagosof mercenariesjoins the expedition
with the best-armed(ED'o7tX6Tatog)lochos 'of hoplites and archers and
( TctpateU'0o0)
peltasts';also for the best-mountedand best-armed(CtRnoT6Tfl K( cti6o0nXoTTrrI) cavalry
squadron.Somewhatparadoxically,the &fJkafor hoplites and cavalry turn out to be ftXka
And
(4.2.7);butoverallthe pictureis one of mercenarylochoicomingforwardready-equipped.45
this of courseleadsus directlyon to the questionof:
(3) 'Unemployed"mercenaries
If we were to acceptthe idea that it was common or even customaryfor the employersof
mercenariesto arm their men beforeusing them and retrievesuch equipmentafterwards,4it
would follow that mercenariescould only operateeffectivelyduringtheir periodsof employment. But this is not the picturethe sourcespaint.
Take (once again)the Dioi in 413.We have alreadyseen that the specializednatureof their
weaponrymakesit highlyunlikelythat they were not issuedwith it until they reachedAthens.
Probabilitybecomes proof, however,when we read Thucydides'graphicand, by his austere
standards,emotionaldescriptionof the atrocitieswhich they committedin Boiotiaon theirway
home (Thucydides7.29-30,cf. Pausanias1.23.3-4).
Otherinstancesare lessclearcut.I confine myselfto two, bothof them fromthe secondhalf of
the fourthcentury:
(i) Diod. 16.62.2.Sailing to Magna Graecia in summer 345 (or spring 344),47 Phalaikos'
mercenariessuspectthat no definiteemploymentis awaitingthem there,drawtheirswordson
Phalaikosand the helmsman,and force them to change course (for Malea and, ultimately,
Crete).These men had been ceremoniallydisarmedin the summerof 346 (Diod. 16.60.3);so we
ot Tag
see here that at least some of them - Diod. 16.62.2writesof the mutineersas .kutcXi9'
1'-yLVCoviag
9XovT; - had subsequentlyre-armedthemselves.
Beforeassemblingat Tainaron,the demobilizedmercenaryarmiesof the
(ii) Diod. 17.111.1.
satrapssupportthemselvesby Ka,9' 6Xpv X'v 'Aaiav nX(av6R6vot oi t6g tV(tyKaiac Tpo0q);
tK TOv ipovoV v noplt6jLvot. This impliestheir retentionand/or subsequentacquisitionof
at least some arms and armour,howevermuch it neededto be supplementedby Leosthenes.48
More significant,though,than individualillustrativepassageslike these is the generalbackdrop of prevailingfourth-century(and later)assumptionsabout mercenariesand the chronic
dangers they pose. The key witness here is Isocrates.With Parke'sopinion that 'Isocrates'
44On the peltast'sequipment see generally Best 3-16; Anderson 37-38 (machairai)and
112-113.
45 The episodeis regardedby Anderson59 as 'implyingthat[the lochagoi]were responsiblefor
the stateof the men's equipment'.This is fair comment,but would not of itself presuppose(as
Andersonappearsto do) centralizedissuingof that equipment.
46 Providedof coursethey were in a positionto do so. The Kyreiansare the obviousexample
of men whoseinitialemployer,ifjhehadever armedthem, lost (alongwith his life) his abilityto
repossessthose arms; note Xen. Anab.7.2.3. For instancesof arms initially provided(on the
McKechniehypothesis)by one employerbeing used in the serviceof anothersee (e.g.) Diod.
19.87.1ff.(Telesphoros)and 20.19.2(Polemaios).
47 For the chronologysee H. D. Westlake,'Phalaecusand Timoleon',CQ34 (1940)44 46.
48See above,n. 24.
Miszellen
113
testimony on strategicmatters is not necessarilyto be taken as accurate'one can have no
quarrel,49but in other, broaderrespectswhat Isocrateshas to say must be taken seriously.The
relevantpassagesare well-known(chiefly,in chronologicalorder:4.168;Ep. 9.8-9; 8.24; 15.115;
5.96 and 120-123; Ep. 2.19), and the image they conjure up is one of itinerant forces of
mercenarieson the loose,especiallyin Asia Minor,and 'committingoutragesupon whomsoever
they encounter'(5.120).The essentialtruth of this is acceptedboth by Parke50and indeed by
McKechnie,who while suggestingthat the units of real durabilitywere less often mercenary
armies, as such, than their constituentlochoi,51writes nonethelessof 'quasi-independentforces'52and offersa lengthyand convincingdemonstrationof the high degreeof overlapbetween
mercenariesand pirates.53
Unless these indicationsthatthe aggressiveactivitiesof mercenaryfighterswereby no means
confined to their periodsin bonafide employmentare somehow illusory,they seem to me to
deal a final and fatal blow to any notion that, as a rule, only during such periods would
mercenarieshave been armed.Accordingly,on the basisof boththis and the otherevidenceand
argumentsherepresented,I wouldurgeinsteadthe opposite(andtraditional)view:thatto hire a
mercenaryin classicalGreece was, under normal circumstances,to hire a man who brought
with him the tools of his trade.
Universityof Manchester
DavidWhitehead
PHILOLOGIE,PROSOPOGRAPHIEET HISTOIREA PROPOS DE LUCIUS FABIUS
HISPANIENSIS
Voila maintenant bien longtemps que deux des senateursde 1'entouragedes Sertoriusqui
participerentau complotcontrelui excitentla curiositedes historiens.Sallustenous apprend,en
effet, qu'au repas oii devait etre assassinece chef charismatiqueparticipait,entre autres, un
certainL. FabiusHispaniensissenatorex proscriptis,qui se trouvaitjuste au-dessusde Sertorius
(occupant lui-meme le locus consularissur le mediusl)et qui, donc, a duiprendreune part
importantedanscet assassinat.Or on connait,sous ce nom, pour la meme epoque,un questeur
du proconsuldes deux Espagnes,C. Annius,qui avait reussia contraindreSertoriusa quitterle
sol espagnolet i s'embarquerpourla Maur6tanie.2
Commece sont pratiquementles deux seules
49 Parke 44 n. 6 (with my emphasis).A good example of the difficulty of using Isocrates'
version of any given instance of mercenaryrecruitmentis 4.144: in 397 Drakon of Pellene
'collectsthreethousandpeltasts(tptaXitouq RCXTraTaCTaUXXRa;)' to campaignin Mysia.In a
more militarily-precisewriterthis might warrantthe assumptionthat peltastswere collected
ready-armed,but not necessarilyin Isocrates;note also that in6vTatxatait r8eta with which
Derkylidashad stockedDrakon'sbase,Atarneus(Xen. Hell.3.2.11),possiblyincludedarms.
50 Parke228-229.
51 McKechnie88, cf. 91.
52 McKechnie87, cf. 115.
53McKechnie 101ff.See also H. A. Ormerod,Piracyin the Ancient World(Liverpool1924)
119-150.
I Igiturdiscubuere:Sertoriusinferiorin medio, supereum L.
Fabius Hispaniensis... (Sall.,
Hist. III, 83 M). Mais Plutarque(Sert.26) et Diodorede Sicile (37, 22a) decriventla disposition
de fa9on differente et, en fait, aberrante.Sur cette question du placement au banquet,uid.
J. Marquardt,La ViepriveedesRomains,trad.frangaise,Paris,1892-1893,356-359; A. Schulten,
Sertorius,2eme ed. Leipzig,1926,134-135.
2 Plut. Sert.7,4. Cette questureest attesteepar une emission monetairedu procos.sur un
denier de laquelleon lit, en effet, L. FABI.L.F.HISP.Q.
(Crawford,RRC 336). Sur le fait que
C. Annius Luscus,avait bien en chargel'ensemblede la peninsule,uid. E. Badian,Studies in
Greekand RomanHistory,Oxford,1964,96 & n. 165.