How is the Rise of Suicide Terrorism in Contemporary
World Politics Best Accounted for?
By David Reichert
Post Cold War World Order
Fall 2010
Introduction
On the cool, crisp morning of September 11, 2001, 19 men boarded 4 passenger planes
on the east coast of the United States. After they took off, two planes were flown into the twin
towers of the World Trade Center in New York, one crashed into the Pentagon in Washington
D.C., and one was crashed into a field in rural Pennsylvania. The terrorist organization headed by
Osama Bin Laden known as Al-Qaeda (the base) had in a single stroke brought the threat of
terrorism to the doorstep of the most powerful nation-state in the world. It had a profound effect.
America’s stockpiles of nuclear weapons, its physical distance from major conflicts, and
protection by oceans, no longer provided it with sufficient national security. It was
incomprehensible that in a matter of hours a few men with resolute will could turn civilian
aircraft into the largest suicide bombs to date. They had invented human smart bombs. This act
caused millions of Americans to finally experience on a large scale the phenomenon that the
inhabitants of the historically blood soaked sands of the Middle East and other cultures have
endured throughout history— suicide terrorism. Americans immediately began to wonder what
causes people to do this and why us? Does it matter that these men who hijacked planes on 9-11
were Muslims? Or is this behavior a rational tactical response to strong state powers?
Indeed, the most prominent threat facing international society following the end of the
Cold War is transnational terrorism. Policymakers, military experts, and intelligence agencies all
continue to struggle for solutions to the complex security problems terrorist threats pose to states.
This paper will explore the primary reasons for the rise in suicide terrorism. First, a working
definition of terrorism must be established. The lack of consensus on a working definition of
terrorism to a large degree makes it difficult to provide objective analyses and policy
prescriptions to address it. Two main arguments will be explored. First, it is necessary to
consider the degree to which culture and religious motivations have contributed to the rise in
terrorism. I draw on Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis to examine this point of
view. Second, I look at the argument that supports suicide terrorism being a rational strategy
persisting throughout history as a means for waging warfare against stronger, more powerful
enemies. Robert Pape’s research is an instructive framework to argue in favor of this position.
Evidence is strong on both sides of this debate. While recent increases in suicide terrorist attacks
appear to be caused by groups that embody elements of extreme religious doctrines and
differences in cultural values, particularly Islamic terrorism, I will conclude that suicide terrorism
and similar acts have been conducted throughout history and are rational strategies and effective
tactics when facing states with overwhelming military power.
1
Defining Terrorism
It is quite fascinating that each of the 16 intelligence agencies in the U.S. has its own
definition of terrorism. The United Nations, foreign intelligence agencies such as Mossad and
MI-5, and other foreign governments have different definitions of terrorism. It may be that
different values are in play. After all, the old axiom ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s
freedom fighter’ may be more accurate today than ever. It is true that in different parts of the
world acts of aggression are viewed by states, cultures, and other actors differently. But for the
purposes of this paper, and to have any hope of determining root causes of terrorism, a working
definition is paramount.
Instead of trying to pick among the various agencies’ and nations’ definitions of
terrorism, the following is an all-encompassing and useful definition. Terrorism is:
•
ineluctably political in aims and motives;
•
violent – or; equally important, threatens violence;
•
designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target;
•
conducted either by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell
structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia) or by individuals or a small
collection of individuals directly influenced, motivated, or inspired by the ideological aims or
example of some existent terrorist movement and/or its leaders; and
•
perpetuated by a substantial group or non-state entity.
Bruce Hoffman’s definition1
Suicide terrorism adds a critical dimension to this definition. It draws on fear and the
psychological aspects noted above, thus establishing the key element of credibility. The act
demonstrates that the bombers are willing to cross a line that most individuals are not, in order to
send their message. Suicide bombers come from all walks of life and are not rooted only in
poverty as some assume. In many cases they are well educated and well financed, a point I will
return to later. Secular-nationalist groups primarily conducted acts of terrorism in the 1970’s and
80’s, but since the end of the Cold War it has been used predominantly by religious
fundamentalist groups, primarily those rooted in Islam. I now turn to the main focus of this
report— how best to account for the rise in suicide terrorism internationally?
2
Religious Fundamentalism and Cultural Values
Contemporary terrorism is typically characterized as Islamic suicide terrorism. By
studying suicide bombings from a narrow scope during the period 2001 - 2005, these forms of
attacks have accounted for 78 percent of all terrorist incidents since 1968.2 Of the 35 terrorist
organizations, 86% (or 31 of these groups) were Islamic. This poses the question: are cultural
and religious values the cause of these attacks? Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’
thesis poses a strong case that these values are indeed a significant factor. I will explore the
historical transition of these values and how current suicide terrorists hold deeply embedded
beliefs that might cause their seemingly irrational behavior.
Huntington, writing this thesis in 1993, was prophetic. He hypothesizes that in the future
“The great divisions of humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural.” 3 He
believed that cultural conflict would prevail in world politics in the future rather than territorial
power and material strength. His view of the future was a world marked by cultural
fragmentation. He divided the world into discreet blocs and noted that religion is the key definer.
Most importantly, people will self-identify with a religion. Proponents of this argument cite that
this is why suicide bombers make tapes of themselves. Huntington further contends that future
conflicts will be primarily between Confucian civilizations (Asia) versus the West, and Islam
versus the West. It is clear there is growing tension with Asian states and the West. The
oppressive North Korea regime is overtly defying the U.S. and their allies’ wishes by moving to
obtain nuclear weapons to balance against them. While China and the U.S. have growing
tensions between them, thus far they remain willing to conduct their interactions through
diplomatic statecraft, largely due to active trade and mutual economic reliance. Worries about
trade-related issues such as disputes over currency valuations persist. As Asian conflicts have yet
to result in notable aggressive acts, I will focus primarily on conflict between Islam and the West,
insofar as conflicts between these two cultures have already proven to be violent.
When there is a lack of order in a state, a power vacuum exists that needs to be filled. In
many cases, radical, religious fundamentalist groups fill these vacuums. These groups meet many
societal and social needs, including the provision of medical and hospital services, kindergarten
and schools, care for the elderly, prompt relief after natural and other catastrophes, and welfare
and social support during periods of economic deprivation.4 Nowhere is this more noticeable
today than in several Islamic states throughout the Middle East, Central Asia, and North Africa.
Huntington suggests that while Asian countries will seek the path of economic growth to
balance against the west, Muslims will have an “Islamic Resurgence”. They will turn towards
religion as a source of power, development, and legitimacy. This resurgence is the notion of
3
willingness to accept modernization, but to reject Western culture. Throughout the political
resurgence of Islam its people are major participants in the products and processes of
modernization. There are several key groups that are involved. The core elements consisted of
students and intellectuals beginning in the 1970s in Egypt, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, mainly at
technical universities, who were increasingly exposed to Islamist influence. They shared five
characteristics: they were 20-30 year olds, 80 percent university students or graduates, over 50
percent came from elite universities, over 70 percent came from the lower middle-class, and were
the first generation in their families to receive higher education. This group filled the militant
portion of fundamentalist groups. In fundamentalist groups the bulk of active membership
included doctors, lawyers, engineers, scientists, teachers, and civil servants.5
Is there an inherently violent component to Islam? According to Huntington there are six
possible causes of Muslim conflict propensity. Three explain conflict between Muslim and nonMuslims and three causes contribute to both intra- and extra-Muslim conflicts. First, the Muslim
religion is steeped in a tradition of dungeon, fire, and sword. Throughout the Koran, military
virtues are glorified (martyrdom here is key), there is a deep tradition of warring nomadic tribes,
and the Muslim prophet Muhammad was himself a great military commander. Second, the
spread of Islam from Arabia to North Africa, the Middle East, central Asia and Balkans brought
this religion in close proximity, by which force of conquest contributed to conversions. These
historic conflicts resurface today as evidenced in Kosovo by Serbs and Kosovo Albanians. A
third source of extra-Muslim conflict is the exclusivity of Islam; Muslim majorities have
problems with non-Muslim minorities. It is an absolutist faith combining politics and religion.
Islam draws a sharp line between countries where Muslims can practice their religion freely and
those where Islamic law is not in force. The fourth cause (extra-Muslim conflict) is the notion of
victim status— the idea that Muslims have been subjugated by Western imperialism and viewed
as militarily and economically weak. Fifth, Islam lacks a centralized core state, which results in
political instability within Muslim states. Finally, there has been a demographic explosion in
Muslim societies, which contributes to a large number of unemployed males between the ages of
15 and 30, which has emerged as a source of violence and instability.
Table 10.4
Possible Causes of Muslim Conflict Propensity______________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________
Historical and contemporary conflict
Extra-Muslim conflict
Proximity
Indigestibility
Intra- and Extra-Muslim conflict_________
Militarism
Contemporary conflict
Victim Status
Demographic bulge
________________________________________________________________________Core state absence_____________________
Huntington6
4
The above causes are evidenced in the growth of conflicts along the major fault lines between
Muslims and others at the micro level, taking place along the border looping across Eurasia and
Africa that separates Muslims and non-Muslims. Huntington appears to be right to some degree
that “Islam has bloody borders.” 7
A brief history of extreme Islamic doctrine is instructive. It is within the Sunni tradition
that the al-Sauds who eventually conquered the area known today as Saudi Arabia merged with
an 18th century martial desert preacher, Mohammad ibn Abdul Wahhab. Abdul Aziz embraced
Wahhabi doctrine during his rule 1765-1803. He banned alcohol, tobacco, embroidered silk,
gambling, fortune telling, and magic. Aziz sponsored a new, fierce, semi-independent vanguard
of Ikhwan, or Brothers, war-fighting believers who dressed in distinctive white turbans and
trimmed their beards and mustaches to express Islamic solidarity.8 These fighters ensured this
doctrine was followed by forcing it upon many subjects under Aziz’s rule. Furthermore, the
doctrine embodies a strict Islamic code and denounces idol worshiping, music, art, and imposes a
strict code of conduct on women’s dress and behavior in public. The doctrine promotes severe
punishments for these offenses, such as stoning and hanging. This extremist Islam became the
dominant doctrine of Saudi Arabia after the oil boom in the 1970s.9
The first major event that truly propelled the Islamic resurgence was the overthrowing of
the Shah in Iran in 1979. The Saudi’s intelligence agency (GID) and the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) feared the Saudi royal family would be next, following a plot to seize Mecca. The
revolt in Iran would signal a spread of the revolution to Saudi Arabia as it is home to some of
Islam’s holiest sites including Mecca, Medina, and Jedda. When the Soviets invaded
Afghanistan, Prince Turki, head of the GID, coordinated with Pakistan’s President Zia. Turki and
the CIA agreed to match funding to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets in 1980. More of a mystery
was the massive number of Saudis flocking to join the Afghan Jihad (struggle) against the
Soviets. One of these young Mujahedeen warriors was Osama Bin Laden.
The second major driving force inspiring Islamic resurgence was the U.S. and their allies’
presence in Saudi Arabia after the Gulf War in 1991. One of the main reasons Bin Laden left
Saudi Arabia was the Royal family’s continued relationship with the West. Bin Laden and his
followers were outraged at this because of the religious significance of Saudi Arabia and its holy
sites. They view the Western presence as deeply offensive. He and his followers returned to
Afghanistan and were accepted by another Islamic fundamental regime, the Taliban (‘students’),
who shared his outrage towards Western states’ proximity to their sacred lands. With his wealth
Bin Laden has helped the spread of his militant beliefs by building Madrassas (Islamic theology
schools) to educate young students, primarily in the strict Wahhabi doctrine. These schools draw
5
on deep traditional beliefs embedded in history and legend, including violent acts against
Muslims by Christians during the Crusades. Through this spread of Islamic beliefs Bin Laden
helped build a seemingly unending army of militant warriors who believed, through these
teachings, that by martyring themselves in the name of their religion they would compel the
Western infidels (non-believers) to leave heir lands.
Andrew McCarthy of the National Review Institute argues that this extreme doctrine of
Islam is not new. He explains several parts of the Koran that are interpreted by Wahhabism to
promote self-sacrifice, martyrdom, and extreme violence are acceptable and rewarded in
spreading the Islamic faith. Many of these violent adaptations of the Koran have deep roots and
are fourteen centuries old. He posits that there is a sizable minority that holds these beliefs. In a
Muslim world with over 1.4 billion in population, even if that number is 20 percent (McCarthy
estimates this as low), it represents over 250 million people.10 If true, this presents a notable
threat and a strong case that culture and more specifically religion is a significant cause of the
violence and beliefs that suicide bombers hold. Furthermore, they have self-determined this.
Currently, the largest suicide attack remains the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon. The U.S. is the sole military super-power in the world, making it the biggest
and most likely target. So far, attacks upon other Western states such as the U.K. and Spain
remain limited. Should they be attacked with the same severity as the U.S. it would likely prove
Huntington’s arguments even more convincing.
The Effectiveness of the Strategy
Causes the Rise in Suicide Terrorism
One must wonder if culture, specifically religion, is the main cause of the rise in suicide
terrorism. Robert Pape says no. A common suicide bomber profile may not exist. By
broadening the scope of incidents, his framework and research provides the central argument that
counters Huntington. Pape argues that just as air power and economic sanctions are tools for
coercion by states, suicide terrorism is a rational and calculated strategy for terrorist actors.
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and eventual defeat by the U.S. and their allies in 1991 proved that in
the post-cold war era challenging major western powers by conventional means is not a winning
strategy. Terrorism throughout history has been a successful tactic by the weaker side. Suicide
attacks have one strategic goal in common: to compel democracies to withdraw military forces
from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland.11 Religion is a factor, but it is
ultimately a recruiting tool for terrorists. Pape’s evidence included a study of 315 suicide attacks
from 1980-2003 (Table 1). The leading terrorist group was the Tamil Tigers based in Sri Lanka,
6
who are a Marxist-Leninist group. Even though their founders are Hindu based, they are very
opposed to religion. They committed 76 of these incidents. This surpasses both Hamas and
Islamic Jihad. 301 of these were part of an organized political or military campaign.
Democracies are uniquely vulnerable to these attacks. All 18 groups in the study had one
overarching aim— seeking to establish or maintain political self-determination. Pape notes that
the suicide terrorism rate has increased from 31 in the 1980s, to 104 in the 1990s, and 53 in 20002001. During this time the total number of terrorist attacks has fallen from 666 in 1987 to 274 in
1998, with 348 in 2001 (The figures are from the Department of State, 2001).
Table 1.
Suicide Terrorist Campaigns, 1980-2003
Completed Campaigns
Date
Terrorist Group
Terrorist Goal
Attacked/Killed
Target Behavior
1
Apr-Dec 1983
Hezbollah
US/France Out of Lebanon
5 / 393
Total Withdrawal
2
Nov 82-Apr 82
Hezbollah
Israel Out, Lebanon
11 / 197
Partial Withdrawal
3
Jun 85-Jun 86
Israel Out, Leb sec. zone
20 / 156
No Change
Sri Lanka accept Tamil State
14 /164
Negotiations
Sri Lanka accept Tamil State
54 / 629
No Change
4
Jul 90-Nov 94
Hezbollah
LTTE (Tamil
Tigers)
5
Apr 95-Oct 00
LTTE
6
Apr-94
Hamas
Israel Out, Palestine
2/15
Partial Withdrawal, Gaza
7
Oct 94-Aug 95
Hamas
Retaliation, Israel Assassination
11 / 65
Partial Withdrawal, West Bank
8
Feb-Mar 96
Hamas
Israel Out, Palestine
4 / 58
No Change
9
Mar-Sept 97
Hamas
Israel Out, Palestine
3 / 24
Top leader released
10
Jun-Oct 96
PKK
Turkey Accept Kurd autonomy
3 / 16
No Change
11
Mar-Aug 99
PKK
Turkey free leader
11 / 6
No Change
12
2001
LTTE
Sri Lanka accept Tamil State
6 / 51
Granted Autonomy
Ongoing Campaigns
13
1996-
Al-Qaeda
US out, Arabian Peninsula
21 / 3661
TBD
14
2000-
Chechens
Russia out, Chechnya
19 / 362
TBD
15
2000-
Kashmir Rebels
India out, Kashmir
5 / 61
TBD
16
2000-
Several
Israel Out, Palestine
92 / 515
TBD
17
2003-
Iraqi Rebels
US out, Iraq
20 / 262
TBD
Total Incidents = 315
# in campaigns = 301
# isolated = 14
Source Pape, Blowing Up an Assumption, NY Times, from his research at University of Chicago
There are five main principles in examining the strategic logic of suicide terrorism. First,
as mentioned above, is strategic. The attacks are generally part of a larger campaign and usually
stop once the objectives are reached. Second, they are designed to coerce democracies to make
concessions to national self-determination. This is why al-Qaeda wants the U.S. to leave the
Middle East. Third, terrorists have discovered that suicide attacks have paid off. They forced
American forces from Lebanon in 1983 and Israeli forces in 1985. Fourth, even though moderate
attacks lead to some concessions, it does not change a nation’s willingness to trade high interests
for high costs due to its relatively limited scope of punishment. America retaliated aggressively
7
against al-Qaeda in the wake of the 9-11 attacks. Finally, reducing terrorists’ confidence is the
most effective way to contain these attacks. Investing significant resources in border defenses
and homeland security is the best policy prescription.12
The coercive logic of suicide terrorism is that the strategy aims to compel a target
government to change policies by inflicting enough pain and punishment to that society to either
force the government to change the policies or induce their population to revolt against that
government. The coercive nature of suicide terrorism as a strategy of a weak actor relies on
leveraging the future expectation of damage. A suicide bomber’s willingness to die amplifies the
effect of this punishment and generally inflicts more damage than other types of terrorist attack.
Such attacks are a very convincing way to signal the future likelihood of attack. Terrorist groups
that rely on these tactics are better positioned than other terrorist groups to increase the
expectations about escalating future costs because they intentionally violate the norms in the use
of violence by crossing thresholds of damage, pushing the envelope on what is considered a
legitimate target, and it helps broaden recruitment.
Bruce Hoffman has argued that the September 11th attacks are instructive in
understanding why suicide terrorism is a logical strategy. First, the 19 hijackers were all prepared
to martyr themselves. Rather than a cause for a rise in terrorism, it demonstrates the usefulness of
religion as being a key recruiting tool for terrorism groups like al-Qaeda. The plan itself was well
designed and highly technical in having the hijackers turn passenger airliners into missiles they
could control as potent suicide weapons. Third, these attacks are relatively inexpensive for
terrorist groups and have arguably contributed to America’s economic woes. It is estimated that
al-Qaeda spent $400,000 - $500,000 on the attacks. At the same time, the U.S. budget deficit has
skyrocketed since 2001, largely driven by defense spending linked to the global war on terror.
Fourth, this attack was extremely destructive. Fifth, the 9-11 attacks had a powerful
psychological impact on the American populace. It did what terrorism strategies are meant to
do— inspire fear. Finally, the media coverage that followed could not have been better for alQaeda. It only helped to spread the impact and message of the disaster worldwide.
There are 8 key factors explaining the utility of suicide terrorism.13
1.
Suicide attacks are more lethal than their conventional counterparts
2.
They are highly effective in gaining the spotlight and international attention.
3.
In enabling social circumstances, suicide attacks build solidarity with one’s political base.
4.
They can deflect or reduce the possibility of backlash over civilian casualties.
5.
Suicide attacks can be “auto-propaganda” motivating a group’s internal membership.
6.
Can be used to gain competitive advantage over other rival terrorist groups.
7.
As noted above, suicide operations are cheap.
8
8.
It is sometimes rational to appear irrational.
Joseph Nye has also argued that terrorism is not new. He points out that its roots date
back throughout history. Terror (Great Fear) was an instrument used historically by several
governments. The first French Republic (1792-1804) and Stalin’s Soviet Union used it to control
their populations. It has been used by revolutionaries in the 19th century and killed half a dozen
heads of state. Nye argues that a chief causal aspect of the rise of terrorism is that technology has
made the complex systems of modern societies more vulnerable. Islamic terrorists use the
Internet to spread their message. A key point Nye raises is that this advancement in technology is
making physical borders less relevant in protecting state security today. The technology of
miniaturization of explosives, vulnerability of modern systems such as air travel, and increasing
ease of communication via the Internet enable non-state actors to do great harm across borders.
Nye adds that terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s was largely driven by nationalism. The groups
were either left-wing, right-wing, nationalist-separatists, and had some compunctions about
killing innocent people— which appears less prevalent among terrorists today. This lack of
distinction between civilians and combatants makes today’s terrorists capable of more destructive
power.14
Conclusion
It is true that some of the suicide terrorists groups operating today are characterized by
their Islamic fundamentalism. Islam vs. the West and Asia vs. the West have been seen as the
major tensions and conflicts in the post Cold War era. Islamic fundamentalists attempt to control
key strategic locations in the Middle East and Central Asia. This is significant as they fill power
vacuums left by weak centralized governments and regimes. Massive corruption and tribal
disagreements have endured throughout the history of these civilizations. They have resurfaced
on a sizeable scale. The explosion of Muslim populations and their ties to historically violent
settlement of disagreements have created great political instability, authoritarian rule, and largescale poverty throughout these lands. Many of these countries and their governments have rich
supplies of oil; and since they control this vital commodity and are compensated handsomely by
other nations, they have no need to develop resources and institutions for these societies. As a
result, extremist Muslim groups fill a societal need. Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other groups step
in to fill these needs. Furthermore, the West has become entrenched in these areas due to several
conflicts over the years and has close ties with Saudi Arabia and their rich oil suppliers. They
have also remained allied and heavily fund the states of Israel and Turkey. The deeply embedded
beliefs and traditions have mobilized and contributed to the rise in Muslim conflict propensity
9
both among their own peoples and with non-Muslims. However, religious beliefs are not a root
cause of increases in suicide terrorism.
While it is true that religious fundamentalism impels many of today’s terrorist actors,
specifically groups using suicide tactics, this has been the dominant, rational strategy of weak
actors against powerful states. Assassins were probably the closest thing to suicide bombers
historically as they were willing to die (and often did) to carry out their missions. Ismali
Assassins killed for political purposes during the medieval Crusades. It is worth noting that even
though they were Muslims, they sold their services just as often to the Christian armies as to
Muslims. In fact, they tried to kill Saladin, the Muslim military leader at the time. Throughout
history, similar groups operated in feudal Japan, China, medieval Europe, Rome, and ancient
Greece.
Robert Pape’s evidence and logic of suicide terrorism is convincing. Recent trends
demonstrate that 76 of 315 of suicide attacks have been carried out by the Marxist-Leninist Tamil
Tigers. Other secular and non-Muslim based terror groups carried out over one third of the
attacks. Suicide attacks inflict punishment and establish credibility, signaling further attacks to
come. Moreover, it pays. Low cost and high rewards are among its defining attributes. It aims
to achieve moderate concessions from larger, more powerful adversaries. Furthermore, the U.S.
has a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons. Its overwhelming, conventional military power in 2003
during the invasion of Iraq clearly demonstrates that the reality on the ground makes challenging
them, even at the state level, irrational. They spend nearly $700 billion on defense annually. The
next closest nation is China, with $98 billion (Figures from Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute). Fighting powerful military states head on is unlikely to be successful for
these groups. Moreover, retaliation against suicide terrorists is problematic. One cannot launch a
nuclear weapon at al-Qaeda and risk harming millions of innocent people. As long as diplomatic
policies and conventional and clandestine military strategies fail to eliminate these threats, suicide
terrorism will continue to be used by a wide spectrum of terrorist organizations and not just those
with extreme religious beliefs. In sum, suicide terrorism is a viable strategy to combat the might
of the U.S. and other Western military powers. The strategy's effectiveness supported by
technological advances has caused the rise suicide terrorism in the post Cold War era, and not
cultural and religious beliefs per se. If history is any indication, long-term solutions to combat
suicide terrorism and similar acts will remain elusive.
10
Notes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 40.
Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 131.
Huntington, S. “The Clash of Civilizations?”, Foreign Affairs, p.22
Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, p. 98
Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, p. 112-114
Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, p. 263
Huntington, S. “The Clash of Civilizations?”, Foreign Affairs, p.35
Coll, S., Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, From the
Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, p.76
Rashid, Taliban, p. 85
Gottlieb, S., Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Andrew McCarthy’s essay ‘Islam
has a Unique Impact on Modern Terrorism, p115
Pape, R., Blowing Up an Assumption, p. 1
Pape, R., The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, p. 344
Gottlieb, S., Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: ‘Suicide Terrorism is a Pragmatic
Choice’, pp. 139-143
Nye, J., Understanding International Conflicts, pp. 247-249.
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