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West Germany and the Irish application to join the EEC, 1961–63:
new findings
Mervyn O’Driscoll
INTRODUCTION
The general situation confronting Ireland following its formal membership application in July
1961 is well-known. It took until October 1962 for the EEC to approve the opening of
negotiations. It might be supposed that West Germany would be well placed to judge Ireland.
Between 1955 and 1962 24 factories with German shareholders were established in Ireland.1
West Germany was Ireland’s third-largest trade partner from the mid-1950s onwards.2 By
the 1960s, German firms were among the top two or three investing in Ireland.3 West
Germany approved of Ireland’s modernisation. But the German perspective was less positive
than often assumed, although it did play an important role in convincing its EEC partners in
October 1962 to begin full negotiations with Ireland.
MISREADING WEST GERMANY
In April 1961 it was announced that Dr Heinrich von Brentano the West German Foreign
Minsiter would visit Ireland.4 But an alleged statement by Dr Ludwig Erhard, ViceChancellor and Economics Minister, in mid-May 1961 caused Irish consternation. Erhard
reportedly said that only the NATO members of EFTA were qualified for full EEC
membership.5 Brentano arrived in Dublin to face restive hosts. He informed reporters that the
core of the EEC ‘had nothing to do with NATO and neutral countries could join and would
1
FO-PA, Bestand B31, Band 238, von Plehwe circular regarding Seán Lemass’s visit to the FRG,
‘Deutsche Investitionen in Ireland’, 18 October 1962.
2
[behind Britain and the US
3
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Sankt Augustin, Pressedokumentation, file: Staaten, Irland, 1951–1983,
Press cutting, Bulletin, nr 197/S.1663, 23 October 1962.
4
See Irish Times, 19 April 1961.
5
‘Link with “Six” would affect Neutrality’, Irish Times, 17 May 1961, 1.
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not be affected’.6 According to many accounts this pacified the Irish. In fact Irish audiences
heard what they wanted to hear. A close analysis of Brentano’s statements reveals that in all
the instances he mentioned neutrals applying for membership, he used the term ‘association’.
He argued that neutrals might acquire the economic benefits of membership without
participating in ‘the political aspects which full membership entailed’.7 On his return to
Germany, he told reporters that, ‘he had received the impression that the Irish Government
had decided on a “wait and see” policy and only then apply for part-membership in the
Common Market after Britain had made a like decision’.8 He intimated that ‘similar talks
were also being conducted with Denmark and that a genuine possibility existed for
admittance of such States as did not wish to become full members of the Common Market’,
indicating that the EEC member states were ‘well aware of…the agricultural structure of
Ireland’.9 Future developments underlined that Brentano, and the FO, had substantial
objections. Similar views prevailed in many EEC capitals and institutions. The Commission
President, Walter Hallstein, who was a German, was similarly doubtful.
In July 1961 the Irish presented the now infamous note to the EEC signifying that the
intention to apply for membership was contingent upon a British application. It worryingly
emphasised that Ireland ‘would be unable to comply fully with some of the provisions [of the
Treaty of Rome] within the time appointed’.10 The Irish application proper three weeks later
was presented to a sceptical Ludwig Erhard, then also president of the Council. Predictably,
the German Economic Ministry formed the preliminary conclusion that full membership was
not appropriate [on economic grounds] and that association status would be preferable.11
The Irish Department of External Affairs quickly formed the impression that the
Atlanticist West Germany was the member most concerned about Ireland’s non-membership
of NATO and ‘tended’ ‘to look at us as a sort of Sweden’.12 Inadvisably the Irish chargé
d’affaires was frank to the head of the FO division responsible for European integration, Dr.
Voigt, in late August in saying that the potential loss of the British market arising from UK
entry into the EEC had prompted the Irish application. He divulged a disagreement between
6
‘NATO membership not needed for Common Market’, Irish Times, 1 June 1961, 11.
‘NATO membership not needed for Common Market’, Irish Times, 1 June 1961, 11.; see also,
‘Ireland might get concessions in the “Six”’, Irish Independent, 1 June 1961, 1.
8
‘Von Brentano hints at Irish membership of “Six”’, Irish Times, 6 June 1961, 1; emphasis added.
9
‘Von Brentano hints at Irish membership of “Six”’, Irish Times, 6 June 1961, 1; emphasis added.
10
See Maher, Tortuous path, 123–6.
11
FO-PA, Bestand B20–200, Band 635, Note: Beitrittsantrag des Irischen Freistaates zur EWG, Hünke
to Müller-Armack, 23 August 1961.
12
See Tara Casserly, ‘Irish-German Relations’, 84.
7
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Lemass and Frank Aiken over whether Ireland should seek full membership or association.13
Voigt doubted if Ireland’s non-membership of NATO was reconcilable with the political
aspect of the EEC.14 Rolf Lahr, the secretary of state of the FO, also favoured association
status for Ireland. He was an advocate of ‘deepening’ European integration rather than
‘widening’ it.
As part of Whitaker and Cremin’s tour of the capitals to soothe European worries in
September they convinced Erhard that the Irish economy was healthier than originally
presented owing to the modernisation drive and it would not require financial aid. The
Economic Ministry concluded by October that Ireland would adapt to the EEC if transitional
arrangements were extended to some protected Irish industries.15 The West German
Ambassador to Ireland Adolph Reifferscheidt played a pivotal role in supporting the Irish
arguments.16 This was a remarkable turnaround assisted by bilateral economic connections.
FO OBJECTIONS
Conversely, the political section of the FO maintained that Ireland’s NATO non-membership
was incompatible with the EEC’s political objectives.17 In October 1961, the head of the FO’s
political section, argued Ireland was unable to cooperate with the EEC on defence and
foreign policy cooperation and that West Germany should adhere to the attitude of Brussels
that pre-negotiations take place with Ireland about membership of the EEC. If it transpired
during these pre-discussions that Ireland’s economic situation was not an obstacle to
immediate membership, it should be explained to the Irish government ‘that the well-known
political grounds are an obstacle to entry for the time being’.18 Jansen was attracted to the
proposition that Ireland should be permitted to become an associate member (under Article
238) and having proved itself it could then be offered full membership.19 Lahr concurred,
13
FO-PA, Bestand B20–200, Band 635, Note, Voigt to Lahr, 25 August 1961.
NAI DFA, embassy series, Rome, 1909 RI, Report, Ó Ceallaigh to Cremin, 30 August 1961.
15
FO-PA, Bestand B20–200, Band 635, Beitritt oder Assoziation Irelands zur EWG, Letter and note,
Meyer-Cording to Lahr, 16 September 1961.
16
FO-PA, Bestand B20–200, Band 635, Irlands Stellung zur Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft,
Report, Reifferscheidt to FO, 10 October 1961.
17
Maher, Tortuous path, 133, emphasis added. The Bonn Declaration of the Six on 18 July 1961
proclaimed in its preamble that only those European states that were ready to commit to the conviction ‘that
only a united Europe, allied to the United States of America and to other free peoples, is in a position to face the
dangers which menace the existence of Europe and of the entire free world’ should join the European
Communities. The FO adhered to a strict interpretation of the Bonn Declaration’s preamble. Moreover, the Six’s
intergovernmental negotiations as part of the Fouchet Committee on political cooperation and foreign policy
coordination were underway since February 1961.
18
FO-PA, Berlin, Bestand B20-200, Band 635, Behandlung des irischen Antrags auf Beitritt zur EWG,
Memorandum, Jansen to Lahr and von Brentano, 13 October 1961.
19
Ibid.
14
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adding that Ireland’s proposal to benefit from a 12-year transition period was irreconcilable
with the spirit of full membership. Lahr, however, considered that political cooperation
should not be linked explicitly with NATO membership. Rather, the applicant had to
demonstrate a benevolent attitude to issues of vital importance to the West, but he deemed
this was not the case with Ireland.20
By this point deep unease afflicted Dublin. Irish representatives and senior
Department of External Affairs staff restated the traditional Irish position that neutrality could
be dispensed with if NATO membership did not require Irish formal recognition of the
legality of partition.21 Simultaneously Cremin the Secretary of the DEA pleaded that Ireland
could not join NATO -- it would be comparable to West Germany signing a defence treaty
with the EG [recognising the division of Germany].22 His German opposite number Lahr was
unyielding saying that the main reason Ireland wished to join was to benefit economically,
but ideologically and militarily Dublin’s credentials were suspect. Ireland’s benevolent
neutrality towards the Six would be insufficient and Lahr was unconvinced by the ‘sore
thumb’ rationale offered by the Irish: if partition was the barrier to NATO, it should also
prevent Ireland from seeking EEC membership, since the Rome was a political treaty as
much as an economic one. He was annoyed at Irish efforts to equate Northern Ireland to
Eastern Germany.23
Nonetheless, the Germans agreed to take into account good bilateral relations.24
Despite, the FO’s lack of sympathy it argued to its EEC partners that the Irish application
should be treated in parallel to the British one on grounds of equity. If the Council of
Ministers agreed to this, the commencement of formal Irish-EEC negotiations should not
predetermine any outcome and could result in association.25 Despite strong support from the
Netherlands the Council of Ministers decided in October 1961 to seek clarifications before
the opening entry negotiations.26
20
FO-PA, Bestand B20–200, Band 635, Irischer Antrag auf Beitritt zur EWG, Note, Allardt to Lahr,
(?)19 October 1961.
21
FO-PA, Bestand B20–200, Band 635, Irischer Antrag auf Beitritt zur EWG, Note, Allardt to Lahr,
(?) 19 October 1961.
22
See Casserly, ‘Irish-German relations’, 86–7.
23
FO-PA, Bestand B20–200, Band 635, Letter, Lahr to Reifferscheidt, 23 October 1961.
24
FO-PA, B20–200, Band 635, Irischer Antrag auf Beitritt zur Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft,
Report, Voigt to German embassy in Dublin, 2 November 1961.
25
FO-PA, Bestand B20–200, Band 635, Letter, Lahr to Reifferscheidt,; FO-PA, B20–200, Band 635,
Report of the Council of Ministers of the EEC, 31 October 1961.
26
FO-PA, B20–200, Band 635, Report of the Council of Ministers of the EEC regarding meeting of
23–25/10/61, 31 October 1961.
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A TRIAL BALLOON, SPRING 1962?
In early 1962, the Irish government considered that neutrality was the ‘key problem’.27
Lemass stated in person to the Council of Ministers in Brussels that Ireland ‘always agreed
with the general aims’ of NATO and its failure to join it were ‘particular circumstances’
unrelated to the thrust of the treaty.28 On 5 February 1962, Micheál Ó Móráin, Minister for
Lands and the Gaeltachta, delivered a widely reported address to the Castlebar Chamber of
Commerce. He argued that29 Ireland was:
ready to subscribe to the political aims of the EEC. It had been made quite
clear by the Taoiseach on different occasions that a policy of neutrality here in
the present world division between Communism and freedom was never laid
down by us or, indeed, ever envisaged by our people.
Neutrality in this context is not a policy to which we would even wish
to appear committed…30
In the ensuing controversy, Ó Móráin and Lemass denied that there was any suggestion
Ireland might or should abandon neutrality. Nonetheless Ó Móráin’s statement was entirely
in accordance with Lemass’s repeated statements since 1959 that Ireland was not an
ideological neutral, but was unable to join NATO for the simple reason that it would cement
partition. In the aftermath of the controversy, Lemass even informed the Dáil that ‘Although
we are not members of NATO, we are in full agreement with its aims’.31All of this convinced
Reifferscheidt that Dublin had provoked a public debate in order to evaluate the
government’s room for manoeuvre domestically on neutrality.32
27
See, for instance, Leo Muray, ‘Fading opposition to Irish link with EEC; neutrality the key problem’,
Irish Times, 1 February 1962.
28
Geary, Inconvenient wait, 43–4; Maher, Tortuous path, 14; FitzGerald, Protectionism to
liberalisation, 180–1;
29
‘Ó Moráin says he did not say it; Blames the Irish Times’, Irish Times, 10 February 1962, 1.
30
‘Ó Moráin says he did not say it; Blames the Irish Times’, Irish Times, 10 February 1962, 1.
31
Dáil Debates, vol. 193, cols 6–8, 14 February 1962.
32
FO-PA, Bestand B20–200, Band 635, Wandlungen in der Einstellung Irlands zur NATO, Report,
Reifferscheidt to FO, 15 February 1962; ‘Ó Moráin says he did not say it; Blames the Irish Times; Ó Moráin
says he was misrepresented’, Irish Times, 10 February 1962, 1, 6.
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RECEDING DOUBTS, SUMMER 1962
Meanwhile German assessments of Ireland’s economic condition continued and led to the
view that Ireland possessed certain weaknesses, but cumulatively its economic situation was
healthier than initially assumed, its industrial development was advancing, and the overall
state of its economy was steadily improving.33
Chancellor Adenauer received high-level direct communications from the US State
Department in early summer 1962 supportive of Irish membership.34 As far as one can infer,
it appeared that the Americans and Western Germans agreed that Ireland’s application to join
the EEC should be viewed favourably especially if she was willing to join NATO. It appears
that the issue was when or if the Irish should be told to fulfil the political requirements for
joining the EEC.35 Senior West German officials, such as the Secretary of State in the Office
of the Federal President, remained perplexed by the paradoxes of the Anglo-Irish ‘family
quarrel’.36 Such squabbles were thought unreasonable grounds for Ireland to refuse to join
NATO.
At this point, the Hague made representations to Bonn in favour of Irish entry. Among
the Dutch arguments was that the political weight of 20 million Irish-Americans would bind
the Americans more tightlty to Europe if Ireland entered the EEC.37 Franz Josef Strauss, the
West German Defence Minister, recognised the advantages of such political leverage on the
US. Appreciating this Dutch line of argument the new Irish ambassador began to deploy this
argument too with the FO.38 Misgivings about Ireland’s non-membership of NATO
remained, but the collapse of the Fouchet negotiations to agree EEC political cooperation
weakened the FO’s objections.39 Lemass had repeatedly declared Ireland’s willingness to
participate in EEC political cooperation (as stipulated by the Bonn Declaration) and this had
33
See, for example, Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Walter Hallstein Nachlass N/1266, Archivsignatur 1224,
Report, Demande d’adhésion de l’Irlande; situation de l’Irlande, 16 April 1962; FO-PA, Bestand B20–200,
Band 634, Fax, Der irischen Regierung vorzulegender Fragenbogen, Brussels to FO, 19 April 1962.
34
FO-PA, Bestand B20–200, Band 634, Report, (probably) Voigt to unknown addressee, 24 May 1962.
35
FO-PA, Bestand B20–200, Band 634, Report, (probably) Voigt to unknown addressee, 24 May 1962.
36
NAI DFA, confidential reports, 313/10H: Bonn, Gallagher to Cremin, 29 May 1962.
37
NAI DFA, confidential reports, 313/10H: Bonn, Gallagher to Cremin, 29 May 1962.
38
NAI DFA, confidential reports, 313/10H: Bonn, Gallagher to Cremin, 2 June 1962.
39
The Fouchet Committee was an intergovernmental committee established in 1961 at the behest of the
first summit of the EEC heads of state. The Committee was to consider de Gaulle’s proposals for greater foreign
policy and defence coordination, otherwise termed ‘political union’, among the EEC member states on a
confederal or intergovernmental basis, i.e. unanimity. The committee was chaired by the French Ambassador to
Denmark, Christian Fouchet, and produced a draft treaty for a ‘union of states’ in November 1961. However,
serious objections to the Gaullist vision emerged , particularly from the smaller and less powerful member
states; they feared a de facto Franco-German directorate would emerge and the Atlantic Alliance would be
diluted. Thus the negotiations broke down due to irreconciliable differences in April 1962. Efforts to achieve
EEC foreign policy coordination or ‘political union’ would only re-emerge in the early 1970s.
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to be accepted at face value, but, according to Jansen and Lahr, Irish membership of NATO
should be demanded once the negotiations proper commenced. But since Ireland’s entry
depended on the success of the UK application, it was not yet appropriate to demand the end
of neutrality, at least not yet.40 On this basis Lahr supported the Dutch proposal to the EEC
Council meeting in July 1962 to commence negotiations with Ireland immediately. The
Commission President Hallstein, the French and the Italians disagreed, and a decision was
postponed.41
ENDGAME, AUTUMN 1962
It was the West German-Dutch campaign that overcame opposition to opening full EEC
negotiations finally. They worked to assure that the Irish application received fair
consideration. During the Council meeting of 24/25 September, they worked in tandem
arguing for an unqualified commencement of formal negotiations. The Italians,
Luxembourgers and Belgians shifted ground in favour of the commencement of negotiations,
with some reservations regarding whether or not Ireland was more suited to association. The
Germans contended that the outcome of the negotiations should not be pre-set, as that would
negate the negotiations’ purpose. Hallstein’s position had also altered since July—he was
now in favour of conceding that Ireland was admissible, noting the unseemly delay of nearly
a year and a half. The balance of the Council had now shifted in Ireland’s favour. The French
delegation in a minority of one played for time arguing that Paris had not formed a view on
the Irish application, but the delegation realised that prevarication would not suffice for much
longer.42
The Irish government was aware that the only remaining block to negotiations was
France. The Irish Times reported that Germany had emerged ‘as the best friend and ally of
Ireland in its application’.43 The scene was set for a warm encounter between Adenauer and
Lemass in late October in Bonn when Lemass was on a state visit. On 22 October 1962, at the
start of Lemass’s visit, Ireland was finally invited to commence membership negotiations.44
40
FO-PA, Bestand B20–200, Band 634, Beitrittsantrag Irlands zur EWG, Note, Jansen to secretary of
state in FO (Rolf Lahr?), 7 June 1962.
41
FO-PA, Bestand B20–200, Band 634, Fax, Harkort to FO, 26 July 1962; FO-PA, Bestand B20–200,
Band 634, Note by Jansen, 30 July 1962.
42
FO-PA, Bestand B20–200, Band 634, Fax, Boemcke to FO, 25 September 1962; FO-PA, Bestand
B20–200, Band 634, Report on the 79th conference of the EEC Council and résumés of meetings of Permanent
Representatives, c. 24/25 September 1962.
43
‘Adenauer may be invited to Ireland’, Irish Times, 12 October 1962, 11.
44
Murphy, Economic realignment, p. 197.
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Adenauer informed Lemass that West Germany ‘was entirely with us on our application’ and
made no reference to NATO or political union.45
CONCLUSION
The irony is that Bonn was supporting the Irish right to negotiate against the
background of a pronounced divergence of opinion in Bonn as to Ireland’s suitability. The
FO’s political resevations remained unwavering. As Rolf Lahr wrote in June 1962 ‘the Irish
must be told’ ‘soon enough’ once full negotiations commenced that they had to demonstrate
commitment to Europe’s political orientation and European political cooperation if necessary
through membership of NATO.46 If de Gaulle had not vetoed the UK application, Ireland
would have faced questioning about its political and defence orientation from West Germany.
I would contend that the neutrality did not recede fully from jeopardising eventual Irish
accession to the EEC until the French withdrawal from the military structure of NATO
(1966) put paid to the lingering aspirations towards European political cooperation.
45
NAI DFA, embassy series, Bonn, 18/2/1II, Taoiseach’s visit to Germany, Annex IX: Conversation
between Lemass and Adenauer, 22 October 1962.
46
FO-PA, Berlin, Bestand B20–200, Band 634, Beitrittsantrag Irlands zur EWG, Jansen to Lahr, 7 June
1962. See Lahr’s notation on the document.