Constraining Ground Force Exercises of NATO and the Warsaw Pact
Author(s): Robert D. Blackwill and Jeffrey W. Legro
Source: International Security, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Winter, 1989-1990), pp. 68-98
Published by: The MIT Press
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Ground
Force Exercises of
NATO and the
Warsaw Pact
Constainin
Robert
D. Blackwill
andJeffrey
W.Legro
Confidenceand secu-
ritybuilding measures (CSBMs) have long been the neglected stepchild of
serious arms control analysis. Some view CSBMs as "arms control junk
food,"'1frivolous,unworkable,or even detrimental.Others are so enamored
of the concept that theyexpect proposals to be accepted as primafaciedesirable. Afterall, the very term "confidence and security"connotes stability
and peace. The problem with both positions is often the dearth of hard
analysis in support of the ideas put forwardand the abstractnature of the
discussions of "securitybuilding."2As witnessed in the contrastbetween the
quiet success of the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement and the disastrous
Trojan Horse episode of ancientGreece, CSBMs can have good or bad results.
It is necessary to sort out analyticallywhich CSBMs make sense to enhance
securityin Europe. This study aims to do that in the case of one important
typeof CSBM: constraintson the militaryground exercisesof NATO and the
Warsaw TreatyOrganization (WTO or Warsaw Pact).
Militaryexercises have been a focal point of CSBM effortsat least as far
back as the Helsinki Accord of 1975 (see Appendix). They retainhighvisibility
today as Gorbachev's artfuldiplomacy includes far-rangingproposals for
limitationson militaryactivities.Measures affectingexercises also deserve
attentionbecause both NATO and the WTO face substantialchanges in their
The authors would like to thank the Carnegie Corporation and the Ford Foundation for supportingthe preparationof this article.
Robert
D. Blackwill,
tothisarticle
F. Kennedy
whocontributed
whilea faculty
member
oftheJohn
School
at HarvardUniversity,
tothePresident
andSoviet
is nowSpecialAssistant
ofGovernment
forEuropean
at theNationalSecurity
W. Legrois a Fellowat theRAND/UCLA
Affairs
Council.Jeffrey
Center
for
inpolitical
at UCLA.
SovietStudies
anda Ph.D. candidate
science
1. The termcomes fromStrobeTalbott'sDeadlyGambits(New York:VintageBooks, 1985), p. 323.
The focus of Talbott's book is on nuclear forces,but similarattitudesexist in the conventional
realm.
2. A conferenceof expertson securityaffairsnoted the need to linkoperationalmilitaryconcerns
to general securityprinciples,particularlyin the area of conventionalwarfareissues. See Joseph
S. Nye, Jr.,and Sean M. Lynn-Jones,"InternationalSecurityStudies: A Reportof a Conference
on the State of the Field," International
Security,Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 22-24.
International
Security,Winter1989/90(Vol. 14, No. 3)
?D1989 by the Presidentand Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Instituteof Technology.
68
Constraining
GroundForceExercisesj 69
trainingpatterns, opening opportunitiesand risks for European security.
Would significant,verifiableconstraintson the exercises of both sides enhance NATO's security,by improvingits abilityto respond effectivelyto
Eastern aggression, more than these measures would degrade the West's
capabilityto defend? An adequate answer to this question requires an examination of: 1) the purposes and nature of militaryexercises in Europe;
2) thegoals and contentofconstraintproposals; and 3) the trade-offs
involved
in acceptingmutual limitationson training.
ThePurposesand DimensionsofNATO and WarsawPact Exercises
NATO and Warsaw Pact exerciseshave both militaryand politicalobjectives.
Each side aims to matchits combatcapabilitiesto its strategywhile enhancing
the unity and integrationof its alliance. Beyond these general similarities,
however, the two blocs' maneuvers have traditionallyhad different
military
and politicalaims which are described below in threecategories: 1) alliancewide reinforcement
exercises;2) nationalground forceexercises;and 3) multinational ground forceexercises.3
NATO REINFORCEMENT
is an integralpart
EXERCISES.
Timely reinforcement
of NATO's plan for forwarddefense. Afterthe firstweek of mobilization,
NATO reinforcementswould come largely from America. At present the
United States should be able to send six active-dutyarmydivisions to Europe
withinten days of notification;equipment forthese units is to be stored at
POMCUS (Pre-positionedOverseas Materiel Configuredto Unit Sets) sites.4
The United States practicesthis reinforcement,
usually in the autumn,5by
transportingone to two divisions (approximately17-35,000 men) to Europe
in the exercise "REFORGER" (REturnof FORces to GERmany). This movement,of primarilyactive-dutysoldiers, is complex and involves much more
than simple flightsto the continent.First,some equipment such as helicop3. Unless otherwisenoted, exercise data presented in this articleis based on informationmade
public pursuant to the exercise notificationprovisions contained in the 1975 Conference on
Securityand Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Helsinki Final Act and the 1986 Conference on
Disarmamentin Europe (CDE) StockholmAccord.
4. SovietReadinessforWar:AssessingOne oftheMajor SourcesofEast-WestInstability,
Reportof the
Defense Policy Panel, Committeeon Armed Services, House of Representatives,100th Cong.,
2d sess., December 5, 1988, p. 10. The U.S. commitmentcalls for10 divisions in ten days, but
only six have most of theirequipment pre-positionedin Europe.
5. In 1979 and 1986, REFORGER took place in the winter. REFORGER is also scheduled for
winterin 1990.
InternationalSecurity14:3
j 70
tersand vehicles is sent by sea because pre-positionedweapons and supplies
are incompletefor supportingheavy divisions.6The soldiers are assembled
in the United States, and airliftmust be readied, loaded, and flown. The
troops disembark in Western Europe, clear the airfield,and then must be
transportedto the POMCUS sites,where theydraw weapons and equipment
and load up with fuel and ammunition. In addition, the materielthat has
been sealifted to Europe must be offloaded and joined with the military
forcesthatwill use it. Finally,the troops travelto the areas in West Germany
where theywill fulfilltheirdesignated combat missions, such as plugging a
hole in the frontline or acting as a strategicreserve.
In addition to testingthese U.S. capabilities,REFORGER also exercisesthe
personnel, facilities,and equipment of European countries that are central
to the reinforcementeffort.Under Host-Nation Support agreements,7individual countries on the continentare committedto assisting arrivingU.S.
forces with transportationto POMCUS and staging area sites, providing
accommodations for troops, and setting up communications and supply
lines.8 REFORGER is importantmilitarilybecause it annually tests U.S. and
allied ability to carry out the transcontinentalreinforcementon which
NATO's securitydepends.
REFORGER's politicalgoals are to promoteextended deterrenceand foster
NATO cohesion. The exercise demonstratesto the Soviet Union the West's
abilityto carryout successfullythe tasks thatwould significantly
complicate,
if not neutralize,an East bloc attack. Practicingthe reinforcement
of Europe
is a vivid symbolof Americansolidaritywithits European allies. In the postINF (intermediatenuclear forces)Treatyperiod, with debates over burdensharingand the possibilityof unilateralU.S. troopwithdrawalsfromEurope,
many questions have been raised about the continuingviabilityof extended
deterrence. REFORGER was institutedin 1968 specificallyto meet similar
concerns when U.S. forceswere withdrawnfromthe continentin response
to budget constraintsand transfersto Vietnam.9Today, REFORGER is equally
6. Karl H. Lowe, "U.S. Mobilization for ReinforcingWesternEurope," in Jeffrey
Simon, ed.,
NATOlWarsawPact ForceMobilization(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University,1988),
p. 104.
7. Host-Nation Support agreementsare bilateraltreatiesbetween the United States and several
European allies.
8. Robert R. Ulin, "Belgium: The StrategicHub," in Simon, NATO/WarsawPact Mobilization,
pp. 415-417, and p. 424 n. 25. Also see "Host-Nation Support," Soldier,January1989, p. 44.
9. David C. Isby and Charles Kamps, Jr.,ArmiesofNATO's CentralFront(London: Jane's, 1985),
pp. 455-456.
GroundForceExercisesj 71
Constraining
importantas a tangibleexpressionof America's determinationto come to the
defense of WesternEurope.
The United Kingdom also conducts alliance-wide reinforcement
exercises
which serve essentiallythe same politicaland militarypurposes as REFORGER. In war, the BritishArmy of the Rhine would expand fromits current
55,000 soldiers to some 150,000. In fact,exerciseFULL FLOW (part of LIONHEART '84) was largerthan any REFORGER; it moved 57,700 Britishtroops
(23,450by sea; 34,250 by air) to West Germany.10
NATO NATIONAL EXERCISES.
A second categoryof NATO exercisesincludes
those conducted by each countryof its armed forces already deployed in
Europe. These can be distinguishedfromone anotherby size: large (50,000
troops and above), medium (25-50,000), small (13-25,000), and those less
than 13,000. These size distinctionsare based on notificationlimits established in the 1975 Conferenceon Securityand Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
Helsinki Accord, which required public announcement of exercises with
25,000troopsor more, and the 1986 Conferenceon Confidence-and SecurityBuilding Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) Stockholm Accord
which, among other provisions, lowered the notificationfloorto 13,000 soldiers (See Appendix).
There have been no large single-nationWesternexercises in the past ten
years.11Those with more than 50,000 troops have all been multinational
exercises involving at least some troops of a second NATO country.Infrequently the United States12and France13have held medium-size national
exercises in Europe that reach corps size (35,000). One purpose of these
maneuversis to testcorps-levelresponsibilitiessuch as command and control
of several divisions. In addition, militaryleaders favor multi-divisionexercises because they bettercapture the "fog of war" effect,the confusionand
chaos thatcharacterizeactual combat.14
The most frequentnotifiableWestern national exercises are those designated "small" (13-25,000 troops) thatdrillthose division-sizetasks related to
command and control, logistics, and intelligencefunctionsthat cannot be
10. Ibid., pp. 303-304.
11. Since 1975, the only single-nationWestern exercise exceeding 50,000 troops was the U.S.
"REFORGER 75" in 1975.
12. The U.S. exercisesin West Germanyare by definitionnot completelyautonomous and there
is always some sortof interactionwith FRG personnel.
13. Franceis not a memberof NATO's integratedmilitarycommand.
14. Authorinterviewswith U.S. Armyofficers.
International
Security14:3 j 72
replicatedwith fewertroops. In the finalcategoryof national exercises (less
than 13,000), soldiers practicetactics,the essence of combat.15
NATO MULTINATIONAL
EXERCISES.
Multinational exercises involve two or
more nations and have traditionallybeen run under the authorityof national
militaryheadquarters.16They can be similarlyclassified according to size:
large, medium, small, and those with less than 13,000 troops. NATO holds
one or two large exercises a year in West Germany.Normallyone is linked
with U.S. troops arrivingas part of the reinforcement
exercise REFORGER.
Once these soldiers are in Europe they join U.S. units stationed on the
continentand otherNATO-countryforcesin fieldmaneuvers. Periodicallya
Britishcontingentwill conduct a similarlarge exercisewithtroopsfromother
Western countries. In 1987, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and
France held a maneuver of this categoryin West Germany,which totaled
some 80,000 troops.17
Large multinationalexercises contributeto several objectives. One is to
improvecooperation among allied armies thatlack common structure,weapons systems,or equipment. NATO plans to fightwith autonomous national
units of at least brigade size. They would have integratedstrategicgoals,
and would support one another in interrelatedoperations. This might require, forexample, a German division to allow a Britishunit on the way to
the FEBA (forward edge of the battle area) to pass through its position.
Practicingcoordination of formationsthe size of several divisions can best
be done througha large exercise. Field trainingof this type also strengthens
deterrenceby demonstratingthat NATO is prepared to fightas a unified
body.
Medium and small multinationalmaneuvers serve essentially the same
purposes as the large type, except that the trainingfocus is on lower ranks
of command and levels of organization. In 1987, NATO's multinationalexercises were primarilyof the large and small type, with only a few in the
medium category. The amount of multinationalNATO trainingwith less
than 13,000 troops is difficultto ascertainfromthe open literature.Nonethe15. For trainingsoldiers to fight,smaller exercises are desirable; "squadron/companyor battalion/brigade-sizeexercises are the rightframework;it is only at lower command levels that the
rightintensityof activitycan be maintained." "Exercise Autumn Forge '84," NATO's Sixteen
Nations(September/October1984), p. 107.
16. A recentexceptionwas CERTAIN STRIKE, the fieldexercisephase of REFORGER '87, which
was run by the commander of NATO's NorthernArmyGroup. See Gen. Sir MartinFarndale,
KCB, "Exercise Reforger87," TheArmyQuarterlyand DefenseJournal,
January1988, p. 11.
17. "French-GermanExercise: FAR From Perfect,"The Economist,September27, 1987, p. 63.
GroundForceExercisesj 73
Constraining
less, thereappears to be littlejoint activityin the fieldat this level, which is
consistentwith NATO's plans to fightprimarilyas national divisions.
An additional type of training,which may involve more or less than 13,000
troops (not necessarily in combat formations),consists of command post
exercises,meant to testcommand and controloperationsby simulatingactual
fieldmaneuvers; thus they require only a limitednumber of combat troops.
The purpose of these exercises is to practice conflictmanagement of both
personneland equipment. Commanders at various levels are trainedto direct
operations (many of which occur only on paper) while the necessary communicationslines and headquarters facilitiesare checked out.
WARSAW PACT TROOP ROTATION.
Twice a year the Soviets have rotatedtheir
conscripttroops, primarilyby air, from the Soviet Union's three Western
militarydistrictsinto the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. The transferinvolves some 125,000 troops
(roughly25 percent of the 600,000 Soviet troops in Eastern Europe, each
servingtwo years), or threetimes as many as NATO's largestreinforcement
exercises. The troop rotationsare not a reinforcementexercise in the same
sense as REFORGER. The Soviet soldiers are new recruits;theydo not travel
in formalunits or with equipment. They disperse to individual units when
theyarrive,and the entirerotationlasts at least threeto fourweeks.18
Nonetheless, the Soviet troop rotationserves some reinforcement
exercise
purposes. In addition to merely rotatingtroops, these transfersallow the
Soviet Union to practiceairliftprocedures. This movementalso concerns the
West because it could be used covertlyto increase troop strength.It is
sometimesdifficultto determinequicklyifthe outgoingtroopshave actually
left.Given the relative state of readiness (about 80-85 percent manned) of
Soviet Category I units in Eastern Europe, this potentiallyrapid method to
increasemanpower could add to Warsaw Pact capabilitiesto mount an attack
by in-placeforceswith littlewarning. This is especially trueif trainedtroops
were broughtin instead of new conscripts.
18. In contrast,REFORGER involves the transportof active duty army personnel, who are in
structuredformationsand accompanied by at least some equipment; these troops move to
concentrationpoints when they land in Europe and do this all in a week's time. According to
the StockholmAccord requirements,because REFORGER exercises involve structuredunits
which concentrate,they must be notified,while troop rotationsdo not require notification.
"Final Act of the Conferenceon Confidence-and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament
in Europe, Stockholm,19 September 1986," in J.A.S. Grenvilleand BernardWasserstein,eds.,
The Major International
TreatiesSince 1945: A Historyand Guide with Texts(London: Methuen,
1987), pp. 482-489.
International
Security14:3 j 74
WARSAW PACT NATIONAL
EXERCISES.
Large Warsaw Pact exercises (50,000plus troops) are relativelyrare, and only the Soviet Union has held them.19
These exercisesserve two purposes. They contributeto publiclystatedSoviet
goals such as "increasing cooperation between differentbranches of the
armed forces,"20and improvement of command and control. The Soviet
militaryplaces great value on, and frequentlypractices,procedures forformulating militaryoperations and transmittingthese plans to lower-level
units.21A second objective of large Soviet exercises has been to intimidate
wayward allies or to prepare for interventionin Eastern Europe. This was
the case in the spring of 1968 before the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and
duringthe Polish crisis of 1980-81.22
Medium-size unilateral Soviet exercises (25-50,000 troops) are relatively
rareand in the past have been close in size to the Helsinki 25,000 notification
floor (i.e., at the lower end of the 25-50,000 range). Since 1986, when the
floorforexercisesto 13,000troops,
StockholmAccord reduced the notification
most Soviet national exercises have been of the small type (13-25,000). Beginningin 1987, each of the East bloc countries(except Romania) gave notice
of one national exercise. Withthe exceptionof several voluntarynotifications
given by Hungary under the Helsinki Accord, this is the firsttime that nonSoviet East European countrieshave announced national exercises.
WARSAW PACT MULTINATIONAL
EXERCISES.
The large multinationalexercises
of the Warsaw Pact, which are not common (just two since 1981), appear to
have several aims. The firstis cover for preparations related to military
actions. It is a standard technique of deception to use exercises as a pretext
forthe massing of men and materielbeforean attack.Priorto the 1968 Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia, Warsaw Pact exercises served as a cover for
concentratingforcesin and around that country.23
19. The Soviet Union has held three since 1980.
20. This is a standard descriptionof the objective of exercises given in officialnotification.See
for example the stated purpose of the exercise KAVKAZ in 1976 in Stockholm International
and Disarmament(New
Peace Research Institute(SIPRI), SIPRI Yearbook1977: WorldArmaments
1982: WorldArmaments
and
York: Crane Russak, 1977), p. 407; and ZAPAD 81 in SIPRI Yearbook
Disarmament
(London: Tayler and Francis, 1982), p. 61.
21. JohnErickson, Lynn Hansen, and William Schneider, SovietGroundForces:An Operational
Assessment
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 129-131.
22. JiriValenta, SovietIntervention
in Czechoslovakia
1968: Anatomyofa Decision(Baltimore,Md.:
Johns Hopkins UniversityPress, 1979), p. 73; Sidney I. Ploss, Moscow and the Polish Crisis
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), p. 51.
23. JohnM. Caravelli, "Soviet and JointWarsaw Pact Exercises: Functions and Utility,"Armed
Forcesand Society,Vol. 9, No. 3 (Spring 1983), pp. 411-412. Also see ChristopherD. Jones,Soviet
Influence
in EasternEurope(New York: Praeger,1981), pp. 114-116.
GroundForceExercisesj 75
Constraining
Ifthe Pact were planning to attackthe West, exercisesmightbe mandatory
for training conscripts or reserves. Soviet militaryhistory writings have
stressed the importantrole of exercises in preparing troops before major
operationsin WorldWar 11.24Soviet conscriptswho rotateintoEasternEurope
are normallygreen inductees; theirbasic militarytraining(i.e., "boot camp")
largelytakes place withinactive militaryunits.25Many of the Soviet Union's
reservistsmightalso require refreshertrainingif theyend up with an unfamiliarunit or equipment.26
Even when militaryinterventionhas not been the chosen course of action,
large Warsaw Pact exercises have also provided opportunitiesfor political
leverage or signalingin crises. During the Berlincrisisof 1961, Soviet troops
combined Warsaw
held large-scale exercises in the GDR, and the first-ever
Pact maneuvers took place.27 Along with the unilateralSoviet exercisesmentioned above, Warsaw Pact maneuvers were also held around Poland during
its politicalturmoilin 1980-81.28
Anothercentralpurpose of the East bloc's large, medium, and small multinational exercises is to integratenational militaryforces within the Soviet
command structure.Improving command and controlis a particularlyimportanttask at all levels because in wartimethe Warsaw Pact and national
This intecommand structureswould be absorbed under Soviet authority.29
grationof forceshas furtheredtwo traditionalSoviet objectives:1) developing
a more unified Warsaw Pact army; and 2) restrictingthe development of
autonomous national East European militarycapabilitiesthat mightencourage effortsto attainpoliticalindependence or to turnagainst Soviet forces.30
FOR THE DIFFERENCES
IN MANEUVER
SIZE. Several reasons
EXPLANATIONS
account for the differencesin the size and types of exercises between East
24. See, e.g., Col.-General M. Gareyev, "About the Experience of Troop Combat Training,"
Voenno-istoricheskii
zhurnal,No. 4 (April 1983), pp. 11-20. (Soviet articletitlestranslatedby the
authors.)
25. The Soviet VoluntarySocietyforCooperationwith the Army,Aviation,and Fleet (DOSAAF)
militaryprogramsin all Soviet secondary schools also contributeto the experienceand knowledge of these new inductees.
26. Soviet
Readiness
forWar,p. 8.
A Theoretical
27. HannesAdomeit,SovietRisk-Taking
andCrisisBehavior:
and Empirical
Analysis
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1982). See pp. 213, 239.
28. Jeffrey
Simon, WarsawPactForces:Problems
ofCommandand Control(Boulder,Colo.: Westview
Press, 1985), pp. 166-177; also Ploss, Moscowand thePolishCrisis,p. 44.
in Peaceandin War,R-355829. See MichaelSadykiewicz,
TheWarsaw
PactCommand
Structure
RC (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, September 1988).
30. Jones,SovietInfluence
inEastern
Europe,
pp. 106-131.
International
Security14:3 | 76
and West. NATO emphasizes large exercises, first,because the AtlanticAlliance must practicethe massive reinforcement
of Europe by sea and air from
the United States and United Kingdom to offsetthe Soviets' shorterland
lines of communication(LOCs), which give the Soviet Union easier access
to Central Europe. In addition, continentalforces(e.g., Belgian and Dutch)
sometimes must travel hundreds of kilometersto reach General Defense
Positions (GDPs) as NATO moves to wartimefooting.Second, NATO's forward defense strategyrequires shiftinglarge formationsflexiblyand quickly
along an extended frontierto reinforceareas of initial attack or attempted
breakthroughsby the numericallysuperior East bloc forces.31Third, NATO
needs largerexercisesbecause it has more countriesto coordinatein combat
operations.Finally,the West requireslargerexercisesbecause it has to cluster
the bulk of its maneuvers in one or two monthsin the fallto avoid the crop
and farmlanddamage that would occur at other times of the year in the
densely populated FRG.
Two explanations can be offeredfor the Warsaw Pact's primaryuse of
medium and small exercises. The traditionaloffensivestrategyof the East
bloc has been designed to seize the initiative.Tactical flexibilityis not as
importantas gettingthe rightforcesto the rightplace in the time required.
The efficientmovement of forceswould also be importantunder the Pact's
declared new "defensive" doctrinewhere, it is said, the decisive "counteroffensive"will be mounted only afteran initialperiod when defensive operations dominate.32In both cases, the Soviet style of warfaremakes command and controlextremelyimportant,and they can be improved through
smaller exercises, primarilyset-piece combinationcommand post exercises
and fieldtrainingexercises,which mix actual maneuvers with simulations.33
A second possible determinantofSoviet exercisepatterns,especiallytoday,
is budgetaryconstraints.Large exercisesare expensive and the Soviet Union
may believe that it gets more for its resources elsewhere. There is some
evidence that suggests that relative to NATO and the United States, the
Soviet Union puts less of its money into training.For example, Soviet tank
31. See SenatorCarlLevin,Beyond
theBeanCount:Realistically
Assessing
theConventional
Military
Balancein Europe,Report of the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee,Subcommitteeon Conventional Forces and Alliance Defense, 2nd ed., July1988, pp. 6-14.
32. See Jeffrey
W. Legro, "The MilitaryMeaning of the New Soviet Doctrine," Parameters,
Vol.
19, No. 4 (forthcoming,December 1989).
33. Roland Flor, "Major Exercises of NATO and Warsaw Pact Land Forces in Europe, 1984-A
ComparativeAnalysis," DefenseAnalysis,Vol. 2, No. 3 (1986), pp. 191-193.
GroundForceExercises| 77
Constraining
gunners fire one-tenththe number of live rounds that U.S. gunners do.34
Soviet fighterpilots flyabout one-halfas much as NATO pilots.35
OTHER
DIMENSIONS
OF MILITARY
EXERCISES
The dimensions of the militaryexercisesof the two alliances can be compared
in termsoftheirnumber,duration,location,timingand operationalelements.
NUMBER. During the Helsinki CSBM agreement (1975-86), NATO gave
notice of more exercises than did the East bloc. This, however, may simply
reflectthe factthatthe Westernalliance voluntarilyincluded a greaternumber
of small exercisesin its public plans than did the Warsaw Pact: 36 of NATO's
69 announced exercises, and 4 of the Warsaw Pact's 28 declared exercises,
were small (i.e., below 25,000 troops).36
Under the more recent Stockholm Accord 13,000 notificationlimit,however, the Warsaw Pact held 36 announced exercisesin 1987 and 1988, while
NATO's total was 30. The large increase in the number of Warsaw Pact
notificationswith the drop in the notifiablelimitfrom25,000 to 13,000 may
suggest that many more Eastern exercises under the 25,000 Helsinki notification thresholdwere held in the 1975-86 period than were announced. It
may also be the case that the Soviets have intentionallyinflatedthe number
of exercisesnotifiedin the past two years, forthe politicalpurpose of touting
the "new thinking"in Soviet attitudestowards compliance.38What remains
unclear is how many Pact exercises are now being held below the 13,000
notificationfloor.The size of a Soviet/WarsawPact division is under 13,000
troops (11,500-12,500); thus, maneuvers at the division level can be conducted withoutpublic announcement.
DURATION.
Most NATO and Warsaw Pact exercises tend to run fromfour
to twelve days.39Several times a year, however, NATO holds exercises that
34. David Evans, "Ill-Fed StrangersWithoutMaps-The Soviet Military,"The ChicagoTribune,
November27, 1987, p. 19, as cited in Levin, BeyondtheBean Count,p. 49.
35. Rick Maze, "Soviets Get What They Pay forin Soldiers," ArmyTimes,September 17, 1984,
p. 7, as cited in Levin, BeyondtheBean Count,p. 49.
36. "Tables of Notificationof MilitaryManeuvers Made Under Provisions of CSCE Final Act
Duringthe Period 1975-1985," Memorandum,JohnGunderson to all Delegation Members, U.S.
Delegation, Conference on Confidence and SecurityBuilding Measures and Disarmament in
Europe, Stockholm,Sweden, June23, 1986.
and Disar37. Based on the notificationschedule in the SIPRI Yearbook1987: WorldArmaments
1988: World
mament(New York: OxfordUniversityPress, 1987), pp. 371-381; and SIPRI Yearbook
(New York: OxfordUniversityPress, 1988), pp. 338-346.
and Disarmament
Armaments
38. U.S. governmentofficialshave claimed to have seen some evidence that unrelated Pact
militaryactivitieshave been grouped togetherso that theyare large enough to be notified.
39. Duration averages hold true across size categories.
International
Security14:3 | 78
last longer,sometimesup to a monthor more. Historically,those rareWarsaw
Pact exercises that have gone beyond twelve days have coincided with politicalturmoilor Soviet interventionin Eastern Europe. This was the case in
Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Poland in 1980-81.
LOCATION.
The public data on the locations of NATO and Warsaw Pact
exercises is sketchyand permits only a few broad generalizations. On the
Westernside, troops trainon the territory
they expect to fighton, primarily
along the inter-Germanand FRG-Czechoslovakia borders, with a few exercises in northernNorway and TurkishThrace. Warsaw Pact countryexercises
have most frequentlybeen held in the northernand centralpartsof the GDR,
the northand northwesternregions of Czechoslovakia, the westernareas of
Hungary, and the WesternMilitaryDistrictsof the Soviet Union.40The politicalsituationhas oftenshaped which of the East European countriesheld
the most exercises in any particularyear. The Czech and Polish crises seem
to have influencedthe location of exercises in the correspondingtime periods.41
The East does not appear to trainin forwardareas as frequentlyas NATO.
There are several possible reasons for this pattern. One is that the terrain
along the eastern side of the borderis not well suited forexercises.A second
explanationrelates to the Pact's traditionaloffensivestrategy.Eastern forces
are less dependent on knowledge and preparation of their own terrain,
as they expect to fightin Western Europe. It is unlikely that the Sovietdominated Eastern alliance is committedto an operational strategyof forward defense if initiallyforcedon the defensive. If historyserves as a precedent, the Soviet Union would trade space fortime in order to establish an
effectivedefense.
TIMING. Anothercharacteristic
differencebetween the militaryexercisesof
the two blocs is in theirtiming.Although the annual REFORGER exercise
and several ground maneuvers are infrequentlyheld in the winter,NATO
conducts the bulk of its maneuvers in Septemberand October in the annual
"AUTUMN FORGE" series. Of the 37 notifiedNATO exercisesheld in West
Germanyfrom1980-88, only three-CERTAIN GUARDIAN (January1985),
CERTAIN SENTINEL (January 1986), and CARAVAN GUARD (February
1988)-have been held outside of the usual September-Octoberfieldexercise
40. Flor, "Major Exercises of NATO," pp. 195-196.
41. See Simon, WarsawPact Forces,pp. 37, 44, 69, 177, 188.
GroundForceExercises| 79
Constraining
period. Warsaw Pact exercisestend to be evenly spaced throughoutthe year,
with a gap sometimesin the late November-Januaryperiod.
OPERATIONAL
ELEMENTS.
The operational characterof the two blocs' exercises is also different.The Warsaw Pact's combinationcommand post/field
trainingexercisesinvolve movementof units in a rigid,sequential fashionat
the tactical level (i.e., division-leveland below). As a Soviet defectorhas
describedthe choreography,Soviet soldierswalk throughthe exercisebefore
they actually carryit out with weapons.42 The troops takingpart have preset times to fulfilldesignated movements at pre-arrangedlocations.43These
exercisesclearlyemphasize tighthigh-levelcommand and controlover flexibilityand initiativein the field.
This does not, however, mean that the Red Army's actions would be
predictableor rigid. Surprise and initiativeare key principlesof Soviet militaryart. Furthermore,in the Soviet system,flexibility
is emphasized at the
strategicand operational levels (such as switchingunits rapidly between
differentsalients). In World War II, Soviet competence at the operationalstrategicscale overwhelmed German forcesthathad superiortacticalskills.44
There are, of course, drawbacks to the Soviet method. Militarywritings
recognize that the formalismof trainingis a problem because the modern
battlefieldwill demand betterleadership skills(creativity,
flexibility,
initiative)
fromlower-levelcommanders.45
The traditional(i.e., pre-Gorbachev)scenariopracticedin Easternexercises
begins with an enemy attack which achieves limited tactical success. The
enemy offensiveis soon contained as Pact forcesregroupand are reinforced.
But defense is considered only a transitorystage, and the Eastern side then
undertakescounteroffensives
which ultimatelydestroythe attacker.Any lost
territoryis regained and sometimes the exercises signal the intention to
Pact maneuvers focus on commounta deep offensiveinto enemy territory.
mand and control,fastlong-rangeattacksby armoredunitswith the support
42. ViktorSuvorov, The "Liberators":My Liftin the SovietArmy(New York: Berkeley Books,
1981),pp. 90-93.
43. Also see Levin, BeyondtheBean Count,pp. 49-50.
44. ChristopherDonnelly,Red Banner:TheSovietMilitarySystemin Peaceand War(London: Jane's
InformationGroup, 1988), p. 85.
45. "New Quality MilitaryEducation," Krasnaiazvezda, January27, 1989, p. 1; and interview
with Army General B.V. Snetkov, Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany,
"MilitaryTraining:Parametersof Quality," Voennyivestnik,June1989, pp. 3-7.
International
Security14:3 | 80
of air forces,and rapid water crossingswiththe aid ofairborneand heliborne
troops.46
As indicatedabove, one apparent omission in Soviet trainingis the scarcity
of large exercises thatundertakethe massive logisticaltasks necessaryforan
invasion. The Soviet Union does test some airliftcapacity with the semiannual rotation of troops into East Europe, but the more difficulttask of
moving large amounts of equipment to support troops in the field is rarely
exercised.47A number of explanations mightaccount forthis pattern.First,
the Warsaw Pact's land lines of communicationsprovide a comparativelogisticaladvantage over the sea lines of the United States to the CentralFront,
and thus reinforcementtrainingdoes not require as much attention.Furthermore,the Soviets have traditionallymaintained significantstocks of
forward-basedequipment and supplies, which would lessen logistical demands in at least the firstphase of a war.48For example, the East could
throw new units into battle when others wear down, while Western plans
to reconstitutepartiallydestroyedformationsput greaterstress on logistics.
Nonetheless, beforethe invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968,the Soviet Union
feltit necessary to carryout a massive logisticalexercise, "NEMAN," which
involved calling up reservists,mobilizingcivilian resources, and deploying
Soviet troops in the USSR and across Poland, along with the materielneeded
to sustain them.49The Soviet reduction of forces in Eastern Europe under
Gorbachev may mean thatlogisticaltasks will be even more importantin the
futureas more men and materiel would have to be moved forwardin a
conflict.
The operational elements of NATO's exercises contrastwith those of the
Warsaw Pact in terms of style, scenarios, and emphases. In terms of style,
the NATO leadership establishes general operational level objectives and
then permitsa good deal of freeplay. Aspects of Westernexercises are also
staged, but relative to Eastern maneuvers, NATO's are less scripted and
allow forgreaterinitiativeon the part of leaders of all ranks. This flexibility
is an importantpart of the Westernalliance's forwarddefense, which must
respond rapidly to Soviet forceconcentrationsand breakthroughattempts.
46. Flor, "Major Exercises of NATO," p. 200.
47. One importantcase is "NEMAN," the largelogisticalexercisethatpreceded the 1968invasion
of Czechoslovakia.
48. David C. Isby, Weaponsand TacticsoftheSovietArmy(London: Jane's, 1988), p. 93.
49. Simon, WarsawPact Forces,pp. 49-50.
Constraining
GroundForceExercises| 81
The scenarios that guide NATO exercises are in principlesimilarto those of
the Eastern alliance, although Westernforcestraditionallydo not simulate a
but only regain the territory
that has been lost.
significantcounteroffensive,
Overall, the tasks emphasized in Western exercises are dominated by the
logisticaldemands of bringingtroops into Europe and moving them up to
the frontline.
CHANGE
IN EXERCISE
PATTERNS?
Today both NATO and the Warsaw Pact appear to be modifyingtheirmilitary
exercises, and it is importantto consider the sources and possible future
directionof this evolution. NATO is moving towards holding smaller and
less frequentexercises in Central Europe. Two considerationsexplain this
development.
First, West German resentmenttowards the disturbances that exercises
cause has crystallizedin the wake of several recentevents. The turningpoint
was the August 1988 crash of an Italian aerobatics team at the Ramstein
airshow where twenty-onespectators-mostly West German-were killed.
Sensitivitiesaroused by this event were heightenedby threelengthyground
exercisesconducted in the same region thatfall.51In December, 1988, a U.S.
A-10 plane crashed in the German cityof Ramscheid killingfivepeople and
injuring dozens more. This led to a quick decision by the United States,
Britain,Canada, and West Germany to halt low-level aircrafttrainingfor
threeweeks.52
Second, Gorbachev's "new thinking"has contributedto a perceptionthat
the Soviet militarythreatto Europe is declining.53Soviet representativeshave
trumpetedthe Soviet Union's new foreignpolicy themes of interdependence
and mutual securitybacked up by a new "defensive" Warsaw Pact military
doctrine.In December 1988,Gorbachev's forcereductionpledge at the United
Nations added weight to the Soviet declaratoryposition.54West Germans in
50. Flor, "Major Exercises of NATO," p. 200.
51. "Not Much Room forManoeuvre," The Economist,
December 10, 1988, p. 58.
52. "Low-Level Jet Training Halted in W. Germany," WashingtonPost, December 13, 1988,
p. All.
53. "The Gorbachev Effect,"The Economist,
February17, 1988, p. 38.
54. A clarificationof Gorbachev's United Nations speech, in an article by Defense Minister
Yazov, indicates that Soviet forcesin Eastern Europe will be reduced by 50,000 men and 5,300
tanks,and Eastern European countries'forcesby another56,000 men and 1,900 tanks; and that
the Soviet Union will furtherdecrease its forcesin the Westernmilitarydistrictsby 190,000men
International
Security14:3 | 82
particularhave begun to wonder why allied militarymaneuvers and movements, and the disruptions they cause, cannot be curtailed in light of improved East-Westrelations.55
These developments have led Western governmentsto reassess NATO
trainingpractices. The West German army has already announced that it is
planningto reduce significantly
the numberofits exercisesheld at thebrigade
level (5,000 men) or above, fromtwenty-onein 1987 to less than ten in 1990.56
General JohnGalvin, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), has
expressed doubt about the militaryeffectivenessand the economic efficiency
of large maneuvers.57And most recently,Pentagon officialshave announced
thatthe size of REFORGER will be reduced and the scope of ground maneuvers in Europe scaled back. REFORGER 89, originallyscheduled forSeptember 1989,will be merged with REFORGER 90, which will take place sometime
between Januaryand March 1990.58
While the number and size of exercises may decrease, the United States
hopes to maintainits capabilitiesby "trainingsmarter."Under the "REFORGER Enhancement Program," a new type of exercise known as a "CFX" is
being developed, which is a combinationcommand post-field trainingexercise that is furtherenhanced by use of computersimulation.The exercise
reduces the overall number of men by simulatingthe battalion-levelforces
in separate smallerexercises),while larger
(which are trainedmore effectively
formationsare simulated throughputtingmore "flags" (division headquarters)into the fieldat one time. Thus, NATO can stillrun large exerciseswith
less damage and disturbanceto the FRG and its populace.59This is, of course,
not a cost-freechange. Much of the stress on logistical organizations and
procedures (and ultimatelycommanders)will be difficult
to recreatewithout
the participationof actual soldiers who must be moved, sheltered,and fed.
and 4,860 tanks. In addition, the Soviet Union and otherWarsaw Pact countrieswill cut 9,130
artillerysystemsand 430 combat aircraftfromthe territoriesof the Westernmilitarydistrictsto
the West German border. See Army General D.T. Yazov, "Based on Principlesof Realism and
a Balance of Interests,"Pravda,February9, 1989, p. 4.
55. RobertJ. McCartney, "Allied Army Maneuvers Irk Germans," Washington
Post, January2,
1989, p. Al.
56. See David Marsh and David White, "Bundeswehr Plans to Hold Fewer Big Manoeuvres,"
FinancialTimes,December 2, 1988, p. 4. (Clarificationon the size of the maneuvers subject to
reductionwas provided by the FRG Embassy in Washington,D.C.)
57. Transcriptof Supreme Allied CommanderEurope (SACEUR) GeneralJohnGalvin's Remarks
to the Dutch AtlanticCommittee,Dortrecht,The Netherlands,December 6, 1988.
58. "U.S. to Cut Back Major Exercises in Europe," BostonGlobe,February2, 1989, p. 4.
59. Interviewswith militaryofficersat the J-5(StrategicPlans and Policy) and J-7(Operational
Plans and Interoperability)branches of the JointChiefs of Staff,March 1989.
GroundForceExercises| 83
Constraining
Eastern maneuvers also may change in the futurebecause of Gorbachev's
"new thinking" concerning militaryaffairs.60Gorbachev's December 1988
United Nations speech stressed that, along with troop and weapon reductions, Soviet forces in Europe would be restructuredto become "clearly
defensive."'61
Soviet Defense MinisterD. Yazov has noted in his writingsand
speeches that Soviet militarypolicy will now emphasize quality instead of
quantity,including the need forbettertraining.62
Althoughit is uncertainwhetherthese developments will actuallylead to
a more "defensive" Warsaw Pact strategyand force structure,they could
affectEastern exercisesin several respects. Both General Yazov and Marshal
Sergei Akhromeyev,formerchiefof the Soviet General Staff,have directed
Westernattentionto Soviet and Warsaw Pact exercises,which they say will
increasinglyreveal a more defensive orientation.63
Exactlywhat this means
is unclear, but Soviet writingsindicate that more time will be devoted to
trainingfordefensive operations.64Marshal Akhromeyev,duringhis visit to
the United States in the summer of 1988, claimed that the Red Army now
plans to remain on the defensiveforthreeweeks at the beginningof a war,
a revisionwhich will supposedly be reflectedin Soviet exercises.65
Reports from Western observers of Pact maneuvers have mostly been
skepticalregardingthe degree of the shifttowards defensive operations. In
the fall of 1988, observers were not shown any maneuvers which included
defensiveactions, with the exceptionof watchingone fortified
position overrun against littleresistance.66In April of 1989, observerssaw no new strides
60. See Stephen M. Meyer, "The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New PoliticalThinking
on Security,"International
Security,Vol. 13, No. 2 (Fall 1988), pp. 124-163.
61. "ExcerptsfromSpeech to U.N. on Major Soviet MilitaryCuts," New YorkTimes,December
8, 1988.
62. Army General D.T. Yazov, "The Qualitative Parameters of Defense Building," Krasnaia
zvezda,August 9, 1988, pp. 1-2.
63. See Michael Gordon, "U.S. and Soviets to Seek Ways to Avoid Fightingby Mistake," New
YorkTimes,July12, 1988, p. A12; George Wilson, "Nicaragua Intrudesas Carlucci-YazovTopic,"
Washington
Post,March 18, 1988, p. A18.
64. One Soviet articleindicates that up to 50 percentof total trainingtimewill be dedicated to
defensive operations. Colonel G. Miranovich and Colonel V. Shitarenko, "How is Defense
Strong?The Organizers of the Model Lesson Tried to Answer the Question," Krasnaiazvezda,
December 10, 1987, p. 2.
65. See WilliamOdom, "Soviet MilitaryDoctrine," ForeignAffairs,
Vol. 67, No. 2 (Winter198889), p. 130.
66. Bernard E. Trainor, "Soviet Maneuvers: A New Strategy?"New YorkTimes,November 4,
1988,p. A8. Also see "The Soviets Practicedonly AttackType of Combat," Die Welt,November
12-13, 1988, p. 4, as translatedin Foreign Broadcast InformationService (FBIS), Daily Report:
Western
Europe,November 16, p. 11.
International
Security14:3 | 84
in offensivepotential,but questioned the supposed defensive nature of the
maneuver, as the defenders had not hidden their tanks well and had no
anti-airguns.67Not all accounts, however are pessimistic.Admiral William
Crowe, then chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff,reported seeing military
exercises and wargames that were "trulydefensive" during his June 1989
visitto the Soviet Union.68 Two explanationsmightaccount forthese differing
reports. Some Warsaw Pact officershad claimed that it would take time to
implementthe concretechanges implied by the new doctrine,and Crowe's
reportmightbe evidence thatthis is now occurring.69
However, the differing
in determiningwhetheroffenseor
accounts may simplyreflectthe difficulty
defense is the actual focus of the exercise.
In addition to scenarios practiced,the number of Warsaw Pact exercises
also could change. The chiefof the General Staff,Army General Moiseyev,
has declared thatthe defensivedoctrinehas led to a reductionin the number
of major exercises. Yet it is not clear thatthe overall quantityof trainingwill
decline. Moiseyev notes that more time will be devoted to the "qualitative
training"of smaller units.70Thus, "public" exercises-those that must be
notifiedunder the StockholmAccord-may decline, while trainingbelow the
13,000 troop level increases.71
Even afterthe forcecuts announced by the Soviet Union and otherWarsaw
Pact countriesare implemented,Easternmilitarymaneuvers and movements
will demand the West's attentionbecause the Warsaw Pact will continue to
have an advantage in importantmajor ground systems (e.g., artillery)in
Central Europe and, more importantly,the capabilityto reinforceforward
areas relativelyquickly fromreserves in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals
area.72If
67. George C. Wilson, "Westerners Fault Soviet War Game: Observers Detect No Shift to
Defensive Doctrine in Mock Battle," Washington
Post, April 20, 1989, p. A36.
68. Interviewon "Good Morning America," June 21, 1989, as reportedin CurrentNews, June
23, 1989, p. A2. Also see Michael Dobbs, "JointChiefsView Soviet Weaponry,"Washington
Post,
April 19, pp. Al and A23.
69. See Trainor,"Soviet Maneuvers."
70. "From Defensive Doctrine Positions," Krasnaiazvezda,February10, 1989, pp. 1-2.
71. The Soviet Union has announced plans to cut the size of some exercises in East Europe
scheduled forthe fallof 1989 to 13,000or less troops,supposedly because of the forcereductions
and restructuring
in that area. See "Fall Exercises to ReflectTroop Reductions," Moscow TASS
in English,July22, 1989; in FBIS, Daily Report:SovietUnion,July24, 1989, pp. 117-118.
72. This conclusion is based on a balance derived from subtractingthe cuts announced by
Warsaw Pact countries(see Yazov, "Based on Principlesof Realism") fromfiguresgiven in IISS,
TheMilitaryBalance,1987-88 (London: InternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies [IISS], 1987).
See also Phillip Karber's figuresin "The Impact of Gorbachev's Reduction Plan," ArmedForces
Journal
International,
January1989, pp. 54-64.
GroundForceExercises| 85
Constraining
thequantityand qualityofWarsaw Pact trainingand exerciseswere increased
withoutfurtherreductionsin manpower and weapons, NATO's advantages
in readiness and quality of personnel mightbe reduced, detractingfromthe
West's security.
ThePurposesand ContentofProposalsto ConstrainMilitaryExercises
The ideal purpose of constrainingmilitaryexercisesis to diminishthe capabilityof large concentrationsof ready militaryforces to attack rapidly and
defeatthe otherside. Limitingthe dimensions of exercisescould provide for
greaterconfidencethat: 1) an attackis not being planned; 2) the other side
has less potentialto execute it; and 3) the defenderwill have a betterchance
to reactand repel it.
Especially in a crisis, exercises could raise anxieties that militaryaction is
imminent,settingoffa chain of events that could lead to war. The mobilization and counter-mobilizationat the startof World War I are oftencited as
an example of this phenomenon.73Proposals to constrainexercises can also
serve political purposes. For example, the West would like to dissuade the
Soviet Union frompressuringor interveningin EasternEurope. The Soviets,
on the otherhand, are interestedin inhibitingthe AtlanticAlliance's cohesion
by limitingU.S. militaryinvolvementin Europe. Westernand Easternofficial
proposals reflectthese differentconcerns about the exercises of the other
side.
NATO PROPOSALS
The United States has traditionallybeen wary of constrainingmaneuvers,
fearingthat such measures would harm NATO's relative position. For example, proposals to create zones along borders where militarymaneuvers
are prohibitedwould impairNATO's policy of forwarddefense more than it
would hinder the Warsaw Pact's offensivestrategy.The United States has
also been concerned that constraintson exercises would slow a NATO defensiveresponse to aggression because the West would be hesitantto react
to ambiguous warning by violatingtreatyprovisions.74American proposals
73. This is the interpretation
presentedby Sidney B. Fay, TheOriginsoftheFirstWorldWar(New
York: Macmillan, 1928). Disagreeing that the cause of World War I was inadvertenceis Fritz
Fischer,Germany's
Aims in theFirstWorldWar (New York: Norton, 1967).
74. JohnBorawski,
FromtheAtlantic
totheUrals:Negotiating
ArmsControl
at theStockholm
Confer-
ence(Washington,D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's,1988), pp. 12-13, 58.
International
Security14:3 | 86
have thereforefocused, not on constraints,but instead on measures that
provide for greater openness and transparency,such as notificationand
inspectionof militaryexercises and activities.75
The stated purposes of these
U.S. proposals are: to reduce the risksof surpriseattackand of conflictwhich
resultsfrommisunderstanding,and to lessen the threatof forceforpolitical
intimidation.76
Most Western nations on the whole share U.S. concerns about exercise
constraints.NATO did consider limitingthe number of divisions out of
garrisonas part of the "Associated Measures" which accompanied its December 1979 proposal at the Mutual and Balanced Force ReductionTalks (MBFR).
Ultimately,however, the proposal was shelved because of concerns on the
part of FRG and NATO militaryauthoritiesthatit would hamper an effective
Westerndefense by restrictingthe large-scaleexercise of overseas reinforcement (e.g., REFORGER) and the movement of troops from garrisons to
forwarddefense positions.77
WARSAW
PACT PROPOSALS
Until recently,the Soviet Union has also been slow to promote constraint
measures, apparentlybecause it has been equally hesitantto accept limitations on its militaryactivities.78The exception to this record has been the
Soviet proposal, firstofferedin 1979, to prohibitexercises with more than
40-50,000 troops.79This constraintappears to be aimed at limitingNATO's
large maneuvers (two or three a year), which are more frequentthan the
Pact's (five since 1980). Yet it would also theoreticallyconstrain the large
Warsaw Pact exercises thathave been used formilitaryinterventionor political leverage over Eastern European countries(assuming the limitscould not
be circumventedvia a number of simultaneous small exercises). One should
note, however, that the Soviet Union ignored Helsinki notificationrequirements during the 1980-81 Polish crisis.80In June 1986, the Soviet Union
75. Ibid., p. 37.
76. See proposal SC.1, which the U.S. co-authoredat the StockholmCDE on January24, 1984,
reproduced in Borawski, FromtheAtlanticto theUrals,p. 167.
77. Lothar Ruehl, MBFR: Lessonsand Problems,Adelphi Paper No. 176 (London: IISS, 1982),
pp. 26-27; Borawski, FromtheAtlanticto theUrals,pp. 23, 58.
78. Borawski,FromtheAtlanticto theUrals,pp. 13, 18-19, 58-59.
and
79. Brezhnev made the firstproposal in 1979; see SIPRI Yearbook1980: WorldArmaments
Disarmament,
p. 498. The offerwas repeated at the 1986 StockholmCDE; see Borawski,Fromthe
Atlanticto theUrals,p. 58.
80. Simon, WarsawPact Forces,pp. 169, 174.
GroundForceExercises| 87
Constraining
offeredto modifyits size constraintproposal by allowing one exercise with
over 40,000 troops every thirdyear,but NATO remained uninterested.
The provisions of recentSoviet and Warsaw Pact proposals, however, are
explicitlyaimed at constrainingmilitaryexercises.The meetingofthe Warsaw
Pact's PoliticalConsultative Committeeon July15 and 16, 1988, produced a
statementadvocating zones of weapons reductionin CentralEurope, which
would be accompanied by measures limitingmany of the dimensions of
militaryexercises including size, number, duration, and location.81On October 28, 1988, the Foreign MinistersCommitteeof the Warsaw Pact advocated restrictions,independent of othermeasures, on the scope and number
of simultaneous exercises, the duration of exercises, movements of troops
and equipment, and militaryactivitiesclose to the borders of other countries.82
On March 9, 1989, at the Vienna Negotiations on CSBMs, four Eastern
European countries(East Germany,Czechoslovakia, Hungary,and Bulgaria)
followed up on the October Warsaw Pact MinistersCommitteemeeting by
proposing specificCSBMs related to the size, timing,number,and duration
of militaryactivities (exercises, transfers,and concentrationof troops and
equipment) in Europe. A size limitof 40,000 troops (also includingalerts) is
advocated. These countrieswould furtherlimitany series of exercisestaking
place in close proximityto one anotherto not more than 40,000 troops each.
The timingof exerciseswould be constrainedto no more than threeactivities
(as definedby currentnotificationlimits)held simultaneouslyon the territory
of each participatingstate, with the total not exceeding 40,000 troops. The
number of exercises with more than 25,000 troops would be restrictedto no
more than two per year foreach participatingstate. Finally,these East bloc
countrieswant militaryactivitiesrequiringpriornotificationto be limitedto
a durationnot exceeding 15 days.83
The motivation for the East's new interestin these constraintsis not
entirelyclear. Certainlyone reason is to contributeto the Soviet campaign
to influenceWestern perceptions of the Soviet/WarsawPact militarythreat
81. "Warsaw Pact States' Statementon Talks on Armed Forces and Conventional Arms Reduction in Europe," Pravda,July16, 1988, pp. 1, 2.
82. "Statementon Confidence and SecurityBuilding Measures and Disarmament in Europe,"
issued by the Warsaw Pact ForeignMinisters'Committeein Budapest, Pravda,October29, 1988,
p. 4.
83. The fulltextof the proposal can be found in ArmsControlReporter,
May 1989, pp. 402.D.6164.
International
Security14:3 | 88
and to demonstratethe Soviet Union's new attitudeon securityissues. It is
also conceivable that,in lightof the East's announced unilateralreductions,
the concentrationof NATO troopsforexercisesin the FRG withinthe months
ofSeptemberand October each year mightbe ofmore concernto the Warsaw
Pact.
There are also pragmaticmilitarypurposes behind these suggested constraints.As clarifiedbelow, many of them favorthe Warsaw Pact's military
position and trainingpatterns at the expense of NATO's. These proposals
are also aimed at takingadvantage of West German domestic opposition to
exercises. The East's suggested limitson the size, number,and duration of
maneuvers withineach country,ratherthan on a bloc-to-blocbasis, certainly
recognizes thatmost of NATO's exercisestake place in West Germany,while
the Pact's are divided among the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary.
Anotherproposal by an Easterncountryat the StockholmCDE talkswould
limitthe location of exercises. Rumania, concernedwith the potentialSoviet
use of force against itselfas well as with East-West conflict,has called for
zones along borders in which therewould be no maneuvers, militarymovements, or concentrationsof armed forcesand armaments.84
Finally,a measure that mightbe used to limitexercisesis a restrictionon
the type of activitiespracticed. The Soviet Union's new focus on defensive
operations suggests the possibilitythat if a way could be found to prohibit
offensivemaneuvers, the ability to attack would be diminished, and the
defender'sposition strengthened.
TheRelativeMeritsofConstraints
versusFlexibility
in MilitaryExercises
The key issue forthe West is whetherexercise constraintswould contribute
to NATO's securityby limitingthe possibilityof a successful Warsaw Pact
attack morethan they would inhibitNATO's abilityto prepare for and respond to such an invasion. This calculation requires an assessment of how
specificconstraintswould affect:
1) Detectingpreparations for a Warsaw Pact attack:Would the constraint
enhance the chances that Westernintelligencewould discover military
preparationsforeithera short-warningor extended mobilizationattack?
84. Rumanian proposal (SC.2), published in Borawski, FromtheAtlanticto theUrals,pp. 41-43
and 167-169.
Constraining
GroundForceExercises| 89
Would it limitthe possibilitythatthe East would be able to use exercises
as cover foran invasion?
2) Decision-making
effectivenesswithinthe Alliance: Would it contributeto
a timelyNATO decision on the use of force?
3) DefendingWest Germanysuccessfully:Does it protectNATO's required
exercise patternsand its trainingneeds? Would it avoid inhibitionson
the abilityof Westernforcesto respond to warning?
4) DiminishingEastern abilityto attack: Would it limitthe Warsaw Pact's
trainingpatterns and preparations necessary to support an offensive
strategy?
An additional criterionby which Western analysts have traditionally
judged exercise constraintmeasures is their effecton the costs of Soviet
interventionin, and militaryintimidationof,EasternEurope. The past record
of the Soviet militaryactivitiesconcerningEast bloc countries(e.g., Hungary,
Czechoslovakia and Poland) indicates thatcertainproposed constraintssuch
as size, duration, and location would have to be violated if the Soviet response to new crises were to be intervention.Such an obvious Soviet breach
of an internationaltreatymightincrease the likelihood of a united Western
response and the magnitude of any resultingsanctions. Thus some types of
constraintson exercisesmightraise the costs of Soviet intervention.Yet given
the historyof tepid Western responses to such invasions in the past, these
additional costs are likelyto be minimal.During the Czech crisis,NATO not
only did not respond to indications of an intervention,but in fact a West
German exercisewas relocatedaway fromthe borderto avoid "provocation."
In short, Western countries are unlikely to alter their response because a
CSBM is technicallybroken when NATO securityis not directlythreatened.
This consideration,therefore,is of secondaryimportanceto the fouroutlined
above, and is not addressed below.
The criteriaof detection,
can be used
decision-making,
defenseand diminution
to assess how Eastern proposals forconstraintsaffectingthe size, number,
timing, duration, and location of exercises would affectthe likelihood of
success of two types of Warsaw Pact attacks against the West.85The firstis
a short-warningattack, where the Soviet Union would attemptto prepare
and deploy ready and near-readyforces under the cover of exercises. The
second is a mobilized attack,where exercises would be used to bring CategoryII and III troops up to acceptable readiness or move themforwardbefore
85. The Warsaw Pact proposal did not include a constrainton activities,but because of the
attentionit has received recently,such a constraintis also examined below.
International
Security14:3 | 90
the onset of hostilities.86
A significantSoviet jump in mobilizationcould be
as deleterious to NATO securityas a surprise standing-startWarsaw Pact
attack,particularlyin lightof Gorbachev's forcereductions.87The two scenarios are addressed separately only when the effectof the constraintsis
differentforeach. Although the proposals examined are specificones, they
reflectthe costs and benefitsto the West of theirgeneral categoriesof constraintson ground exercises.88
LIMIT
SIZE
The East Bloc's proposal to prohibitexercises with more than 40,000 troops
has mixed effectson the four criteria.First,detection:In terms of NATO's
abilityto foreseeEastern surpriseattackpreparations,a size constraintwould
marginallyhelp the West by allowing intelligenceanalysts to differentiate
activitiesneeded foran exercise(e.g., supply stockpiling)fromthose required
foran invasion. The largerthe exercise,the more troops and materielwould
be gathered to conduct it, and the more difficultit would be to distinguish
fromactual preparations. It is generallyrecognized that NATO intelligence
means would provide detection of significantEast bloc war preparations.89
Thus the 40,000 limitwould merelyprovide a clearerline forjudging intentions related to militarypreparationsforattack. It would, however, be only
one of many indicatorsused to assess the likelihood of an invasion. A size
constraintwould not significantly
benefitdetectionof a mobilized attack,in
thatthe trainingand exercises needed to bringCategoryII and III troops up
to speed would primarilytake place below a 40,000-trooplimit.90
86. Soviet divisions are maintained at three states of readiness. Category I troops are fully
deployed formations(85 percent manned) which can go to war in a matterof hours. Category
II divisions have 100 percent of theirequipment but only 50-75 percentof theirmanpower and
would take several days to one month to mobilize and become operational. Category III formations have most of theirequipment, although it is older, but are only 15-30 percentmanned
and would take two months and upward to prepare forcombat. For a discussion of Categories
I, II, III (also referredto as A, B, and C), see TheMilitaryBalance,1987-88 (London: IISS, 1987),
p. 34.
Balance,N-284287. See JamesA. Thomson, An Unfavorable
Situation:NATO and theConventional
FF/RC(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, November 1988), esp. pp. 30-33.
88. This analysis is based on exercise patterns,forcestructure,and strategiesas theyappear at
the presenttime. Change is of course apparent in these areas, yet its futureformand direction
remainvague.
89. JamesBlaker,"Transparency,Inspections,and SurpriseAttack,"in S. Windass and E. Grove,
eds., Cooperative
Security(Adderbury,U.K.: Foundation forInternationalSecurity,1987), pp. 125.
90. Donnelly,Red Banner,p. 159, describeshow a CategoryIII unit doing a practicemobilization
spent two weeks trainingat the company and battalion level and ten days in a regimental
exercise.
GroundForceExercisesI 91
Constraining
is responding in a
One of the main problems for NATO decision-making
timelyfashion to a threatof a Warsaw Pact attack. Western officials,concerned with their domestic political standing or a desire to avoid conflict,
mightbe disinclined to approve a disruptivemobilization.And officialsare
aware that such an act under certaincircumstancescould fuel the intensity
of a crisis, contributingto the onset of conflict(as in World War I). A
constrainton the size of exercises would enhance decision-making,by providing a means of judging intentions.Leaders who mightotherwisewish to
would have betterinformation
delay initiatingmilitarycounter-preparations
to convince both themselves and theirpublics that speedy action was necessary.
Several counter-argumentsto this conclusion should be considered. First,
a size constraintmight be circumventedby holding many exercises below
the 40,000 limit.Yet such activityin itselfwould be an indicationof potential
trouble. It might also be argued that a limiton the size of exercises would
work to the disadvantage of NATO decision-making,since Westernsocieties
are more likelythan Eastern ones to feel restrainedby the "legal" limitsof a
size restriction.If warningwere at all ambiguous, some maintainthatNATO
officialswould be less likely to take the necessary preparatorymeasures
because this would break the treaty"law." Nonetheless, intelligencemeans
should be able to ascertain if such a constraintwere being violated by the
Pact. Given, then, thatthe ambiguityof a treatyviolationwould be minimal,
this argumentagainst a restraintis not verypowerful.
A 40,000-trooplimitwould marginallyhamper the West's defense
capability.
NATO relies on intensive trainingto maintain the readiness and reinforcement capacity to sustain a credible forwarddefense. Under a 40,000-troop
limit,the Westernalliance would have to reduce the size ofits largerexercises
that occur in the fall, particularlythe field exercise in which forcesarriving
as part of REFORGER join allied troops already in Europe. In REFORGER
1987 (the largest ever), 35,000 troops were deployed fromthe continental
United States to Europe. Once there,the troops combined with other allied
forcesin the exerciseCERTAIN STRIKE, involvinga totalof 78,000 soldiers.91
This constraintwould have prohibited the participationof the 35,000 REFORGER forcesin that fieldmaneuver. The resultof such a limitationmight
91. Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, "CounteringSoviet EncirclementOperations: EmergingNATO Concepts," International
DefenseReview(November 1988), pp. 1417-1418.
International
Security14:3 | 92
thereforebe a reductionin NATO capabilityto integratelarge reinforcements
fromthe United States into the defense of Europe.
Two developments, however, make constraintson trainingin large numbers less damaging for NATO in the future.The firstis that the West is
unilaterallyreducing the size of its exercises. The second is that new types
of exercises are being developed that make use of computer technologyto
simulatelarge combat operationswhile using relativelyfew troops. SACEUR
General Galvin argues that this will allow the West to "train smarter."Furthermore,it may give NATO a comparativeadvantage because its computer
and softwaretechnologyis ahead of the East's.92
In terms of diminishing
Warsaw Pact capabilities by limitingtrainingfor
offensiveoperations, a size constraintwould have only a minor effect.The
East is less dependent than the West in peacetime on maneuvers of more
than 40,000 troops: thus it would be able to meet most of its trainingneeds
withinthe boundaries of this measure.
In sum, t-hereis a close trade-offbetween what NATO would gain and
what it would lose under this restrictionon size. It would benefitthe West
because it enhances detection and decision-making.Its main drawback is
thatitwould restricttraditionalNATO training,especiallylargefieldexercises
involvingEuropean forces,the U.S. Armyin Europe (USAREUR), and U.S.
soldiers arrivingas part of REFORGER. Nonetheless, the WesternAlliance
would stillbe able to conduct REFORGER and field maneuvers with corpssize formations.And given thatNATO has both the need and the technology
to move to less manpower-intensiveexercises, some type of size constraint
(not necessarily40,000) could benefitNATO security.
LIMIT
NUMBER
The Warsaw Pact proposes to limitthe numberof medium-sizeexercises(25of each participatingstate per
50,000) to no more than two on the territory
the impact of this measure is
year. In termsof detectionand decision-making,
essentially the same as that of a size constraint;both would benefitfrom
having a firmstandard by which to judge Warsaw Pact intentions.
This constraintwould, however,be detrimentalin termsof NATO's ability
to use exercises in preparingan adequate defense.NATO holds several exercises each year with over 25,000 soldiers. Furthermore,these maneuvers all
92. General Galvin made this point in a presentationat Harvard's JohnF. Kennedy School of
Government,March 13, 1989.
Constraining
GroundForceExercises| 93
take place in West Germanybecause, as the only Allied state on the NATOWTO centralborder,thatis where most of the West's troops are located and
where the forwarddefense strategywould be implemented.
Not only would this limitNATO's training,but it would provide a comparativeadvantage to the Warsaw Pact's capabilities.
The East conducts fewer
25,000-plusexercisesthan the West, and those thatare held could be distributed among the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. This measure
would not have affectedthe Warsaw Pact's 1987 and 1988 exercises, while
NATO would have had to give up seven out of its twelve exercises held in
1987and 1988 with 25,000 or more soldiers. Thus, thisconstrainton numbers
does not work to NATO's advantage.
RESTRICT
FREQUENCY
The East's proposal affectingthe timingof exerciseswould not permitmore
than three activitiesto be held simultaneouslyon the territory
of any state
(totaltroops in all must be under 40,000).
Both in terms of detectionand decision-making,
this limit would benefit
NATO. It mightaid intelligencesomewhat by clarifyingWarsaw Pact intentions if a build-up of troops either in East Germany and Czechoslovakia
(short-warningattack) or in the Soviet Union (mobilized attack)were staged
under the guise of simultaneous maneuvers. More important,this constraint
could promotea NATO consensus to act, by providingWesternleaders with
ready evidence that the USSR had offensiveintentions.To mount an attack,
the Warsaw Pact would have to marshal forcesin more than threelocations
in each state, or they would total more than 40,000 troops. Thus, if these
guidelines were exceeded, firmevidence would be available that Western
counter-preparations
were necessary.
The problemwiththismeasure is thatitwould prohibitthe currentWestern
practiceof groupingmany exercisesin Septemberand October. During September1988,NATO held fiveexercisesin West Germanyalone, which totaled
some 240,000soldiers.93Restrictingthispracticewould impairNATO's ability
to defend.In addition, under this limitation,80,000 troops could be concentratedon the East side of the centralborder (40,000 in each of the GDR and
Czechoslovakia), but only 40,000 could be put into the fieldin NATO's one
East-Westborder state, the FRG.
93. Based on figures of notified activities for 1987-88, supplied by the Arms Control and
DisarmamentAgency on NATO and Warsaw Pact.
International
Security14:3 | 94
This proposal would not significantlydiminishthe impact of trainingon
Warsaw Pact capabilitiesbecause its maneuvers would not be affected:they
are more evenly spaced throughoutthe year. In 1988, the Warsaw Pact held
maneuvers in nine out of twelve months with three or less in every month
except April (which had four).94However, a constrainton timing (accompanied by the size restriction)might complicate the amount of training
needed to prepare the large numberof CategoryII and III troops thatwould
be mobilized foran invasion, althoughundoubtedlymuch of thiswould take
place below the 13,000-troopnotificationlimit.All in all, this size and timing
constraintdoes not serve NATO's interest.It would impairthe West's defense
preparations while leaving the East's peacetime practices essentially untouched.
LIMIT
DURATION
The Warsaw countrieshave also advocated allowing no large exerciseto run
longer than 15 days. Such a constraintwould benefitNATO early detection
of a short-warningattackbecause the amount of war materielthat must be
gathered for a fifteen-dayexercise is significantlydifferentthan that for a
maneuver of thirtydays or, of course, an invasion. Thus, build-ups for
militaryactivitieswhich exceed the duration limit would set offwarning
bells. This measure, however,mightnot enhance Westernleadershipdecisionmaking,at least in the case of a pre-planned short warning attack,because
an Easterninvasion could take place within15 days; thus no provisionwould
be violated before the actual attack occurred. In termsof mobilized attack,
duration would also be relativelyunimportant.A long series of shorteror
non-notifiabletrainingexercises could be used to bring Category II and III
troops up to speed.
The impact on NATO defensepreparations would be harmful. NATO's
reinforcement
exercises regularlyrun longer than 15 days and oftenup to a
month.This amount of timeis needed to transporttroops and materielfrom
the United States to Europe, match them with pre-positionedequipment,
and completea maneuver. NATO could limitREFORGER to a reinforcement
exercise without any accompanying activitiesin the field, but this would
raise trainingexpenses (because it is more efficientto trainthe troops once
they are in Europe), and would lose the trainingsynergyof the movement
94. Ibid.
GroundForceExercises| 95
Constraining
oftroopsand materielfromthe United Statesintoactionin the FRG's forward
area.
A 15-dayconstrainton durationwould but littlediminish
Soviet capabilities,
as Easternexercisesrarelycontinuethatlong. Exerciseshave, however,lasted
more than 15 days during times of political crisis in Eastern Europe. This
suggeststhata durationconstraintwould representan obstacle forpreparing
significantmilitaryoperations, such as those undertakenin Czechoslovakia,
or exertingleverage via militaryexercises in extended crises. Overall, this
constrainton duration would not be to the advantage of Westerninterests
because it offersfew benefitsin comparisonto the costs of restricting
importantNATO trainingpracticessuch as REFORGER.
RESTRICT
LOCATION
Romania's proposal, for a zone along borders in which maneuvers, movements, and concentrationswould be prohibited,would not improve NATO
because it would simply
security.This measure would not enhance detection
move what now occurs back toward the Soviet Union. Maneuver-freezones
would increase the likelihood of a quick NATO decisionto respond to aggression by establishinga clear measure of ill intent:a violationof the zone. But
the central problem with this constraintis that it would seriously impede
NATO's abilityto trainforand to mount an adequate forwarddefense.Unless
the zone on the Eastern side of the inter-Germanand FRG-Czech borders
were much wider than NATO's, Pact forcescould cross it fasterthan NATO
could assume its general defense positions.95Furthermore,the West's forward defense policy requires peacetime militaryactivityin the region along
the borderin order to familiarizetroopswith territory
and prepare positions.
Moreover,eight of NATO's eighteen main exercise areas are located within
the likelyzone, 50 km fromthe inter-Germanand Czech borders.96
The consequences of a locationconstrainton Warsaw Pact capabilities
would
be minimal,because the East is not tied to a forwarddefense strategyand
does not depend on trainingalong the border. In short, a limitationon
location of exercises does not benefitNATO's securitybecause, unless it is
95. See RobertD. Blackwilland WilliamJarosz,"Confidence-Buildingin Europe: An Assessment
of ConventionalWeapons Exclusion Zones," manuscript,1989.
96. These eight NATO exercise areas are Nord-Munster,Sud-Munster, Bergen Hohne, Ehra
Lessien, Wildflecken,Hammelburg,Grafenwohr,and Hohenfels.
International
Security14:3 | 96
highlyasymmetrical,itworksto the advantage oftheWarsaw Pact's offensive
militaryplanning.
RESTRICT
ACTIVITIES
A finalconstraintmeasure to be considered here involves limitationson the
activitiespracticed in exercises. As noted earlier, Soviet maneuvers have
traditionallyfocused more on offensivetasks, while the West concentrates
on logistical tasks related to its reinforcements.The Soviet Union's recent
statements,thatits exerciseswill be increasinglydevoted to defense, further
suggest that in Moscow's view, activitiesin exercises can be categorized in
termsof theiroffensiveor defensivenature. The idea behind a constrainton
activities,therefore,would be to limitthose of the offensivetype in order to
impair the ability of one side to attack the other. This type of constraint
would, in principle,benefitNATO security,because its implied asymmetry
would limitthe Soviet Union's offensiveorientationmore thanit would affect
the West's defensive plans.
In practice,however, the meritsof this proposal are questionable because
of definitionalproblems related to the terms "offense"and "defense." It is
difficult
to name offensiveactivitiesthatmightnot also be a partof defensive
strategies.Practicingrivercrossingsconnotesan offensiveactivity,yetarmies
on the defensive may need to cross over water obstacles to resupply the
frontlines, retreat,or counterattack.Tacticalcounteroffensives,
even within
a broader defensive strategy,are necessary to fend offan invasion. Thus,
even though overall exercise scenarios mightbe judged offensiveor defensive, the activitieswhich take place withinthem cannot. This makes it problematicto constrainexercise activitiesin a way thatwould significantly
limit
the capabilityto attack,withoutalso inhibitingdefensivepotential.
Conclusion
This analysis of constraintproposals indicatesthatmost of those offeredthus
farwould diminishNATO's security.Given currentWarsaw Pact quantitative
advantages, secrecy,and offensivepotential,the AtlanticAlliance has good
reason to be wary of restrictionson its trainingwhich could lower its readiness and abilityto respond to aggression. The measures discussed above
affecting
timing,number,duration,and location are undesirableforthe West
because theirharm to NATO's abilityto defend would outweightheirbenefit
in areas such as earlywarning, decision-making,and limitson Warsaw Pact
Constraining
GroundForceExercises| 97
capabilities. A constrainton the types of activitiespracticed in exercises
appears unfeasiblebecause of the problems of differentiating
offensiveactivities fromdefensive ones. The one proposal that mightbe desirable, given
indicationsthatNATO will limitits exercisesunilaterally,is a size constraint.
However, it remains to be seen whethera measure can be developed which
prohibitsEastern circumventionof its provisions (e.g., by holding several
simultaneous maneuvers, each of sizes just under the limit),yet does not
restrictNATO's grouping of exercises in the fall each year.
This pessimisticview of these specificexercise constraintproposals does
not mean thatall limitationswould a prioribe detrimentalto the West. What
it does suggest is that, due to importantasymmetriesbetween the Warsaw
Pact and NATO in termsof strategy,forcestructure,number of allies, decision-makingcapacity, and geography, it is difficultto formulatepragmatic
constraintsthatdo not asymetricallydetractfromNATO's capacityto defend
itself.
A betterstartingplace forCSBMs on militaryexercises would be to lower
the notificationfloorsbelow the present 13,000, and to increase inspection.
The purpose of these measures would be to develop a clearer idea of the
quantityand nature of each side's training,much of which takes place at the
division level and below. Forces of this size generally do not represent a
short-warningattack threat,but the overall quantityof trainingat this level
can importantlyreflectcapabilities,if not intentions.As Gorbachev's unilateral cuts are implemented, the immediate threat of a surprise attack decreases, but the problem of a powerful offensivefollowingmobilizationremains. Lower notificationlevels, accompanied by more extensiveinspections,
would enhance confidence that the Soviet Union is not undertaking the
necessary preparationeffortsforbringingits large militarypotentialto bear
in Europe.
International
Security14:3 | 98
Appendix: Summaries of Helsinki Accord (1975) and Stockholm Accord (1986)
The Final Act of the 1975 Conference on Securityand Cooperation in Europe,
August 1, 1975 (CSCE Helsinki Accord) requestsof signatorynations, on a voluntary
basis:
a) priornotificationof militaryactivitiesexceeding a total of 25,000 troops, independentlyor combined with air or naval components;
b) the designation, purpose, type of activity,numerical strength,and estimated
duration of such activities;
c) prior notificationof 21 days of militaryactivities,but in the case of a maneuver
arranged at shorternotice, at the earliestpossible opportunitypriorto its starting
date;
d) special regard for those countries near the area of maneuvers with respect to
notificationof smaller exercises;
e) that observers be invited on a voluntary and bilateral basis to attend military
maneuvers, with special regard for those of countriesnear the area of such maneuvers; the invitingstate determinesin each case the number of observers and
the procedures and conditions of otherparticipation,and gives otherinformation
which it may consider useful.
The Final Act of the Conferenceon Confidence-and Security-Building
Measures and
Disarmamentin Europe, September 19, 1986 (CDE StockholmAccord) requires:
a) an exchange of data on militaryactivitiesexceeding 13,000troops (3,000 ifairborne
or amphibious) or 300 battle tanks, by November 15 of each year; informationon
air forces when more than 200 sorties take place in conjunction with ground
exercises;
b) an exchange of preliminarydata on any militaryactivityinvolving more than
40,000 troops planned forthe second subsequent year;
c) notificationat least 13 months prior to militaryactivitieswith more than 75,000
troops;
d) notification42 days prior to militaryactivitiesof a size greaterthan specified in
(a), but militaryactivitiescarriedout withoutadvance noticeto the troopsinvolved
(i.e., alerts) are exempt;
e) notification42 days prior to transfersof forcesfromoutside the zone to arriving
points in the zone, and fromoutside the zone to points of concentrationin the
zone, to participatein militaryactivitiesexceeding the sizes specifiedin (a);
f) observation of militaryactivities of at least 17,000 troops (5,000 if airborne or
amphibious) by two observersfromeach memberstate;
g) a maximumof threechallenge inspectionsannually,although no state is required
to accept more than one inspectionfromthe same challengingstatein one calendar
year.
Thirty-five
nations signed each of these Accords. The fulltextscan be found in J.A.S.
TreatiesSince1945: A
Grenvilleand BernardWasserstein,eds., TheMajor International
Historyand GuidewithTexts(London: Methuen, 1987), pp. 482-489.