The Sources of Public Opinion for American Foreign Policy Officials
Author(s): Philip J. Powlick
Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Dec., 1995), pp. 427-451
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association
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(1995) 39, 427-451
InternationalStudiesQuarterly
The Sources of Public Opinion for
AmericanForeignPolicy Officials
PHILIPJ. POWLICK
DePauw University
Public opinion is increasinglybeing considered an importantfactorin
foreignpolicydecisions.This articlethusexamineswhatsources of informationforeignpolicyofficialsactuallyuse to representpublic opinion. A
linkagemodel is hypothesizedwithcommunicationsbetweengovernment
and the public followingfive paths: elites, interestgroups, the news
media, elected officials,and the mass,or general,public. The data show
thatthe elite and interestgroup paths are least used, paths based on the
newsmedia and elected officialsare mostused, withmass opinion sources
of moderateimportance.Furtherdata show thatthe use of any one path
depends to some extentupon the typesof issueswithwhichofficialsdeal,
and the institutional
positionand ideologyof individualofficials.Foreign
policyofficialsare oftenskepticalabout public opinion polls; however,in
using theirown alternative"operational"sources, such officialsmay be
more receptiveto public input than previouslythought.The resultsof
this studyare compared with Bernard Cohen's The Public'sImpacton
diminisheduse
Policy(1973). This comparisonfindsa significantly
Foreign
of elite sources to represent public opinion, most likely a result of
officials'sense of the "lessons"of Vietnam.
The literature on American foreign policy has recently seen a growing number of
articles and books discussing the importance of public opinion. (For an overview
see Holsti, 1992.) Whereas public opinion on foreign relations was once seen as
largely ignorant, characterized more by "moods" than by well-reasoned opinions
(e.g., Almond, 1960), many scholars have now come to view public opinion as both
rational (Graham, 1989; Russett, 1990; Page and Shapiro, 1992) and stable
(Caspary, 1970; Page and Shapiro, 1992; Peffleyand Hurwitz, 1992), or, in Bruce
Jentleson's (1992) words, "prettyprudent." Accompanying this has been new scholarship regarding the impact that public opinion has on American foreign policy.
The conventional wisdom was that public opinion did not much matter to those
who made policy (Yarmolinsky, 1963; Cohen, 1973); several recent authors have
challenged thisassessment,suggestingthatforeignpolicyofficialsare attentiveto
public opinion and that public opinion mattersin theirdecisions (e.g., Graham,
1989; Powlick,1991; Hinckley,1992).
Accepting the new line of argument that public opinion is important(see
Author's
Note:The authorwishesto thankthe manydozens of StateDepartmentand NationalSecurityCouncil staff
memberswho have donated theirtime and confidentialcommentaryfor thisand related researchprojectsover the
past eightyears.
? 1995International
StudiesAssociation.
PublishedbyBlackwell
238 MainStreet,Cambridge,
MA 02142,USA,and 108 CowleyRoad,OxfordOX4 1JF,UK
PuLblishers,
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428
The SourcesofPublic Opinion
Powlick,1991), thisarticleseeks to identifyand assess the relativeimportanceof
different
sources of public opinion to foreignpolicyofficials.If public opinion is
important,what do officialslook to in order to gauge its tone and direction?
Public Opinion and Paths of Linkage
In any democraticsociety,legitimacyrequirespopular consent,suggestingthata
significant
degree of harmonybetweenpublic opinion and governmentpolicy-or
at the veryleast, public acquiescence in policy-is desirable. It has been shown
empiricallythat on most American foreignpolicy issues such harmonyusually
exists(e.g., Monroe, 1979; Page and Shapiro, 1983). Yet our understandingof the
processbywhichsuch agreementis achieved-that is, how governmentand public
opinion are 'linked"-remains murky.
As a move towardbetterunderstanding,this
studyexamines the sources of informationthatforeignpolicyofficialsidentifyas
representative
ofAmericanpublic opinion; thatis,how do officials"operationalize"
public opinion?
In most studies of how governmentinteractswithpublic opinion, the phrase
"public opinion" is used as a term withoutspecific definition.V. 0. Key, for
example,definedpublic opinion as "thoseopinions held byprivatepersonswhich
governmentsfindit prudentto heed" (Key,1964:14). Conceptually,such a definitionis fine,but operationally,it leaves much to be desired.Whichprivatecitizens?
On whichissues?For whichgovernmentsor segmentsof government?Answersto
these questions are clearlynecessaryif we are to betterunderstandhow foreign
policyis linkedto public opinion. In surveyingthe literatureon linkagein foreign
policyseveralpossible paths of opinion transmissioncan be identifiedand placed
withina hypotheticalmodel of foreignpolicylinkage.
Elites
Manyscholarshave hypothesizeda major role forelitesin the influenceof foreign
policy.GabrielAlmond (1960), forinstance,sawpublic influencecomingprimarily
fromnongovernmentalelites,witha subsidiaryrole forwhathe called "the attentive public." Bernard Cohen (1973) saw a major opinion linkage role for two
distinctgroupswhichhe called "intimates"(friendsand associatesof officials)and
"experts."Elites are oftenthoughtto representan articulateand knowledgeable
group who often act as both influencersof and receptorsfor mass opinion on
foreign policy. Through their ongoing interactionswith policy makers, and
throughthe channels of elite dialogue (e.g., editorials,foreignpolicyjournals),
theymay serve to mediate or representpublic opinion withinthe foreignpolicy
process.
Interest
Groups
The classic interestgroup (or pluralist) model of politics sees public opinion
actionsof diverseand comtransmitted
to governmentthroughthe self-interested
petitivegroupsor factions.The activitiesof such groupsin theforeignpolicyrealm
have been studiedin a limitednumber of areas. Businessgroups were studiedby
Bauer, Dexter,and Pool (1972), ethnic groups by Bard (1988), and single-issue
groupsby Moffett(1985) and byKusnitz(1974). No clear consensushas emerged
from this literatureon the overall degree of interestgroup influence; group
influenceis oftenseen to be eithergroup-or case-specific.In the contextof this
article,however,it should be kept in mind thatgauging the overallinfluenceof
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PHILIP J. POWLICK
429
such groups on foreignpolicy is not necessarilyour goal.1 Rather,we wish to
examine the extentto whichofficials,
acceptingthe pluralistmodel itself,consider
such groups to be representative
of public opinion.
TheNewvs
Media
The news media are, by definition,primarilytransmitters
of information.In his
studyof public opinion and foreignpolicy,however,BernardCohen (1973) found
thatforeignpolicyofficialsconsideredthe media to be a sourceof public opinion.
Cohen wrote that this linkage operates in two ways: (1) Reportersmay be wellinformedmembersof the public withviewsworthyof attention,and (2) the news
storiestheyreporttransmitthe opinions of othersin the politicalsystemand the
nation at large.2 The media's "priming"and "framing"roles (see Iyengar and
Kinder, 1987; Iyengarand Simon, 1994) are of importancehere as well. Media
to previouslyobscureissues,or framethe
coveragemightraise public attentiveness
termsbywhichthe public willevaluatespecificpolicies.
ElectedRepresentatives
In Rousseau's classic conception of representation,elected officialsare to act as
delegates,directlyvoicingthe viewsof those who elected them and using little,if
any,of theirownjudgment (Rousseau, 1960; see also Pitkin,1969). Such delegate
behavior (in theory,at least) representsa fairly"pure"formof linkage.On foreign
policyquestionswe usuallylook to Congressforexamples of such delegate behavior.To the extentthatmembersof Congressdo act as delegates,the foreignpolicy
opinions theyespouse should be equivalentto public opinion itself.3While such
an approach mayseem naive,both Cohen (1973) and Powlick(1991) have already
found thatsome foreignpolicyofficialsdo, in fact,considerCongressto represent
public opinion in thisway.
The General,orMass, Public
The general,or mass,public seems to be the most common meaning of the term
to
"public opinion."Yet,when we discusslinkagewithforeignpolicy,it is difficult
findmanywell-definedavenues of opinion thatrun more or less directlyfromthis
public to policyofficials.Demonstrationsin LafayettePark or at the State Department's C Street entrance of course qualifyhere. So, too, does the contact that
governmentofficialshave withordinarypeople (especiallywhen traveling).Letters
and phone calls also fallwithinthiscategory,thoughsome mightobject thatsuch
contactis usuallyinitiatedby "attentive"
as opposed to "mass"publics.In his study
of the State Department,Cohen (1973) combined all of these sources into a
categoryhe (somewhatderogatorily)called "facelessor impersonalsources."Cohen also included in this categorypublic opinion polls. Polls are not, of course,
I Indeed, one of the best studiesof interestgroup activity
in foreignpolicy(Bauer et al., 1972) found thatinterest
groups have surprisingly
littleimpactupon policy.
2 Cohen also wrote (The Pressand Foreign
Poliy, 1963) thatreportersthemselvessaw the pressas the representative
of public opinion to foreignpolicyofficials:"Some reportersobserve that,so faras the Presidentand manyothersin
governmentare concerned,whattheyhear fromnewspapermen,or whattheyread in the newspapers,constitutesthe
most importantelementin theiruniverseof public opinion as it bears on foreignpolicy"(1963:32).
3 Indeed, there is some evidence that some legislatorsare so in touch and in tune withtheirdistrictsthatsuch
delegate behavioris likelyto occur withoutconscious effortto behave as eitherdelegate or trustee(see Fenno, 1978;
also Hill, 1993).
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430
The SourcesofPublic Opinion
directavenuesof opinion; nevertheless,
in the academic communitytheyare widely
consideredto representmass public attitudes.Indeed, the vastmajorityof studies
on public opinion/foreignpolicy linkage rely heavilyon poll data to describe
public attitudes(see, e.g., Page and Shapiro, 1983;Jentleson,1992).
Polls are perhaps the mostcontroversial
source of public opinion in the foreign
policyprocess.Whereas mostpresidentsdenythattheyrespond to polls (see, e.g.,
Reagan, 1983), and many of theircurrentand formersubordinatescriticizethe
use of poll data (Yarmolinsky,
1963; Destler,Gelb, and Lake, 1984), others,such
as Altschuler(1990), Hinckley(1992), and Jacobs and Shapiro (1992b) nevertheless tell us thatpresidentsdo make frequentuse of public opinion polls in considering foreignpolicy issues. This article certainlycannot resolve the controversy
surroundingpresidentsand polls,but it can examine the extentto whichpoll data
are perceivedto representpublic opinion bylower-ranking
foreignpolicyofficials.
Toward a ForeignPolicy/PublicOpinion Linkage Model
Withthesefivemajor sources,or paths,of linkage,we can constructa hypothetical
model of foreignpolicylinkage (see Figure 1). The model assumesthatall fiveof
the opinion sourceslistedtransmit
who in turnare affected
viewsto policyofficials,
by them.This model also representsthe acknowledgmentthateach of the factors
withinthe model, both governmentaland "public,"affectone another.Thus, each
opinion source is connected to everyother source and to governmentofficialsby
arrows(i.e., communicationoperatesin both directions).To illustratethe
two-way
processesat work,considerthe following(not entirelyhypothetical)example:
The presidentgrantsmost favorednation statusto China. This
causes outragedcriesfrommembersof Congress,whose speeches
are replayedon the TV news.More such speeches fromCongress
are heard, as members receive calls and lettersfrom outraged
human rightsactivistsin theirdistricts.
At the same time,business
groups breathe a sigh of reliefand release favorablepublic statements.A poll is takenand the public is ambivalent(indeed, many
have not heard much about the issue). Responding to whatthey
have seen on the news, a few people writelettersto the White
House, alternatelypraisingthe president'scourage and chastising
his cowardice.Policyofficialsand the presidenttogetherdecide
that the basic policy may be sustained, but that some way of
standingup to China should be attempted,resultingin a ban on
the importof Chinese weapons.
Both the figureand the example above illustratethe same keypoints:
It is notjust polls,and notjust a vague "public
1. Public opinion is multifaceted.
mood."
2. The process of linkage involvesmultipleinfluences.No one public "voice"
operateswhollyindependentlyof any other.
3. The process is highlyiterative.Governmentboth affectsand is affectedby
voices over time.
manydifferent
The purpose of thisarticleis not to "prove"such a model. Rather,it is to focus
our attentionon a limitednumberof itspaths.This articlethusexamineslinkage
paths from "public" sources to governmentalactors (the heavier arrowsin Figure 1) and examines which "voices"are most frequently"heard" in the foreign
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PHILIPJ. POWLICK
Elites
431
Interest
*___
__
__
_
News
Elected
Media
Representatives
General
or Mass
Public
Foreign
Policy
Officials
FIG.
1. A HypotheticalModel of ForeignPolicyLinkage
policy process. As a prerequisiteof the question of influence,we need to know
which sources of public opinion are heard most oftenby foreignpolicyofficials.
Which typeor typesof opinion receivethe mostattentionhas implicationsforthe
natureof public influenceon foreignpolicy.If,as some scholarsnow attest,foreign
policy officialsare attentiveto public opinion, are theyrespondingto a narrow
segmentof opinion? Are theyrespondingto polls? Officialsrespondingto what
theyconsider public opinion mightnot be responding to what others-such as
social scientists,opinion analysts,and policycritics-consider to be "true"public
opinion.
Methodologyand Sample
The data in thisarticleare based upon a seriesof 70 interviewscarriedout bythe
author throughout1988 and continuingintoJanuary1989. (See Powlick,1990.)
Those interviewedincluded both National SecurityCouncil staffmembers and
StateDepartmentofficials,
withsubjectsat Staterangingin rankfromdesk officers
to assistantsecretaries.The mix of officialsrepresentsa broad cross-sectionof all
officialsat State and NSC. There is a much larger number of State than NSC
officialsin the sample (as is the case in reality),and there is a skewtowardthe
lowerranks.(More informationon the makeup of the sample maybe foundin the
Appendices.) This broad cross-sectionshould not, therefore,be thoughtto represent solelyforeignpolicydecision makers(althoughsome are included withinthe
sample), a termusuallyreservedforthe highestofficials.Rather,it representsthe
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The SourcesofPublic Opinion
432
broader foreignpolicybureaucracyof the State Departmentand NSC staff.This
skewtowardthe lowerranksalso allowsforgreatercomparabilityacross presidential administrations(as willbe discussedin more detail below).
Respondentswere asked to discusswhatrepresented-or operationalized-public opinion for them in the contextof theirforeignpolicyroles. Utilizingboth
open-ended personal interviewsand closed-endedquestionnaires,the data upon
whichthisarticleis based incorporateboth the methodologyof surveytechniques
(in orderto performstatistical
analysisand to presentconcretedata to the reader)
and the richnessand depth of open-ended interviews.(Furtherdetailson sample
and interviewmethodologymaybe found in Appendix 1.)
OperationalizingPublic Opinion Sources
When asked to explain how theydefinedpublic opinion in operationalterms,most
of the officialsinterviewedcited a shortlistof opinion sources (see Table 1). Up
to threeresponseswere coded for each interview.Most of the specificresponses
can be coded as fallingwithinone of the avenues of linkage examined above.
(These categoriesappear on the rightside of Table 1.) One categoryof responses,
labeled "Conceptual Non-Operationalization,"comprises responses that were
eitheroverlybroad and vague or strictly
conceptual. (Examples of such responses
were that public opinion was, for instance,'what the average American thinks,"
"articulateopinion,"or "informedopinion.") These responsesare treatedas missing data. For some officialsthese responseswere partof a processof "thinkingout
loud" before movingon to more specific,operational responses.A few officials,
however,never moved beyond such vague answers. Thus, a small number of
respondents(3 of 70) are excluded fromfurtheranalysis.
TABLE 1. Frequency of Mentions of Operational
Responses
Specific
Frequency %
Sources of Public Opinion
LinkagePath Categories Frequency
%
Congress
National elections
Elected officials (general)
29
5
1
43
7
1
Delegates
31
46
News media/news stories
32
48
News media
32
48
Public opinion polls
Letters & phone calls
Speaker feedback
18
11
5
27
16
7
Unmediated opinion
26
39
Interest groups
19
27
Interest groups
19
28
4
2
3
6
3
4
8
12
9
12
3
13
18
4
21
31
News editorials
Friends/acquaintances
Academics/experts
Elites (broadly stated)
Mass public (broadly stated)
"Expressed opinion"
Elites
Conceptual nonoperationalization*
n = 67
*Responsesin thiscategoryare consideredto be missingdata and are excluded fromfurtheranalyses.
Note: Specificresponsesare grouped accordingto theircorrespondencewiththe linkagepath categorieson the
rightside of the table. Each respondentwas coded forup to threeresponses.Percentagesrepresentthe percentage
of 67 officialswho mentioned at least one specificsource. Thus, total number of responses exceeds n and total
percentagesexceed 100%.
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PHILIP J. POWLICK
433
EliteOpinionSources
A smallnumberof officials(only8 of the remaining67, or 12%) cited operational
sources of public opinion comprisingelites.These included newspapereditorials,
discussionswithfriendsor family,
and the opinions of expertsin particularfields
or Foreign
of foreignpolicy (including articlesin journals such as ForeignAffairs
Policy).Several commentsare warrantedby these results.
First,it should be noted thatofficialsdistinguishedbetweeneditorialopinions
(classifiedhere as an elite source) and news media reports.For them,editorials
representeda directexpressionof knowledgeableopinion,whereasnewscoverage
conveyedthe mood of a broader public. It is notable that,whetherclassifiedas an
elite or media source, only 4 of 67 officials(6%) cited editorialsas representing
public opinion. Moreover,when otherrespondentswere asked if editorialswere a
source of public opinion, theyexplicitlydiscounted them,usuallydescribingeditorialsas solelythe viewsof editorsand publishers.As such, the large majorityof
officialsdid not considereditorialopinion to be veryimportant.
fromthose reIt should also be noted that these findingsdiffersignificantly
ported by Bernard Cohen (1973). Cohen stated,for instance,that "nearlyonethird"of officialscited familyand/or friendsas public opinion sources (Cohen,
1973:80), and that55 percentof his respondentscited academic expertsas among
their sources of public opinion (1973:88). He also attributeda great deal of
importanceto "notables-privatemen of public standingwithpriorexperience in
foreignaffairs"as public opinion sourceswithinthe State Department(1973:84).
It would appear as if there has been a change over time in the degree to which
foreignpolicyofficialsconsider elite opinion to be equivalentto public opinion.4
(This issue is explored furthernear the end of thisarticle.)
The findingson elite sources carrysome theoreticalimplicationsas well. It is
notable how few officialsin this studycited elite opinion in any formas representativeof public opinion, calling into question models of foreignpolicylinkage
that emphasize elites generally(such as Almond, 1960), or "intimates"and "specialists" (Cohen, 1973). Thomas Graham, for instance, feels that "perceptions
among the opinion and policy[elite] are extremelyimportantbecause mostof the
time governmentleaders mistakeattitudesheld by these politicallyactivepeople
. . . as public opinion" (1989:302). These data may also cast doubt upon linkage
models that depend on an "attentivepublic" (Almond, 1960; Devine, 1970).
Whereas poll data tell us an "attentive"public exists,this studyhas found little
evidence thatforeignpolicyofficialsare concerned about it, or thattheyare able
to assess,measure,or distinguishit fromotherformsof opinion.
Interest
Groups
As seen in Table 1, 19 of 67 (27%) foreignpolicyofficialscited interestgroups as
an operationalsource of public opinion. Manyof theseofficialsviewedotherforms
of opinion as too generalor too vague to providepolicyguidance. Indeed, on many
of the specificissues withwhich officialsdeal, it is difficultto assess mass public
policytowardthe civil
opinion at all. How, forexample,can an officialformulating
war in Zaire findpublic opinion data on his or her issue?Thus, officialswho work
in highlyspecialized or obscure areas oftensee public opinion as the opinions of
narrowsegmentsof the public,motivatedby unusual interest,and organizedinto
groups.
4 It should be recalled that Cohen's interviewswere conducted in 1965-1966, over 20 yearsbefore the present
study.
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434
The SourcesofPublic Opinion
Operationalizingpublic opinion in termsof interestgroups makes possible the
considerationof public attitudeson verynarrowissues.While the vastmajorityof
officials(92% of those in the sample) indicateda desire to keep informedabout
the viewsof interestgroups relevantto theirissue areas, for most,these groups
representednarrowinterestsratherthan the broaderinterestsand concernsof the
Americanbody-politic.Yet, on manyissues,interestgroups are the only "public"
officialssee, leading some to equate such groups with "public opinion." The
followingstatementby a State Departmentdesk officeris a good example of this
kind of operationalization:
The public opinion which is going to take a position on which variantof the
Maverickmissileshould go to Kuwait,or which enhancementof the F-15 should
be allowed for Saudi Arabia, is going to be highlyinformedand politicized,but
narrowlybased. It's going to be AIPAC or a fewfolksat McDonnell-Douglas.It's
not going to be the man in the street.
Twenty-nine
percentof the officialsin thisstudythusexpressedoperationalizations
of public opinion thatinclude interestgroups,oftenwhilesimultaneously
expressing misgivingsabout them.The followingAfricanAffairsofficialis one example:
Part of the problem is thatthereare a lot of individualpressuregroupsspeaking
forthe Americanpublic,manyof whom representonlythemselves;theirviewsare
not widelyshared by the American public, and you end up with one of these
agonizing questions . . . Do the silentsupportthe fivepercentwho are speaking
out? Does the silentmajoritysupportthe statusquo, or does the veryfactthatit
does not stand up for the statusquo in effectgive its supportto the fivepercent?
to measure
One has to takeinto accountpublic opinion,but it can be verydifficult
public opinion.
As a resultof such misgivings,
officialsoftenfeel as if theyhave to strikea balance
betweenthe viewsof interestgroups and the broader "publicinterest."
These resultsprovide some supportto the pluralistviewof opinion linkage in
the foreignpolicyprocess.Interestgroupsare listenedto, and are furtherconsidered to be (at least partially)representativeof public opinion by 29 percent of
those interviewed.However,the factthat other officialsexpressmisgivingsabout
the self-interested
natureof interestgroups' opinions leaves us withan ambiguous
resultregardingthe role of such groupsin the opinion/policylinkageprocess.
TheNewsMedia
For nearlya majorityof officials(32 of 67, or 48%) the news media were thought
to representpublic opinion. Public attitudeswere oftenthoughtto be reflectedin
the tone and intensityof news coverage. The media were also seen by some as
informedmembersof the public because reportersboth knowthe issues and have
an "outside"perspectiveon them.While manyofficialssaw mass opinion as being
eitherill-informed
or unable to voice a clear message on specificissues,to many,
the pressrepresentedboth an informedand articulatesegmentof public opinion.
The followingstatementfrom a desk officerfor a small Asian countryis an
example:
In some ways,unless you're talkingabout a verybig issue, thereis no such thing
as "public opinion." Public opinion for me is journalistsI know and respect,or
certainnewspapers.So public opinion in the mass doesn't mean thatmuch. It's
got to be brokendown into somethingthat'smuch more specific.
Many officialswho cited the news media as representingpublic opinion also
expressedskepticismabout public opinion polls. One officialstatedthatthe media
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PHILIP J. POWLICK
435
are "whatpublic opinion means to me. It's not an Iowa corn farmer'sresponse to
a poll. It's the WashingtonPost or other news media." Anotherofficialcited skepticism about polling methods as his reason for emphasizingmedia coverage as an
operationalizationof public opinion. "In manycases [public opinion is] whatI see
in the newspaperor what I see on TV. In general, I'm a littleskepticalof public
opinion surveysthat I don't read in depth and don't understandwhat kind of
sample has been taken."Thus, assessingthe "flavor"of media coveragehas become,
formany,a means of assessingpublic opinion.
reinforcethose foundpreviouslybyCohen (1973) on
These resultssubstantially
the importanceof the media as a source of opinion linkagein the policyprocess.
Though this findingis not new, it is not one that seems to have been widely
digested.Althoughthe literatureon how the media influenceboth the government
and the public throughtheiragenda-settingfunctionsis widelyknown (e.g., Cohen, 1963; Iyengarand Kinder,1987; however,see Geyelin,1990), rarelyare the
media considered to be a means of transmitting
public opinion to government.
Indeed, it is probablyfairto assume thatthe large majorityof theAmericanpublic
would insistthatthe newsmedia do notrepresenttheirviews.Yet,forthose within
the foreignpolicy bureaucracy,the media play a key role as a form of public
opinion. In large part this is because officialsrecognize theirisolation fromthe
Americanpublic.Their contactwiththoseoutsideof "The Building,"let alone their
contactwiththose outside the Beltway,is quite limited.They knowthatissues that
reactions
mayseem obviousor noncontroversial
to policyelitesoftenelicitdifferent
among the public at large.5Because theyconsiderit a politicalnecessityto be aware
of public attitudes(Powlick,1991), theysearch forwaysto gauge opinion outside
of theirnarrowcircle.The media providean avenue for this.
ElectedRepresentatives
A substantialnumber of those interviewed(31 of 67 officials,or 46%) defined
public opinion (at least in part) as the positions of elected officialsand the
outcomes of national elections.Officeholders' viewswere seen not solelyas their
own, but were thoughtto reflectpublic attitudesas well. This was thoughtto be
the case even when the viewsof constituentson specificissueswere not known.
A few officialsidentifiedthe presidentas among those fulfillingthis delegate
role, but a much largernumberof officialsspecificallycited Congressas a source
of public opinion. Unlike the broader public which elected them, members of
Congress can be contacted by policy officialsand theirviewssolicited.They are
also likelyto be aware of and knowledgeableabout many of the questions that
foreignpolicyofficialsraise.
I don't thinkas policymakerswe have to sit down and say,'Well how will public
opinion react to this."It's much more specific.WhatwillCongressthinkof this,or
this particularcongressman,or this particularnews organization.But as to what
Americanpublic opinion thinksas a whole? No, youjust can't . . .
Similarly,some officialsexpressed the need to operationalizepublic opinion via
the Congressdue to the relativeclarityof viewsarticulated.
Congressis also seen bymanyforeignpolicyofficialsas a more relevantformof
public opinion than mass attitudes-or at least mass attitudesas reportedin polls.
Rarely is mass opinion thought to have a direct impact upon the lower-and
officialswho make up the majorityof subjectsin thisstudy.Public
middle-ranking
5 Though not a foreignpolicyissue,consider,forexample, the initiallyelite and then public reactionsto the Zoe
Baird nominationforAttorneyGeneral.
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The SourcesofPublic Opinion
436
opinion becomes operationallyrelevantto themwhen it is manifestedin actions
withdirecteffect,such as the oversight,budgeting,and legislativeactivitiesof the
Congress. The operational constraintsimposed by Congress are often seen as
surrogatesforpublic opinion on issueswhere the public is likelyneitherto know
nor have opinions about policyalternatives.
As one officialstated,"Publicopinion
primarily
is the collectiveviewsofverbalinfluencein Americaat large,and it boils
down to-in additionto editorsand journalists-congressmenwho decide an issue
is importantto them."6
It may be suggestedthat officialshere are operationalizingpublic opinion via
the Congressprimarilybecause of the power Congresswields over them; that is,
because Congressboth controlstheirbudgetsand exercisesoversight,it becomes
the mostsalientformof "outside"-therefore"public" opinion availableto them.
This idea is onlypartiallyborne out in the data. For example,all respondentswere
asked how importantpublic opinion was as a factorin theirown policydecisions
or recommendations.As seen in Table 2, there is virtuallyno differencein responsesto thisquestion betweenthosewho consideredCongressto be a source of
public opinion and those who did not. In other words,for officialswho equate
public opinion withCongress,thisopinion isjust as importantor unimportantto
them as it is forofficialswho use other opinion sources. Moreover,the resultsof
a writtenquestionnaireitemillustratethatthevastmajorityof officials-boththose
who do and those who do not thinkthat Congress representspublic opinionthinkof Congressas importantforreasons beyondthe budgetand oversightroles.
A mere five(8%) subjectsagreed withthe followingstatement:
In the U.S. government,
it is oftennecessaryforforeignpolicyofficialsto be aware
of Congressionalopinions and desires because of the Congress' oversightand
budgetingroles. Beyondthis,however,foreignpolicyofficialsshould not be greatly
concerned withthe Congresson foreignpolicyissues.
It would be a mistake,however,to conclude thatthese resultsreflecta noninstrumental set of justificationsfor being aware of congressional opinion. On the
contrary,among those who thinkpublic opinion is an importantfactorand also
TABLE2. Importanceof Public Opinion as a Decision Factor,byUse of
Congressto OperationalizePublic Opinion
PublicOpinionvia Congress?
Does Official
Operationalize
Yes
Importance
ofPublicOpinion
Never/rarely
important
Slightly/occasionally
important
Somewhat/often
important
Very/nearly
alwaysimportant
Number
1
9
13
8
31
No
%
3.2
29.0
41.9
25.8
99.9
Number
2
10
14
8
34
%
5.9
29.4
41.2
23.5
100.0
Tau-b= .039; p = .704
Note: Percentagesare column percentages.Data are derived fromopen-ended interviewquestionswhich asked
the following:"How about public opinion in particular?Is public opinion importantto you in formulatingpolicy
decisions/recommendations?"
6 Cohen's discussionof the subject is more extensivethan thatpresentedhere, but his reporton the thinkingof
officialson the topic of Congress as public opinion is very much in liniewith what respon-denits
to this study
on Foreign
stated-pages 113-117 of ThePublic'sImipact
Pohcyis worthan examinationby the interestedreader.
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PHILIP J. POWLICK
437
is representedby the Congress (22 officials),thereis a consensuson the need for
supportivepublic opinion in order to sustainpolicy (see also Powlick,1991). The
idea that congressionalsupportis importantto sustainpolicyhas been shown to
be a major aspect of the post-Vietnam
conventionalwisdomamong foreignpolicy
elites (Holsti and Rosenau, 1984). When bothpublic and congressionalsupportare
seen as necessaryelements to successfulpolicy implementationby officialswho
consider congressionaland public opinion to be roughlyequivalent,thereis, no
doubt, a reinforcementof the need to consider Congress while making policy
recommendations.
The findingthat foreignpolicy officialsoften equate Congress with public
opinion is not new.MelvinSmall (1988) has writtenthatWhiteHouse staffers
often
interpretCongress'sopinions as surrogatesforpublic opinion,whileCohen (1973)
reportedthat71 percentof his State Departmentsubjectsequated Congresswith
public opinion. Most politicalscientists,though,draw a clear distinctionbetween
congressionaland public opinions, both in general and in the studyof foreign
policy making.James Rosenau (1961, 1980), for instance,in several conceptual
discussions,has categorizedCongressas partof the governmentalprocess,separate
from public opinion. Bruce Russett (1990) proposes a model of foreignpolicy
makingwhere the presidentis surroundedby a triangleof forces,withthe international sphere at one corner,the U.S. public at another,and Congressand the
Washingtonbureaucracysharingthe third.This distinctionis notwithoutempirical
merit,as Miller and Stokes's (1963) now-classicstudyof House voting patterns
demonstrated.In short,fewconceptualmodels of foreignpolicyequate public and
congressional opinion.
The view of officialswithinthe foreignpolicy bureaucracyis quite different,
however.Whereas the Congressis viewedas a governmentalactor thatcan have a
considerable (and concrete) impact upon policy,it is simultaneouslyviewed by
manyas a collectiveproxyfor the opinions of its constituents.Legislatorshave a
dual role to both oversee policyand maintainan awarenessof public opinion. In
effect,legislativebehavior manifestsmuch of the constraintthat public opinion
places upon foreignpolicy.When the public complainsabout foreignpolicy,it is
Congress that usuallygives both voice and effectto its dissatisfaction.
Thus, for
the conceptualdistinctionbetween
many(althoughnot all) foreignpolicyofficials,
public opinion and Congressis less importantthan the operationalequivalence of
the two.Indeed, fromwhere theysit,thismakes a greatdeal of sense.
General,orMass, PublicOpinion
This categoryincludes opinion sources thatare more or less directexpressionsof
public attitudesto policy makers,or direct responses by members of the mass
of 67 officials(39%) interviewedcited
public to public opinion polling.Twenty-six
at least one such avenue of opinion as importantto them.
Two unmediated sources of opinion are lettersand phone calls directlyto the
State Departmentor White House. A few officials(11 of 67, or 16%) saw such
directcontactof governmentas a valid and usefulsource of public opinion. The
followingexample comes froman NSC staffer:"I define public opinion as any
group ofAmericanswho feelstrongly
enough about an issue to voice theiropinion,
either by sending their letters to the White House or Congress....
Public opinion
is expressedrarely,so when it is expressed,we like to take account of it."
Anotherdirectavenue of opinion (cited by 5 of 67, or 7% of those interviewed)
is contactofficialshavewithcitizensaround the United States,whetheron speaking
tours or during personal travel.The following(froma State Departmentoffice
director)emphasizesthe importanceof opinion gatheredduringspeakingtours.
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The SourcesofPublic Opinion
438
The best way to get [public opinion] is to get out of thistownand to get on an
airplane and get out to Iowa or some place like thatand do some public speaking,
and say,"Look, I can spend an hour tellingyou what'son mymind,but whatare
you folksthinkingabout?"I've done thata fewtimes-tremendouslyvaluable!
This categoryalso includesdemonstrationsas a directformof opinion expression.
While a small numberof Cohen's (1973) subjects(6 of his 50) mentioneddemonstrationsas a formof public opinion,none of the officialsin thisstudycited them,
no doubt owingto the substantialdrop-offin such activitiessince the early1970s.
In discussingpublic opinion polls during interviews,
more officialsspecifically
indicated theydid not thinkpolls were valid or usefulavenues of public opinion
than thought theywere useful for any purpose. A Soviet affairsspecialist,for
example, expressed his opinion that polls are not worthyof more than casual
attention.
They're importantand you followthem,but it'sjust sort of a watchingbrieffor
changes; what issues are important.It's somethingthatyou watchfortrendsin a
fairlyrelaxed way,but theydon't have any operationalcurrencyforus.
Anotherofficialstated,
I don't recalldealing on an issue,sittingaround a tableand saying,'Whoops,we've
got a Gallup poll here that'srunningagainstus eightto one; let'snot do this."It's
more intuiitive.
It's importantbut I've never seen it swing an issue one way or
another.It's a factor,and I see those polls, and franklyI pay some attentionto it,
but I figurethat when we're hearing fromthe Hill, we're hearing the popular
mood.
Even some of those who indicated thatpolls were usefulto them oftenqualified
theirstatements,such as the followingfroma deputyassistantsecretary:
Polls are sometimesrelevant,sometimesnot relevant,simplybecause they'renot
timelyor the questions asked are oftensloppyor don't address the actual policy
And theytend to take attentionawayfromthe
issues facingthe administration.
difficultchoices and tend to be black and white kind of questions.They're not
real-worldkind of greyquestions.But by and large,polls do have an impact.They
have a verynoticeable impact.
In spite of frequentlyexpressed reservationsabout polls, and even though a
about one-quarter
majorityeitherdid not mentionthemor discountedtheirutility,
of those interviewed(18 officials)cited them as a source of public opinion. The
majorityof those citationswere made in conjunctionwithotherformsof opinion;
sometimesotherformsof mass opinion, sometimesnot. (For instance,the official
quoted directlyabove also cited Congressand the newsmedia as sources of public
opinion.)
These resultsmayprovokeskepticismfromtwo opposite directions.For some,
the pervasivenessof polls, both in the modern media and withinpoliticalorganiRonald
zations,would seem to make theirimportanceobvious.FormerNSC staffer
Hinckleyhas writtenthat"publicopinion polls have become a vitalelementin the
creationof foreignpolicyand the analysisof how foreignpolicyis influencedby
public opinion must examine the roles these polls play in the decision-making
process" (Hinckley,1988:23; see also Hinckley,1992). Manyhistoricalstudieshave
attributedan equally large role to public opinion polls in the policyprocess (see,
e.g., Small, 1988; Graham, 1989; Altschuler,1990). Thus, some may see these
resultsas an understatementof the degree to whichpoll data are used by foreign
policyofficials.
The notion thateven one-quarterof foreignpolicyofficialsvalue poll data may,
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PHILIP J. POWLICK
439
to others.Both social scientistsand policyofficials
however,seem an overestimation
consenwho adhere to whatOle Holsti (1992) has called the "Almond-Lippmann
sus" would challenge such results.So, too, would those who assume thatforeign
policyofficialsbehave accordingto the realistparadigm (see, e.g., Oneal and Lian,
1992). LawrenceJacobs and Robert Shapiro's (1992a) research on the Kennedy
administrationshowed heavyreliance upon poll data in domesticpolicymaking,
but conscious contradictionof poll resultson foreignpolicyissuessuch as aid and
trade. Cohen (1973) reported virtuallyuniversaldisdain for polls in the State
Department during the 1960s. More recently,at a 1990 conference on public
opinion and American policy towardNicaragua, several Reagan administration
officials(including formerAssistantSecretaryof State ElliottAbrams) indicated
thattheyconsideredpoll resultsto be guides to neitherpublic opinion nor correct
policy,but rhetoricaltools, available to both administrationofficialsand their
opponents,to be used in justifyingpolicypositions(see Sobel, 1993).7
What the data here indicateis thatneitherthosewho thinkpolls are irrelevant,
nor thosewho thinktheyare critical,are whollycorrect.Issue salience is one factor
useless forsome officialsand indispensablefor
thatcan cause polls to be virtually
others (see below). Another factor may be the level of support or opposition
manifestin poll data. Thomas Graham (1989) proposes that public support or
oppositionto policyunder the levelof 50 percentin polls has no effecton decision
makers,whereas public opposition to policy in the 60-69 percentrange strongly
influencespolicymakers,and oppositionover 70 percentcauses actual changes in
policy.If Graham is correct,we mightexpect foreignpolicyofficials'viewson poll
data to be associatedwithissueson whichopinions approach these criticalthresholds. Whateverthe explanation,theresultsreportedhere providea less-than-definitive answerregardingthe importanceof opinion polls withinthe foreignpolicy
process.Some officialsshowconfidencein polls, othersare openlydisdainful,and
manyare simplyambivalent.
Caveat: PoliticalAppointees
All of the resultsreportedabove maybe challengedin thattheyrepresenttheviews
of career bureaucratsand political appointees at the end of the Reagan administration,and should no longer be assumed to be valid. Two points are in order
here. One is that career bureaucratsremain withinthe systemwhen the White
House changes hands. Thus, the resultsreportedhere, which representthe permanentforeignpolicyapparatus,remainapplicable. Second, the appointeesin this
study,although interviewedin Ronald Reagan's last year,for the most part remained in the same or comparable positionswiththe successionof George Bush
into office.However,mostof these officialshave not carriedover into the present
and we should not assume thatClintonappointeesshare the same
administration,
attitudesor outlook towardpublic opinion as did theirpredecessors (although I
suspecttheyare more similarthan mightbe expected). Thus, it becomes prudent
to separate appointees fromcareeristsin thissample to determinethe degree to
whichthe resultsreportedabove remainapplicable. Table 3 reportsthe frequency
ofuse foreach operationalopinion category,subdividedbythe careeror appointee
statusof the respondents.On four categoriesof opinion-interest groups,news
significantdiffermedia, elites,and mass opinion-the data reveal no statistically
7 Such is not to say that these officialswere whollyunconstrainedby public opinion. Rather,theyindicatedthat
Congresswas theirprincipalconcern. It is thusconceivablethatpoll data, in influencingmembersof Congress,may
officials;such is the complex and iterativenatureof linkage (see
have had an indirecteffecton Reagan administration
Sobel, 1993:106-107,269-278).
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The SourcesofPublic Opinion
440
TABLE 3. Use of Operational Sources of Public Opinion: Total and Divided by
Career Officialsand PoliticalAppointees*
Elected representatives
News media
Unmediated opinion
Interestgroups
Elites
All
(n=65)
%
30
31
24
18
7
46
48
37
28
11
Career
Official
(n=53)
29
27
20
16
5
Political
Appointees
%
(n=12)*
%
53
49
36
29
9
2
5
6
3
3
17
42
50
25
25
Significance
ofDifference
(t-test)
.012
.656
.419
.781
.264
n = 65
*Politicalappointees include the following:All thoseon staffsupportforthe President(in thiscase the NSC) and
the Secretaryof State (in thiscase the PolicyPlanningStaff);all assistantsecretaries;deputyassistantsecretaries(or
those of equivalentrank) on the SES (executiveservice) schedule, as opposed to those on the FE-MC schedule (the
ForeignService'sexecutiveservicerank). Thus, FSO's who hold deputyassistantsecretarypositionsare consideredto
be career officials,not appointees.
ence between appointees and careerists.We are left,however,with a strongly
negativeassociationbetweenappointee statusand use of elected officialsto representpublic opinion. That thisrelationshipemergesshould not be surprising,
given
that the appointees in question were in officein the last days of the Reagan
This categoryof opinion sources is based primarilyon responses
administration.
identifying
Congressas the operational equivalentof public opinion. Aftereight
years of battle between Congress and a popular president,if we found many
appointees who thoughtCongressreflectedpublic opinion,we would be properly
surprised.Careerists (made up predominantlyof Foreign Service Officers,or
FSOs), on the otherhand, do not appear to have sharedthe same negativefeelings
theirappointee colleagues displayedtowardCongress. By separatingappointees
foreignpolicybureaucfromcareer officials,
we now see thatthe semi-permanent
racyis most likelyto define public opinion operationallyas the viewsof elected
representatives.
Although we can say little about how public opinion is operationalized by
we mayreasonablyexpect that
politicalappointees in the Clintonadministration,
the resultsreportedabove continue to be applicable to the career foreignpolicy
bureaucracy.
Other Patternsin Use of Operational Opinion Sources
of respondentsto
Furtheranalysishas been performedusing the characteristics
determineif there are additional patternsof use or nonuse of differentopinion
sources.Respondents'age and degree of governmentexperiencewere examined,
on the hypothesisthatchanges in the use of specificopinion sources (compared
to Cohen, 1973) are the resultof echelon change; thatnewerand youngerofficials
withdifferentattitudestowardpolls and policy elites may have entered the burelationshipwas found betweeneither
reaucracy.In fact,no statistically
significant
age or experience and any of the categoriesof opinion used in this study.One
mightalso expecta relationshipbetweena respondent'srankand theuse of certain
typesof opinion. (This expectationis easilyderivedfromthe differencesalready
seen between careeristsand appointees.) In fact,no relationshipwas found betweenrank and any of the opinion categories.
Findingson appointees (above) mightlead us to expect a relationshipbetween
typeof opinion used and the partisanshipor ideologyof respondents,withRepub-
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PHILIP J. POWLICK
441
licans and conservatives
less likelyto use Congressand the newsmedia to represent
public opinion. Contraryto this expectation,there is no relationshipbetween
ideologyand use of any operationaldefinitionof public opinion. Consistentwith
expectations,however,self-identified
Republicans showed a strongdisinclination
to look towardthe news media to representpublic opinion (Tau-b = -.268, p =
.012). It is unclear frominterviews
whetherthisattituderesultsmore fromperceptionsof "liberalbias" in the media, or fromresentmentover the supposedlyunfair
treatmentthe media accorded Reagan administration
foreignpolicies.Also consistentwithexpectations,thereis also a tendencyamong Republicansin the interview
group not to identifyCongress with public opinion (Tau-b = -.174, p = .102),
although thisassociationfallsslightlyshortof statisticalsignificance.
It mayalso be suggestedthatworkin certainpolicyareas mightlead officialsto
look towarddifferentsources of public opinion. We might,for example, expect
officialswho workin highlysalientissue areas to followthe "lawof the hammer"
and use poll data,letters,and phone calls (obviouslymore common on high-profile
issues) to representpublic opinion. Indeed, we findconfirmationof thishypothesis. Issue salience was unrelatedto fourof the opinion categories,butwas positively
associated withthe use of unmediatedformsof opinion generally(Tau-b = .217,
p = .067), and opinion polls in particular(Tau-b = .217, p = .061). (For derivation
of the salience variable see Powlick,1991.) When officialsworkin highlysalient
issue areas, the public's opinions are thrustupon them,makingit oftenunnecessaryto relyupon mediatedor "surrogate"formsof opinion such as interestgroups
or the Congress.
There is also a clear relationshipbetween officialsin the State Department's
geographic bureaus-the traditionalcenters of power among State's many bureaus-and the use of the news media to representpublic opinion (Tau-c = .261,
p = .031). No obvious explanationfor thispatterncomes to mind, althoughit is
plausible thatclose relationshipshave developed betweenofficialsin thesebureaus
and journalistswho seek out contactsthere preciselybecause these officialsare
perceivedto be more influentialthan others.
Finally,we find one very strong,issue-basedvariable among officialsin this
sample. Officialswho work primarilyon internationaleconomic issues show a
definite tendency to look toward interestgroups to representpublic opinion
(Tau-c = .257, p = .000), as well as a tendencynotto mentionthe news media as
representingpublic opinion (Tau-c = -.171, p = .015). That such officialslook
towardinterestgroups is not surprising.The issueswithwhichtheydeal are often
technical and not of high salience. Thus, the views presented (particularly)by
business interestgroups representknowledgeableopinion forsuch officials,
while
media reportson their issues often either simplifycomplex economic issues or
virtuallyignore them. Whereas the resultsreported here indicate that officials
workingon foreigneconomic policyare attentiveto interestgroups'opinions,thus
supportingthe pluralistmodel of policymaking,the findingsof Bauer et al. (1972)
require thatwe be cautious in assessingthe degree of influencethatsuch opinion
has, at least in thisone area of policy.
Have the Sources of Public Opinion Changed?
The picturethathas emerged fromthisstudyis one whereforeignpolicylinkage
most promiis achieved throughmultiplesources of public opinion information,
nent of which are the Congress and the news media. Lesser roles are played by
interestgroups and unmediated formsof public opinion, witha minor part reservedfortheviewsof elites.Some of theseresultsare roughlyconsistentwithprior
research in thisarea, while others (most notablyon the role of elites) are quite
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The SourcesofPublic Opinion
442
It would thusseem appropriateto devotesome effortto comparingand
different.
theseresultswiththoseof themostcomparablepreviousstudy,Bernard
contrasting
Cohen's 1965-1966 interviews as reported in The Public's Impact on ForeignPolicy
(1973).
Table 4 presentsa summaryof the relatedfindingsin thisand Cohen's study.It
is not a simple matterto compare these results.First,the sample populations of
the twostudies,set more than 20 yearsapart,show some significantdifferences.
and respondentranksforthetwostudiesmaybe found
(Specificagencyaffiliations
in Appendix 2.) Cohen's interviewstook place in the State Departmentand the
AgencyforInternationalDevelopment(AID), whereasthisstudyhas excluded AID
but has included theNSC staff.
Cohen's
Althoughitdoes not include theNSC staff,
sample does include a higher proportionof top-levelofficialsat State than the
TABLE 4. Summaryof Findingson Public Opinion Sources, PresentStudyand
Bernard Cohen's ThePublic'sImpacton Foreign
Policy(1973)
Percent
ofOfficials
Citing
Source,Present
Study
News media, all types
48%
Elected representatives
All typescombined
Congress
46%
43%
Unmediated sources
All typescombined
Polls
39%
27%
Letters
Public speaking
16%
7%
Interestgroups
All typescombined
"Rightwing"
27%
-
Economic
-
Ethnic
-
Elites
All typescombined
Friends+/or family
12%
3%
Experts/academics
4%
"Notables"
-
Description
ofFindingfromCohen
(1973)
80% "discussed. .. contactswith
and exposure to... at some
length"
saw.. . as having
70% "explicitly
public opinion role"
"Only"20% "made any mention
of"; "onlyone official. .. paid
serious attention"
66% "tooksome cognizance"
40% "explicitlymentioned.. . as
opinion samplingdevice"
"Almost20% ... had contact...
or... were aware
50% "mentionedhavingcontact
witheconomic interests"
"1/3 mentioned. .. as important
pointsof contactwiththe outside
public"
"Nearlyone third. . . cited . . . as
public opinion sources"
"Half. . . mentioned. . . as being
... in some formof contact"
'Verygreatimportance"
statedthatmentionedsource
Note: Percentagesforpresentstudyare based upon numberof officialswho explicitly
representedpublic opinion on foreignpolicyissues. (See prior sectionsand Appendix 2 for furtherinformation.)
ResultsforCohen are derivedfromChapter3 of ThePublic'sImpactonForeign
Policy.Descriptionsand percentagesare
as presentedin thatchapter."Notables"are definedbyCohen as "privatemen of public standingwithpriorexperience
in foreignaffairs,"
citing,forexample, Dean Acheson, George Kennan, and ChristianHerter (1973:84).
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PHILIP J. POWLICK
443
present one (Appendix 2). It is also notable that Cohen included no officialsof
Affairsbureau, whileincludinga large numberof those in the
the Inter-American
European Affairsbureau (20% of the totalsample). Finally,changes in the State
in the samples.Cohen was
Departmentitselfnecessarilyhave produced differences
of the State Departmentin
attemptingto create a sample thatwas representative
1965, but if his sample were replicatedtoday,it would exclude a large number of
Affairs
policy-areabureaus created since the mid-1960s(such as Politico-Military
and Human Rights and HumanitarianAffairs,itselfrecentlyrestructuredand
renamed). Thus, we must be careful in comparing these studies. I have thus
assumed that my resultsdemonstratechange only when the magnitude of any
differencebetweenthisand Cohen's studyis quite large.
and thusapparentchange over time,is in the
One apparentarea of difference,
role of elites as representatives
of public opinion. Recall that Cohen stated that
"nearlyone-third"of officialscited familyand/or friendsas public opinion sources
and that55 percentcited academic experts.Cohen also attributeda greatdeal of
importanceto "notables"as public opinion sources. This contrastsstronglywith
thisstudy'sfindingthatonly12 percentof officialscited anysource of eliteopinion
as representingthe public. To what should such differencesbe attributed?Some
may be due to sample variance,but I would contend thatthese differencesare of
a magnitude that cannot be explained solely to sampling variance. Two other
possible explanationswill thus be explored: coding and change over time.
Coding
Cohen seemed to assume that outside sources of informationwere necessarily
equivalent to operationalized public opinion. For example, policy expertswere
equated with public opinion because they "were among the people outside of
governmentwithwhom [officials]were in some formof contact" (1973:88). In
interviewsfor thisstudy,officialswere asked to identifyexternalgroups or forms
of opinion thattheystriveto be awareof. This broad, open-endedquestionyielded
a varietyof responses.One of the mostcommonwas "academics,"or "area experts"
(mentionedby 31% of respondents).However,when asked to listtheirsources of
public opinion elsewhere in the interview,only three officialsstated that such
expertsrepresentedpublic opinion. Thus, the major role thatCohen attributedto
elite opinion as an operationalformof public opinion maybe an artifactof how
he coded his respondents'general commentsabout externalopinion.
The problem of coding differencesis, in many ways,a pervasiveone when
comparingthese twostudies.As Table 4 shows,there are severalinstanceswhere
Cohen's reportis of "contactwith"or "exposureto" an outsidesource,or of officials
"takingcognizance" of specificsources,whileforsome categoriesof opinion he is
of public
quite explicitin statingthata formof opinion was seen as representative
attitudes.Thus, once again we must take care in comparingspecificpercentages
of sources.
ChangeOverTime?
Can all of the variancebetween these two studies'findingson the operationalization of public opinion be due to sample variance and coding? Might there also
have been a change over timein the wayofficialsviewpublic opinion?
Both studiesrank the newsmedia as the most common formof public opinion
operationalization(Table 4). Differencesin magnitude (48% versus80% for CoThe importantand
hen) are probablyattributableto significant
coding differences.
consistentresult,however,is thatthe news media rank at or near the top of both
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444
The SourcesofPublic Opinion
listsof opinion sources.In the elected representatives
categorycodingsseem to be
closer. Does the differencein findings(46% versus 70% for Cohen) therefore
representchange? The safe assumptionhere is to say no, again relyingupon the
rankingof these sources (a close-secondin both studies). Moreover,samplingand
political differencesmay also be factorshere. Recall that a subset of this study's
sample comprisedReagan appointees (interviewedduringDemocraticcontrolof
both houses of Congress) who did not see Congress as representativeof public
opinion.When theseappointeesare removed,53 percentof theremainingsubjects
cite elected representatives
as public opinion sources. Cohen's sample includes a
higherproportionof top-levelofficials,
presumablyJohnson
and Kennedyappointees, servingduringDemocratic controlof Congress.When we thus consider the
differentproportionsof appointees in the two samples and the probabilitythat
Cohen's appointeeswere more sanguine about Congress'srepresentative
role, the
gap between findingsseems less clear. Again, the safe assumptionis that a significantdegree of consistencyexistsbetweenthe twostudies.
Whatof the apparentdifferencesin the use of unmediatedsources of opinion?
Withregardto the rankingof the general category,it seems safe to say that,then
as now,unmediatedsources are used less commonlythan eitherCongressor the
news media. Within the general category,however,some wide gaps seem to
emerge. Two are probablyartifactual,however.On letters,Cohen's reportis too
vague to be of much use in comparison;that66 percent "tooksome cognizance"
ofletterstellsus littleabout how manyof themthoughtlettersactuallyrepresented
public opinion. Public speaking does not offerthe same coding problems, as
Cohen's reportis that 40 percent of his sample "explicitlymentioned"thisas an
opinion source. Here, samplingis the likelyexplanation.Again, Cohen's sample
includes a higher proportionof top-rankingState Departmentofficials(see Appendix 2). Cohen reportsthatthe 20 officialswho made such explicituse of this
source came "disproportionately
from the higher levels of the Department"
(1973:121). It is thusreasonable to assume thatsome of the differencehere is due
to the overall proportionsof top-rankingState Departmentofficialsin the two
samples.
Althoughthisstudyreportslimiteduse of public opinion polls by officials,this
neverthelesssuggestsa differencefromCohen's findings.His reportthatonlyone
of 50 officials"paid seriousattention"to polls contrastswiththisstudy'sreportthat
27 percentexplicitlyindicatethatpolls representpublic opinion to them.That this
apparent change should occur is not surprising,given the increasinguse of polls
by political leaders and social scientists-it is importantto note that a large
proportion of foreign policy officialshave postgraduatetrainingin the social
sciences-and the reportingof polls by the news media. As reportedabove, this
apparentchange is not the resultof cohort effects;youngerofficialsare no more
likelyto make use of polls thanolder ones. The mostreasonableexplanationwould
seem to be that salient foreignpolicyissues are more likelyto be the subject of
opinion polls now than theywere 20 yearsago (when polls were both more rare
and more expensiveto conduct), and thatmanyofficialsworkingon high-profile
issues (as discussed above) merelyfollowthe "lawof the hammer"and rnakeuse
of such informationwhen it is available.
It is safeto assume a roughequivalenceof findingson the use of interestgroups.
Again, the relativerankingof this source in the two studies is consistent(below
Congress, the media, and unmediated sources). Substantialcoding differences
make furthercomparison difficult.Cohen's reportsdo not include the kind of
explicitlanguage thatwould indicate comparable coding. Moreover,the present
studydoes not differentiate
clearlyamong typesof groups,combiningthem into
a general category,whereasCohen reportsspecificgroups' typeswithoutcombin-
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PHILIP J. POWLICK
445
ing them into a general type.It can, however,be pointed out that mentionsof
"right-wing
groups"of the typereportedbyCohen (such as the Committeeof One
Million) were whollyabsent frominterviewsfor this study,suggestingthe virtual
disappearance of one sub-avenueof opinion transmission.
The most strikingdifferencebetween the two studies-and the one we now
returnto-is in regardto theuse ofelites.Whilesome of the differences(described
above) can be attributedto coding, Cohen's reportthat "nearlyone-thirdof the
respondentsspontaneouslyand voluntarily
cited familyand/or friendsin and out
of the Departmentas public opinion sources"(1973:80) appears to offerno coding
problem.If officialsin the 1960s did look to familyand friendsas sourcesof public
opinion, then the presentstudyindicatesa change in how officialsassess public
opinion, relyingless now upon those withwhom theyhave routinepersonal and
professionalcontact than theydid in the past. (Only 3% in thisstudycited such
sources.) Moreover,Cohen's report (withoutgivingfrequencies) that "notables"
such as Dean Acheson and George Kennan were of "verygreat importance"to
State Departmentofficialsas sources of public opinion findsno verificationat all
in the presentstudy.Not one of the officialsinterviewedindicated thatany contemporaryequivalentsto Cohen's "notables"-such as a HenryKissinger,Lawrence
Eagleburger,or RobertMcNamara-had anylinkwithpublic opinion. Thus, while
there are some coding and frequencyproblems in comparing the two studies
regarding the role of elites in opinion linkage, the overall magnitude of the
differencessuggeststhe probabilityof a change in the manner in which foreign
policyofficialsinterpretpublic opinion.
What may have caused thisshiftin the role of elites?One explanationfor this
change is technologicaladvance in thenewsmedia. The increasinguse of television
as a primarynews source among membersof the public, along withthe development of satellitetechnology,has meant thatissues can reach salience much more
quicklythan was previouslythe case.8 The public thusnow respondsto issues that
in the past mighthave been too remote fromtheirlives or perceptionsto elicit
interest.This is likelyto create a heightenedimperativefor officialsto followthe
news media and poll data, given the importance of television's"framing"and
"priming"effects(Iyengarand Kinder,1987).
However,the explanationforchange thatseemsto resonatemostamong officials
themselvesis the experience of Vietnam.A recurringtheme when discussingthe
role of public opinion with foreign policy officials-particularlythose senior
enough to have had Vietnam-eraexperience-is the impactVietnamhas had upon
the way in which public opinion is viewedwithinthe foreignpolicybureaucracy.
At one level, this change is manifestedin the developmentof a virtuallyinstitutionalnorm thatsuccessfulimplementationof foreignpolicyis impossiblewithout
domesticsupportfor-or perhapsacquiescence in-foreign policy (see Holstiand
Rosenau, 1984; Powlick,1991). Of more relevanceto thisarticle,however,is a set
of common (though not universal) attitudesthat downplaythe role of elites in
opinion linkage.As has been amplyshownbyJohnMueller (1973), elites showed
a higher tendencyto followand support governmentpolicy during the critical
Officialsof the
stages of Vietnam decision making than did the public-at-large.
period,searchingforpublic opinion among elitesin the mannerCohen described,
would be likelyto findwidespreadsupportforVietnampolicy,onlyto learn later
thatthe greaterdegree of ambivalenceor oppositionelsewherein the publicwould
8 Interviewsby the author during the summerof 1994 for a similarstudyyielded severalcommentsattributing
technologicalimmediacyforU.S. actionsin Somalia and Rwanda. Severalofficialsstatedthatwithoutpicturesof the
suffering
in thesetwocountries,therewould have existedlittleor no issuesalience,and thuslittleor no publicpressure
to act.
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446
The SourcesofPublic Opinion
make the policyunsustainable.Thus, use of elites as a source of "public"opinion
decreased as some officialsdeterminedthat,in theVietnamcase, elite opinion was
withpublic opinion.
not synonymous
A relatedchange among officialshas been a perceivedneed to look beyondthe
realm of elite opinion for feedback on policy due to the perception (by some)
that,on Vietnam,the elites' earlyconfidencewas wrong,while wider public ambivalence was more prudent (see Powlick,1991). Senior officialsare oftenvery
reflectiveon this point, having lived throughthe change. One deputyassistant
secretarystatedsimplythat"nobodythesedayscan carryon a sort-ofelitistforeign
policy;thatera has ended, ifit everreallyexisted.You just can't do that."Another
officialof comparable seniorityexpressedsimilarideas at greaterlength:
There are still a few people around who, like Kennan, thinkof foreignpolicy
making as a group of wise men doing what is rightand then fightingoff the
ignorantyokelswestof Washington,but I reallydon't knowmanyof these people
and none of them are in positionsof authority.
The people who make policynow
are the people who have learned.... I thinkprobablythe Sixtieswere criticalthatifyou don't startwithpublic opinion,you'regoing to end up by losing.
Finally,an NSC staffer
operationalizedsuch thinkingbycitingthe famous"mother
test":
A guy in our officeuses the phrase, "Can I explain it to mymother?,"which is a
surrogatefor"Is thisthe kind of policywhichyou can standup and defendto the
ordinaryAmerican?" . . . I thinkthatit'sa beliefthatifI couldn'texplain the policy
to a group of competent,non-specialistAmericancitizens,then maybethe policy
is all screwedup.
All of thisis not to say thatthe elite dialogue has become irrelevant;as indicated
earlierin thisarticle,manyofficials(31%) do followelite opinions in the formof
academic area experts.What has apparentlychanged is the perception that the
viewsof such elitesmaybe consideredan aspect of public opinion. Since Vietnam,
officialsfeel an increasedneed to findpublic supportfor theirpolicies,but such
or
supportis not likelyto be perceivedas the viewsof the "notables,""specialists,"
"intimates"to whom Cohen attributeda major public opinion role in the 1960s.
Summaryand Conclusion
This articlehas hypothesizedfiveavenues of linkagebetweenpublic opinion and
Americanforeignpolicy.Based on interviewswithofficials,strongestsupportwas
found forlinkage based on the news media and the Congress.Some supportwas
found fora directlinkage path (whereofficialsused letters,phone calls, and poll
data to discernpublic opinion), thoughthe strengthof thislinkvariedsignificantly
withissue salience. Some supportwas also found for a linkage path based upon
interestgroups,especiallyforofficialsworkingon economic issues.The weakestof
the fivepaths was one based upon elites. In addition, political appointees were
examined and compared to careerofficials.While differences
werefoundbetween
these two groups,when career officialswere examined as a separate group, the
resultantpatternsreinforcedoverall findings.Careeristswere much more likely
than appointees to look to Congress to representpublic opinion. Thus, whereas
presidentialadministrations(and theirappointees) maycome and go, the importance of Congress,and the virtualirrelevanceof elites,in linkingpublic opinion
to foreignpolicyofficialsremainsconstant.The officialsinterviewedshowed significantdivergence on the question of public opinion polls. Although many
officialswere found who echoed the findingsof previous studies (e.g., Cohen,
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PHILIP J. POWLICK
447
1973) by sayingthattheyneitherused nor trustedpoll data, about one-quarterof
those intervieweddid indicate that theyused public opinion polls as sources of
informationabout public opinion.
and changes were seen in the sources of public opinion
Finally,both continuity
used byofficialswhen compared to the mostimportantpriorresearchin thisarea,
Bernard Cohen's ThePublic'sImpactonForeignPolicy(1973). The news media and
Congresscontinueto top the listof public opinion sources,whilethe role of elites
Though the use of unmediatedsources as a
has apparentlydeclined significantly.
more frequent,public opinion
group does not appear to have become significantly
polls, seeminglyirrelevantto Cohen's subjects,are now seen as an important
opinion source by about one-quarterof those interviewedforthisstudy.
To officialsin the foreignpolicyprocess,public opinion speakswithmanyvoices,
some of which are not typicallythought of as "public opinion" (such as the
Congress), and certainvoices are more likelyto be heard by actors in different
positionswithinthe policyprocess-Congress speaks loudlyto careerists,but not
necessarilyto appointees;interestgroupsare heard on economic issues,but much
less so in otherareas of policy.Thus, public opinion as a factorin the foreignpolicy
process should not be viewedas a unidimensionalvariable,eitherin termsof how
it is viewedbyforeignpolicyofficials,or in termsof how it affects(or perhapsfails
to affect) policy outcomes. The influence of differentforms of opinion must
whetherrelevantpolicyactorsactually
thereforebe seen as dependent upon first,
use a particularsource to representpublic opinion, which is in turn dependent
upon the typeof issue involved,the backgroundsand predispositionsof the actors,
and the positionsrepresentedbyother (perhaps countervailing)formsof opinion.
The wide range of operational definitionsthatforeignpolicyofficialsassign to
public opinion suggeststhe possibilitythattheyare, in fact,much more attentive
to public opinion-as theyoperationallydefine it-than was previouslythought.
Indeed, ifwe definepublic opinion as the mass public only,then officialsdo seem
ratherinattentiveand unresponsiveto public opinion. If, however,we adopt the
operational definitionsused by foreignpolicybureaucrats,the process begins to
look more permeable to public input and influence.Whetheror not we accept
such formsof linkageas normatively
desirable,theiradoption in the policyprocess
allows foreignpolicyofficialsto feel as if theyhave considered public opinion in
manymore cases thanwould otherwisebe possibleundera more narrowdefinition
definedoperationalizationsalso
of public opinion. However,the use of individually
allowsforeignpolicyofficialsto justifytheirpolicydecisionsas havingbeen made
aftertakingpublic opinion into account,whetheror not such decisionsnecessarily
reflectthe opinions of the mass public.
Appendix 1. Samplingand InterviewMethodology
The data and findingspresented in this article are derived froma larger study
(Powlick, 1990) examining the linkages between public opinion and American
foreignpolicy.Field researchwas conductedfromDecember 1987 toJanuary1989,
inclusive.General interviews(in person) were conducted with 76 foreignpolicy
officials,all in officeat the time of the interview.Of this group, six officials
(opinion poll and editorial analysts)are excluded from the data and findings
because of their atypicalfocus on specificsources of public opinion and their
process. Interviewsof the remaining70 indiseparationfromthe policy-making
vidualsmake up the primarysource of data.
Of the 70 interviewsubjects,64 held StateDepartmentpositionsin Washington;
the remainingsix were National SecurityCouncil staffmembers in policy (as
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448
'TheSourcesofPublic Opinion
opposed to support) positions.(For a breakdownof agencyand bureau affiliation
see Appendix 2.)
Interviewsubjectswere not chosen at random. State Departmentofficialswere
selectedbased upon criteriadesigned to ensurerepresentationfornearlyall of the
policy-making
bureaus of the State Department,a wide diversity
of functionaland
policyresponsibilities,and the full range of ranks fromdesk officerto assistant
secretaries.(See Appendix 2 for a rank breakdownof officials.)The six NSC
respondentswere chosen based primarilyupon issue area; that is, each NSC
respondentresided in a differentgeographic or issue-orientedoffice.This was
done to ensure a diversity
of issue and officeperspectives.
Interviewsaveragedabout one hour,rangingfrom30 to 150 minutes.Interviews
were conducted-on background-in the respondent'soffice.All subjectswere
asked if theywere willingto have the interviewtape-recorded.When tapingwas
declined, interviewswere recorded by contemporaneousnote-takingand by furtherreconstructionof responsesimmediatelyaftereach session.Nearlytwo-thirds
of those interviewedagreed to being taped. Such interviewsprovided a great
wealth of quotable (though of course not attributable)accounts. For the vast
majorityof interviewquestions, I found no significantdifferencesbetween the
responsesof those who were and those who were not taped.
Interviewswere conducted throughthe use of a standardset of interviewquestions.All itemswereopen ended, and follow-upand clarifying
questionswereasked
where necessary.The data on the operationalizationof public opinion were obtained primarily
fromtwoquestions,spaced severalminutesapartin the interview:
1. When you thinkof the term"publicopinion,"how do you operationalizethis
concept?In otherwords,what,foryou, representspublic opinion?
2. What are the most importantsources of informationyou use to gain your
knowledgeabout Americanpublic opinion on a givenissue?In otherwords,
how do you, personally,gauge public opinion?
In order to maintaina comfortableand friendlydialogue, some variance occurredin the order in whichquestionswere asked. The order of questionswithin
the entireinterviewoftenvariedifthe respondentembarkedupon a logical course
of argumentcontraryto thatset down in the listof questions.Manyquestionswere
asked using examples fromthe respondent'srecent policy experiences,both to
make abstractquestionsmore accessible and to provideexamples of how certain
decisionswere made. In short,the formof each interviewwas subjectto considerable variance.The decision to conductinterviewsin thiswaywas takenconsciously
and deliberatelyin order to maintainthe interestof the respondent,to minimize
the formality
of the situation,and therebyto enhance the qualityof information
gained. While such interviewmethodsundoubtedlycan resultin increased errors
in the coding and analysisof data, and perhaps even bias, theyalso undoubtedly
resultin greatervolume and richnessof information.
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449
PHILIP J. POWLICK
APPENDIX 2. Comparability
of Samples:
PresentStudyand Bernard Cohen's ThePublic'sImpactonForeignPolicy(1973)
Cohen'sStudy
Present
Study
AssistantSecretary(or
equivalentor higher
rank)
DeputyAssistantSecretary
(or equivalentrank)
OfficeDirector,Deputy
OfficeDirector(or
equivalentrank)
Officers(FS 3 to FS 1 or
equivalentGS levels)
"Special Assistant"(rank
unspecified)
% State,
w/Rank
Specified
(n=40)
% of
State
Resps.
(n=64)
Raw #,
State&
NSC
(n=70)
% of
State&
NSC
(n=70)
Raw #,
State
Only
(n=50)
2
3.1
5
7.1
8
20.0
17
26.6
20
28.6
10
25.0
24
37.5
24
34.3
14
35.0
21
32.8
21
30.0
9
22.5
10
-
Raw#,
State
Only
RankofInterview
Respondent (n=64)
Agency
ofRespondents
Affiliation
#in Present
Study
(n=70)
National SecurityCouncil
State Department
Secretariat
Undersecretariat,
Economics
Political
Undersecretariat,
Bureaus:
Inter-American
Affairs
AfricanAffairs
East Asia & PacificAffairs
European & Canadian Affairs
Near East & South Asia Affairs
Economic & BusinessAffairs
Human Rights/Humanitarian
Affairs
InternationalNarcoticsMatters
InternationalOrganizationAffairs
Oceans, Environment,Science
Affairs
Politico-Military
LegislativeAffairs
Public Affairs
AgencyforInternationalDevelopment (AID)
Miscellaneous,unspecified
#in Cohen'sStudy
(n=50)
6
0
4
1
1
3
0
0
9
6
8
8
9
3
3
1
2
2
3
2
2
0
0
0
5
7
10
4
0
ne
ne
4
ne
ne
0
5
5
7
ne = Bureau not in existenceat the time of Cohen's interviews.
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450
The SourcesofPublic Opinion
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