Power Politics
Shimko, Chapter 3
notes by Denis Bašić
Peace through Strength
Is there any reason to believe that peace and strength go hand-in-hand,
that the latter leads to the former?
Is there any evidence, for example, that strong nations are involved in
fewer wars than are weaker nations?
Probably not: Research actually demonstrates that great powers are
involved in more, not fewer, wars.
The expression “peace through strength” reflects a commitment to power
politics, a perspective in which international politics inevitably entails
“perceptions of insecurity (the security dilemma); struggles for power; the
use of Machiavellian stratagems; the presence of coercion; attempts to
balance power; and the use of war to settle disputes.”
Power Politics
power politics A realist/conservative perspective portraying international
relations as inevitably a realm of conflict and competition for
power among states.
The guiding assumption is that nations have no choice, or at
least no otherwise choice, but to engage in power politics. If
nations neglect considerations of power and place their fate in
the hands of international institutions or the good will of
others, they imperil their survival.
Anarchy & the U.N.
Realists believe that since international politics is anarchic, nations must
provide for their own security; nations can never be certain what others are
up to; war is always a possibility; and alternatives to national power as the
final guarantor of safety and independence are unrealistic. By stating that the
international society is anarchic, realists mean that there is no world
government with the right, obligation and/or capacity to protect nations.
The United Nations is an international governmental organization (IGO)—
that is, a voluntary organization of states. The United Nations is not, nor was
it ever intended to be, a world government. Without a central authority to
protect them from threats, nations have no alternative but to protect
themselves as best as they can. This contrasts with domestic society in which
people are not responsible for providing their own security. This is why we
have police.
Self-Help & Security Dilemma
self-help The necessity for actors to make provisions for their own security
in the absence of any central authority to protect them from
potential threats.
security dilemma The problem nations face when the actions taken to make one
nation feel more secure, like increasing its military strength,
inevitably make other nations feel less secure.
In realists’ opinion, since international politics is anarchic, there is
no lasting solution to the security dilemma of nations.
What is the power of a state?
The power of a state is its ability to prevail in conflict and to
influence the behavior of other actors.
The power of a state is made of its latent power and military
power.
Whereas military power is fairly self-explanatory, “latent power
refers to the socio-economic ingredients that go into building
military power;
it is largely based on a state’s wealth and
overall size of its population.
Great powers need money, technology and personnel to build
military forces and to fight wars.
Balance of Power Theory
balance of power theory Predicts that the pursuit of security by nations tends to result in the
creation of balances of power (equilibrium of power) on a systemic
level. This is often accompanied by the prediction that war is less
likely when power is balanced because no nation can be confident
of winning a war (and, thus, no nation is tempted to initiate one).
NOTE: “favorable balance of power” is a misleading expression.
The very idea that there is “favorable” balance suggests that power
is not balanced at all. In this case, we are rather talking about the
imbalance of power.
Internal & External Balancing
Balance of power theory predicts that states will do exactly what the
theory’s name suggests—balance against the power of other states.
In order to prevent any one state or alliance from achieving
dominance, states can do one of two things;
increase their own power or
band together with other states.
These options are sometimes referred to as internal and external
balancing.
States do not always intend for a balance to emerge, but “according
to the theory, balances of power tend to form whether some or all
states consciously aim to establish or maintain a balance.”
Bandwagoning
Balancing, however, is not the only option states have. There is also the
possibility of joining forces with the stronger power—that is, states could
bandwagon with, rather than balance against, the most powerful state or
alliance. Balance of power theorists see bandwagoning as unlikely
because “to ally with the dominant power means placing one’s trust in its
continued benevolence. The safer strategy is to join with those who cannot readily
dominate their allies, in order to avoid being dominated by those who can.”
Furthermore, “joining the weaker side increases the new members’ influence
within the alliance, because the weaker power has greater need for the assistance.”
bandwagoning When less powerful actors align with (rather than against) the most
powerful ones. This idea is inconsistent with balance of power theory,
which predicts that nations will align against (and hence “balance ”) the
most powerful nation.
Weaknesses of
the Balance of Power Theory
The main weakness of the theory seems to be that it predicts that
nations will align against (and hence “balance ”) the most powerful
nation. Critics of the theory point to many historical examples that
appear to run counter to this predictions.
In the early years of the Cold War, for example, the United States was
undeniably the world’s most formidable military and economic
power. If ever there were an undisputed strongest power in the
world, the United States was it. According to balance of power
theory, other nations should have been flocking to align against the
United States. However, this did not happen.
Why not?
Balance of Threat Theory
Balance of threat theory agrees that states do in fact balance; the
question is what they balance against - power or intentions?
After WWII, most nations aligned with the United States rather
than the Soviet Union because the latter was seen as posing the
greater threat despite its more limited power.
balance of threat theory Predicts that nations align against whichever nation is seen as
posing the greatest threat, not necessarily against the powerful
nation.
Balance of Power vs. Balance of Threat Theory
Preponderance or
Hegemonic Stability Theory
Preponderance or hegemonic stability theory argues that nations
tend to align on the basis of interests—those that are satisfied with
the status quo as opposed to those that are dissatisfied. Peace and
stability are more likely when there is a great imbalance of power in
favor of the status quo states—that is, when there is a preponderance
of power in support of the existing order.
Degree of power - In power preponderance theory, refers to a state’s
position in the international power hierarchy—that is, whether it is a
great power, a middle-range power, or a weak state.
Degree of satisfaction - In power preponderance theory, the extent
to which a state is essentially satisfied or dissatisfied with the
existing international order.
Degree of Satisfaction
Degree of satisfaction refers to whether a state is essentially satisfied
or dissatisfied with the current international order and its place in it.
Satisfied states are interested in preserving the international status
quo, whereas dissatisfied states are revisionist and want to change
(i.e., revise) the existing order. On the basis of power and satisfaction,
the theory identifies four types of nations:
(1) the powerful and satisfied,
(2) the powerful and dissatisfied,
(3) the weak and satisfied, and
(4) the weak and dissatisfied.
At the top of the power hierarchy is the dominant power or
hegemon, which typically emerged from the last major war as the
victor. By definition, the hegemon is a status quo power interested in
preserving the existing order. Below the hegemon are great powers,
middle powers, small powers, and dependencies. In each category
there are typically both status quo (“satisfied”) and revisionist
(“dissatisfied”) states.
Preponderance or Hegemonic Stability Theory
vs. The Balance of Power Theory
According to Organski, it is not a balance of power that leads to
peace but rather an imbalance of power:
“World peace is guaranteed when the nations satisfied with the
existing international order enjoy an unchallenged supremacy of
power … major wars are most likely when a dissatisfied challenger
achieves an approximate balance of power with the dominant nation.”
Though it is true that a balance of power “means that either side might
lose, it also means that either side may win.” When there is a great
imbalance of power, the challenger knows there is no chance of
winning a war and the dominant status quo power has no need to
resort to war.
Disagreements among the Preponderance vs.
Balance of Power vs. Balance of Threat Theories
At the end of the Cold-War era, the United States was the only nation
with the ability to project military force on a global scale.
Balance of power theory would predict that other nations, fearful of U.S.
power and uncertain of its intentions, will eventually balance and align
against the United States in order to prevent American domination.
Balance of threat theory would not automatically predict the emergence
of a counter-American coalition. The important variable is not the power
of the United States per se but whether it comes to be viewed as a threat.
Hegemonic stability theory would predict that a counter-American
coalition will not emerge because the other major powers (Japan,
Germany, Britain, France), whatever their disagreements with the United
States, are all essentially satisfied powers interested in preserving, not
overturning, the existing international order. But, how about the Russia?
Agreements among the Preponderance vs.
Balance of Power vs. Balance of Threat Theories
The most important point is that all of these theories agree on
the fundamental features and dynamics of international
relations:
Anarchy is the central fact shaping relations among
states;
nations have to be concerned about their power vis-à-vis
other states; and
the pursuit of power and security by independent states
is the driving force of international politics.
There is no suggestion of any feasible alternative to the reality
of international power politics in a world of sovereign states.
World Government as a Liberal answer &
the Realists’ response to it
To the extent that anarchy is the fundamental cause of power
politics, the creation of a world government would constitute a
frontal assault on the problem. On the level of theory and logic, the
case for world government is impeccable and simple.
Realists, such as Kenneth Waltz, concede that in theory world
government presents a solution to the problems of anarchy. But
world government is “unattainable in practice” because the world
lacks the sense of shared values and community that are essential
preconditions for effective government. “In a society of states with
little coherence,” Waltz predicts, “the prospect of a world
government would be an invitation to prepare for world civil war.”
Collective Security Systems
collective security A system in which states renounce the use of force to settle disputes and
also agree to band together against states that resort to the use of force.
In such a system, the threat of collective response by all states deters the
use of force by individual states. Collective security was the initial goal
of the League of Nations.
Though there would certainly be institutions for making decisions
about how and when to respond to aggression, collective security does
not create a world government. Individual states are not disarmed and
replaced by some global police force. International politics remains
anarchic and states sovereign. Nor does collective security reject power
and deterrence as vital components of preserving peace.
All Nations as
an International Police Force
Because the protection of each state’s security becomes the
responsibility of the wider international community, states would
no longer be in a pure self-help situation. In committing
themselves to aid any state threatened with aggression, all nations
become part of an international police force, albeit one more like a
volunteer fire department than a full-time police department.
The element of self-help is removed because states are obligated to
help whenever peace is threatened, not merely when it is in their interests
to do so. And the fact that aid would be available to all members of
the community allows states to escape the security dilemma. The
security afforded to all does not come at anyone else’s expense.
The League of Nations
The most significant experiment with collective security was the League of
Nations during the 1920s and 1930s. In urging the creation of the League,
U.S. President Woodrow Wilson laid out the basic logic of collective
security.
Though the League of Nations provided for means short of force to punish
and deter aggressors, such as economic sanctions, the military option
remained the ultimate deterrent.
According to Article 16 (1) of the League Charter, “Should any Member of the
League resort to war … it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war
against all other members of the League,” and after other measures had failed to
restore the peace, “the Members of the League should severally contribute to the
armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.”
Why did The League of Nations fail
so miserably to achieve its objectives?
Some trace its failure to specific historical circumstances,
particularly the unwillingness of the United States to join.
It is also clear that even though members paid lip service to the
principles of collective security, they proved time after time
unwilling to actually do what needed be done to make it work.
There was a huge gulf between the rhetoric and treaty on one
hand and the real world of policy on the other.
Others go further and attribute the League’s failure to the inherent
weaknesses of collective security that render it unworkable in
almost any context.
Problems of Collective Security:
Identifying the “aggressor”
For instance, the identification of aggressor:
Was Iraq an “aggressor” vis-a-vis Kuwait in 1990?
Is Israel an “aggressor” vis-a-vis the Palestinians?
Was the U.S. an “aggressor” vis-a-vis Vietnam during the
Vietnam war (1950-1975)?
And if nations cannot agree on who the aggressor is, how can
they be expected to fall into line in punishing and/or deterring
the aggressor?
Problems of Collective Security:
Preserving the “status quo”
In rejecting as illegitimate any forceful change of the existing order,
collective security is inevitably biased in favor of the status quo and
those that benefit from it.
The League’s goal of collective security “was, of course, identical with
the defense of the post–World War I status quo.” Unfortunately,
Germany and other nations viewed the World War I settlement as
illegitimate, and they eventually possessed the power to challenge and
change it.
Nations disadvantaged by the existing international order, rather than
seeing collective security as a noble and high-minded attempt to
preserve peace, they view it as a scheme for protecting the status quo.
Realist & Marxian view of
Collective Security
As E. H. Carr argues, “just as the ruling class in a community
prays for domestic peace, which guarantees its own security
and predominance … so international peace becomes a special
vested interest of predominant powers.”
Interestingly, both realists and Marxists tend to dismiss the
lofty pronouncements about preserving peace as mere
smokescreens for the underlying interests of dominant states.
Realists’ response to
Woodrow Wilson
Woodrow Wilson recognized that “the central idea of the
League of Nations was that States must support each other
even when their national interests are not involved.
Realists argue that collective security arrangements are bound
to fail for two basic reasons:
The necessary common interests and values among
great powers will rarely be achieved, and
states will place their national interest above the security of
others.
Pro’s and Con’s of the
Collective Security
Even those who support collective security admit that it only
works if the major powers share an interest in upholding the
status quo.
In order for collective security to work, all major powers must
“share similar values and interests.”
Skeptics are quick to note that if all major powers share the same
basic values and interests, the chances for war are exceedingly low
to begin with.
Thus, collective security arrangements are most likely to work
under conditions where there is no major threat to peace and most
likely to fail when they are needed most.
Liberalism and Collective Security
Liberals see common interests as a basis for international cooperation.
Collective security assumes that the common interest in preserving peace
outweighs particular interests that might be advanced through war.
Advocates of collective security concede that the League of Nations was a
failure, but they warn against assuming that every effort at collective security
is doomed.
Though not part of a formal collective security arrangement, the international
coalition that reversed the Iraqi conquest of Kuwait in 1991 is often cited as
an example of the world community coming together to resist aggression.
According to Shimko, in 1991 there were plenty of nations that committed to
use force even though it would be difficult to identify any national interests in
the outcome of the crisis.
Can collective security prevent all wars? Certainly not. Collective security
offers no guarantees of a peaceful world. But what does? Certainly not the
balance of power.
Security Community
Scandinavia provides an example of what Karl Deutsch
referred to as a security community, a group of nations sharing
a reasonable and prevailing expectation of nonviolence.
Critical factors for the development of security communities:
the most important being shared political and social values
among political elites
and a history of reliable and predictable behavior.
European Union
European Union - A regional intergovernmental organization of European
states designed to promote greater trade and economic integration. Those
who founded its precursors hoped that economic cooperation and
prosperity would lead to greater political cooperation and a reduction in
the conflict and competition that had marked European politics before
World War II.
The EU had its origins in the European Coal and Steel Community (1952)
in which France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Luxembourg agreed to reduce barriers to trade in coal and steel.
The European Economic Community (EEC) was an international
organization created by the Treaty of Rome of 1957. Its aim was to bring
about economic integration, including a common market, among its six
founding members of the ECSC. The EEC was also known as the Common
Market in the English-speaking world and sometimes referred to as the
European Community until it was officially renamed into EU in 1993.
Constructivist view of Security
Constructivism assumes that the behavior of social actors, be
they individuals or nations, is shaped by their identities and
prevailing beliefs and norms about how they should behave.
Hence, constructionists claim that if nations engage in power
politics it is “not because that behavior is natural or inherent in the
structure of reality, but because realism has been accepted as a guide
that tells leaders (and followers) the most appropriate way to
behave.” Thus, if we tell ourselves that nations should and will
act in certain ways, we create “a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy.”
It is not anarchy but rather “realist folklore [that] has
provided a guide and cultural inheritance for Western states
that has shaped and patterned the behavior of major states.