7
Theodore Roosevelt and the Philippine Insurrection
John Davenport
In our history, perhaps no single armed conflict has touched the collective soul of the
American people as deeply as the war in Vietnam. In what became a multimedia event, the war in
Indochina presented American soldiers in a new light. For the first time, it was thought, our
troops were fighting a war of aggression, a war for empire. This empire however, was not a
product of the 1960s, nor was it the denouement of the post-World War II realignment. Long
before young soldiers found themselves fighting for their lives in places such as Khe Sanh and Da
Nang, other young Americans had fought this nation’s first imperial war in Asia
--
the Philippine
Insurrection.
From 1899-1902, the United States fought to extinguish the flame of independence which
had flared in the Philippines following the defeat of Spain in the Spanish-American War. An
aggressive newcomer on the imperial stage, America was a nation which had cut its teeth on a
patrimony of “manifest destiny.” For many people in the United States, freedom and liberty
emanated from our shores. Counted among this number was the energetic young governor from
New York, Theodore Roosevelt. From his earliest appearance in the public limelight, Roosevelt
expressed an abiding belief in the superiority of western culture and the rectitude of Western
expansion, particularly the American variant. This belief shaped his personal and life profoundly
and affected his conduct as President of the United States. Nowhere is this evinced more clearly
than in his conduct of the American war in the Philippines between his assumption of power in
1901, and his declaration of the islands’ pacification in July 1902.
The month of March, 1899, saw American troops continuing an advance outwards from
Manila which had begun a month earlier. Different readings of an agreement between the Filipinos
and Americans, concerning guarantees of the former’s independence, had caused tensions which
escalated to the point where a minor incident triggered a war. An American sentry fired on a
Filipino patrol, and within days the Americans were driving the ill-equipped and poorly trained
Filipinos away from their capital city into the surrounding countryside. By March 19, Manila was
held securely by the Americans; by March 31, it was reported that “greater damage and heavy
losses” had been suffered by the Filipinos. It could be boasted, without exaggeration, that
“nowhere was the enemy able to retard the advance.”1
As the war progressed in the Philippines, controversy over the American presence in the
archipelago grew. People such as Andrew Carnegie, former President Grover Cleveland,
Lester Brune, Chronological History of United States Foreign Relations (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc.,
1985), 423-426. Adjutant-General’s Official Correspondence, vol. II. (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1902), 873-876. Hereafter referred to as AGC. Moorefleld Storey, ed., Secretary Root’s Record (Boston: George Ellis
Co., 1902), 7. Text-fiche. Karl Irving Faust, Campaigning in the Philippines (San Francisco: The Hicks-Judd
Company, 1899; reprint, New York: Arno Press, 1970), 118-240.
8
and William Jennings Bryan, spoke out forcefully against the war. David Starr Jordan, in a speech
in
given at Stanford University, urged the government to withdraw from the islands “as soon as
dignity we can.” 2 Ex-President Cleveland, in a fit of sarcasm, demanded that if the Filipinos
“prefer something different from the plan for their control which we propose,” then they “should
William Jennings Bryan warned that “the conquest of the Philippines. ..will
be slaughtered.”
certainly prove embarrassing to those who still hold to the doctrine which underlies a republic.”
“Military nile,” of the type which would be needed in the islands, he continued, “is antagonistic to
Yet, possibly the sharpest and most personal attack of all was
our theory of government.”
reserved for the toothy, young New Yorker who was beginning to make his presence felt on the
national political scene. “It is not the armed savagery of the Philippines which threatens America,”
remarked William Lloyd Garrison of the Peace Union,” but the savagery that Theodore Roosevelt
represents.”
Although stung by such attacks, Governor Roosevelt soon proved that he could give as
good as he got. Comparing the anti-imperialists to the copperhead Democrats of the Civil War,
Roosevelt expressed his contempt for the people who were “really chagrined at every American
triumph, while they showed very poorly concealed satisfaction over every American shortcoming.”
Privately, he criticized his “barbarous friends on the other side of the political fence,” who were
“half-hearted on the Philippine question.” Considering the fact that American boys were fighting
for their lives in the archipelago, he express “regret that any American should go wrong at a time
6
like this.”
‘
Roosevelt never hid his unabashed patriotism, nor did he hide attraction to the notion of
American expansion. As American troops were battering away at the insurgents, Roosevelt was
8
confidently, and publicly, announcing “I am an expansionist.” Some months later on October
21, 1899, in a speech given at Cincinnati, the future president gave what was perhaps the most
succinct and complete statement of his views on the issue of expansion:
“Expansion is not only the handmaid of greatness, but, above all it is the handmaid of
2 Horace Newton Fisher, Principle of Colonial Government (Boston: L.C. Page and Company,1899), 3.
3 Alden March, History and Conquest of the Philippines (Philadelphia: J.C. Winston and Company, 1937), 244.
Text-fiche.
Ibid., 243.
New York Times, 26 August 1899, p.4.
6 Herbert Ronald Farleger and Albert Bushnell Hart, eds., Theodore Roosevelt Cyclopedia (New York: Roosevelt
Memorial Association, 1941), 245-246.
7 Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge,
1884-1918, vol. I. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1925), 389.
8 Ferleger, 170.
9
peace.. .every expansion of a civilized power is a conquest for peace.. .It means not only the
extension of American influence and power, it means the extension of liberty and order, the
bringing nearer by gigantic strides of the day when peace shall come to the whole earth.”
Words such as these, spoken without equivocation, characterized the public orations of Theodore
Roosevelt in 1899 and through out the war years. Time and again he made crystal clear his belief
that “civilization” was synonymous with white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant culture. For Roosevelt,
the expansion Euro-American culture was a positive good, an ennobling experience for the
expanding power, as well as an edifying experience for the recipient of the former’s attention.
Within this scheme, America held a unique position. America had not only a right, but a
duty, to expand and share with the less “fortunate” of the world the civilization, peace, and liberty
which were all by-products of its history. Without a doubt, Roosevelt declared, his countrymen
could not “if they wish to retain their self-respect, refrain from doing their duty as a great nation.”
10 Nor did Roosevelt see this duty as something which could be accepted or rejected at will. The
land of liberty had not asked for the responsibility of bestowing civilization upon its Asian charges,
but like it or not, the former Spanish possessions were now ours. The force of American arms had
won the Spanish war, now the United States was responsible for the future happiness and
prosperity of the Philippines. Thus, “under no conceivable circumstances,” said Roosevelt, could
we “turn [the FilipinosJ over to rapine and bloodshed” or “allow them to sink into a welter of blood
and confusion.”
Roosevelt’s resolve to hold the Philippines was hardened by the pressure of the
insurgency. The major obstacle to the betterment of the islands, as Roosevelt saw it, was the
“half-caste and native Christians, warlike Moslems, and wild pagans” of the archipelago who made
up the forces of guerilla fighter Emillo Aguinaldo. 12 There probably would have been little
argument from the future president over the characterization of the insurgents made by Elihu Root.
In a Youngstown, Ohio speech given less than a month before the presidential election of 1900, the
Secretary of War inveighed against the “haif-guerilla, half-bandit” Filipino insurgents who
hindered the bestowal of “happiness, peace, and prosperity” which submission to American
authority would ensure. 13 In fact,Roosevelt had welcomed the appointment of Root by William
McKinley as a good first step toward putting down the insurrection. From his home in Oyster
Bay, Roosevelt wrote Henry Cabot Lodge that “Root realizes that the first thing to do is smash the
Philippine insurrection.” 14 Privately, Roosevelt admitted that while he hoped that, “the trend of
events will speedily as may be justify us in leaving them,” he had, “never varied in my feeling that
Ibid.
10 Eltin Morrison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. II. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1951), 1400.
11 Ibid., 1415. See also Ferleger, 426-428.
12 Ferleger, 427.
13 Storey, 8-9.
14 Lodge, 416.
10
we had to hold the Philippines.” 15
These were the thoughts of the man who, on September 15, 1901, became the President of
the United States. Three months after President McKinley was felled by an assassin’s bullet in
Buffalo, Roosevelt reiterated his determination to bring the Philippines to heel. The islands, he
stated, would be looked after and “developed along American lines.” While he intended to
“guarantee the islands against any kind of exploitation,” he nonetheless would do everything in his
power to throw “them open to industrial development.” “Nothing better can be done for the
islands,” he claimed. 16 The new President was equally conmiitted to guiding the Filipinos along
the path to “civilization” and stamping out the insurrection. He never lost sight of nor confidence
in those two, mutually concomitant, goals. Yet obstacles did appear throughout the remainder of
the war. A contentious Congress was one, but other presidents had successfully maneuvered
through those dangerous straits, and Roosevelt would prove equal to the task in his turn. It was in
the Army, of all places, where the President would experience his most intractable problems.
A popular song among American soldiers summed up the Army’s view of the insurrection:
“Damn, damn, damn the Filipino! Pock-marked khakiac Ladrone/ Underneath the starry flag!
17 The same sentiment
Civilize him with a Krag/ And return us to our beloved home.”
accompanied Major General Adna Chaffee to his new post in Manila in 1901. Chaffee had arrived
to fight a war, and fight it he would. The new commander however, was not the sole
representative of American authority in the archipelago. Sharing the limelight was the newly
promoted civil governor of the Philippines future President of the United States William Howard
Taft. Taft already had been on the scene a year before the successor of General Arthur MacArthur
arrived to take command of the American forces. From the moment he came to the Philippines as a
member of the Second Philippine Commission, Taft found the Filipinos to be “a pleasant people to
--
Thus, two men of authority,
meet” even if they were not quite ready for self-government.
guided by two very different views of affairs in the islands, shared the stage. Disputes arose
almost immediately, one of the first which centered on criminal jurisdiction. On the one hand was
Taft and the civil government which insisted on jurisdiction over criminal cases; on the other was
Chaffee and the Army who claimed that they, as the legal policing authority in the Philippines, had
the right to handle all criminal matters. Pleading his case to Washington in a dispatch dated
October 4, 1901, Chaffee argued that the matter was a simple one of principle. He explained to his
superiors,
15
Morrison, 105-106.
16 Papers Relating to the foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 63. (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1902), xxxii-xxxiu. Hereafter referred to as Papers.
Blout, The American Occupation of the Philippines (New York: Knickerbocker Press, 1912), 270.
The reference to a “Kmg” is to the standard-issue American rifle of the period.
18 David H. Burton, Theodore Roosevelt: Confident Imperialist (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1968), 78.
17 James H.
1
11
Principle involved is that when court is informed that prisoner held by military authority of
United States Army for crime, court shall not discharge prisoner, nor shall he be taken into
court, nor is thai by authority of military law reviewable on habeas corpus by court.19
The stage was set for the next act which would include as players an indignant President, a
scheming general, and revelations concerning American war crimes. “I am deeply chagrined,”
Roosevelt wrote Chaffee, “to use the mildest terms, over the trouble between yourself and Taft.”
friend to both men, the President was presented with a paradox which was eerily analogous to
his own thinking. While he advocated expansion, it was to be mainly for the benefit of “savages;”
while he believed that “we can ultimately help our brethren of the Philippine Islands,” 21 they must
be taught “that we are the masters.” 22 Roosevelt’s confidence in Western expansion was
predicated upon competing views of the objects of that expansion. It was easy enough to enunciate
20
the value of expanding Christian virtue, white “civilization”, and American liberty, but what if your
“barbarous neighbor” refuses the offer? The dispute between Chaffee and Taft forced Roosevelt to
confront his own conflicting views concerning expansion. 23
While the President wrestled with the question of authority in the Philippines, other
developments began to overtake him. Soon after Roosevelt assumed office, a flurry of dispatches
went out to “all Station Commanders” in the islands. One in particular urged its readers to “wage
war in the sharpest and most decisive manner possible.” 24 Another, lamented the fact that it was
“an inevitable consequence of war” that the civilian population must suffer, but warned that it
would “be impossible to wage war efficiently” while considering the welfare of noncombatants.
With directives such as these floating around, it was only a matter of time before what had
heretofore only been hinted at, became common knowledge.
Although reports of alleged atrocities committed by American troops were nothing new, in
fact many reports went back to the opening of hostilities, the allegations made in the closing
months of 1901 were more than distasteful rumors. In the Philippines, Governor Taft had been
alerted to the situation in a report from Major Cornelius Gardener of the Thirteenth U.S. Infantry.
In Washington, the news reached the President through the efforts of Army chief Nelson Miles.
On february 17, 1902 Miles submitted to Roosevelt “an unsigned draft...containing a number of
sentences which in effect recited alleged cruelties and barbarities.” 26 Striking a note of irony, the
19
AGC, 1296.
20 Thid., 1297.
21 Morrison, 1343-1344.
22
23
24
25
26
Ferleger, 427.
Thid., 246.
Storey, appendix A, Circular #6, December 24, 1901.
Ibid., Circular #3, December 9, 1901.
Morrison, 297.
12
President remarked that it was interesting that General Miles should come to him with news of war
27 Roosevelt
crimes considering the lathers dismal record in the same area during the Indian Wars.
claimed that Miles had exaggerated any American transgressions but why? The answer was
power. Along with his report on war crimes, the general submitted a new organizational plan for
--
the administration of the Philippines which would have given him control of civilian as well as
military affairs. The president reacted strongly to the proposed shift in power, remarking to Elihu
Root that Miles’ plan “would be in effect to restore military government under a dictatorship.”
Finding it “difficult to imagine a proposition at once more mischievous and more foolish,”
Roosevelt predicted dire consequences if it were accepted. In fact, to adopt the proposal “would
do serious and lasting harm to the islands.” 28 In addition to this blatant power grab, it became
clear to Roosevelt that here was the source of the recent reports of atrocities surfacing in the press.
Taking all this into consideration, the President refused Miles’ request and noted for the future the
obvious “political design” of the plan. 29
Not long after the meeting with General Miles, a writer identifying himself simply as “a
gentleman in Manila” wrote to the New York Evening Post and gave his opinion regarding the state
of Filipino-American relations in the islands: “Sir The natives do not love the Americans, and
--
with good reason.” 30 There was indeed good reason for the islanders to hate and fear the white
invaders. Since the opening days of the war, the American forces had been singularly brutal.
Although the President would later defend American conduct as resulting from a combination of
combat stress and an enemy who was “very treacherous,” 31 it soon became painfully clear that the
crimes committed had nothing to do with combat or enemy activities. The soldiers on station in
Manila in 1899 were not exactly the cream of the American crop. Spending much of their time
idling in Manila’s cafes, the troops kept boredom at bay by drinking heavily and harassing the
locals. One American officer, apparently noticing the image which his soldiers’ behavior was
conveying, admonished a British observer not to “form your opinion of our people by those whom
you see representing us here.. .it is impossible for me to justify their conduct.” 32
The fact that American brutality was driven by more than the rigors of combat was proved
by the rapidity with which their behavior degenerated after the war began. Referring to the natives
as “niggers,” the Americans wasted no time in venting their pent-up hatred on the villages and
In one unfortunate village, during the first days of the
hamlets of the Philippine countryside.
Miles not only built up a rather bloody record on the Plains, but he was also famous as the man who
captured the Apache chief, Geronimo.
28 Morrison, 244-245.
29 Morrison, 244-245.
30 Storey, 64.
31 Morrison,297.
32 Richard Brinsley Sheridan, The Filipino Martys (New York: The Bloody Head, 1900), 104-108.
33 fairness necessitates the noting at this point that the mcial hatreds which were to be found among the American
troops were no different that those prevalent at home. These men came from an America which quite possibly had
reached the zenith of overt racism. Between 1899 and 1902, 381 African-Americans were lynched in the United
27 Ibid.
13
fighting, the Americans set fire to each hut and then shot the inhabitants as they fled. One report of
the event described how the soldiers made the “women denude themselves,” and how when one
L.f. Adams, a soldier from
woman “resisted being denuded...She was shot on the spot.”
Missouri, wrote home that
In the path of the Washington Regiment and Battery D of the Sixth Artillery there were 1,008
dead niggers, and a great many wounded. We burned all their houses. I don’t know how
many men, women, and children the Tennessee boys did kill. They would not take any
prisoners.35
Another soldier, Sergeant Howard Mcfarland of Co. D, 43 Infantry, reported that his
solution to the Philippine question would be to “blow every nigger into nigger heaven. ..When we
find one that is not dead, we have bayonets.” 36
As reports such as these filtered back home, Congress set itself to investigating not only the
overall conduct of the war, but also the allegations of atrocities. On January 13, 1902, Senator
George Hoar of Massachusetts, introduced a resolution which would create a Senate committee to
“examine and report into the conduct of the war in the Philippine Islands.”
The testimony given
to this committee by former American servicemen was disturbing. It told a story of cruelty and
inhumanity which shocked many who heard it. 38
In Washington, Roosevelt initiated his own investigation in the hopes of possibly
insulating the army. When this became impossible, he attempted to justify the unjustifiable. He
promised a crowd gathered in Arlington, Virginia, that he would make every effort “to find out
every instance of barbarity on the pan of our troops.” Furthermore, he intended “to punish those
guilty of [crimes] and take, if possible even stronger measures.. .to prevent the occurrence of all
such instances in the future.”
Privately, he stressed that while there had “been some blots on the
record” of the army, his troops had been “exceedingly merciful.” He claimed that the soldiers
fought under conditions which “were most exasperating.” Elucidating this point, Roosevelt
stressed that the “enemy were very treacherous.” 40 He added,
it was well-nigh impossible to find out who among the pretended friends really had
committed outrages; and in order to find out, not a few of the officers, especially those of the
native scouts, and not a few of the enlisted men, began to use the old Filipino method of mild
torture, the water cure. Nobody was seriously damaged, whereas the Filipinos had inflicted
States.
Sheridan, 172-173.
Storey, 10.
36 Ibid.
united States Congress. Senate. Congressional Record (13 January 1902), 649.
38 For transcripts of the testimony see Henry Graff, ed., American Imperialism
and the Philippine Insurrection
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969), 64-79.
Storey,4.
40 For example see New York Times, 26 September 1901,
p.6.
14
incredible tortures upon our own people.4’
The “water cure” of which Roosevelt spoke of as “mild,” was a process in which water
was forced into the stomach of a captive until the pain of distension extracted the desired
information. Throughout this period, Roosevelt defended the actions of the army, choosing to see
only those aspects of the war effort which fit his preconceived notions concerning white, Christian
Americans.
Fortunately, for the President, the revelations of atrocities coincided with the rapid collapse
of the insurgent forces. One by one, gueriula leaders were either captured or turned themselves in.
In increasing numbers, insurgent bands, once so potent a force, laid down their arms. By July,
1902, so few guerilla units remained active that Roosevelt felt secure in proclaiming an end to the
war. He confidently declared that “the insurrection against the authority and sovereignty of the
United States is at an end and peace has been established.” 42 In his opinion, the Philippines were
now ready to be molded in the American image. With the political questions regarding the
American involvement still open, Roosevelt thanked the soldiers whose conduct had tarnished the
once glittering facade of American expansionism. In a message to “the Army of the United
States,” Secretary of War Root, conveyed the President’s gratitude:
The President thanks the officers and enlisted men of the Army in the Philippines, both
regulars and volunteers, for the courage and fortitude, the indomitable spirit and loyal
devotion with which they have put down and ended the great insurrection which has raged
throughout the archipelago against the lawful sovereignty of the United States... [the ArmyJ
has added honor to the flag which it defended, and has justified increased confidence in the
future of the American people, whose soldiers do not shrink from labor or death, yet love
liberty and peace.43
Theodore Roosevelt’s beliefs shaped profoundly his conduct of the war from September 1901 to
July 1902. He brought to the Office of President and the position of Commander-in-Chief a deep
and abiding confidence in the virtue of the American people and the superiority of white, Western
culture. The war for Roosevelt, had been a crusade to save the Filipinos from themselves, from
the catastrophe of a non-American future. The war was over; the examination of what is meant and
how America fought it, of which this essay is but one small part, had just begun.
41 Morrison, 297.
42 New York Times, 4 July 1902, p.1.
43 AGC, 1352.
Although Roosevelt declared the Philippine war to be at an end in July 1902, combat in the archipelago would
continue until 1905 as the United States Army fought the Moros.