CHINA IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: THE DYNAMICS OF
CHANGE AT THE BEGINNING OF A NEW MILLENIUM
MONICA GHEORGHITA
Institute for World Economy
Romanian Academy
ROMANIA
[email protected]
Abstract:
The study examines the contours of a growing Chinese influence in the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) and seeks to establish the reasons for its varied cooperation with the other
permanent members of the Council. It attempts to extract patterns of foreign policy behaviour
and looks beyond the array of apparently inconsistent reactions embedded in broader political
relationships. Several questions are raised: What can help to explain the variance in China’s
mixed cooperativeness in the Council and what does the answer suggest about the constraints
on the other members in the UNSC? What consequences may arise if China’s actions are based
on a set of values and national interests different from those of the major Western powers?
Could China’s attitude disrupt the traditional working and normative practice of the United
Nations?
Key- Words: United Nations, assertiveness, veto, voting patterns, win-win cooperation,
internal-external linkage,
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1 Setting the Stage
The world is changing, yet the West is still judging the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) by the yesterday, almost vintage picture. China’s heightened profile is the product of its
changing global status and the trend is visible across a spectrum of issues, ranging for the
institutional culture within organizations to substantive issues of policy.
One key question must be raised in relation to the perceived “assertiveness” of China in
the UN: namely, who defines this so-called assertiveness? If each side uses its narrow national
interests as a criterion to judge the behaviour of the other side, the concept is meaningless.
Conversely, China must resist the temptation to maximize its parochial interests at the expense
of the global system. It is reasonable to acknowledge that PRC learns very quickly and
participates in international organizations in much the same way as does the United States: it
attempts to use these institutions as vehicles to advance its national interests and uses smart
power to further boost its position. China’s posture backs its strategic interests, but is also
frequently beneficial for the organizations in which it participates. The country’s constructive
engagement in these institutions is tactically wise because it bolsters Chinese credibility, which
further strengthens its power and ability to achieve its pursued objectives. The reverse side of
the coin is that international institutions have not and will not cause any bold policy shifts in
China, although some modest examples do exist of the country moving towards practices which
reflect the operating ethos of the organizations in which it participates. [1]
China’s “assertive behaviour” is flexible and pragmatic, and can be read as a strategic
use of its relations as leverage to bargain for side payments or relative gains from the other
side(s). However, when in disagreement in the Security Council permanent five members group
(P5), China appears to be more non-interfering than troublesome in the negotiations.
The analysis focuses on the interactions in the P5, taking into consideration the input
from a mix of external and internal variables, i.e. national interests at stake, internal audiences,
position of the ten non-permanent members and/or regional stakeholders involved in specific
cases. The general framework includes US, UK and France acting frequently as a voting bloc,
together with the Chinese and Russian condominium. The latter is a reflection of a progressive,
pragmatic cooperation to “soft balance” the former group and not a voting bloc, a relationship
labelled as a potential “axis of obstruction” in the Security Council, which works to ensure that
neither regime is left isolated as the solo veto on a Security Council resolution. [2]
2 What Does China Think? The Attitude in Time Sequence: From Passivity to a
Pro-Active Cat-and-Mouse Game
For most of its four decades of membership in the Council, the PRC has behaved as a
regional power with narrow interests. Its diplomacy has been restrained, measured and largely
acquiescent. Chinese diplomats, suspicious and non-participatory, almost never introduced a
resolution of their own, preferring to react to the initiatives of others. They generally abstained
from or did not participate in voting, unless the issue touched a sovereignty question, especially
if it might have influenced Taiwan or Tibet.
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China’s assertiveness in the UN has grown in tandem with its increased economic might
and one may witness a general trajectory from a passive to pro-active cat and mouse game.
Over the last fifteen years, as the PRC’s economic fortunes have boomed, its diplomacy has
acquired new confidence and the United Nations has become a suitable scene to amplify the
Chinese Weltanshauung. Nevertheless, due to the conflicting impulses of its political
philosophy (the internal-external linkage), it will always participate with a certain degree of
ambivalence. Running through many of the Chinese positions is a persistent limiting
interference with countries’ internal affairs, and resistance towards the expansion of the
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, for reasons of both principle and strategic interest. It
is no less true that in many cases – for example, Iran, North Korea, Sudan - China has moved
in recent years from deliberate opposition and appeal to solidarity with the developing world to
an attempt to balance its material interests with its acknowledged responsibilities as a rising
global power.
An irregular feature of the PRC’s contemporary foreign policy in the UN Security
Council is easily discernible: normally quiet, but occasionally clamorous; usually restrained,
but sporadically contentious; sometimes touchy; and never entirely foreseeable. Against this
background, the apparent pattern of behaviour is that there is no clear, stable and predictable
pattern. Still, transitional patterns based on refined principles of foreign policy conduct are
noticeable. The difficulty to acknowledge these patterns stems from the fact that the crucial
stage of China’s own development happens to coincide with a protean external environment,
which makes dealing with diplomatic and security issues more complicated. If Western
policymakers want to play the long game, no tangible political and economic results (from
which stem all the rest) can be obtained if the focus is on China’s diplomatic rhetoric and
varying narrative and not on the objective evaluation of China’s behaviour in international
forums.
In recent years, China has complicated the UN decision-making process on a range of
issues, including North Korea, Iran, Sudan, Burma/Myanmar, Zimbabwe, Libya and Syria. In
some cases (such as Iran), it has agreed to “punish” its own partner; in others (such as
Burma/Myanmar), it has not. Identifying the reasons for this variance is necessary to explain
why China sometimes endorses the Western (and especially US) position, and why it sometimes
says “no.” Several case studies have been selected to investigate the topic: the Security
Council’s imposition of sanctions against North Korea (October 2006, June 2009) and the
Islamic Republic of Iran (since 2006 onwards); the rejection of proposals to condemn the
incumbent regime in Burma/Myanmar (2007); the Chinese reaction to the attempted hardening
of the UN sanctions regime against Sudan in 2007; and the veto cast to Security Council draft
resolutions meant to impose sanctions on the Syrian regime (2011) and lay juridical grounds
for a foreign military intervention in Syria (2012). These cases include a range of outcomes in
terms of China’s participation in the negotiations, from assent to abstention and to the use of
veto in the final cases.
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3 The Privilege of Veto and Other Actions of Chinese Diplomacy in the Wider UN
Forum
As of October 2012, the PRC has used its Security Council veto nine times, considerably
fewer than other countries with veto power. China is the member of the permanent five member
countries of the UN Security Council (P5) that has employed the veto the least. Robert Sutter
argues that the use of the veto may be regarded as a “breach of a developing informal norm of
non-use”. [3]
In 1972, China stood against the admission to the UN of Bangladesh, as Beijing
regarded it as a part of Pakistan. In 1973, it joined the Soviet Union to veto a resolution calling
for a ceasefire in the Yom Kippur War. A third vote occurred in 1997, when China rejected a
proposal to send ceasefire observers to Guatemala, as the country had diplomatic ties with
Taiwan. In the same vein, in 1999, shortly after the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
established diplomatic relations with Taiwan, China vetoed the extension of the UN
peacekeeping mandate in the Balkan country. In 2007, together with Russia, China blocked a
resolution critical of Myanmar’s human rights record. A year later, in the same tandem with the
Russian Federation, China vetoed sanctions against Zimbabwe. More recently, in 2011 and
2012, it used its veto power to block two draft resolutions that condemned the incumbent Syrian
regime and proposed sanctions against it.
Each time it used its veto, China sought to make a point regarding its non-negotiable
sovereignty over Taiwan, [4] reject international intervention in what it regarded as the internal
affairs of a sovereign state, or counter what it perceived to be hegemonic U.S. action. The PRC’s
decision on whether to cast its veto to prevent UN intervention may also be influenced by its
cautious approach towards acting as the sole veto on a resolution, as China has not used a lone
veto on a Security Council resolution since 1999.
In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that between 2000 and 2012, China voted
affirmatively 98% of the time in the Security Council (which shows increasing voting affinity
with the Western bloc), abstained on only 13 ballots and used its veto five times. It is arguably
in the interests of the five permanent members of the UNSC to present a façade of unity to the
world, given not only the pressures towards reform of the Security Council and the resulting
loss of leverage for some of its members, but also a sign of China “fitting in” at the Great Game
table.
China’s often cautious stance in the UN Security Council belies its deeper engagement
in other aspects of the UN’s work. In peacekeeping, for example, as previously detailed in the
paper, China has consistently increased its level of support, participation and commitment since
first casting a vote in favor of a resolution to authorize a UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus in
1981.
Its support for UN reform is illustrative of the Chinese ambivalence in negotiations.
While the PRC accepts the idea of broadening permanent membership in the Security Council
to include other developing countries (this would presumably exclude Japan), it dislikes
devaluing the veto by according the privilege to newcomers. Beijing has wavered between
supporting permanent membership for India without veto power and rejection after India joined
Brazil, Germany and Japan to push as a group for their inclusion.
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PRC is a shrewd, savvy, and successful operator. While cautious in the Security
Council, the refined Chinese diplomacy has had large impact on the fall of US influence in the
wider UN forum: in 1995 the USA won 50.6 percent of the votes in the United Nations General
Assembly; by 2006, the figure had fallen to just 23.6 percent. On human rights, the results are
even more dramatic: China’s win-rate has rocketed from 43 percent to 82 percent, while the
USA’s has tumbled from 57 per cent to 22 percent. [5]
4 The Intramural Squabble: Case Studies on the Dilemma of the So-Called “Pariah
States”
4.1 两面三刀 (Liang mian san dao): The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(DPRK) or the Sword with Three Edges [6]
With a rather unsophisticated, but effective military strategy, the totalitarian regime of
the DPRK succeeds from time to time in flabbergasting the global political arena by going too
far off-track with its nuclear programme. Viewed by the Chinese leadership as a buffer zone
and an increasingly troublesome ally, the DPRK is highly dependent of its neighbour, as 70%
of its foreign trade and 90% of its energy supplies come from China. Although not in a
privileged position, the PRC holds a big trade and energy stick to stimulate more rational
behaviour of its Eastern neighbour.
As a general rule, the sanctions regime imposed by the international community has
seldom triggered a fundamental change in the political behaviour of the Korean ruling elite.
When the UN adopted sanctions in 2006, the DPRK decided initially for a more aggressive
stance, but simmered down eventually. Nevertheless, a stronger UN sanctions regime, often
backed by all key players, has presented greater global consensus that adds pressure on an
already massively challenged regime.
North Korea pursued a nuclear test on October 9, 2006. The reaction of the international
community was prompt and severe and China adhered to it, using language in a similar tone to
that used before in the aftermath of the 1999 US bombing the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade.
On October 14, 2006, the Security Council unanimously voted for the adoption of Resolution
1718 which imposed embargoes on a range of arms and on luxury goods. [7] It called for
voluntary cargo inspections, but ruled out the use of force. On June 12, 2009, following a second
nuclear test and the firing of several short-ranged ballistic missiles, the Security Council
unanimously approved Resolution 1874, which widened existing arms and economic measures.
The Chinese foreign policy assertiveness proved to be in sync with the other P5 members of
the Security Council.
However, China’s affirmative vote was couched with a clear non-interventionist
language. Its representative held that China supported the balanced reaction of the Security
Council, stating that „the DPRK had violated Security Council resolutions, impaired the
effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and affected international peace and
stability”. The text showed the determination of the Council to resolve the DPRK nuclear issue
peacefully, through dialogue and negotiations. At the same time, it stressed that „the
sovereignty, territorial integrity and legitimate security concerns and development interests of
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the DPRK should be respected. Under no circumstances should there be the use of force or
threat of the use of force.” [8]
The two cases must be seen in the wider perspective of a fundamentally conservative
and cautious Chinese diplomacy that has abjured coercion (i.e. sanctions, embargoes, threat or
use of military force), in order to avoid instability on the Korean peninsula, and has proved
reluctant to have the North Korean matter raised in the United Nations. What are the reasons
that convinced China to the contrary? Geographic proximity and geostrategic importance of the
peninsula require taking a more comprehensive approach to Pyongyang’s provocations. Beijing
is concerned with preventing economic or military crises that would lead to thousands of North
Korean refugees fleeing across the 1,400-kilometer border into China. Therefore, instability
and uncertainty were seen as big risks undermining Beijing’s carefully created policy in the
region. Moreover, if China opposed such sanctions, Beijing would have been isolated from and
criticized by the international community, and then the North Korea-US problem could have
shifted into a Sino-US problem. A potential military conflict involving the United States near
Chinese borders was thought to be highly undesirable for Beijing’s interests. If not responded
too promptly, such a situation could have offered the incentives for rapid changes of the political
situation in Pyongyang that would have led to less-than-positive outcomes for the Chinese
geopolitical strategy. In the same vein, a lack of viable alternatives following failed bilateral
talks before the votes, a stalled Six Party Talks process and the united response of the regional
stakeholders (South Korea, Japan, and the Russian Federation) have contributed to this
outcome.
4.2 The “Fast and Loose” Game: Chinese Reactions to the UN Sanctions
Regime against the Islamic Republic of Iran [9]
Since July 2006, when the Security Council unanimously imposed the first round of
sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), the Chinese scepticism towards the
imposition of sanctions as an effective nuclear deterrent seemed diluted by superior reasons and
growing material interests. It is significant to observe that, up to now, China has not vetoed any
of the UN sanctions regimes against Iran, although opposed in many cases during the
negotiations, in order to postpone the hardening of restrictive measures. China has applied a
foot-dragging strategy to weaken the effect of sanctions against the Islamic Republic.
Although Chinese diplomats have insisted from the very beginning that they would not
support "the arbitrary use of sanctions", nor "approve the use of force" against Iran, they have
never claimed that China would oppose or prevent them from being imposed. During or after
negotiations, top Chinese diplomats reiterated the PRC’s preference for the matter to be settled
through mediation (i.e. not to be referred to the Security Council), and the pivotal role of the
AIEA as the principal mechanism for dealing with the issue. [10] In the same vein, despite lack
of progress in the negotiations, China held that the dual track approach of incentives and
pressure should be sustained, with diplomacy remaining the best way out. [11]
If one delves more into the matter, it appears quite obvious that the Sino-Iranian
relationship is based on a pragmatic meeting of interests. Beijing perceives the increase of U.S.
influence in the Middle East as detrimental to China’s long-term interests, but the outcome of
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negotiations are clear evidence that short-term interests are likely to matter more. The Chinese
authorities are cautious of an outright breach with Washington, its most important bilateral
relationship. Suspicion towards Tehran partially counterbalances Beijing’s mercantilist
approach, as reflected in China’s behaviour in the UNSC forum.
The insatiable demand for energy has become a driver of Chinese foreign policy and
made Iran a significant player for the Chinese market, as a petroleum and liquid natural gas
exporter. In 2010, China had $3.4 billion in foreign investment in Iran, Algeria, Nigeria, and
Sudan, a detail that significantly impacts its foreign policy in the region. In its defence, Beijing
replies that it has no other option. Most of the oil and gas assets in stable countries are no longer
available, therefore China has to turn to countries where American (and international) sanctions
regimes forbid Western companies from doing business, such as the Sudan and IRI.
By resisting cooperation on Iran with the United States and Western Europe, and
protecting Tehran in the Security Council by weakening sanctions resolutions, Beijing has
ensured that a significant part of Washington’s energy was spent on the Middle East. China
benefits when America’s attention is swerved from the Asia-Pacific. Equally, it is difficult to
accept another nuclear power that may complicate the strategic divisions in the Middle East and
Tehran is not unaware of Beijing's duplicity in the matter. Hoseyn Adeli, a former deputy
foreign minister, said that Iran should not put too much trust in China and Russia because each
country would pursue its own interests. Likewise, a member of Iran's National Security Council
wrote in an article entitled "China and Russia Will Sell Us Out" that in spite of the advantages
offered by Iran to Beijing and Moscow, the record shows that in the end, both countries would
rather align themselves with the Western powers. [12]
Fully aware of the necessity to be ambivalent on the issue, cornered by Iranian
intransigence during the negotiations, and cautious about a possible spike in global oil prices if
Iran were to turn nuclear and being given serious incentives for its companies, in 2010, as in
the previous years, the Chinese authorities altered their mind-set against the adoption of new
rounds of sanctions. Of course, guarantees and certain privileges granted to the Chinese side
helped in the process. The US offered “special conditions” to China, guaranteeing no
disruptions in oil supply in the region, alternative energy suppliers (Saudi Arabia) and consumer
markets in case of crisis. Other key factors, i.e. Russia, UK, France and Germany (partners in
the “P 5+1” or “EU 3+3” format of negotiations with Iran), in favour of the new resolutions
and the high-level political pressure to this end impacted significantly towards this outcome. At
the same time, while China has not overtly indicated a shift in its Iranian policy, the pace of
Chinese energy transactions with Iranian firms has declined, i.e. Chinese UNIPEC plan to cut
10-20% of its crude oil imports from IRI in 2012. [13]
The deal struck in July 2015 by the EU3+3 in the negotiations with Iran has been
labelled as the most important diplomatic achievement of the US President’s tenure in the White
House. Analysts believe that China played a major role in preventing Russia from unhelpful
manoeuvres in the final stage of the negotiation, given its interests to invest massively in oil
and gas projects in Iran. The Beijing syndrome of Russia led the latter to fewer and fewer
options on the international stage, to the net advantage of its Asian strategic partner.
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4.3 A Strategic Dilemma: China’s Recourse to Veto in the 2007
Burma/Myanmar Case
On January 12, 2007, China vetoed a draft resolution initiated by the U.S. and UK that
would have urged the military junta in Burma/Myanmar to engage in a “substantive political
dialogue” with the opposition party, the National League of Democracy, and set free the leader
of the movement, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, Aung San Suu Kyi. The resolution also
demanded an end to human rights violations against members of ethnic minorities, “including
widespread rape and other forms of sexual violence carried out by members of the armed
forces.” [14]
This atypical reaction from a country that is not accustomed to recourse to veto must be
put in a larger framework. Faced with the conundrum of two opposite political regimes (the
ruling junta and a more open opposition faction) that may both challenge its interests, China
supported a gradual return to stability. It did not appoint a special representative in the country
(as in the following case study on Sudan), in a public diplomacy campaign to support its vision,
satisfied with the readiness of the junta to take part in international mediation, i.e., the ‘good
offices’ missions of Ambassador Ibrahim Gambari, UN Secretary General Special Envoy to
Burma/Myanmar. It may be argued as well that China’s motivation behind the veto was to
shield from eventual international criticism reiterated against it on human rights matters.
Secondly, it was the prevalence of Chinese material interests in a contiguous country
that added supplementary pressure: Burma/Myanmar is a significant supplier of natural gas and
the host for an oil pipeline built in 2013, a Chinese attempt to diversify its routes from the
Malacca Strait. Thirdly, Washington’s stance, who ultimately wanted to underline symbolically
the SC commitment to democratic values and not pressure change too much before the time
was ripe. Fourthly, the Russian Federation supported China with a second veto, not very eager
to boost international reaction too closely from its “near abroad” territories, and also taking into
consideration a poor trade record with Burma/Myanmar. Lastly, regional organizations like
ASEAN were not in favour of the UNSC implication in the matter, opting for a constructive
engagement with the country under the auspices of the UN mediation efforts. Chinese
Ambassador to the UN, Wang Guangya said that “all Myanmar’s immediate neighbours, all
ASEAN members and most Asia-Pacific countries” did not believe that the situation amounted
to a threat to regional peace and security. He added that the problems in Myanmar were largely
the internal affairs of a sovereign state and the Government and other groups should be allowed
to continue their efforts towards reconciliation.[15] To sum up, the implication of relevant
actors further bolstered the Chinese position and gave Beijing the chance to build regional
confidence, fancying itself as a stakeholder in sync with the other players in Southeast Asia.
[16]
4.4 The Case of Sudan and the Chinese Opposition to Extend the UN
Sanctions Regime in 2007
Economic co-operation lies at the forefront of contemporary China-Sudan relations.
Through its diplomatic relations and growing economic role, not to mention through its
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cooperation on military affairs and trade in arms, China has already impacted the internal affairs
of Sudan, as of many other African countries. The case illustrates the implementation of several
Chinese foreign policy objectives, such as preservation of access to vital resources, expansion
of markets, and maintaining diplomatic leverage in the UN and other forums on human rights
and trade issues.
Whenever the issue of Darfur was put on the UN Security Council agenda, China
abstained (i.e. SC Resolutions 1556/2004, 1564/2005, 1591/2005, 1593/2005, 1672/2006,
1679/2006). Most of the documents called for the imposition of travel and financial sanctions
on Sudan under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The UN had authorized an arms embargo on
Darfur in 2004 and broadened it in 2005, with Chinese acquiescence. Nevertheless, despite
international calls for a further extension of the regime in 2007, China opposed. Beijing argued
that Darfur was an internal affair that should have been solved by Sudan's government, assisted
by regional organizations, such as the African Union. Obviously, China was against the
adoption of extended restrictive measures, as "experience shows that sanctions could not reach
the expected results and victimized the civilian population.”[17] China voted against
supplementary restrictive measures on Sudan, despite several statements to the contrary made
by the British, American and French diplomatic representatives. Nonetheless, the procedures
within the Security Council did not reach the stage of drafting a resolution, or the casting of
votes. What are the reasons for the perceived passivity of the Security Council in this regard?
On one hand, China acted as a wise negotiator and put back on track both the bilateral and the
multilateral forums of gradual dialogue (Sudan-UN-African Union). China reiterated its view
during the process that “dialogue and equal negotiation is an effective approach” to the problem.
[18] According to the statement of Liu Guijin, the Chinese Special Representative for Darfur,
“In our own way and through various means and various channels we have tried to advise the
Sudanese government to be more flexible. Even on certain issues [...] we used very direct
language to persuade them.” [19] On the other hand, parallel to this process, other significant
actors must be taken into consideration: the Russian Federation, the African Union, the Arab
League, Egypt and South Africa were all opposed to the extension of sanctions, and, despite
consistent rhetoric on the topic, there was no actual high-level pressure on behalf of the US to
conclude the problem in line with the statements.
4.5 When China Says Nothing It Actually Says a Lot: “Mr. Abstention” in the
2011 Libyan Case
Instead of casting vetoes, China seems to have adopted a strategy of abstention on UN
Security Council votes, as “a key part of its UN strategy” [20] and as a “preferred instrument of
showing its opposition” [21]. The trend has led to it being labelled “Mr. Abstention”. [22] An
important factor in China’s UN diplomacy is its deep reluctance to appear isolated and Beijing's
explanations for this approach have been remarkably consistent. Deeply embedded within
Chinese foreign policy is a preference for conflicts to be settled by the parties concerned or, as
a last resort, by regional organizations, without external intervention. Beijing has been sensitive
to the adoption of sanctions and the use of force in the UN, even before joining the international
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forum, when Chinese endorsed enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as
solely circumscribed to apartheid and colonial issues.
Against this background, the vote in the UN Security Council on March 17, 2011, when
a resolution against the Libyan government that authorized member states acting through
“regional organizations” to “take all necessary measures to protect civilians” [23] passed with
China’s abstention, appears to be a not so surprisingly deft move. Many observers precipitated
into the conclusion of a shift in the canonical principle of Chinese foreign policy, i.e. the noninterference in internal affairs of other countries. The arguments are based on the assumption
that China’s global exposure expands and diversifies, and therefore the internal affairs of other
countries have increasingly become a concern for the PRC interests. A cautious analysis of
Chinese rationale suggests that the interpretation of the abstention is too ambitious. [24]
In recent years, China’s commitment to the pure principle of non-interference has been
altered by its position on the international “trendy” intervention based on the “responsibility to
protect” doctrine. At the same time, the Chinese authorities have also consistently opposed the
use of force, with clear statements that external intervention is only permitted when authorized
by the Security Council. In his explanation of the vote on Libya, Chinese Ambassador to UN,
Mr. Li Baodong held that “China has serious concerns over some elements of the resolution”
and noted that "China has always emphasized that in its relevant actions, the Security Council
should follow the UN Charter and norms governing international law and respect the
sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Libya and resolve through peaceful
means the current crisis in Libya”. [25]
China’s decision on Libya was “the product of very particular circumstances”,
according to Ambassador Li’s statement, and in this case it found itself “boxed in”.[26] Again,
several elements contributed to this outcome. Firstly, the key regional actors were in favour of
UNSC action: "Taking into account the concerns and positions of the Arab countries and the
Arab League and the special situation in Libya at that time, China joined some other countries
to vote in abstention”, and it had “attached great importance to the requests of the Arab League
and African Union”, foreign minister Yang Jiechi stated when asked why China did not veto
the resolution. [27] In addition, the risk of isolation in the Security Council was clear, as Russia
had no intention to join for veto.
The stress on the “special circumstances” in Libya reflects the careful attention paid by
China to the creation of a possible precedent in customary international law, away from the
principle of non-interference. This is partly because it could boomerang on the internal situation
in China, i.e. Tibet and Xingjiang, and partly because the international community may put
increased pressure on its neighbours, North Korea and Burma/Myanmar, to reform.
In the same vein, following NATO airstrikes on Libya, Russia joined China in their
overt criticism of NATO’s conduct as going beyond the intent and terms of Security Council
Resolution 1973. [28] China’s statements on „responsibility to protect” (R2P) showed an
explicit concern over possible political shifts in Lybia, and therefore “there must be no attempt
at regime change or involvement in civil war by any party under the guise of protecting
civilians.” [29] This reluctance to the implementation of R2P in Libya set the scene for China’s
veto on the Syrian resolutions.
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4.6 A Smarter Hedging Power: Chinese Reactions to the Events in Syria
Learning well from the Libyan lessons, China, together with Russia, has vetoed three
Security Council draft resolutions on Syria, in October 2011, February 2012 and July 2012
respectively. [30] It is relevant to remark that Brazil, South Africa, India and Lebanon abstained
from voting on the October 2011 resolution, the representatives from Lebanon and South Africa
noting their concern to respect the “territorial integrity and sovereignty of Syria”, a situation
that did not repeat in February 2012, when all other thirteen members of the Security Council
voted in favour of the draft. Notwithstanding the more unified approach of the Council
members, Ambassador Li Baodong sought to justify the veto in part on the basis of Security
Council members remaining “seriously divided” over the issue. [31] In statements milder in
tone than those of the Russian counterparts, the Chinese representatives emphasized the
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states and noted China’s belief that the
threat of sanctions would not help to resolve the situation in Syria.
According to Yan Xuetong, a prominent Chinese strategist, the West and Arab states
did not show any appreciation for China’s effort on Libya and instead labelled China an
“irresponsible power” for not participating in the military campaign. As for China’s
international image, Yan argues “regardless of how China votes on Syria, the West will always
see China as an undemocratic country with a poor human rights record and the Arab states will
always side with the West.” [32] In fact, China adopted a smarter strategy in its own interest on
Syria than it did against Libya and instead of aligning itself with the incumbent Syrian regime
or the opposition, China has been “actively betting on both”. [33] China proposed a so-called
"third path" for Syria and soon after it cast the veto, hosted a delegation of the Syrian opposition
in Beijing to prove that it could communicate with both parties involved. It’s an example of
China guarding its substantial economic and political interests in Syria.
Note: In recent years, China ranked as Syria’s top trading partner, ahead of Russia.
Exports totalled more than $2.4 billion per year and included communications and electronic
equipment, heavy machinery and other important goods. [34] It is also an influential player in
the oil industry and has signed multibillion-dollar contracts for exploration and development
activities. China has also stepped in as a buyer of Syrian crude in the aftermath of the European
Union embargo in 2011. [35] The country also takes into careful consideration the protection
of its 1400 nationals in Syria (of which 1100 work for different corporations while the rest are
mostly students who study in Damascus). [36]
By casting its veto, China broke another pattern, that of traditionally giving weight to
regional opinion, proving that, while remaining a significant factor, it is not and has not been
conducive to meaningful alterations in the Chinese decision-making process, once superior
strategic interests are at stake. To exemplify, whereas Chinese representatives held that they
“attached great importance” to the support of the Arab League for a no-fly zone in Libya,
instead have shown no deference to the body’s recommendations with respect to Syria and
distanced itself not only from the Arab League, but also from Brazil and India, vanishing BRIC
states solidarity as well. China vetoed the resolution while insisting that it "supported the Arab
League's "good office efforts to restore stability in Syria".
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The Chinese decision has been highly controversial, given that Secretary General Ban
Ki-Moon had urged the permanent five members of the Security Council against using the veto
“in situations of manifest failure to meet obligations relating to the responsibility to protect”.
[37]
During negotiations on the draft resolution in July 2012 at both expert and permanent
representative level, Russia continued to take the position that it would vote against any draft
resolution under Chapter VII which included the threat of sanctions. It seems China was more
circumspect during negotiations in its criticism of the text, but has nevertheless clearly
expressed that it shares Russia’s position. [38] In fact, the alliance has no chance to be damaged,
since the scope of a possible foreign intervention in Syria would not be crafted as a forceful
regime change, but a ceasefire to put an end to an ongoing humanitarian disaster, followed by
an eventual political transition. A more pro-active approach of Chinese diplomacy (and signs
of it would appear soon enough) would benefit the country’s perception in the Arab world,
somehow tarnished by the Chinese veto.
Against its traditional background of foreign policy making, China has done a surprising
gesture: at the end of October 2012, it proposed a peace plan to settle the conflict, as "an
extension of China's effort to push for a political resolution of the Syrian issue". [39] The
country’s new proposal is aimed at “building international consensus and supporting Brahimi's
mediation efforts and push forward for relevant parties in Syria to realize an early ceasefire and
end of violence, and launch a political transition process led by the Syrian people at an early
date." [40] The key points are rather vague, but what is important here is the symbolic message.
With the US and the EU not able or not interested enough to bring the Syrian crisis to an end,
China stepped in to avoid a more and more possible spill–over effect of instability in the entire
Middle East region, detrimental to the Chinese economic interests. As Ian Bremmer holds, this
step “is symptomatic of China’s new approach, one that Hu Jintao hinted at in one of his final
addresses as Chinese president. He said China would “get more actively involved in
international affairs, (and) play its due role of a major responsible country.” In the wake of
downturns in the West, there is a new diplomatic structure emerging. China is determined to be
one of its architects.” [41]
5 Conclusion
The Chinese behaviour in the UN reveals a clearly crafted hierarchy of interests: the
major powers are pivotal, neighbouring countries are a priority as a strategic hinterland,
developing countries are the foundation and multilateral relations are vital as one of its basic
foreign policy guidelines, conducted at the highest level, with the United Nations as a growingly
significant arena. In the years and decades to come, the UN will evolve differently, and in some
respects, away from the U.S.-influenced philosophical foundations upon which they were built.
Institutional policies and governance structures will gradually shift to reflect the priorities,
needs, and interests of a wider range of countries. New organizations, built upon a different set
of assumptions and philosophies, will come into being, and in some instances, challenge the
relevance of their predecessors. For the Western powers it is of utmost importance to bear in
187
mind that the most powerful strategic weapon is the ability to decide what sort of international
order will be in place to welcome China at the Great Table.
Against this background of continuous changes, the EU needs flexibility and
adaptability in approaching its relationship with China. With the establishment of the External
Action Service, the challenge for the EU will be to articulate a coherent vision of engagement
with old and emerging structures of global governance and to put in place concrete strategies
for dealing with China. The Union must establish a unitary position in relation to UN reform,
in order to be taken seriously as a leader with global reach. The EU also needs to meet the
Chinese preference for multilateral formats based on informal, consensual procedures and
concentrate on practical, new mechanisms for cooperation.
Still reluctant to take the lead on sensitive issues, China will likely continue to act as a
status-quo oriented nation, despite its growing use of power within the Security Council. At the
same time, its successful diplomacy in other UN forums proves that it is an increasingly
challenging actor capable of imprinting its mark and even shifting organizational policies that
were considered default until recently. These trends are also a reflection of the two diverging
tendencies existing within the Chinese decision-making elite: one relatively liberal, open to
cooperation in a multilateral framework, focusing on economic policies, and the other more
nationalistic in its approach, focused on robust foreign policy making and defence policies,
rather cautious about opening too much in front of the outside world.
On a long term basis, though, a more confident and assertive military, along with China's
ballooning appetite for foreign natural resources, could be steadily undermining Beijing's longheld foreign policy of cooperation and inoffensiveness. China will use its rising influence to
shape, to the extent that it can, the rules of the game. There is already increasing sensitivity
within international institutions to the question: “What will China think? - another sign that
China “casts a large shadow” within the organizations it participates in, and is able to wield
influence directly and indirectly, in a variety of subtle, and not so subtle ways.
References:
[1]
Stephen Olson, Clyde Prestowitz, The Evolving Role of China in International Institutions, January 2011,
prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commision, available at:
http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2011/TheEvolvingRoleofChinainInternationalInstitutions.pdf
[2]
Joel Wuthnow, China’s Troubling Syria Veto, The Diplomat, Feb.16, 2012.
[3]
Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War, Asia in World
Politics, 2012
[4]
It should be noticed that it was not an impediment for China’s decision not to veto the UN operation in
Haiti in 2010, despite its recognition of Taiwan, due to very special humanitarian circumstances.
[5]
Mark
Leonard,
Unrestricted
Warfare,
February
6,
2009,
available
at
http://www.adbusters.org/magazine/79/unrestricted_warfare.html
[6]
Literally, it means “two-faced, three knives “(idiom); double-cross, double dealing and back stabbing;
i.e. one sword usually has two edges, but some swords have three edges. This suggests a tricky and dishonest
Pyongyang towards Beijing – a third sword edge.
[7]
SC Document SC/RES/1718, Oct, 14, 2006
188
UN Security Council, Acting Unanimously, Condemns in Strongest Terms Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea Nuclear Test, Toughens Sanctions, SC/9679, Security Council 6141st Meeting (June 12, 2009),
www.un.org
[9]
Michael Fullilove, China and the United Nations: The Stakeholder Spectrum, 34 Washington Quarterly,
2011 (quoting a UN official)
[10]
SC, Verbatim, S/PV.5612, December 23, 2006
[11]
China, U.S. Discuss Iran Nuclear Impasse, AFP, February 26, 2008
China Says Sanctions Not Meant to Punish Iran, AFP, March 4, 2008
[12]
Yitzhak Shichor, China's Voting Behaviour in the UN Security Council, September 6, 2006,
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=32007&tx_ttnews%5Bback
Pid%5D=196&no_cache=1
[13]
Ken Sofer, China and the Collapse of its Non-Interventionist Foreign Policy, Center for American
Progress, March 8, 2012
[14]
SC Document S/2007/14 January, 2007
[15]
Statement from Security Council Meeting on the Situation in Burma, Jan. 12, 2007, Security Council
Chamber,
excerpts
available
at
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/Excerpted%20Statements%20from%20SC%20meeting%20on%20B
urma.pdf
[16]
Despite its veto cast on Burma/Myanmar, China played an essential part in arranging a visa for UN
Special Envoy to Myanmar and ensuring access to key personnel in Yangon.
[17]
Security Council document, SC/8700, April 25, 2007
[18]
Mr. Qin Gang, spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 15, 2007
[19]
Alec Russell and Willam Wallis, Beijing Puts Quiet Pressure on Sudan, Financial Times, June 19, 2007
[20]
Della Fok, The Emergence of a Superpower: China’s UN Policies from 1971 to Present, Duke E. Asia
Nexus, May 12, 2011
[21]
Nicola Contessi, Multilateralism, Intervention and Norm Contestation: China’s Stance on Darfur in the
UN Security Council, 41 Security Dialogue, 2010;
[22]
Cary Huang, For Beijing, It’s No More Mr. Abstention, China News Watch, Feb. 28, 2012
[23]
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, UN Doc S/RES/1973, March 17, 2011
[24]
Yun Sun, China’s Acquiescence on UNSCR 1973: No Big Deal, available at
http://csis.org/files/publication/pac1120.pdf
[25]
Explanation of Vote by Ambassador Li Baodong after Adoption of Security Council Resolution on Libya,
Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN, March 17, 2011
[26]
Fullilove, op. cit, p.72
[27]
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/commentary/the-china-post/frank-ching/2012/02/15/331682/p1/UNveto.htm
[28]
For the Chinese reaction, see Ambassador Li Baodong, Statement at Security Council Open Debate on
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, May 10, 2011
[29]
Ibid, note 29
[30]
On October 4, 2011 Russia and China vetoed a draft resolution condemning the Syrian crackdown on
protesters, with Brazil, India, Lebanon and South Africa abstaining; the February 4th, 2012 draft resolution
condemned the violence in Syria and supported the Arab League’s decision to facilitate a Syrian-led political
transition. Russia and China vetoed the text, with all other Council members voting in favour. On July 19, 2012,
a UK draft resolution was vetoed by China and Russia, with abstentions by Pakistan and South Africa
[31]
United Nations Document, Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Syria as Russian
Federation, China Veto Text Supporting Arab League’s Proposed Peace Plan, UN Doc SC/10536, 6711th
Meeting, Feb. 4, 2012;
[32]
Cited by Yun Sun in Syria: What China has Learned from its Libya Experience, 152 Asia Pacific
Bulletin (2012), http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/apb152_1.pdf
[33]
Yun Sun, op.cit.
[8]
189
[34]
Joel Wuthnow, Why China Would Intervene in Syria, July 16, 2012, The National Interest, available at
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/why-china-would-intervene-syria-7197
[35]
Ibid, note 29
[36]
Data according to a CCTV piece of news, available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W9d8twchIAk
[37]
Ian Williams, Ban Ki Moon and R2P, Foreign Policy in Focus, Aug. 3, 2009
[38]
Security Council Report,
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/syria/index.php?page=4
[39]
Chinese Foreign Minister Hong Lei, on the 30th of October 2012, http://www.reuters.com
[40]
Ibid.
[41]
Ian Bremmer, In Syria - a Rare Chinese Foray into Foreign Policy, available at:
http://blogs.reuters.com/ian-bremmer/2012/11/20/in-syria-a-rare-chinese-foray-into-foreign-policy/
Acknowledgement:
This paper is financially supported within the project entitled “Horizon 2020 - Doctoral
and Postdoctoral Studies: Promoting the National Interest through Excellence,
Competitiveness and Responsibility in the Field of Romanian Fundamental and Applied
Scientific Research”, contract number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/140106. This project is cofinanced by European Social Fund through Sectorial Operational Program for Human
Resources Development 2007-2013. Investing in people!
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