Book Review: Racing the Enemy
By Jim Miles
Racing the Enemy – Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of
Japan.
2005.
Tsuyoshi Hasegawa.
Belknap Press, Harvard University,
The end of the Second World War with Japan is a story of the
clashes of three empires – the struggling Soviets, the decline
of the Japanese, and the ascendancy of the American. The
common media perception is that the use of the atomic bombs
ended the war, and while that is part of the picture, it
misses several other nuances that played critical roles in the
ending of the war. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa in his work Racing the
Enemy provides a history of the critical months of the summer
of 1945 that demonstrates the culpability of all three empires
leading to the use of these weapons of mass destruction. It
also serves as a story of the empirical elites working towards
their own advantage, regardless of outcomes for others.
It is the idea of the atomic bomb itself that creates an
unusual image of immense destruction, as the U.S., Britain,
and Germany had all used mass carpet bombings to try and force
the opposition to quit the war. The overall result in all
affected areas was a stiffening resolve against the
perpetrators of the other side (a lesson not yet learned in
Iraq and Afghanistan). Incendiary bombings had already
obliterated several cities and hundreds of thousands of lives
before the atomic bomb became operational (Dresden, Hamburg,
Tokyo). According to Hasegawa, while the Japanese were
impressed by the power of the bomb, its actual destructiveness
and its threatening power were not the main reasons for ending
the war.
Hasegawa’s
picture
of
the
summer
of
1945
is
one
of
manipulations and deceit involving all three parties, with
very few of the motives being altruistic and humanitarian but
rather mostly geopolitical.
The triangulations of power
involved the expected entry of the Soviet forces into the war
with Japan, a concept that the Japanese remained out of tune
with real Soviet intentions until the end. It also involved
American concerns about Soviet power and the occupation of
Japan’s northern island of Hokkaido, although there were only
minimal concerns about the Soviet occupation of the Southern
Kurils as was agreed to in principle at the Yalta conference.
The main American concerns for the war was the possible
necessity of having to invade the mainland and the probable
entry of the Soviets into the war that would add complications
to both post war occupation and treaties, as well as
geopolitical concerns for the future. Along with all this was
the ongoing development of the atomic bomb.
Thus Hasegawa’s title stands clearly defined.
He presents a
story that clearly shows the three combatants trying to ‘race’
each other to a conclusion of the war that satisfied one or
more of their own major concerns. As it was, none of the three
escape criticism for actually extending the war, as the race
involved purposeful roadblocks along the way as one side or
the other tried to manipulate the situation in their favour –
not surprising in a war, but not normally as clearly defined
in history texts either.
The ‘story’ is clearly told, and unlike many history texts
provides a compelling narrative that includes much anecdotal
material from diaries and war records on all three sides of
the conflict. It remains an academic history, the story of the
elite policy makers and how their decisions reflect more the
future geopolitical needs of the respective countries/empires
than concerns for any citizens in harms way.
Most critical to the discussion is Hasagawa’s presentation of
the Potsdam ultimatum. First, the ultimatum was not delivered
through diplomatic channels (i.e. using the neutrality of
Sweden and Switzerland to deliver the message) and “was issued
as propaganda through the Office of War information.”
Truman’s citation of newspaper editorials does not serve as
proof of the “prompt rejection” of the ultimatum by the
Japanese rulers, or “that the reaction of the Japanese
government was entirely different from what Radio Tokyo had
reported” as the government was divided as how to approach the
issue. Rather, the Japanese reception was to reserve comment
on the ultimatum, “that the Japanese government suspended
judgment on the Potsdam ultimatum.”
The ultimatum did not include any message about one of the
over-riding concerns of the rulers of Japan that the Imperial
house be preserved (a natural response of self preservation
for all ‘supreme’ rulers). There is considerable discussion on
this issue, with Hasagawa’s focus being that Truman needed and
indeed wanted the Potsdam ultimatum to be rejected in order to
use the atomic weapons:
one cannot escape the conclusion that the United States rushed
to drop the bomb without any attempt to explore the readiness
of some Japanese policymakers to seek peace through the
ultimatum.
Why
the
rush?
In
Hasagawa’s
interpretation
the
bomb
represented a solution to three dilemmas faced by Truman:
“unconditional surrender, the cost of Japan’s homeland
invasion, and Soviet entry into the war.” The bomb itself did
not solve any of these issues, but Truman’s temporary
jubilance at its success was “because of the satisfaction that
everything had gone as he had planned.”
Japan’s reaction was in a sense under whelming. Already
subject to fierce fire bombings that had killed hundreds of
thousands of civilians, the bomb “did not lead to their
decision to accept the Potsdam terms…[but] further contributed
to their desperate efforts to terminate the war through
Moscow’s mediation… Indeed, Soviet attack, not the Hiroshima
bomb, convinced political leaders to end the war by accepting
the Potsdam declaration.”
While the Potsdam ultimatum receives some of Hasagawa’s
strongest critique, his conclusion finds all parties guilty
for delaying the war even further than had been necessary.
Truman “needed Japan’s refusal to justify the use of the
atomic bomb…thus…he could not include the provision providing
a constitutional monarchy” in the ultimatum. The Soviets
continually mislead the Japanese as to their intentions
concerning the Neutrality Pact between the two, and
“Ironically, both Stalin and Truman had vested interests in
keeping unconditional surrender [no monarchy] for different
reasons.” While the two atomic bombs alone “would most likely
not have prompted the Japanese to surrender…the war most
likely would have ended shortly after Soviet entry into the
war – before November 1.”
Overall, while there were alternatives available to all three
sides that could have allowed the war to terminate sooner
without the use of the atomic bombs, political concerns,
rather than military ones (or concerns about civilian deaths)
carried the weight in the decisions. While the use of the
atomic bomb can be seen as an atrocity, it is an atrocity that
is not greater than the fire bombings on all sides, of the war
crimes committed by the Japanese in China and Korea and other
theatres of operation. While decisions by the Soviets and the
Americans could have ended the war sooner without the
catastrophe of using atomic weapons, Hasagawa lays the main
blame on the Japanese policymakers who “must bear the
responsibility for the war’s destructive end more than the
American president and the Soviet dictator.”
While this is truly history now, not current events, its
ramifications are obvious for our current world situation. The
Japanese still have not resolved their war crimes issues with
China. Japan’s ‘defence’ forces are among the world’s largest
military forces, and even with a ‘peace’ constitution, Japan
has enough plutonium – and the technology – available to make
dozens of nuclear warheads. The issue of the Kuril Islands
still interferes with Russian-Japanese politics, even after
the dissolution of the Soviet empire. The Americans in some
respects still occupy Japan after sixty years, with Japan a
nominal independent and democratic country.
In an even broader perspective, the narrative of war, this war
or any other, as presented by historians at the politicalstrategic level clearly demonstrates how empires are about
power and control of heartlands and hinterlands regardless of
the wishes of the majority of citizens. Those same citizens
unfortunately are subject to ongoing propaganda in the form of
out and out rhetoric and uber-patriotism, combined with the
more nuanced propaganda from the education systems and
dominant media of their respective elites.
The current geopolitical struggles of the world over the oil
and strategic importance of the Middle East and Central Asia
continues this pattern. Our societies are now determined by
our access to formerly cheap oil; the military relies on that
oil for their dominance over other players; the elites wish to
retain their hold on power, their hold on the resources of the
world for their own benefit.
The narrative continues, an
ongoing history punctuated by dates of conflict that are truly
a series of encounters for empires to control and dominate
other people and their resources.
To bring this back from that philosophical tangent, Hasagawa’s
interpretations should be a must read for anyone interested in
how the final acts of the Second World War set the stage for
our current geopolitical encounters. In reality, the American
empire, the Russians, Chinese, and Indians are still Racing
the Enemy in an ongoing battle for the world’s resources.
-Jim Miles is a Canadian educator and a regular
contributor/columnist of opinion pieces and book reviews for
The Palestine Chronicle. Miles’ work is also presented
globally through other alternative websites and news
publications.