THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY BASIS FOR DEFENSE
MOBILIZATION IN CHINA
Lonnie D. Henley
RAND/CNA Conference on Chinese Mobilization
Warrenton, Virginia
February 2005
USE LAW TO STRICTLY GOVERN THE ARMY
The People’s Liberation Army finds itself in 2005 somewhat past half-way in a forty-year
effort to transform itself into a competent modern military force. There are many aspects of this
ambitious undertaking, from its highly visible acquisition of 1990s-technology military hardware,
to equally vital but much less dramatic reforms of personnel systems, fiscal management,
logistics structure, maintenance procedures, staff processes, education and training, and all the
other sinews of a professional military organization. This paper examines the intersection of two
of these essential reforms, military laws and regulations on the one hand, and national defense
mobilization on the other.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, the PLA and its political masters have sought to develop for
the first time a relatively complete set of statutes and regulations to provide clear legal
underpinning for military activities. This may be viewed as part of two larger trends, the
Communist Party regime’s overall effort to implement rule by law (if not necessarily rule of law)
throughout Chinese government and society, and the PLA’s Herculean effort to standardize,
regularize, and codify its operational and managerial processes. By this author’s count, at least
169 military-related laws and high-level regulations (enacted at the Military Region level or
above) have appeared since 1995, and innumerable lower-level implementing regulations. Twothirds of those have been since 2000, and the flow looks set to continue at the same pace for
several more years at least.
The overall slogan for this effort is “use law to strictly govern the army” (yīfǎ cóngyán
zhìjūn; 依法从严治军), echoing the broader “use law to govern the country (yīfǎ zhìguó; 依法治
国).1 The slogan reportedly first appeared in local commentaries in the mid-1980s, gained central
Lonnie Henley is a senior analyst with CENTRA Technology, Inc. The views in this chapter are
those of the author, and do not necessarily represent those of his employer or its clients.
1 “Woguo junshi fazhi jianshe jincheng jiakuai” (我国军事法制建设进程加快) [Accelerate
Development of China’s Military Legal System], Fazhi Ribao (法制日报) [Legal Daily], December 23,
2001, http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/gb/content/2001-12/23/content_29349.htm, accessed March 2004. All
translations are by the author unless otherwise noted.
support in early 1990, and was established as official strategic direction by Central Military
Commission Jiang Zemin in early 1991.2 The slogan gained legal weight when it was written
into the 1997 National Defense Law,3 and the legal reform effort is cited as a major goal of the
PLA Tenth Five Year Plan (2001-2005).4
The other major trend is in development of the national defense mobilization system. The
system is discussed in more detail by other authors in this volume, so need only be summarized
here. The effort to revitalize defense mobilization is considerably more complex than many other
aspects of the PLA standardization, regularization, and codification program. Mobilization issues
involve relationships between the armed forces and governmental organs at the central, provincial
and local level; relationships between active forces and the PLA’s extensive institutional support
base, parts of which are in the active and reserve components and other parts of which are civilian
or paramilitary in nature; and above all the multi-sided relationship among military forces,
government offices, and an increasingly complex array of state-owned, collective-owned,
individually owned, joint-venture, and wholly foreign-owned businesses and enterprises in
China’s rapidly-evolving “socialist market economic system.”5 Owing both to a later start and
the enormous difficulty of the task, the development of mobilization laws and regulations lags
behind other aspects of the evolving military legal system, an issue we shall discuss at more
length below.
The rapid evolution of the Chinese economy, particularly the blossoming of the private
sector since about 1990, has made the need for a new legal basis for defense mobilization all the
more pressing. For the first 40-50 years of the People’s Republic, government administrative
actions were a fully adequate foundation for mobilization activities. Military organizations stated
their needs for manpower, transportation, supply, maintenance, and other resources from the
civilian economy. Government offices developed mobilization plans, and issued administrative
orders directing the appropriate preparations or initiating war mobilization when required.
Virtually all businesses and enterprises were state-owned and responded to the government
Gao Xiaming 高遐明, “Xin shiqi guofang he jundui fazhi jianshe de zhinan – xuexi Jiang Zemin
junshi fazhi sixiang de tihui” (新时期国防和军队法制建设的指南 – 学习江泽民军事法制思想的体会)
[Guidance for National Defense and Army Legal Building in the New Period – A Study of Jiang Zemin’s
Thought of Military Legal System], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (中国军事科学) [China Military Science],
Vol. 16 No. 1 (2003), pp. 51-58.
3 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guofang Fa (中华人民共和国国防法) [National Defense Law of
the People’s Republic of China], Article 28.
4 “‘Yi fa zhi jun’ xieru ‘shi wu’ jihua gangyao” (“依法治军”写入“十五”计划纲要) [‘Use law to
govern the military’ is written into the outline for the Tenth Five Year Plan], Jiefangjun Bao, March 7,
2001, http://www.pladaily.com.cn/gb/pladaily/2001/03/07/20010307001005_TodayNews.html.
5 Wang Fuju 王福巨, ed., Jiaotong Dongyuan Xue 《交通动员学》[The Science of Transportation
Mobilization], Beijing: Junshi Kexue Chubanshe, 2004, p. 190.
2
2
directives as a matter of course, with the Party and militia structures within the enterprise serving
as the organizational framework for support to the armed forces. Almost everyone was assigned
to a work unit (dānwèi, 单位) which controlled every aspect of their lives, from job assignment to
housing to marriage licenses and birth control. Beijing presided over an official and unofficial
bureaucratic structure stretching down to every worker, warehouse, truck and phone switch in the
country. In the classic Maoist system, war mobilization was an administrative issue wholly
within the regime’s bureaucratic control.
Clearly, China is not like that any more. Local governments have more autonomy and a
different set of priorities than the armed forces, but that is the least of the PLA’s mobilization
problems. The central issue is that with the evolution of the market economy, a large proportion
of the resources the PLA might want to mobilize are in private hands, not part of any
government-controlled work unit, and the danwei that do still exist have a much reduced span of
control over people and resources. An administrative order from the State Council is still
sufficient to reassign government-owned or state enterprise-owned resources, but is not a
sufficient legal basis for mobilizing collective-owned or private property. A recent article from
Shandong Military District noted that a 1993 administrative regulation directs enterprises to
support militia, reserve, and mobilization activities, but there is no such requirement in either the
Enterprise Law or Companies Law. The authors complained that some companies, especially
collective-owned and privately-owned firms, use the lack of clear law on the subject as an excuse
to evade their national defense responsibilities, a problem they hoped would be rectified in the
forthcoming Militia Law. “The approach of relying on administrative orders is already unsuited
to development in the new circumstances,” they argued.6
In a major war or serious emergency, of course, the state would have no qualms about
seizing whatever it needed. But ad hoc requisitioning would not be nearly as effective as a well
planned, detailed mobilization that had been organized, rehearsed and incorporated in militia
training over many years. Such methodical organization and training requires the cooperation of
property owners, not to mention of the crew and operators who must be mobilized along with
their vehicles and facilities. Disregard for property rights would also seriously disrupt other
aspects of economic and social development that are high national priorities. So the Party and
government see a need for better legal underpinnings for defense mobilization, as for many other
aspects of China’s internal evolution.
Dong Zhikui 董智奎, Wang Qingjun 王庆军, and Zhang Yongkun 张永坤, “Yao mingque qiye
zhua minbing gongzuo de zhineng he renwu” (要明确企业抓民兵工作的职能和任务) [We must clarify
the function and duties of enterprises in grasping militia work], Zhongguo Minbing [China Militia] No.
229, October 2003, http://www.pladaily.com.cn/item/zgmb/200310/txt/10.htm. The authors are assigned to
the Mobilization Department of Shandong Military District.
6
3
At the same time, the “worldwide new revolution in military affairs,” as the Chinese call it,
and the “twin historic missions of mechanization and informationization” make the PLA’s
mobilization needs much more complex. The kinds of mobilization support needed in the past
remain important – additional troops and laborers, defense of vital facilities, transportation
services, dual-use materials and supplies, political motivation of the civilian populace, etc. But
the shift to more high-technology forms of warfare, by both the PLA and its potential
enemies(-y), creates a new range of additional requirements, from mobilizing technical specialists
to supplement the PLA’s organic repair and maintenance capabilities, to organizing urban air
defense observer nets to supplement radar surveillance, to rallying legions of patriotic hackers for
“people’s war under informationized conditions.”7 The PLA’s increasingly serious consideration
of the requirements for an invasion of Taiwan have also highlighted the need for a more
structured approach to the use of civilian shipping.8 All in all, life is not nearly as simple as it
once was for the Chinese mobilization planner.
THE CHINESE MILITARY LEGAL SYSTEM
Before considering mobilization laws and regulation, let us take a broader look at the
overall PLA legal structure. The Chinese use the term “legislation” (lìfǎ; 立法) to encompass
both enactment of statutes by the National People’s Congress, and regulatory rule-making by
Central or lower-level government, Party, and military organizations. There are several broad
categories of laws and regulations in the Chinese system:9
- Laws (fǎlǜ; 法律) enacted by the National People’s Congress (NPC) or its Standing
Committee (NPC SC).
- Administrative regulations (xíngzhèng fǎguī; 行政法规) enacted by the State Council or
Central Military Commission. Decrees passed by provincial People’s Congresses or municipal
councils are also classed as fagui (administrative regulations) of a local nature, rather than falü
(laws).
Chen Ke 陈克, “Guanyu xinxihua tiaojian xia renmin zhanzheng de tantao” (关于信息化条件下
人民战争的探讨) [An exploration of peoples war under informationized conditions], Zhongguo Guofang
Bao [Chinese National Defense], September 29, 2003, p. 3,
http://www.pladaily.com.cn/gb/pladaily/2003/09/29/20030929001216_gdyl.html.
8 For more detailed examination of this issue, see Kevin Pollpeter’s chapter in this volume, and
Lonnie Henley, “PLA Logistics Reform Five Years On,” presented at the RAND/CNA Conference on PLA
Logistics and Sustainment, December 2003, Warrenton VA; conference volume forthcoming.
9 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lifa Fa 《中华人民共和国立法法》[Legislative Law of the
People’s Republic of China], Chinese text at various places including http://www.lawlib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=105, English translation at
ttp://www.eastlaw.net/service/datacnlaw/code/admin/legislation.htm.
7
4
- Other regulations and rules (guīzhāng; 规章) enacted by ministries and offices of the
State Council or lower level governmental offices to implement laws or fagui, or to deal with
local or technical issues.
An alternative categorization of military laws and regulations groups them as follows:10
- Laws on national defense (guófáng fǎlǜ;国防法律)
- Regulations of the armed forces (jūnduì fǎguī; 军队法规)
- Military criminal laws (jūnshì xíngshì fǎlǜ; 军事刑事法律)
- Laws of war (zhànzhēng fǎlǜ; 战争法律)
Regulatory documents issued within the two broad categories of fagui and guizhang will
not have those words in the title, but rather will be called Regulations, Provisions, Procedures,
Rules, etc. More on terminology below.
In the military structure, the Central Military Commission (CMC) is empowered in the
Legislative Law to issue fagui separately or in conjunction with the State Council.11 Among key
regulations by the CMC issued in recent years is the 2003 Regulation on Military Regulations
(Jūnshì fǎguī jūnshì guīzhāng tiáolì,《军事法规军事规章条例》), which stipulates that the
authority to issue fagui is limited to the CMC itself, while authority to issue guizhang is delegated
to the General Departments, services, and Military Regions.12
In theory, the Ministry of National Defense has the same regulatory authority as any other
ministry or commission of the State Council, but in practice its name has not appeared on any
military regulation found by this author.
10 Xu Jiangrui 许江瑞 and Zhao Xiaodong 赵晓冬, Junshi Fa Jiaocheng 《军事法教程》[Military
Law Course Textbook ], Beijing: Junshi Kexue Chubanshe, 2003.
11 Legislative Law Article 93.
12 Jinshi Fagui yu Junshi Guizhang Tiaoli《军事法规军事规章条例》[Regulation on Military
Regulations], April 2003, Chinese text published in Jiefangjun Bao April 5, 2003,
http://www.pladaily.com.cn/gb/pladaily/2003/04/05/20030405001005_Army.html.
5
Table One: A note on terminology
PLA laws and regulations have one of several different terms in the title, all of which are
translated as “regulation, rule, ordinance” etc. in any Chinese-English dictionary. The terms
seem to have specific meaning in the Chinese system, however, and in order to preserve the
distinctions in translation, I propose the following lexicon, in rough order of legal precedence:
- fǎ 法: Law
- fǎguī 法规 and guīzhāng 规章: I cannot find English terms that reflect the overarching
nature of these two categories, so I propose to simply leave them as fagui and
guizhang. These terms do not appear in the titles of specific regulations.
- tōngzhī 通知: Circular. These and the two following categories (Opinions and
Resolutions) tend to be authoritative statements by the State Council, Central
Committee, Central Military Commission, or other senior body, not enacted through
legislative procedures under the Constitution and Legislative Law, and not structured
as formal regulations, but having the practical force of law.
- yìjian 意见: Opinion.
- juéyì 决议. Resolution.
- gāngyào 纲要: Outline. These are top-level military regulatory documents, ranking
above tiaoling, tiaoli, and other military regulations.
- dàgāng 大纲: Outline. Apparently not as broad-ranging as gangyao; only seen so far in
the title of training regulations.
- tiáolìng 条令 and tiáolì 条例: Regulation. I cannot determine a difference between
these two types of documents, so I propose the same term for both. These seem to
rank just below gangyao.
- guīdìng 规定: Provisions.
- bànfǎ 办法: Procedures.
- gōngzuò tiáolì 工作条例: Work Regulations. These seem to be a lower order of
creature than tiaoli or tiaoling, although there are major exceptions, such as the 2004
Political Work Regulations.
- gàizé 概则: Principles.
- guīfàn 规范: Standards.
- biāozhǔn 标准: Standards. (My thesaurus begins to fail me.)
- guīzé 规则: Rule.
- xìzé 细则: Rule.
- guīchéng 规程: Rule.
6
The Regulation on Military Regulations specifies that the following issues are reserved for
fagui enacted by the CMC itself or by General Departments when specifically delegated to do so
by the CMC:13
(1) The organization and structure of the People’s Liberation Army;
(2) The duties and responsibilities of the General Departments, Military Services, Military
Regions and comparable level units;
(3) The basic organizational structure of the People’s Liberation Army military, political,
logistical, and armaments establishments;
(4) The People’s Liberation Army’s system of rewards and punishments;
(5) Issues that require enactment of military fagui in order to implement the provisions of
legal statute;
(6) Other provisions that fall under the authority of the Central Military Commission.
For other issues, the General Departments may enact guizhang pertaining to the entire
PLA, and military services and Military Regions may enact guizhang pertaining to their own
territorial or functional jurisdiction.14 The Regulation does not specifically grant these entities
the right to further delegate authority for guizhang.
The top entity in the PLA rule-making system is the Legal System Office of the CMC
(Zhōngyāng jūnshì wěiyuánhuì fǎzhì jú; 中央军事委员会法制局).15 It compiles a five-year
CMC Legislative Plan (Zhōngyāng jūnwěi lìfǎ guīhuà; 中央军委立法规划) with input from
subordinate Legal System Offices at the General Department, service, and Military Region level,
in accordance with the broader objectives of the Armed Forces Mid- and Long-term Development
Plan (Jūnduì jiànshè zhōng-chángqī jìhuà; 军队建设中长期计划). Annual legislative plans at
each level implement the objectives of the CMC five-year plan.16
Although it is outside the scope of this discussion, the Commission on National Defense
Industry, Science, and Technology (COSTIND – 国防科学技术工业委员会) issues regulations
for defense industry in a role parallel to that of the CMC, although COSTIND seems to be limited
to guizhang-level rules. COSTIND also issues some rules governing civilian industry, such as the
2004 Licensing Procedures for Safe Production of Civilian Explosives.17
Regulation on Military Regulations, Articles 7 and 8.
Regulation on Military Regulations, Articles 9 and 10.
15 “Yu shi ju jin de junshi lifa – 2002 nian junshi lifa chengjiu huimou” (与时俱进的军事立法 —
—2002 年军事立法成就回眸) [Military legislation keeps up with the times – a retrospective on the
achievements in military rule-making in 2002], Fazhi Ribao (法制日报) [Legal Daily], December 31,
2002, http://www.law.com.cn/pg/newsShow.php?Id=7234.
16 Regulation on Military Regulations, Articles 15-18.
17 “Guofang Kegong Wei guanyu yinfa ‘minyong baopo qicai anquan shengchan xukezheng shishi
banfa’ de tongzhi” (国防科工委关于印发《民用爆破器材安全生产许可证实施办法》的通知)
13
14
7
LAWS ON NATIONAL DEFENSE MOBILIZATION
The entities described above have enacted a wide range of laws and regulations relevant to
national defense mobilization. A few deal specifically with mobilization topics; others address
mobilization issues in the context of broader military functions.
Components of National Defense Mobilization
The Chinese definition of “national defense mobilization,” also called “war mobilization,”
includes the following components:18
-
Mobilization of the armed forces (wǔzhuāng lìliàng dòngyuán; 武装力量动员):
rapidly shifting military units from peacetime to wartime footing; mobilization of
reserve units, armed police units, and militia organizations; making up shortfalls of
personnel, weapons, or equipment; and reorganizing or enlarging military units as
necessary.
-
Mobilization of the civilian economy (jīngjì dòngyuán; 经济动员): putting the
economy on a wartime footing and mustering national economic resources to support
armed forces materiel requirements. (Fiscal needs fall under a separate category
below.)
-
Mobilization of communication and transportation (jiāotōng yùnshū dòngyuán; 交
通运输动员): vehicles, aircraft, and vessels, transportation facilities and equipment,
transportation service personnel, transportation-related supplies and parts, roads,
ports, and airfields.
-
Mobilization of post and telecommunications (yóu-diàn tōngxìn dòngyuán; 邮电通
信动员): all electronic and hard-copy information systems; a component of economic
mobilization.
-
Medical mobilization (wèishēng lìliàng dòngyuán; 卫生力量动员): hospitals and
medical personnel, supplies, and equipment; local government health and sanitation
departments; manpower for stretcher and evacuation teams, etc.
-
Financial and monetary mobilization (cáizhèng jīnróng dòngyuán; 财政金融动员):
central and local government fiscal resources to underwrite mobilization, including
funds to compensate owners whose resources were requisitioned for military use.
[COSTIND Circular on the Publication of the Licensing Procedures for Safe Production of Civilian
Explosives], http://www.costind.gov.cn/htm/zcfg/zcfg_brow.asp?xh=66.
18 China War Mobilization Encyclopedia Editorial Committee, Zhongguo Zhanzheng Dongyuan
Baikequanshu 《中国战争动员百科全书》[China War Mobilization Encyclopedia], Beijing: Junshi
Kexue Chubanshe, 2003, pp. 4-9, 81-206 ff.
8
-
Science and technology mobilization (kēxué jìshù dòngyuán; 科学技术动员): S&T
personnel, equipment, funds, and other resources from government S&T
departments, research institutions, state-owned enterprises, and private businesses to
support accelerated military research and development as well as to help operate and
maintain military systems.
-
People’s air defense mobilization (rénmín fángkōng dòngyuán; 人民防空动员):
civil defense protective measures to minimize civilian casualties; early warning
networks to assist detection and engagement of enemy aircraft; camouflage and other
measures to protect key facilities; rapid repair teams to minimize the impact of
enemy air strikes.
-
Political mobilization (zhèngzhì dòngyuán; 政治动员): “patriotic education and
political encouragement” to maintain support for the war and bolster the will to fight,
both among the general public and within the armed forces; public diplomacy to
enlist foreign sympathy and support for the Chinese cause.
-
“Support the front” mobilization (zhīyuán qiánxiàn dòngyuán; 支援前线动员):
manual labor to move supplies; requisition of local resources and equipment; morale
support efforts, etc.
Absence of several basic laws on defense mobilization
There are specific regulations on a few aspects of national defense mobilization, but there
are major gaps in the legal and regulatory structure. The most glaring is the absence of a
fundamental law on the subject. PLA delegates to the National People’s Congress (NPC) have
called year after year for early enactment of a National Defense Mobilization Law (Guófáng
dòngyuán fǎ《国防动员法》).19 There have been confident predictions the law would be
approved each year since 2002, and it was a major item on the NPC Standing Committee 2004
legislative plan, but has not been enacted as of February 2005.20 Every commentator decries the
19
“Yi fa zhi jun – maixiang xin zhengcheng” (依法治军迈向新征程) [Use law to control the
military – set off on a new journey], Fazhi Ribao《法制日报》 [ Legal Daily ], July 29, 2002,
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/gb/content/2002-07/29/content_40699.htm; “Wo wei lifa gu yu hu – jiu jie
quanguo renda qijian jiefangjun daibiao zhongyao yi’an saomiao” (我为立法鼓与呼——九届全国人大期
间解放军代表重要议案扫描) [I drum and shout for legislation – an overview of major motions by PLA
delegates during the Ninth National People’s Congress]”, Jiefangjun Bao March 6, 2003,
http://www.pladaily.com.cn/item/LIANGHUI/yata/001.htm.
20 “Zhongguo ‘Guofang Dongyuan Fa’ youwang niandi chutai” (中国“国防动员法”有望年底出
台) [It is hoped that China’s National Defense Mobilization Law will appear by the end of this year],
Xinhua March 8, 2002, http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/kuaixun/116757.htm; “Yu shi ju jin de junshi lifa
– 2002 nian junshi lifa chengjiu huimou ” (与时俱进的军事立法 ——2002 年军事立法成就回眸)
[Military legislation keeps up with the times – a retrospective on the achievements in military rule-making
9
absence of a basic law to provide the necessary legal foundation for defense mobilization in a
socialist market economy.21
It is not that the NPC is ignoring these calls. An NPC “National Defense Mobilization
Law Legislative Investigation and Research Committee” (Guófáng dòngyuán fǎ lìfǎ diàoyán zǔ;
《国防动员法》立法调研组) was established in August 2000.22 The committee has been
circulating a draft law for comment by provincial and local governments leaders as well as
state-owned and private enterprises. The committee visited Kunming and Beihai in April 2004.
The Kunming People’s Armed Forces Office said the committee delegation included
representatives of the NPC, State Planning Commission, State Council Legal System Office, and
CMC Legal System Office; Beihai Ribao named NPC Legislative Committee Deputy Chairman
and former PLA General Logistics Department Political Commissar Zhou Kunren; NPC
Legislative Committee member and former Shenyang MR Deputy Political Commissar Cao
Huichen; CMC Legal System Office director Major General Gao Xiaming, and National Defense
Mobilization Commission General Office acting deputy director Major General Huang Yichang.
Local officials meeting the committee included the Guangxi Military District commander,
Guangzhou MR Mobilization Department director, and provincial and city party and government
in 2002], Fazhi Ribao (法制日报) [Legal Daily], December 31, 2002,
http://www.law.com.cn/pg/newsShow.php?Id=7234; “Quanguo renda changweihui jinnian jiang shenyi
xiugai 20 jian falü cao’an” (全国人大常委会今年将审议修改 20 件法律草案) [NPC Standing Committee
will consider or amend 20 draft laws this year], Xinhua April 6, 2004,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2004-04/06/content_1404486.htm.
21 E.g., Dai Fengxiu, Guofang Dongyuan Zhanlüe yu Duice《国防动员战略与对策》[National
Defense Mobilization Strategies and Measures], Beijing: Junshi Kexue Chubanshe, 2004, p. 310. Dai’s
book carries the hallmarks of authoritative PLA writings on a given subject; it was “examined and
approved” by a committee including directors of mobilization and civil defense departments at the central
and MR level as well as several provincial Military District commanders, and had “drafting assistance”
from staff officers in virtually every concerned office of the PLA and civilian government structure.
22 “Wo wei lifa gu yu hu – jiu jie quanguo renda qijian jiefangjun daibiao zhongyao yi’an saomiao”
(我为立法鼓与呼——九届全国人大期间解放军代表重要议案扫描) [I drum and shout for legislation –
an overview of major motions by PLA delegates during the Ninth National People’s Congress]”, Jiefangjun
Bao March 6, 2003, http://www.pladaily.com.cn/item/LIANGHUI/yata/001.htm.
10
officials.23 The drafting committee has issued at least eleven editions of its work bulletin, one of
which included an article on its visit to Guangzhou.24
Once the National Defense Mobilization Law is finally enacted, it will be followed by a
series of related laws dealing with more specific mobilization issues. Major laws known to be in
draft as of late 2004 include a National Defense Transportation Law 《国防交通动员法》;
Militia Law《民兵法》; Reserve Officers Law (Revised) 《预备役军官法(修订)》; National
Economic Mobilization Law《国民经济动员法》; and Law on States of Emergency《紧急状态
法》. 25
Clearly, enactment of key mobilization statutes has been more difficult than anticipated.
The Mobilization Law could appear at the March 2005 NPC plenum, but its long delay attests to
the thorny nature of the legal, economic, and political problems surrounding defense mobilization
in an era of incomplete reform and socio-economic transformation.
In the discussion of specific laws and regulations below, those for which the author has
found full text of the law or regulation are marked “Text available.” In cases where no text has
been found, footnotes cite sources that verify its existence, often a Jiefangjun Bao article
announcing its enactment.
Laws and regulations of broad relevance to defense mobilization
National Defense Law of the People’s Republic of China 《中华人民共和国国防法》
enacted by the NPC on March 14, 1997. (Text available.) This law addresses the broadest issues
23
“Quanguo renda fazhi weiyuanhui fuzhuren Zhou Kunren yihang dao Gao-Xin Qu diaoyan” (全
国人大法制委员会副主任周坤仁一行到高新区调研) [NPC Legislative Committee deputy director Zhou
Kunren and delegation visit the High-Tech Zone],
http://www.kmhnz.gov.cn/info/gxdongtai/2004_5/6513.htm (Kunming High-Technology Development
Zone website); “Guofang Dongyuan Fa lifa diaoyan zu dao Beihai diaoyan” (《国防动员法》立法调研组
到北海调研) [National Defense Mobilization Law Legislative Investigation and Research Group Arrives in
Beihai to Conduct Investigation and Research], Beihai Ribao April 23, 2004,
http://www.bhrb.com.cn/news/20040423/bhyw/180033.htm.
24 Wang Baokun 王宝坤, “Guofang Dongyuan Fa lifa diaoyan zu fu Guangzhou Junqu diaoyan
qingkuang”《国防动员法立法调研组赴广州军区调研情况》 [National Defense Mobilization Law
Legislative Investigation and Research Committee visits Guangzhou to investigate circumstances],
Zhonghua Renmin Gonghequo guofang dongyuan fa qicao gongzuo jianbao 《中华人民共和国国防动员
法起草工作简报》 [Work Bulletin of the People’s Republic of China National Defense Mobilization Law
Drafting Committee], No. 11 (no date), http://www.mparuc.edu.cn/teachershow.asp?id=73.
25 Wang Fuju, The Science of Transportation Mobilization, p. 191; “Junshi fazhi jianshe: maixiang
xin zhengcheng” (军事法制建设：迈向新征程) [Development of the military legal system: Setting out on
a new journey], Jiancha Ribao 《检察日报》[Procuratorial Daily], August 11, 2003,
http://www.jcrb.com/n1/jcrb187/ca106274.htm; “Fahui guofang dongyuan de yingji gongneng” (发挥国
防动员的应急功能) [Bring into play the emergency response functions of national defense mobilization],
Xuexi Shibao《学习时报》[Study Times ]. December 2004,
http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/zhuanti/xxsb/727752.htm.
11
of defending the country, including the power to declare war or, of interest to us, to declare a state
of national defense mobilization. The National People’s Congress or its Standing Committee are
empowered to make such a declaration, but the President of the PRC as head of government
would be the one to issue the actual mobilization order. The State Council and Central Military
Commission share overall administrative direction of mobilization work. Provincial and local
governments exercise local administration of conscription, militia, reserve, national defense
education, economic mobilization, and people’s air defense work. The law provides brief
instructions for activation of reserve units upon mobilization, peacetime preparations for war
mobilization, and stockpile of strategic materials. It requires all state organs, armed forces,
political parties, mass organizations, enterprises, institutions, and citizens to participate in
peacetime mobilization preparations, and to carry out mobilization tasks when a mobilization
order is issued. It briefly but clearly authorizes the State to requisition equipment, facilities,
vehicles, and materials belonging to organizations or individuals, and requires local governments
at county level and above to provide compensation for direct economic losses caused by
mobilization.
Martial Law of the People’s Republic of China 《中华人民共和国戒严法》 enacted by
the NPC Standing Committee on March 1, 1996. (Text available.) When martial law is declared
nationwide or in a local region, the local government may requisition buildings, facilities,
vehicles, and equipment. (This law does not specify the distinction between mobilization
(dòngyuán; 动员) and requisitioning (zhēngyòng; 征用), but the National Defense
Transportation Regulation discussed below does. Mobilization is carried out only pursuant to an
order from the President as stipulated in the National Defense Law, while requisitioning is an
administrative act decided by the provincial government.) Under emergency conditions, this law
states, commanders of People's Police, People's Armed Police, or PLA units may make
requisition decisions on the spot, and local governments shall cooperate. Receipts shall be issued,
and requisitioned articles shall be returned promptly after use or when martial law is lifted.
Damage shall be compensated by local government. During martial law, the enforcement
organizations may control production, supply, and prices of daily necessitate.
Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on Management of Radio Communications
《中华人民共和国无线电管理条例》
enacted by the State Council and Central Military
Commission September 11, 1993. (Text available.) This and the following regulation give the
PLA broad responsibility for management of the electromagnetic spectrum in China, and when
necessary, control over broadcast stations and facilities.
Regulation of the People’s Liberation Army on Management of Radio Communications
《中国人民解放军无线电管理条例》 enacted by the Central Military Commission on
December 3, 1995. (Text available.) Companion to the broader government regulation above.
12
National Defense Education Law of the People’s Republic of China 《中华人民共和国国
防教育法》 passed by the NPC Standing Committee April 29, 2001. (Text available.) The
overall thrust of this law is to require that all schools, universities, civic organizations, news
media, and governments at every level carry out programs to educate the general public on
military issues. From a mobilization perspective, such education helps to raise the national
defense consciousness of the general public so they are more able and willing to contribute to
national defense needs, including mobilization. As in most military issues, the State Council and
Central Military Commission share national-level oversight and responsibility, and the law
methodically lists every other kind of organization in Chinese society, from industrial enterprises
to militia organizations to village councils, and charges them with actively conducting and
supporting national defense education. The act requires coverage of military issues in elementary
and junior middle school teaching materials, and specific separate military training classes in high
schools, colleges, and universities. All educational institutions at high school level and above,
and all enterprises, businesses, and non-profit organizations, are required to establish military
training departments, with a minimum number of military affairs staffs calibrated according to the
size of the enterprise or business. National defense education is to be funded by local
governments, and provided for in fiscal plans and budgets.
Teaching Outline for Military Courses in Ordinary Institutions of Higher Learning《普通
高等学校军事课教学大纲》 enacted by the Ministry of Education and the PLA General Staff
Department and General Political Department, June 19, 2002. (Text available.) Military training
courses are mandatory for all students in basic and specialized programs at ordinary colleges and
universities. Students are to learn basic military theory and military skills in order to strengthen
national defense consciousness and national security concepts, strengthen patriotism and
collectivist consciousness, strengthen collective discipline, promote overall student quality, and
provide a foundation for PLA training and participation in the militia and reserves. Students are
to receive 36 hours of military theory education and two to three weeks of military skills training,
with not less than 14 days of actual training time. Training is to be strict and in compliance with
PLA regulations. The Outline provides a fairly detailed breakdown of education and training
topics.
Teaching Outline for Military Training of Upper Level High School Students《高级中学
学生军事训练教学大纲》 enacted by the Ministry of Education and the PLA General Staff
Department and General Political Department, January 30, 2003. (Text available.) This Outline
specifies the length and content of military training for high school students under provisions of
the National Defense Education Law.. Each student must receive 14 days of military training per
year, compressible to 7 days in extraordinary circumstances. The Outline specifies topics to be
taught and hours of instruction for each topic. Representative topics include four hours on the
13
nature and glorious tradition of the PLA; 51 hours on military discipline and close-order drill
(marching); 10 hours small-arms marksmanship; 6 hours map-reading; 3 hours on the
international strategic situation, etc.
Interim Outline for Military Education in Elementary and Middle Schools 《国家教育委
员会小学、初中国防教育纲要(试行)》 enacted by the National Education Commission,
February 19, 1992. (Text available.) This Interim Outline significantly predates the National
Defense Education Law, and it is likely it will be superseded soon if it has not been already,
although this author has not been able to find a new version.
Legislative Law of the People’s Republic of China《中华人民共和国立法法》 enacted
by the NPC on March 15, 2000. (Text available.)
-
Authority for Central Military Commission and subordinate military organizations to
enact administrative regulations (fagui and guizhang)
Regulation on Military Regulations 《军事法规军事规章条例》 enacted by the CMC on
April 4, 2003. (Text available.)
-
Authority, procedures, formats, and standards for enacting military regulations.
Laws and regulations relevant to armed forces mobilization
Military Service Law of the People’s Republic of China 《中华人民共和国兵役法》
enacted by the NPC on May 31 1984, amended by the NPC Standing Committee December 29,
1998. (Text available.)
-
Mandatory military training for all students in universities and colleges, which shall
establish military training departments to carry out the training. [Art. 43, 44]
-
All high schools to set up military training departments and conduct military training
for students [Art. 44]
-
Responsibility for military training in universities, colleges, and high schools is
shared between Ministry of Education and Ministry of National Defense. [Art. 46]
(Note that this provision cites MND rather than CMC, but the 2001 National Defense
Education Law stipulated the CMC had responsibility, and GSD and GPD have
issued the relevant training outlines.)
-
Governments at all levels must prepare for war mobilization, and carry out the
mobilization order when issued [Art. 47, 48]
-
Active duty stop-loss upon issuance of mobilization order; reserves prepare for
activation; government departments prepare to assist. [Art. 48]
-
State Council and CMC may raise the age for conscription in wartime. [Art. 49]
-
Demobilization after war ends; find work for demobilized soldiers [Art. 50]
14
Law on Active Duty Officers of the People’s Republic of China 《中华人民共和国现役军
官法》 enacted by the NPC Standing Committee September 5, 1988, revised several times, most
recently by the NPC Standing Committee December 28, 2000. (Text available.)
-
Cancellation of leave in case of mobilization
Law on Reserve Service Officers of the People’s Republic of China 《中华人民共和国预
备役军官法》enacted by the NPC Standing Committee, May 10, 1995. (Text available.)
-
Callup of reserves [a central part of “armed forces mobilization”]
Militia Work Regulation 《民兵工作条例》enacted by the State Council and the Central
Military Commission, January 1, 1991. (Text available.)
-
Mobilize the militia in wartime to support active forces [Art. 17]
-
Management of militia operating expenses [Chapter 7, Art. 37-41]
Provisions Concerning Militia and Reserve Work in Enterprises《关于企业民兵、预备
役工作的规定》enacted by the General Staff Department, General Political Department, State
Economic System Reform Commission, State Economic and Trade Commission, Ministry of
Finance, and Ministry of Civil Affairs, August 14, 1993. (Text available.)
-
Enterprises must establish militia and reserve organizations; do militia/reserve
political work; conduct training; maintain militia/reserve equipment; help maintain
social order; help with conscription; register vehicles and vessels; carry out wartime
mobilization preparations; establish people’s armed forces departments; carry out
campaigns to encourage people to support the war effort [Art. 3]
Law on Protecting Military Installations of the People’s Republic of China 《中华人民共
和国军事设施保护法》enacted by the NPC Standing Committee, February 23, 1990. (Text
available.)
-
Demarcation of, access to, and security of military prohibited areas and militarycontrolled areas; management responsibilities; punishment of offenders
-
Conditions for conversion of military facilities to civilian or dual military-civilian use
-
[Listed in the China War Mobilization Encyclopedia as a key law relevant to
mobilization work, but this author sees little direct relevance. The only possible
relationship could be in the identification of facilities that need to be protected by
those mobilized for civil defense purposes.]26
Procedures for Implementing the Law on Protecting Military Installations 《中华人民共
和国军事设施保护法实施办法》enacted by the State Council and Central Military
Commission, January 12, 2001. (Text available.)
26
China War Mobilization Encyclopedia pp. 327-328.
15
-
[same as for Law on Protecting Military Installations; adds more detail on what
facilities need to be protected, but does not directly mention people’s air defense or
civil defense.]
Regulations relevant to political mobilization
Political Work Regulation 《政治工作条例》 enacted by the Communist Party Central
Committee and the Central Military Commission in December Dec 2003. (No text.)27
Outline on Wartime Political Work 《战时政治工作纲要》 enacted by the Central
Military Commission in 2002. (No text.)28
Outline on National Defense Political Mobilization in Nanjing War Zone 《南京战区国防
政治动员纲要》 enacted by Nanjing Military Region not later than 2002. (No text.)29
Laws and regulations relevant to civil defense mobilization, people’s air defense, and
urban militia structures
People’s Air Defense Law of the People’s Republic of China 《中华人民共和国人民防空
法》enacted by the NPC Standing Committee, October 29, 1996. (Text available.)
-
cost of people’s air defense to be shared among central government, local
government, and society (i.e., private enterprises must bear part of the cost) [Art. 4]
-
Everyone entitled to protection; everyone must perform their obligations [Art. 8]
-
Designation of key points, preparation of key point protection plans [Art. 13]
-
Transportation and construction projects must accommodate civil defense needs [Art
14, 18-25]
Widely discussed in Jiefangjun Bao and many other sources.
Mentioned in at least two sources; “Liaoning mou yubeiyi shi zhaoyan shizhan xuyao jiang
zhengzhi gongzuo tuixiang yanlianchang ” (辽宁某预备役师着眼实战需要将政治工作推向演练场)
[Liaoning reserve division concentrates on realistic combat requirements to push political work into the
training field], National Defense [Guofang Bao] April 8, 2004,
http://www.pladaily.com.cn/gb/pladaily/2004/04/08/20040408001175_gfsy.html (Chinese); and Biography
of Senior Colonel Gong Fangbin, Academy of Military Sciences, posted at
http://www.cnread.net/cnread1/zjgw/019.htm (Chinese).
29 Mentioned in various sources; “Zhejiang sheng renmin zhengfu, Zhejiang sheng junqu guanyu
jiaqiang 2002 nian minbing yubeiyi budui gongzuo de tongzhi” (浙江省人民政府、浙江省军区关于加强
2002 年民兵预备役部队工作的通知) [Circular of Zhejiang Province and Zhejiang Military District on
Strengthening Militia and Reserve Work in 2002],
http://www.yfzs.gov.cn/gb/info/LawData/difang/ZheJiang/2003-03/13/1109209911.html; West Zhejiang
mobilization report 2003, http://sqgfy.qz.gov.cn/FILES/nzyjh.htm; “Jianchi yi dang de shiliu da jingshen
wei zhidao: buduan tuijin wo shi guofang jiaoyu xiang zongshen fazhan” (坚持以党的十六大精神为指
导： 不断推进我市国防教育向纵深发展) [Follow the spirit of the 16th Party Congress: unceasingly
promote deepening of national defense education in our city] (Jinhua MSD mobilization report 2002),
http://www.jinhua.gov.cn/jhgf/GFJY/JYDT03.HTM, Google cache Jan 2005; Hangzhou 2002 yearbook,
national defense education article,
http://www.hangzhou.gov.cn/main/gb/tradition/introduce/yearbook/viewarticle.jsp?artid=2768.
27
28
16
-
Mass air defense organizations shall undertake wartime tasks to deal with
emergencies, rush repairs, medical services, fire prevention and fire-fighting,
epidemic prevention, sterilization, elimination of contamination, ensuring the
operation of telecommunications and contacts, rescuing personnel, rush
transportation of materials, and maintaining social order, and in peacetime shall
undertake such tasks as helping flood control and natural disaster relief departments
deal with emergencies and provide disaster relief. [Art. 41]
-
Public education on people’s air defense roles [Art. 45-47]
Procedures for Implementing the People's Air Defense Law in Guangdong Province 《广
东省实施《中华人民共和国人民防空法》办法》enacted by the Standing Committee of the
Guangdong Provincial People’s Congress on July 29, 1998. (Text available.)
Opinion on Strengthening and Improving Urban Militia Work 《关于加强和改进城市民
兵工作的意见》 issued by the Communist Party Central Committee, State Council, and Central
Military Commission in September 2002. (No text.)30
-
Revitalize urban militia
-
Establish militias in privately-owned enterprises, including foreign-owned
enterprises. This parallels the effort to establish Party organizations in privatelyowned enterprises.
-
Enterprises must create enterprise armed-forces departments, or appoint specialized
personnel to handle armed forces issues.
-
Local governments bear the expense
-
New urban militia structures: technical professional group; anti-aircraft group;
emergency group; communications support group
Laws and regulations relevant to transportation mobilization
National Defense Transportation Law 《国防交通法》- currently in draft. (No text.)31
Provisions on Meeting National Defense Needs in Capital Construction Projects for
Transportation, Post and Telecommunications 《交通运输、邮电通信基本建设贯彻国防要求
规定》 issued by the State Planning Commission, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Railroads,
30
“Yushi jujin jiaqiang chengshi minbing jianshe – Zongcan, Zongzheng youguan bumen fuzeren
jiu Zhongyang xiafa ‘Guanyu jiaqiang he gaijin chengshi minbing gongzuo de yijian’ da jizhe wen ” (与时
俱进加强城市民兵建设——总参、总政有关部门负责人就中央下发《关于加强和改进城市民兵工作
的意见》答记者问) [Move with the times and strengthen urban militia development – Heads of relevant
departments of GSD and GPD answer reporter’s questions about the Opinion on Strengthening and
Improving Urban Militia Work issued by the Center], Jiefangjun Bao November 30, 2002, p. 2, translated
in FBIS CPP20021130000008.
31 Wang Fuju, The Science of Transportation Mobilization, p. 191.
17
Ministry of Communications, Civil Aviation Administration, Ministry of Information Industry,
General Staff Department, and General Logistics Department on April 20, 2000. (Text
available.)
-
All new or renovated major infrastructure projects must accommodate military
requirements (including privately-financed projects)
-
Includes road, rail, waterways, aviation, pipeline, and communications infrastructure
-
National Defense Transportation Management Offices at each level are the interface
to articulate military requirements and ensure they are met
-
Modifications required to meet military needs are funded out of central and local
government capital construction budgets
National Defense Transportation Regulation 《国防交通条例》enacted by the State
Council and Central Military Commission, February 24, 1995. (Text available.)
-
Provisions for mobilizing 动员 or requisitioning 征用 vehicles, transportation
facilities, and operator personnel. “Mobilization” is a wartime or emergency measure
pursuant to a mobilization order issued by the Center; “requisitioning” is an
administrative act decided at the provincial level.
-
Mobilization and requisitioning expenses are shared among central government, local
government, relevant ministry, and enterprise.
-
Administrative and criminal sanctions for not fulfilling duties to support defense
transportation or defying mobilization/requisition order
-
compensation mechanisms not addressed; left for later regulations
-
[mobilization/requisition is only a part of this regulation, which mostly deals with
planning and executing PLA transportation requirements]
Procedures for Implementing the National Defense Transportation Regulations in
Zhejiang Province 《浙江省实施《中华人民共和国人民防空法》办法》enacted by the
Standing Committee of the Zhejiang Provincial People’s Congress on September 2, 1999. (Text
available.)
Procedures for Implementing the National Defense Transportation Regulation in
Guangdong Province 《广东省实施《国防交通条例》办法》enacted by the Guangdong
Provincial Government on May 31, 2000. (Text available.)
Regulation on Military Traffic and Transportation of the Chinese People’s Liberation
Army 《中国人民解放军军事交通运输条例》enacted by the Central Military Commission on
March 7, 1997. (No text.)
Regulation on National Defense Mobilization of Civilian Means of Transportation 《民用
运力国防动员条例》enacted by the State Council and Central Military Commission in October
2003. (Text available.)
18
-
In wartime or other extraordinary circumstances, the State has the authority to
allocate (diàoyòng; 调用) civilian vehicles and vessels belonging to or managed by
state offices, social organizations, businesses, enterprise danwei, or individual
citizens [Art. 2]
-
Owners must carry out mobilization obligations [Art. 3]
-
Division of responsibility for planning; National Defense Mobilization Committee
system has lead [Art. 4]
-
Local governments must make mobilization preparations, including maintaining
registry of available assets and certifying their suitability [Art. 7, 14, 15, 23]
-
Manufacturers of vehicles and equipment must design in features to accommodate
mobilization needs [Art. 12]
-
People’s Armed Police and militia units should calculate their wartime transportation
needs [Art. 16]
-
Contingency planning [Art. 17-21]
-
Owners to be compensated for damage to equipment and wages and allowances of
crews [Art. 39]
-
Financial burden shared between central and local governments [Art. 42]
-
Overall: a much more thorough treatment of the issue than the one chapter in the
1995 National Defense Transportation Regulations.
Work Rule on Military Use of Ports in Zhejiang Province 《浙江省港口军事运输工作规
程》enacted by the Zhejiang Provincial Transportation Office and Zhejiang Military
Representative Office on January 31, 1997. (Text available.)
-
Detailed specification of procedures and responsibilities for movement of military
forces, materiel, and individuals through both coastal and inland waterway ports
-
Does not apply to ports subordinate to the Ministry of Transportation
Provisions on Mobilizing Civilian Ships in Guangdong Province 《广东省海上民用船舶
动员征用规定》enacted by the Guangdong Provincial Government on May 13, 2002. (Text
available.)
-
Responsibilities and procedures for registering vessels for mobilization
-
Kind of vessels and facilities that must register
-
Pre-mobilization certification
-
Division of financial responsibility compensation, reparations, and necessary
modifications to vessels
-
Compensation procedures for use and damage
19
CONCLUSION
It seems to this observer that the emphasis on creating a better legal foundation for national
defense mobilization is driven as much by economic and social changes in China as by the
requirements of a Taiwan conflict. Clearly, the specific issues being addressed are directly
shaped by Taiwan-centered contingency planning, particularly mobilization of civilian shipping
and preparations to withstand American air strikes. Just as clearly, the pace and timing of the
effort are influenced by the broader push since about 1999 to create more effective military
options against Taiwan. But the main impetus has much deeper roots in the need to develop new
modes of governance if the Party regime is to remain viable in a rapidly changing China. The
need for transparent, standardized, institutionalized legal foundations for government power and
social order is apparent in every aspect of Chinese development. For defense mobilization in
particular, the old model is simply no longer viable due to the changing economic structure of the
country and the rapidly evolving nature of modern warfare. Even if there were not a push to be
better prepared for a Taiwan conflict, the PLA and the government would still need to develop a
better legal structure for defense mobilization, or abandon it altogether as a significant component
of Chinese military readiness.
The new legal structure is very much a work in progress. Military leaders recognize major
components are missing. Some are in draft now, while others cannot begin until necessary
foundations are in place, particularly the National Defense Mobilization Law. This contrasts to
some other aspects of modernization and reform in the PLA, where the regulatory structure is
much more complete. Personnel management regulations are perhaps the best developed,
followed closely by the regulations which constitute the PLA’s joint operational doctrine for
large-scale maneuver warfare. Progress on mobilization reform is roughly comparable to that in
logistics reform, which did not get underway in earnest until the late 1990s, nearly a decade later
than the effort to develop new operational doctrine. In part, this reflects the relative urgency of
personnel reform and war-fighting doctrine, which were rightly seen in the 1980s and 1990s as
among the most pressing needs in PLA modernization. The slower progress also reflects the
much greater complexity associated with mobilization and logistics issues. How to fight on the
battlefield is a purely military question, something the PLA can decide on its own, while
procedures to train, educate, and select military leaders are handled between the PLA and the
Party. Mobilization and logistics reform, however, both require complex coordination across a
wide range of governmental, economic, social, and political structures, in many different
bureaucratic fiefdoms or outside government control altogether. So between getting a later start,
and being inherently more complex than some other aspects of regulatory reform, it will be
several more years before the full set of mobilization-related laws and regulations is complete.
20
This is not to say China could not mobilize if war broke out in the meanwhile, of course.
But mobilization will better serve military needs if Beijing can successfully create a revamped,
well-organized, frequently-exercised mobilization system that fits China’s changing social and
economic realities.
Even when the whole range of laws and regulations is in place, however, this generation of
documents should be viewed as “version 1.0.” Besides the inevitable omissions, internal
contradictions, and unforeseen problems in the regulations themselves, the PLA is changing
rapidly, as is the society within which it exists. The evolution of the military legal system over
the past decade reflects a continuing maturation of the institutional mechanisms for managing the
PLA, as well as the steadily improving competence of the Chinese managerial class across the
board. In fact, I would offer “competence” as the grand theme for PLA development in this
decade, perhaps even more important than the embrace of “professionalism” in the 1980s.
Progress is very uneven, and the PLA has a long way to go in many areas, but it is a very
interesting process to watch.
21