William Glenn Gray. Germany’s Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 19491969. Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 2003. xiii + 351 pp. $ 49.95
(cloth), ISBN 978-0-8078-2758-1.
Reviewed by Mathilde von Buelow (Corpus Christi College, University of Cambridge)
Published on H-German (December, 2003)
A West German Take on Containment, Deterrence, and Flexible Response
A West German Take on Containment, Deterrence, War? For one thing, William Gray’s first monograph,
and Flexible Response
based on his doctoral dissertation submitted at Yale University, is an extremely well-researched, clear, and conSpecialists of twentieth-century German history take cise account of the German-German competition for init for granted that from their foundation in 1949, the ternational recognition. Furthermore, Germany’s Cold
lives of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German War differs considerably from previous renditions of the
Democratic Republic (GDR) were fundamentally and inintra-German rivalry in scope and in approach.
extricably intertwined not only with each other but also
with the Cold War. Consequently, the story of the proBy concentrating on the global reach of this comtracted German-German rivalry within the context of the petition, Gray takes the story well beyond the boundEast-West divide, related in William Glenn Gray’s re- aries of Europe and into the developing world. Gercently published Germany’s Cold War, is hardly a new many’s Cold War explores how it was that leaders of the
one. It concerns one of the fundamental tenets un- non-aligned movement, such as Yugoslavia’s Josip Broz
derlying West German foreign policy, the Alleinvertre- Tito, Egypt’s Gamal Abdul Nasser, Indonesia’s Ahmed
tungsanspruch, namely Bonn’s claim to be the sole le- Sukarno, and Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, could retain
gitimate representative of the German people. German such great attention in Bonn and East Berlin. Gray furspecialists will immediately think of the so-called Hall- ther explains why even the leaders of geopolitically less
stein doctrine, the epitome of the Federal Republic’s cam- significant states, such as Guinea’s Ahmed Sekou Toure,
paign to ostracize and isolate the GDR internationally by Ceylon’s Sirimavo Bandaranaike, and Cambodia’s Prince
requiring states to retain diplomatic relations only with Norodom Sihanouk, at times wielded considerable power
Bonn. After all, international recognition would have over the Federal Republic, simply by announcing their inconferred upon East Berlin what it craved most and what tention to establish diplomatic or consular relations with
Bonn strove to prevent: legitimacy, credibility, and per- the GDR. Thus, the author demonstrates just how global
manence as a state. The intra-German rivalry has there- the German question was between 1949 and 1969, and
fore received ample scholarly attention, most recently how events in even the remotest place, for instance the
from the former diplomat Werner Kilian, and Ruediger “spice island” Zanzibar, could influence affairs in both
Booz, but also from doyens of German diplomatic and German states.
political history such as Hans-Peter Schwarz and Klaus
Germany’s Cold War unfolds as a chronological narHildebrand.[1]
rative divided into eight compact chapters in which Gray
Why then, should historians read Germany’s Cold examines “the ever changing nature of East and West
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German strategy against the shifting context of the Cold
War” (p. 5). Four layers of analysis run through these
chapters. First, Gray looks at the relationships between
the two German states and the countries of the developing world. Strategic and tactical considerations dominate this level of analysis. Second, Gray considers the domestic politics of Bonn’s isolation campaign against the
GDR. How did West German political parties and public
opinion react to and influence the federal government’s
strategies? Third, the author analyzes how relations between the two German states themselves influenced the
evolution of the isolation campaign abroad, particularly
during the 1960s. Finally, Gray considers the roles played
by the four occupying powers in the German-German
competition (the United States, France, Britain and the
Soviet Union), since these powers not only initiated the
struggle over representation when both states lacked all
vestiges of sovereignty, but also retained formal responsibility over reunification.
Acting in parallel to the goal of containing Soviet expansion pursued by the West, the Federal Republic aimed
to isolate the GDR, which only gradually managed to extend its official and unofficial ties beyond the communist
bloc. Thus, in 1957, in the spirit of Washington’s strategy of “massive retaliation,” the Federal Republic severed relations with Yugoslavia after Tito declared his intention to establish diplomatic ties with East Berlin. At
the time, Bonn’s uncompromising stance served to deter
other non-aligned states from following Tito’s lead. Indeed, of the sixteen African states to gain independence
in 1960, not one opted to recognize the GDR (p. 227).
In the 1960s, however, as the superpowers embarked
on a policy of detente, Bonn’s strategy had to adjust to accommodate a more “flexible response.” Through a carrotand-stick approach using development aid and economic
sanctions, Bonn still managed to contain the expansion
of East Berlin’s foreign ties. Yet, the Hallstein doctrine
increasingly fell into disrepute, as Third World leaders
Such deep and layered analysis can only work if the began to question Bonn’s Alleinvertretungsanspruch, arauthor tackles his subject as a “multiarchival, truly cos- guing instead that the existence of two German states had
mopolitan history” (p. iv), even if the principal focus of become an unalterable reality. Bonn’s strategy had to
this book rests on the Federal Republic. On this front, adapt to the world’s increasing willingness to deal with
William Gray clearly deserves praise. His endnotes and East Berlin. Thus, recognition of the GDR could no longer
bibliography testify to the fact that he researched his sub- lead to an automatic break of relations with Bonn, as the
ject thoroughly in all of the most important national and cases of Ceylon or Cambodia demonstrated.
political archives of the Federal Republic and the GDR, as
Gray argues that East Berlin’s true breakthrough on
well as in American, British, and French archives. Gerthe
international scene was ultimately possible only bemany’s Cold War is thus the first study to analyze the
cause
Bonn itself had opted for “peaceful coexistence.”
“international dimensions of an intra-German conflict”
In
light
of global shifts in the Cold War, Willy Brandt
based on such multi-archival and multi-national research
and the SPD began to promote the notion of “two states
(p. 9).
within one nation” (p. 218). Thus, East Berlin’s internaGray’s basic argument challenges conventional wis- tional breakthrough was qualified. For one thing, Bonn
dom, which depicts the so-called Hallstein doctrine as withheld a de jure recognition of the GDR. Moreover,
a failed strategy. Most historians argue that the policy international recognition, including membership in the
of non-recognition vis-a-vis the GDR was too rigid, thus United Nations, only followed after the signature of the
limiting the Federal Republic’s foreign policy maneuver- German-German Basic Treaty in December 1972. The auing room and leading increasingly to Bonn’s own isola- thor interprets this as a testament to the longevity of the
tion.[2] Indeed, Bonn’s isolation campaign was always Hallstein doctrine.
extremely controversial. Many circles within West GerConsidering that Gray does indeed take this story up
many, particularly the Free Democrats (FDP) and the Sountil
the German-German Basic Treaty of 1972, which
cial Democrats (SPD), perceived the Hallstein doctrine
represents
the natural breaking point of Bonn’s isolation
as one of the chief obstacles to reunification and to reccampaign,
it is unclear exactly why the author chooses
onciliation with Israel and Eastern Europe (along with
the year 1969 as the official chronological boundary for
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s Westpolitik). Gray, howhis study. One reason is methodological, as every conever, maintains that the isolation campaign was highly
successful at staving off official recognition of the GDR. temporary historian will understand. The author chooses
Moreover, he argues that Bonn’s strategy adjusted con- to exclude an intricate discussion on the revision of
stantly to changing circumstances and to shifts in the Bonn’s non-recognition policy in light of the SPD’s takeover of power in 1969 and Chancellor Willy Brandt’s
Cold War.
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championship of a neue Ostpolitik because at the time he
prepared this manuscript, he did not yet have access to
archival documentation for this period.
competition, William Glenn Gray does shed a new light
on the German-German rivalry from 1949 to 1969.
Notes:
Gray ignores a further aspect of the intra-German rivalry, albeit a minor one. A recently published study has
demonstrated that the German-German competition for
the favor of the Third World sometimes began well before developing states even won their independence.[3]
Gray, however, focuses only on Bonn’s diplomatic relations with independent states. Indeed, given the broad
scope of Germany’s Cold War, it is impossible for the author to focus on all of the complexities underlying Bonn’s
and East Berlin’s relations with the various states of the
non-aligned world between 1949 and 1969, let alone with
movements of national liberation. Nor is this his intent,
for the purpose of this monograph is to delineate the
broad strokes of and key influences on the Federal Republic’s global isolation campaign against the GDR.
[1]. Werner Kilian, Die Hallstein-Doktrin. Der diplomatische Krieg zwischen der BRD und der DDR 1955-1973
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001); Ruediger M. Booz,
“Hallsteinzeit”. Deutsche Aussenpolitik 1955-1972 (Bonn:
Bouvier, 1995); Hans-Peter Schwarz, Die Aera Adenauer. Gruenderjahre der Republik, 1949-1957 (Stuttgart:
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1981); Hans-Peter Schwarz,
Die Aera Adenauer. Epochenwechsel, 1957-1963 (Stuttgart:
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1983); Klaus Hildebrand, Von
Erhard zur grossen Koalition (Stuttgart: Deutsche VerlagsAnstalt, 1984).
[2]. Waldemar Besson, Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik. Erfahrungen und Massstaebe (Munich: Piper,
1970), 199; Heinrich End, Zweimal deutsche AussenpoliFundamentally, Germany’s Cold War is an excel- tik. Internationale Dimensionen des innnerdeutschen Konlent treatment of a very complex topic. Weighing the flikts 1949-1972 (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1973), 43; Wolfram Hanrieder, Germany, America, EuGerman-German competition against the backdrop of the
rope: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy (New Haven,
Cold War while keeping in mind such vital matters as
German domestic politics, inter-allied relations, reunifi- Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989), 170-209.
cation, Ostpolitik, and German-Israeli relations, is no easy
[3]. Jean-Paul Cahn et Klaus-Juergen Mueller, La Refeat. Gray manages to balance these matters, and reveals publique federale d’Allemagne et la guerre d’Algerie (1954how each factored into Bonn’s isolation campaign and 1962) (Paris: Le Felin, 2003).
East Berlin’s counter-offensive respectively. At the same
Copyright (c) 2003 by H-Net, all rights reserved. Htime, Gray keeps his story relatively short and succinct.
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This ensures that Germany’s Cold War is extremely lucid.
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Citation: Mathilde von Buelow. Review of Gray, William Glenn, Germany’s Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate
East Germany, 1949-1969. H-German, H-Net Reviews. December, 2003.
URL: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=8480
Copyright © 2003 by H-Net, all rights reserved. H-Net permits the redistribution and reprinting of this work for
nonprofit, educational purposes, with full and accurate attribution to the author, web location, date of publication,
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