UNCTAD
The Least Developed Countries Report 2007
Background Paper
Brain Drain and Brain Gain: A Survey of Issues, Outcomes
and Policies in the Least Developed Countries (LDCs)
Chris Manning
The Australian National University
Background Paper No. 6
This paper was prepared as a background paper for UNCTAD's Least Developed
Countries Report 2007: Knowledge, Technological Learning and Innovation for
Development. The views in this paper are those of the author and not necessarily those
of UNCTAD. The designations and terminology employed are also those of the
author.
Table of Contents
A.
B.
Introduction……………………………………………………………………3
Brain drain and brain gain: International experience………………………….3
1.
The incidence and rates of brain drain………………………………...4
2.
Debates on the impact of emigration…………………………………..6
(i)
The optimists…………………………………………………..7
(ii)
The realists………………………………………………….....8
(iii)
Remittances…………………………………………………..10
3.
Implications for the LDCs……………………………………………10
C.
Estimates of brain drain and remittances in LDCs: OECD countries………..11
1.
More recent developments in LDCs………………………………….15
2.
Brain drain and remittances in LDCs………………………………...16
D.
South-South migration……………………………………………………….17
E.
Regional trends and country case studies…………………………………….18
1.
Africa…………………………………………………………………19
2.
Asia…………………………………………………………………...19
3.
The South Pacific Islands…………………………………………….20
F.
The case of health…………………………………………………………….21
G.
Receiving and sending country policies……………………………………...23
1.
Countries of destination………………………………………………24
(i)
The United Kingdom and Europe…………………………....24
(ii)
The United States…………………………………………….26
(iii)
International programs……………………………………….26
(iv)
Sending country policies……………………………………..28
References……………………………………………………………………………31
Annex………………………………………………………………………………...37
2
A.
Introduction
This paper examines brain ‘drain’ and brain ‘gain’ through international
migration of skilled and professional workers from the least developed countries
(LDCs). It deals mainly, although not exclusively, with permanent emigration to
developed OECD countries. The paper is set in the more general context of
international experience with brain drain, and debates over costs and benefits of outmigration, from developing countries (Section II). In the third section, we present data
on migration of skilled workers for individual LDCs and regions. This provides an
overview of the situation, although detailed country-level data for LDCs, as a whole,
are now somewhat dated (the most comprehensive information is available only for
the year 2000). The analysis is based on lifetime migration data for OECD countries
and uses tertiary educated residents as a proxy for skilled and professional migrants.
We also provide an estimate of more recent trends for all LDCs.
Next the discussion moves to major patterns of South-South migration among
the skilled in Section IV. Although these latter movements are of considerable
significance, quantitative data is fragmentary at best. Subsequently, in section V, the
discussion focuses on regions and case studies of brain drain and brain gain. The
exposition is organised around three major groups of LDCs: Africa (with a focus on
sub-Saharan Africa, and within sub-Sahara, East and West Africa), which account for
the large majority of LDCs; second, the more densely populated LDCs in Asia; and,
third, the smaller, island states of the South Pacific. We give examples of case studies
of skilled migration experience in each of these groups. Section VI takes a sectoral
approach, giving special attention to the case of health care professionals (doctors and
nurses), who has been a focus of much of the literature on brain drain.
Finally, in section VII, the paper turns to policies towards skilled migration in
both receiving and sending countries. Besides looking separately at the evolution of
policies in the UK and the rest of Europe, and USA, we also track international
initiatives and deal very briefly with regional arrangements of importance to some
LDCs. The section closes with a short examination of LDC policies, especially with
regard to professionals in health care.
B.
Brain drain and brain gain: International experience
Brain drain has long been an important issue in the development literature as
underutilised skilled and professional manpower from newly independent countries
Africa and Asia sought jobs in Europe, North America and Oceania from the 1950s
(Lucas, 2004). Slow economic growth and political instability, especially in parts of
Africa, saw an increase in cross border movements of professionals, during the 1970s
and 1980s, both to developed countries and more rapidly growing neighbouring states
(Russel, Jacobsen and Stanley, 1990). While supply pressures from developing
countries, including many LDCs, have remained strong in the past two decades,
demand pressures for increased deployment of migrants from developing countries
have increased in industrialised countries, despite their rapidly rising numbers of
tertiary graduates. This has in turn contributed to increased skilled migration to
developed countries. Such movements have been underpinned by large and increasing
absolute wage differentials for skilled manpower between developed and developing
3
countries. More open policies towards skilled migration in developed countries have
also been important, especially in North America, Australia and New Zealand.1
In this section we document some of these trends. It examines the impacts of
emigration and temporary migration of skilled and professional workers on countries
of origin and draw some conclusions for LDCs. Most the data and discussion are
based on literature dealing with permanent emigration of skilled migrants to
developed countries (mainly North America, Europe and Oceania, specifically
Australia and New Zealand). In particular, two important groups of skilled migrants
are not covered in most of the literature. The first are the increasing proportion of
skilled workers migrating on temporary contract to developed and other developing
countries. The numbers are large, and are not incomparable with permanent
movements. Several of the issues for temporary migrants are somewhat different from
those with respect to permanent out-migration, which was the dominant mode of
recruitment in most developed countries through to the 1980s and 1990s. Return
migration is more predictable for many contract workers, although contracts are
renewed in many cases, and highly valued contract workers may well become
permanent. Brain gain is more immediate, but probably less substantial for those who
do move, and remittances are probably larger.
Second, the discussion ignores, for the most part, South-South migration,
which is estimated to account for around half of all migration flows (Ratha and Shaw,
2006). South-North flows are relatively more important for skilled and professional
manpower than movements of the unskilled. But nevertheless, South-South
movements of skilled manpower are very important in certain parts of the world, for
example Southern Africa and Southeast Asia. We will come back to some of these
issues in the discussion of specific LDC experience in later sections.
1.
The incidence and rates of brain drain
The latest estimates of skilled out-migration rates are for the year 2000 when
population censuses were undertaken in most OECD countries. The data suggest that
skilled out-migration (proxied by movements of tertiary educated people) from
developing countries, increased sharply in the 1990s (Docquier and Marfouk, 2006).2
While the total OECD population increased by less than 20 per cent in the 1990s,
migration rose by some 40 per cent overall (from 42 to 59 million) and skilled
migration rose by some two-thirds (12 to 20 million).
The patterns are documented by Docquier and Marfouk (2006, Table 5.3,
pages 170–71), based on OECD data.3 Table 1 summarises several of the main
findings of this study:
1
See especially Freeman (2006) and Pritchett (2006).
Recent studies showing similar patterns include Adams (2003).
3
See Table 5.3, pages 170–71. Migration data analysed by Docquier and Marfook are only for OECD
countries (based on the birth place of resident populations from national censuses) and hence they
understate the extent of intra-regional migration across national borders within Africa, South and East
Asia and the South Pacific. A significant proportion of skilled migrants to South Africa and Singapore,
for example, were born in other Southern African and Asian countries, respectively. However,
Docquier and Marfook point out that the bias is less important for skilled than for unskilled migrants,
2
4
•
•
•
•
•
Skilled out-migration rates were inversely related to country size; they
were:
o seven times greater in countries with <2.5 million people compared
with those with 25 million and above
o higher in middle than in low or high income countries
o very high among UN-defined small island developing countries
By geographical region, skilled migration rates in 2000 were:
o were highest in Africa among regional groups (compared with
Asia, America, Europe, and Oceania), even though Africa only
accounted for eight per cent of all out-migrants, see last column in
Table 1).4
o among sub-regional groups, they were approximately more than
ten times higher in Polynesia, 4–6 times higher in the Caribbean,
Melanesia and Micronesia, and 2–3 times higher in Eastern,
Western and Central Africa, and Central America than in all lower
middle and low income countries. However even though the small
Island states recorded very high rates of out-migration, they
accounted for a tiny proportion (less than one per cent) of all
skilled emigrants.
o even though rates were relatively high in most of Africa and the
South Pacific, a much higher proportion of all educated migrants
living in OECD countries in 2000 came from East, Southeast and
South Asia (mainly China, India and the Philippines)
Rates of skilled out-migration were highest (13 per cent) in LDCs,
compared with all other country income groups. Nevertheless, LDCs only
accounted for less than five per cent of all skilled migrants, compared with
close to 30 per cent each among lower middle income and higher income
countries.5
As might be expected the stock of skilled manpower was positively
related to level of economic development. However, the share of skilled
migrants was negatively correlated with the level of development, except
for the high income countries (that is, skilled migration relative to the
stock of educated manpower at home was highest in low-income countries
and especially in the LDCs, but lower in middle income countries: see
column 4 in Table 1)
These data on skilled (tertiary educated) migration flows provide no
breakdown by industry/occupation and level of schooling. Thus outmigration is very much higher in certain professions that are skill intensive
and where skills are relatively uniform internationally, such as medicine.
The greatest concerns in many countries are related to the out-migration of
health professionals. Moreover, migration of highly educated persons with
more than basic tertiary training tends to be much greater than for the
since a high proportion of international skilled migration flows (and estimated 90 per cent) were to
OECD countries in the 1990s.
4
In terms of ‘selectivity’, one study suggests that over 75 per cent of all African out-migrants to the
OECD were tertiary educated, compared with just over, and just under, 50 per cent in the Asia Pacific
and Latin America, respectively, around 1990 (Lowell and Findlay, 2002)
5
See section III below for further detail on LDCs.
5
tertiary educated population as a whole. For example Lowell et al. (2004:
9) cite studies which suggest that as many as 30–50 per cent of the
developing world’s population trained in science and technology live in
the developed world.
Thus, most of the skilled migrants have not come from least developed
countries but rather from large, lower middle income and middle income countries ––
China, India, Mexico, Brazil and the Philippines. A large repository of skilled
manpower related mainly to absolute population size, a well established diaspora in
host countries and policies targeting greater migration of skilled manpower have all
played an important role in these movements. But the incidence of out-migration was
high in several LDCs –– Ethiopia, Sudan, United Republic of Tanzania (Tanzania),
Bangladesh, Nepal and Myanmar (Burma), as well as some of the smaller LDC,
island states in the South Pacific such as Samoa. It is understandable that much of the
discussion of brain drain has been focused on the larger countries of out-migration
such as India. However, since per capita incomes are only marginally higher than in
many of the LDCs, there are important lessons to be learned for the LDCs from the
experience of brain drain and brain gain in the larger countries.
On the demand side, opportunities for work among skilled immigrants in
developed countries accelerated from the 1990s and increasingly into the 21st century.
More open policies were related to increasing shortages of skilled manpower, as a
result of demographic and structural change. While skill shortages have been
experienced across the board in many increasingly technologically advanced
developed countries, three sets of factors have been especially important in
influencing renewed demand for skilled manpower. They have stimulated renewed
attention to the issue of brain drain, as well as potential brain gain –– benefits to
poorer origin countries from deployment of former migrants (or their knowledge)
back home –– as well as to potential worldwide benefits from international migration
(World Bank, 2006: Chapter 2).6 First, ageing of developed country populations,
especially in Europe and later Japan, has contributed rising demand for skilled
manpower in non-tradable service industries, particularly in health and aged care.7
Second, the information technology revolution has greatly increased the demand for
skilled manpower in the production of computer software and the demand for
computer and ICT engineers. Third, shortages of lower to middle-level skilled
manpower –– technicians, electricians, plumbers, nurses and teachers –– has been
especially marked, as developed country workers shun difficult and ‘dirty’ blue collar
and related jobs, and the output of their educational institutions have failed to keep
pace with demand.
2.
Debates on the impact of emigration
6
Modelling exercises have paid most attention to the potential benefits from liberalising the movement
of unskilled workers, although they also note modest gains to developed and developing countries from
increased mobility of skilled manpower. See, for example Winters, et al. (2003).
7
Much of the increased demand has also been for unskilled workers in non-tradable services, the most
rapidly growing sector of employment in the United States and other developed economies (Pritchett,
2006).
6
The literature on brain drain and brain gain is ambivalent as to whether
sending countries gain from migration of skilled manpower. A range of factors have
been identified as important: rate of economic growth and utilisation of skilled
manpower back home, especially in certain skilled occupations (particularly relevant
to the LDCs); the size of the brain drain relative to the domestic supply of skilled
manpower; the role of remittances; and the extent to which migration stimulates
development of human capital in countries of origin (partly determined by the scale of
out-migration and the role of the diasporas).
Early theoretical studies tended to emphasize the negative effects of brain
drain, which supported much of the public debate focusing on the negative effects of
out-migration of skilled manpower.8 The studies focused on the short-run impact of a
loss of human capital, the cost of which is mostly born by domestic taxpayers, and the
impact of the fall in the supply of educated manpower on national output. Subsequent
research regarding the impact of out-migration of skilled manpower on countries of
origin can be divided into two groups, for convenience: the findings of the migration
optimists and the migration realists.
(i)
The optimists
Early research gave way to more complex and optimistic models that stressed
the dynamic effects of migration. It highlights the positive impacts of remittances on
consumption and investment at home, and the impacts on human capital development
in sending countries. The scope broadened to include technology and knowledge
transfer and other benefits of brain circulation, and the potential benefits from
diaspora links. Theoretical models developed by migration optimists such as Stark
(2004)9 examined the impact of skilled migration in an open economy framework,
and posited the potential for ‘brain gain’ and a higher level of human capital per
worker as a result of increased demand for and access to education among those left
behind. Mountford (1997) argued that such general improvements in education could
contribute to greater equality and the possibility of a permanent increase in average
productivity of workers. Docquier and Rapoport (2004: 27) summarise the main
effects in response to the successful experience of migrants abroad: “…successive
cohorts adapt their eduction decisions, and the economy-wide average level of
education partly...or totally catches up, with a possible net gain in the long run..” and
“...the creation of migrants’ networks that facilitate the movement of goods, factors
and ideas between migrants’ host and home countries.”10 The diaspora reduces the
costs of migration and risks in countries of destination, providing greater incentive
and demand for migration linked education at home (Kanbur and Rapoport, 2004
cited in Docquier and Rapoport, 2004: 28).
8
See Grubel and Scott (1966) and Bhagwati and Hamada (1974). While Grubel and Scott argued the
loss to developing countries was likely to be relatively small (equal to the direct loss of output from
withdrawal of skilled manpower), Bhagwati and Hamada developed a theoretical model predicting
larger losses as a result of to upward pressure on skilled and unskilled urban wages, and increased
unemployment, from migration, owing to institutionally set minimum wages in developing countries.
9
In this paper, Stark draws on earlier research published in 1997 and 1998.
10
Thus trade and capital, and labour flows, are no longer viewed as substitutes but complements as a
result of such networks. See Rauch and Trindale (2002) on the links between migration and trade
networks and Javorcik, et al. (2006) who find evidence for a positive relationship between migration
and foreign investment (FDI) flows from the United States to countries of origin.
7
At the same time, dynamic effects associated with brain ‘circulation’ have
received increasing attention. More attention in the empirical literature was given to
the role of return migrants in raising skill levels, and promoting technology transfer
and capital accumulation, especially in the successful growth cases of Taiwan and
South Korea by the late 1990s, and in India following economic reforms in the early
1990s (Saxenian, 2002). In the case of both Taiwan and South Korea a range of
factors contributed to a rising number of returnees from the mid to late 1980s and into
the 1990s ( Yoon, 1992; Luo and Wang, 2002; the World Bank, 2006). Government
policies targeted the return of skilled manpower that had stayed abroad after studying
in developed countries, especially the United States. The emphasis on industrial
upgrading and technological change was accompanied by financial and other
inducements for engineers and managers to return to take up high level jobs in
government and research institutes.11 At the same time, as the economies expanded, a
more sophisticated industrial base meant a greater demand for highly skilled
manpower from the private sector, in a range of industries, such as the emerging
computer, electronics and automobile industries.
Complementary efforts involved government efforts – to develop links
between diaspora groups overseas, and business and government in source countries –
to help compensate for the loss of skilled manpower and promote investment in skills
and productive activities back home (Saxenian, 2002). As in India, overseas
professionals contributed to economic development through exchange of ideas, shortterm and temporary visits to countries of origin, as well as permanent relocation.
(ii)
The realists
The above-mentioned relationships are complicated, however, especially since
theoretical models fail to take account of a number of factors: migration ‘realists’
have focused on differences in the quality of out-migrants, and return migrants,
compared with their (potential) replacements back home and on the extent to which
skilled migrants are employed in skilled occupations abroad (see especially Docquier
and Rapaport, 2004 for a survey).12 Several of these factors have been identified as
reducing potential gains from brain circulation and remittances from skilled and
professional manpower in many LDCs.
Many studies have focused on the migration premium –– a range of 2–10 time
higher earnings among migrants compared with non-migrants in the same
occupations, according to Docquier and Rapoport (2004: 16) –– while paying less
attention to the costs of migration, both psychic and social, as newcomers seek to
assimilate in new environments. One important finding on the jobs undertaken by
educated migrants suggests that many work in less skilled jobs, and thus experience
11
The encouragement of emigrants to take positions in technology parks, such as the well known
Hsinchu Science-Based Industrial Park in Taiwan, is one example.
12
For a summary of some of the debates and empirical analysis in recent literature, see especially
Lucas’s major survey of the literature and empirical evidence on international migration and
remittances (2004), the International Organisation of Migration Global Migration report (2005), the
World Bank Global Economic Prospects (2006, Chapters 3–5), and papers included in Ozden and
Schiff (2006).
8
brain ‘waste’. Such patterns have been noted among migrants from countries where
educational standards (the quality of education) are low relative to those more
developed countries. It also seems to have been more prevalent among emigrants
from non-English speaking backgrounds and those from countries that experience
political or other conflicts (Ozden, 2006). Doctors working as nurses are one example,
especially in the case of the Philippines.
In such cases, migration of educated persons is not necessarily a stimulus for
education in countries of origin, or may be a stimulus for learning skills which do not
replace those that are lost (for example, doctors retraining to become nurses in the
Philippines). These impacts may be inter-generational. Mackenzie (2006), for
example, found that the children of tertiary educated migrants who had moved to the
United States from Mexico, had lower enrolment rates at ages 16–18 compared with
children of non-migrant compatriots. He suggests that potential returns to schooling
were lower for children of emigrants, compared with children in non-migrant
households. Mackenzie argues that those in non-migrant households were less
responsive to the potential gains from migration, and hoped that a tertiary education
would provide an opening for better jobs at home in Mexico.
Impacts on human capital in places of origin are likely to be varied and larger
(understandably) in low human capital and low migration contexts, either through
return migration or remittances, than where there is already an abundant supply of
educated manpower, and substantial out-migration (Docquier and Rapoport, 2004).13
Nevertheless, while short run brain drain effects are likely to be greater in countries
with a narrow human capital base,14 brain drain has been found to be negatively
related to economic growth in countries where migration rates for the highly educated
are high (above 20 per cent) and where the proportion of more educated persons in the
total population is also relatively high (Beine, Docquier and Rapoport, 2003).15 One
possible explanation is that rates of return migration are low among skilled migrants,
in general, and a large diaspora discourages return migration. This begins to have a
drag on growth in countries of high out-migration.
Heterogeneity among migrants and non-migrants is also an important issue.
Schiff (2006) has drawn attention to the fact that the more optimistic models of
migration tend to ignore self-selection which results in higher quality (both more
clever and more experienced) manpower going abroad. For these migrants there are
not near-perfect substitutes among the remaining stock of skilled or potential
manpower. It has also been noted that the less successful skilled migrants tend to
return home, and hence the brain gain is smaller than some of the theoretical models
predict.16
13
Nevertheless some studies suggest even in country cases of high migration and abundant human
capital in source countries, the effects of remittances on skill formation may be large, such as in the
case of Indian doctors who remit substantial shares of their earnings in the United Kingdom back home
(Kangasniemi, et al., 2004 [cited in Docquier and Rapoport, 2004: 26)
14
Although Docquier and Rapoport note that brain drain has only had a significant short run effect on
per capita income in extreme cases such as Guyana and Jamaica.
15
Beine, et al. (2004: 23–24) did find however that the migration rate among educated persons exerted
a strong positive influence on human capital formation in a sample of 50 countries.
16
Borjas (cited in Beine, et al., 2004) showed, for example, that less successful foreign scientists in the
United States were more likely to return home than those who fared better in their professions abroad.
9
(iii)
Remittances
Finally to remittances. From the period of the oil boom in the 1970s, when
large numbers of temporary migrants left their home countries for the Middle East,
there was increasing attention to the impact of remittances on incomes of those left
behind (Amjad, 1989). In more recent times, several studies have pointed to the
dramatic increase in remittances abroad –– totalling an estimated $167 billion in 2005
according to official estimates. Their major role has been highlighted both at micro
and macro levels in stimulating consumption and investment, and helping relax
foreign exchange restraints.17 The absolute flows of remittances back home have been
dominated by nationals of the large emigration and temporary out-migration countries
–– Mexico, the Philippines, India and Brazil. They have nevertheless been significant
in many LDC economies. For example, in a range of LDCs (Cape Verde, Haiti, Nepal
and in the micro states of Kiribati and Samoa), remittances are greater than total
exports, and are a major source of foreign exchange in many others (the World Bank,
2006: 88).18
However, even though incomes earned abroad are higher among the skilled
than the unskilled, we have already mentioned the possibility of lower levels of
remittances from more permanent skilled migrants. This group are more likely to
move with families, or are either more likely to inter-marry with residents, or to be
joined later by family members). They also tend to migrate longer distances than
unskilled migrants, and hence have less intensive contacts with their country of origin
(Faini, 2006). Faini (p. 3) notes that although “The direct effect on skills might be
positive, …the overall effect, that controls for the longer propensity to stay abroad of
skilled migrants, may well be negative.” The less skilled are more likely to migrate to
nearby locations for shorter periods, and if they are employed on temporary contracts
are more likely to send remittances back home on a regular basis.
Evidence from the Philippines, Mexico and Egypt all provide some support for
this proposition. Faini’s own analysis of data on skilled and unskilled overseas
migrants in OECD countries finds that a higher proportion of skilled migrants (and an
increasing proportion over time, tends to be negatively related to the size of
remittances (pp. 8–12, Table 2 and 3).19 Remittances may well have a positive impact
on consumption and investment back home, and contribute to poverty alleviation
(Adams, 2007). But these effects appear to have been stronger in cases where
unskilled migration predominates, than for migration of more highly educated
workers.
3.
Implications for the LDCs
17
These figures are based on official IMF data, indicating remittances grew faster than foreign direct
investment and official development assistance (ODA) over the past decade, doubling in several
countries and rising by close to 10 per cent per annum between 2001 and 2005 (the World Bank, 2006:
87–89). Remittances accounted for around seven per cent of domestic investment and imports in all
developing countries in 2005. A high proportion of the flows were between developing countries (4050 per cent) and it is estimated that an additional 50 per cent of all remittances flow through informal
channels.
18
See Section III below for further details on LDCs.
19
See also Niimi and Ozden (2006).
10
Many of the findings of this literature survey need to interpreted with care
since they pertain mainly to larger, lower income and lower middle income countries
which account for a large share of international migration of skilled manpower.
Nevertheless some important lessons can be learned. First, following Docquier and
Rapoport (2004: 34), while the optimal rate of skilled and professional out-migration
“...is likely to be positive”, whether the “current rate is greater or lower than this
optimum is an empirical question that must be addressed country by country.” In
short, there appears to be huge variation in individual country experience with respect
to brain drain, brain circulation and brain gain. One important factor is the size of the
brain drain, which has both positive and negative effects: a large diaspora provides a
cushion and a support for would be skilled migrants, but (as noted) at the same time
may reduce the potential benefits to countries of origin over time. More settled
migrants tend to have more tenuous links with home countries, especially net of the
impact of remittances.
Second, industries which employ emigrants also play a part in determining the
benefits. Benefits to the home country from out-migration of doctors and nurses in a
largely non-tradable, and heavily regulated industry (despite the internationalisation
of health care service provision in some countries) might be expected to have few
benefits in terms of technology transfer, investment from abroad and, of course, trade.
They can be expected to be much more positive in a highly open, tradable industry
such as ICT, where economic benefits from nationals working for private investors
abroad can be substantial for technology, employment and investment in countries of
origin. It is perhaps thus no surprise that Indian policy makers tend to be much more
enthusiastic about brain drain into ICT industries than Filipinos are about loss of
doctors and nurses to hospitals in countries across the globe.
Finally, home country policies and growth prospects can play a major role in
increasing brain gain, and reducing the costs of brain drain. Rapidly growing, middle
income, countries, that have passed the migration ‘hump’, are likely to be in a better
position to utilise skilled manpower from abroad, and to invest in the human capital
that is necessary to plug the gaps created by emigrants (Lucas, 2004).20 But even at
lower levels of per capita income, domestic policies appear to be important. For
example, while the Philippines shows no sign of being over the migration hump (and
certain sectors appear to suffered negative effects from brain drain), the government
has been proactive in seeking to reduce the costs, encourage return migration and
increase the social and economic benefits from emigration. As we shall see, LDCs
have much to learn from the experience of some of the middle income countries with
regard to increasing the net gains from emigration.21
C.
Estimates of brain drain and remittances in LDCs: OECD countries
We now turn to some quantitative estimates of skilled out-migration for the
LDCs. The latest data on the total number of skilled out-migrants are from the round
of censuses conducted in 1990 and 2000 in OECD countries, which are host to a high
20
The migration ‘hump’ refers to a process whereby the rate of (net) out-migration increases in the
early stages of economic development until it reaches a peak, somewhere in the middle income range
of national GDP per capita, and then begins to decline.
21
See Section V below for a discussion of some of these policies.
11
proportion of all skilled migrants. This is the basis for our discussion of brain drain in
terms of absolute numbers, and shares in the sending populations. Hence the data
presented in this section are only a rough proxy of total skilled migration stocks and
flows, and of current conditions with respect to LDCs.
One major, potential bias in the data is the under-enumeration of illegal or
undocumented/unregistered migrants in censuses in receiving countries, especially
among individuals who have overstayed their visas. This problem is typically much
greater for unskilled than for skilled migrants. Nevertheless, overstays among skilled
migrants emerged as a significant problem in the United States in particular from the
late 1990s, after policies towards skilled migrants were liberalised (Martin, et al.,
2006). Our guestimate is that perhaps as many as five per cent of all skilled migrants
may be missed from the OECD censuses. However, we don’t have any basis for
estimating the number or share of illegals by country of origin.
More recent data suggest that total migration has probably accelerated in the
period 2000–2005 (see below for some rough estimates), although there is no
breakdown by country of origin and for skilled (more educated) workers separately.22
Despite these data limitations, later we provide an estimate of the share of skilled
migrants to total population for LDCs in 2004, based on past trends in skilled
migration to major developed (OECD) countries. Case studies provide some
additional information on more recent trends.
The data set used for much of the quantitative analysis in this paper is the only
comprehensive one available internationally, as an indicator of skilled and
professional out-migration from the LDCs. While it is a little out of date, it is
nevertheless a remarkable collection of information: the first quantitative estimate
ever made of the incidence of brain drain from all developing countries and LDCs,
based on the census and related labour force data of some 30 OECD countries. Skilled
emigrants are proxied by the share of tertiary educated overseas population in all
OECD countries as a share of the stock of tertiary educated in source countries in the
years 1990 and 2000.23 Table 2, and Annex Table 1, provide information on the main
rates for all emigrants and tertiary educated emigrants, as well as rates of change for
the period 1990–2000 for all LDCs for which there are data. The main data source is
Docquier and Marfouk (2004), which was updated with relatively small changes in
Docquier and Marfouk (2006).24
To help interpretation the data are organised by region: the main regions of
Africa, where the bulk of LDCs are located; the Island economies (in the Pacific and
22
More up-to-date analysis awaits publication and analysis of census data for 2005 in receiving
countries, which provide information of birthplace and previous residence of the total population.
23
In the discussion of these data, we use the terms skilled, skilled and professional and tertiary
educated interchangeably, as the emigration rates of tertiary educated are used as a proxy for skilled
out-migration. As noted in Section II, rates for tertiary educated persons are only a rough proxy for
skilled out-migration, bearing in mind that numbers of tertiary educated persons are likely to be
employed in less skilled occupations. From the perspective of brain drain from sending countries,
however, the bias is not too significant. But it obviously impacts on rates of skilled in-migration into
OECD countries, and policy implications drawn from these movements.
24
Docquier and Marfouk (2006: 194–95).
12
elsewhere –– mainly in Africa); and Asia.25 Within regions, countries are ranked by
total population size in Annex Table 1, which is correlated with the absolute number
of emigrants, although not necessarily with migration rates. Annex Table 1 also
includes data on per capita income and the human capital index for all countries.
What are the main patterns of skilled emigration and changes in emigration
rates in the period 1990–2000 among the LDCs. Three stand out. Emigration rates
were high; they demonstrated some important regional effects even though variations
were quite large within the main geographical regions; and rates increased in the
1990s, again with some significant differences among regions and countries.
First, as noted in Section II, emigration rates were generally high among
tertiary educated persons by international standards (unweighted mean by country of
21 per cent in 2000). There was considerable variation in the (unweighted) total rates
of emigration among tertiary educated persons within and by country group among
the LDCs. They were close to 25 per cent in the Pacific and other island states, West
Africa and East Africa, and lowest in the generally more populated countries of Asia
(5 per cent), with Central Africa falling in between (15 per cent). The overall
unweighted mean was much higher than for all lower middle and low income
countries (7.6 and 6.1 per cent respectively in Table 1 above), although the latter
figure (weighted) is heavily influenced by quite low out-migration rates in the giant
developing countries of China and India in particular.
As mentioned in Section II, these rates compare with overall out-migration
rates among tertiary educated persons that were very high among all Caribbean
countries (39 per cent) (see Docquier and Marfouk, 2004: Table 2). This was followed
by West and East Africa (27 and 18 per cent respectively – most of which consist of
LDCs). They were moderately high among several of the better endowed, developed
countries in Europe (in particular Northern Europe), Central America and Southeast
Asia (close to 10 per cent), but moderately low (around 5 per cent) in Western and
South-Central Asia, Latin America and all of Oceania (the latter dominated by
Australia), and very low in the North America (the United States less than one per
cent, much less populated Canada recorded a rate of around five per cent).
Second, these average rates of emigration of skilled persons across the main
LDC regions hide very substantial intra-regional variations, with coefficients of
variation close to one in all regions except for East Africa (Table 3). Figures 1–6
summarise the data by country for the major regions of skilled out-migration among
the LDCs. All regions, especially West and East Africa, show substantial variations in
rates across countries, both in 1990 and 2000.
Out-migration rates were especially high in several of the very small island
countries, both in the South Pacific and elsewhere (Sao Tome and Principe, Cape
Verde and Samoa), in countries that had experienced political instability in the 1980s
25
The main sub-regions among LDCs in Africa are East, Central and West Africa. Following
UNCTAD practice, we have included one country from North Africa (Sudan) and one from Southern
Africa (Lesotho) with Central and Southern Africa respectively (hereafter we refer to East, Central and
West Africa as the main groups on the African sub-continent). For ease of exposition, Haiti, the only
South American country, is included with West Africa in the regional grouping of the data, also
following the current convention in UNCTAD publications on LDCs.
13
and 1990s (Sudan, Liberia, Mozambique, Somalia, Eritrea) and in some of the poorest
countries (eg., Sierra Leone) (see Figure 7). They were lowest in some of the larger
countries (the Congo, Sudan, Niger and Malawi, and in all the more populous Asian
countries (especially land locked Nepal, and Myanmar; see Figure 8).
Third, increases in out-migration among the tertiary educated to OECD
countries were quite substantial: they increased by over 70 per cent in the 1990s, a
figure only slightly less than the 96 per cent rise for all migrants (see the last two
columns in Table 2). As Figures 1–6 indicate, rates of emigration were relatively
stable across countries and regions over the ten year period. In general, the same
countries recorded high emigration rates in 2000 and 1990, with one major
exceptions: They increased very substantially in Madagascar and war torn
Mozambique in the 1990s.
Nevertheless, despite sustained high rates of migration from several countries,
there was also some variation across countries in out-migration rates recorded in 1990
compared with 2000.26 By region, the greatest increase was for West Africa, followed
by Central Africa, whereas out-migration declined among the tertiary educated in the
Pacific Island economies in the 1990s. Very large increases in rates of out-migration
were recorded in a handful of countries with several of the same characteristics noted
above for high emigration countries. Thus, out-migration rates are estimated to have
more than tripled in Angola, Mauritius, Guinea-Bissau and Burundi and were close to
double rates in 1990 in Senegal and Guinea (in West Africa), Rwanda and
Mozambique (in East Africa) and in the largest LDC economy, Bangladesh, in South
Asia.
At the other extreme, eight African, two Asian (Lao PDR and Bhutan) and all
South Pacific countries registered a decline in out-migration rates from 1990–2000.
Declines were smaller than increases, but were nevertheless quite large. In East
Africa, for example, Lesotho and Uganda both registered a falling stock of tertiary
educated persons abroad: by 61 and 28 per cent respectively. Compared with Samoa
and Kiribati in the Pacific, where declines were relatively small, the declines were
substantial (40 and 47 per cent respectively) among the very small island states of
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. This suggests a return of some of the tertiary educated
to these countries, despite the disappointing development record of the 1990s.
What factors contributed to these high emigration rates? We have not
undertaken a multivariate analysis of the determinants of out-migration. Nevertheless,
correlation coefficients between tertiary levels of out-migration and several key
variables confirm some of the observations made in the description of patterns and
trends above (Table 4). Population size and the human capital index were (weakly)
inversely correlated with out-migration rates (especially among the West African
countries), while GDP was positively correlated with out-migration among educated
people (again the strongest relationship was for West Africa).
26
The coefficient of variation for increases/decreases in migration rates for the entire sample was more
than two for the period 1990–2000. Data reliability probably contributed to this wide range in changes
in migration rates for countries and regions. Docquier and Marfouk (2006) indicate that one needs to be
especially careful in interpreting apparent trends in out-migration, given data problems. The data for
1990 are probably less reliable than for 2000 and in both years are based on estimates using data from
neighbouring countries with similar characteristics.
14
Finally, to put these movements in perspective, we have assembled data which
compare emigration rates in 2000 among the countries with the largest absolute
number of outmigrants, and LDCs with the highest rates of emigration. The latter
organised into two groups and ranked by the magnitude of emigration in each (Table
5). Two points stand out:
1.
•
First, the absolute number of tertiary educated out-migrants was relatively
small among all LDCs, viewed on a global scale. Thus whereas several of
the large exporters (the Philippines, India, China and Mexico) had around
a million educated people living abroad in 2000, only Haiti among LDCs
recorded close to 100,000 skilled emigrants. Most of the rest of the larger
LDC exporters recorded a stock of around 20–40,000 tertiary educated
people living overseas in 2000. The differences between the two groups of
countries are partly a function of population size. It is also partly
associated with low enrolment rates at tertiary level in the LDCs,
compared with some of the globally large exporters of skilled manpower,
such as the Philippines.
•
Second, emigration rates among the educated were indeed very high by
international standards in a number of LDCs. Table 5 indicates that among
the large emigration countries only Jamaica recorded higher out-migration
rates than Haiti (82 per cent), Cape Verde (69 per cent), Samoa (67 per
cent), Somalia (59 per cent), Eritrea (46 per cent) and Mozambique (42 per
cent). This was not simply a matter of scale. Although we noted above that
emigration rates were high in some of the smallest countries, four LDCs
with populations of five million or more ranked among the top ten
countries in the world, in terms of emigration rates in 2000 (Docquier and
Marfook, 2006: 176–77).27 Thus even for a sample of larger countries,
high emigration rates were a feature of economic and social life among the
LDCs.
More recent developments in LDCs
The available data do not enable us to update the figures on rates of emigration
among more educated and skilled people by country. However, we have attempted to
estimate the magnitude of emigration to OECD countries for all LDCs based on the
baseline data calculated by Docquier and Marfouk (2006). Assuming that outmigration rates in 2000–2004 were at least similar to those in the previous decade, we
27
The four were Haiti, Somalia, Mozambique and Sierra Leone. Data in Table 5 for individual
countries are taken from Docquier and Marfouk (2004), which has a relatively complete country list of
emigration rates. In the revised version of their paper (which only reports the data for selected
countries), the same two authors reported higher migration rates for the Lao PDR (37 compared with
14 per cent reported in the 2004 paper) and Uganda (36 per cent compared with 22 per cent in 2004)
and Angola (33 per cent compared with 26 per cent in 2004); the later publication records a decline in
emigration rates among the educated for Somalia (33 per cent recorded versus 59 per cent in 2004). For
consistency, we have only used the data from the 2004 publication for the discussion of country trends
in this paper. While the absolute rates do differ between the two studies, only Lao PDR (which was
already the highest out-migration country among LDCs in Asia according to the 2004 study) changes
significantly in ranking among the high emigration countries.
15
find that total emigration of skilled manpower from the LDCs probably amounted to
around 15 per cent of their total stock of tertiary educated people aged 25 or above
(Table 6), a share which probably increased, albeit only slightly, compared with the
year 2000. In total this would have amounted to around one million tertiary educated
people working abroad from LDCs, whose total stock of educated manpower
amounted to around 6.6 million (including over one million in Bangladesh alone) in
2004.
The composition of migrants to OECD countries from Africa, in particular,
has been heavily dominated by educated persons. Thus OECD (2002) reported that 75
per cent of migrants from African countries to the OECD countries had completed
tertiary education, many among them medical personnel –– doctors and nurses ––
who had received subsidised training in their countries of origin. Many of these
migrants came from low and middle income countries such as Ghana, Nigeria and
South Africa, however, rather than the least developed countries in the region.28 At
the same time, there has been some evidence of substitution effects in LDCs.
Outmigrants were being replaced by other nationals in several locations. Adedpoju
(1988, cited in Gubert: 24) found early evidence of rural migrants or migrants from
neighbouring countries replacing skilled international migrants in Burkina Faso,
Senegal and Mali among the least developed countries.29
2.
Brain drain and remittances in LDCs
How large were the remittances associated with these patterns of brain drain?
International data sets do not breakdown of remittances by skill group, and hence the
evidence is indirect with regard to the importance of remittances from educated
persons abroad.30 Table 7 presents data on remittances in selected years 1990–2004
from the World Bank website for a collection of LDCs for which data appear to be
plausible.31 On average, excluding a number of extreme values in the calculation of
changes over time, remittances per capita appear to increased quite significantly in
LDCs in the 1990s and even more in the first half of the 21st century. The mean value
rose three fold from around $200 million in 1990 to just under an estimated $600
million in 2005. Remittances are highly correlated with both total rates of emigration
to OECD countries and out-migration rates among skilled workers (for both a
correlation coefficient of 0.79 between the value of remittances and migration rates in
2000).
28
For example, Adebusoye (2006, cited in Gubert, n.d.: 23) reported that close to one-quarter of
Ghanaian health workers trained in 1995–2002 migrated, including around two-thirds of all general
practitioners.
29
Presumably the rural-urban migrants tended to replace less skilled emigrants (although they may also
consist of rural doctors or nurses moving to higher paid jobs in the cities –– a kind of internal brain
drain that is not uncommon in many countries). Gubert suggests that international migration may be a
final step after skilled migrants move from villages to cities, to other cities and then abroad.
30
It should also be borne in mind that an estimated 40–50 per cent of all remittances occur through
informal channels and are not recorded in official balance of payments data (the World Bank 2006:
Chapter 4).
31
The data need to be interpreted with care, given that the reliability of coverage appears to differ
significantly for individual countries from year to year.
16
Aside from the major oil and mineral exporters, these figures are significant in
terms of foreign exchange earnings for a large number of countries, given that total
merchandise exports were less the $500 million per year for the large majority of
LDCs (UNCTAD, 2006: Chart 1). Thus, for example, estimated remittances of nearly
$4 billion in Bangladesh in 2005 were greater than the total value of merchandise
exports of $1.4 billion in 2003–4; among the smaller exporters –– for example
Lesotho, Uganda and Senegal –– around $200 million were equivalent to or greater
than total exports in the same years. Among several very small countries –– Cape
Verde and Samoa –– remittances of around $50–100 million were the major source of
foreign exchange. It is noteworthy that Senegal, Cape Verde and Samoa all had
emigration rates of 20 per cent or more (69 per cent for Cape Verde) in 2000, and
hence skilled out-migration probably played a major role in remittance incomes.
D.
South-South migration
Most of the migration of skilled workers discussed so far has been between the
better-off OECD countries and the LDCs. Data on skilled movements between
developing countries is fragmentary. Nevertheless it is undoubtedly quite large and
important for the economic and social policy. Movements of all migrants between
developing countries gives some idea of the magnitude, relative to movements from
developing to developed countries. For all developing countries, it is estimated that
another 50 per cent (74 million) of all migrants reside in other developing countries,
most of which takes place between contiguous borders (Ratha and Shaw, 2007).
Remittances, often more intensive across shorter distances, amounted to around 20
per cent of all remittances to developing countries, a figure that probably also applies
for the LDCs. Ratha and Shaw (2007: 10–12) indicate one major issue are the
obstacles to a free flow of remittances, especially for South-South flows. These
include regulation of outward remittances in some source countries (for example
Bangladesh among LDCs), and India, a large destination country for cross-border
flows from several LDCs (Bangladesh and Nepal). In several countries, remittances
have to be reported to the authorities, and fees tend to be higher than for north-north
corridors, partly because of lack of competition among financial institutions.
Among LDCs, movements of Bangladeshis to India and from Burkina Faso to
the Ivory Coast are two of the major ‘corridors’ of South-South migration, the former
accounting for some 3.5 million migrants, and the latter approximately one million
(Ratha and Shaw, page 8, Figure 3). For sub-Saharan Africa, which accounts for a
significant share of LDCs, Ratha and Shaw (p. 8, Figure 2) estimate that 69 per cent
of all migration flows occurred within the region alone, compared with only 27 per
cent with of all migration to OECD countries. Many of these movements are volatile
and have been dominated by refugees from countries suffering armed and political
conflict, but also drought and natural disaster. This applies to from Liberia, Burundi,
Somalia, Angola and Sierra Leone especially, as well as to other countries in Central
and West Africa, including the Congo and Central African Republic, and also some of
the East African countries of Kenya and Tanzania (Lucas 2006). In recent times, from
around 2000, the movement of refugees declined as many returned to their home
countries (Gubert, nd: 16). Southern Africa, principally South Africa, has traditionally
been a net in-migration area, as workers sought employment mining and agriculture,
from a range of sub-Saharan countries, although the South African government began
17
to control these movements more tightly in the 1990s (particularly after the end of
apartheid).
While the share of tertiary educated persons is estimated to be quite low
among many of the South-South movements, several are of importance. Although
unskilled migrant flows still dominated, skilled migration has historically been most
important to the mining economies in Southern Africa. But more generally, educated
migration flows appear to be greater from poorer sub-Saharan African countries to
other countries within Africa, although it is difficult to assess the extent of such
movements in the absence of precise quantitative data. In contrast, movements of
skilled manpower to OECD countries tend to be greater in the higher income
countries of the region, especially from South Africa (Lucas, 2006: 49). Indeed, Lucas
raises the question as to whether this implies that future growth in incomes and
tertiary enrolments might lead to a shift in skilled migration flows from the LDCs to
OECD countries, with quite “profound” implications for patterns of return migration.
It might result in more brain gain abroad but less frequent return, for example. And
perhaps even greater induced demand for higher education would result, as countries
move up the migration hump, in terms of skilled migration.
At the same time, there appear also to be countervailing forces on the
continent contributing to greater movements of skilled manpower within Africa. Thus
Adepojo (2004: 2) cites improved economic conditions in several countries in
Southern Africa (the “booming economies –– Gabon, Botswana, Namibia and South
Africa) as a magnet for skilled professionals from elsewhere in the region, who had
previously sought jobs in the Middle East, Europe or the United States.
There is little quantitative information on the contribution of return migrants
to skill formation and technology back home among LDCs. Nevertheless limited
studies among similar economies do show that return migrants can make a difference
in key areas important for economic progress. Ammassari (2003:2) concludes from a
study of skilled returnees in the Ivory Coast and Ghana that they “fostered positive
development effects in both private and public sectors.” This differed across
generations with earlier return migrants assisted to “nation building”, while the
contribution of later cohorts was more directly related to entrepreneurship. Among the
benefits which returnees cited themselves as most important, specialised technical
expertise and communication skills ranked highest. Knowledge and skills were more
important than work experience, although contributions to work morale and
productivity in new jobs were also ranked quite high. Besides technical expertise, the
returnees modest amounts of capital with them (reported to be less than US $10,000
for over half of respondents in both countries), and mainly utilised them for housing
and consumption of durable goods, although around one-third also reported providing
assistance to family members.
E.
Regional trends and country case studies
There are many similarities between countries in the main LDC regions –– in
Africa, Asia and the Pacific Islands –– but there are also some important differences
related to geography, history, demography and economic development.
18
1.
Africa
As the region with most LDCs, Africa has often been highlighted as the
continent which suffers most from brain drain. The most recent account of these
patterns can be found in Lucas (2006). While he shows that skilled migration has been
dwarfed by the ebb and flow of large numbers refugees over the past several decades,
the continent has remained an area of net out-migration to the rest of the world,
especially for skilled migrants. Economic growth and wage differentials have been
identified as key negative and positive factors, respectively, contributing to high rates
of out-migration, although rapid population growth among young people (and
conflict) were also a factor.32
In the African case, there is no clear resolution of the brain gain-brain drain
debate. While out-migration of skilled manpower can impose severe economic and
social costs in some sectors, such as health (see below), a number of factors need to
be taken into consideration before one can conclude that emigration is bad for
national economies and communities. One consideration is the under-utilisation of
skilled manpower at home which is common in many countries, including the LDCs.
Under such circumstances social costs of out-migration are likely to be smaller, at
least in the short run. Another is fiscal impacts. With regard to tax revenues lost,
Lucas (p. 36) notes that this must be weighed against the reduction in state spending
for emigrants (for example on health and education of children). The gains also need
to be evaluated carefully. Benefits from reverse capital flows, technology transfer and
greater trade with countries of origin, such as identified in the case of India and the
Philippines, are likely to be small in most African LDCs.33 Such gains depend
critically on a favourable investment climate which is absent in many LDCs in
Africa.
Lucas (2006: 38–41) reports the results from a simple regression exercise
seeking to explain differentials in migration rates among tertiary educated persons
across the continent. Three results are of interest. First, per capita income is
statistically insignificant as an explanation for brain drain. Second, tertiary enrolment
rates are strongly positively correlated with out-migration. And third, location and
size both matter: emigration was negatively associated with both a Southern Africa
and a Francophone country dummy variable. However, out-migration rates were
negatively associated with a dummy variable representing countries with populations
below one million. It would seem, at first glance that at least the positive association
between tertiary enrolment and emigration rates provides some support for the brain
drain hypothesis. Nevertheless Lucas (p. 41) warns that the interpretation of the
finding for tertiary enrolments rates is not as simple as might first appear: “…whether
a higher brain drain induces more students to enrol, or expanding the college
education systems results in a larger exodus of the highly skilled, remain to be
disentangled.” An interpretation in favour of brain gain would be valid if emigration
of the tertiary graduates induces high levels of enrolment.
2.
Asia
32
Lucas (2006: 23) cites a panel study by Hatton and Williamson (2003) which examines some of the
determinants of brain drain.
33
Among LDCs, such benefits are probably more significant among the manufacturing exporters
Bangladesh and Cambodia, which rely on imported capital and technology in exporting industries..
19
As noted in the discussion of overall trends in overall and skilled emigration,
densely populated Asian LDCs (Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal and Bhutan in South
Asia, and Cambodia and the Lao PDR in East Asia) have experienced much lower
levels of brain drain than many countries in Africa or the Pacific Island states.34 Only
the Lao PDR has emigration rates which approach levels of those among other major
LDCs. Demand factors appear to have been more important. Out-migration was low,
even though tertiary level enrolments and the stock of tertiary educated is relatively
high in several of the Asian countries by LDC standards. For example gross tertiary
enrolment rates were estimated at 6.5 per cent in Bangladesh according to UNESCO
statistics (Global Education Digest, 2006), higher than any other LDC economy, with
the possible exception of Samoa (for which more recent data are not reported).
On the demand side, relatively rapid economic growth in recent decades, in
Bangladesh and Cambodia in particular, has almost certainly increased demand for
skilled manpower across a range of occupations. Nevertheless, brain drain issues have
been an important issue in development debates in the largest LDC economy of
Bangladesh (which has also been growing quite rapidly), especially with regard to the
outflow of doctors to the United Kingdom in particular (Dovlo, 2004). Loss of skilled
manpower abroad is also significant in Myanmar and the Lao PDR, both of which
have suffered from slow rates of economic growth in the recent decade.35 In the case
of Myanmar, political conflict has also been a factor over several decades.
3.
The South Pacific Islands
The very small, island state LDCs in the South Pacific –– Solomon Islands,
Vanuatu, Samoa, Kiribati and Tuvalu –– contrast markedly in migration patterns from
the large and densely population Asian LDCs discussed above. They are characterised
by relatively small populations, land abundance and dependence on Australia and
nearby New Zealand in particular (especially in the case of Samoa in Polynesia) as
migration havens. This has meant that emigration is intensive in some states and
skilled out-migration and associated brain drain an important policy issue across the
region. Emigration of professionals is particularly high in the case of Samoa and
Kiribati (see Annex Table 1), although it is considered a major policy issue
throughout the region.36 Connell (2006) in a recent survey draws attention to some of
the underlying factors contributing to movement overseas. Many of them are
strikingly similar with the case of many smaller African states –– slow economic
growth and high youth (and educated) unemployment, especially in the main towns
and cities; high rates of population growth (though slower at around 2–2.5 per cent
p.a. than in the immediate past); and close proximity to former colonial countries
34
For general surveys of skilled migration from Asia see especially Iguchi (2003) and Chalamwong
(2003). Unfortunately, these surveys concentrate on migration from India and China, and the Southeast
Asian countries of the Philippines and Thailand, with little reference to the LDCs in the region.
35
In the case of Myanmar, official OECD data on out-migration are probably a significant
underestimate, given substantial movements to other South and Southeast Asian countries (such as the
employment of Burmese doctors in Malaysia). For a discussion of migration of health care and IT
professionals from these two countries within Southeast Asia see Manning and Sidorenko (2007).
36
The widely used acronym MIRAB, referring to migration (both internal and international),
remittances and bureaucracy, encapsulates the main challenges of economic development in the region.
See Connell (2006) for a comprehensive survey of recent migration patterns in the Pacific.
20
Australia and New Zealand, both of which suffered problems of skill shortages in the
past decade. Like some of the small island African states, such as Cape Verde,
remittances account for a significant share of GDP, as high as 30–50 per cent in some
countries, and are by far the major source of foreign exchange in most countries in the
Pacific (Ware, 2005: 446).37
Brain drain is an issue in countries such as Samoa in Polynesia, and Kiribati in
Micronesia. But governments are less concerned about its impact on development
than in many other LDCs. They are more likely to be pro-active in encouraging outmigration to support resident populations, many of which have few natural resources
which could raise living standards. Communities typically suffer from major
problems of isolation that affects the costs of economic activity. The Philippines has
been taken as a model for development of beneficial links through skilled migration in
Samoa and Kiribati, with nurses and seafarers playing a major role in generating
remittances (Connell, 2006). Diaspora play a major role in supporting communities
back home, and remittances from some groups of skilled manpower have remained
high over several decades.38 Unlike in Africa, however, brain gain in the form of
return migration is not an issue: it is accepted that most skilled out-migrants will
never return to work in their countries of origin, except perhaps to retire. The main
policy issue appears to be utilising remittances and the skills of those abroad to
greater advantage for community and national development (for example, through
temporary return visits).
F.
The case of health
The situation facing the health care sector has been given particular attention
in the literature on brain drain, especially with reference to the plight of the Africa.39
The emigration of doctors to the United States is a case in point (Hagopian et al.,
2004). The proportion of Africans is small among the large number of doctors of
foreign origin in the United States, and LDC Africans make up a tiny proportion of
the total.40 But these movements are nevertheless significant in terms of the stock of
doctors remaining at home. Table 8 based on data collected by Hagopian, et al.
(Tables 1 and 2) presents data on the number of physicians residing the United States
who originated from four LDCs –– Ethiopia, Uganda, Zambia and Liberia. In these
four countries, the percentage of doctors practicing in the United States relative to the
total stock of doctors back home ranged from 43 per cent (Liberia) to 10 cent
(Zambia). This might not be regarded as a problem, if the stock of medical doctors
remaining in their country of origin was sufficient to meet the needs of the population.
But table 8 (last column) suggests otherwise. All four countries had very few doctors
to serve their populations (highest Zambia 7 per 100,000 people) lowest Ethiopia 2
per 100,000. The percentage was low in all four countries, even compared with an
37
Papua New Guinea and the Solomon islands are important exceptions.
Brown and Connell (2006) demonstrate that Samoan and Tonga nurses continued to remit
considerable amounts back home 20–25 years after emigration, challenging the predictions in the
literature that diaspora links with home countries would decline over time.
39
For general surveys, see for example, Hardill and MacDonald (2000), and Martineau, Decker and
Bundred (2004).
40
The large majority (some two-thirds) of sub-Saharan African doctors were from Nigeria and South
Africa.
38
21
African average of 12.5 physicians per 100,000 population (sub-Saharan Africa 10
per 100,000). It was tiny compared with the United States and United Kingdom
figures of close to 300 and 150 respectively. The point is that even though the
absolute number of professionals from the poorest countries working abroad may be
small, the impact on professional services back home can be severe. Hagopian, et al.
(p. 5) mention, moreover, that the number of recent graduates leaving sub-Saharan
Africa has been increasing in recent years. He suggests that the situation could well
get worse.
While the brain drain among doctors to the United States, by far the largest
employer of foreign trained medical practitioners, provides the starkest example of
loss of professional output in LDCs, it is only one example of a much broader
problem. A high proportion of medical professionals to the United Kingdom are
increasingly recruited from overseas –– doctors recruited outside the United Kingdom
and the EEA amounted to 45 per cent of all new registrations in the United Kingdom
in 2002, up from just over 33 per cent a decade earlier (Dovlo, 2004: 6). Bangladesh
and Burma among LDCs are major countries of recruitment. Mauritius was a major
country of recruitment of nurses in 2002. South Africa has long been an area of
recruitment for doctors from various countries in sub-Saharan Africa, although more
recent agreements with Southern African states have begun to curb some of these
flows.41
A range of factors have been identified as contributing to the brain drain
among medical practitioners. These include very large wage differentials between
countries of destination and origin (over 20 times in case of Ghanaian nurses
compared with the United Kingdom and the United States), poor working
environments and poorly designed career paths, especially for nurses. Associated
problems relate to low efficiency of health care systems, high risks for practitioners
especially those involved in HIV/AIDS programs, and poorly designed programs of
social security.
Among South Asian LDCs, Bangladesh and Nepal, quite substantial early
investment in the health sector, and a supply of well trained and English speaking
medical practitioners has facilited brain drain. Adkoli (2006: 52) notes, for example
that 65 per cent of all newly graduated Bangladeshi doctors seek jobs abroad and the
country loses 200 doctors from the government sector each year, contributing to a
stock of some 1000 Bangladeshi doctors working overseas.
Nevertheless, Lucas (2006) cautions against drawing too strong conclusions
regarding brain drain effects, even in the case of health care workers. Drawing on data
from South Africa in particular, an OECD study suggests that brain drain may only be
an “aggravating” rather than a fundamental cause of poor standards of health care. It
draws attention to the fact that many health care workers are unemployed prior to
departure and concludes: “It is not clear whether emigration of health has been the
main constraint on ability to improve health standards in the region” (OECD, 2003a).
Lack of sufficient resources and insufficient (or inappropriate) training to meet the
health care needs of national populations have also played a role. These conclusions
41
In 1998, some 27 per cent of all doctors registered in South Africa were non-citizens. South Africa
has subsequently developed arrangements with the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) to limit the number of medical doctors recruited from abroad.
22
appear relevant for many of the LDCs suffering an outflow of health professionals in
Africa. It underpins the need to look carefully at the domestic conditions underlying
the demand and supply of skilled workers in particular sectors suffering brain drain, in
the context of varying country-specific circumstances across the region.
The Pacific Island economies also suffer problems of out-migration of skilled
health care workers (Connell, 2006). But, unlike in Africa, there is probably more
focus on the possible positive effects of out-migration. Arguing against the
conventional wisdom, Ware (2005), for example, argues that new efforts to increase
tertiary facilities and enrolments in response to out-migration of nurses is a positive
development, and an example of brain gain through internationally generated demand
for education. This is precisely the point that Stark (2004) and others have stressed, in
seeking to temper the arguments of the brain drain pessimists (see Section II above).
It rests on the assumption that a significant number of graduates from new courses
and new schools, who initially enrolled with the aim of going abroad, end up
contributing to provision of a higher value of goods and services to the domestic
economy.
G.
Receiving and sending country policies
Before beginning a discussion of developed and other receiving country
policies with regard to skilled immigrants, two comments are important. First, brain
drain and costs associated with out-migration of skilled workers is one unfortunate
consequence of dramatically different standards of living, wages and opportunities,
widening in absolute terms, between LDCs and developed and even middle income
countries: wage differentials of 20: 1 or more even in PPP terms. It is not possible to
halt these flows, even if this was desirable, in the foreseeable future. It seems
reasonable to suggest that policies in both sending and receiving countries should be
targeted at reducing the flows that are shown to be most detrimental to national
development, and to increase the benefits from such flows.
Second, it is important to reiterate the importance of circumstances in sending
countries. This is a key message from all country and regional case studies.42 The key
to reducing the costs of brain drain, and increasing the benefits from brain gain, lies
crucially with economic (and political) conditions and related policies in countries of
origin.43 As already discussed above, economic growth and creation of employment
opportunities in LDCs for educated manpower appear to be closely associated with
slower rates of brain drain – even if there may be short term losses during periods of
structural change (Lucas, 2004). Associated policy reforms include specific efforts to
retain skilled workers. The list is well known and includes improved salaries, working
conditions and career paths, and improvements in governance, especially
administrative and bureaucratic in key public sector areas such as health and
education. Short of draconian restrictions on mobility, policies in the major
42
Lucas (2006) and Connell (2006) provide the most compelling cases for improving policies back
home as the key to increasing the benefits poorer countries in Africa and the South Pacific,
respectively, derive from the emigration of skilled manpower.
43
Greater political and freedom stability is clearly a critical element, although strategies for achieving
such a goal are complex and beyond the scope of this study (and indeed for the most part depend on
choices made by LDCs, rather than developed country initiatives).
23
destination areas can only act as a complement to developments and policies in the
sending countries. They may help reduce the extent of emigration, and increase the
gains from emigration. But alone they cannot suffice to overcome the root causes of
costly migration.
1.
Countries of destination
What have been the main policies in developed countries and how have these
changed over time? Two broad and potentially conflicting policy objectives have
emerged in recent years.44 On the one hand, both rapid ageing of populations
(contributing to slow growth in labour supply and increased demand for skill intensive
services) and rising living standards in developed countries have contributed to
shortages of skilled manpower. This applies especially to intermediate levels of skill
(nursing, technicians and other blue collar skills). The major labour importing
countries –– especially the United States, the European Union, Canada and Australia
–– have all reacted in different ways to increase the supply of skilled manpower by
attracting workers from abroad.45 At the same time, there is a growing recognition,
especially in areas like health care, that excessive brain drain can hurt developing
economies and LDCs in particular. Several countries, led by the United Kingdom,
have developed innovative policies to attempt to minimize the brain drain in certain
sectors, with mixed success, especially from poor countries in Africa. Others, most
notably the United States, have been less willing to tailor any national migration
policies to help minimize the costs of brain drain from developing countries, and
especially from LDCs, preferring rather to provide support to those back home,
through development assistance in selected countries.
(i)
The United Kingdom and Europe
What new policies are particularly relevant for skilled manpower from the
LDCs. As Lowell, et al. (2004: 14–16) discuss the United Kingdom has been at the
“forefront” of policies to reduce the impact of brain drain in the health sector in
poorer countries. Initiatives include the banning of National Health Service trusts
from recruiting from South Africa and Caribbean countries, and the Department of
Health issue of guidelines on international recruitment for nurses, with a list of
countries (including many in sub-Saharan Africa) in from which recruitment is
banned. Initially, the policy was only partly successful because the private recruiters
were not covered by the ban. Subsequently the code was extended to doctors and
included private healthcare providers.46
44
See especially Lowell (2002), Lowell and Findlay (2002), Wikramasekera (2003) and Lowell (et al.,
2004) for general surveys of developed country policies.
45
Both Canada and Australia have substantially liberalized immigration regimes in the past five years
or so with regard to skilled workers from abroad. Changes have occurred both through programs which
allow graduates to stay on after completing their courses, and through the adoption of points systems
which target specific skill groups in short supply. Several EU governments (the United Kingdom,
France, Germany Ireland, and the Netherlands also significantly relaxed restrictions on the employment
of skilled manpower through through new legislation from the late 1990s (Mahroum, 2001).
46
www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/world-health-day-2006.asp
24
Clearly these are still limited objectives and might be extended to other areas
where the social costs of migration are demonstrated to be high. European countries
are still reluctant to introduce similar legislation, despite pressure from the United
Kingdom. As a recent agreement between the European Union and African countries
indicates, developing a broader approach which slows the movement of skilled
workers by seeking to dampen demand in developed countries is still a difficult task.
The Joint Africa-EU Declaration on Migration and Development signed by foreign
ministers on November 23 2006 shied away from the sensitive issue of payments to
African countries to compensate for costs of skilled migration.47 The European Union
turned down the African minister’s proposal to create a special development fund,
provided by the European Union, to finance development to prevent young Africans
from leaving for work in Europe –– in essence seeking to have the similar effect,
albeit in a different form, as the long discussed migration tax raised by Bhagwati in
the 1970s. Nevertheless, progress was indicated by the commitment of the European
Union to “commit to promoting policies and reforms to reduce brain” by supporting
human resource and educational development and “supporting programmes which
foster mobility and temporary return of members of the diasporas with the necessary
skills in their countries of origin.”
Development assistance to countries which have demonstrated a willingness to
tackle key issues of reform is another, perhaps more effective, channel through which
developed countries can help tackle the worst forms of brain drain. The case of the
United Kingdom development assistance agency (DFID) assistance to Malawi is
instructive. Malawi, one of the poorest countries in Africa, has expanded training of
health professionals but suffers major problems in retaining staff at home (Record and
and Mohiddin, 2006). DFID has developed a special program of assistance to Malawi
to increase training for both doctors and nurses, and increasing pay and job
opportunities. DFID reports, moreover, that the program has met with some initial
success, with the enrolment of a significant number of 450 new health workers, an
increase in some 570 staff recruited to the Ministry of Health, recruitment of
international volunteers and the establishment of new laboratories.48
While the United Kingdom has taken some important initiatives in the health
care sector, selective policies targeting professional and skilled workers is a major
element in the United Kingdom immigration program, regardless of country of origin
(Nunn, 2005).49 Professionals accounted for approximately 40 per cent of all
migration into the United Kingdom from the mid 1990s, as an integral component of
the medium term economic growth program. While North America and the European
Union contributed the large share of foreign born academic staff, African recruits
amounted to well over one thousand (around 4 per cent of all foreign born
academics), mainly from Nigeria and South Africa. Nevertheless Ethiopia, Mauritius,
Sudan, Uganda, Sierra Leone and Zambia among LDCs accounted for well over one
hundred lecturers and professors in the United Kingdom in 2002. In light a serious
shortage of university staff in many African countries, Nunn (p. 10) recommends that
the United Kingdom promote international protocols on recruitment similar to those
47
See www.euractiv.com/en/justice/eu-africa-talk-migration-brain-drain/article-159976
www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/world-health-day-2006.asp
49
The three tier program launched in 2002 distinguishes highly skilled (doctors, lawyers, engineers,
academics), skilled (nurses, teachers and administrators) and the low skilled.
48
25
developed by the NHS, besides efforts to improve the quality of teaching and output
of universities, and promote debate on compensatory mechanisms.
Incentives for emigrants to return home have also been offered to by some
European countries. For example, France, Italy and Germany have provided loans,
training and technical assistance to migrants (World Bank, 2006: 71). For example, in
the case of France, loans were made to emigrants from Mali and Senegal to establish
businesses in their home countries. However, the small size of the programs, migrant
inexperience in undertaking business ventures (particularly among less educated
migrants), and a poor investment climate at home are reported to have reduced the
effectiveness of such programs. It seems that all these factors need to be taken into
account if such programs are to have a significant influence both on the return of
emigrants, and the impact of their return on the local economies.
(ii)
The United States
Like the United Kingdom, skilled migrants from the LDCs make up a very
small proportion of the skilled migrant stock. Among low income countries, China,
India and the Philippines dominate (Martin, 2003: 70). Nevertheless, like in the
United Kingdom and Europe, small numbers of well educated migrants moving to the
United States from countries such as Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Sudan can have a
significant impact on developments back home. United States’ policies towards
skilled migrants changed with the introduction of the 1-B visa in the 1990s, which
made it easier for professionals recruited by private companies to enter the United
States.50 Workers could stay for up to a period of six years and were no longer
required to demonstrate a clear intent to return (Lowell, et al., 2004: 18). They are
attached to specific employers who are responsible for the migrant’s return at the end
of her/his contract.
Partly in response to the ‘doc.com’ boom, the number of migrants recruited
through the program rose rapidly in the 1990s, and into this century, with even higher
ceilings for annual recruits, reaching close to 200,000 by 2004.51 Private recruiting
agencies/brokers flourished as providers of foreign workers, some of which were
engaged in illegal practices in an effort to maximise fees. Nevertheless, despite these
important changes, permanent migration has often been more difficult in the USA
than in many parts of Europe. The United States government requires that potential
employers provide sufficient evidence for immigrants to pass quite stringent
‘economic needs’ tests showing that they are “uniquely” suited to the job.
(iii)
International Programs
While discussions of recipient developed country programs have centred on
restricting inflows and compensation, international agency policies have been placed
greater emphasis on brain gain through returnees. The focus has been on maximising
50
See especially Martin (2003) and Martin et al. 2006 (64–70) for discussions of the 1-B program.
Intakes fell briefly in 2001 in the wake the set back in the information technology industry. Martin et
al. (2004: 66) show that the annual ceiling rose from 65,000 in the early 1990s to 115,000 in 1999 and
195,000 in 2001 through to 2004.
51
26
the brain gain through working with diasporas (either providing incentives for skilled
migrants to return permanently or to assist technology and skill transfer). The United
Nations agency the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) has been at the
forefront of these efforts, which have had mixed success. A special program for
Africa was established as early as 1983, the Return of Qualified African Nationals
Program (RQAN) with the main objective of “mobilising, and promoting the
utilisation of highly qualified, qualified and skilled personnel in the development of
African countries through voluntary programs” (Wikramasekera, 2002: 11–12). Over
nearly two decades some 1,500 Africans were induced to return to their home
countries before the program was discontinued. The numbers appear very small,
although they are not insignificant in the context of the importance of highly trained
returnees for certain LDC African countries. Nevertheless the high unit cost of the
program, equity considerations (with regard to colleagues back home that did not
migrate) and especially lack of ownership by recipient governments have been all
identified as problems. In 2001 RQAN was replaced by the Migration and
Development for Africa program (MIDA) which places much greater emphasis on
short term visits and transfer of knowledge through the internet and diaspora groups,
rather than permanent return of skilled migrants.52 The United Nations Development
Fund for Women (UNIFEM) has launched a ‘Digital Diaspora Initiative’ through
overseas professionals helping women in countries of origin use new information
technologies (Mutume, 2003).
These shorter-term and more modest programs appear to have greater chances
of success, although they are not without their critics. Martin et al. (2006: 76) note
that only emigrants with permanent residence rights overseas are likely to return even
for short visits, and the costs are still high by poor country standards.
One other set of international initiatives relates to relaxation restrictions on
services trade, including the temporary deployment of labour in service industries, or
Mode 4, under GATS (the General Agreement on Trade in Services), administered by
the World Trade Organisation (Martin et. al, 2006: 82). The potential economic gains
for developing countries from the GATS initiatives appear to be substantial, and the
political obstacles to temporary (contract) migration much greater than for permanent
movements.53 Nevertheless, negotiations have been disappointing in the most recent
Doha round of World trade negotiations, mainly because developed countries had
been not prepared to liberalise regulations with regard to movements of unskilled
workers, or to remove many of the ‘economic needs’ tests which inhibit the
movements of skilled workers.54
International agreements on migration, or even the formation of an
international body similar to the WTO (to establish rules and procedures for
regulating international migration), appear to be difficult to achieve in the short to
52
Other international programs include the Return for Qualified Afghans Programme (co-funded by the
EU) and the Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) project run by the
UNDP. The latter also stresses returns for shorter periods of 3-6 months (Lowell et al., 2004: 21).
53
Modelling exercise suggest benefits are likely to be greater from the liberalisation of unskilled than
skilled worker migration (see Winters, et al., 2003; the World Bank, 2006).
54
The latter require host employers to demonstrate that local workers with equivalent skills are not
available.
27
medium term future.55 Nevertheless regional agreements, often between LDCs and
their more prosperous neighbours, may have greater prospects of success. For
example, the Association of Southeast Asian (ASEAN) countries’ regional equivalent
to arrangements through GATS has made some progress in facilitating the movement
of architects, engineers, health care workers (mainly nurses rather than doctors)
between LDCs such as Myanmar, Cambodia and the Lao PDR to their better-off
neighbours Singapore and Malaysia.56
However, actual migration under this program is still small; in practice, most
existing movements between LDCs and the more developed countries in the ASEAN
region have occurred through unilateral policies which encourage the movement of
skilled workers through the migration of ‘talents’ and professionals on a contract
basis, for a period (with renewals) of up to 6–7 years (Manning and Sidorenko, 2007).
The case of doctors mentioned above is an example. More generally, temporary
migration of skilled workers appears to have been much more successful
administratively than in some developed countries such as the United States, where
overstaying has been a major problem owing to the failure of migrants to return after
contract periods expire.
(iv)
Sending country policies
We have mentioned that brain gain depends crucially on general economic
(and political) developments in receiving LDCs. Nevertheless, targeted interventions
can also make a difference. Some earlier sets of policies are now being questioned
while new initiatives appear to be more successful. For example in the health care
sector policies tried in the past such as bonds and financial sanctions have often failed
because of poor administration and unrealistic restrictions placed on doctors and
nurses (for example, long periods of placement in rural areas despite high wage
differentials with urban areas, and even high differentials when compared with
opportunities abroad) (Dovlo, 2004: 12).
Dovlo (2004: 11–14) outlines some of the new initiatives which are beginning
to make a difference in some countries. These include significant increases in salaries
especially of nurses (Botswana), schemes to develop health care cadres especially in
rural areas (for example, Malawi and Zambia have clinical officers, and Mozambique
a similar category of health carer), and new programs of management of migrant
return, especially on a temporary basis to replace unsuccessful programs for
permanent return of migrants in the past. Other initiatives include extending the
retirement age (for example, beyond 55 as is currently the practice in Malawi and
Lesotho), using community based curricula and strengthening training systems,
especially target at retaining skilled trainers. While some of these initiatives have met
with resistance from the medical profession (such as substituting health cadres for
trained professionals), they provide encouraging signs that initiatives can have a
positive impact in occupations badly affected by brain drain.
55
Bhagwati (2003) has been in forefront in calling for the establishment of a world migration body
equivalent to the WTO.
56
The ASEAN equivalent is AFAS or the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services.
28
Regional initiatives to increase the brain gain have been especially important
in Southern Africa through the South Africa Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA)
(Mutume, 2003). Through its website some 22,000 graduates from five countries
(none of them LDCs) were reported to be linked up to universities back home, in a
range of fields, including medicine, commerce, education and engineering. Brain gain
consists of offers to train South African counterparts or help them conduct research,
help transfer technology (such as providing computers and software) and facilitate
business contacts. NEPAD, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, has also
given some attention to brain drain issues through discussion of conditions which help
curb the brain drain, although concrete initiatives for LDCs in particular have not
been addressed systematically.
Policies seeking to increase the gain from return migration, such as outlined
above for countries like Korea, Taiwan, India and more recently China, also have
some potential in the LDCs. Realistically, the initiatives with the most chance of
success are likely to involve short term visits rather than policies targeted towards the
permanent return of skilled professionals. Thus, for example, doctors returning to
assist with specific health care campaigns, teachers and professors giving crash
courses, or engineers making particular contributions in helping design of
infrastructure relevant to their field of expertise, could all make significant differences
to specific development projects and programs. Skilled persons selected from among
the diaspora are likely to have the advantage over other international experts in terms
of their understanding of local circumstances. Programs targeting emigrants can also
produce longer term ‘external’ benefits through keeping them engaged with the
environment and challenges in their home countries, and also keeping open the
possibility of return if conditions are favourable.
One important initiative to ensure greater utilisation of diaspora skills is the
collection and tracking information on the occupation and training of nationals
working abroad. Another is ensuring that overseas nationals are able to retain their
citizenship in their country of origin, even though they take up citizenship in
destination countries. This means recognizing dual nationality, which may require
special arrangements with countries of destination that do not allow dual citizenship,
either in general or in specific cases (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, 2002). Other
incentives involve revising regulations which discriminate against emigrants, such as
eliminating restrictions on ownership of land and property.
Benefits from such programs are unlikely to be large in terms of overall
national economic and social development. But they can assist in overcoming
bottlenecks in social and economic development. However, there is no strong
argument for selecting nationals to work as international experts on a preferential
basis (contravening international principles which emphasize equal national
‘treatment’). Nationals living abroad who are interested in particular projects will self
select, if indeed language ability and knowledge of local circumstances are important
for effective application of higher level skills in projects in LDCs.
Attracting the permanent return of significant numbers of the skilled emigrants
depends on the capacity of the economy to utilise higher level skills intensively.
Governments and private enterprise need also to be in a position to offer attractive
levels of remuneration and conditions of work. A favourable investment climate is
29
critical if emigrants are to commit money as well as their skills. In part, such
improvements will depend on the rate of economic growth and stage of development.
In part, specific policies adopted by the source countries can also play a part.57 It is
noteworthy that significant numbers of Koreans and Taiwanese did not return to their
home countries until the 1980s when these countries had already achieved middle
income status, and governments were able to offer attractive jobs and positions which
could utilise the skills of overseas professionals (Yoon, 1992; Luo and Wang, 2002).
In the case of India, economic reform in the early 1990s was the trigger for
development of the IT industry in Bangalore, Hyderabad and other locations. The
improved investment climate subsequently contributed to skill acquisition at home,
and out-migration of skilled manpower, and then the return migration of Indians with
experience abroad in the IT industry, in more recent times.
Overall, while developed country initiatives can complement the efforts of
LDCs in reducing the costs and increasing the benefits from skilled migration, it is
initiatives at home which are likely to make a real difference to the overall balance of
gains and losses. Martin, et al. (2006: 72) makes the case for LDC initiatives (which
go beyond merely raising salaries, although the latter is also crucial in many cases), in
summarising their discussion of United Kingdom initiatives in health care:
“Countries worried about the emigration of their health care professionals
could do more to retain them, including making health care institutions more
employee friendly, improving working conditions, increasing the respect for
nurses, and developing career ladders with transparent criteria for
advancement. ...higher salaries alone are not likely to fix systemic problems in
human resource management in health care and other sectors that are losing
professional jobs abroad.”
57
For example, the World Bank (2006: 71, citing research by Gevorkyan and Grigorian, 2003) note
that barriers to foreign investment and inadequate enforcement of contracts acted as a disincentive for
the Armenian diaspora to become more actively involved in national development.
30
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36
Annex
Table 1. Rates of emigration for all workers and skilled workers among LDCs and
other groups of countries, 2000
Rate of Emigration (%)
Share of Skilled Workers
(%)
Among
Among
Residents
Migrants
Share of
Migrants
(%)
Total
Skilled
By Size
Large (Pop. >25 m.)
Intermediate (Pop. 15-<25m.)
Smaller (Pop. 2.5-<15)
Small (Pop. <2.5m.)
1.3
3.1
5.8
10.3
4.1
8.8
13.5
27.5
11.3
11.0
13.0
10.5
36.4
33.2
33.1
34.7
60.6
15.8
16.4
3.7
96.5*
By Income/Disadvantage
High income
Upper-middle income
Lower-middle income
Low-Income
2.8
4.2
3.2
0.5
3.5
7.9
7.6
6.1
30.7
13.0
14.2
3.5
38.3
25.2
35.4
45.2
30.4
24.3
26.6
15.1
96.4*
By Region
America
(Caribbean)
Europe
Africa
(East)
(Central)
(West)
Asia
(Southeast)
Oceania
(Melanesia)
(Micronesia)
(Polynesia)
3.3
15.3
4.1
1.5
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.8
1.6
4.3
4.5
7.2
48.7
3.3
42.8
7.0
10.4
18.6
16.1
14.8
5.5
9.8
6.8
44.0
32.3
75.2
29.6
9.3
17.9
4.0
1.8
1.6
2.4
6.3
7.9
27.8
2.7
7.1
7.1
29.7
38.6
31.7
41.2
40.8
30.9
42.2
46.8
51.4
45.0
45.0
43.6
22.7
26.3
5.1
35.7
7.6
1.4
0.5
1.3
25.5
7.0
1.4
0.2
0.0
0.2
Special Groups
UN Land-Locked Dev. Ctrys.
UN Small Island Ctrys.
UN Least Dev. Ctrys. (LDCs)
1.0
13.8
1.0
5.0
42.4
13.2
6.8
8.2
2.3
37.1
37.6
34.0
2.1
6.8
4.2
* Total sums to slightly less than one hundred
Source: Docquier and Marfouk (2004, 2006).
Table 2. Rates of out-migration from the LDCs, 1990–2000
Country Group/
Country
Africa
Central (and North)*
West**
East (and South)***
Asia
Island States
Pacific Islands
Other Islands
Mean
(unweighted)
Standard Deviation
Population
(millions)
2005
(1)
Rate of Out-Migration
2000
Total Tertiary Educated
(%)
(%)
(2)
% increase in Out-Migration
Rate
1990-2000
Total
Tertiary Educated
(3)
20.9
7.3
17.5
35.9
1.3
2.0
1.6
1.5
14.1
27.3
24.3
6.4
341.7
87.1
31.8
72.4
157.8
107.7
46.1
25.2
0.3
0.4
12.5
7.9
25.1
30.4
23.2
52.3
-26.6
104.1
3.1
7.2
21.4
20.2
95.6
289.7
72.6
151.6
Source: Docquier and Marfook, 2004 for rates of emigration; World Economic Outlook Database (IMF), 2006 and
Selected Economic and Social Indicators for LDCs (UN), 2005 for GDP per capita and population
Selected Economic and Social Indicators for LDCs (UN), 2005 for human capital index
Notes :
*) Includes Sudan
**) Includes Haiti
***) Includes
Lesotho
38
Table 3. Mean, standard deviation, and coefficient of variation of out-migration rates in 2000
and changes in out-migration, in selected groups of LDCs 1990–2000
Country Group
Africa
Central (and North)*
Unweighted Mean
Standard Deviation
Coefficient Variation
West**
Unweighted Mean
Standard Deviation
Coefficient Variation
East (and South)***
Unweighted Mean
Standard Deviation
Coefficient Variation
Asia
Unweighted Mean
Standard Deviation
Coefficient Variation
Island States
Pacific Islands
Unweighted Mean
Standard Deviation
Coefficient Variation
Other Islands
Unweighted Mean
Standard Deviation
Coefficient Variation
All LDCs
Unweighted Mean
Standard Deviation
Coefficient Variation
Out-Migration Rates 2000
Total
Tertiary Educated
(%)
(%)
(1)
% Change in Rates
1990-2000
Total
Tertiary Educated
(2)
1.3
1.7
1.4
14.1
12.5
0.9
341.7
788.9
2.3
157.8
282.6
1.8
2.0
2.7
1.3
27.3
23.8
0.9
87.1
55.8
0.6
107.7
173.6
1.6
1.6
4.0
2.5
24.3
16.4
0.7
31.8
71.5
2.2
46.1
98.4
2.1
1.5
2.5
1.6
6.4
4.7
0.7
72.4
76.5
1.1
25.2
44.7
1.8
12.5
20.5
1.6
25.1
29.3
1.2
23.2
5.1
0.2
-26.6
19.9
-0.7
7.9
10.7
1.4
30.4
29.3
1.0
52.3
67.3
1.3
104.1
122.1
1.2
3.1
7.2
2.3
21.4
20.2
0.9
95.6
289.7
3.0
72.6
151.6
2.1
Source: Docquier and Marfook, 2004 for rates of emigration; World Economic Outlook Database (IMF), 2006 and
Selected Economic and Social Indicators for LDCs (UN), 2005 for human capital index
*) Includes Sudan
**) Includes Haiti
***) Includes
Lesotho
39
Table 4. Correlation coefficient for rates of skilled emigration 2000 and
several other variables
Population Size
GDP per capita
Human Development
Index
-0.5
-0.9
-0.6
0.1
-0.2
-0.2
Africa
-0.3
0.3
Central (and North)
-0.5
0.3
West
-0.8
0.6
East (and South)
-0.1
-0.4
Other Countries
-0.2
0.2
All LDCs
-0.3
0.2
Source: Author’s calculation.
Note : Population Size, GDP per capita and Human Development Index are 2005 figures
40
Table 5. Migration of skilled persons in largest emigration countries among
developing countries and the LDCs with highest emigration rates, 2000
Country
Large Emigration
Countries: All Developing
Philippines
India
China
Mexico
Vietnam
North Korea
Cuba
Iran
Jamaica
Brazil
Colombia
Least Developing Countries
Populations > 4 million
Haiti
Angola
Ethiopia
Mozambique
Uganda
Tanzania
Madagascar
Senegal
Somalia
Sierra Leone
Rwanda
Burundi
Eritrea
Populations < 4 millions
Liberia
Samoa
Cape Verde
Total Population
GDP per
(millions)
2005
(1)
capita
(PPP $)
2005
(2)
No. of Highly
Educated
Out-migrants
(000)
2000
(3)
84.2
1094.3
1307.6
105.3
83.2
23.1
11.4
69.5
2.7
184.2
46.0
4923
3320
7198
10186
3025
1800
3900
7980
4381
8561
7326
1261
1022
906
901
447
423
336
283
261
254
233
14.8
4.2
4.2
14.3
39.0
5.3
28.9
13.1
82.5
3.3
11.0
92
38
36
36
32
29
26
24
81.6
25.6
17.0
42.0
21.6
15.8
36.0
24.1
16
14
5
4
8
58.6
41.0
19.0
19.9
45.8
14
7
5
37.4
66.6
69.1
*)
*)
8.3
11.1
73.0
19.4
27.2
36.7
18.0
11.1
1791
2813
823
1379
1501
723
908
1759
8.5
6.0
8.4
6.3
4.6
600
903
1380
739
858
3.3
0.2
0.5
1033
6344
6418
**)
***)
Emigration
Rate
(%)
2000
(4)
Source: Docquier and Marfook, 2004 for rates of out-migration; World Economic Outlook Database (IMF),
2006 and Selected Economic and Social Indicators for LDCs (UN), 2005 for GDP per capita and population
Note: *) 2006 estimate; **) 2005 estimate; ***) 2003–2004 estimate
41
Table 6. Estimated number of LDC tertiary educated migrants and emigration
rates to OECD countries, 2000 and 2004
2000
2004
Growth rates
(% p.a)
Total population in LDCs (m.)
670
740.4
2.60
Share of total population in all LDCs 25+1
0.63
0.63
Total Pop in all LDCs aged 25+ (m.)
422.1
466.5
2
Estimated tertiary educated population (000)
3.79
--Millions
5.65
6.57
--% of population aged 25+
1.33
1.41
0.86
1.04
4.85
Educated migrants living in OECD countries(m)3
‘Brain Drain’: share of educated population living in
OECD countries
0.152
0.158
1
Assumed to be the same for 2004 as for 2000.
2
Based on the percentage recorded for nine of the larger LDCs (Bangladesh, Burundi,
Cambodia, Ethiopia, Lao PDR, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rawand, Uganda) for which there
are data on the tertiary educated stock of manpower in 2004 (these countries accounted for
approximately 42 per cent of the LDC population in 2000).
3
Data for 2000 are based on Docquier and Marfouk (2006), assuming that migration of
educated persons increased at the same rate for 2000–2004, as for the period 1990–2000
among LDCs living in OECD countries.
Sources: UNCTAD, Least Developed Country Report, Statistical Tables, various years for population
data; Global Education Digest, UNESCO 2006; Docquier and Marfouk (2004, 2006).
Table 7. Value of remittances and remittances per capita, LDCs and selected countries with high rates of emigration
(millions)
GDP
per capita
(PPP $)
Total
Tertiary Educated
2005
2004
(%)
(%)
(1)
(2)
40.1
2340
0.2
5.6
62
641
1403
934
119
42.9
12.2
11.1
7.4
5.7
1082
1661
1135
1635
0.7
2.6
0.3
1.0
11.5
24.1
7.5
13.6
107
142
101
27
73
233
87
34
154
511
84
149
-32
64
-14
26
111
119
-3
338
12.6
44.9
11.6
27.5
27.2
1.8
1433
2083
0.5
0.0
21.6
2.4
428
238
252
291
355
-41
22
41
10.5
152.9
144.3
27.6
20.7
13.6
1890
1610
736
2256
0.3
0.1
0.2
3.1
4.7
2.7
5.7
6.8
1968
111
1288
121
3824
785
1315
138
153
94
607
2
121
22.6
33.9
51.5
9.8
0.2
0.2
0.1
3249
6087
2339
1.2
43.1
5.1
5.0
66.6
24.9
35
45
7
9
45
7
338
5
40
-74
0
0
42.5
248.6
76.1
Country Group/
Population
Country
Africa
North
Sudan
West
Mali
Senegal
Benin
Togo
East and South
Uganda
Lesotho
Asia
Bangladesh
Nepal
Yemen
Cambodia
Island States
Pacific Islands
Vanuatu
Samoa
Kiribati
Rate of Out-Migration 2000
(3)
Value of Remittances
(current US $ Million)
2005
1990 2000
(estimate)
(4)
779
1498
8
43
5
% increase in
Remittances
1990- 2000
20002005
(5)
-14
Value of
Remittances
percapita
(current US $)
2004
(6)
Table 7. Value of remittances and remittances per capita, LDCs and selected countries with high rates of emigration (ctd)
Country Group/
Population
Country
(millions)
GDP
per capita
(PPP $)
2005
2004
(1)
(2)
0.7
0.4
1829
5996
2.2
23.5
14.5
69.1
10
59
12
87
12
92
20
47
0
6
20.4
197.0
8.1
19
1752
2188
10.2
5.1
81.6
23.4
61
206
578
349
919
623
848
233
92
59
94
101
107.1
62.8
3058
9788
4674
6978
4263
0.3
11.5
5.2
2.7
29.0
4.2
14.3
14.8
11.0
82.5
2384 12890
3098 7525
1465 6212
495 1610
229
892
21727
18955
13379
3668
1398
441
143
324
225
290
69
152
115
128
57
20.1
174.8
140.7
70.4
527.9
Other Islands
Comoros
Cape Verde
Other
Haiti
Total: Mean 1**
Mean 2 ***
Selected Large Emigration
Countries
India
1094.3
Mexico
105.3
Philippines
84.2
Columbia
46.0
Jamaica
2.7
Rate of Out-Migration
2000
Total Tertiary Educated
(%)
(%)
(3)
Value of Remittances
(current US $ Million)
2005
1990 2000
(estimate)
(4)
% increase in
Remittances
199020002000
2005
(5)
Value of
Remittances
percapita
(current US $)
2004
(6)
Source: Docquier and Marfook, 2004 for rates of emigration; Global Economic Prospects data set (World Bank), 2006 for remittances;
World Economic Outlook Database (IMF), 2006 and Selected Economic and Social Indicators for LDCs (UN), 2005 for population and GDP per capita
Notes:
** All countries
*** Excludes outliers (Sudan, Haiti and Vanuatu)
44
Table 8. Number of African trained physicians residing in the United States and
Canada compared with the number residing in countries of origin, 2002
Country
Ethiopia
Uganda
Zambia
Liberia
Sub-Saharan
Africa
No. of African
Trained Doctors
Residing in the
US or Canada
No. of
Doctors
Residing in
Place of
Origin
266
175
74
55
5334
1564
722
676
72
12912
% of Total
African
Trained
Doctors
Residing in the
US/Canada
15
20
10
43
10
Physicians per
100,000
population*
2.0
3.0
6.9
2.3
12.5**
* Total number of doctors in the United States and Canada, plus numbers in place of origin divided by
number of doctors in the United States & Canada.
** Data for all African countries.
Source: Adapted from Hagopian, et al. (2004), Tables 1 and 2.
45
Figure 1
Central and North Africa
Rates of Out-Migration (Tertiary Educated)
1990-2000
90
80
70
(%)
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1990
Congo, DR
Sudan
Angola
Chad
Central
African Rep
Countries
2000
Equatorial
Guinea
Figure 2
(%)
West Africa
Rates of Out-Migration (Tertiary Educated)
1990-2000
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
Guinea-Bissau
Gambia
Mauritania
Liberia
Countries
Togo
Sierra Leone
Haiti
Benin
Guinea
Senegal
Niger
Mali
2000
Burkina Faso
1990
46
Figure 3
East and South Africa
Rates of Out-Migration (Tertiary Educated)
1990-2000
90
80
70
60
(%)
50
40
30
20
10
Djibouti
Lesotho
Eritrea
Burundi
Rwanda
Somalia
Zambia
Malawi
Madagascar
Mozambique
2000
Uganda
Un. Rep. of Tanzania
Ethiopia
1990
Countries
Figure 4
Asia
Rates of Out-Migration (Tertiary Educated)
1990-2000
90
80
70
(%)
60
50
40
30
20
10
Yemen
Bhutan
Lao PDR
Cambodia
Nepal
Afghanistan
Myanmar
2000
Bangladesh
1990
Countries
47
Figure 5
(%)
Pacific Islands
Rates of Out-Migration (Tertiary Educated)
1990-2000
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
Tuvalu
* Data for East Timor and Tuvalu are not available
Kiribati
Samoa
Vanuatu
Solomon
Islands
2000
East Timor
1990
Countries
Figure 6
Other Islands
Rates of Out-Migration (Tertiary Educated)
1990-2000
90
80
70
(%)
60
50
40
30
20
10
Comoros
Maldives
Cape Verde
2000
Sao Tome
and Principe
1990
Countries
48
Figure 7
The Ten Highest Rates of Out-Migration (Tertiary Educated)
of LDC Countries in 2000
90
80
70
(%)
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Madagascar
Liberia
Sierra Leone
Mozambique
Eritrea
Somalia
Gamb ia
Samo a
2000
Cape Verde
Haiti
1990
Countries
* No data for Eritrea in 1990
Figure 8
(%)
The Ten Lowest Rates of Out-Mi g ration (Tertiary Educated)
of LDC Countries in 2000
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Bhutan
Maldives
Lesotho
Nepal
Burkina Faso
Myanmar
Islands
Solomon
Bangladesh
Rep
Central African
2000
Vanuatu
1990
Countries
49
Country Group/
Population
Country
(millions)
2005
(1)
Africa
Central (and North)
Democratic Rep. of the Congo
Sudan
Angola
Chad
Central African Republic
Equatorial Guinea
Unweighted Mean
West (and Haiti)
Burkina Faso
Mali
Niger
Senegal
Guinea
Haiti
Benin
Sierra Leone
Togo
Liberia
Mauritania
Gambia
Guinea-Bissau
Unweighted Mean
Annex Table 1. Brain drain from the LDCs, 1990 and 2000
GDP per
Human Capital
Rate of Out-Migration
capita
Index
2000
(PPP $)
(Rank out of 177)
Total Tertiary Educated
2005
2005
(%)
(%)
(2)
(3)
(4)
60.0
40.1
11.1
9.8
3.7
0.5
20.9
700
2522
2813
1519
1128
2700
1897
13.9
12.2
11.6
11.1
9.4
8.1
7.4
6.0
5.7
3.4
3.1
1.5
1.4
7.3
1285
1154
872
1759
2035
1791
1176
903
1675
1033
2535
2002
736
1458
*)
*)
% increase in Out-Migration Rate
Total
1990-2000
Tertiary Educated
(5)
167
Not Ranked
160
173
171
121
158
0.3
0.2
2.7
0.1
0.2
4.1
1.3
7.9
5.6
25.6
6.9
4.7
34.1
14.1
0.0
100.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1950.0
341.7
-4.8
12.0
260.6
-20.7
6.8
693.0
157.8
175
174
177
157
156
153
162
176
143
Not Ranked
152.0
155
172
163
0.2
0.7
0.1
2.6
0.5
10.2
0.3
1.4
1.0
2.6
1.4
3.1
1.8
2.0
3.3
11.5
6.1
24.1
11.1
81.6
7.5
41.0
13.6
37.4
23.1
64.7
29.4
27.3
100.0
0.0
0.0
62.5
66.7
39.7
50.0
180.0
100.0
136.4
133.3
138.5
125.0
87.1
26.9
74.2
-26.5
117.1
117.6
4.2
23.0
32.3
52.8
35.0
560.0
-14.9
398.3
107.7
50
Country Group/
Country
East (and South)
Ethiopia
Tanzania (United Rep. Of)
Uganda
Mozambique
Madagascar
Malawi
Zambia
Somalia
Rwanda
Burundi
Eritrea
Lesotho
Djibouti
Unweighted Mean
Unweighted Mean
Asia
Bangladesh
Myanmar
Afghanistan
Nepal
Yemen
Cambodia
Lao PDR
Bhutan
Unweighted Mean
Annex Table 1. Brain drain from the LDCs, 1990 and 2000, continued
GDP per
Human Capital
Rate of Out-Migration
Population
capita
Index
2000
(millions)
(PPP $)
(Rank out of 177)
Total Tertiary Educated
2005
2005
2005
(%)
(%)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
73.0
36.7
27.2
19.4
18.0
12.1
11.2
8.5
8.4
6.3
4.5
1.8
0.5
17.5
14.0
823
723
1501
1379
908
596
931
600
1380
739
858
2113
2253
1139
1411
144.3
42.9
29.9
27.6
20.7
13.6
6.2
2.2
35.9
2011
1693
1310
1675
751
2399
2118
3921
1985
*)
170
164
144
168
146
165
166
Not Ranked
159.0
169
161
149
150
159
161
0.5
0.3
0.5
0.9
0.2
0.1
0.3
14.6
0.2
0.3
2.3
0.0
0.5
1.6
1.7
17.0
15.8
21.6
42.0
36.0
9.4
10.0
58.6
19.0
19.9
45.8
2.4
17.8
24.3
23.6
139
129
Not Ranked
136
151
130
133
134
136
0.3
0.2
1.0
0.1
0.2
3.1
7.1
0.1
1.5
4.7
3.4
13.2
2.7
5.7
6.8
13.8
1.2
6.4
% increase in Out-Migration Rate
Total
1990-2000
Tertiary Educated
(5)
25.0
0.0
25.0
12.5
0.0
0.0
50.0
2.8
100.0
200.0
22.3
6.8
-27.8
130.8
-34.8
25.3
-18.0
19.8
102.1
298.0
-100.0
66.7
31.8
115.0
-61.3
89.4
46.1
93.5
200.0
100.0
25.0
104.3
3.0
12.8
42.1
72.7
3.0
-7.4
-29.4
25.2
100.0
3.3
6.0
72.4
51
Country Group/
Country
Island States
Pacific Islands
East Timor
Solomon Islands
Vanuatu
Samoa
Kiribati
Tuvalu
Unweighted Mean
Other Islands
Comoros
Cape Verde
Maldives
Sao Tome and Principe
Unweighted Mean
Unweighted Mean
Annex Table 1. Brain drain from the LDCs, 1990 and 2000, continued
GDP per
Human Capital
Rate of Out-Migration
capita
Index
2000
Population
(millions)
(PPP $)
(Rank out of 177)
Total Tertiary Educated
2005
2005
2005
(%)
(%)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.9
0.5
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.0
0.3
**)
1813
1894
3346
6344
2358
1100
2809
*)
% increase in Out-Migration Rate
1990-2000
Total
Tertiary Educated
(5)
128
118.0
74
Not Ranked
Not Ranked
107
0.6
1.2
43.1
5.1
3.7
5.0
66.6
24.9
20.0
20.0
22.1
30.8
-40.3
-46.8
-12.3
-7.1
12.5
25.1
23.2
-26.6
0.7
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.4
1889
6418
7675
1547
4382
132
105
96
126
115
2.2
23.5
0.2
5.6
7.9
14.5
69.1
2.2
35.6
30.4
120.0
-1.3
100.0
-9.7
52.3
126.6
27.0
-4.3
267.0
104.1
0.4
3438
111
10.2
27.7
37.7
38.7
738.5
Total
1908
149
3.1
21.4
95.6
72.6
Mean
7.2
20.2
289.7
151.6
Standard Deviation
Source: Docquier and Marfook, 2004 for rates of out-migration; World Economic Outlook Database (IMF), 2006 and Selected Economic and Social Indicators for LDCs
(UN), 2005 for GDP per capita and population; Selected Economic and Social Indicators for LDCs (UN), 2005 for human capital index
Notes:
*) 2003–2004
**) 2004
52