INSTITUTIONAL REFORM: NECESSITY OR DISTRACTION?
John Coakley
School of Politics and International Relations, UCD
[email protected]
Presented at the MacGill Summer School, Glenties, Co Donegal, 22-27 July 2012
INTRODUCTION
Since the onset of the economic crisis, and in particular in the run-up to the general election
of 2011 and to the formation of the new government, a relatively clearly defined “reform
agenda” has been discussed at some length. Designed to tackle perceived gaps in the
state’s policy making and implementation structures, to hasten the process of restoration of
political and economic sovereignty and to ensure that a similar collapse will not recur, this
agenda has identified specific institutions that are seen as being in need of fundamental
overhaul.
The present paper accepts the argument that institutional reform is desirable, but argues that
this needs to be targeted carefully on the basis of available evidence regarding the
functionality or dysfunctionaltiy of specific state institutions. In particular, it warns that
however extensive the degree of institutional change, we need to bear in mind the reality that
institutions are operated by human beings with inevitable limitations and ingrained cultural
priorities. We should not expect too much, therefore, from institutional reform alone; political
cultural change is at least as important.
The paper begins by outlining this dilemma—the interaction between institutional reform and
cultural evolution—and goes on to explore the extent to which cultural values have
implications for the working of institutions in three areas, selected to illustrate three types of
debate (respectively, a very old one, an entirely new one, and an issue that has received
only limited public exposure). The first is the hoary argument about the adequacy of the Irish
electoral system, the single transferable vote system of proportional representation, and the
allegation that it promotes inappropriate priorities among elected representatives. The
second is the barely noticed, eccentric practice of constituency boundary revision, which sets
Ireland quite apart from other countries that use proportional representation. The third is the
process by which ministers are selected for high office, another area in which Ireland has a
unique and unnecessarily restrictive track record.
Coakley / Institutional reform
THE REFORM AGENDA
The debate on institutional reform has focused on a number of quite specific alleged defects
in the Irish constitution. By implication, the criticisms include the propositions that a second
chamber is unnecessary (hence, the Seanad should be abolished), that the Dáil is
needlessly large (so that it should be reduced in size) and that the electoral system promotes
“clientelist” and “localist” behaviour (which could be discouraged by abolishing the single
transferable vote system).1 But there are other areas of potential institutional change that are
rarely mentioned. Four further examples may be selected out of the many that could be cited;
each is marked by the fact that Ireland departs decisively from the international norm, yet this
deviant status has gone largely unobserved:
• In proportional representation systems, constituency boundaries normally follow those of
local government units and are very stable over time; but in Ireland boundaries are
revised frequently, revisions commonly ignore administrative boundaries, and the resulting
constituencies are unstable and dogged by controversy
• In proportional representation systems, casual vacancies in parliament are normally filled
by giving particular weight to the party which suffers the vacancy (through use of
substitute candidates, for example, or re-count of ballot papers); but Ireland uses byelections to achieve this, even though they violate the principle of proportional
representation and are not required by the constitution2
• Directly elected presidents normally enjoy considerable authority by virtue of their election
by popular vote, and even the weakest of them can exercise political discretion in such
circumstances as the aftermath of indecisive elections; there is a peculiar but widespread
view that the President of Ireland possesses no such discretion, since it is not specifically
provided for in the constitution
• In continental Europe, government ministers, though answerable to parliament, are not
themselves required to be parliamentarians, and ministers may even be prohibited from
being members of parliament; in Ireland, there is a widely shared assumption that
ministers must be parliamentarians.
It is not possible here to examine all of these respects in which Irish institutions depart from
the European norm, though some of them are considered later. In any case, the suggestion
that deficiencies in the Irish political system might be corrected by reforming institutional
arrangements needs to be examined carefully. It is true that institutional change can, in the
longer term, encourage cultural adjustment, and that the incentive structure can be amended
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to promote new patterns of behaviour. But we should not overlook the painfully slow manner
in which cultural values are normally transformed; and analysts of Irish political culture have
often been harshly critical of certain of its fundamental values. Fintan O’Toole, for example,
offered a plausible and eloquent analysis of the cultural roots of the Irish economic and
political collapse:
Large chunks of classic democracy were missing—the shift from religious authority to public
and civic morality; the idea that the state should operate objectively and impersonally rather
than as a private network of mutual obligations; the notion of the law as a universal and neutral
check on everyone’s behaviour, whatever their status; the belief in an independent parliament
that exists to legislate rather than to service clients and to make government accountable rather
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than to keep it in place at all costs.
This persuasive interpretation of a political culture challenged by the pace of socio-economic
change has alarming implications for the capacity of institutional reform to deliver significant
change. If voters and leaders lack a strong sense of civic morality, if those interacting with
and managing the state are characterised more by a sense of entitlement than a spirit of
commitment, if informal networks overshadow formal procedures in decision making, and if
political leaders are motivated more strongly by clinging to power rather than by using power
to achieve positive ends, then there are severe limits to what may be achieved by
institutional reform. But this does not render such reform pointless.
THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM
The first topic to be considered further here is the electoral system—the issue that has
probably attracted more attention over the years than all of the other topics on the reform
agenda. Imported without fuss into the 1922 constitution from the Government of Ireland Act,
1920, the single transferable vote system of proportional representation was incorporated in
the new constitution in 1937 and survived two efforts to abolish it by constitutional
amendment, in 1959 and 1968. Notwithstanding the level of apparent popular support for this
system, it has remained a matter of debate among politicians, and was subjected to renewed
attack in the context of Ireland’s economic and political crises. Critics of the system allege, in
effect, that it is too democratic. The arguments of the 1950s and 1960s were directed at its
proportionality—by translating voters’ preferences relatively fairly into Dáil seats, it was
alleged, it failed to give an appropriate advantage to big parties of a kind that is normal in the
British plurality system, thus typically resulting in no party having an overall Dáil majority. The
more recent arguments allege that the system in effect brings Dáil deputies into too close a
degree of contact with their voters, and promotes a level of competition between deputies
within a constituency that results in all vying for support by doing favours for their
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constituents. Consequently, the criticism continues, deputies are encouraged to devote less
attention to their primary role as legislators.
The merits of the Irish electoral system are too big a topic to be addressed comprehensively
here, and in any case have been discussed extensively in the MacGill summer school and
elsewhere in previous years. But it should be pointed out that extensive research by the main
authority in the area, Michael Gallagher, suggests that under other electoral systems, too,
parliamentarians tend to have heavy constituency workloads.4 As in the operation of other
Irish institutions, it is likely that the relationship between Dáil deputies and their constituents
is a function not just of the electoral system but also of deeply ingrained political cultural
attitudes, and this paper will confine itself simply to illustrating this point.
Quite apart from TDs’ diaries, the Dáil debates record an extraordinarily high level of activism
by deputies on behalf of their constituents and constituencies. Thousands of examples could
be given, but one, chosen almost at random, should be sufficient to convey the flavour; it
concerns the efforts of Timothy O’Connor, Fianna Fáil TD for Kerry South, 1961-81, to
secure improvements to a harbour in his constituency:
Mr. O'CONNOR: asked the Minister for Finance when the boring survey will be carried out in
Cahirciveen harbour for the general improvement of berthing facilities at the pier in Cahirciveen
which are urgently needed as two new trawlers will be working out of this harbour before the
end of the year and two next year.
PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY TO THE MINISTER FOR FINANCE (Mr. J. GIBBONS): The
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survey will be made this summer.
We need not confine ourselves to speculation as to how parliamentarians would relate to
their constituents were the British plurality system to be reintroduced: we have hard
evidence. This system operated in single-member constituencies in Ireland from 1885 to
1918, offering us an abundance of data on the behaviour of MPs with secure seats
(incumbent Irish nationalist MPs could typically see off all electoral challenges without
difficulty). If we go back 100 years to 1912, to the time when the momentous third home rule
bill was going through the House of Commons, we will find the parliamentary record showing
that the “mother of parliaments” was able also to consider less weighty matters. The MP for
South Kerry, John Pius Boland (a Dubliner famous for his achievements during the 1896
Olympics, when he won two gold medals in tennis), found time to avert his gaze from the
national question and the Ulster problem—the truly pressing issues of that time—to more
local matters:
Mr. BOLAND: asked the Chief Secretary whether he is aware that, in spite of repeated
representations, the Congested Districts Board has not yet undertaken the construction of a
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boatslip at Caherciveen; and whether steps will be taken to complete it before the autumn
fishing season opens?
Mr. BIRRELL: The Congested Districts Board have decided upon not undertaking the
construction of a boatslip at Cahirciveen at present, as, in their opinion, other more important
works in the county Kerry require earlier attention.
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This example could, of course, be multiplied; the pages of Hansard are full of such
references. It is hard to resist the conclusion that, regardless of electoral law, Irish
constituents expect their elected representatives to be particularly vigilant in respect of all
local matters, and that their representatives respond accordingly.
CONSTITUENCY BOUNDARY REVISION
The second matter to be considered here is one that flares up from time to time, particularly
when change is proposed: the system for revising Dáil constituency boundaries.7 European
countries that use proportional representation as their electoral system have a simple
mechanism for distributing seats on a territorial basis: they use existing administrative
divisions, such as counties or provinces, allocating seats to them in proportion to their
population. With a view to maintaining something close to a uniform population – deputy
ratio, a mathematical formula is used after each population census to redistribute seats
between constituencies; constituency boundaries themselves remain unchanged.
It looked as if this was the kind of system that would be created in Ireland by the Electoral
Act of 1923. The general principle was that each county became a constituency, except
where counties were considered too large (Cork was divided into three constituencies, and
Mayo into two) or too small (as in the case of Leitrim, Monaghan, Longford, Laois and
Carlow, each of which was merged with an adjacent county to produce a double-county
constituency). Special arrangements of course had to be made for Dublin.
Subsequent electoral acts, however, from 1935 onwards, rather than redistributing seats
between these constituencies, began the practice of tinkering with constituency boundaries
to adjust the population and not just the number of TDs in each. The maximum number of
members per constituency was also reduced—from nine in 1923, to seven in 1935, and to
five in 1947, the level at which it has subsequently remained. A High Court judgement in
1961 aggravated the position. It declared the 1959 revision act unconstitutional on the
grounds that there were “substantial departures from the stipulated ratio of members to
population, causing grave inequalities of parliamentary representation”, and that “there are
no relevant circumstances to justify these departures”.8 While the judgement represented an
effort to ensure electoral fairness, it had an unfortunate consequence. By insisting on the
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need to vindicate the principle that the population – deputy ratio should “as far as it is
practicable” (in the words of article 16.2 of the constitution) be the same from constituency to
constituency, it provided cover for the Minister for Local Government to micro-manage
boundaries in such as way as to maximise party advantage. It ushered in an era of bitter
debate on constituency boundary revision bills, one that was to end only with the
establishment of an independent commission in 1979.
While independent boundary commissions brought charges of electoral gerrymandering to
an end, county boundaries continued to be apparently arbitrarily breached, resulting in
understandable dissatisfaction on the part of citizens and unease on the part of TDs. Given
their terms of reference, the commissions felt constrained to define boundaries by reference
to small, unrecognisable territorial divisions. The result was arithmetical fairness, but often
incomprehensible boundaries. Thus in 2012, for example, the commission felt obliged to
remove certain electoral divisions from the southern part of Mayo and transfer them to West
Galway, even though the population of these areas identify strongly with Mayo, and see
themselves as having little in common with, say, Clifden and Carraroe—towns with which
they will shortly share a constituency and five TDs. This deviation from established
boundaries was described as follows:
The county of Mayo, except the part thereof which is comprised in the constituency of Galway
West [which includes:] the electoral divisions of: Cong, Ballinrobe, Dalgan, Houndswood,
Kilcommon, Kilmaine, Neale, Shrule, in the former Rural District of Ballinrobe; Garrymore in the
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former Rural District of Claremorris.
The anxiety of TDs at the unpredictability of their constituency boundaries and the
resentment of voters at their transfer into the “wrong” county could easily have been avoided.
The manner in which this process might have been carried out since 1923 is illustrated in the
accompanying maps. Map 1 shows boundaries outside Dublin similar to those in the 1923
act (but without dividing Mayo, and with Cork county divided into its two long-established
ridings). Assuming a Dáil size of 140, later rising to its current level of 166, and then dropping
to 158, the size currently proposed, seats are re-allocated by constituency after each
population census, using a conventional highest average formula. It is assumed that no more
than nine seats should be allocated to any one constituency.
A computation of notional reallocation of seats after each census suggests that this system
could work. For reasons of space, only one later outcome can be shown here. Map 2
illustrates what the position would have been in 2012 had this system been retained. It is
striking that, outside Dublin, only one change in constituency boundaries would have been
needed since 1923: by 1971, the population of Roscommon would have been too low to
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1923
2012
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Maps 1 and 2: Illustrations of possible seat allocation to fixed-boundary
constituencies, 1923 and 2012
Note: boundaries are those of counties or groups of counties, except in the case of Cork. Seat allocation is
based on the Sainte-Laguë highest average formula, using census data of 1911 and 2011 respectively.
Assumed total number of seats is 140 (1923) and 158 (2012). One new constituency is shaded. Dublin
constituencies are not illustrated.
return three TDs, so it has been merged here with Leitrim-Sligo to produce a new “East
Connacht” constituency.
Of course, Dublin would have presented particular difficulties. Its three original
constituencies (Dublin county, Dublin North and Dublin South) expanded rapidly in
population, and would have had to be further divided in due course if the cap of nine TDs
were to be maintained. Any effort to reform the current system would be likely to encounter
opposition from established political interests, since it is now apparently widely accepted that
constituencies must not exceed five members in size. This is, however, a view that it is hard
to defend; six-member constituencies are now the norm in Northern Ireland, and in 1982 one
constituency, Antrim South, returned ten members to the Assembly.
A more serious problem is posed by constitutional considerations. Article 16.2 provides that
“the Oireachtas shall revise the constituencies at least once in every twelve years, with
due regard to changes in distribution of the population”, but this does not impose any
specific requirement to adjust boundaries. Maintaining an even population – deputy ratio
would, however, pose a bigger challenge. The report of the boundary commission in
2012 recommended constituencies where this ratio ranged from 4.9% above the national
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average to 4.9% below this (the 2004 commission allowed a much wider variation, from
7.9% above to 7.5% below). As proposed here, the 2012 range would be from 15.7%
above the national average to 8.2% below, a much wider range. Ultimately, it is the
courts that would adjudicate on the constitutionality of such an arrangement; it is thus
possible that the suggestion made here might required constitutional change, but this is
by no means certain.
SELECTION OF GOVERNMENT MINISTERS
A third area where Ireland departs significantly from international norms is the process of
ministerial appointment.10 Here, the constitution seeks to implement a narrow interpretation
of the British model. The relevant articles are the following:
28.1. The Government shall consist of not less than seven and not more than fifteen members
who shall be appointed by the President in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.
28.7.1° The Taoiseach, the Tánaiste and the member of the Government who is in charge of
the Department of Finance must be members of Dáil Éireann.
28.7.2° The other members of the Government must be members of Dáil Éireann or Seanad
Éireann, but not more than two may be members of Seanad Éireann.
In the United Kingdom, each government includes at least one member of the House of
Lords, and that chamber is commonly used to bring into the cabinet individuals with particular
qualities of which the prime minister wishes to avail. To cite a well-known example, in 2008
Gordon Brown appointed Peter Mandelson (at the time removed from British politics as an
EU commissioner) to his government by making him a life peer, and thus a member of the
House of Lords.
In Ireland, however, this route to ministerial office has been sparingly used—only twice,
indeed, since the constitution was adopted in 1937. The first occasion was the appointment
of Sean Moylan, a defeated Fianna Fáil candidate in the 1957 general election, to the post of
Minister for Agriculture via the Seanad route. The second occasion was the appointment of
James Dooge, who had retired from active political life, as Minister for Foreign Affairs in
1981, also through the mechanism of appointing him as one of the Taoiseach’s eleven
senators. In practice, any Taoiseach is under powerful pressure to reward talented members
of the Dáil party by offering them ministerial posts; any deviation from this principle, by
offering prized positions to “outsiders”, is likely to be resented within the party and to cause
trouble for the Taoiseach.
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Elsewhere, though, the practice of appointing non-parliamentarians as ministers is well
established. Indeed, Ireland falls into one unusual pattern among parliamentary
democracies; it may be seen as one of three broad approaches, which may be described as
follows:
• Ministers are required to be parliamentarians, though not necessarily members of the
lower house (examples: Ireland, United Kingdom)
• Ministers may be parliamentarians, but are not required to be; they may be selected from
outside parliament, perhaps as “expert” ministers (examples: Germany, Italy)
• Ministers may not be parliamentarians; if a member of parliament is appointed to
government, he or she must resign from parliament (examples: France, Netherlands).
It should be stressed that in each of these patterns ministers are not just permitted to attend
parliament (though not to vote there, unless they are members); they are required to attend
there, and, indeed, are ultimately answerable to parliament for their actions and policies.
Democratic accountability is secured not by virtue of the fact that a minister has been elected
by his or her constituents, but by virtue of accountability to the national parliament. It is not
the votes of the electorate in one constituency that confer democratic legitimacy, in other
words, but the votes of members of the national parliament. In presidential systems, such as
that of the United States, ministers are not answerable to parliament in the same way, and
they owe their position to the confidence vested in them by a directly-elected president.
There are two main advantages associated with the non-parliamentary route to ministerial
office. First, it greatly extends the range of available candidates for ministerial office, so that
a prime minister can appoint people with special skills and aptitude for specific posts (and,
indeed, it is to be presumed that the skills required in an effective minister would not be the
same as those associated with being a competent parliamentarian). Second, it significantly
strengthens parliament, which is no longer dominated by a single, powerful committee (the
cabinet), since ministers can no longer assert the same degree of influence within it. It is
possible to envisage a number of approaches to introducing such a system in Ireland.
• More use could be made of the appointment of ministers from the Seanad, using the
Taoiseach’s power of appointment there to bring in “outside” experts, without
constitutional change
• The constitution could be amended to permit the appointment of non-parliamentarians
(who would not be required to be members of either Dáil or Seanad)
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• The constitution could be amended to require the appointment of ministers from outside
the Dáil, by establishing some kind of quota for non-parliamentarians
• The constitution could be amended to prohibit the dual parliamentary-ministerial mandate,
requiring any parliamentarian appointed a minister to resign his or her parliamentary seat.
There is no reason to assume that the first of these options would work, for reasons already
mentioned: a typical Taoiseach would be reluctant to confront the wrath of the Dáil party by
“giving away” plum ministerial positions to “outsiders”. This would be likely also to undermine
the effectiveness of the second option. The third option, requiring the appointment of nonparliamentarians, might work, but would be artificial. The last system has been proven to
work in other societies, and some countries (such as Sweden, Portugal and Belgium) have
moved in this direction, requiring government ministers to resign their parliamentary seats.
Such resignations need not trigger a flurry of by-elections; as mentioned above, other
mechanisms for filling casual vacancies on a temporary or long-term basis could be devised.
CONCLUSION
There is, then, a case for selective constitutional reform with a view to enhancing the quality
of Irish democratic institutions. But it would be a mistake to expect too much from such
reform. Deeply ingrained cultural values are likely to colour the manner in which any new
arrangements are put into operation, and the need to address the issues arising from these
values should be stressed. The real issue is the profound one of reshaping values—a longterm process that implies investment in elite education and training, as well as in education
of the public.
In the three more specific sample areas considered here, too, caution would be wise. It is
unlikely that electoral reform would deliver what is promised of it, though debate in this area
has already acquired momentum, and it is proposed to discuss the matter further in the
constitutional convention. A less radical reform that might bring benefits would be replacing
the work of the constituency commission by the calculations of an official from the Central
Statistics Office, in the context of fixed Dáil constituency boundaries (though such a change
would provoke strong political opposition). The ministerial recruitment process could also be
broadened, even within the context of the current constitution; but it is likely that unless
“outside” ministerial appointments were required (and not merely permitted) there would be
little change in the current position. The reality is that political institutions, however wisely
designed, will always be shaped by the values of the individuals who operate them.
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REFERENCES
1
See Programme for Government, sections on “Constitutional reform” and “Political reform”
(per.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/ProgrammeforGovernmentFinal.pdf), and Fine Gael manifesto, p. 62
(www.finegael2011.com/pdf/Fine Gael Manifesto low-res.pdf). The Labour manifesto, One Ireland:
jobs, reform, fairness (pp. 45-6) also committed itself to abolition of the Seanad (see
www.labour.ie/download/pdf/labour_election_manifesto_2011.pdf).
2
For discussion, see Michael Gallagher, “By-elections to Dáil Éireann 1923-96: an anomaly that
conforms”, Irish political studies 11, 1986, pp. 33-60.
3
Fintan O’Toole, Ship of fools: how stupidity and corruption sank the Celtic Tiger. Updated ed.
(London: Faber and Faber, 2010), pp. 213-4
4
Michael Gallagher, “Ireland: the discrete charm of STV”, pp. 511-32 in Michael Gallagher and Paul
Mitchell, eds, The politics of electoral systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); see also
Michael Gallagher and Lee Komito, “The constituency role of Dáil deputies”, in John Coakley and
Michael Gallagher, eds, Politics in the Republic of Ireland (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 230-62, and
David Farrell, “Irish electoral reform: three myths and a proposal”, paper presented to MacGill Summer
School, Glenties, Co Donegal, 19 July 2010; available
politicalreformireland.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/irish_electoral_reform-2.pdf
5
Dáil debates, vol. 240, 29 April 1969, col. 38.
6
House of Commons debates, vol. 39, 20 June 1912, col. 1983.
7
The argument here is developed further in John Coakley, “Revising Dáil constituency boundaries:
Ireland in comparative perspective”, Administration 55 (3), 2007, pp. 1-29, and “Does Ireland need a
constituency commission?”, Administration 55 (4), 2008, pp. 77-114.
8
“John O’Donovan, Plaintiff, v. The Attorney General, Defendant”, Irish reports 1961, pp. 114-56.
9
Constituency Commission, Report on Dáil and European Parliament Constituencies 2012 (Dublin:
Stationery Office, 2012), appendix 1; see www.constituency-commission.ie/docs/report2012.pdf.
10
For further discussion of the matters discussed in this section, see John Coakley, “Selecting Irish
government ministers: an alternative pathway?”, Administration 58 (3), 2010, pp. 1-26.
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