Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies
Vol. 35, No. 2, February 2009, pp. 271288
Theories of the State Accommodation
of Islamic Religious Practices in
Western Europe
Eren Tatari
In their work on Muslims in Western Europe, social scientists often employ four theories
to explain the state accommodation of Muslim minorities’ religious practices: resource
mobilisation theory, political opportunity structure theory, ideological theories, and
approaches highlighting the influence of churchstate relations. In this article, I propose a
dynamic-compound framework which outlines the interactions between these four
theories, and argue that it is necessary to include a fifth independent variable to account
for the religious traditions characteristic of a particular group. In analysing the state
accommodation of the religious practices of Muslim minorities, taking the institutional
framework of Islam into account clarifies the impact of churchstate structures, based on
Christianity and a history of conflict between church and state in Europe.
Keywords: Muslim Minorities; ChurchState Relations; Western Europe; Islam
Introduction
There is a consensus among scholars studying Muslims in the West that, through the
growing religious demands of the Muslim minorities, ‘a painful reconsideration of
the role of religion in public policy has begun in Europe (Klausen 2005: 107). One of
the intriguing questions scholars address is: What explains cross-national variation in
the state accommodation of Islamic religious practices in Western European
countries? In this article, I map out the dynamic mechanisms through which policy
outcomes related to the religious practices of Muslim minorities are formulated in
Western European countries.
Scholars working on Muslims in the West often employ four theories to explain the
state accommodation of Islamic religious practices:
Eren Tatari is PhD Candidate in the Political Science Department of the University of Indiana. Correspondence
to E. Tatari, Dept of Political Science, 1100 E. 7th St, Woodburn Hall 210, Bloomington IN 47405-7110, USA.
E-mail: [email protected]
ISSN 1369-183X print/ISSN 1469-9451 online/09/020271-18 # 2009 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/13691830802586260
272 E. Tatari
. resource mobilisation theory, which argues that the political resources of Muslims
determine the extent of concessions generated;
. political opportunity structure theory, which emphasises the influence of political
institutions on the capacity of each group’s political activism;
. ideological theories, which contend that it is primarily national ideas about
citizenship, nationhood and assimilation which determine state responses;
. churchstate relations theory, which helps to explain relations between the state and
Muslim minorities.
In this paper, I propose a dynamic-compound framework outlining the interactions
between these four dominant theories. In addition, I argue that inclusion of a fifth
independent variable is necessary to account for the particularities of the religious
tradition of the group under consideration. When analysing the state accommodation
of Muslim minorities’ religious practices, taking into account the institutional
framework of Islam clarifies the impact of churchstate structures, which are based
on Christianity and a history of conflict between church and state in Europe.
I first provide a brief account of common policy issues concerning Muslims in the
West, followed by examples of specific policies related to religious practices. I then
discuss the four dominant theories listed above, plus my own dynamic-compound
framework. In explaining the relationships between the different structures in the
framework, I give concrete examples of policies on the state accommodation of
Islamic religious practices from different national contexts in Western Europe.
Common Policy Issues
The most prominent policy issues concerning Muslim minorities can be categorised
as political (i.e. citizenship/naturalisation, political representation), economic (unemployment, welfare policies), social (social stigmatisation and discrimination) and
religious (Islamic cemeteries, Islamic dress code).
Political Issues
One of the key issues that impact on the social and political status of Muslim
minorities is naturalisation laws. Many European countries have very strict rules on
naturalisation. As a result, only 1025 per cent of the Muslim population in Western
Europe have citizenship and are eligible to vote (Klausen 2005: 21). There are some
exceptions to this, where certain non-citizens are allowed to vote in some elections.
Table 1 indicates which Western European countries permit non-citizens to vote.
Recently, some European countries have proposed even stricter terms for
naturalisation, including citizenship tests which seem to unfairly target Muslims.
For instance, ‘the Dutch immigration test is openly discriminatory in that it only
applies to would-be immigrants from ‘‘non-Western countries’’, i.e. not the EU or the
United States’.1 This procedure involves watching an obligatory video screening
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies
273
Table 1. European countries allowing non-citizens to vote
Country
Date voting first
allowed
Type of election
Belgium
Austria
European
Union
Spain
Finland
2004
2002
1992
Local
Local, in Vienna
Reciprocal local and European Parliament, for all member-nations
1985
1981
Netherlands
Norway
Denmark
Portugal
Sweden
Ireland
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1963
United
Kingdom
Switzerland
1948
Local
Local, Nordic Union citizens (expanded 1991 to all 4-year
residents)
Local, in Rotterdam (expanded nationwide in 1985)
Local, for Nordic Union (expanded 1995 for 3-year residents)
Local, for Nordic Union (expanded 1981 for all foreign residents)
National and some local (expanded 1997 to all 3-year residents)
Local and regional, plus some national referenda
Local (expanded 1985 to remove 6-month residency requirement
and allow British citizens a national vote)
National, for Commonwealth and Irish citizens
1849
5-year residents in Neuchâtel canton (expanded 1979 to include
10-year residents in Jura canton)
Source: The Immigrant Voting Project; http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/display.cfm?id265
topless females and gay men kissing, to make sure that applicants are accepting of the
‘tolerance’ supposedly shared by all Dutch citizens. Likewise, Baden-Württemberg has
been the first German state to introduce a citizenship test, asking questions about
applicants’ views on forced marriage, homosexuality and women’s rights.
Another central issue impacting on Muslims in the West is political participation
and representation. In general, Muslims are seriously under-represented in Western
European parliaments: in 2005, for instance, there were only about 30 Muslim
members across all countries. Yet in the Netherlands, the ratio of Muslim members
of parliament to the total number of parliamentarians parallels the ratio of the
Muslim population.2 However, in other countries Muslims are seriously underrepresented in both local and national elected bodies. For instance, France has only
one Muslim MP out of 577 members, despite about 5 million Muslims residing in
this country.3
Economic Issues
Unemployment and welfare policies impact on the day-to-day lives of Muslims living
in Western Europe and may lead to social ills such as juvenile delinquency.
Unemployment among Muslim minorities is consistently higher than overall
unemployment rates, and increasing crime rates are sometimes associated particularly with unemployed Muslim youth. In a study conducted in the Netherlands,
274 E. Tatari
Junger and Polder (1992) reported that rates of arrest were substantially higher for
ethnic minority youth compared to indigenous youth, mostly due to cultural
dissonance and migration-related social problems. Although systematic data on
unemployment rates of Muslims in Europe are scant, OECD data on unemployment
levels for the foreign-born4 give some idea of the unemployment ratios of Muslims
and non-Muslims, due to the fact that a substantial portion of the foreign-born in
Western European countries is Muslim. For instance, in 2004, unemployment rates
for the foreign-born living in the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark and
France were more than twice as high as for natives.5
Social Issues
Religious and ethnic discrimination is a widespread problem that faces Muslims
daily. A 2005 opinion poll conducted by the Pew Research Center reports that 47
per cent of Germans, 51 per cent of Dutch and 34 per cent of French (a figure that
was 29 per cent in 2004) has an unfavourable opinion of Muslims.6 Organisations
monitoring discrimination in employment and other venues report increasing acts
of discrimination against Muslims in different Western European countries.7 These
occurrences, illustrating the daunting reality of the day-to-day experiences of
Muslim minorities, build up a strong sense of marginalisation, especially when
factored in with the political and economic issues discussed above.
Religious Issues
The state accommodation of religious practices constitutes one of the most
encompassing and important policy issues affecting the lives of Muslims on a daily
basis. The next section of the paper provides a more detailed survey.
Accommodation of Religious Practices
Given the political, economic and social issues facing Muslims in Western Europe, let
us now consider those Muslim religious practices which necessitate state accommodation, followed by a brief explanation of each policy issue and illustrative
examples of restrictive or flexible government responses from one or more countries.
Ritual Slaughter
One of the most prominent religious issues subjected to state regulation is ritual
animal slaughter, which is of concern to millions of Muslims living in Western
Europe (Bergeaud-Blackler 2007). Islamic teachings require animals to be
slaughtered in the name of God, while they are alive (and not stunned prior to
slaughter), making sure minimal blood remains in the body. Whether or not animal
slaughter according to the Islamic prescriptions is in accordance with animal rights
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies
275
laws in a given country has led to extensive debates in some countries, leading to
the prohibition of Islamic ritual slaughter, whereas other countries have issued
special exemptions for Muslims. In Denmark and Sweden, where kosher butchering
is currently prohibited, halal butcheries are permitted. However, in Germany, where
kosher butchering is legal through an exemption under Article 4, Islamic ritual
slaughter was also legal from 1988 to 1995, became illegal between 1995 and 2002,
and is currently legal while still being challenged by animal rights activists.
Burial Spaces
Another religious matter that leads to controversy is the provision of Muslim
burial grounds and/or the accommodation of particular religious needs in existing
cemeteries. For instance, Islamic burial practices require the body to be buried
without a casket, wrapped in a white piece of cloth, with the head placed towards
Mecca. In almost all Western European countries, the cemeteries are run by local
officials and/or national churches according to Christian rituals. Hence, where no
concessions are granted to religious minorities, Muslims are left with no choice
but to send their dead to their countries of origin. In Sweden, cemetery councils
have recently been issued directives to work with local imams to facilitate Islamic
burial. Danish Muslims, on the other hand, have been struggling to obtain land to
establish a Muslim cemetery for over a decade and have yet to succeed, whereas
both Jews and Catholics were granted special permission to buy cemetery land for
their confessions.
Public Funding for Islamic Schools
Public funding for religiously affiliated schools has been an issue of debate in
Western European countries. Some argue that no religiously affiliated school
should receive public funding, while others contend that if any religious group
receives tax money then all others should be granted the same right. Amidst these
discussions, Muslims have succeeded in obtaining public funding in Britain and
Germany, whereas in France there is not a single publicly funded Islamic school.
This is despite the fact that, in theory, under the Debré laws of 1959, and upon
the demonstration of qualified teachers, large numbers of students and clean
facilities, any five-year-old Islamic school is eligible for public funding, as are
Jewish and Catholic ones (Fetzer and Soper 2005: 85). Muslims in France feel
particularly frustrated by this, for their tax revenues are used to finance Jewish
and Christian schools while they are being deprived of the same right.
Islamic Dress Code
Another religious matter that impacts on the lives of numerous Muslim women,
and to a lesser extent Muslim men (particularly those who like to grow long
276 E. Tatari
beards), is that of religious dress. A significant proportion of Muslim women
choose to wear a headscarf for religious reasons and to dress modestly, with loose
clothes covering their body. The Islamic headscarf has been an issue in France,
particularly, where it has been banned in public schools (except in higher
education), burdening the lives of millions of Muslim women. In some Western
European countries, courts have ruled that wearing the headscarf in public
contradicts with the principle of secularism, whereas in other countries like Britain
and Sweden, accommodation has been made to grant religious exemption at
educational institutions as well as in employment.
Provision of Prayer Rooms and Time for Prayer
Another Islamic religious practice that requires accommodation is the five-timesa-day ritual prayer, which may impinge on work or school schedules. Although
there are no overarching laws implemented by the EU to ban or make obligatory
the provision of prayer rooms or time for faith in the workplace or in educational
institutions, certain countries like the United Kingdom have implemented
regulations that accommodate these religious practices. The Employment Equality
(Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 (Statutory Instrument 2003 No. 1660)
require employers ‘to make reasonable adjustments to accommodate religious
practices at work. Muslims can now ask for prayer facilities, or for flexible
working time so they can attend Jummah prayers. A request can only be refused if
it would cause an undue financial or business burden on an employer.’8 Yet, in the
absence of such laws, most employers allow adequate time for prayers, and
accommodate flexible working hours during Ramadan to enable Muslims to leave
earlier in order to break fast. Since, according to Islamic teachings, any clean
space is adequate to perform these prayers, Muslims may use any appropriate
place and do not have to go to a mosque.
Teaching Islam in School Curricula
In several countries, there have been public debates over whether or not Islam
should be taught on religious studies courses, what the content should be, and
who should teach it. Most Muslim parents want their children to receive Islamic
education at school, yet are concerned about the misrepresentation of Islam in
textbooks. European states, on the other hand, seek to ensure that a ‘Westernfriendly’ version of Islam is taught to Muslim students, if it is taught at all. In
some countries or regions, Islam is taught as part of courses on comparative
religion; evidently textbooks pick and choose the version of Islam that is to be
taught. In Germany, ‘Since no Muslim group has yet achieved public corporation
status, Land school officials do not feel obligated to provide Islamic instruction or
to consult formally with Muslim leaders on the content of any such classes’
(Fetzer and Soper 2005: 112).
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies
277
Exemptions in State Schools
Muslim parents have also raised questions about their children having to participate
in co-ed physical education classes in state schools, in particular swimming or
sex-education classes, and some even resent art, music or biology classes (Fetzer and
Soper 2005: 42, 85).
Training Programmes for Muslim Religious Scholars
The majority of imams at mosques across Western Europe are appointed or
simply imported from countries across the Middle East (with the Turkish
government sponsoring the largest number of imams appointed directly from
the Turkish Ministry of Religious Affairs, Diyanet). The need for training
programmes for imams in Western Europe has arisen mostly as a result of
concerns voiced by two parties, second- or third-generation Muslims, and their
respective states.9 For the most part, these imported imams do not speak the
language of the host country and lack sufficient understanding of the life-style;
hence they are not appealing to or satisfactory for many, and for young Muslims
in particular. For their part, Western European governments are concerned by the
‘strict’ version of Islam preached by these imams (except Turkish imams, since
they are employees of the Turkish government who cannot contradict secular
principles), and the political messages they import from their countries of origin.
As a result, there is growing demand for European-trained religious scholars by
both Muslims and their respective governments, albeit for different reasons. To
this end, in 2004 Britain announced a set of new rules to monitor imams from
overseas and ensure that they demonstrate sufficient mastery of the language,
understanding and engagement with the British way of life and, most importantly,
an understanding of other faiths prominent in Britain. There are a few
establishments offering imam training programmes in Britain, such as the Muslim
College in Ealing, which offers diplomas in collaboration with the University of
London’s Birkbeck College, and the Markfield Institute of Higher Education.
Other countries have implemented rules to monitor imported imams*such as the
Danish regulations demanding mastery of Danish*and France, Spain and the
Netherlands have announced the establishment of degree programmes for imams
that are yet to be implemented.
Theories of State Accommodation
As becomes apparent from these accounts of policy issues concerning the religious
demands of Muslims, Western European countries have either abstained from
responding altogether or have responded in different ways. Scholars working on
Muslims in the West often employ four theories to explain this cross-national
variation: resource mobilisation theory, political opportunity structures theory,
ideological theories and churchstate relations theory.
278 E. Tatari
Resource Mobilisation Theory
Resource mobilisation theory argues that the political resources of Muslims
determine the extent of concessions generated by the state, resources such as effective
organisational structures, wealth channelled into these organisations to further the
political agendas of the group, and a successful leadership with knowledge of the
political system of the host country. Scholars emphasising the influence of resource
mobilisation argue that there is a correlation between the failure of Muslim groups to
obtain the desired policy outcomes and the lack of ‘the resources necessary to bargain
effectively with the state’ (Fetzer and Soper 2005: 8). This argument has extensive
merit, as:
. there is a natural hiatus while Muslims, as newcomers, adapt to the political
system; issues of leadership legitimacy arise because the personal-faith framework
of Islam does not sanction the authority of a single voice, as, for instance, does
Catholicism;
. due to strict naturalisation regulations, only a small percentage of Muslims are
eligible to vote; even though citizenship is not required for political activism,
politicians are unlikely to grant the demands of a non-voting interest group;
. heterogeneity is likely to challenge group cohesion despite shared problems and
demands.
Yet, with the passage of time, the acquisition of valuable experience, and the pressing
problems waiting to be resolved, Muslims gradually develop viable methods to deal
with these issues. For instance, Klausen notes that ‘Muslim leaders often identify
themselves with . . . the ‘‘new line’’ in European Muslim politics . . . described as a
focus on national politics, a new emphasis on Muslim unity irrespective of ethnic and
religious differences, certain expectations about professionalism and ‘‘playing by the
rules’’ of national political discourse’ (Klausen 2005: 17).
Political Opportunity Structures Theory
This theory emphasises the influence of political institutions on each group’s capacity
for political activism. Unlike resource mobilisation theory, which designates Muslims
as the principal actors and emphasises group qualities, political opportunity
structures theory highlights the role of the system itself as constraining or facilitating
group actions. Hence, factors that are independent of the actors, such as state
institutions, existing legislation and the attitudes of individuals with decision-making
authority, ‘influence the degree of involvement and authority of a particular group’.10
Evidently, strict naturalisation regulations, legislation on minority rights, antidiscrimination laws, and even laws designating the recipients of welfare, directly
impact on the prospects for the social, economic and political status of Muslim
minorities*in other words, their prospects for securing accommodation from the
state for their religious demands.
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies
279
Ideological Theories
Ideological theories contend that it is primarily national ideas about citizenship,
nationhood and assimilation that determine the state response. For instance, in
France it is the republican ideals of the concepts of citizenship and laı¨cité that
account for the state’s response to the religious demands of minorities. Even though
this approach has strong explanatory power, academic studies employing ideological
theories mostly lack any analytical causal framework outlining the mechanism of how
exactly ideas of citizenship, for instance, influence policy outcomes.
ChurchState Relations Theory
Many scholars, on the other hand, emphasise the influence of churchstate relations
in explaining the particularities of relations between Muslim minorities and their
respective states. Fetzer and Soper, in their Muslims and the State in Britain, France,
and Germany (2005), analyse the state accommodation of Muslim minorities’
religious demands in these three countries and conclude that it is primarily church
state structures in each country which account for cross-national variance. Scholars
like Cesari (2004), Fetzer and Soper (2005, 2007) and Vetvik (1992) have used
traditional typologies to categorise different patterns of churchstate relations in
Western Europe. Despite minor variance, these typologies depict similar patterns, as
described below by Nielsen (2005: 2):
. states with concordat:11 Italy, Spain, Portugal and Germany;
. countries with an established state church: Denmark, Finland, Norway, the United
Kingdom, until recently Sweden, and maybe Greece;
. countries with an official separation of church and state: France, Ireland, Belgium
and the Netherlands.
Similarly, Cesari (2004: 65) classifies Western European countries along three
principle patterns of governmentreligion relations, which she depicts as:
. the state recognition of religion: Austria, Belgium, Italy, Spain and Germany, where
‘the development of Islamic institutions is facilitated’ and ‘where all religions are
already legally recognized’;
. the special case of France; and
. countries with a state religion: Great Britain, Denmark, Greece.
Silvio Ferrari (2003), on the other hand, argues that constitutional frameworks can
be, and in most cases are, different in practice. For instance, both Ireland and France
officially accept the principle of ‘laicity’, or secularism, which dictates the strict
separation of church and state, yet in practice churchstate relations are strikingly
dissimilar in these two countries. Ferrari (2003: 226) conceptualises a European
model under three themes:
280 E. Tatari
. the protection of individual rights to religious freedom;
. a degree of autonomy for religious confessions; and
. selective collaboration between the state and religious confessions.
I contend that established structures of churchstate relations alone do not account
for the variation in policy outcomes across Western European countries. As Klausen
argues, even in countries that claim a strict separation of church and state, there are
numerous ‘barriers to state neutrality in religious matters posed by the existing state
Church arrangements’ (Klausen 2005: 13). Furthermore, ‘. . . Europeans tend to
ignore the fact that their established norms and policies are not necessarily secular,
but may reflect long-standing practices that were instituted in order to appease
national churches’ (Klausen 2005: 108). Therefore, I argue that all four theories
provide important insights enabling us to understand the variation in policy
outcomes of the state accommodation of religious demands, yet they each fail to
take into account all the explanatory factors and to adequately explain the entire
causal mechanism.
A Dynamic-Compound Framework
The theoretical approach of this framework derives from historical institutionalism,
which explains ‘the way institutions shape the goals political actors pursue and the
way they structure power relations among them, privileging some and putting others
at a disadvantage’ (Hall and Taylor 1996: 940). It attributes social causation to path
dependency and is inclusive of other factors such as ideas, beliefs and culture.
Institutions are seen as mechanisms that structure options and preferences through
rules and norms. The key to historical institutionalism is the emphasis on
contingencies of institutions and path dependency (Immergut 1998: 19).
Therefore, in order to map out the entire framework, it is necessary to analyse the
nature of the historical and contemporary interactions between four independent
variables*derived from the four theories outlined above*which influence policy
outcomes. I also contend that the addition of a fifth independent variable is necessary
to account for the particularities of the institutional framework of Islam, which
changes the impact of churchstate structures compared to Christianity, Judaism or
other religious traditions, each with their unique institutional arrangements. In this
framework, therefore, the variable ‘Muslim minorities’ can be substituted by any
other religious minority group. Likewise, the variable ‘institutional framework of
Islam’ can be replaced by the institutional arrangement of the respective religious
tradition of any other minority group. Although the institutional framework of Islam
seems to be fixed in stone, it does in fact vary according to the interpretation of
different individuals, as will be discussed further below. Thus, the two variables
‘resource mobilisation’ and ‘institutional framework of Islam‘ are qualifiers that, in
turn, alter the bargaining power of the ‘Muslim minorities’ variable*for which
another religious minority can be substituted. In this sense, the framework does not
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies
281
assume Muslim minorities to be a monolith category but allows for within-group
diversity.
In Figure 1, which models this dynamic-compound framework, it is also important
to note that the arrows do not necessarily denote causal mechanisms but refer to the
direction of the interaction between the variables. Two-directional arrows, therefore,
suggest that there is a two-way interaction between the variables. In this framework,
the following dynamic processes are depicted.
A. Ideology0 State (Political Opportunity Structures)
Since ideologies are not autonomous actors, this independent variable refers to
individuals who pursue their ideologies in order to impact on political phenomena.
Ideologies affect policy outcomes by shaping the ways in which state institutions are
structured. For instance, ideals of republicanism and citizenship are institutionalised
into laws, which constitute political opportunity structures within which Muslim
minorities have to function. In France, ‘marriage or period of residence, ‘‘good moral
character’’ and knowledge of the French language and culture from living in the
society remain the chief requirements for admission to the political community’
(Kastoryano 2002: 115). These qualifications require a level of assimilation into the
social and political system of the host country, putting unique pressures on Muslims
seeking policy change. Sweden, on the other hand, introduced a new law in 2001
allowing dual citizenship in order to ‘help immigrants in Sweden, many of whom are
not able or willing to renounce their original citizenship, to have a better chance at
integration by becoming Swedish citizens’.12 This policy reflects an integrationist
ideology which welcomes newcomers without forcing them to denounce their
Ideology
Ideology
B
A
Church–state
Church-State
structure
Structure
C
STATE
(Political opportunity structures)
Policy
Policy
outcomes
Outcomes
I
G
D
H
Muslim
Muslim
minorities
Minorities
E
Resource
mobilisation
Mobilization
F
Institutional framewor
frameworkk
of Islam
Figure 1. Dynamic-compound framework of the state accommodation of Islamic
religious practices
282 E. Tatari
identity completely. Hence, diverse ideologies produce distinct political opportunity
structures which determine the rules of the game allowing Muslims to obtain state
accommodation for their religious practices.
B. Ideology0 ChurchState Structure
Another area where ideologies of the masses or key players influence policy outcomes
for the state accommodation of religious practices is through churchstate structures.
Ideologies also shape how churchstate relations are institutionalised over time. For
example, in France and, to a lesser extent, in Ireland, ideas about laicity lead to a strict
separation of church and state, encoded into laws where religion is sought to be
eliminated from the public space altogether. House (1996) contends that ‘The French
revolution, while having started a process of desacralising religion to some extent, in
turn made sacred the politico-religious settlement of secularism, which became the
‘‘state religion’’*as Third Republic state school publications called it. The neutrality
of this secularism has been contested’ (1996: 229). On the other hand, the AngloSaxon version of secularism prevailing in the United Kingdom generates an entirely
different churchstate structure. This ideology crystallises into churchstate structures where the state respects the rights of diverse religious traditions and seeks to
avoid endorsing any particular religion at the expense of others. Hence, as ideologies
vary, the particular churchstate structure they produce varies accordingly.
C. ChurchState Structure 0 State (Political Opportunity Structures)
Churchstate relations influenced by ideologies are then institutionalised into laws,
constituting diverse political opportunity structures. The most striking example of
how political opportunity structures (and consequently policy outcomes) vary
depending on the churchstate structures is in the Alsace-Lorraine province (HautRhin, Bas-Rhin and Moselle) of France. Since Alsace-Lorraine was part of Germany in
1905, it is governed by the Concordat of 1801, where the governing authority
recognises certain religious groups and extends them privileges such as public
funding for schools*Catholic, Protestant and Jewish*and tax-exempt status (which
means that the local authority in Alsace-Lorraine pays the salaries of the clergy at
these schools). Conversely, all other French provinces are ruled by the 1905 law of
strict separation of church and state. As a result, different churchstate structures
within a country lead to highly diverse policy outcomes in issues of religious
accommodation.
D. ChurchState Structure l Muslim Minorities
Established churchstate relations set the institutional framework within which
Muslim minorities have to function. Most importantly, the legal status of religious
minorities vis-à-vis the state is legislated according to the established churchstate
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies
283
relations of the country. This, in turn, determines the bargaining power of religious
minorities to obtain state accommodation for their religious practices. For example,
Cesari’s discussion of the essence of laı¨cité in theory and in practice illustrates the
two-way dynamic relationship between churchstate relations and Muslim minorities:
Laı̈cité refers to the uneasy compromise that French people have made between the
letter of the law of separation of state and church and its peculiar implementation
within French culture. Quite paradoxically, when passed in 1905, the law’s primary
intention was not to champion religious freedom per se in France. Rather, it was to
weaken Catholic influence by putting Catholicism on an equal footing with
religious minorities within the public domain. Practically speaking, conforming to
the law meant confining religious belief to the private sphere. Ideally speaking,
conformity meant and still means extirpating homage to religious values from all
spheres: personal, familial, social, cultural, and political. Through the decades,
major religious groups*Christian and Jewish*have made uneasy peace with
laı̈cité by relegating religious expression to private domains. Muslim settlement in
France has disrupted that peace. It has introduced new confusion over boundaries
between public and private space and led to renewed controversy over religious
freedom and political tolerance (Cesari 2002: 44).
Hence, churchstate structures are constituted with the aim of regulating the political
and social power of religious groups and, therefore, influencing the prospects for
Muslim-friendly policies.
E. Resource Mobilisation 0 Muslim Minorities
The political resources of the minority group*effective organisational structures,
wealth, successful leadership and group cohesion*are all qualifiers of Muslims as an
interest group. For instance, many scholars argue that the fact that Muslims are a
highly heterogenous group divided along ethnic, gender, political and class lines
causes a lack of group cohesion (Cesari 2004; Fetzer and Soper 2005; Klausen 2005),
thus weakening their odds of effectively bargaining with the state. Similarly, House
argues, ‘part of the weakness of Islam in France is due to its internal divisions and the
lack of a single, institutionally recognized authority through which to negotiate its
place vis-à-vis state and civil society’ (House 1996: 219). Therefore, successful
resource mobilisation directly impacts on the bargaining power of Muslim
minorities.
F. Institutional Framework of Islam 0 Muslim Minorities
The variable ‘institutional framework of Islam’ in fact refers to the lack of an
organisational structure and of clergy in the Islamic tradition, as are present, for
example, in Catholicism. The institutional framework of Sunni Islam does not
sanction a hierarchical clergy or an established church. Hence, there may be
284 E. Tatari
scholars who are specialised in Islamic law, yet who are by no means authoritative
figures, and whose ideas and interpretations are not binding for Muslims, and
certainly not for Muslims in the West. This personal-faith framework raises issues
of leadership legitimacy among Muslim minorities, making it more challenging to
negotiate with the state as a unitary actor represented by a designated body or an
individual. This is evident in the failed attempts of some Western states, such as
France, to establish an umbrella organisation which can negotiate with the state
on behalf of the different Muslim communties. Therefore, the ‘institutional
framework of Islam’ variable differs according to the personal judgments of
individual believers or sub-group consensuses. However, ‘in the French system,
developed in the 19th century after the turmoil of the Revolution, the state
chooses those it wants to represent a community’; Leveau further argues that the
French state ‘wants to offer the same set-up to the Muslims, but they mostly fail
to grasp the issues in building a pluralistic system that consigns religion to a
person’s private life. They are prepared to drop many attitudes inherited from
being part of a Muslim majority in their home country, but do not see the need
to fully join a secular accord made before they came along and in conditions that
do not entirely suit them’ (Leveau 2002: 96). I would argue that Muslims do not
fail to grasp the secular construct of society, but that Islamic history presents a
different understanding of plurality, where different groups were welcome to
practice their religion freely, and where plurality*or the peaceful coexistence of
different ethnic and religious groups*did not require the confinement of religion
to a private sphere.13 Consequently, the ‘institutional framework of Islam’ variable
determines the rules of the game for Muslim minorities, shaping the way they
interact with the state in order to pursue policy change.
G. Muslim Minorities l State (Political Opportunity Structures)
Together, political resources and the institutional framework of Islam influence the
effectiveness of Muslim minorities to bargain with the state. However, Muslim
minorities have to function within the political opportunity structures, regulatory
constraints and laws of the state that have been shaped through ideology and church
state structures. For instance, naturalisation laws determine what rights immigrants
or asylum-seekers have, and how easily immigrants or descendants of immigrants can
become citizens. Countries whose regulations are based on the jus soli principle
automatically grant citizenship to the descendents of immigrants born in the country;
other countries have firm requirements such as adherence to the dominant culture in
the country. Another example of how Muslim minorities are shaped by political
opportunity structures is the regulations for organisations. For instance, in France,
even though Muslim organisations are not recognised by the state as religious
organisations, there are roughly 1,000 associations run by Muslims, registered under
the law of 1901 because of their cultural activities at the local level.
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies
285
H. State 0 Institutional Framework of Islam
State actors seek to influence the framework within which Muslim minorities
function in order to facilitate negotiations, and form bodies that are prone to cooptation. The best example is the efforts of European states to create organisations
which provide a unitary body as an interlocutor in negotiations. Wihtol de Wenden
argues that ‘Although Islam has no institutional framework, it was first represented in
France by the Paris Great Mosque . . .’ (1996: 54). Yet, despite the efforts of the
French government, the Great Mosque of Paris has failed to be a representative agent
for all Muslims, since it was largely controlled by the Algerian government, and a
substantive majority of its governing body were Algerians (Cesari 2004: 712).
However, after years of failed initiatives, the then Minister of the Interior, Nicolas
Sarkozy, succeeded, in 2002, in gathering major Muslim organisations in France
under the umbrella of the French Council on Islam (Conseil Français du Culte
Musulman*CFCM).
I. State (Political Opportunity Structures)0 Policy Outcomes
All these mechanisms are thus factors that account for policy outcomes related to the
state accommodation of Muslim minorities’ religious practices by shaping, framing,
constraining and facilitating the rules of the game. Ultimately, it is the state apparatus
that determines the policy agenda (or policy silences), and passes and implements
policy outcomes.
Within this framework, Muslims can be both individual actors and multiple group
actors*special-interest group, minority group, constituency group, or local/national
organisations established to pursue the interests of a group of Muslims*instead of a
necessary unitary actor (i.e. Muslims in France). This framework also depicts a twoway adjustment between the state and Muslim minorities. Muslims adapt to the
political system and develop the means of functioning within the system, whereas
state actors seek ways in which to accommodate the demands of Muslim minorities
by adjusting existing legislation and institutions or creating new legislation. Some
scholars argue that Muslims have to do the adjusting since they are newcomers to an
already established set of institutions and rules, whereas others argue that, as
democratic states, Western European countries have to amend their existing laws to
accommodate this new interest group. I contend that, as depicted in the framework,
there has to be adjustment on both sides; moreover, there is overwhelming empirical
evidence that this two-way process has already started to unfold. As Cesari argues,
Muslims adjust to the existing rules and institutions since they have to function
within this system:
European secularism does not consist merely in the protection of religious
freedoms and the political independence of religious organizations as it does in
the United States. It is also, if paradoxically, accompanied by a collaboration
between Church and State. The secularization of Islam, therefore, is seen
286 E. Tatari
particularly in the emergence of Muslim Organizations adapted to preexisting
structures of ChurchState relations within the host country (2004: 65).
On the other hand, more and more countries are passing laws in response to the
demands, problems and needs of Muslim minorities. Even though this response may
not be positive in all cases, it nevertheless indicates an interaction, a process of
bargaining back and forth between the state and Muslim minorities. For instance,
recognising that Muslim men commonly abuse certain licences in Islamic divorce law,
Norway has recently passed a law stipulating that no family reunification through
marriage will be permitted unless both partners have the right to initiate and obtain a
divorce.14
Conclusion
As the dynamic-compound framework demonstrates, there are multiple dynamic
factors interacting simultaneously with each other that account for final policy
outcomes. None of the four theories of state accommodation therefore sufficiently
accounts individually for this compound mechanism. Yet further deconstructing the
different components of this framework, while taking into account the institutionalism literature*which emphasises that institutions are not actors with agency*
would also contribute to our understanding of how this mechanism functions and
why there is cross-national variation in a given variable.
In most cases of state accommodation of the religious demands of Muslims, the
common theme is ‘the tendency of . . . policymakers to react to the problems of
religious pluralism in a restrictive and piecemeal fashion’ (Klausen 2005: 121). Over
time, the unresponsiveness of governments increases the sense of alienation of
Muslim minorities experiencing systematised discrimination. Social tensions are not
resolved but are further exacerbated when Muslims feel that they are not treated as
equal subjects of the state. Although, as depicted in the proposed framework, twoway adjustiment is taking place, it is quite gradual and rather painful. These problems
therefore urgently demand effective solutions. Klausen argues that ‘Existing laws
could instead be adjusted, through new implementation rules and flexible legal
interpretation, to accommodate religious pluralism’ (Klausen 2005: 122). Yet in most
cases the equal and fair implementation of the existing laws to all religious minorities
would be sufficient. This would promote democratic and liberal values, ease social
tensions, and further minorities’ integration. Further research is needed to provide
insights into how public policy should be adjusted to reflect religious pluralism and
the social change taking place in Western European societies. As Klausen argues, ‘. . .
Muslims are simply a new interest group and a new constituency . . . the European
political systems will change as the processes of representation, challenge, and
cooptation take place’ (2005: 3), probably to the point of negotiating a new social
contract. Since ‘democracies are tested by their capacity to integrate’ new interest
groups, as the proposed framework suggests, ‘prospects for accommodation of Islam
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies
287
rest in part on the ability of governments to come up with solutions, and in part on
the Muslim elite’s involvement in the resolution of conflict‘ (Klausen 2005: 7).
Notes
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
See article ‘Testing the Limits of Tolerance’, Deutsche Welle, 16 March 2006. Online at http://
www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,1935900,00.html
In the current Dutch parliament, 10 out of 150 MPs are Muslim (6.7 per cent); the ratio of
the Muslim population is approximately 6 per cent.
Mansour Kamardine was elected to the National Assembly in 2005, from one of the territoires
d’outre-mer (overseas territories), the island of Mayotte. In the 1997 and 2002 elections, 20
and 21 MPs respectively of North African origin (born in Morocco, Algeria or Tunisia) were
elected to the National Assembly, yet none were Muslims. Currently, in France, two out of
the 78 members of the European Parliament, and three out of the 331 senators are Muslim.
For a complete list of names, see http://users.skynet.be/suffrage-universel/fr/frmielan.htm.
Published annually in the SOPEMI Trends in International Migration report.
The January 2003 figures from the Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration
Affairs give an unemployment rate of 12 per cent for immigrants and their descendents but
only 4 per cent for native Danes. Sweden’s Muslims have unemployment rates four to ten
times higher than non-Muslims, depending on ethnicity (see www.euro-islam.info).
The exact question posed to the respondents was ‘Please tell me if you have a very favourable,
somewhat favourable, somewhat unfavourable, or very unfavourable opinion of Muslims’.
These percentages are the sum of respondents answering ‘very unfavourable’ and ‘somewhat
unfavourable’.
The French Organization against Islamophobia (CCIF) was established in 2003 to monitor
acts of intolerance and discrimination against Muslims. In its first report, the CCIF listed
more than 50 incidents, along with a number of websites propagating anti-Muslim
sentiment. In 2003, the National Federation of Anti-Discrimination Bureaus (NFAB)
registered 270 allegations of religious discrimination. However, there was a significant
upswing in attacks after the murder of Theo van Gogh in November 2004. A report from the
Anne Frank Foundation found 106 violent anti-Muslim incidents in the month following the
murder, while anti-discrimination bureaus recorded 4050 attacks on individual Muslims
during the same period. Most of these were verbal (www.euro-islam.info).
See http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2003/20031660.htm for a complete text of this regulation.
Most scholars present this issue as training programmes for ‘imams’, where the imam is
framed as a religious authority or clergyman who has parallel rights and responsibilities to a
Christian one. However, in mainstream Sunni Islam, followed by the majority of Muslims,
the term imam refers to someone who leads congregational prayer, and is selected from the
congregation at the beginning of every service. Since Islam does not sanction clergy, this
policy issue may be misrepresented. Yet, in modern times, due to demanding work schedules,
people who are knowledgeable about Islamic teachings take on the duty of leading prayers at
a single mosque and consult Muslims on matters of religion. In reality, therefore, what is at
stake here is the provision of educational facilities for every Muslim to learn about his or her
religion.
See S. Suteau: ‘Muslim political participation in Western Europe’, online at www.euroislam.info/PDFs/political_participation_west_europe.pdf.
Concordat signifies a churchstate constitution where the state recognises certain religious
groups and extends to them privileges such as public funding for schools and tax-exempt
status.
The Nordic Way, http://www.nordicway.com/search/Citizenship.htm, accessed 15 April 2006.
288 E. Tatari
[13]
[14]
For instance, during the life of the Prophet Muhammad in the Madina contract, adherents of
multiple faiths co-existed peacefully, and believers of other faiths were offered the possibility
of being judged according to their own laws.
Information for Persons Applying for Family Reunification in Norway, issued by the Norwegian
Directorate of Immigration, online at http://www.udi.no/upload/Publikasjoner/full%20versjon-engelsk.pdf, accessed 15 April 2006.
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