ENHANCING PHILIPPINE NATIONAL SECURITY AGAINST EXTERNAL CHALLENGES AND THREATS Report and Selected Papers Roundtable Discussions organized by the Asian Center, University of the Philippines Diliman 2008 Edited by Rowena Pangilinan Project leaders: Edgardo E. Dagdag & Herman Joseph Kraft With the support of Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research and Development, University of the Philippines Diliman 1
INTRODUCTION The Philippines’ national security environment has experienced dramatic transformations over the past six decades that has led to changes in the country’s security policies. This, in turn, have had an enormous impact on Philippine’s foreign policies. Anchored on the Philippine-­‐American alliance, external security has largely been left to the United States since 1946 while the Philippine government focused on resolving internal concerns. However, following the Senate rejection of the proposal to extend the military bases in 1991, the Philippine nation-­‐state was faced with the enormous task of securing its territorial integrity. Adding to this difficulty is China’s assertion of its rights on some islands within Philippine jurisdiction as exemplified in the incursions on the Kalayaan Group of Islands in the mid-­‐1990s. While the Philippine National Police was tasked to address internal security (Republic Act 6975, December 1990), the defense community pushed forth a Modernization Plan aimed at external defense which was eventually enacted in February 1995 (Republic Act 7898). However, pressing internal security concerns, including the CPP-­‐NPA-­‐NDF, Abu Sayyaf Group, MILF and other secessionist groups, have led the security sector to review its focus on external security. By 1998, the Visiting Forces Agreement was signed signaling the continuation of the RP-­‐US security cooperation, and paving the way for a total refocusing on internal security. Through Republic Act 8551 (February 1998), the AFP re-­‐assumed its primary role of suppressing insurgency with the PNP playing a supporting role. Notwithstanding the security alliance with the United States, the Philippines has also strengthened its bilateral security relations with other countries, as well as its participation in multilateral security cooperation on various issues in regional and global institutions like ASEAN, ARF and UN. The country has continually enhanced security relations with ASEAN member countries as well as countries like the United Kingdom, Australia and France. By 2003, security dialogues and a memorandum of understanding have also ensued between the Philippines and rising powers in the region, namely China and India. Hoping to examine how the Philippine state and non-­‐state actors articulated external security in its foreign policy stance since 1946, academics, stakeholders and national security practitioners gathered during two roundtable discussion last June 23 and July 7, 2008 at Bulwagang Sala’am, Romulo Hall, University of the Philippines Diliman. 2
RTD 1: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The participants of the first roundtable discussion last June 23, 2008 included: 1. Cong. Joseph Emilio Abaya 11. Commo. Francisco L. Tolin AFP (Ret.) 2. Usec. Edilberto P. Adan 12. Dir. Danilo T. Ibayan 3. Brig. Gen. Raynard Ronnie Y. Javier 13. Dir. Rhodora Joaquin AFP 14. Col. Daniel A. Lucero PA 4. Commo. Jose Lansangan AFP (Ret.) 15. Col. Ricardo B. Jalad PA 5. ADG Augusto Francisco J. Mier 16. Capt. Bayani R. Gaerlan PN 6. Asec. J. Eduardo Malaya 17. Maj. Rommel Cordova PA 7. Brig. Gen. Eduardo SL Oban AFP 18. Dir. Christine June P. Cariño 8. Prof. Amado M. Mendoza, Jr. 19. Mr. Julio Amador III 9. Prof. Benito O. Lim 20. Ms. Mereniza C. Gomez 10. Prof. Raymund Jose Quilop The discussion was led by three speakers: Dr. Carolina G. Hernandez, Usec. Feliciano M. Gacis (Ret.) and Prof. Roland G. Simbulan. The first two talked about the content and direction of the security discourse in the Philippines from 1946 to the present time. Prof. Simbulan talked about the perceptions of civil society regarding the external dimension of Philippine National Security. Basically, three main points have emerged out of the discussion. First, Philippine security policy remains dominated by a realist perspective which continues to emphasize the protection of the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty from the possible threat intentions of other states. This was particularly evident in the enumeration of geopolitical conditions that may affect the security of the Philippines given in one of the presentations. This include: cross-­‐strait relations between China and Taiwan, the threat of nuclear proliferation posed by the policies of North Korea and Iran, and the issue of theatre missile defense. More directly, territorial disputes between the Philippines and Indonesia and Malaysia, and competing claims of sovereignty over the Kalayaan Island Group involving the Philippines and other states around the region constitute sources of continuing concern for the Philippines. Interestingly, the fact that issues of sovereignty and territorial dispute remain as continuing and long-­‐standing concerns that are sources of external challenges and threats to the security of the country do not seem to be reflected in the security policies of the country. In particular, the lack of capability of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to defend the country against such threats was constantly referred to. This weakness is a by-­‐product of the combination of almost four decades of addressing resurgent armed communist and Muslim secessionist insurgencies, and a historic dependence on American military capability (and a seemingly boundless capacity to believe in the 3
willingness of the American government to defend the Philippines from these external threats). One of the presenters noted that the security policy of the country, in de-­‐
emphasizing external security, effectively perpetuates a colonial legacy of focusing on internal threats to security while depending on the US for external defense -­‐ a perspective that colored and influenced thinking about security in the country throughout the days of the Cold War. It also reflected the nature of politics in the country which gives emphasis to elite interests, while targeting people’s organizations and mass movements in counter-­‐insurgency operations. Ironically, the Philippines remains the only country in Southeast Asia with a resurgent communist insurgency. The weakness in external defense capabilities also limits the ability of the country to maneuver diplomatically because of its lack of leverage in negotiations. Thus, a fundamental aspect of Philippine foreign policy and security that needs to be addressed is the strengthening of the capacity of the AFP to defend the Philippines from external threats, whatever the nature of these threats might be. Aside from military capability serving as leverage in diplomacy, it also plays a role in deterrence against threats, and as insurance – should diplomacy and deterrence ultimately fail. The influence of the US in the determination of external threats to the Philippines and the kinds of policies that the Philippine government should implement in response to these threats is further seen in the issue of counter-­‐terrorism. Despite the Philippine government’s emphasis of its commitments to the Global War on Terror, this is really an issue that is connected again to the internal security situation of the country – which is not just a military problem but one that involves good governance. This brings in the second point that came out of the discussion. Perceptions about threats to security, particularly external threats to security, are increasingly changing as the influence of emerging norms in international relations make themselves more evident. The state-­‐
centric nature of national security is being balanced by the more people-­‐centric perspective central to the concept of human security. This is the reason why U.S. rhetoric on counter-­‐terrorism, and the extent to which this is supported by the Philippine government, is balanced by concerns over its implications for human rights observance and protection. Similarly, concerns over such issues as climate change, toxic waste dumping, the depletion of marine resources, illegal drugs, and human trafficking are now emerging as new issues which reflect a concern which goes beyond traditional security issues. These issues reflect the emergence of new nations (especially developing countries with their different sets of security concerns), and new actors (such as non-­‐governmental organizations, social movements, and regional and international civil society groups) and the way they have influenced norm-­‐setting agenda in international relations. A third point is the idea that the Philippines by itself might not be able to address all of these security issues. In this context, one of the presenters emphasized the importance of ASEAN as a vehicle for a cooperative response to these new threats. Another pointed to the approach of establishing an East Asian Community with regional security cooperation as one of the major components of the rationale behind community 4
building. The case of ASEAN, however, brings in a different set of issues. A fundamental one is the extent to which the ASEAN Charter (which is undergoing a ratification process in ASEAN) will help facilitate this cooperative nature of addressing these emerging threats to security. The emergence of these different perspectives, however, brings in with them a different set of questions, some of which are really very fundamental ones. What is security to the Philippines? Or what is security to the Filipino people? In the end, who is supposed to be the provider of security? What kinds of policies could then be undertaken to address these new security issues? These are all fundamental questions but require in-­‐
depth analysis. A point that was repeatedly noted in the discussion, however, was the evident need for a national think-­‐tank that would take a multi-­‐faceted approach to looking at security and a strategic perspective to identifying threats to security (whether internal or external) and how to respond to them. The NSC could perhaps perform this function but as it is currently configured it is mired in fire-­‐fighting activities in response to more short-­‐term and immediate demands of current developments. In any case, the need for such a think-­‐tank is evident, but it might be something that will have to be established outside of existing government (and maybe even non-­‐government) institutions. 5
SUMMARY REPORTS Session 1: Content and Direction of Security Discourse in the Philippines since 1946 to present “Changing Discourse on Security: 1946 to the Present” Carolina G. Hernandez Carolina Hernandez noted that the realist perspective of international relations continue to hold sway in the Philippines. In this context, the state still needs to rely on force or on power. The tendency is to look at security in terms of protection. But the world is evolving largely due to the experience of humanity on the atrocities of war. The norms in international relations are changing and this is being led by more advanced countries. Hernandez also discussed the country’s alliance with the United States that extended to the Cold War and up to the present. In recent years, the alliance faced certain challenges as with the case of Angelo dela Cruz whereby Philippine troops in Iraq pulled out to save the Overseas Filipino Worker. She also adds that many has begun to question the entire relationship altogether. Post World War II, other issues also gained prominence like those pertaining to the environment as well as human rights and human development. Vis-­‐à-­‐vis these issues is the preoccupation of countries in pursuing economic growth and development. Food security is also a recent concern for many countries following the food crisis. The strategic location of the country is integral in the country’s security considerations. Hence, maritime security is important for the Philippines. Along with environmental concerns like overfishing and pollution, the problems of piracy, trafficking of humans and drugs are increasingly being paid attention to. However, external defense capability of the country is wanting. All these are transforming the security discourses, according to Hernandez. The advanced technology that is prevalent in the world which has precipitated quick travel and communication has also affected security conceptions. The world is increasingly being seen as one earth and we are in one global planet. Notwithstanding, traditional security concerns like the communist insurgency (CPP-­‐NPA-­‐
NDF) remain. Hence, countries like the Philippines tries to address the dilemmas in this new security context by various mechanisms. One of which is the passage of the Human Security Act of 2007. Here, human security, the discourse that underpinned this legislation, is focused towards obtaining a people-­‐centered security, cooperative security and comprehensive security. This development is also based on various international norms that are contained in various international agreements on 6
international humanitarian law, international human rights law and other humanitarian conventions. “Enhancing RP National Security against External Challenges and Threats” Feliciano M. Gacis, Jr. The presentation focused on the military dimension of national security. Threats to national security are categorized into two: traditional and non-­‐traditional. Gacis identified several traditional security threats and discussed their implications on Philippine national security: China-­‐Taiwan standoff, North Korea’s nuclear program, Iran’s nuclear program, US-­‐Russia tension over the US anti-­‐missile defense shield in Europe, and bilateral and multilateral territorial disputes. China is opposed to any move towards independence by Taiwan. She maintains that force will be used if necessary. The standoff between China and Taiwan has become more complicated because of the United States. The United States has a security agreement with Taiwan. Hence, on one hand, she recognizes the one-­‐China policy and on the other hand, she is opposed to unification by force. Moreover, the United States helps improve Taiwan’s defense capability by making available lethal military equipment. In Gacis’s view, a war between China and Taiwan might involve the Philippines because of the RP-­‐US Defense Treaty. For Gacis, the issue of North Korea’s nuclear program is unlikely to turn into an armed conflict but if it does, it will have an impact on the Philippine economy. Meanwhile, although Iran claims that her nuclear development program is for peaceful purposes, Israel and the United States fear that Iran would use her nuclear program to produce nuclear warheads. Israel maintains that she would not hesitate to take preemptive strike if there is any threat to her national existence. Gacis argued that any involvement of Israel would mean the involvement of the United States as well. In fact, the United States has imposed sanctions on Iran and has taken an offensive stance to deter Iran. Gacis expressed his belief that in the event that the United States and Israel take a preemptive strike against Iran, their goal would be to destroy Iran’s nuclear development and missile delivery capabilities and not to occupy Iran and call for a regime change. Gacis said that if such a conflict takes place, there will be a disruption of Philippine oil supply that will consequently affect the country’s economy and cause internal instability. Moreover, a new wave of Iran terrorism and an upsurge of Al Qaeda terrorism will be directed against the United States and her allies such as the Philippines. 7
Gacis also said that the dispute over the installation of anti-­‐missile defense shield in Europe between the United States and Russia is a possible threat to Philippine national security. Although territorial disputes with Indonesia and Malaysia remain unresolved, Gacis asserted that they pose no threat to Philippine national security. The Kalayaan Islands territorial dispute among the Philippines, China, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Taiwan, is likewise unresolved and it remains to be seen whether or not peace and stability will be maintained. Gacis identified and briefly discussed non-­‐traditional security threats to the Philippines: terrorism; food crisis; and energy crisis. He said that Al Qaeda terrorism has reached the Philippines, infiltrated and found refuge in mainland Mindanao, and strengthened the internal terrorist Abu Sayyaf group. He argued that final peaceful settlement of conflict in Southern Philippines will result in the decline of both internal terrorism and imported terrorism. Food crisis is another threat to Philippine national security. Gacis stated that rice shortages and increasing prices of rice may bring about mass unrest which may consequently lead to internal instability. The Philippines is also vulnerable to the energy crisis since she depends heavily on imported oil to drive her economy. The consequences of the energy crisis may likewise result in internal instability. Thus, there is a need to closely monitor the combined effects of food and energy crises. Gacis gave an assessment of past and present responses to external security challenges and threats to the Philippines. For Gacis, the Philippines has never been confronted with serious security challenges and threats. Gacis said that Philippine national security is enhanced by defense relations with the United States, defense and security cooperation agreements with neighbor countries, and strengthening of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. With regard to RP-­‐US defense relations, Gacis expressed his belief that although RP-­‐US MDT has served Philippine security interests, the Philippines must assert her sovereignty and independence of action in cases where RP and US security interests diverge, especially in situations where involvement with the United States would drag the Philippines to war. He argued that although the RP-­‐US MDT is asymmetrical in nature, RP-­‐US defense relations will remain a status quo and hence, there is a need to look into the issue of the future of RP-­‐US defense relations. Establishing and maintaining friendly relations with neighbor countries have helped enhance Philippine national security, Gacis said. Defense and security cooperation agreements with countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Australia, Korea, and China have served the interests of the Philippines in so far as national security was concerned. Philippine anti-­‐terrorism efforts such as the tripartite RP-­‐
Indonesia-­‐Malaysia agreement, operational linkages with the United States, and links with UN and ASEAN are adequate. The strengthening of the Armed Forces of the 8
Philippines in Gacis’s view is likewise important in enhancing the capability of the Philippines to address external security challenges and threats. Gacis discussed some prospects in the strategic security environment for the next ten years. He said that the Asia Pacific security equilibrium will be maintained by the balance of power between the United States and China. Under the prevailing equilibrium, Gacis opined that the China-­‐Taiwan standoff will remain below the threshold of flashpoint while the dispute over the North Korean nuclear program will remain manageable and be peacefully resolved. He also expressed his belief that the Iran nuclear dispute erupting into war will not have a significant effect on the regional security except perhaps the disruption of oil supply and the emergence of a new wave of Iranian terrorism. Gacis said that the regional strategic security environment will continue to be benign as regional tensions will remain below threshold of flashpoint. US-­‐China rivalry will be manageable while terrorism can be contained by affected countries singly or collectively. Although the Kalayaan territorial dispute remains unresolved, cooperation among claimant countries will continue and thus, peace will be maintained. Gacis stated that although the idea of regional security cooperation as a component of an East Asian community is revolutionary, there are some formidable challenges and obstacles to such an idea. These include diversities of history, traditions, ideologies, values and norms, and conflicts of interest among EAC prospective countries; inter-­‐state conflicts; and US-­‐China power rivalry. For Gacis, “the desiderata of an EAC-­‐cum-­‐RSC should be: neutrality; non-­‐alignment in power rivalry; related to a., free of defense alliance; a binding conflict resolution mechanism. This does not preclude bringing dispute to appropriate bodies of the UN for resolution if the parties concerned mutually agree; commonality of certain values and norms; no primus inter pares; and non-­‐
interference in internal affairs.” As such, the EAC-­‐cum-­‐RSC at this stage is a vision worth pursuing. He said that the creation of a multi-­‐institutional, multi-­‐disciplinary think-­‐tank that would study in-­‐depth national security issues and concerns could enhance the quality and timeliness of response to security challenges and threats and could likewise study the EAC-­‐cum-­‐RSC. He further stated that there is a need to create RP-­‐US Mutual Defense Policy Board (MDPB) under the Council of Ministers and above the RP-­‐US Mutual Defense Board to provide policy direction and advice to the MDB. Gacis concluded that among the external security challenges and threats to the Philippines, the food and energy crises are of immediate concern. The China-­‐Taiwan standoff will become a serious concern if it becomes an armed conflict involving the United States. Al Qaeda terrorism is not a major security threat while the Kalayaan Islands territorial dispute is the most problematic since no arrangement among the claimant countries for the exploration and sharing of oil has been made. 9
ON FOREIGN POLICY Gacis says, The Philippines should: “Maintain the present defense relations with the US and retain the RP-­‐US Mutual Defense Treaty as policy insurance in case external threat materializes beyond the capability of the country’s military to cope with; Continue to develop our nation’s capacity to make diplomacy as our first line of defense in meeting threats and challenges to national security, and as a fallback alternative in a post-­‐conflict resolution where possible; Strengthen ASEAN security cooperation by institutionalizing peaceful resolution of conflicts and make it binding on the members. In the field of anti-­‐terrorism, we should accelerate the momentum of institutionalizing and improving linkages among the military and police forces of ASEAN countries involved and improve the exchange of intelligence on trans-­‐border terrorism and other trans-­‐border non-­‐traditional threats; Continue to support the regime in the SCS area and the Declaration of the parties in the SCS and maintain surveillance over the Kalayaan Islands; and Review the AFP modernization program as the principal means of improving the military defense posture, keeping in mind the constraints of resources. Such a review could lead to a reprioritization of national security among an array of other national priorities competing for scarce national resources.” DISCUSSION Raymund Quilop asked how the Philippines can attain genuine external security when most of the sources of external defense capability emanate from the United States. The Americans even provide advice to the Defense Department. He also inquired how the proposal of Feliciano Gacis for a Mutual Defense Policy Board lead to an effective engagement with the United States and how is this different with the Mutual Defense Board and Mutual Engagement Board. Carolina Hernandez clarified that the Philippines as early as the time of President Ferdinand Marcos, has already accepted that security is beyond military terms; it adopted the idea of comprehensive security that contains political, economic and military elements, even cultural and geographic. Comprehensive security, however, is still defined by the state. Meanwhile, cooperative security is also gaining ground. Here, Philippine security is also grounded on the security of its neighbors. This is where East Asian security cooperation comes in. Non-­‐traditional security concerns then emerged alongside traditional ones. Increasingly therefore, the civil society and the academe have become stakeholders in the security discourse in addition to the uniformed service (Armed Forces and the Police). This was necessary so that decisions related to security 10
have more credibility and popular support and therefore are more acceptable from the policy up to implementation stages. While recognizing the asymmetry of the Philippines-­‐
US relations, Hernandez admits that the country needs the US since it does not have external defense capability of the country. The Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) project also focuses on Internal Security Operations (ISO) capability of the Armed Forces and not external defense. On his proposal of a Mutual Defense Policy Board, Feliciano Gacis asserts that on the operational level, the Philippines only relates to the US through the Mutual Defense Board. However, the MDB is restricted to purely military matters. Yet, in the past, the United States was able to inject policy matters and the AFP knowingly or unknowingly approves it. When it reaches to the (RP) Defense Department in consultation with the Foreign Affairs Department, the leadership disallows these agreements. When the US talks to us, they speak in unison, while on the Philippine side, there are different responses and this does not reflect well on the country. Gacis emphasized that the Philippines must have a reexamination of its relations with the US setting aside emotional attachment. Philippine independence, sovereignty, and national interest must prevail in the relations. The country should always keep in mind that MDT was meant to serve mutual interest of both parties. In developing the Philippine external defense capability, Gacis also contends that the country should not solely rely on the United States. He recalls when the Philippines did not approve of the treaty that would extend the US military bases, the military aid amounting to about US$150 M plummeted to US$1 M for training. It was only when the VFA was signed when aid resumed but this time, it only amounted to about US$20 M. The Philippines should start relying on its own. The modernization program is a political decision on the part of the Philippines. Benito Lim inquired what really constitutes Philippine alliances with the United States and other countries. For him, it is necessary to know what these alliances mean for the country and who will really provide security when the need of the Philippines arises. Will the United States provide such security? He contends that here is a need to think about security in contemporary terms amidst contemporary problems and challenges and must not be encumbered by the past. The past, he said, should only provide us lessons. Ed Malaya agreed with Gacis’s analysis that security issues have political dimensions, and therefore focus should also be directed to the security and foreign policy decision-­‐
making. A more integrated and coordinated approach by the security community in coordination with the DFA and Office of the President is imperative. It is necessary to examine whether the Cabinet cluster approach is effective and if not, he suggested that the National Security Council explore ways on how to bring security issues to the OP and other stakeholders. He added that studies on security, especially by Filipino academics, should have more relevance to decision-­‐makers. Notwithstanding, he thanked the 11
organizers of the roundtable for the invitation to interact with those who will actually conduct and produce the studies, as well as other stakeholders. While the concept of security expands, Hernandez emphasized the importance of improving the country’s external defense capability. She regarded this as an insurance that while peace has characterized the region, one could not discount of the possibility of an external attack or threat. This is insurance for the survivability of the state. She recalled that during the debate of whether to extend the military bases in the country or not, she advanced that the defense and military sector should be given a ten year transition period to procure adequate external defense capability before removing the US bases. Session 2: External Dimension of Philippine National Security: Perceptions of State, Non-­‐State Actors and the Filipino Public “External Dimension of Philippine National Security: Civil Society Perspective” Prof. Roland G. Simbulan Simbulan said that the Philippine national security is heavily tied to the national security of the United States. He stated that the establishment of the Armed Forces of the Philippines was part of the pacification campaign of the United States. From the very start, the country’s security forces have been subordinated to US military policies. With the assistance of US military aid, the primary role given to the Philippine Army was to wage counter-­‐insurgency pacification campaigns. He argued that the Philippine external defenses against external security threats were completely placed in the hands of the United States even after the granting of formal independence in 1946. He asserted that the various treaties and military agreements that were forged after 1946, from the military bases agreement, military assistance agreement to the mutual defense treaty, were not aimed at developing a modern and self-­‐reliant Philippine armed forces. These agreements, Simbulan said, were aimed at continuing the country’s dependence on the United States for external defenses. The security sector in general and the Armed Forces of the Philippines in particular have, for a long time, considered non-­‐governmental community-­‐based or sectoral organizations/people’s organizations as threats to Philippine security. For Simbulan, this is a continuation of US pacification campaigns which targeted social movements all over the country. Simbulan expressed his belief that as long as the Philippines is very dependent on the United States and all the various treaties and military agreements, the country would never really develop its own external capability. 12
Meanwhile, Simbulan said that non-­‐state actors/civil society groups perceive that the role of the Armed Forces of the Philippines is exceedingly dependent on its subordination to US foreign and military policies. For many civil society groups, external threat to the Philippines lies in the continued presence of the United States in the country. Thus, there is a difference between the official perception of external security threats and perceptions of many civil society groups. Simbulan opined that China and other foreign powers are also perceived as threats or potential threats. However, for Simbulan, external threats to Philippine security are integrated within the society. With regard to external threats, Simbulan said that it is important to take into consideration the reality of stiff competition over trade markets. Moreover, the country’s intelligence services should support Filipino policy makers. Simbulan concluded that it is imperative that the Filipino people stop perceiving national security interests as just part of US interests. The Filipinos need to protect their own security interests. DISCUSSION Raymund Quilop noted that Roland Simbulan seemed to regard the civil society as one homogenous sector when in fact there are so many divisions within this sector. He asked the presentor what should be done for both sectors to touch base given what he pointed out as an incongruence of perceptions between the government and civil society. Simbulan, in response, mentioned a group (with diverse backgrounds and with representation from different sectors) where he is a part of, that tackles security sector reform. He shared that the group is trying to better understand the Philippine military establishment in order that effective reforms are implemented and better policies are formulated. The task is to move the military away from partisan politics, help them focus on external defense and for the police to remove its image away from human rights abuses. Simbulan noted the misuse of the intelligence service, including being used by the government to spy on members of political opposition. He also noted that the military service has also been used by some corrupt senior military officers as their milking cows. This may be one of the reasons why the military has not put an end to insurgency or even just the Abu Sayyaf Group. The private armies in some parts of the country should also be curbed. He also agrees that the PNP should have the responsibility over internal security while the AFP focus solely on external defense. Simbulan noted that some members of the civil society have entered into the parliamentary arena. While they may indeed have connections with the underground rebel groups, this should not be an excuse that they be physically attacked. Members of Social Movements are now wary of participating in the legal process because of their past experience. Instead, they should be encouraged to further participate in the legal 13
parliamentary arena. It is in fact highlighted in the Constitution that peoples’ organizations be recognized. Jose Lansangan noted the disjointed approach of various government sectors on national security. He therefore proposed that the National Security Council be the center of all these government sectors on security in order that all dimensions of the problem – economic, political, social – are addressed. If NSC or NICA is up to task, an interdisciplinary group may also be created. He raised concerns on how defense and security policies are arrived at, including the pronouncement that the insurgency should be crushed in three months. He wonders whether studies were conducted to arrive at such pronouncement since this is a deep-­‐seated problem and the military solution is inadequate. On the issue of Kalayaan Islands, he also asked whether there is a defense policy related to this flashpoint and whether possible political and economic repercussions were considered in arriving at such policy. 14
Enhancing RP National Security against External Challenges and Threats Feliciano M. Gacis, Jr. Introduction A comprehensive treatment of national security includes at least the political and economic dimensions. However, the political and economic dimensions are not in my territory. I will therefore focus my discussion on the military dimension where I feel at home and comfortable and refer in passing to the political and economic as necessary. Scholars and practitioners of national security categorize threats to national security into traditional and non-­‐traditional. This paper adopts it. Identification of Challenges and Threats and their Implications to National Security Traditional Threats A scan of the strategic security environment discloses partial and actual threats, three of which have implications to our national security. A. China-­‐Taiwan Standoff China is sensitive to any move towards independence by Taiwan and made it clear that it will oppose such move, by force if necessary. The US factor complicates the standoff. US has a security agreement with Taiwan. Although it recognizes the one-­‐China policy, it on the other hand has categorically stated that it is opposed to unification by force. It has demonstrated its security commitment to Taiwan by making available lethal military equipment to improve its defense capability. An incident happened in 1996 in the Taiwan straits, in which China flexed its muscles by firing missile tests into the Taiwan straits and the US, sent two aircraft carriers. To underscore the implications of this incident, Dr. Steinbruner, in his book titled Principles of Global Security, wrote (p.218): 15
“Although it was evident that both sides were displaying resolve rather than priming their forces for combat, the perceived need for such an exercise revealed the dangers of ambiguity. China and the United States have not established the organizing principle of their security relationship and are hostage to the internal politics of Taiwan. The situation is a major strategic accident waiting to happen ad promising to do so.” (underline supplied) Should the China-­‐Taiwan standoff erupt into conflict, the danger of miscalculation is high on both sides. Rapid decision to start the war or pause and step back will have to be made under severe stress, by decision-­‐makers at the rear and at the front by commanders of opposing forces at the points of contact. The deployment of US forces to combat in the defense of Taiwan will be tantamount to a declaration of war by the US on China. The Philippines may be dragged into the war because of the RP-­‐US Defense Treaty. The armed conflict will very likely spill out of Taiwan. Military necessity will compel both sides to expand the arena of battle to the Chinese mainland by US forces, into waters beyond Taiwanese territory by Chinese forces. The situation could get out of control and deteriorate into general war between China and the US. The consequences are frightening to contemplate. The implications to our national security are obvious. Since that incident, there has been no significant change in the situation, especially with respect to China and Taiwan. Neither has there been any movement between US and China. It is encouraging to note, however, that lately, China and Taiwan have agreed to resume talks (CNN, 29 May 2008). B. Dispute over North Korea’s Nuclear Program The parties to the dispute are North Korea on one side, US-­‐South Korea and Japan on the other. China is the principal mediator, and to a lesser extent Russia. Should this problem deteriorate into armed conflict, South Korea and Japan would bear the initial brunt. North Korea has the missiles capable of reaching the entire Korean peninsula and Japan. The Korean and Japanese economy will suffer. It is comforting to note that the US has taken a two-­‐tracked approach to the problem. While it has not abandoned the use of force, it has at the same time taken positive steps towards a peaceful accommodation with North Korea with promises of economic assistance and the replacement of North Korea’s energy production capacity which would be lost by abandoning her nuclear program. 16
Nevertheless, apprehensions remain. There is suspicion that North Korea has hidden reserves which it has not disclosed of high-­‐grade nuclear material which could be used to produce nuclear weapons. At its request, the US provided Japan with anti-­‐
missile defense capability in the form of Patriot missiles (Such missile cannot provide foolproof guarantee against a few missiles penetrating the Patriot shield, as the war in Iraq demonstrated). With respect to South Korea, the US commitment to the defense of South Korea in case of North Korean attack is unequivocal. US ground forces, deployed in the close proximity to the North Korean forces along the DMZ function as the trip-­‐
wire to activate the military counter-­‐action. The conflict will be fierce but would be short-­‐lived, with North Korea brought to its knees. C. Dispute over Iran’s Nuclear Program Iran appears persistent in the pursuit of its nuclear development program insisting that it is for peaceful purposes. Sanctions imposed under UN authorization and by the US have not deterred Iran. Israel fears that Iran would also use its nuclear program to produce nuclear warheads. Coupled with Iran’s development of missile delivery capability of intermediate range, the fear of Israel is not unfounded. Israel had demonstrated in Iraq in the past that it will not hesitate to take preemptive strike if its national existence is threatened. If Israel is involved, can the US be far behind? On its part, the US has taken a confrontational stance to dissuade Iran. It had hinted that the military option is not foreclosed. Added to this option is the US policy of preemptive strike. Lately, it was reported (CNN) by US Ex-­‐President Carter that Israel possesses some 100 nuclear weapons (He knows what he is talking about, the cat is now out of the bag). Whether a slip of the tongue or deliberate, this revelation raises the ante. In the event the US and Israel decide on a pre-­‐emptive strike, the objective would be to destroy Iran’s nuclear development and missile delivery capabilities. The occupation of Iran and regime change would not be an objective. Neither the US and Israel combined have the ground forces to undertake an invasion and occupation. US deployable ground forces are heavily committed in Iraq. The geography of the war will be confined to Iranian territory, except perhaps a few missiles with conventional warheads from Iran hitting Israel. But this will have no effect on the outcome of the war. 17
Russia is the unknown factor in this conflict. It has supported the UN and US only up to a certain point in the imposition of sanctions but has given indications that it is on Iran’s side. If it gets actively involved, the conflict could get out of hand. The implication to our national security is the possible disruption of oil supply which could adversely affect the Philippines. Unless readily resolved, such disruption is bound to affect our economy and as a consequence lead to internal instability. D. US-­‐Russia over the US Anti-­‐Missile Defense Shield in Europe At this juncture, I would like to raise a signal of caution and add another possible threat, latent at this stage, that involves the world powers US and Russia. The US moved toward the installation of anti-­‐missile defense shield in Europe. Russia objected. Meetings between Bush and Putin did not overcome the Russian objection. US tried to allay Russian apprehension, saying that the Cold War is over. (This justification is shallow.) Russia is not convinced, and for good reason. With the installation of the shield initially in Poland a done deal (as stated by US Secretary Rice) and the plan to install another system in Czechoslovakia, the Russian apprehension is understandable. It perceives the shield is directed against Russia with the object of neutralizing its still sizeable nuclear arsenal in the event of war. It reinvigorated its nuclear arsenal by technological improvement to penetrate the shield and test-­‐fired an ICBM. Has the Cold War been resurrected? Territorial Disputes The Philippines has three territorial disputes. Two are bilateral, with Indonesia and Malaysia. One is multilateral, with China, Malaysia, Vietnam and Taiwan. A. RP-­‐Indonesia Sea Border Delineation Talks were conducted by both parties toward a peaceful resolution but without conclusive results. Indonesia has indicated its willingness to negotiate the Western part of the border, but was unyielding in the eastern part which it considered a closed matter. There is no threat to national security arising from this dispute, for as long as both parties continue to pursue the course of peaceful resolution. B. RP-­‐Malaysia over Sabah 18
The RP claim to Sabah likewise remains unresolved. Malaysia in the past indicated its willingness to negotiate the proprietary claim of the Sultanate of Sulu, provided that the heirs would agree on having only one to represent them in the negotiation. But the heirs could not agree. The negotiations, to my knowledge, never took place. On the other hand, Malaysia has indicated its unwillingness to negotiate the sovereignty aspect of the claim. In the meantime, the Sabah claim appears to have been made by both parties to sleep. (My knowledge of the Sabah claim stops here.) C. Kalayaan Islands Territorial Dispute The dispute arises from the conflicting and overlapping claims of the claimant countries. Under Presidential Decree 1596 issued on 11 June 1998, the Philippines claimed all of the Spratlys. On the same day, PD 1599 was issued which defined the Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). China claims all of the Spratlys, stating that it is historically indisputably part of China’s territory. Malaysia passed a law in 1981, laying claim to the southern part. Vietnam claims the western part. The legal basis of its claim is the right of succession to France after the French departure from Indo-­‐China. According to Prof. Merlin Magallona in a lecture at the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP), France laid claim to the Spratlys in 1933 and asked the US if it had any objection. The US had none. The basis of Taiwan’s claim is unknown to the author. Taiwan occupies only one island in the Spratlys, Itu Aba, which it took over from the Japanese following the end of World War II. I will not dwell in the legal aspects of the claims for lack of competence. The Spratlys is veritably an armed area. Many of the islands/ islets occupied by the claimants are fortified. In the past, the relationships of the claimants can be characterized as confrontational. Overt attempts made by the claimants as intrusion into their claimed areas were accosted. Philippines apprehended Chinese fishing boats and fishermen. Malaysia apprehended Filipino fishermen found fishing in their area. These incidents were however resolved peacefully. Vietnam fired at Philippine Air Force (PAF) reconnaissance aircraft in the vicinity of Pugad Island which it occupied. 19
Diplomatic efforts were undertaken for a Regional Code of Conduct to govern the Spratlys. In November 2002, such efforts bore fruit with a Declaration on the Code of Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea, signed in by ten countries, namely Brunei, China, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. The dispositive portion of the Declaration reads: “undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peace means… undertake to exercise self-­‐restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability… pending peaceful settlement of territorial and jurisdictional disputes, the Parties concerned undertake to intensify efforts to seek ways, in the spirit of cooperation and understanding, to build trust and confidence between and among them…” The Declaration is, however, non-­‐binding on the Parties and depends on their good faith for its observance. In May 2000, the Philippines and China signed a Joint Statement for the Framework of Bilateral Cooperation in the Twenty-­‐First Century, in which the two sides commit themselves to the maintenance of peace and stability in the South China Sea area. This is where things stand at this time. Our confrontational stance has mellowed to one of accommodation and tolerance. The SCS area is tranquil on the surface. If the SCS dispute were solely about territory (land and waters) and maritime resources, the claimants could take their time in moving towards peaceful resolution of the territorial dispute. But the Spratlys is suspected by many to contain black gold beneath the seabed. The discovery of oil anywhere in the Spratlys could shatter the tranquility. Unless a cooperative arrangement on the exploration and exploitation of oil is in place prior to its discovery, a scramble could likely take place among the claimants to stake their claim. The seabed on which the oil drilling rigs are set up becomes occupied territory. To allow oil exploration in the Spratlys and go around the problem of territorial jurisdiction, the Philippines put forward two schemes. One was the “doughnut” concept of President (Fidel) Ramos, the other the condominium concept of Speaker (Jose) de Venecia. Both schemes provided for the sharing of oil. There were no takers from the other claimants. Since then, the issue appears to have been shelved. Non-­‐Traditional Threats 20
This paper will focus on terrorism, food and energy crisis. A. Terrorism Al Qaeda terrorism in its mutant form of the Jemaah Islamiyah of Indonesia has reached the Philippines. It has infiltrated and found a sanctuary in mainland Mindanao and has reinforced the internal terrorist Abu Sayaff group. Lately, terroristic activities again flared up with the bombings in Zamboanga City, Cotabato and Davao. It has still to be established whether these were perpetrated by the so-­‐called MILF lost command or the JI-­‐Abu Sayaff. Terrorism is a form of asymmetrical warfare between a poor and weak adversary against a rich powerful enemy. Terrorism does not adhere to any convention on warfare. It does not respect boundaries which it crosses at will. It does not discriminate its targets, combatant or civilian non-­‐combatants. As the saying goes, all is fair in love and in war for terrorism. Should the conflict in the South be finally peacefully resolved, internal terrorism will wither on the vine, and with it, imported terrorism. B. Food and Energy Crisis Both are of recent vintage. The food crisis appears to have reached global proportion with the recent world leaders summit in Rome convened to tackle the problem. Affluent, developed countries have the capacity to cope with the impact of the crisis. Poor countries are the most vulnerable. The Philippines, while not a poor country and having the internal capacity to cope with the crisis, nonetheless is now experiencing the rice shortage and its rising prices. When the belts of the hungry poor which constitute the majority of the Philippine population can no longer be tightened, mass unrest will arise which could lead to internal instability and become a security threat. Rice in the Philippines is not only a staple food but also a political commodity under a situation of scarcity and rising prices. The capacity of internal production may not be fully sufficient, necessitating augmentation of external supply. The energy crisis appears to be a function of the heartless law of supply and demand, aggravated by tensions and conflicts at the source of oil which threaten to disrupt its supply. Affluent and poor countries are both vulnerable to the energy crisis, the poor non-­‐oil producing countries more. The Philippines relies heavily on imported 21
oil to drive its economy. Unabated, the crisis will increasingly impact on the economy, the effects of which, similar to the food crisis, lead to internal instability and become a security threat. The combined effects of food and energy crises, now beginning to unfold, need to be closely monitored by the country’s national security managers in consultation with the economic managers. The country’s armed forces may have to be called upon should the situation degenerate beyond the capability of the police to cope with. This is an internal matter. Responses, Past and Present – An Assessment Were there opportunities missed or mishandles? In national security, I do not think so. The Philippines has never been confronted with serious challenges or threats to national security. Beginning with RP-­‐US defense relations, the agenda of national security has expanded to include security cooperation, Kalayaan Islands and anti-­‐
terrorism. A. RP-­‐US Defense Relations After 1946, the US continued to underwrite Philippine national security and influence its course. The external security threat at that time was perceived to be China (in hindsight, this was imaginary) against which only the US could shield us. Inter-­‐state tensions later between the Philippines and Indonesia and between Malaysia did not pose a serious threat to national security. In 1946, shortly after Philippine independence, the US retained its military presence in Clark and Subic bases under the RP-­‐US Military Bases Agreement (MBA). In 1951, the RP-­‐US Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) formalized US commitment to defend the Philippines against external threat with a reservation of subject to “constitutional processes” to meet the common danger, meaning that US responses is not automatic. After 1946 and well into the 90’s, the US under the RP-­‐US Military Assistance Agreement (MAA) of 1947 provided the major end items, spares, some consumables and training to develop the country’s armed forces. Such assistance eased considerably the burden of defense spending on the national budget. US military assistance peaked at one time to $US 150M in the 90’s. When the US departed from Clark and Subic in 1991 upon the termination of the MBA, US assistance immediately plummeted to $US 1M annually. The resulting 22
frostiness of RP-­‐US defense relations thawed only in 1999 with the passage of the so-­‐
called RP-­‐US Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). US military assistance thereafter rose to some $US 20M annually and has hovered at this level up to the present. This assistance has gone mostly to the improvement of the AFP to meet the twin internal security threats of communist insurgency and separatism in the South, with hardly anything left to improve AFP external defense capability. RP-­‐US defense relations need adjustment to conform to present-­‐day realities. RP must assert its sovereignty and independence of action in cases where RP and US security interests diverge, especially in situations where involvement with the US would drag RP to war of the US making. The termination of the RP-­‐US MBA was a big step in this direction. One should realize the asymmetrical relationship of the RP-­‐US MDT. RP, understandably, adopts a rather parochial view of the MDT and would prefer to limit its application to Philippine territory. On the other hand, to the US, it is a link in the US global security network of defense arrangements and would want it to also serve US global security interest. It must also be clearly understood by the RP and US that the value of the MDT is the mutual interest being served. At the core of the treaty, where the mutual interests of both parties are congruent, the treaty can be relied upon. But as divergences occur, the treaty becomes less reliable. At this juncture, I would like to pose the question: Where to RP-­‐US defense relations? Figuratively speaking, the Philippines has grown accustomed. Even addicted, to the warm feeling of security of the mantle of US protection that it would feel naked if that mantle was removed. So the answer to the question at this time and for some more time would invariably be status quo, with perhaps a few dissenting. I submit that the issue of the future of RP-­‐US defense relations should be probed. It is now 2008, more than half a century from 1946. The situation has changed. The Philippines has matured as a sovereign independent country. This subject cannot be discussed in this paper. It should be discussed advisably in a closed door forum. On the whole, the MDT has served RP security interest. It should be maintained in the absence of any viable alternative. B. Security Relations with Countries in the Region The country’s security is enhanced by the security cooperation agreements with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Australia and Korea, and in 2006, China. These 23
security arrangements have served our interest. Australia extends to RP training assistance; Korea, military equipment. Our agreements with Indonesia and Malaysia enhance the inter-­‐operability of military forces in protecting the southern border areas from non-­‐traditional threats, as drugs trafficking, smuggling and piracy. Lastly, our security relations promoted confidence building among top defense and security leaders. C. RP Claim to Kalayaan Islands This is explained earlier under the topic of territorial dispute. For security reasons, the military concept of defense of Kalayaan Islands and the operational implementation cannot be discussed in this paper. D. Anti-­‐Terrorism RP efforts are likewise adequate. It supported the UN and worked closely with ASEAN. A tripartite RP-­‐Indonesia-­‐Malaysia agreement on anti-­‐terrorism established a common policy and operational framework. Operational linkages in anti-­‐terrorism have been established between RP and US. E. Strengthening the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) The principal burden of meeting external threats to national security devolves on diplomacy as the first line of defense. Failing in this, the country’s military power will be used as the last resort. The capability of the AFP for defense against traditional external armed threats and some of the non-­‐traditional threats as piracy on the high seas, border intrusions, illegal poaching in Philippine waters and imported terrorism can stand a lot of improvement. The major obstacle to AFP modernization has been the perennial insufficiency of the defense budget. For the last ten years, almost the entire AFP budget has gone to meeting the internal threat of communist insurgency and separatism in the South. Nothing is left for capability against external armed threats. The budget required to provide a modest capability against external armed threat could easily be over P500 billion for a five year program at today’s prices. The bulk would go to the Navy and Air Force. The cost of operating and maintaining these equipment would be huge, over and above the budget for meeting the internal armed threats. Sourcing the major end-­‐items of equipment is not possible under the US military assistance program. Present and foreseeable levels of US assistance are primarily for the maintenance of the AFP capability to meet internal threats with hardly anything left for external threat. 24
The problem of the defense budget is an internal matter for the Philippines. The most that the defense establishment can do is to intensify advocacy for increased defense spending and hope for a giant stride of the economy. That advocacy must contend with the reality that there are other pressing national priorities which compete for limited resources. Prospects in the Strategic Security Environment The following scenario for the next ten years is postulated. Regional Security Situation For the Asia-­‐Pacific region, the paradigm of security equilibrium in the region will continue to be a function of balance of power, US and China. This equilibrium has its inherent fault lines. The US views the modernization of China with serious concern as a threat to regional security and a calculated Chinese move toward regional hegemony and a challenge to US primacy. May hold this view (I disagree, but this would need another paper to discuss). The suspicion is mutual. China views the US military superiority as a threat to its security, necessitating the modernization of the PLA to counterweight the perceived US threat. The US will continue to be a Pacific power well into the future. It is steadfast in its policy that US military power must remain unchallenged. The military supremacy, to remain unchallenged, requires not only technology, but also allies in the region from which to deploy US military forces. The time is still far off when US can deploy military forces directly to the area of combat from the US mainland. Viewed in this light, the US forward deployment line extending from South Korea to Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines and Australia, countries with whom the US has security alliances, is understandable. It also explains the reason for the US functional security strategy in Asia-­‐Pacific of Shape, Prepare and Respond. Under the prevailing equilibrium, the potential threats in the region, especially over the China-­‐Taiwan standoff, will remain as real threats. Potential at this time, the China-­‐Taiwan threat could develop to the threshold of flashpoints and eventually armed conflict. To this day, the US and China have not established organizing principles of their security relationship which Steinbruner pointed out. 25
The China-­‐Taiwan standoff will likely remain below the threshold of flashpoint. High level contacts between the two countries to work out a peaceful resolution will take place. One is scheduled in Beijing soon (CNN). This will diffuse the tension. The North Korean Nuclear dispute will remain manageable and eventually peacefully resolved. Under the combined pressure of China-­‐Russia and US-­‐Japan-­‐Korea, North Korea will compromise. The global energy crisis will put a higher price on US assistance to replace North Korean energy generation capacity that will be lost by the dismantling of its nuclear program. On the other side of the globe, the Iran nuclear dispute erupting into war will not have a significant effect on the regional security except perhaps the disruption of oil supply and a new wave of Iranian terrorism. It can be expected that the Al Qaeda will continue to wage terrorism primarily targeting the US and its allies. Regional terrorism, as the JI, will persist in its efforts in the Philippines. Should the Muslim related conflict in the South come to a final peaceful settlement, it can be expected that internal and imported terrorism will eventually wither on the vine. In conclusion, the regional security environment will continue to be benign. The tension points, China-­‐Taiwan, North-­‐South Korea and the North Korean nuclear dispute will remain below the threshold of flashpoint. The US-­‐China rivalry will be manageable. Terrorism will be coped with by affected countries singly and collectively. The tranquility of the Spratlys will be maintained; the issue of territorial jurisdiction will remain unresolved but will be subdued. Conciliation will increasingly be the preferred mode of settling inter-­‐state disputes. Regional Security Cooperation Recently, the idea of regional security cooperation as a component of an East Asian Community emerged. It is gathering momentum and gaining attention in regional fora. Interestingly, China is at the forefront of its advocacy. Literature on this subject by different authors is found in the compilation of essays by Prof. Aileen Baviera titled Regional Security in East Asia: Challenges to Cooperation and Community Building. These essays provide useful insights. The EAC-­‐cum-­‐RSC is indeed a revolutionary idea. Could it be an alternative to the traditional balance of power in maintaining the regional strategic equilibrium? These are formidable challenges and obstacles. Diversities of history, traditions, ideologies, values and norms, and conflicts of interests among EAC prospective countries need to be harmonized into working relationships. Inter-­‐state disputes have to be resolved. 26
From the security standpoint, the biggest obstacles to the EAC-­‐cum-­‐RSC are the potential conflict points in the region, compounded by the rivalry between China and the US stoked by mutual suspicions which in turn influence reactive security policies and strategies on both sides. In the context of this rivalry, the following questions, among others, need to be asked. a. Is the modernization of the PLA a threat to the region? This is the US view. What is the view of countries in the region? b. What should be the US policy on the China-­‐Taiwan standoff? Should the US continue to underwrite the security of Taiwan? c. Should the US not compromise with its military superiority in order to accommodate China’s military modernization? What could be such compromise if at all possible? d. With respect to the EAC, and in view of the prominence of China in it, will the US not suspect the EAC as China’s soft-­‐approach strategy to undermine the US regional dominance? (Refer to Prof. De Castro’s essay in the compilation of Prof. Baviera.) Will the EAC soften the rivalry? Or on the contrary, sharply polarize it? I am not prepared to answer the foregoing interlocking questions at this time. To me, the desiderata of an EAC-­‐cum-­‐RSC should be: a. Neutrality; non-­‐alignment in power rivalry. b. Related to a., free of defense alliance. c. A binding conflict resolution mechanism. This does not preclude bringing dispute to appropriate bodies of the UN for resolution if the parties concerned mutually agree. d. Commonality of certain values and norms. e. No primus inter pares. f. Non-­‐interference in internal affairs. Are these desiderata utopian? In sum, the EAC-­‐cum-­‐RSC is at this stage visionary. But the vision is worth pursuing. Options Policy Options 27
The policy options presented below are limited to those which are relevant to foreign policy. a. Maintain the present defense relations with the US and retain the RP-­‐US Mutual Defense Treaty as policy insurance in case external threat materializes beyond the capability of the country’s military to cope with. b. Continue to develop our nation capacity to make diplomacy as our first line of defense in meeting threats and challenges to national security, and as a fallback alternative in a post-­‐conflict resolution where possible. c. Strengthen ASEAN security cooperation by institutionalizing peaceful resolution of conflicts and make it binding on the members. In the field of anti-­‐terrorism, we should accelerate the momentum of institutionalizing and improving linkages among the military and police forces of ASEAN countries involved and improve the exchange of intelligence on trans-­‐border terrorism and other trans-­‐border non-­‐traditional threats. d. Continue to support the regime in the SCS area and the Declaration of the parties in the SCS. Maintain surveillance over the Kalayaan Islands. e. Review the AFP modernization program as the principal means of improving the military defense posture, keeping in mind the constraints of resources. Such a review could lead to a reprioritization of national security among an array of other national priorities competing for scarce national resources. Institutional-­‐Structural Options Create a multi-­‐institutional, multi-­‐disciplinary think-­‐tank to study in-­‐depth national security issues and concerns. Such a think-­‐tank could enhance the quality and timeliness of response to challenges and threats to national security. It could also study the EAC-­‐cum-­‐RSC. Relatedly, create a permanent body of the MDT under the Council of Ministers (Secretary of State for the US, Secretary of Foreign Affairs for the RP) and above the RP-­‐
US Mutual Defense Board to provide policy direction and advice to the MDB on matters pertaining to the implementation of the MDB of its mandate which is restricted to purely military matters. Conclusion Of the external challenges and threat, the food and energy crises are of immediate concern. The China-­‐Taiwan standoff, should it erupt into armed conflict in which the US will be involved, is a serious concern. The Philippines could stay out of the fight but it will not be spared from its severe consequences. 28
Al Qaeda terrorism is of minor concern. The most worrisome is the Kalayaan Islands territorial dispute. The Declaration of the Parties in the South China Sea, already non-­‐binding, is but a temporizing palliative. The claimants are unmoving in their claims. There are indications pointing towards the exploration of oil in the SCS.1 Unless an arrangement among the claimants for the exploration and sharing of oil is in place prior to the discovery of oil, the prevailing tranquility in the SCS could turn out to be an illusion. The military option for the Philippines to resolve its claim is absolutely out of the question. Bringing our claim to the UN for resolution requires the agreement of the other parties concerned – they are not inclined. Indeed, for the Philippines, the Kalayaan claim is a perplexity wrapped in a quandary. In facing this challenge, diplomacy is at the front line backstopped by solid national unity at the home front. 1
Tripartite Philippines-China-Vietnam agreement for the conduct of seismic testing in the South China Sea
was reported in the papers. Is the Philippines-China agreement on joint venture in Kalayaan as alleged by
some Senators to exist and connected to the aborted NBN-ZTE contract, and admitted by Malacañang to
exist, also about oil exploration?
29
RTD 2: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The participants of the second roundtable last July 7, 2008 included: 1. Cong. Roilo S. Golez 10. Prof. Raymund Jose Quilop 2. Usec. Feliciano M. Gacis, Jr. (Ret.) 11. Capt. Bayani R. Gaerlan PN 3. Commo. Carlos L. Agustin AFP (Ret.) 12. Lt. Col. George Patrick V. Avila PA 4. Maj. Gen. Ben D. Dolorfino AFP 13. Mr. Julio Amador III 5. Maj. Gen. Gilbert S. Llanto AFP 14. Ms. Tephanie M. Gandia 6. Brig. Gen. Eduardo SL Oban AFP 15. Ms. Mereniza C. Gomez 7. Brig. Gen. Ricardo C. Morales AFP 16. Ms. Angel Ines 8. Dr. Dante Simbulan 17. Ms. Kathline Anne S. Tolosa 9. Prof. Roland Simbulan (To be provided by Prof. Kraft) SUMMARY REPORTS Session 3: External Security Challenges and Threats in the Hierarchy of Philippine National Security Concerns “External Security Challenges and Threats in the Hierarchy of Philippine National Security Concerns” Augusto Francisco Mier
Augusto Francisco Mier stated that although conditions outside the Philippines have rapidly and profoundly changed in the last 60 years since the country’s independence, internal conditions such as rampant corruption, degradation of education standards, and social unrest appear to persist in the country. Therefore, Philippine security policy is hostaged to a pre-­‐Cold War realist perspective that affects national governance and development policies. Thus, while volatile market forces, safety of OFWs, pandemic threats, global warming, regional flashpoints, and international terrorism pose challenges and threats to the Philippines, it is not clear how these external security issues rank vis-­‐à-­‐vis the entire range of the country’s national security concerns, creating the impression that external security challenges and threats are de-­‐emphasized by the government. He argued, however, that the apparent ‘de-­‐emphasis’ of external security concerns by the Philippine government could simply be a case of having to prioritize among equally 30
important and urgent objectives in an environment of crushing scarcity of resources and the relative immaturity of institutions. For Mier, this does not mean that the Philippine government has been neglectful of addressing external security issues. There is also a need to look into and discuss the efforts of other non-­‐uniformed sectors national security community such as the Philippine diplomatic corps in addressing external security concerns that faced the Philippines in the past 60 years. In his view, the de-­‐emphasis of external security and the seeming strong focus on internal security can be attributed to the urgent need of the Philippines to address local problems first before she can help address problems of international concern. Mier stated that the definition of national security has evolved from the traditional pre-­‐
Cold War perspective that equates national security with national defense to the broader concept of national security as an “end-­‐state or condition where the Filipino people’s core values, way of life, institutions, welfare, well-­‐being, and territorial integrity are protected and enhanced.” Mier, moreover, provided an alternative definition of national security based on what distinct human groups do in order to survive and how humankind as a political group evolved through time. This alternative definition is premised on the assumption that the duality of human nature could lead humans either to prosperity or disaster. On one hand, the rational, intelligent, and humane side of people has enabled them to accumulate knowledge and use it to choose best survival arrangements. On the other hand, the animal and irrational side of people has led them to commit atrocities and blunders that became examples of behavior that must be avoided or discarded altogether. Mier said that the core human survival tasks during the stage of the ‘nation-­‐state’ include national development, national security, and national governance. Mier said that national security is an activity which represents one of several primal urges that allows humans to survive in the world. It is a task that humans carry out to ensure that other core survival tasks can also be undertaken successfully. Thus, when complemented by the successful execution of other human survival tasks, it becomes effective and is improved further. National security is the protection and enhancement of the nation’s capability to create wealth and value and share these among members of the nation in a way that motivates toward more innovative and legitimate wealth/value creation; to administer, manage and lead all social institutions in support of other survival tasks; and to protect and enhance security assets and capabilities. Mier concluded that despite the evolution and expansion of our understanding of national security in the last 60 years, our behavior as a nation has not changed in line with our understanding. National security is not only addressing challenges and threats and taking advantage of opportunities in the environment but also working out the internal conditions and relationships that will improve the Philippines’ overall quality of survival through time and protect her capacity to carry out her survival tasks. Thus, the ability of the Philippines to address external security issues depends on the quality of 31
her national security apparatus, which in turn depends on the quality of the nation’s development and governance. The viability of the Philippine State depends on the support of the business and civil society sectors. This support depends on the quality of trust among these sectors. Session 4: Philippines’ Archipelagic Character, Military Resources and Capabilities: Impact on Philippine External Security “The Philippine National Territory” Ambassador Lauro Baja Ambassador Lauro Baja stated that based on the 1935, 1973, and 1987 constitutions of the Philippines, the country’s national territory has three categories: (1) the Philippine archipelago; (2) other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction; and (3) the Philippine waters, airspace and submarine areas. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides a broader definition of Philippine national territory. For instance, Part IV of the Convention which deals with archipelagic states provides that the various islands of the Philippines as well as all waters between them are no longer regarded as separate units. Instead, the Philippines as an archipelagic state has sovereignty over those islands and all surrounding archipelagic waters. The Philippines also has sovereignty over the airspace above the archipelagic waters and the seabed and subsoil below them as well as living and nonliving resources. Another very important concept in the Convention that affects Philippine national territory in Baja’s view is the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In archipelagic states, EEZ is a belt around the archipelago with more than 200 nautical miles wide, measured from the archipelagic baselines. The Philippines has certain rights in this exclusive economic zone namely (1) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing living and nonliving natural resources of the waters and the seabed and deep subsoil; and (2) jurisdiction with regard to the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures for marine scientific research and protection and preservation of the marine environment. The Convention also provides solutions in cases of overlapping boundaries in the territorial sea, EEZ, and the continental shelf. With regard to the drawing of baselines to include the Kalayaan Island Group, Baja expressed his belief that it will not violate the UNCLOS as long as the Philippines does not exceed the maximum length of the lines. The Philippines has every logical reason to draw baselines that will include KIG. Since the Philippines has established a military garrison and local civil units in KIG, she therefore 32
exercises effective jurisdiction over the islands. The islands are considered part and parcel of the Republic of the Philippines by virtue of Presidential Decree 1596 of 1978 which was registered with the UN Secretariat on May 14, 1980. Baja said that the KIG is the most strategic in the country’s exclusive economic zone in terms of food, energy, navigation, trade and security. In Baja’s view, the Kalayaan Island Group in particular and the drawing of baselines in general as well as the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) are current challenges to Philippine diplomacy. Baja concluded that there is an urgent need for the Philippines to draw her baselines as an archipelagic state and hence measure the extent of her continental shelf. DISCUSSION (inaudible) 33
External Security Challenges and Threats in the Hierarchy of Philippine National Security Concerns Augusto Francisco J. Mier Introductory Remarks A pleasant morning to everyone, and let me thank the UP Asian Center for hosting this Round Table Discussion and inviting me to talk about “External Security Challenges and Threats in the Hierarchy of National Security Concerns”. When I received the invitation letter to present this paper and saw the proposed title, I initially thought we were just being asked to enumerate the external security challenges and threats of the Philippines from the viewpoint of the NSC, and to rank them vis-­‐à-­‐vis the entire range of our national security concerns. It was a fortunate thing that I attended the first Roundtable Discussion, and it was even better when I got the Synthesis of Discussions of that exercise. The Synthesis of Discussions helped a lot by showing me that there seems to be a standing impression among the academic and non-­‐academic participants in the first RTD that: 1. The Philippine government has de-­‐emphasized external security in favor of internal security concerns; 2. The national security paradigm of the Philippines has remained pretty much within the 19th century realist perspective and this has influenced the way Philippine security policy is being formulated and executed; 3. The colonial nature of Philippine politics has something to do with government’s emphasis on internal security, and is also the reason for the existence of social unrest in the form of insurgencies; 4. The US decides what external security threat the Philippines will choose to address; and 5. The Philippines will not be able to address its external security concerns alone and so has to turn to bilateral and multilateral alliances and relations – ASEAN/ARF, US, etc. – for help. The last paragraph of the Synthesis was particularly helpful in designing my presentation framework, especially the three questions on the nature of national security: What is security to the Philippines? Or what is security to the Filipino people? In the end, who is supposed to be the provider of security? What kinds of policies could then be 34
undertaken to address these new security issues? These questions bring to the fore the need to come up with an understanding of national security that is based on universal truths that can be tested by anyone and accepted across ideologies and belief systems To my mind, these impressions raise another set of questions that must also be addressed by my presentation: What are the external security challenges and threats to the Philippines? How do these challenges and threats rank in the range of national security concerns being addressed by the Philippine government? Why is the Philippine government focused on internal security concerns/issues? What the heck is national security anyway and who should provide it? If external security concerns were de-­‐
emphasized, what were emphasized instead? Internal security concerns? If so, why? I do hope what I’ll discuss with you today can clarify or confirm some, if not all, of the relevant issues on national security raised during the First RTD. Before I proceed, allow me to make the standard disclaimer that the views and opinions I will express in this forum are entirely my own and do not represent those of the National Security Council. At this point, let me start answering the questions that need to be answered by this presentation. External vs. Internal Security Concerns Let me refer back to the Synthesis of Discussions whose Paragraph 4 talks about what it considers as emerging new issues such as “climate change, toxic waste dumping, the depletion of marine resources, illegal drugs, and human trafficking …” These are said to reflect the reality of the rise of “new nations … and new actors …” which are said to have “influenced norm-­‐setting agenda in the international relations”. Another perspective can be provided by an environmental scan of conditions in and around the Philippines since the grant of its independence some sixty years ago (see below). One interpretation of the information presented by the slide is the assessment that while conditions outside the Philippines rapidly and profoundly change, internal conditions appear to be in a state of suspended animation. This corroborates the impression in the Synthesis that security policy in the country is hostage to a pre-­‐Cold War realist paradigm. But more is revealed: that it is not only security policy that is affected, but national governance and development policies as well, which are all compromised by what we can describe as 18th century behavioral pattern still obtaining in the Philippine political-­‐economy. 35
In the last 60 years… External Environment n Cold war ended n Technology advanced n Global interdependence expanded as emerging economies needed more & more raw materials/resources n Asymmetric threat groups became sophisticated & attacked n Environmental degradation intensified & pandemics threaten whole regions n Global oil price spiked n Threat of food scarcity arose Internal Environment n In the Philippines, social order remained feudal n Non-­‐state interest groups remained strong n The Philippine State remained weak and divided n The political system remained dysfunctional n Bureaucratic red tape prevented quick infrastructure development n Economic productivity remained low vis-­‐à-­‐vis those of neighbors n Yet, pockets of excellence in certain areas in the country & sectors of society The summary below identifies the national security concerns arising from conditions in and around the Philippines. The slide somehow reflects the ranking of concerns that I made based on my observation on the allocation of time, energy and meager resources of the NSC. These rankings are not fixed but change through time. For instance, the ranking under Local Concerns was not like this three to five years ago. Three to five years ago, social unrest and terrorism would be at the top of the list. National Security Concerns
Local Concerns
Broader
Concerns
n Political culture
– Rampant corruption, rent n Volatile market forces
–
Energy
price
&
supply
seeking;
n Political system
– Food security
n
Safety
of
OFWs
abroad
– Institutional, policy &
n Pandemic threats
regulatory capture
n Global warming
– Institutional, leadership &
n Regional flashpoints
program discontinuities
– China-Taiwan
n Degradation of education
standards
– North Korea
n
Social unrest
– South China Sea disputes
n International terrorists
– Destabilization
36
– Insurgency, Separatism
n Local terrorists
The layout of the summary does not give any hint as to where external security issues are in the hierarchy of national security concerns. This seems to suggest they are co-­‐
equal in importance. Yet the impression expressed in the Synthesis – that external security challenges and threats are de-­‐emphasized by the government – do have a basis, but not in any malicious or perverse attitude of government officials and/or institutions. Any human group, especially self-­‐respecting nations, generally desire to be perceived and to actually be strong, productive members of the larger community of nations. This is not achieved through mere public relations work nor media promotions alone. The ability to address effectively and expeditiously external security challenges and threats depend much on the quality of political-­‐economic conditions in the country. For instance, what the Synthesis of Discussions lament in the second half of its third paragraph as the ‘lack of leverage’ that ‘limits the ability of the country to maneuver diplomatically’ can be attributed to the ‘lack of capacity’ of key national security institutions to do their mandated jobs effectively as pointed out in the upper half of the same paragraph. From this perspective, the apparent ‘de-­‐emphasis’ of external security concerns by the Philippine government could simply be a case of having to prioritize among equally important and urgent objectives in an environment of crushing scarcity of resources and the relative immaturity of institutions. This does not mean that the Philippine government has been remiss on addressing external security issues. What the discussions in the first RTD seems to have missed as reflected in its Synthesis of Discussions are efforts of other non-­‐uniformed sectors national security community (e.g., the Philippine diplomatic corps) in addressing external security concerns that faced the Philippines in the past 60 years. Why then the strong impression on the de-­‐emphasis of external security and the seeming strong focus on internal security? Why does internal security appear more important at this juncture than external security issues? A short answer is that the Philippines simply needs to put its house in order first before it can help address problems in the neighborhood. This insight has been repeated time and again in earlier administrations, and any President who attempts to put the Philippine house in order through reforms are either trumped by a statutorily short term of office or resisted tooth and nails by special interest groups. This diagram below shows the extent of the mess our political-­‐economy is in right now that needs to be resolutely addressed by the entire Filipino national community. It will be interesting to note that Secretary (Romulo) Neri has been discussing the issues reflected in this diagram as early as the Ramos Administration. More interesting is the fact that members of President Ramos’ national security team have discussed the issues reflected in the same diagram as early as the Marcos Administration and attempted to address some of them during the first years of the Martial Law period. 37
What the heck is national security? Let me now proceed to the final section of this presentation, which is a discussion on the nature of national security. My treatment of this subject will hopefully answer the corollary question of who it is that should provide national security. Our current definition of national security is already broader than the traditional pre-­‐
Cold War perspective that equates national security with national defense. Yet somehow, we in NSC felt the need to continue searching for and attempting to grasp the meaning and significance of national security. I encountered the current definition of national security when I joined NSC in 1989 during the Aquino Administration. Under the Ramos Administration, the definition was elaborated on – let’s say ‘enhanced’ – with the seven elements or objectives of Philippine security, the three pre-­‐
conditions and the two strategies toward NIC-­‐hood under one vision called ‘Philippines 2000!!!’ 38
The Estrada Administration decided to focus on people empowerment – promoted as ‘Erap para sa Mahirap’ and packaged under the ‘Angat Pinoy sa 2004’ vision. After the Arroyo Administration’s assumption to power, there was little time to pursue officially (i.e., as part of our assigned research agenda) any further conceptual development of the national security concept. This is in view of the fact that the government was wracked and hammered from many sides by threat groups and the vicissitudes of our society’s political dynamics. Although challenges and pressures against the Arroyo Administration mounted during its second term, a small band of knowledge workers in the NSC Secretariat used what little time was left in between the National Security community’s major fire fighting efforts to arrive at a new and hopefully more profound and useful understanding of the nature of national security. This alternative understanding of national security is based on the study of what distinct human groups as well as the entire human race itself did in order to survive in the world through time. It is also based on how human groups, as political entities, evolved since homo sapiens appeared on earth. It is premised on the assumption about the duality of human nature that could lead humans either to prosperity or to disaster. It pins the hope on the intelligent and humane side of people that can choose arrangements that allow them to live comfortably but not at the expense of other human groups, attain the fullness of every person’s physical and spiritual development, and survive on a sustained basis without straining the ecosystem around them. Europe has been an example of a human group’s survival toward a status we now call “first world”. It is a status that other regions in the world are trying to emulate and attain. Yet, the value of using Europe as an example is to show that attainment of a first world status entails much cost and sacrifice. It also takes a long long time to happen. The length of time from the first stirrings of initially imperfect democratic rule in Greece to the signing of the Charter creating the European Community took several thousands of years of inter-­‐group conflict and warfare for territory, raw materials and resources needed for group survival. Previously we said that the basis for our alternative concept of national security are the activities undertaken by human individuals and human groups alike in order to survive, and how they evolved through time as political entities. Here, we tackle first what human groups do in order to survive. 39
There are two general sets of activities every human group does in order to survive: to cooperate and/or compete with each other. The more important of these is cooperation which in turn has three very important sets of tasks directly linked to human survival. These core survival tasks are first, creation and sharing of value and wealth within the group. Like nutrition for the human body, value and wealth serve not only to sustain the group but more importantly allows it to grow and attain higher levels of social maturity through time. Another core survival task is protecting and enhancing the group’s capacity to create wealth, the assets generated from wealth and value creation, as well as all other tasks in support of wealth creation. The last core human survival task bears all the elements of administration, management and leadership needed to guide and support the two other survival tasks. To make our discussion about the core human survival tasks easy, we assigned simple and tentative labels on each one of them. For value and wealth creation and sharing, we assigned the label ‘Development.’ For protection and enhancement of the other survival tasks, we assign the label ‘Security.’ For administration and management of support for the other two survival tasks, we assign the label ‘Governance’. In NSC, we have qualified the labels further to show that the survival tasks refer to those of a specific evolutionary stage of human race as a political entity – the stage of the ‘Nation-­‐state’, thus value and wealth creation becomes ‘National Development’, the protection and enhancement of other core human survival tasks becomes ‘National Security’, and finally management and leadership over support activities for the other two survival tasks becomes ‘National Governance’. Going now to the second basis for our alternative concept of national security, I would like to attempt to summarize the evolution of human groups as political entities. Please note that the table tries to show how each stage of humankind’s political evolution undertook the core human survival tasks and by what means. STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT EVOLUTION GOVERNANCE FAMILY 100,000 ago Control by Head of Strong Man Protection Family yrs Foraging & Hunting SECURITY CLAN/TRIBE 40,000 yrs ago Foraging, Hunting & Control by Head of ‘Champions,’ Domestication Clan/Tribe Mercenaries & Slaves VILLAGE 7,000 yrs ago Basic Agricultural Village Head & Council production & trade 40
Volunteers, Slaves & Mercenaries CITY & EMPIRE 2,500 yrs ago Agricultural Production & Trade NATION STATE 1800 – present Professional Agricultural, Industrial Political Leaders & Soldiers/Police & Services/Trade Bureaucracy & Enforcers SUPRA-­‐NATION STATE 1950 -­‐ present Agro-­‐industrial Services/Trade GLOBAL STATE 2000 -­‐ present ? City Head & Council Volunteers, Slaves & Mercenaries Professional & Political Leaders & Soldiers/Police Bureaucracy & Enforcers World Government? ? Idealist Perspective on Human Survival This table presents how the core human survival tasks themselves evolved along with the human political groups. The caption on ‘idealist Perspective’ expresses one side of the duality of human nature. This is balanced by the following table. STAGES EVOLUTION OF DEVELOPMENT GOVERNANCE SECURITY FAMILY 100,000 yrs ago Brutal attack by Pillage, raids, control Control by Head of strong man/men of of territory; etc. Family the group CLAN/TRIBE 40,000 yrs ago Brutal attack by Raids, rustling, Control by Head of strong man/men of control of territory Clan/Tribe the group VILLAGE 7,000 yrs ago Conquest; enslavement peoples; CITY & EMPIRE 2,500 yrs ago Conquest; enslavement peoples; NATION STATE 1800 – present Conquest; annexation; Enforcement Political Leaders & Professional Bureaucracy Soldiers/Police SUPRA-­‐NATION STATE Control of markets Political Leaders & Enforcement by Bureaucracy market sectors & Village of Council Head & of City Head & Council 41
Terrorism by Volunteers, Slaves & Mercenaries Terrorism by Volunteers, Slaves & Mercenaries by 1950 -­‐ present GLOBAL STATE 2000 -­‐ present industrial forces ? World Domination? ? Realist Perspective on Human Survival The table above which presents the unsavory side of human survival, where for instance, human groups with more advance warfare technology discovered they can create wealth and become very rich by dispossessing weaker groups of their properties, food supply or territory. It is said that the Age of Enlightenment begot the Industrial revolution that represents the flowering of human ingenuity through technology. This period, however, also produced the nation-­‐states which rapidly started taking over the political roles of monarchies and city-­‐states throughout the world. A series of fateful and historic events during this period also produced lessons on human survival that led to the formation of the first functioning supra-­‐national entity in the world. World War-­‐I, World War-­‐II, and the Cold War and the conditions that led to these conflicts all resulted in the accumulation of principles and the deepening of understanding about the best way for humankind to survive in the world. In the process, some approaches to human survival were discarded while others were accepted for further testing. Despite the dark view that some people might have about the history of the Philippines during this period, it cannot be denied that Filipinos have become what they are in view of inputs from other cultures in the past as well as to this very day. This rather elaborate discussion on human evolution and survival tasks will already provide us the elements of a deeper understanding about national security. One important insight here is the reality that national security is one of several fundamental human survival tasks that continues to evolve through time. It complements other core human survival tasks. The material we have could also be fashioned into a new but very raw definition of national security. National security can be: • an activity representing one of several primal urges that allow human groups to survive in the world; 42
•
•
•
a task that human groups undertake to ensure other core survival tasks can also be undertaken successfully; a task that becomes effective and further improves when complemented by the successful execution of other human survival tasks. the protection and enhancement of the nation’s capacity to o create wealth and value, and share these among members of the nation in a way that motivates toward more innovative and legitimate wealth/value creation; o administer, manage and lead all social institutions in support of other survival tasks; o protect and enhance security assets & capabilities. The table below is an attempt to answer the question “who is suppose to provide security?” For a Philippines that aspires to become a first world democracy, security will be the responsibility of all citizens although the assignments may differ from one citizen to another. Democratic Private, entrepreneurial 1 and/or DEVELOPMENT business class; civil society Authoritarian Totalitarian State-­‐selected members from private, State entrepreneurial and/or business class 2 SECURITY State actively supported by civil society and the State entrepreneurial and/or business class State 3 GOVERNANCE State; civil society & business State sectors as fiscalizers State Eg US, Japan North Korea Singapore 43
Concluding Remarks In the last 60 years, our understanding of national security evolved and expanded. However, our behavior as a nation has not changed in step with our understanding. Even our ‘model’ for a social order – the US – has experienced a reversal in its application of lessons of human interaction. 44
The Philippine National Territory* Ambassador Lauro Baja The subject is important as it is relevant. It is important to have an inventory of what we hold in common and know what we are and where we are as a nation. Knowing the metes and bounds of our national territory gives the nation a sense of self, and would help the Government and other countries especially in cases where there would be negotiations on overlapping maritime regimes. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS The 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions of the Philippines contain provisions on the national territory. Under the 1935 constitution, the Philippines comprises all territory ceded to the United States by the Treaty of Paris concluded between the US and Spain on December 10, 1898, the limits of which are set forth in Article III of said treaty, together with all the islands embraced in the treaty concluded at Washington between US and Spain on November 7, 1900 and in the treaty concluded between the US and Spain on January 2, 1930, and all territory over which the present Government of the Philippines Islands exercises jurisdiction. The 1935 constitution is a colonial constitution, approved by the President of the United States on March 23, 1935. Under the 1973 constitution, the national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all the other territories belonging to the Philippines by historic right or legal title, including the territorial sea, the airspace, the subsoil, the seabed, the insular shelves, and the other submarine areas over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction. The waters around, between and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. * Ambassador Baja initially delivered this paper during the Third Distinguished Lecture
organized by the Philippine Judicial Academy of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on
June 27, 2008 at the Far Eastern University (FEU) Auditorium. 45
The 1987 constitution provides that the national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its territorial, fluvial and aerial domains including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves and other submarine areas. The waters around, between and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. No reference is made to the Treaty of Paris and related treaties in the 1973 and 1987 constitutions. The Philippine territory thus falls into 3 groupings: (1) the Philippine archipelago, (2) other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, (3) the Philippine waters, airspace and submarine areas. The Philippine National Territory and UNCLOS No international agreement has greater impact on Philippine National Territory than the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). After three years of preparatory committee work and nine years of sessions of the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS was adopted on April 30, 1982. It was opened for signature at Montego Bay, Jamaica, where 119 States signed on December 10, 1982 the Convention, including the Philippines. The Convention entered into force on November 16, 1994, more than 12 years after its adoption. The Convention represents the codification and the comprehensive and progressive development of the international law of the sea. It is generally considered by the international community as the accepted legal norm for maritime conduct, a “constitution for the oceans” governing all ocean areas, exploitation of ocean resources and the protection of the marine environment. The Philippines ratified the Convention on February 27, 1984. The UNCLOS establishes zones of national jurisdiction. There are seven types of waters with varying regimes recognized under the Convention, namely (1) internal or domestic, (2) archipelagic, (3) territorial sea, (4) contiguous zones, (5) 200-­‐mile exclusive economic zone, (6) straits used for international navigation, and (7) high seas. There are certain aspects of the Convention which directly affect the Philippines. The first and foremost is Part IV of the Convention dealing with archipelagic states. The Philippines is the pioneer proponent of the archipelagic principle in the international forum. In the first UN Conference on Law of the Sea in 1958 and the Second Conference in 1960, the Philippine delegation tried to push through the archipelagic principle, but in both conferences, the principle failed of adoption. The third UN Conference finally incorporated the principle in to the Convention. 46
ARCHIPELAGIC STATE The Convention established the legal concept of the archipelago as an integrated unit in which the islands, waters and other natural features form an integral, geographical, economic and political entity. Before Part IV of the Convention, the Philippines was in legal effect, dismembered, since international law recognized only a 3-­‐mile territorial sea around every island so that in many parts of the Philippines, the waters between the islands beyond 3 miles from the shore of the opposite island were regarded as open sea or international waters. With Part IV of the Convention, no longer will the various islands of the Philippines be regarded as separate units, each with each own maritime areas and waters between them as distinct from the land territory. The archipelagic state, like the Philippines, is permitted to draw baselines around the archipelago, connecting the outermost points of the outermost islands. All waters within the baselines, designated as archipelagic waters, are under the sovereignty of the archipelagic state regardless of their width and dimension. This national sovereignty exists also with respect to the airspace above the archipelagic waters and to the seabed and subsoil below them and to all the resources living on nonliving. Let me take up the matter of the Philippine maritime limits set by the Treaty of Paris and related treaties as they are affected by UNCLOS. We have a wider territorial sea were under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties. Even the US expressly opposed our claim, saying that Spain has ceded to the US only the islands, inside the described limits in the treaty and not the waters. The US contends that when she was exercising sovereignty in the Philippines, she limited herself for 3 miles around every island. Even Indonesia, also an archipelago, refused to support our claim to this “historic waters”. The Philippine delegation to UNCLOS thus opted for acceptance of the Convention because we believed that the Convention as a whole would be more beneficial to the Filipino people. We have in mind the recognition of the archipelago principle and the provisions of the exclusive economic zone. This option was endorsed by the different groups subgroups created by the Cabinet Committee on the Law of the Sea which was tasked to study the Convention prior to the Philippine ratification. THE PHILIPPINES AND THE EEZ The exclusive economic zone is one of the new concepts in the Convention, as an additional maritime area of states. In archipelagic states, it is a belt around the archipelago with more than 200 nautical miles wide, measured from the archipelagic baselines. The Philippines, has certain rights in this exclusive economic zone; namely (1) 47
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources whether living or nonliving of the waters and the seabed and deep subsoil; (2) jurisdiction with regard to the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures for marine scientific research and protection and preservation of the marine environment. The exclusive economic zone of the Philippines measures about 395,400 square nautical miles. The area that we have been claiming as our historic territorial sea extending to the limits of the Treaty of Paris measures 263,300 square nautical miles. The EEZ, therefore, is bigger than the territorial sea by 132,100 square nautical miles which is equivalent to about 45 million hectares where the Philippines will be entitled to all the resources. Moreover, with the adoption of the archipelagic principle, the Philippines gained 141,800 square nautical miles, inside the baselines or a total gain of 93 million hectares. It is also important to note that the Philippine Declaration on the signing of the Convention on the Law of the Sea where the country manifests. 1. The signing of the Convention by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall not in any manner impair or prejudice the sovereign rights of the Republic of the Philippines under and arising from the Constitution of the Philippines; 2. Such signing shall not in any manner affect the sovereign rights of the Republic of the Philippines as successor of the United States of America, under and arising out of the Treaty of Paris between Spain and the United States of America of December 10, 1898, and the Treaty of Washington between the United States of America and Great Britain of January 2, 1930; 3. Such signing shall not diminish or in any matter affect the rights and obligations of the contracting parties under the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Philippines and the United States of America of August 30, 1951, and its related interpretative instrument; nor those under any pertinent bilateral or multilateral treaty or agreement to which the Philippines is a party; 4. Such signing shall not in any manner impair or prejudice the sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines over any territory over which it exercises sovereign authority, such as the Kalayaan Islands, and the water appurtenant thereto; 5. The Convention shall not be construed as amending in any matter any pertinent laws and Presidential Decrees or Proclamations of the Republic of the Philippines; the Government of the Republic of the Philippines maintains and reserves the right and authority to make any amendments to such laws, decrees or proclamations pursuant to the provisions of the Philippine Constitution; 48
6. The provisions of the Convention on archipelagic passage through sea lanes and do not deprive it of authority to enact legislation to protect its sovereignty, independence, and security; 7. The concept of archipelagic waters is similar to the concept of internal waters under the Constitution of the Philippines, and remove straits connecting these waters with the economic zone or high sea from the rights of foreign vessels to transit passage for international navigation; 8. The agreement of the Republic of the Philippines to the submission for peaceful resolution, under any of the procedures provided in the Convention, of disputes under Article 298 shall not be considered as a derogation of Philippine sovereignty. The Declaration was made under Article 310 of the Convention which allows 3 categories of declarations, namely 1) general declarations, 2) interpretative declarations, and 3) declarations relating to settlement of disputes. According to the late Senator Arturo Tolentino, who headed the Philippine Delegation in all 3 UN conferences on the law of the sea, we filed this declaration to give notice to other countries signing the Convention that we have claims which may not be completely in harmony with the provision of the Convention in relation to our domestic legislation. The Declaration was circulated to all states which participated in the drafting of the Convention. Concerns have been expressed on the nature of archipelagic waters in relation to our internal waters. The sovereignty over archipelagic waters is subject to two kinds of passage by foreign ships: First, innocent passage and second, archipelagic sealanes passage. Innocent passage is well known in international law. It is passage that is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security. Archipelagic sealanes passages means continuous and expeditious and unobtrusive navigation or overflight through and above sealanes that must be established by the archipelagic state between one part of the high seas or EEZ and another part of the high seas or EEZ. Archipelagic sealanes passage must be distinguished from transit passage envisioned in straits used for international navigation. The latter is imposed by the Convention; archipelagic sealanes passages can be exercised only on such sealanes that the archipelagic state would want to designate and establish. Our straits are entirely within our archipelagic waters and therefore cannot be said to be connecting an EEZ or high seas with another part of the high seas or EEZ. 49
It is also important to note that the Convention provides for solutions in case of overlapping boundaries in the territorial sea, EEZ, and the continental shelf. In the case of the territorial seas that overlap, a median line shall be drawn and each party gets one-­‐half of the overlapping area. In the case of overlapping EEZ and continental shelf, the issue of overlap will be effected by agreement among the parties concerned. Failing agreement, the parties should resort to the settlement of disputes provision of the Convention. BASELINES The importance of drawing baselines cannot be overemphasized. It is from these baselines that the regime of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and to a certain degree the continental shelf is measured. The Philippines has its own baselines law. Republic Act No. 3046 and Republic Act No. 5446. They are not going to be disturbed at all but we may have to amend existing baselines which do not conform with the requirements of the Convention. The longest baseline can only be 100 nautical miles with some exception that would extend to 125 nautical miles, provided they do not exceed three percent of the total number of baselines. Therefore we have to adjust or do some installations to our baselines which exceed 100 miles. Our law cannot be automatically modified or repealed by the Convention. They can be modified or repealed only by our own domestic laws which we reserve the right to pass. KALAYAAN GROUP OF ISLANDS Will the drawing of baselines to include the Kalayaan group violate the UNCLOS? The Philippine Delegation believes that it will not as long as we do not exceed the maximum length of the lines. The lines do not have to be drawn from large islands as long as they are kept above the level of the water. These islands can be used as point for drawing baselines. The Philippines has every logical reasons to draw baselines that will include KIG. The Philippines exercises effective jurisdiction over it considering the establishment of a military garrison and local civil units there. The islands are considered part and parcel of the Republic of the Philippines by virtue of Presidential Decree 1596 of 1978. The Decree was registered with the UN Secretariat on May 14, 1980. The Kalayaan Island Group is part of the Spratly Group of Islands. As we know, China, Taiwan and Vietnam claim the entire Spratlys. All claimants except Brunei, occupy 50
parts of the Spratlys. Kalayaan is a 5th class municipality of Palawan composed of 7 island namely: 1) Pag-­‐asa -­‐ 32.2 hectares 2) Likas -­‐ 18.6 hectares 3) Parola -­‐ 12.7 hectares 4) Lawak -­‐ 7.9 hectares 5) Kota -­‐ 6.45 hectares 6) Patag -­‐ 0.52 hectares 7) Panota -­‐ 0.44 hectares The KIG adds to the Philippines exclusive economic zone an area of 360,850 square nautical miles. That the Spratlys group of islands, to which the Kalayaan Island Group is a part, are claimed by other countries should reinforce rather than deter our determination to include the Kalayaan in drawing our baselines. The KIG is the most strategic in our exclusive economic zone significant in terms of food, energy, navigation, trade and security. It is our national heritage as the book edited by Porfirio Aliño and Christine Quibilan aptly describes in details the dynamics of the islands. We must formulate policies and adopt measures which will not diminish that heritage. To exclude Kalayaan and just say we are not abandoning our claim to the islands is empty rhetoric and does violence to common sense. An unlikely diplomatic fallout by including KIG in our baselines should not unduly worry the Philippines. Nor should we entertain the bogy of war erupting over this issue. Notes verbale and aide memoires are SOP noises, in international relations, especially among claimant countries. We should be doing the same. In foreign relations, silence is not golden all the time. Let us note that the signals which come from outside which gave the leadership of the country feet of clay in drawing our baselines are mere talking points, if reports are accurate. Kalayaan and baselines are current challenges to Philippine diplomacy. The DFA should restore and renew being primus inter pares on foreign policy issues and be confident, consistent and committed in its advocacies of policies. There is a time for niceties and politesse and a time to be pro-­‐active, forceful and aggressive in international relations. To be timid and pursue a serendipitous approach on Kalayaan and baselines can be perfect diplomatic storm of irrelevance for the Department. There is no greater tragedy for an institution than to find itself, too late, that it has become irrelevant because of inaction and or timidity. These thoughts should apply to our attitude towards the Tripartite Agreement, the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU). The issue is sub judice. It is, however, 51
relevant to note that the area of JMSU fall within our EEZ; that seismic activities are precursors of exploration and exploitation of natural resources; that the undertakings were signed by the oil authorities of the 3 countries and that if reports are true, one of the parties objected to let the undertaking lapse after 3 years. Previous attempts at joint exploration and development of the South China Sea failed because of no agreement on where it will be held. Let me just state that we may have unwittingly allowed ourselves to be led back to the status where we were before we negotiated the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. ASEAN, led by the Philippines, has always taken pride in convincing China to discuss with ASEAN as group the South China Sea as a regional and international issue instead of a bilateral issue among claimant countries. JMSU may have put us back to square one. The Philippines may have unwittingly contributed to ASEAN again being sucked in the vortex of irrelevane. BACK TO THE FUTURE It is urgent for the Philippines in so far as the metes and bounds of its national territory is concerned to draw its baselines as an archipelagic state and consequently measure the extent of our continental shelf, bearing in mind the deadline on May 13, 2009. The continental shelf comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine area beyond the territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured when the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance. Time is of the essence for us to submit our claim to our continental shelf as a natural prolongation of our land territory. The proposal for a congressional commission on national territory which would be given until December 31 to submit a report on national territory may be a bit late. Information and technical description on the limits of our continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles (which we are claiming) should be submitted to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Considering the process involved, a submission by the Philippines even 3 months before its deadline may preempt favorable consideration. It is also too late in the day to debate whether we should be an archipelagic state or not, unless we intend to denounce UNCLOS. It would be unrealistic to hope for a perfect definition of the national territory in the sense that it will be acceptable by all. National governments invariably decide paramount issues not on idealistic considerations but on practical realities on the ground. The Philippines should be unyielding insofar as national interests are concerned. That is what the Philippine Delegation to UNCLOS did and that is what the Government should do insofar as the metes and bounds of our territory are concerned. 52
In the life of all nations, there come moments that decide the direction of a country and reveal the character of its people. We are now of that moment. We bind the future by what we do or fail to do in the present. I believe that the learned men and women of the Philippine Judicial Academy can extricate the leadership of the country from the present policy blindspot on baselines and the continental shelf and rescue its leaders from inertia and inaction. This should promote national ocean consciousness and would be a great oblation to stability and security. It is time to give in to reason. 53