TABLE OF CONTENTS
Part
Title
Pages
4
1
INTRODUCTION
2
METHODOLOGY
6
3
THE COMPLAINANT
10
4
PARTICULARS OF
COMPLAINT
10
5
CRIMINAL ALLEGATIONS
11
6
MISCONDUCT
ALLEGATIONS
12
-
12
13
13
14
15
15
16
16
17
17
OFFICER A
OFFICER B
OFFICER C
OFFICER D
OFFICER E
OFFICER F
OFFICER G
OFFICER H
OFFICER I
OFFICER J
7
CHRONOLOGY OF KEY
EVENTS
8
SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE,
CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
19
25
1
COMPLAINT REGARDING
THE INTERPRETER
SERVICE
(COMPLAINT 1)
9
25
COMPLAINT REGARDING
CCTV MONITORING
(COMPLAINT 2)
27
ALLEGATION
REGARDING PNC
29
COMPLAINT REGARDING
HANDOVER AND
CONTINUED
SUPERVISION AND
STANDARD OF
INVESTIGATION
(COMPLAINT 3)
31
COMPLAINT REGARDING
WETHERSPOONS
(COMPLAINT 4)
41
COMPLAINT REGARDING
TRAFFIC STOP
(COMPLAINT 5)
48
COMPLAINT REGARDING
PHOTOGRAPHS OF
INJURIES
(COMPLAINT 6)
55
ALLEGATION
REGARDING RESPONSE
OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
UNIT
63
COMPLAINT REGARDING
POOR STANDARD OF
INVESTIGATION
(COMPLAINT 7)
73
SUMMARY OF
COMPLAINT AND
MISCONDUCT/DISCIPLINE
RECOMMENDATIONS
76
2
10
PRACTICE AND
ORGANISATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
78
11
SUMMARY OF PRACTICE
AND ORGANISATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
RECOMMENDATIONS
84
12
CONCLUDING
OBSERVATIONS
88
3
INTRODUCTION
Hayley Jane RICHARDS (“Hayley”) was murdered on Saturday 11
June 2005. Her body was discovered by Wiltshire Constabulary
officers at her home at 17 Carders Corner, Trowbridge, Wiltshire
on Saturday 11 June 2005.
Hugo QUINTAS, a Portuguese national who was her recently
separated boyfriend, was convicted of her murder on 29 March
2006 following a lengthy trial at Bristol Crown Court. He was
sentenced to life imprisonment with a recommended minimum
tariff of 17 years. At the same time he was sentenced to three
years imprisonment for an offence of actual bodily harm on Hayley
- the matter central to this investigation - to which he had pleaded
guilty.
On the previous Sunday 5 June 2005 Hayley had reported to
Wiltshire Constabulary via a 999 call, an assault upon herself and
threats to kill made by Mr QUINTAS at her home.
OFFICER A attended Hayley’s home in response to her call and a
nine page statement, detailing the events, was recorded.
A Domestic Violence referral form (DV1) was also completed
detailing the assault as an “ABH [ an assault occasioning actual
bodily harm] and Threat to Kill”, and it was noted for an “immediate
response” from the Force Domestic Violence Unit. Hayley was
then taken to hospital by OFFICER A for a check up, as she was
approximately 12 weeks pregnant.
A Wiltshire Constabulary investigation began to trace Mr QUINTAS
with a view to his arrest for the assault.
On the night of Sunday 5 June 2005, the investigating officer,
OFFICER A, made early enquiries regarding the availability of a
Portuguese interpreter, anticipating his arrest later that night.
Over the next few days the investigating officer made several
attempts to locate and arrest Mr QUINTAS.
Between 5 and 11 June 2005 there were two specific opportunities
presented to Wiltshire Constabulary to arrest Mr QUINTAS, but he
was not arrested.
4
On Sunday 12 June 2005, Wiltshire Constabulary referred the
matter to the IPCC which decided to launch an independent
investigation into the following:
1. Did any action or omission of any police officer or police
staff resulting from the initial report of assault upon Hayley
on 5 June 2005 until her death on 11 June 2005 amount to
misconduct?
2. Did any feature of Wiltshire Constabulary’s organisation,
practice or procedures influence the conduct of police
officers or police staff following the initial report of assault?
3. Did any other factors have an impact on the outcome of the
police investigation into the assault on Hayley Richards?
Mrs Christine Richards, Hayley’s mother, later made complaints
against officers and staff of Wiltshire Constabulary and the IPCC
investigation and this report addresses those specific complaints
additionally.
This report is supported by three document bundles
•
•
•
Statements (ST)
Exhibits (EX)
Other Documents (OD)
5
METHODOLOGY
The Independent Police Complaints Commission commenced their
investigation on Monday 13 June 2005 following an initial briefing
by Superintendent BONNÉ of Wiltshire PSD.
The enquiry team consisted of independent investigators from the
IPCC Wales & South West region who were based for the early
part of the enquiry at Wiltshire PSD in Chippenham Police Station,
Wiltshire. Later the enquiry team relocated to continue their
enquiries from the IPCC regional office in Cardiff.
Terms of Reference for the IPCC investigation were drafted and
agreed as follows:
1. To fully investigate the circumstances of Wiltshire
Constabulary actions and involvement in their dealings with
Hayley Jane RICHARDS prior to her murder on 11 June
2005.
2. The investigation to include a full assessment of all
documented and purported contacts between any individuals
and the police, the actual responses to those contacts and
the appropriate responses to those contacts. It will consider
whether there were any circumstances in relation to the
contacts and actions or inaction which could have impacted
on or potentially prevented the death.
3. The investigation will be undertaken in a timely manner,
having due regard to the broader impact on all parties, but will
be thorough and effective. The Investigating Officer (IO) will
keep the Commissioner informed of any issues or conflicts,
particularly with any parallel investigations or proceedings
and provide assessments of the impacts of such issues,
especially on timescales. The investigation will ensure that it
does not impact on the ongoing murder enquiry and all
information gathered will be shared with the Senior
Investigator responsible for conducting that murder enquiry.
This is to ensure that the requirements under CPIA are
complied with.
4. The IO will identify and make recommendations with regard to
criminal and misconduct issues and will consider whether all
appropriate and relevant legislation, regulations, guidelines,
procedures and policies have been followed in relation to
points 1 and 2 above. He will prepare a written report on the
findings of the investigation for the attention of the
Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC)
6
Commissioner. It will be a matter for the IPCC to forward the
report for the attention of the Crown Prosecution Service,
should any criminal issues be identified and to make any
recommendations regarding discipline outcomes to the
Deputy and Assistant Chief Constables, as appropriate.
5. The Commissioner responsible for this case will be Ian
Bynoe, and IPCC Investigator, Richard Reynolds will run the
investigation on his behalf. The direction and control of the
investigation is for the IPCC, through Richard Reynolds. An
appropriate risk assessment will be undertaken and provided
to the IPCC Investigating Officer Cy a suitably knowledgeable
and qualified local officer, and should particularly highlight
any community or media concerns or tensions that are
relevant to the case.
6. Wiltshire will provide a Liaison Officer who will work to the
IPCC Investigator, for the purposes of the investigation.
7. Organisational learning will be clearly identified, as part of the
IO’s report, to enable monitoring through the guardianship
activities of the IPCC. Matters requiring an immediate
response will be brought to the attention of the force at the
earliest opportunity.
8. All interested parties will be kept fully informed as they require
during the investigation, including any officers who are
identified as part of the investigation, through the force
nominated link and subject to necessary disclosure
limitations. The Investigating Officer will document the
agreements on this matter and ensure they are met. Officers
will have their welfare needs addressed by the force.
Regulation 9 notices will be served as appropriate, but only
where evidence suggests a criminal or misconduct matter
may have occurred.
9. All publicity other than that directly related to the murder
enquiry will be cleared with the Commissioner and the
relevant parties to the investigation, but will remain the
responsibility of the IPCC. The Commissioner is to be kept
fully and immediately informed of local media/community
interest in the case.
Following receipt of the complaints made by Mrs Christine
RICHARDS, the Terms of Reference referred to above were
reviewed and it was decided that no amendment was required to
ensure that the investigation covered both the incident being
investigated and the specific complaint allegations made by the
RICHARDS family.
7
The enquiry was conducted by means of a manual recording
system which complemented the Wiltshire murder enquiry which
was conducted on HOLMES (Home Office Large Major Enquiry
System). The IPCC enquiry was run in line with the principles of
MIRSAP (Major Incident Room Standardised Administrative
Procedures).
At an early stage the need for a working protocol with the Wiltshire
murder enquiry was recognised. To that end a protocol on the
sharing of information was agreed between the two investigations.
Due to the nature of the ongoing murder enquiry the IPCC
investigation was focused, to avoid duplication and not to
compromise it in any way.
Suitable lines of enquiry were developed and Principal Officers
identified. These are:
Officer A – investigating officer of the original assault on 5 June
2005.
Officer C – Local Area Duty Sergeant and OFFICER A’s Shift
Supervisor.
Officer B – Local Area Duty Sergeant and OFFICER A’s Shift
Supervisor.
Officer D – Local Area Sergeant.
Officer E – Melksham Area Traffic Officer
Officer F – Melksham Area Traffic Officer
Officer G – Domestic Violence Unit Supervisor
Officer H – Domestic Violence Liaison Officer
Officer I – Crime Scene Investigation (“CSI”) Department
Supervisor
Officer J - Crime Scene Investigator
All other officers and police staff were treated as witnesses subject
to a review of their status.
Throughout the enquiry, when necessary, advice was sought from
IPCC and Crown Prosecution Service lawyers with respect to
running this investigation alongside the murder investigation.
Consideration was given to the provision of Family Liaison support
8
to Hayley’s immediate family by the IPCC. Following consultation
with the family and the murder investigation it was agreed that the
support given by the Wiltshire Constabulary Family Laison officers
was sufficient and ensured effective lines of communication.
9
THE COMPLAINANT
The following person made a statement of complaint to the IPCC
highlighting several areas of concern and will be treated as the
complainant for the purposes of this report
Mrs Christine RICHARDS
PARTICULARS OF COMPLAINT
The complaint can be summarised as follows:
1. That following Hayley’s complaint to the police that initially
no attempt was made to arrest Mr QUINTAS because there
was no Portuguese interpreter available. The complainant
believes that the police should have arrested him first and
then arranged for an interpreter.
2. A uniformed female police officer allowed Hayley to believe
that she would be personally monitored on CCTV cameras
when she was going to and from her place of work, (the
Red or White Café, Trowbridge) and that this would protect
her.
3. That the officer responsible for the investigation of the
assault did not ensure that, when she was not on duty, the
investigation was given to another officer to investigate.
4. That following information given to Hayley from a friend
Steve LEWIS that Mr QUINTAS was in The Sir Isaac
Pitman (Wetherspoons) public house in Trowbridge and this
information was given to the police and that no attempt was
made to arrest him.
5. That on two separate occasions following Hayley’s
complaint of assault to the police, Mr QUINTAS was
stopped by the police but not arrested.
6. That a police photographer failed to turn up to take
photographs of Hayley’s injuries following assault and
instead the photographs were taken by a uniformed female
police constable using a disposable camera.
7. That the criminal investigation into the serious assault on
10
Hayley on Sunday 5 June 2005, by Mr QUINTAS, was of a
poor standard and not to the level required to ensure the
arrest of the offender and to ensure Hayley’s safety.
CRIMINAL ALLEGATIONS
No criminal allegations were considered by the IPCC during this
investigation.
11
MISCONDUCT ALLEGATIONS
A total of seven Regulation 9 notices were issued to Police
Officers as a result of this investigation and a total of three Notices
of Report, Allegation or Complaint were issued to Civilian Staff.
They are detailed below:
OFFICER A
1) That you failed to be conscientious and diligent in your duties in
the investigation into the assault on Hayley RICHARDS which took
place on 5 June, by Hugo QUINTAS. That this investigation was of
a poor standard and not to the level required to ensure the arrest
of the offender and to ensure Hayley’s safety
2) That following Hayley RICHARDS’ complaint of assault on 5
June 2005 you failed to be conscientious and diligent in your
duties in that initially no attempt was made to arrest the offender
as no access could be gained to the Interpreters database at that
time.
3) That as the officer responsible for the investigation of the
assault on Hayley RICHARDS by Hugo QUINTAS you failed to be
conscientious and diligent in your duties in that there was no
circulation on PNC for his arrest and you did not ensure the
continued investigation of the case when you went off duty.
All contrary to Police (Conduct) Regulations 2004, Schedule 1,
Paragraph 5, Performance of Duties.
4) That between 5 and 11 June 2005 you allowed Hayley
RICHARDS to believe that she would be personally monitored on
CCTV cameras when she was going to and from her place of work
(Red or White Café, Trowbridge) and that this would protect her
against Hugo QUINTAS.
Contrary to Police (Conduct) Regulations 2004, Schedule 1,
Paragraph 1, Honesty and Integrity.
12
OFFICER A was interviewed on 10 November 2005 at the
Professional Standards Department in Chippenham Police Station
by IPCC Investigators Hannah GEORGE and Richard
REYNOLDS. Her interview was conducted in accordance with the
Police (Conduct) Regulations 2004.
OFFICER A was accompanied by her solicitor, Mr Ian WILSON of
Russell Jones & Walker and her Police Federation friend, PC Phil
DAVENPORT.
OFFICER B
That you failed to be conscientious and diligent in your duties as a
supervisor of OFFICER A in her investigation into the serious
assault and threats to kill upon Hayley RICHARDS by Hugo
QUINTAS, which took place on 5 June 2005, and that you failed to
provide supervision to ensure the continued investigation of this
serious assault to effect the arrest of the offender and to ensure
Hayley’s safety.
Contrary to Police (Conduct) Regulations 2004, Schedule 1,
Paragraph 5, Performance of Duties.
The Regulation 9 Notice issued upon Officer B was withdrawn on 16
November 2005.
This decision was taken following further investigation which
highlighted he had minimal involvement in the incident and no
misconduct was identified prior to his appointment for interview.
Officer B subsequently provided a statement which incorporated his
prepared interview statement.
OFFICER C
1) That you failed to be conscientious and diligent in your duties to
supervise the investigation into the serious assault on Hayley
13
RICHARDS which took place on 5 June 2005, by Hugo QUINTAS
and that this investigation was of a poor standard and not to the
level required to ensure the arrest of the offender and to ensure
Hayley’s safety.
2) That you failed to be conscientious and diligent in your duties as
the officer responsible for the supervision of the investigation into
the assault on Hayley RICHARDS by Hugo QUINTAS, to ensure
the offender had been circulated on PNC and to ensure the
continuation of the investigation until the offender had been
arrested.
Contrary to Police (Conduct) Regulations 2004, Schedule 1,
Paragraph 5, Performance of Duties.
Officer C was interviewed on 23 November 2005 at the
Professional Standards Department in Chippenham Police Station,
by IPCC Investigators Hannah GEORGE and David FORD. The
interview was conducted in accordance with the Police (Conduct)
Regulations 2004.
Officer C was accompanied by her solicitor Mr David MELVILLE
WALKER of Talbot Walker, Solicitors.
OFFICER D
That you failed to be conscientious and diligent in your duties on
Tuesday 7 June 2005, when as Acting Sergeant at Trowbridge
Station you received notification that Hugo QUINTAS, who was
wanted for arrest, was in the Wetherspoons public house,
Trowbridge and that you did not ensure that efforts were made to
effect his arrest.
Contrary to Police (Conduct) Regulations 2004, Schedule 1,
Paragraph 5, Performance of Duties.
Officer D was interviewed on 20 January 2006 at the Professional
Standards Department in Chippenham Police Station by IPCC
Investigators David FORD and Hannah GEORGE. The interview
was conducted in accordance with the Police (Conduct)
Regulations 2004.
Officer D was accompanied by her Police Federation Friend
14
Sergeant 1428 David IBBORT.
OFFICER E
That you failed to be conscientious and diligent in your duties on
10 June 2005 when you were teamed with OFFICER F and you
stopped vehicle L857 SOR containing Hugo QUINTAS who was
wanted for arrest for a serious assault which had taken place on 5
June 2005 and that during this stop you failed to arrest Hugo
QUINTAS.
Contrary to Police (Conduct) Regulations 2004, Schedule 1,
Paragraph 5, Performance of Duties.
OFFICER E was interviewed on 11 October 2005 at the
Professional Standards Department in Chippenham Police Station
by IPCC Investigators Sarah PRICE and James DAVIES. The
interview was conducted in accordance with the Police (Conduct)
Regulations 2004.
OFFICER E was accompanied by his Police Federation Friend PC
959 Windsor WOON.
OFFICER F
That you failed to be conscientious and diligent in your duties on
10 June 2005 when you were teamed with OFFICER E and you
stopped vehicle L857 SOR containing Hugo QUINTAS who was
wanted for arrest for a serious assault which had taken place on 5
June 2005 and that during this stop you failed to arrest Hugo
QUINTAS.
Contrary to Police (Conduct) Regulations 2004, Schedule 1,
Paragraph 5, Performance of Duties.
OFFICER F was interviewed on 11 October 2005 at the
Professional Standards Department in Chippenham Police Station
by IPCC Investigators James DAVIES and Sarah PRICE. The
interview was conducted in accordance with the Police (Conduct)
Regulations 2004.
15
OFFICER F was accompanied by his Police Federation Friend PC
959 Windsor WOON.
OFFICER G
That you failed to be conscientious and diligent in your duties as
supervisor of the Domestic Violence Unit to ensure that all of the
Domestic Violence Liaison Officers duties into the investigation of
serious assault and threats to kill upon Hayley RICHARDS by
Hugo QUINTAS which took place on 5 June 2005, were carried
out effectively and in a timely manner to ensure the welfare and
safety of Hayley RICHARDS. In that a DV1 form was submitted on
5 June 2005 to the Domestic Violence Unit detailing the serious
nature of the offence and that immediate action was required by
the Unit, and that no attempt at contact was made with Hayley until
four days after the assault referral.
Contrary to Police (Conduct) Regulations 2004, Schedule 1,
Paragraph 5, Performance of Duties.
Officer G was interviewed on 11 November 2005 at the
Professional Standards Department in Chippenham Police Station
by IPCC Investigators Ayesha DAR and Anna KITCHEN. The
interview was conducted in accordance with the Police (Conduct)
Regulations 2004.
Officer G was accompanied by his solicitor, Mr David MELVILLE
WALKER of Talbot Walker, Solicitors.
OFFICER H
That you failed to be conscientious and diligent in that you failed to
ensure contact was made with Hayley RICHARDS until Friday 10
June 2005, despite OFFICER A indicating that immediate follow-up
enquiries were needed by a Domestic Violence Liaison Officer.
The above may amount to misconduct or potentially, depending on
the outcome of the investigation, gross misconduct in accordance
with Police Staff Discipline.
16
Officer H was interviewed on 7 November 2005 at Professional
Standards Department in Chippenham Police Station by IPCC
Investigators Anna KITCHEN and Ayesha DAR. The interview was
conducted in accordance with the Discipline Code of Conduct for
Police Staff.
Officer H was accompanied by her UNISON representative Mr
Michael MURPHY.
OFFICER I
That you failed to be conscientious and diligent in your duties to
supervise the CSI Division to ensure the continued progress of
photographing the injuries sustained by Hayley RICHARDS as a
result of this assault and that your supervision was of a poor
standard and not to the level required to ensure the diligent
investigation of the assault.
The above may amount to misconduct or potentially, depending on
the outcome of the investigation, gross misconduct in accordance
with Police Staff Discipline.
Officer I was interviewed on 12 October 2005 at Professional
Standards Department in Chippenham Police Station by IPCC
Investigators James DAVIES and Anna KITCHEN. The interview
was conducted in accordance with the Discipline Code of Conduct
for Police Staff.
Officer I was accompanied by his UNISON representative Mr
Michael MURPHY.
OFFICER J
That you failed to be conscientious and diligent in your duties in that
you failed to ensure that the photographs of the injuries sustained by
Hayley RICHARDS as a result of this assault were taken and that
you failed to ensure that this task was handed over to another CSI
photographer for completion.
17
The above may amount to misconduct or potentially, depending on
the outcome of the investigation, gross misconduct in accordance
with Police Staff Discipline.
Officer J was interviewed on 12 October 2005 at the Professional
Standards Department in Chippenham Police Station by IPCC
Investigators James DAVIES and Anna KITCHEN. The interview
was conducted in accordance with the Discipline Code of Conduct
for Police Staff.
Officer J was accompanied by his UNISON representative Mr
Michael MURPHY.
18
CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS
The following is a chronology of key events which were established
by the murder enquiry and the IPCC investigation and form the
context for this report.
SUNDAY 5 JUNE 2005
On Sunday 5 June 2005 Hayley RICHARDS was assaulted at her
home address of 17 Carders Corner, Trowbridge.
Hayley immediately contacted Wiltshire Constabulary to report the
assault and identified her attacker to police as her recently
separated boyfriend Hugo QUINTAS.
Hayley had previously told MR QUINTAS that she was pregnant. It
appears they had been saving for the birth.
On the afternoon of the assault Mr QUINTAS allegedly attacked
Hayley over the forthcoming baby, questioning whether he was the
father and demanding his half of the saved money as he wanted
nothing to do with the baby.
Approx 16:30 hrs Hayley contacts police reporting a domestic
assault at her home address, identifying her boyfriend Mr
QUINTAS as the attacker.
16:33 hrs Mr QUINTAS takes a taxi from outside Hayley’s home to
his home, 36 Seymour Court, Trowbridge.
17:00 hrs OFFICER A attended Hayley’s home address and a
detailed nine page statement was taken.
17:44 hrs An offensive text message received by Hayley on her
mobile phone, sent by Mr QUINTAS.
18:00 hrs Hayley is taken to hospital by OFFICER A for a check up
of her injuries as she was approximately 12 weeks pregnant.
19
19:20 hrs (approx) Hayley returns from hospital with her brother
Paul.
19:20 hrs OFFICER A submits via e-mail a DV1 form to the
Domestic Violence Unit, marked for immediate referral. Nature of
offence is noted as “ABH and Threats to Kill”
19:31hrs OFFICER A contacts Melksham Custody Unit regarding
the availability of a Portuguese Interpreter via the Interpreters
database accessed via the custody terminals. The system was not
available and OFFICER A was given the option of contacting
Swindon Custody Unit to access theirs.
19:46 hrs OFFICER A tags the police log for CSI to arrange to take
photographs of Hayley’s injuries.
OFFICER A sets up a crime file.
OFFICER A produces a briefing sheet for the following oncoming
shift, making then aware of the need to arrest Mr QUINTAS and
the need for an interpreter.
MONDAY 6 JUNE 2005
13:30 hrs Officer J telephones Hayley to make an appointment to
take photographs of Hayley’s injuries. Hayley was unavailable that
afternoon and arranges with Officer J that photographs can be
taken the following afternoon.
16:59 hrs OFFICER A makes three attempts to locate Mr
QUINTAS at his home address, 36 Seymour Court, Trowbridge.
00:10 hrs Hayley stays at her sister Sam’s house overnight as she
believes that Mr QUINTAS may call at her house.
TUESDAY 7 JUNE 2005
20
At approx 13:40 hrs Hayley receives a text from a friend stating
that Mr QUINTAS is in the Sir Isaac Pitman Public House
(Wetherspoons) Trowbridge.
13:46 hrs Hayley phones police to inform that Mr QUINTAS is in
the Sir Isaac Pitman Public House (Wetherspoons), Trowbridge.
The Control Room contacts the Duty Sergeant in Trowbridge –
Officer D who states that no resources are available to send out.
14:15 hrs Hayley goes to her sister Debbie’s house to collect a
photograph of Mr QUINTAS to aid the police enquiries.
15:00 hrs OFFICER A comes on duty.
16:30 hrs OFFICER A collects photographs of Mr QUINTAS from
Hayley at her place of work, the Red oror White café, Trowbridge.
16:35 hrs OFFICER A attempts to locate Mr QUINTAS at the Sir
Isaac Pitman Public House (Wetherspoons), Trowbridge and then
at his home address, 36 Seymour Court.
22:02 hrs phone call from Mr QUINTAS’ mobile to Hayley’s home
phone – duration 8 minutes 11 seconds.
22:22 TO 22:45 HRS Text messages between Hayley and Mr
QUINTAS regarding photos of the expected baby for Mr QUINTAS’
parents.
WEDNESDAY 8 JUNE 2005
Approx 01:00 hrs OFFICER A goes off duty for four days on rest
days.
07:00 hrs Officer C goes off duty on rest days.
14:50 hrs Hayley and Mr QUINTAS seen talking at bus stop in
21
Trowbridge by her sister Sam. Hayley says she is OK to Sam and
will call to see her in a few minutes.
15:00 Hayley called at Sam’s house and said that Mr QUINTAS
had apologised and wanted to talk to the family. Hayley said she
would not have him back.
Approx 20:30 Mr QUINTAS is at Hayley’s house, drunk.
22:09 Hayley called ALPHA taxis to take Mr QUINTAS home.
22:48 to 23:16 Text messages between Hayley and Mr QUINTAS.
Mr QUINTAS apologised for the incident on Sunday and Hayley
offers to take the baby to Portugal to see his parents. States the
baby needed a father and that he’d hurt her very much and just
wanted him there now for the baby.
23:28 hrs Further text from Mr QUINTAS asking for one more
chance and asked Hayley to look out of the window.
Approximately 00:00 hrs Mr QUINTAS at Hayley’s house.
Approximately 00:30 hrs Mr QUINTAS leaves.
01:01 hrs Text from Mr QUINTAS to Hayley saying ‘sweet
dreams’.
THURSDAY 9 JUNE 2005
18:13 hrs Hayley called taxi to take her home from work.
23:20 to 23:29 Text from Mr QUINTAS to Hayley saying sorry and
to look out of her window.
Approximately 23:30 hrs from text message analysis between
Hayley and Mr QUINTAS, Mr QUINTAS in Hayley’s house.
22
FRIDAY 10 JUNE 2005
00:08 hrs Mr QUINTAS takes taxi from Hayley’s to his home
address. He was pushed away by Hayley and heard muttering ‘It’s
my baby’.
00:13 hrs Mr QUINTAS calls Hayley’s mobile from his mobile.
00:15 hrs believed that Mr QUINTAS either in or outside Hayley’s
home
00:26 hrs Text message from Hayley to Mr QUINTAS asking if he
got a taxi.
00:29 hrs Call from Hayley’s landline to Mr QUINTAS’s mobile.
00:31 hrs Call from Hayley’s landline to A & D Taxis.
00:33 hrs Call from Hayley’s landline to Alpha Taxis.
00:40 hrs Taxi called to Carders Corner to pick up Mr QUINTAS.
Taxi driver witnesses the front door closed on him and taken to his
home at 36 Seymour Court.
06:43 hrs Text message from Mr QUINTAS to Hayley, apologising
for last night.
14:20 hrs Mr QUINTAS stopped in his car by OFFICER E and
OFFICER F for a defective tail light cover. Sergio DA CUNHA is a
passenger in the car. Mr QUINTAS unable to provide any motor
documents and issued with HO/RT1 by OFFICER E.
19:49 hrs Text to Hayley from Dean PEVERLY stating that Mr
QUINTAS is in Terry’s Social Club and telling her to ring the Police
before he hits him.
23
20:15 hrs Hayley rang her Mum and discussed Dean PEVERLY’s
call. Hayley stated that she didn’t want any more stress.
20:50 hrs Hayley with her Mum at the Red oror White Café, stated
that she was going to be Mr QUINTAS’ friend for the baby’s sake.
23:20 hrs Hayley at her home.
23:56 hrs Text from Mr QUINTAS to Hayley, he is at her home
window requesting to speak to her. States that he is not drunk and
not driving.
SATURDAY 11 JUNE 2005
00:57 hrs Call to Alpha Taxi by a female from Hayley’s landline for a
taxi to 36 Seymour Court.
01:00 hrs Estimated time of Hayley’s murder.
24
SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE, CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ON COMPLAINTS AND ALLEGATIONS
COMPLAINT CONCERNING INTERPRETER SERVICE
(COMPLAINT 1)
That following Hayley’s complaint to the police that initially no
attempt was made to arrest Mr QUINTAS because there was no
Portuguese interpreter available. The complainant believes that
the police should have arrested him first and then arranged for an
interpreter.
SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE
Officer A faces an allegation that, following Hayley RICHARDS’
complaint of assault on 5 June 2005, she failed to be conscientious
and diligent in her duties in that initially no attempt was made to
arrest the offender as no access could be gained to the interpreter
database at that time.
The investigation into this allegation was focused upon the following
areas:
•
The practice and procedures adopted by the Wiltshire
Constabulary for the use of the Interpreters Database in
operational circumstances;
•
The use made of the interpreters database by OFFICER A
during her investigation of assault upon Hayley RICHARDS;
•
Whether the existence of the interpreters database had any
influence on the decision to arrest and its timing;
•
What actions were taken on the night with regard to the
Interpreters Database
Our enquiries have established that the lack of access to the
25
Interpreters Database should not have been a bar to arresting.
There are alternative systems in place, such as Language
Line/manual records of interpreters, which will provide access to an
interpreter to fulfil custody and charging requirements. The Force
policies and procedures are covered in TROVE (Wiltshire
Constabulary’s intranet site and accessible by all officers).
The use of the Interpreters Database by OFFICER A would have to
have been via the Custody Unit at Melksham, which is the normal
procedure.
We have established through interviewing the Custody staff that
OFFICER A did telephone the Melksham Custody Unit on Sunday 5
June 2005 at 19:31 hours. This is corroborated by CCTV footage
from the Custody Unit.
Access could not be gained to the Interpreters Database system due
to a fault. However, the availability of Language Line was
unaffected.
We have established that, following this enquiry, OFFICER A was
reassigned to other tasks assessed as having a higher risk status.
This was confirmed by her supervisor, OFFICER C, at interview
It was after the completion of these duties that OFFICER A
completed a handover minute and package for the oncoming shift
and consulted with her Supervisor, OFFICER C.
OFFICER A confirmed her busy schedule that evening. This is
backed up by her pocket notebook entries and supported
documentation.
She stated that the decision not to arrest on the evening of Sunday 5
June was not because of the Interpreter Database but rather
because of the occurrence of a higher risk-assessed crime in
progress, coupled with the operational demands placed upon her to
conduct a video interview that same night.
OFFICER A did not complete her shift that night until some hours
after it should have concluded.
26
OFFICER A was unhappy about doing the video interview. The
reason she had to do it was because she was the only one trained to
do video interviews.
It is clear that OFFICER A was not avoiding work. Far from it, she
seems to have been required to carry a very heavy work load. This
meant that she had to work later than her shift pattern. It is
inadvisable for an officer so young in service, however competent, to
be put in this position.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
The inquiry has found that the IT systems and, in particular, the
Interpreters’ Database made available to those working in Wiltshire
Constabulary, were not as easily accessible as they could have
been. Improvements could certainly be made to raise awareness
and accessibility amongst uniformed staff such as OFFICER A who,
from time to time, will need ready access to the information these
can provide. However, although the officer in the case (OFFICER A)
made preliminary enquiries prior to tracing an interpreter, in the
event she did not need to obtain such details since she did not
attempt an arrest on the night of 5 June 2005. The inquiry has
established that, were she to have done so, then the systems
available to her could have given her the information which she
required without any need for the arrest to be delayed or postponed.
The primary reason why OFFICER A did not attempt to arrest Mr
QUINTAS that night was not any perceived or real difficulty in
obtaining the assistance of a Portuguese interpreter.
Without sufficient evidence to support the complaint, I therefore
recommend that this specific complaint is unsubstantiated.
COMPLAINT CONCERNING CCTV MONITORING
(COMPLAINT 2)
A uniformed female police officer allowed Hayley to believe that
she would be personally monitored on CCTV cameras when she
was going to and from her place of work, (the Red or White Café,
Trowbridge) and that this would protect her.
27
SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE
OFFICER A also faces an allegation of misconduct in that, between
5 and 11 June 2005, she allowed Hayley RICHARDS to believe that
she would be personally monitored on CCTV cameras when she
was going to and from her place of work (Red or White Café,
Trowbridge) and that this would protect her from Mr QUINTAS.
Our enquiries have established that there are CCTV cameras which
cover the area in which the Red oror White Café is situated.
The CCTV camera system is organised by the local authority and
operates from the Shires Shopping Centre in Trowbridge Town
Centre.
The Manager of Shires Shopping Centre confirmed that they have
historically never received any request from Wiltshire Constabulary
to ever monitor individuals to ensure they are safe.
He also goes on to state that he never received any such request
regarding Hayley RICHARDS.
At interview with OFFICER A, this area was addressed. OFFICER A
stated that she had discussed CCTV with Hayley on Tuesday 7 June
2005 where OFFICER A stated to her that there were CCTV
cameras covering her workplace and that any potential incident
would be recorded on CCTV. However, OFFICER A states that she
did not at any point say to Hayley that she would be personally
monitored or protected by the CCTV cameras.
This allegation forms part of the statement of complaint received
from Christine RICHARDS, the mother of Hayley.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
The complaint is that OFFICER A allowed Hayley to believe that she
would be personally monitored on CCTV cameras when she was
going to and from her place of work and that this would protect.
There is evidence that Hayley was informed that CCTV cameras do
cover the area in which the café, her place of work, is situated.
OFFICER A states that she informed Hayley of this fact and that any
28
potential incident would be recorded on CCTV. However, the officer
denied informing Hayley that she would be ‘personally monitored or
protected’ by the CCTV cameras and those managing the facility
state that they had not been requested to provide such personal
protection for individuals in the past.
It is not hard to imagine that, if told that her place of work was
monitored by a CCTV camera, then Hayley would be led to believe
that she was safer than if no such TV monitoring was in place. She
would undoubtedly have felt vulnerable and it would have been
natural and reasonable to take some reassurance from what she
was told about the CCTV coverage. It is unlikely that OFFICER A
would have given the reassurance which forms the core of this
complaint if she had not then contacted the CCTV manager with
details of Hayley’s ID and circumstances. There is no evidence this
happened and the officer denies going so far as to state this.
There is insufficient evidence to support this specific complaint and I
recommend that it be unsubstantiated.
ALLEGATION CONCERNING USE OF POLICE NATIONAL
COMPUTER (PNC)
There is no complaint concerning use of the PNC but it forms one of
the areas investigated under misconduct notice.
SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE
OFFICER A faces an allegation of misconduct in that she, as the
officer responsible for the investigation of the assault on Hayley
RICHARDS by Mr QUINTAS, failed to be conscientious and diligent
in her duties in that there was no circulation of PNC for his arrest
and that she did not ensure the continued investigation of the case
when she went off-duty.
Our enquiries have established that, for the purposes of entering
information on PNC, Wiltshire Constabulary has a Form 25. This
requires an officer to complete the form, and then send this to an
Inspector to approve and authorise putting the information onto
PNC.
Our enquiries have established that details of the incident were
29
entered on the force’s local intelligence system including that Mr
QUINTAS was wanted for ABH. No entry was made on the PNC.
The established practice within Wiltshire Constabulary is that a risk
assessment must be considered and all lines of enquiry must be
completed before an Inspector will authorise the information to go on
PNC. These lines of enquiry and risk assessment consist of
whether the name, address and place of work are known to the
police. In this particular case, they were. OFFICER A also knew
that Mr QUINTAS had removed all of his belongings from Hayley’s
home and that he had no key to her address.
In respect of the issue of PNC, OFFICER C, along with OFFICER A,
had conducted a risk assessment based upon the known facts and
had classed the apparent risk towards Hayley as low, agreeing with
that of OFFICER A. OFFICER C has stated that she had decided as
a result that it did not warrant being placed on PNC at this time and
that further lines of enquiry and arrest attempts were to be made by
the investigating officer, OFFICER A. She also stated that she would
have considered his addition to PNC if after a week no arrest had
been made.
OFFICER A confirmed that she believed it would not be considered
to go onto PNC until further/all lines of enquiry had been completed.
In light of this, putting Mr QUINTAS’ details on PNC was not
considered by OFFICER A or OFFICER C between 5 and 10 June
2005.
Notably, it seems that OFFICER A had never seen a Form 25 before
and that she had never put anyone on PNC before. She was also
unaware of what information is required in relevant sections of the
Form 25.
In light of this you would expect the Sergeant/Supervisor of
OFFICER A to offer advice/guidance.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
The Police National Computer is not used by the Police service as a
database to record the details of all persons who are wanted for
arrest in connection with Police investigations. A procedure was in
30
place in Wiltshire Constabulary reflecting the same practice as in
other Police Forces, to limit the information put on PNC and,
although OFFICER A was not familiar with using this procedure, the
inquiry has not found that this lack of knowledge was a reason for
her not applying for authority to put the details of Mr QUINTAS on
the National Database.
The practice in Wiltshire Constabulary was that, for arrests involving
persons with some known address and community links, then
attempts would be made to arrest them without the use of PNC and
this is what happened with regard to the investigation of Mr
QUINTAS. Details of the offence for which he was to be arrested
and about himself were put on the force local intelligence database
which would have served to provide anyone seeking information
against his name with that essential information.
The inquiry has investigated whether OFFICER A should have
circulated Mr QUINTAS on PNC and I must conclude the evidence
shows that the officer followed established and accepted Wiltshire
Constabulary practice.
I therefore recommend that this misconduct allegation be
unsubstantiated.
COMPLAINTS CONCERNING HAND OVER ARRANGEMENTS
AND GENERAL STANDARD OF INVESTIGATION
(COMPLAINT 3)
That the officer responsible for the investigation of the assault did
not ensure that, when she was not on duty, the investigation was
given to another officer to investigate.
SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE
In terms of the allegation that OFFICER A did not ensure the
continued investigation of the case when she went off-duty, our
investigation has found that on the evening of 5 June 2005,
OFFICER A completed a Wiltshire Constabulary minute sheet
detailing the offence of ABH and Threat to Kill upon Hayley by Mr
QUINTAS.
Also in the minute, which is marked for the Duty Sergeant for nights
and days, OFFICER A asked that they make their shifts aware of the
incident and that Mr QUINTAS was wanted for arrest.
31
OFFICER A also asks that if anyone is available, that they arrest Mr
QUINTAS around lunchtime on Monday 6 June 2005 as she was
due on duty later that afternoon.
There is no written policy or procedure for handovers and briefings,
but a general practice is adhered to. The general practice consists
of three stages:
i) Section Sergeant or Acting Sergeant, who is coming to the end of
their shift, will have a general awareness of incidents on that day
which might require actions by the incoming shift, or individual
officers will make the Sergeant aware of specific needs or actions
they would like passed on.
ii) The Sergeant will then give a handover to the incoming shift
Sergeant.
iii) The incoming shift Sergeant will then give the incoming team a
briefing.
In addition to preparing a minute sheet, OFFICER A verbally
explained the incident of assault occasioning ABH on the Sunday
evening to her duty sergeant, OFFICER C.
OFFICER C advised OFFICER A to contact the Crime Scene
Investigation Department (CSI) to visit Hayley in order to take photos
of her injuries and during this conversation it was decided that
OFFICER A should contact the Custody Suite at Melksham to check
on Portuguese Interpreter availability. It was soon after this that
OFFICER A and OFFICER C were called to a domestic arson, which
was the higher risk-assessed crime in progress.
It seems that OFFICER A followed the established practice of
making the incident known to her duty sergeant and colleagues. Her
Supervisor was aware of the case and that OFFICER A over the
next few days was going to attempt to arrest Mr QUINTAS.
On Wednesday 8 June 2005 OFFICER A went off-duty for rest days.
32
OFFICER A stated at interview that on Wednesday 8 June 2005 at
0200 hrs she was about to update the investigation file when she
was told by OFFICER C, her duty Sergeant, to go home as her shift
had ended a few hours ago, and that OFFICER C would sort it out
and pass to the day shift Sergeant for further enquiries.
OFFICER A also stated at interview that there was no set procedure
for handing over when an officer goes on rest days.
Therefore, OFFICER A was confident that she had verbally updated
her sergeant, OFFICER C, with the status of the investigation before
going on rest days.
OFFICER A followed this general practice for handover and briefings
by producing a minute sheet and verbally updating her duty
sergeant, OFFICER C.
Despite the fact that Wiltshire have a “positive arrest” policy for
Domestic Violence offences, this particular offence was not deemed
a high risk. The reasons for this were:
•
•
•
•
That Hayley and Mr QUINTAS had separated;
Mr QUINTAS did not have independent access to Hayley’s
home;
He had removed all his belongings;
The police knew of his home address and his place of work.
To OFFICER A’s credit, despite having a heavy workload, she took
a detailed nine page statement from Hayley. She completed the DVI
form and referred it to the DV Unit, asked for an immediate
response. She contacted CSI to take photos of Hayley’s injuries.
She maintained contact with Hayley prior to her going off on rest
days. She acquired from Hayley a photo of Mr QUINTAS to aid with
his identification and arrest.
OFFICER A took Hayley to hospital on the Sunday evening for a
check-up despite Hayley feeling it was unnecessary. Between 5 and
8 June 2005, OFFICER A pursued the arrest of Mr QUINTAS.
OFFICER A visited his home address on several occasions,
contacted his place of work and attempted to locate Mr QUINTAS
when she came on duty, at The Sir Isaac Pitman public house,
Trowbridge (Wetherspoons) on Tuesday 7 June 2005 following
Hayley contacting the police stating that he was in there.
33
Coupled with this, OFFICER A gave adequate briefings and updates
to her Supervisor, OFFICER C, and followed the general procedure
of Trowbridge police station of passing on things to other colleagues.
Also, a rational risk assessment based upon the known facts was
undertaken by OFFICER A and OFFICER C. This took into account
the injuries sustained by Hayley and the fact that Mr QUINTAS had
no independent access to the victim’s home address and that he
had removed all of his belongings from the house.
The fact that Hayley was pregnant has not been mentioned by these
officers as a main consideration in their risk assessment. The 2004
Centrex Guidance for police officers on risk assessment lists
pregnancy as an important factor to consider in Domestic Violence
assaults and states that domestic assaults during pregnancy are an
indication of a high risk of future harm. Neither officer had been
trained in the contents of this Guidance manual. I shall comment
below further regarding risk assessment and training needs.
It is important to note here that this investigation found that
OFFICER A was working to full capacity. OFFICER A was at the
time a tutor constable to PC THATCHER and they were involved in
other ongoing investigations and current incidents.
As a tutor constable, the time given to each incident was effectively
longer than another officer dealing with the case due to the fact that
she had to explain the work to her probationer.
At interview, OFFICER A highlighted that Trowbridge was a very
busy station and suffered from low morale amongst staff. OFFICER
A stated that, during the week of 5 June 2005, she felt particularly
stressed due to the amount of workload assigned to her.
OFFICER A also had other files for arrest that week. She is also a
response driver and one of the few officers at Trowbridge who had
been trained in video interviewing, of which she had to utilise her
skills in the particular week, on the night of Sunday 5 June 2005.
OFFICER A also raised the issue of the then new crime recording
system that they had in place – HERMES.
34
OFFICER A stated that any incident, be it crime or non-crime, all
had to go on the HERMES TASKER system, which meant that the
workload of an officer is heavy and believed that the staffing levels
at Trowbridge compared to the workload meant that caseloads were
not manageable.
OFFICER C
In considering OFFICER C’s actions, it has to be decided whether
she failed to be conscientious and diligent in the performance of her
duties to supervise the investigation into the serious assault on
Hayley RICHARDS which took place on 5 June 2005 by Mr
QUINTAS, and that this investigation was of a poor standard and not
to the level required to ensure the arrest of the offender and to
ensure Hayley’s safety.
In respect of the issue of continuity of investigation, our enquiry
revealed that OFFICER C was on duty as Sergeant at Trowbridge
on Sunday 5 June, Monday 6June and Tuesday 7 June. She then
went off-duty for rest days.
From our enquiries, it was established that OFFICER C was a newly
promoted Sergeant, having 17 years’ experience as a police officer.
OFFICER C was OFFICER A’s supervisor and also the Duty
Sergeant on the evenings of 5 and 6 June 2005 at Trowbridge
Police Station. OFFICER C had not previously worked with
OFFICER A, but knew of her competence as a police officer and that
she was well-regarded by colleagues.
In respect of the allegation, the evidence suggests the following:
OFFICER C became aware of Hayley’s assault following a verbal
briefing by OFFICER A at approximately 9.00 pm on the evening of
5 June 2005.
During this update, OFFICER C confirmed with OFFICER A the
need to contact CSI to take photographs of Hayley’s injuries and
also to contact Melksham Custody Unit to seek out the availability of
a Portuguese Interpreter.
OFFICER C states that, although not having read the statement of
35
Hayley, she was aware that OFFICER A was competent and had
given her enough information regarding the incident in accordance
with her role as her supervisor.
The conversation she had with OFFICER A enabled her to make a
rational risk assessment of the case based on the known facts. The
factors she considered in this risk assessment were:
•
•
•
•
The offender’s identity was known.
His address and place of work were known.
He had no independent access to the victim’s property.
He had removed all of his belongings from Hayley’s house.
OFFICER C was also aware of the injuries that Hayley had
sustained and judged the risk of her being a repeat victim to be low.
OFFICER C herself checked Hayley’s address by drive past, whilst
on night shift a 01.40hrs on Monday 6 June 2005.
OFFICER C has had numerous years of experience conducting risk
assessments. She had a Domestic Violence/Child Protection
background and was used to conducting risk assessments based
upon Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) charging standards.
In discussion with OFFICER A they had decided to treat the assault
as an ABH rather than a common assault, which the injuries
suggested might have been more appropriate. The effect of this
decision was to provide a power of arrest, which would not have
been available for a common assault. We have established from our
enquiries that this is common practice within Wiltshire when dealing
with Domestic Violence incidents.
It is important to note here that 5 June 2005 was OFFICER C’s first
day as a substantive Sergeant and her first day as a
Supervisor/Sergeant in Trowbridge.
The evidence suggests that OFFICER C had received no Sergeants’
training prior to 5 June 2005 and up to her interview this situation
had not changed.
OFFICER C stated that she had not been afforded the benefit of a
structured handover for her new role. She was unaware of who her
36
team were to be, did not know where her locker was, how to get her
radio, or where the CS spray was kept, she also did not know that
briefings were done on PowerPoint, nor could she use it as she had
not been trained. OFFICER C felt totally unprepared to fulfil her new
role.
A risk assessment had been carried out by both herself and
OFFICER A and, from her professional background and experience
as a police officer, she felt confident in making a decision on the risk
assessment level of this incident, based upon the known facts.
OFFICER C stated that she feels she has not been given the duty of
care that she should have expected from her employers. Upon
starting as Duty Sergeant in Trowbridge on 5 June 2005, she had
received no contact from her Inspector, nor any introduction or
training to her role. This is even more important when you consider
the fact that she had come from a non-uniform background where
she should have been able to expect adequate and sufficient
preparation for her new role.
In addition to these facts, OFFICER C found herself on her second
shift on 6 June 2005 as the only substantive Sergeant on duty
covering the whole of West Wiltshire. OFFICER C had been told this
by the outgoing Sergeant and not by her Inspector, or anyone of a
higher rank. She took it upon herself to contact the Control Room to
check this, as she did not know how many staff she was to be
responsible for and who and where they were.
In light of the evidence, it is apparent that OFFICER C took her
newly promoted role as a Sergeant and Supervisor seriously. She
was fully aware of the incident and was aware that OFFICER A had
ongoing enquiries to conduct.
In consideration of the position and environment within which
OFFICER C was placed, she had coped well.
Shortly after the incident, OFFICER C was signed off sick from work
with stress by her doctor. OFFICER C stated that this was due to
the high stress levels and the position that she was placed into by
the organisation.
OFFICER C stated that Wiltshire Constabulary had placed her and
37
others in a difficult position.
OFFICER C’s role is to prioritise cases and allocate officers
accordingly to deal with all incidents reported. As a Sergeant she is
responsible for prioritising workloads in order to manage resources.
This incident had been risk assessed and deemed low risk, which
meant that more serious crimes/incidents assessed with a higher
risk would take precedence.
As well as the existing crimes being investigated, OFFICER C had to
deal with incoming incidents reported, many of which required
immediate police response, and had to prioritise and juggle cases
around these.
OFFICER C stated that she would ideally like to undertake proactive
policing to help reduce crime which would, in turn, ease the
workloads of her officers, but due to the continued lack of resources,
OFFICER C stated that it was simply not possible and that she was
unable to undertake any proactive work.
OFFICER C, at the time of her interview, suggested that the officers
at Trowbridge were carrying excessive workloads, in excess of 15
cases each, which she felt was not manageable. These are in
addition to the day-to-day jobs coming in via the radio or tasked to
them by Hermes as well as persons detained in custody who need
interviewing.
OFFICER C describes the staffing levels with Trowbridge as ‘dire’.
Ideally, it would be a Sergeant plus 6 officers, but OFFICER C had
never experienced this level of staffing since she started as Duty
Sergeant at Trowbridge.
In conclusion, OFFICER C’s actions as a supervisor of the
investigation were rational and proportionate.
There is no set policy on the procedure of handovers but a general
practice is adhered to. It is not practical for a Sergeant to outline all
cases dealt with, they have to risk assess all incidents and so
prioritise what incidents require immediate action. Therefore, the
Sergeant has to decide what cases require immediate action and
they will then hand over to the oncoming Sergeant. The oncoming
Sergeant will then hold a briefing for the oncoming team where they
38
will be briefed accordingly and required action would be prioritised
and allocated to officers.
OFFICER C had evaluated that this particular incident was not a
priority and therefore did not fall into the high risk handover
category.
The general practice is that the individual officer dealing with a
specific case has overall responsibility for keeping their crime file upto-date and ensuring handover to the shift Sergeant and highlights
any actions they want the next shift to deal with. This is also the
procedure for officers when they are going on to rest days, which is
to notify the Duty Sergeant of any actions that require advancing
during the interim period.
The Shift Sergeant has responsibility for assessing the risk and
prioritising and actioning accordingly. OFFICER C states that it was
possible that the “handover file” was left on the Sergeant’s desk at
the conclusion of OFFICER A’s shift, before going on rest days.
The file containing details of the assault was left by OFFICER C on
the Sergeant’s desk on Wednesday 8 June at the end of her duty
shift in the early hours of the morning, in line with the general
practice adhered to for handover of ongoing files.
For lower risk assessed cases, including Domestic Violence, the
general practice within Wiltshire Constabulary was that officers
would maintain their own investigations.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In relation to the complaint that the officer in the case and, by
implication, her supervisor, failed to make suitable arrangements for
the ‘handover’ of her investigation, the inquiry has shown that both
officers discussed the appropriate risk status for the investigation
and decided together that the risk was ‘low’. The investigation has
not produced evidence which casts serious doubt on their approach
to risk assessment and the status which they gave this investigation.
It was not unreasonable to assess the probability of a repetition of
the incident as low for the reasons set out above, albeit if guidance
issued in the previous year had been considered then more
emphasis may have been give to the fact that Hayley was pregnant
when assaulted.
39
The practice in Wiltshire Constabulary for a matter assessed as low
risk was that the officer in the investigation kept their own
investigation and, although the assistance of other colleagues could
and would be sought, the investigation remained their own to
progress when they were on duty.
There is evidence that OFFICER A and her sergeant supervisor did
make efforts to inform other shift teams of the investigation and the
need to arrest Mr QUINTAS. Officer C had assessed the
investigation as not to be a priority and it did not, therefore, attract
any specific priority attention or action at handover.
Both OFFICER A and Officer C would assume, given the referral to
the Domestic Violence Liaison Unit, that a Liaison Officer would
provide some continuity for Hayley during times when either or both
of the Police Officers were off-duty or unavailable.
The complaint is that the officer responsible for the investigation of
the assault did not ensure that, when she was not on duty, the
investigation was given to another officer to investigate. The IPCC
inquiry has established that OFFICER A was not under a duty to
ensure that such a handover took place. Indeed, it would have been
exceptional for her to seek this for an investigation of this type.
There is evidence that she made efforts to brief sergeants and
supervisors of other shifts that there was a need to arrest Mr
QUINTAS in connection with her investigation and neither this officer
nor her supervisor, Officer C, can be said to have failed to comply
with any practice or procedure then in force governing handover
arrangements.
Although practice in Wiltshire Constabulary has now changed
following Hayley’s murder, there is not sufficient evidence to support
this aspect of the complaint against these individual officers.
I therefore recommend that this specific complaint be
unsubstantiated.
In relation to the complaint as to the general standard of the
investigation, there is not sufficient evidence to show that OFFICER
A or her sergeant supervisor neglected their duty in pursuing this
investigation. Early contact was made with Hayley and a full
statement of evidence taken from her. She was conveyed to
hospital by OFFICER A for a check-up. OFFICER A completed the
necessary electronic crime report for the HERMES Tasker System
and forwarded an electronic referral to the Domestic Violence Unit
with all information needed by that Unit for it to act on the referral.
OFFICER A made several attempts to trace Mr QUINTAS at his
home and work addresses, collected a photograph of Mr QUINTAS
from Hayley to assist in his identification, and sought to arrest him
40
unsuccessfully at Wetherspoons public house on the afternoon of 7
June 2005. That she was frustrated in her attempts to trace and
arrest Mr QUINTAS is not a sign of a poor or failing investigation and
the IPCC inquiry must conclude that her response did not fall below
the standard required of officers in her position and with her
experience. To the extent that this complaint relates also to the
conduct of OFFICER A’s supervisor, Officer C, the IPCC inquiry
does not identify any specific failing in her supervision by this officer
such that it led to a ‘poor standard of investigation’.
Against both officers, therefore, I recommend that this specific
complaint be unsubstantiated.
However, I make observations below in relation to the overall
response of Wiltshire Constabulary to the assault on Hayley. As will
be seen, certain aspects of this response were undoubtedly of a
poor standard.
COMPLAINT CONCERNING FAILURE TO ARREST MR QUINTAS
AT WETHERSPOONS PUBLIC HOUSE (COMPLAINT 4)
That following information given to Hayley from a friend Steve
LEWIS that Mr QUINTAS was in The Sir Isaac Pitman
(Wetherspoons) public house in Trowbridge and this information
was given to the police and that no attempt was made to arrest
him.
SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE
OFFICER D
This officer faces an allegation of failing to be conscientious and
diligent in the performance of her duties in that she did not ensure
that efforts were made to effect the arrest of Mr QUINTAS when she
received notification from force control room that he was in
Wetherspoons public house, Trowbridge on Tuesday 7 June 2005.
OFFICER D’s shift pattern for the week commencing Sunday 5 June
2005 meant that she was one of the Duty Sergeants at Trowbridge
for Monday (07:00 – 16:00), Tuesday (07:00-16:00) and Wednesday
(15:00 – 23:00), and Thursday (16:00 – 01:00).
41
Our enquiries established that OFFICER D first became aware of
the Hayley RICHARDS incident on Tuesday 7 June at approximately
13.52 hrs. At this time she received a telephone call from the Control
Room operator stating that a female, Hayley RICHARDS, had rung
in to police to say that her ex boyfriend, Hugo QUINTAS, who was
wanted for arrest for assaulting her(ABH) was currently in the Sir
Isaac Pitman Public House (Wetherspoons), Trowbridge.
OFFICER D’s initial response to this request from Control Room was
that she would try to locate the crime file to ascertain the facts, but
that she did not have any officers available at that time, and if any
became available, then she would try and deal with it.
She stated to the call handler that the Investigating Officer on that
case, OFFICER A, was coming in for 3.00pm that afternoon and that
she would pass it on.
OFFICER D initially states that she checked the “Officer In Charge
(OIC) tray” for OFFICER A and that she could not find the file.
When further questioned on this area, OFFICER D seemed to
contradict her PNB entry stating that the file could well have been in
OFFICER A’s tray, or that of her probationer, WPC THATCHER.
However, she could not find their tray. Her reason for this was that
they had only recently started and that they may have not had a tray
designated to them.
OFFICER D stated that she did check the Hermes crime recording
system, which would have shown the log reference for this incident
(Log 353). This would then have allowed her to check the log and
get the incident details.
Our enquiries show that the log had details of Hayley’s home
address, and mobile. It also had details of Mr QUINTAS’ home
address and place of work and that he was Portuguese. The log also
describes the incident as an ABH domestic with injuries sustained
and that Hayley was approximately 10 weeks pregnant. There was
no risk assessment of the incident on the log.
OFFICER D believed that she checked the crime log, however,
could not remember the details. On the log Officer D would have
seen that OFFICER A had made several attempts the previous day
to locate Mr QUINTAS, both at his home address and place of work.
42
As the log did not have details of any risk assessment on the
incident, OFFICER D had no way of knowing how serious the ABH
had been. However, in line with Wiltshire’s positive arrest policy for
DV offences and the fact that the victim was pregnant, it should have
warranted a greater degree of interest.
Hayley’s call to the police to notify them that Mr QUINTAS was at
that time in Wetherspoons public house, Trowbridge, was an effort
on her behalf to aid the police in arresting MR QUINTAS for the
assault. This shows that Hayley was obviously trying to help to
ensure the arrest of Mr QUINTAS.
OFFICER D could have done things differently. She was due to end
her duty shift that day at 15.00 and OFFICER A was due on duty at
15.00 that day. The call from the Control Room was received at
13.52.
OFFICER D at interview described her role as an Acting Sergeant
as supervising, delegating and allocating work and sorting out the
clerical side. She stated that she was not going to be proactive in
her work.
At interview, when questioned, OFFICER D stated three main
reasons for not arresting Mr QUINTAS when he was reported as
being in the Sir Isaac Pitman Public House (Wetherspoons),
Trowbridge on Tuesday 7 June 2005. These are:
1 That there were no resources available to her to send
to the public house to arrest Mr QUINTAS.
2 That she could not locate the Investigating Officers
incident (crime) file and without this would not arrest,
as the file contained the evidence to charge.
3 That she could not attend the public house herself due
to “Health and Safety” reasons
OFFICER D could have sought more information from her officers
on duty to establish the relative importance of what they were doing
compared to effecting the arrest of a Domestic Violence offender
who was in a local pub.
43
She could have found out how long these officers were likely to be
committed for, how near to the pub they were on their committed
incidents and did their incidents still require both officers. Possibly
then one or more of these officers could have been redeployed to
effect Mr QUINTAS arrest so that OFFICER A would have her
prisoner.
This would have been in line with the priority and policy of Wiltshire
Constabulary concerning “positive action” for Domestic Violence
assaults.
Our enquiries have revealed that the resources committed
elsewhere were dealing with a man reported to be driving while
under the influence of drugs and a dog reported as in distress in a
car.
OFFICER D stated at interview that one of her reasons for not
arranging the arrest of Mr QUINTAS was that she did not have
enough information and could not locate the incident file.
The absence of a file itself is insufficient grounds to dismiss the
possibility of an arrest of a Domestic Violence offender who is known
to be in a local pub.
OFFICER D, as the person responsible for organising the arrest
resource could have sought more information from Hayley. Hayley
had, after all, contacted police in the first instance, being proactive in
relaying information which was to aid the police in arresting Mr
QUINTAS. One can safely assume that had Hayley received a call
back from OFFICER D, that she would have been able to help
further by providing any required information concerning the assault,
such as a description of Mr QUINTAS and to confirm that a
statement had been provided. OFFICER D would have been aware
of her contact details on the HERMES Incident Log 0353, which she
says she examined.
This would have provided some form of reassurance to Hayley that
her call was being actioned and that positive attempts were being
undertaken by Wiltshire Constabulary to apprehend Mr QUINTAS.
Although in her PNB she states that there were no resources to
send to the pub, at interview Officer D stated that, in addition to this,
44
she could not find the incident (crime) file. OFFICER D stated that
she would not arrest anyone without the file as this contains the
evidence to charge. Despite having knowledge of the incident from
the crime recording system, OFFICER D felt that this was not
enough information to warrant sending offices, if any had been
available, to the Sir Isaac Pitman Public House, and she decided to
wait for OFFICER A to come on duty at 15:00hrs.
As long as OFFICER D had reasonable grounds to suspect a
criminal offence had been committed she had grounds to arrest the
offender, or to allocate officers to arrest the offender.
Another element to consider is that OFFICER D was not OFFICER
A’s Supervisor and would not, therefore, have detailed knowledge of
the cases she had. However on checking the log, this information
would have been available to her. The log showed the attempts that
OFFICER A had made to locate Mr QUINTAS at both his home and
work addresses.
Despite this, OFFICER D was aware that OFFICER A had not
arrested Mr QUINTAS on Tuesday 7 June as on her following shift,
Wednesday 8 June, OFFICER D verbally told the oncoming
Sergeant that if Mr QUINTAS came to attention of officers, he was to
be arrested, but that positive steps to trace Hugo were not
necessary. It is disappointing that she did not make greater efforts
to follow her own instruction the previous day.
OFFICER D stated that the call from Hayley had initially gone into
the call room handler and details had been taken. They had then
been passed to the Control Room with the view to operate a patrol
to try to deal with the arrest. She states that she became involved
because there were no patrols to deal with the arrest because they
were all committed. The Control Room felt that they could task a
patrol to effect the arrest from the information they had on the log. It
is confusing to understand why OFFICER D, based on the same
information, dismissed any chance of effecting arrest, because she
could not locate the crime file.
OFFICER D states she did not have the evidence to hand to act on.
She stated that, because she couldn’t locate the file, she did not
think that any Custody Sergeant would proceed with the charge or
accept the arrested person for detention in custody. Her role is to
provide resources to effect arrests, it is the role of the Custody
Sergeant to decide what evidence is needed to proceed with the
45
charge.
OFFICER D appears not to have considered arresting Mr QUINTAS
and then to get OFFICER A to liaise with the Custody Suite in regard
to the file when she came on duty within the hour.
It is important to note that, due to the lack of resources OFFICER D
stated she could not have gone to Wetherspoons on her own to
arrest Mr QUINTAS due to “Health and Safety” reasons. Wiltshire
Constabulary have a “Generic Risk Assessment” regarding “single
crew policing” and each officer may patrol and act on their own
depending upon the circumstances, taking into account time of day
and area etc. The force do not have a specific policy regarding
female police officers attending incidents on their own.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
When Hayley telephoned the police, reporting that Mr QUINTAS had
just been seen in the Wetherspoons public house in Trowbridge, a
real opportunity to arrest him and progress the investigation
presented itself to Wiltshire Constabulary. However, OFFICER A,
the officer in the case, was not due to report for duty for another 70
minutes. It was likely that an immediate or at least a rapid response
would be necessary if he was likely still to be at the pub when police
arrived.
Four police constables (two in each of two vehicles) and an acting
sergeant supervisor (at Trowbridge Police Station) comprised the
shift’s resources at that time. When the call was received by the
Control Room both mobile patrols were already assigned to other
tasks and neither could be sent immediately to Wetherspoons. It is
clear however, that if officers had been available, then the Control
Room would have assigned them to this arrest, given the information
found on the Hermes Log. In the event, OFFICER D was passed
Hayley’s report specifically because of this non-deployment and it
became her responsibility to deal with it since, as supervisor, she
could review those assignments and redeploy if she judged this
necessary.
In reaching its conclusions as to this officer’s response to the arrest
opportunity, the IPCC inquiry found there were two possible
alternative explanations consistent with the evidence:
Either:
OFFICER D noted OFFICER A’s planned arrival on duty at 3pm
46
that day ie in 70 minutes time and without seeking any further
information about the investigation or the crime victim, she
judged that the call could wait for OFFICER A to action when she
came on duty;
Or:
She tried unsuccessfully to locate the arrest file and decided that
without it no lawful arrest could take place and that the call would
have to wait for OFFICER A to action when she reported for duty.
What is clear from the evidence, including the officer’s statements in
interview, is that she did not review the then deployment of
resources in order to assess whether Hayley’s report and the arrest
opportunity affected this at all. What were the available officers
assigned to? The IPCC has established that one car with two
officers was dealing with a report of a car driven by a man who had
consumed drugs; the other car was dealing with a report of a
distressed dog in a locked car. Could one or some of these officers
be redeployed to enable an early response to the reported sighting
of Mr QUINTAS? There is no evidence to show that OFFICER D
undertook such an evaluation and it did not feature in the account of
her actions.
For domestic violence investigations, Wiltshire Constabulary had at
the time a “positive arrest” policy. When asked in interview why she
did not go herself alone to arrest Mr QUINTAS, OFFICER D stated
that for health and safety reasons she would not contemplate doing
so in a public house as a solitary officer. Although other officers we
have spoken to would not, apparently, have felt such limitations and
would have gone alone to the pub to attempt to arrest the suspect,
the Officer Bould have called on other resources had she decided
that Mr QUINTAS needed to be arrested as soon as possible. Two
of the four officers on patrol were assigned to deal with a distressed
dog. One, with a car, could have been redeployed to accompany
OFFICER D to effect the necessary arrest. If this had been
successful, it would have delivered the suspect to custody at
precisely the time the officer in the case reported for duty.
If OFFICER D simply decided that OFFICER A should attempt to
arrest Mr QUINTAS later that afternoon, then I consider she failed in
the performance of her duties as a shift supervisor. It was open to
her to redirect resources so as to achieve a rapid response and she
did not consider doing so.
If the alternative explanation reflects what happened, then we
cannot accept OFFICER D’ objection to directing officers to arrest
without an arrest file being to hand. Indeed, on the basis of her
answers in interview, I am not certain that the officer did make the
search for this file in the way she asserted. The IPCC has learned
47
nothing to suggest that the arrest file was missing or mislaid or that
OFFICER A would have found herself unable to justify her arrest to
the custody officer had she detained Mr QUINTAS and presented
him at Melksham. Control Room staff would have deployed to arrest
Mr QUINTAS on the basis of the information on the Hermes Log. If
this indeed was OFFICER D’ position, rather than simply to wait for
OFFICER A to report in, then it was not consistent with this practical
approach and in my view was excessively cautious and inflexible. As
a result, precious time and a clear opportunity for an arrest were
lost.
When OFFICER A came on duty she visited Hayley, obtained a
photo of Mr QUINTAS and went with two other officers to
Wetherspoons’ pub to try to arrest him. But by this time he had left
the premises and so evaded arrest. There is no guarantee that a
speedier response to Hayley’s call would have yielded an arrest but
the chances would have been greater and Hayley would have
witnessed a more determined and positive reaction than the one she
actually saw that day.
For these reasons, I consider this complaint to be substantiated.
COMPLAINT CONCERNING THE FAILURE TO ARREST MR
QUINTAS BY TRAFFIC OFFICERS ON 10 JUNE 2005
(COMPLAINT 5)
That on two separate occasions following Hayley’s complaint of
assault to the police, Mr QUINTAS was stopped by the police but
not arrested.
SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE
Mr QUINTAS was stopped on 10 June 2005 at approximately 14:20
hours by Wiltshire traffic officers, Officer E and Officer F.
Mr QUINTAS was stopped whilst driving a black Rover 214 car,
registration number L857 SOR. He was stopped in Bythesea Road,
Trowbridge for what is described by the officers as a “damaged rear
near side tail light assembly, showing white light to the rear.”
He had a passenger in the car, namely Sergio DA CUNHA, who was
seated in the front passenger seat.
48
There is no evidence of a second police stop, whether on foot or in a
car, on MR QUINTAS between the dates of 5 June 2005 and 11
June 2005, despite media reports stating otherwise. This forms one
of the family’s complaints. It is likely that the family formed this
belief from the aforementioned media reports at the time of Hayley
RICHARDS’ death.
The media reports may have arisen from the information that Mr
QUINTAS was stopped in April 2005 as well as on 10 June 2005.
What may also have misled the family was the reference made by
Wiltshire Constabulary’s Assistant Chief Constable, Mr Peter
VAUGHAN, in the early press releases following the murder,
reporting that the police had two opportunities to arrest Mr QUINTAS
during the week of the murder. A natural assumption from this is that
they would have had actual contact with him twice. This could refer
to the information given to police that Mr QUINTAS was in Sir Isaac
Pitman Public House (Wetherspoons) on Tuesday 7 June 2005.
Both officers face a complaint and allegation of failing to be
conscientious and diligent in the performance of their duties in that
they failed to arrest Mr QUINTAS when he was stopped on 10 June
2005 in vehicle L857 SOR, when wanted for arrest for a serious
assault.
On 10 June 2005 OFFICER E was teamed with OFFICER F on
traffic duties. Both these officers are from the Melksham area.
At the time of the incident, OFFICER E had been a serving officer
since 1992 and had been on “traffic aid” secondment for
approximately three months, with a view to gaining experience in
and familiarity with the role. OFFICER F is an experienced traffic
officer with some 15 years experience and was acting as a tutor to
his partner OFFICER E.
As a tutor, part of his responsibility was to ensure OFFICER E dealt
with drivers effectively and that it would be his own responsibility in
relation to specialist parts of traffic policy, but not for run-of-the-mill
cases where his role would be to monitor and explain if there was an
easier way to complete or point out any errors.
OFFICER E had completed a Police National Computer (PNC)
check on the vehicle at 14:20 hours on 10 June 2005, in tandem to
49
stopping the vehicle and speaking to Mr QUINTAS.
Transaction enquiries showed that the recorded registered keeper of
the vehicle was Miss
H of 75, Radbury Wood View,
Marlborough, Wiltshire.
A Force Intelligence Database check was also completed on the car
at 14:21 on 10 June 2005. Both OFFICER E and OFFICER F cannot
recall requesting this to be done and believe it may have been done
as an extra check by Control Room.
Neither the PNC check nor the Force Intelligence Database check
on the vehicle would have given any evidence to OFFICER E and
OFFICER F that Mr QUINTAS was wanted for arrest.
After stopping the vehicle OFFICER E spoke to the driver, Mr
QUINTAS outside, at the rear of the car and OFFICER F spoke to
the passenger, Mr DA CUNHA, who remained in the passenger
seat.
OFFICER F explained that this is their standard practice when
stopping motor vehicles containing more than one person. In this
case he obtained information from the passenger and OFFICER E
obtained information from the driver, which could then be compared
if they had any cause for suspicion.
Both OFFICER E and OFFICER F stated that neither Mr QUINTAS
nor Mr DA CUNHA appeared suspicious to them or nervous during
their stop.
OFFICER E has stated that they stopped the vehicle to advise the
driver about the defective tail light and to point out the offence to the
driver.
OFFICER E has stated at interview that his conversation with Mr
QUINTAS was limited to the defective tail light and his ownership of
the car.
Concerning his ownership of the car, Mr QUINTAS told OFFICER E
that he had very recently purchased the car and produced to
50
OFFICER E a tear off portion of the V5 document, (which is the
registration document for the car) which would act as a temporary
log book for the car that the new owner keeps until they receive the
full V5 document back from the DVLA.
The V5 tear off which Mr QUINTAS produced to OFFICER E had Mr
QUINTAS’ name and address in the section headed “Keepers Name
and Address”.
However, this had been written over a tippexed portion of the V5
tear off form.
OFFICER E stated that he then held up the V5 tear off slip up to the
sunlight and could quite clearly see through the V5 that Miss
HH
had written her name and address underneath the tippex.
OFFICER E stated that the new V5 forms, of which this was one, to
be very confusing and he believed that Miss
H
had filled out
the bottom part of the form by mistake before giving it to Mr
QUINTAS and that he had added his details to it.
The documentation supplied to the officers correlated with the
information which they already knew from the PNC request, that the
registered keeper was Miss
H.
The tippex on the V5 tear off document provided to OFFICER E by
Mr QUINTAS was held up to the light and revealed the details of the
registered keeper written underneath which corresponded to their
PNC information.
OFFICER E believed that Mr QUINTAS was plausible and no
suspicion had been aroused. If they had suspected anything
untoward then both OFFICER E and OFFICER F stated at interview
that they would have carried out further checks.
No PNC check or Force Intelligence checks were performed on Mr
QUINTAS. If a name check on PNC had been conducted, there
wouldn’t have been any information/reports on the assault. If a
Force Intelligence Check had been carried out on Mr QUINTAS, the
crime report containing details of the assault would have been found
together with the crucial information that he was a suspect for the
51
offence and was wanted.
OFFICER E issued the driver of the car, Mr QUINTAS with a Home
Office Road Traffic 1 (HO/RT1) form instructing Mr QUINTAS to
produce his documents within seven days at Trowbridge police
station. The documents required to be produced were his driving
licence, the vehicle registration document, an MOT certificate and
Insurance. This is to verify the legality of a vehicle on the road and
the HO/RT1 system was introduced to enable drivers stopped to
produce their documents at their local police stations as these
documents are rarely all carried with them.
Wiltshire Constabulary does not have a written policy on stopping
vehicles which commit traffic offences. However, there are best
practices to which traffic officers adhere.
There is no policy instructing officers, who stop a vehicle for a road
traffic offence, to make PNC checks. It is down to the discretion of
the officer. It would not be best practice to undertake a PNC check
every time a vehicle is stopped as it may be impractical in the
circumstances and each decision should be based on its own merits.
When a vehicle is stopped, a number of different forms could be
issued to the driver: a HO/RT1 form, for the driver to produce their
driving documents to a police station within seven days; a VDRS
form where the driver needs to get their car repaired within a specific
period; Fixed Penalty Notices; Words of Advice, where there is no
form, but the officer may make a note of it in their PNB.
An officer has a certain amount of discretion when it comes to
stopping a vehicle and that it is not always necessary to do a PNC
check on its occupants. It would be down to the circumstances and
the type of offence committed. Despite relying on officer’s
discretion, in the majority of cases, a PNC check is expected to be
done on the vehicle or person as experience may tell the officer that,
if the driver does not comply with the terms of the HO/RT1, then they
will be requested to do a prosecution file. Within this file a PNC
result would be required.
A local intelligence database check on a driver or passenger is not
routinely expected to be conducted. However, if, from experience or
local knowledge, the driver is known, then the officer is expected to
conduct a local intelligence check.
52
OFFICER F believed that the decision to run an intelligence check
on a vehicle would depend on many factors, such as the time of day
and the area.
OFFICER F understood that a PNC check would be carried out on a
vehicle to see if there are any markers, for health and safety
reasons.
In regard to running PNC checks on persons, OFFICER F stated
that this was not routinely done on every person, but if a vehicle was
stopped in an area with a high incidence of burglary, or if the driver
had no means of identification, then it should be considered.
Officers’ discretion plays a large part in the decision-making as to
what checks should be conducted. Accepted best practice in
Wiltshire is to conduct PNC checks on either the vehicle or the driver
/ passenger, but there are no requirements for an officer to do either.
On 29 April 2005, Mr QUINTAS was issued with a HO/RT1 when he
was driving a Ford Probe, L513 YDG. The ticket was issued by a PC
CATCHPOLE. Mr QUINTAS did not produce his documents, but
further action was not taken timeously by the local Criminal Justice
Unit until the time when Mr QUINTAS was due to be extradited from
Spain for the murder of Hayley.
Although it was OFFICER E dealing with Mr QUINTAS, OFFICER F
was aware that the V5 document had tippex on the part where the
name is filled out.
OFFICER F, believed that the tippex covered only the start of Mr
QUINTAS’ name and instead of crossing the text out, had decided to
use tippex. OFFICER F believed that this was simply an error.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OFFICER E stopped this car because of a small defect in one of the
rear red lights. When illuminated, some white light was visible
through a small hole in the coloured plastic light housing. Instead of
reporting the driver for this defect, OFFICER E decided to warn him
and advise him to have the defect repaired as soon as possible.
53
This was an entirely reasonable and satisfactory response to the
circumstances which presented themselves. The car was stopped
under Section 163 Road Traffic Act 1988 which also empowers an
officer to ask the driver for driving documents
(licence/insurance/MOT/V5 registration document).
OFFICER E arranged for a Police National Computer and local
intelligence database check on the car and this disclosed nothing
suspicious except that the name of the registered keeper, Miss
H
, was not that of the driver. However, the driver produced part
of the V5 registration document which OFFICER E took to examine.
This is the part of the document which a recent purchaser would
possess prior to sending it to the DVLA. The document has preprinted details on it and a space for the new purchaser to insert their
name and address. Mr QUINTAS’ name appeared written over an
area of tippex and the officer stated that he held the document to the
light and found that it showed Miss
H
below the tippex.
No part of the pre-printed area of the form had been altered.
The officer’s evidence is that he assumed a mistake had been made
and this was an explanation for the former owner’s name appearing
under the current owner’s. Nothing which the IPCC inquiry has
learned casts doubt on this explanation, nor shows that it was a
wrong assumption for the officer to make, or that Mr QUINTAS did
not have legal possession of the vehicle, having genuinely bought it
from Miss
H .
Clearly, if the officer was suspicious as to that fact or ought
reasonably to have been suspicious, then a PNC check against the
name given by the driver would have provided him with an
opportunity to check the bona fides of the driver and discover if
anything was known about him which might cast doubt on his
account of honest ownership.
Some police officers may have remained sceptical in the
circumstances, but I do not conclude that either of these officers
ought to have remained suspicious and therefore ought to have
undertaken further checks, this time against Mr QUINTAS’ name.
Mr QUINTAS was not a qualified driver, holding only a provisional
licence permitting him to drive only with a qualified driver in the front
passenger seat beside him. His passenger on this occasion (Mr DA
CUNHA) was not such a fully qualified driver and Mr QUINTAS was,
therefore, driving without the required licence, a criminal offence.
Where a motor vehicle driver is not known to the officer who has
required the stop and, specifically, not known to be committing a
driving offence, then it is the issue of a ‘producer’ form (HO/RT1)
which initiates an investigation of their licence status.
If they do not, in response to the ‘producer’ provide within the time
54
limit the necessary licence details, then the illegal driving may be
disclosed and prosecution action follow after they have been
reported for summons. Traffic officers are not expected to
challlenge a driver’s assertion that they have a licence, nor to
question a person as to its type (full or provisonal) and, if the latter,
whether a passenger present holds the necessary full driving
licence.
OFFICER E had conducted a check against the car and issued the
driver with a form HO/RT1. The evidence shows he had discovered
enough about the V5 to satisfy himself that it was not suspicious, nor
was the driver’s possession of this car.
Neither OFFICER E nor OFFICER F were aware that Hugo
QUINTAS was wanted for his assault on Hayley. They are both
traffic officers from the Melksham area, not Trowbridge, and had not
been briefed orally or otherwise that Mr QUINTAS was wanted. If
OFFICER E had asked for a PNC local intelligence check against
the name QUINTAS, then the latter database would have revealed
that he was wanted for arrest for the assault and, although it is likely
that the officer would have sought more information to follow this up,
an arrest could well have resulted from such enquiries. Once he
learned of the driver’s ‘wanted’ status, he would have been under a
duty to follow this up and prevent Mr QUINTAS from leaving whilst
he did so.
However, the IPCC’s inquiry has produced no evidence to show that
OFFICER E was under any operational duty or practical expectation
that he would automatically check the driver’s details WHETHER OR
NOT there was a reason or justification for this, arising from the
Road Traffic Act. A police force could decide that all drivers stopped
under Section 163 Road Traffic Act 1988 would have their
identification details checked against the PNC and the local force
intelligence database. Such a ‘trawl’ would undoubtedly, from time
to time, lead a police officer to those liable to arrest and, no doubt,
some arrests would follow. However, this was not the rule in
Wiltshire Constabulary at this time and, were it to become so, it
would need to enjoy public confidence if it were not to be perceived
as just another unreasonable and oppressive extension to police
surveillance, particularly by members of minority communities.
I recommend that, on the available evidence, this complaint be
unsubstantiated.
COMPLAINT OF FAILURES REGARDING PHOTOGRAPHS OF
HAYLEY’S INJURIES (COMPLAINT 6)
That a police photographer failed to turn up to take photographs of
55
Hayley’s injuries following assault and instead the photographs
were taken by a uniformed female police constable using a
disposable camera.
SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE
CRIME SCENE INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT
All incidents that require the services of the CSI Department are
electronically tasked to them via a system known as CSI TASKER.
Tasks for the CSI personnel are allocated via STORM logs by Force
Operations Room. These logs are created by the force operations
room in response to incidents and crimes and record all available
details relating to these. They are updated as events unfold and as
officers report back developments. They provide an electronic log of
individual incidents and are used to tag and request the services of
any specialist department. Any STORM log needing follow up action
by a CSI will be placed on a separate database on the system
known as CSI TASKER. All such “tagged” incidents will be received
electronically by the CSI Department.
At the time of the assault upon Hayley RICHARDS, the procedure
followed by the CSI Department on receipt of “tagged” incidents via
TASKER was to print out the electronic logs and then request
Control room to remove the “tag” from the CSI TASKER system. By
doing this the incidents would become untagged and would not be
re-referred to CSI again, but they would still remain on the STORM
log system.
OFFICER A requested the CSI tag be added on to STORM log
number 20050605/0353 on the 5 June 2005 at 19:46:25. This was
the log concerning the assault upon Hayley.
The CSIs on duty would check their TASKER system for work and
would allocate the tasks needed completing amongst themselves,
normally on a geographical split between North of the Division and
South of the Division together with an awareness of priority of order
in which jobs need to be completed.
Officer J was the CSI who was actioned to take the photographs of
56
Hayley’s injuries on 6 June 2005.
His hours of work on the 6 June 2005 were 08:00 to 16:00.
The Supervisor of the CSI department is Officer I who supervises
five CSIs. They all work shifts.
According to their policy, CSIs must photograph all domestic
violence injuries. There is no need to photograph other minor
assaults, unless there is an exceptional reason. This policy has been
in place for a number of years, in agreement with the CPS.
At the time of the incident there were no specific targets for when a
job had to be done. It appears from our enquiries that the
photographers try and complete the same day during their shift, but
if they can’t, then the job either gets passed on to another CSI for
completion or retained if they are available the next day.
The working practice of the CSI department was that if a CSI was
unable to complete all his jobs in his shift and needed to pass them
on for completion, they left all unfinished jobs for the following shift
with the use of pending boards. This was a clip board hanging on
the office wall for the next shift to pick up.
OFFICER J – CSI PHOTOGRAPHER
This civilian staff officer faces an allegation of failing to be
conscientious and diligent in his duties, in that he failed to ensure
that the photographs of Hayley RICHARDS as a result of the assault
were taken and that he failed to hand the task over to another CSI
photographer for completion.
Our enquiries have shown that Officer J rang Hayley RICHARDS at
approximately 13:30 hours on the 6 June 2005 to arrange a time that
afternoon to call to photograph her. She wasn’t available that day
and arranged an appointment for the afternoon on the following day,
7 June 2005.
It seems that Officer J then put the job on the pending board having
marked ‘for PM on the 7th’ for the shift covering 14:00 – 22:00.
57
There is no corroborative evidence recording that he did this. There
appears to be no audit trail for this action as the text box on the CSI
TASKER programme is there to record any relevant information and
that it was not normal practice, to record in this text box that the
photographer was leaving the job for another shift.
Officer J then went on rest days until the following Monday, 13 June
2005.
WHEN Officer J came back off rest days on Monday, 13 June 2005,
he heard about the murder of Hayley RICHARDS and asked around
the office to see who went to take photographs of the original assault
injuries. It appeared that nobody had any knowledge of it.
It did not get done by any other CSI. We have not been able to
determine definitively the reason for this due to the lack of available
evidence. Firstly it is possible that the log print out was not put on
the pending board by Officer J. Secondly, if it was put on the
pending board by Officer J it is possible that it was removed but not
actioned. No CSI has reported doing this. Thirdly, photographs of
Hayleys injuries were taken, but were never handed in to be
developed. If photographs were taken then only Hayley and the
photographer would know and our enquiries have not identified the
photographer.
The Murder Enquiry attempted to trace photographs of the injuries
sustained by Hayley following her assault, without success. The
IPCC Investigation then instigated a force wide e-mail which was
sent on the 6 February 2006 at 11:20 hours to establish whether any
officer took any photographs of Hayley’s injuries. No response was
received.
From our enquiries Wiltshire Constabulary’s photography printing
department has not developed any photographs of Hayley’s injuries,
nor did they receive any undeveloped film.
At interview OFFICER A confirmed that she did not take any
photographs of Hayley’s injuries and to date no other officer has
come forward with any further information.
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However, OFFICER A stated she was told by Hayley on 7 June
2005 in the afternoon between 15:00 and 18:30 that a CSI had come
to take photographs of her injuries. This was when she was visiting
Hayley to collect a photograph of Mr QUINTAS for her arrest file.
On Tuesday 7 June at 11:39 Hayley had also texted a relative to say
that she was waiting for a phone call from a police photographer, the
assumption is to arrange a time to photograph her injuries. This
corresponds with Officer J’s recollection that he spoke to Hayley
RICHARDS the day before and arranged a PM appointment for
Tuesday.
There are no female CSIs working at Melksham and covering the
area of Trowbridge.
Officer J did telephone Hayley RICHARDS when he was tasked the
job and made attempts to arrange an appropriate time to take
photographs of the injuries.
In line with the general practice, Officer J states that he put the job
on the clipboard on the job pending board, clearly marked for the
attention of the next shift, as he was on rest days.
The job print out was never picked up by any other CSI and to this
day the print out has never been found.
It is of deep concern that no photographs can be found of Hayley
RICHARDS’ injuries, Of greater concern is the fact that the CSI
department can not locate the log print out after it was printed out
and “untagged” from the system and put on the pending board. Nor
can the CSI Department confirm if any other action was taken.
I find it difficult to believe that such a highly technical unit relied at
the time upon an archaic and unauditable system for allocating and
tracking their work. There was also no overseeing supervision within
CSI that can answer the question as to what happened to the
missing log print out.
Officer J has stated that obviously an error has been made
somewhere along the line, though he is happy in his own mind that
the job was put on the pending board. However, whether he actually
59
did or not and whether anybody picked it up or not, cannot be
established.
We cannot identify whose neglect caused this failure. It must be
considered that the missing log print out may not be due to
coincidence and that it may have gone “missing” after the murder
occurred, since it or the person in possession of the log print out
may have pointed to who was responsible for the failure to take
photographs.
It is regrettable that following investigation there is still only a limited
understanding of the truth in this area of complaint. It could be
argued that it appears all too convenient.
OFFICER I – CSI SUPERVISOR
This civilian officer faces an allegation of failing to be conscientious
and diligent in his duties to supervise the CSI department in
ensuring the continued progress of photographing the injuries of
Hayley RICHARDS following her assault, and that this supervision
was of a poor standard.
Officer I is the supervisor of five CSIs in Melksham Basic Command
Unit (BCU), and has the sole responsibility for the day to day running
of the CSI unit. He also caters for any of the CSIs needs or welfare
as required in his role as line manager. He also acts as a Crime
Scene Manager for major crimes inquiries and as a co-ordinater for
major crime incidents.
Officer I has been a CSI for 14 years and a Supervisor for five years.
Officer I’s duties that week were 6 June 2005 – 14:00 – 22:00 and
off duty for the 5 and 7 June 2005.
Officer I did not allocate the tasking of photographing. It is the issue
of supervision that is being looked at.
Officer I had not had any formal management training.
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The allocation and prioritisation of the daily work was done by the
CSIs. Officer I had no input into the allocation of work on a daily
basis unless there was a problem, such as someone being unable to
do something allocated for some reason, or if there was a query in
terms of prioritisation and he would intervene and pass judgement .
Officer I’s responsibility is to ensure the department is running
correctly.
One of Officer I’s responsibilities is to check if log print outs are done
and to check that there is nothing left on the office pending board.
If Officer I is not on shift there is no other supervisor. A stand in is
only appointed if Officer I is away for more than one week.
As part of Officer I’s shift he states he would have checked the
TASKER system and the office pending board for any log print outs
which had not been completed. There would normally be an
explanation written by the CSIs on any outstanding log print outs.
Officer I stated that he had an experienced team of CSIs.
The general system within the CSI Department was that each shift of
CSIs would interrogate the CSI TASKER electronic system for logs
tasked to them, print off the logs and then request control room to
delete the CSI tag.
This resulted in no record remaining on CSI TASKER and therefore
no way of checking if a task had been completed apart from the
paper based log print out produced by CSI at the time the incident
was “de-tagged”. Therefore the benefits of the TASKER system
were not fully utilised. The reason this was done was that these
tasks would continue to be shown on the CSI TASKER system until
they had been completed, causing a large number of duplicated
tasked cases to check through.
Officer I does not recall ever seeing the Hayley RICHARDS job on
the pending board and states that he would have viewed the board
at the end of his shift, since it is a visual reminder.
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IT have now installed a new facility - a green tick icon can be added
by the CSI on each task to show that they are aware of it. The task
is not removed until it is completed, therefore showing that it has
been tasked and completed.
In my opinion, Officer I has supervised to a minimum standard with
having little or no involvement in the day to day allocation and
prioritisation of work. He has relied on the experience of the CSI
team. It would benefit the CSI department at Melksham if their
supervisor had a more active role in the control and evaluation of the
work that they do.
It has taken the issue of a misconduct allegation notice for Officer I
to be prompted to contact Mr Brian PICKLES, the Head of Crime
Scene Investigation, to highlight that there is a worrying shortcoming
within the CSI allocation of work system.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Photographic evidence of the injury caused to Hayley during
QUINTAS’ assault upon her was important and it was acknowledged
that, in Domestic Violence cases, the CSI Department would obtain
such evidence. If photographs had been taken, then it is reasonable
to conclude that these would have surfaced, either in the CSI
Department at Melksham Police Station or, if they had not been
taken by CSI but by a uniformed officer, then at Trowbridge Police
Station. No photographs or negatives have been traced and the
IPCC inquiry has concluded that no photographs were taken by
Wiltshire Constabulary.
Specifically, a Crime Scene Investigator did not attend to take the
photographs and this specific complaint is therefore substantiated.
However, the inquiry has not been able to identify who in the CSI
Department was responsible for this failure. There is evidence that
the job was allocated, but that the CSI initially allocated was not then
available at a time when Hayley was available to have the
photographs taken. The IPCC’s investigation has not been able to
establish whether the failure in service then resulted from a
handover failure or a neglect by staff responsible for picking up this
task from the previous shift.
The inquiry has shown that this Department had a very weak system
for monitoring outstanding work and the fact that the paper job
docket relating to this task is now missing and cannot be traced is
62
evidence of that.
That the docket is mislaid may, in itself, explain why the task was not
undertaken. Alternatively, it may have been removed or destroyed
so as not to provide evidence of neglect. Whatever may be the
reason, I understand that the monitoring and audit system has now
substantially changed and we comment on this further below when
discussing organisational learning and recommendations.
To clarify an outstanding point, this complaint also stated that the
photographs were taken “by a uniformed female PC”, which we have
found no evidence to support. This part of the complaint I
recommend is therefore unsubstantiated.
ALLEGATION CONCERNING RESPONSE OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE UNIT
This did not form part of a complaint but was investigated under
Discipline Notice.
According to the Wiltshire Constabulary Domestic Violence Policy,
the role and actions of a Domestic Violence Liaison Officer (DVLO)
are to:
- Monitor on a daily basis the Domestic Violence 1 (DV1) forms
that have been submitted by email.
- Should pass the DV1 forms to the unit administrator, where
the details are entered onto a spreadsheet. If there is a
request for immediate contact, the DV1 form is handed
straight back to the DVLO
- Administrator then enters information on to OPTIMUS – the
Domestic Violence Intelligence System
- DV1 forms are then passed back to the DVLO
- DVLO checks submitted DV1 forms to ensure that
appropriate police action has been taken.
- Incidents that require remedial action are to be brought to the
attention of the Crime Prevention Unit Sergeant for further
enquiry and, where necessary, the provision of appropriate
guidance to the officer(s) who dealt with the initial incident.
- Identify repeat victimisation
- Ensure the victims of Domestic Violence are aware of the
support that can be obtained from other agencies and
voluntary organisations. Liaise with other agencies and other
voluntary organisations to ensure that victims receive
appropriate support. Sharing information if pertinent with
external organisations
The policy also states that DVLOs and the Headquarters
Community Safety Sergeant will receive specialist training to deal
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with domestic violence, and that all officers will receive appropriate
training to effectively assist the victims of domestic violence and
associated issues.
In the Domestic Violence Unit the working practice was to input DV1
forms rather than personally contact the victims which these forms
referred to. The system was organised and run in a bureaucratic
way, in that until all backlogs of DV1 forms are secured on the
recording system, victims are not contacted.
OFFICER H – DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LIAISON OFFICER
This officer faces an allegation that she failed to be conscientious
and diligent in her duties to ensure that contact was made with
Hayley RICHARDS until Friday 10 June 2005, despite OFFICER A
indicating on the DV1 form that immediate follow up enquiries were
needed by a DVLO.
Officer H at the time of the incident was a DVLO based at
Melksham, a civilian staff officer who had worked in the DV unit for
approximately three and a half years. Her supervisor within the
Domestic Violence Unit was OFFICER G.
Officer H’s role as a DVLO was to monitor domestic violence in ‘C’
Division, to raise awareness of domestic violence, and to assist
colleagues to deal with domestic violence incidents.
The Domestic Violence unit is considered to be a specialist unit that
is there to offer informed advice to victims.
There are two DVLO’s, covering North and West Wiltshire. One
being Officer H, the other being PC 1206 ROBERT.
The domestic violence unit is open Monday to Friday from 08:00 to
17:00. There is no weekend cover.
OFFICER G is the Supervisor of both the Vulnerable Adults and
Domestic Violence Units based at Melksham.
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There is no dedicated administrator support post for the Domestic
Violence Unit. It has two administrators from other units who provide
support when time allows.
Their support consists of inputting DV1 forms onto their intelligence
recording system which is known as OPTIMUS.
This information is then put on an excel spreadsheet for actioning.
Neither Officer H nor PC ROBERT have had specific, specialised
domestic violence training.
Wiltshire uses a 2000 Domestic Violence Policy, and at the time of
the Hayley RICHARDS incident had not yet adopted the latest
ACPO policy and guidelines issued in 2003/2004.
Our enquiries have shown that the action of the DVLO, Officer H,
assigned to the Hayley RICHARDS case, was as follows:
- On Sunday 5 June 2005 OFFICER A e-mailed the DV1 form
marked for immediate response over to the Domestic
Violence Unit.
- On Monday 6 June 2005 the Domestic Violence UnitUnit
receive the DV1 form.
- Probably mid-week, Officer H entered the referral information
on to OPTIMUS system.
- On Friday 10 June 2005 OFFICER H’s attempts to call
Hayley RICHARDS by phone are unsuccessful as there is no
answer, Officer H only had Hayley’s home phone number on
the DV1 form. The Log created by OFFICER A had Hayley’s
mobile number but this had not been entered on the DV1
form.
- Officer H records that the call was unsuccessful on the DV1
form.
Officer H does not monitor the DV1 forms that get submitted on a
daily basis due to the lack of administrative support and the fact that
during 5 –10 June the unit did not have any administrative report.
Therefore she had to work through a backbacklog of DV1 forms.
During the week of 5-10 June 2005 37 incidents were reported, of
which 24 were notified on 6 June 2005. Officer H and OFFICER G
65
have stated that this situation was not unusual as the Domestic
Violence Unit was not open at the weekends.
PC 1206 ROBERT had also been off work for the previous week.
Officer H does usually pass on the DV1 forms to an administrator
when they are available to input the details onto the spreadsheet.
Officer H does this herself when there is no administrative support.
There was no administrative support during the week of 6–10 June
2005.
During the week of the 6-10 June 2005, due to the backbacklog of
DV1 forms that had been submitted over the weekend, the DV1
forms that came in then, were printed off and entered onto the
spreadsheet by Officer H later on that week.
Despite the fact that the DV1 form had beenmarked “immediate
follow up needed” this was not treated as an urgent action for the
following reasons:
- the majority of DV1 forms are marked immediate whether it is
needed or not
- Officer H as well as completing her DVLO role was also
undertaking the admin support role
- There was a backbacklog of DV1 forms to action
Officer H did enter the Hayley Richards’ DV1 form on to OPTIMUS
possibly mid week.
On 10 June as OFFICER H came to the Hayley RICHARDS DV1
form having worked through some of the backbacklog, she
attempted to call Hayley, there was no answer and OFFICER H’s
standard practice is not to leave messages on answer phones for
domestic violence incidents.
In light of the evidence gathered, I have to consider whether Officer
H failed in the performance of her duties as a DVLO.
Officer H had no specialist training as a DVLO.
Officer H has only ever job shadowed the in post DVLO for two
66
months when she first joined.
At interview, Officer H stated that she did not believe that she had
had enough training to complete her duties.
If specialised training had been provided staff may have been more
aware that delays in contacting victims of Domestic Violence can
affect their confidence and early contact provides reassurance in the
fact that actions have been taken on their behalf. Victims of
Domestic Violence understandably feel insecure and isolated and
the reassurance of a point of contact from a specialist officer dealing
with their circumstances is vital in the overall investigation process.
Officer H was aware of a Centrex training package for Domestic
Violence, but this had not been provided to staff working within
Wiltshire Constabulary.
This, as well as the fact that Officer H during that week was not only
doing her own role as a DVLO but also covering the administration
role that week, means that Officer H was working to full capacity and
beyond in attempting to ensure that the DV1 forms were completed
that week.
OFFICER A was known to the Domestic Violence Unit as the officer
dealing with this domestic assault, she was known to be a
competent officer who would herself be following up enquiries and
calling Hayley back. This may also have had an effect upon the lack
of prompt response from the Domestic Violence Unit.
OFFICER G
This officer faces an allegation of misconduct in that he failed in his
performance of duties as supervisor of the Domestic violence Unit,
to ensure the duties of the DVLO were effective and complete and
also did not ensure the welfare and safety of Hayley RICHARDS due
to the length of time taken to follow up the response required
following the referral of the DV1 form.
OFFICER G manages the Vulnerable Adults and Domestic Violence
Units at Melksham. The two units were amalgamated in June 2003.
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DI Sarah BODELL is responsible for North Wiltshire Reactive CID as
well as the Vulnerable Adults and Domestic Violence Unit, and is
OFFICER G’s immediate line manager.
The Domestic Violence Unit in Melksham covers ‘C’ Division only,
covering North and West Wiltshire.
OFFICER G has not received any formal, specific training in
Domestic Violence policy and practice. His knowledge comes from
his experience as a Police Officer and from working within Domestic
Violence work.
Between May/June 2004 and May/June 2005 there has been a 30%
increase in domestic violence reports. In May 2004, there were 125
Domestic Violence reports and in June 2004 there were 139 reports,
compared to 179 in May 2005 and 199 reports in June 2005.
However, despite this increase there has been a 13% reduction in
staffing.
OFFICER G was on annual leave on 6 June 2005.
On the 7 June 2005 OFFICER G attended a Vulnerable Adults
workshop in the morning and attended an update meeting with his
line manager DI BODELL in the afternoon.
On the 8 June 2005, OFFICER G attended a number of meetings
and dealt with the administration and paperwork actions following
the meetings.
On the 9 June 2005 the morning was taken up on an operational
matter: the afternoon taken up with the call out system of Sergeants.
OFFICER G was on leave on 10 June 2005.
Our enquiries show that OFFICER G has taken his role as
Supervisor of the Vulnerable Adults and domestic violence units very
seriously. This can be shown by his repeated attempts to draw
management attention to problems which he had identified within the
Domestic Violence Unit, for it to perform effectively.
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OFFICER G had written updated Domestic Violence Policy and
submitted this to his superiors for evaluation and subsequent
implementation, but nothing had been done with his revisions.
There is a clear absence of specialised domestic violence training
for OFFICER G and his staff. OFFICER G stated this had been
promised on a regular basis. This aspect concerning training is also
included in the Force Domestic Violence Policy, that all staff within
the Domestic Violence Unit be appropriately trained.
An area which OFFICER G highlighted at interview that the
response from the Domestic Violence Unit once received a DV1
form sometimes depends on the officer dealing with the case itself. If
the Officer is known to the Domestic Violence Unit as competent,
with a good knowledge of domestic violence, where they have
covered everything that should have been done, i.e. explaining the
support which is available and conducting risk assessments would
not result in a priority response from the Domestic Violence Unit.
It is not OFFICER G’s role to read every DV1 form that is sent to the
Domestic Violence Unit as it would be duplicating work done by the
DVLOs – Officer H and PC ROBERT. OFFICER G believes his role
is to advise an officer if the Unit takes the view that s/he has not
responded to a domestic violence incident appropriately or
effectively.
The major part of OFFICER G’s role is to develop policy in relation
to Domestic Violence and in the Vulnerable Adults Unit to investigate
and support the prosecution of offenders.
In terms of the Hayley RICHARDS DV1 form, although OFFICER G
had no involvement with the case, he has examined it and believed
it to be no higher than a medium risk, with a risk assessment
applied. His reasons being that MR QUINTAS had a separate
address and was not threatening to return to Hayley’s address. This
was also the first time that a referral concerning these parties had
been made to his Unit.
OFFICER G stated that during the week of the 6 – 10 June 2005 a
discussion took place between himself, OFFICER H, PC ROBERT
and DI BODELL, regarding their concerns that they were not able to
69
monitor the level of investigation of domestic violence and they did
not have the resources, skills or expertise to provide sufficient
support to victims. The Domestic Violence Unit on the week of 5
June 2005 was experiencing backlogs of DV1 referrals as they had
no admin support and PC ROBERT had been off the previous week
without any cover. They were playing catch up and this is a main
contributory factor in their failure to contact Hayley for five days.
OFFICER G has accounted for his working schedule, which was
busy, during the week 5 June 2005. However he could have
considered prioritising his own and his staff’sstaff’s activities to
ensure contact with victims was made as soon as possible following
referral, thus ensuring public confidence and reassurance in the fact
that their reports were being dealt with by professionals.
OFFICER G states that due to statistical demands for Home Office
Performance Returns, the Performance Review Department requires
no statistics on when/if victims are contacted. Under these present
guidelines, contacting victims is placed lower in priority compared to
providing the Home Office with the number of domestic violence
incidents.
A worrying factor which has arisen out of our enquiries is that the
Domestic Violence Unit had to train probationary officers on how to
deal with Domestic Violence incidents, without being trained
themselves. I do not believe that, even if all staff were fully trained,
the situation that they found themselves in on the week 5 June 2005
could have been avoided with the conditions they were working
under. However with specialised training and more active
supervision that week, it may have provided the DVLOs with a
different focus of putting contact with the victim first and then
attempting to clear the referral backlog.
The Vulnerable Adults and Domestic Violence Units have been
amalgamated since June 2003, this in itself has had a negative
effect on the efficient running of the Domestic violence Unit.
OFFICER G is not aware of any other police force which has set up
a joint Domestic Violence and Vulnerable Adults Unit. They are both
resource intensive if run correctly. OFFICER G believes that this
structure is a fundamental difference of principle in terms of
approach.
The Vulnerable Adults Unit is more of an investigative function,
whereas the domestic violence unit is more of a supportive role to
70
the police in terms of checking that the victim is being supported
appropriately and the investigation undertaken effectively.
In terms of staffing for the two units, the Domestic Violence Unit
comprises; One full time civilian member of staff and one part time
Police Officer.
For the Vulnerable Adults, the unit comprises of three full time Police
Officers and one full time administrator.
Prior to the Hayley’s murder, this administrator would spend three
days a week on Vulnerable Adult support and possibly two days a
week on Domestic Violence support. Since June 2005, the majority
of the administrator’s time is spent in supporting the domestic
violence unit, to the detriment of the vulnerable adult unit.
OFFICER G places emphasis on the importance of having a full time
administrator for domestic violence. This is due to the volume of
recordable information needed, both for statistical purposes and for
processing DV1 forms.
Due to the lack of administration resources, OFFICER H and PC
ROBERT spend too long inputting information, where their time
should be spent on actioning DV1 forms.
OFFICER G has made many representations to the force for extra
resources, he produced two reports available to us for this enquiry
that highlighted the need for extra resources. Although the need for
extra resources has been recognised by management, no extra
resources have been allocated to the Domestic Violence Unit.
In September 2005 a report supported by Wiltshire and Swindon
Intervention Partnership, Safer Wiltshire and the Swindon
Community Safety Executive Board was published reinforcing the
view that domestic violence needed a much higher priority.
OFFICER G indicates that despite strongly supporting the report,
unless additional resources are provided the Domestic Violence Unit
could not implement the recommendation effectively.
A Wiltshire Constabulary document titled ‘Tackling Domestic
Violence Strategy 2005-2008’ - Public Information Strategy Leaflet
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for tackling Domestic Violence - was not incorporated in Wiltshire
Constabulary’s Domestic Violence Policy. Their force Domestic
Violence Policy had not been significantly updated or revised
officially since the year 2000.
In 2004, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) prepared
guidance in relation to domestic violence to forces in England &
Wales for the Chief Officers to consider incorporating by an end date
of March 2006. Despite OFFICER G preparing guidance for its
adoption within Wiltshire Constabulary, in November 2005 the
ACPO guidance remained unadopted, although OFFICER G
believes that his work in this area had been approved by senior
officers.
At the time of the incident, there was a National Centrex training
Module available, but nobody within Wiltshire had received any
training. In October 2005, OFFICER G and OFFICER H received
training on one module which lasted half a day.
The “immediate follow up box” is completed by most officers dealing
with a domestic violence incident, it does not therefore mean that
every case is urgent, discretion is given to the DVLO when
assessing the DV1 form. I believe DVLOs must be aware of the
consequences of not acting quickly in these matters.
OFFICER G had identified the shortcomings of the Domestic
Violence Unit and had made representations to senior management
on numerous occasions for extra resources, to rectify these
shortcomings.
OFFICER G reported that all of his representations had been to no
avail, as the volume of work had increased and the effective staffing
levels had decreased, leaving himself and the staff he supervised
struggling to maintain an effective service for both the force and the
victims of Domestic Violence.
Wiltshire Constabulary had a “Positive Arrest Policy” for Domestic
Violence Offences, however they were working with policy dating
from 2000 and the force had not yet incorporated the new ACPO
definition of Domestic Violence. Despite having a new inter-agency
strategy for domestic violence, the resources were insufficient to
make this work in reality.
72
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
No specific complaint was made about the Domestic Violence Unit
but the IPCC inquiry has examined the part it played in the response
by Wiltshire Constabulary to Hayley’s report of the assault upon her
and her fear of further violence. OFFICER A’s referral was emailed
to the Unit late on 5 June (the Sunday night). It was not until Friday
10 June, five days later, that Officer H attempted to phone Hayley,
using her landline number not that of her mobile phone. She could
not reach her and, applying policy, did not leave a message. By any
reasonable standard, the Unit failed to make early and effective
contact with this highly vulnerable victim. As a result, Hayley did not
receive timely information from the police about the support that she
could obtain from other agencies and from local voluntary
organisations and was not assisted to receive any such support
which she then sought. One can only speculate as to the possible
effect upon her if early contact had been made which she felt was
positive, helpful and easy to resume.
The cause of this failure in performance, however, was not the
neglect or inadvertence of Officer H, the DVLO assigned the referral,
nor her supervisor, OFFICER G, who both impressed the inquiry
with their genuine commitment to do their best in difficult
circumstances. The absence that week of administrative support to
the unit meant that Officer H devoted significant time to catching up
with inputting data on the Home Office statistical database drawn
from a backlog of DV1 referrals. Most referrals were marked for
“immediate” action (whatever the circumstances and the level of
need) but the limited staff resource available that week and the
established working practices of the unit precluded such a response
in Hayley’s as in other cases.
I recommend that the allegations concerning Officer H and
OFFICER G both be unsubstantiated.
Its very few Domestic Violence Unit staff carry a heavy responsibility
in Wiltshire Constabulary for raising and maintaining the profile of
their specialist role and work. I shall comment below on the subject
of training for this Unit and the need for its resourcing, performance
and working practices to be reviewed.
COMPLAINT CONCERNING POOR STANDARD OF
INVESTIGATION (COMPLAINT 7)
That the criminal investigation into the serious assault on Hayley
73
on Sunday 5 June 2005, by Mr QUINTAS, was of a poor standard
and not to the level required to ensure the arrest of the offender
and to ensure Hayley’s safety.
A complaint is made that the standard of investigation was poor and
I must consider this in the round, not just with reference to the
actions of the officer responsible for that investigation and her
supervisor. When the individual elements described above are taken
together and seen as a whole, it is fair to conclude that the overall
response by Wiltshire Constabulary to the assault on Hayley was
poorly coordinated, the positive impact of certain actions weakened
by failures elsewhere.
The Unit responsible in the organisation for recognising and
responding to the special needs of such crime victims could not
attempt contact until nearly five days had elapsed since Hugo
QUINTAS’ initial violence - a day before he murdered Hayley. The
Unit did not assist the OIC in the process of identifying risk factors,
nor did it categorise the level of risk which was attached to the case.
The DVU Coordinator, when later asked to rate the risk, put it no
higher than medium – but higher than “low”.
Despite an arrangement being provisionally made for this to happen,
no CSI visited Hayley to take photographs of her injuries. When a
rapid reaction to her report of QUINTAS being seen in the
Wetherspoons’ pub could have led to his arrest, the slower pace
dictated by the area shift sergeant’s approach meant the chances of
this happening diminished by the minute.
Traffic officers from a neighbouring area, working in Trowbridge
where patrol officers HAD been briefed to arrest QUINTAS for
assault, had not themselves received any such briefing. They cannot
be criticised for not checking the local force intelligence database
against his personal details, since this inquiry has found that they
had no reason for doing so. If they had done, they would have
immediately learned of QUINTAS’ wanted status and it is probable
he would have been arrested.
The risk of QUINTAS further harming Hayley was assessed by
officers close to the investigation as “low”. These officers had not
received training based on the 2004 Centrex Manual of Guidance for
Investigating Domestic Violence. If they had done then they may
have rated the risk of harm as higher given Hayley’s pregnancy. The
“low” risk status greatly limited the chances of the officer in the case
progressing her investigation through the efforts of her colleagues
on duty when she was not at work.
Whatever the diligence and commitment shown by individual officers
and staff - and this inquiry saw much evidence of each - this alone
74
could not and did not fashion the holistic approach needed.
I am driven to conclude that the complaint is supported by the above
factual analysis. I therefore recommend that this complaint is
substantiated in part.
75
SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT AND MISCONDUCT/DISCIPLINE
RECOMMENDATIONS
Complaint 1 That following Hayley’s complaint to the police
that initially no attempt was made to arrest Mr QUINTAS
because there was no Portuguese interpreter available. The
complainant believes that the police should have arrested him
first and then arranged for an interpreter.
This complaint is found to be Unsubstantiated.
Complaint 2 A uniformed female police officer allowed Hayley
to believe that she would be personally monitored on CCTV
cameras when she was going to and from her place of work,
(the Red or White Café, Trowbridge) and that this would protect
her.
This complaint is found to be Unsubstantiated.
Misconduct allegation That Officer A failed to circulate
QUINTAS on PNC.
This allegation is found to be Unsubstantiated.
Complaint 3 That the officer responsible for the investigation of
the assault did not ensure that, when she was not on duty, the
investigation was given to another officer to investigate.
This complaint is found to be Unsubstantiated.
Complaint 4 That following information given to Hayley from a
friend Steve LEWIS that Mr QUINTAS was in The Sir Isaac
Pitman (Wetherspoons) public house in Trowbridge and this
information was given to the police and that no attempt was
made to arrest him.
76
This complaint is found to be Substantiated.
Complaint 5 That on two separate occasions following
Hayleys’ complaint of assault to the police, Mr QUINTAS was
stopped by the police but not arrested.
This complaint is found to be Unsubstantiated.
Complaint 6 That a police photographer failed to turn up to
take photographs of Hayley’s injuries following assault and
instead the photographs were taken by a uniformed female
police constable using a disposable camera.
This complaint is found to be Substantiated
Misconduct/ Discipline allegations That DVU staff failed in
their duty by not contacting Hayley until 10 June 2006.
This allegation is found to be Unsubstantiated.
Complaint 7 That the criminal investigation into the serious
assault on Hayley on Sunday 5 June 2005, by Mr QUINTAS,
was of a poor standard and not to the level required to ensure
the arrest of the offender and to ensure Hayley’s safety.
This complaint is found to be Partially Substantiated
77
PRACTICE AND ORGANISATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Tackling Domestic Violence
An enhanced or specialised response to domestic violence is
required because of the features of this type of crime and the
emotional and psychological context in which it is committed, against
vulnerable individuals. One should not be surprised to learn from
evidence seen by this inquiry and given at QUINTAS’ trial for
murder, that Hayley, pregnant with his child, had contact with him
during the days before she was murdered. If QUINTAS had been
arrested in the days following his first attack; if the Domestic
Violence Unit had contacted and advised Hayley; or if a CSI had
visited to take photos of her injuries: one can only speculate on the
impact which these events might have had on Hayley, on her
attitude towards QUINTAS and on his ability to inveigle his way back
into her life and home.
It is neither unrealistic nor unreasonable to judge that more should
be done for a woman in her situation. In learning from the
circumstances of Hayley’s terrible murder and developing its ability
to respond to future victims like her the force should consider
changes that are specific to Domestic Violence policy and practice
as well as a number of improvements to general investigative action
and support.
I propose the following recommendations to encourage a more
coordinated, timely and expert response to such incidents consistent
with Wiltshire Constabulary’s “duty of positive action” to prevent
homicide and other serious harm.
The force Domestic Violence Units must be enabled to respond
quicker to referrals, making very early contact with the crime victim
to increase the potential for early confidence in the force’s response
to the report. DV staff must be trained (see recommendation below)
as to current thinking on the risk identification factors for domestic
violence and how to categorise and manage risk in an individual
case.
ACPO and Centrex guidance gives them lead responsibility for
assessing risk. This was not reflected in what we saw of the work of
the Unit during the week of Hayley’s assault and later murder.
Fundamental changes will be needed in Wiltshire’s units if they are
to meet the challenges presented by recent policy and guidance –
challenges already identified by their coordinator and highlighted to
force managers.
The Units will only be able to perform an enhanced and more
interventionist role if their workloads and working practices do not
78
regularly restrict this. Much may be achievable within current
resources if working practices or administrative systems are
modified to guarantee at least some initial early contact.
Recommendation: There appears to be some doubt whether
Wiltshire Constabulary has formally adopted current ACPO
policy and guidance on investigating reports of domestic
violence and identifying and managing risks associated with
this type of crime. Chief Officers should remove this as soon as
possible by fully endorsing such policy and guidance for the
force and committing the force to work on its effective
implementation.
Recommendation: Building on work already undertaken by
their coordinator, Chief Officers (with other agency partners
where appropriate) should review the resources available to,
policy for and working practices of the Domestic Violence Units
to ensure fitness for purpose and to raise performance in
responding to all referrals. In particular, the review should (i)
define in what circumstances an “immediate” response will be
provided and what this will be; (ii) define the role that Domestic
Violence Liaison Officers will in future play in assessing and
managing risk; and (iii) identify what core administrative
resources are required for the Units to be able to function
effectively.
The inquiry noted that Liaison Officer time was, on occasions when
admin support was lacking, spent not in contact with crime victims or
investigating officers but with inputting referral data for Home Office
statistical purposes. This is not a satisfactory use of such staff
resources, particularly when training investment has equipped them
with an expert knowledge base and skills.
Recommendation: Specialist Domestic Violence Liaison
Officers should not in future be expected to devote time to
inputting data for Home Office statistical purposes, but should
focus on communications with crime victims.
There was discontinuity in the progressing of QUINTAS’ arrest when
the officer in the case was off duty, since the case did not take
priority with incoming shifts. Since Hayley’s murder, the
Constabulary has implemented changes to shift Hand Over
arrangements which appear now to give priority status to all
domestic violence cases. These changes may have proved effective
in winning a more informed, urgent and consistent response from
other shift sergeants. A review needs to test if this is the case.
Recommendation: Chief Officers should review changes to
handover arrangements implemented since June 2005 with the
use of a yellow “Priority” cover for domestic violence arrest
79
files, to test compliance with them and their impact. If the
procedure has resulted in effective continuity in such
investigations, it should be retained. If not, Wiltshire
Constabulary must develop an alternative means of ensuring
arrest files for such cases are passed from shift to shift without
discontinuity.
The IPCC inquiry found that in June 2005 Domestic Violence Unit
staff and their supervisor had not received specialist training. In
particular they had not undergone the Centrex Responses to
Domestic Violence Modular Training Programme, developed in
2004. According to this Programme and the ACPO policy which it
reflects1, Police Domestic Violence Officers, not investigators,
should take the lead in assessing and managing risk in relation to
domestic crime victims, developing safety plans etc.. Wiltshire
Constabulary have much to do if it is to move to this model. First,
specialist staff, their managers and investigative officers need up to
date training in the latest approaches to investigation and to risk
assessment in tackling domestic violence and preventing repeat
victimisation.
Recommendation: Chief Officers should commission a force
wide Domestic Violence training needs review leading to an
action plan with timescales to provide officers and staff with
the expert training it identifies they need.
Officers and staff need ready access via the HERMES tasker log to
up to date and full risk assessment information.
Recommendation: The Hermes Tasker log template and
operating guidelines should be modified to ensure that detailed
risk information and current risk status are recorded by the
OIC.
Aiding the basic investigation process
The IPCC was surprised to learn from one area shift sergeant’s
evidence in interview that she was deployed for duty without having
been trained and inducted into this role. There will clearly be aspects
of the role which will be familiar to an experienced officer, but it is
concerning that this supervisor was not given specific guidance and
instruction in what was expected from her as a line manager and
team leader. The Constabulary should seek to train all its
supervisors in the demands and responsibilities of this role BEFORE
they have to perform it.
Recommendation: A fully promoted area patrol sergeant should
1
See ACPO Guidance on Identifying, Assessing and Managing Risk in the Context of Policing
Domestic Violence (2003)
80
always be required to undergo structured training and
induction prior to serving in this role.
The traffic officers, based at Melksham, who stopped QUINTAS on
10 June in Trowbridge had received no specific briefing on persons
wanted for arrest in that area. Patrol officers based at Trowbridge
had been asked to arrest him if he was encountered. From time to
time, those wanted for arrest will be stopped by traffic officers and if
they are not the subject of a general circulation or do not otherwise
attract suspicion, will evade arrest. If, by some means, briefings are
coordinated so as to include traffic officers the risk of this happening
may be reduced. The IPCC does not envisage a cumbersome or
impracticable scheme but one which can play its part in
guaranteeing the positive action approach needed for priority arrests
such as for domestic violence.
Recommendation: Chief Officers should review the adequacy of
current arrangements for briefing BCU traffic officers as to
“persons wanted” etc., when they work across more than one
area, and devise a suitable means of ensuring officers are
notified of priority arrest cases.
QUINTAS was stopped in his car at the end of April 2005 and
received a HO/RT1 requiring him to produce his driving licence,
insurance and MOT certificate. He did not possess the necessary
documents and did not respond to the Notice, thus committing the
offences of driving without them. However, by the time he was
stopped again on 15 June, no action had yet been taken to
prosecute these offences. As evidence given at his trial made plain,
this delay was significant for a variety of reasons, not least that he
still felt able, in mid June, to purchase and drive a car with impunity,
when not complying with Road Traffic Act conditions for doing so.
The issue of a summons to court for these offences may have
disrupted his freedom to do so. Was the delay in initiating
proceedings typical for such matters dealt with in the BCU Criminal
Justice Unit or was it exceptional? The IPCC inquiry has not
answered this question and I propose that a limited review does so,
recommending ways of speeding the process if these are needed.
Recommendation: Melksham BCU commander to assess
performance of Criminal Justice Unit in taking action on
failures to produce following receipt of HO/RT1 in comparison
with other BCUs. If Unit failing to meet force standard, seek
improvements to ensure timely and effective action to reduce
or end illegal driving.
The IPCC inquiry identified the systemic weaknesses in the CSI
Department’s task allocation procedures. Though changes were
introduced as this inquiry made progress, the effects of these need
to be formally evaluated.
81
Recommendation: Chief Officers should review new
procedures for CSI tasking administration introduced since
June 2005, to test compliance with them and their impact,
particularly in the absence of a supervisor. If these have
resulted in effective monitoring of job allocation and
outstanding tasks, they should be retained. If not, Wiltshire
Constabulary must urgently develop and introduce an
alternative method for delivering clear, recorded decisions on
job allocation and the monitoring of outstanding work.
The inquiry identified a number of potential or real difficulties which
officers experienced when seeking information on local interpreter
services available to deal with suspect or witness interviews. We
make the following practical recommendations for reducing or
removing these problems and raising the general level of knowledge
and understanding as to current services and how to obtain access
to them.
Recommendation:
(a) BCU commanders raise general awareness of all officers
and staff on the functions of the Interpreters Database and
how to use it;
(b) Chief officers consider providing more officers and staff
with access to the Interpreters Database;
(c) That some form of service level agreement be drawn up
between Wiltshire Constabulary and the IT Helpdesk so that
set standards of accessibility and reliability of the Interpreters
Database can be formally addressed. All staff should have
access to the database;
(d) BCU commanders remind officers and staff, particularly
those working in custody areas, of the need to notify the IT
Helpdesk when they move departments via the Form 248
which notifies the Helpdesk that their profile needs to be
changed, thus ensuring timely access to the Interpreters
Database, when required;
(e) BCU commanders review the location of the terminals
having the Interpreters Database software loaded onto them.
Although a priority for use in Custody areas, their use can
lead to congestion and disruption when Custody is busy;
(f) BCU commanders consider increasing the number of
terminals which contain the Interpreter Database software. ,
which means that the service can be accessed by the screen
icon and that they make officers/staff aware of the terminals
to use;
(g) Chief officers consider the force subscribe to the National
Register of Public Service Interpreters. This is advocated by
the Interpreter Working Group, who regulate the service of
interpreters and work to ensure that supply meets demand for
82
suitable interpreters.
In this case the details entered onto the HERMES tasker by
OFFICER A on 5 June 2005 had been lost off the system by the
next day. OFFICER A together with the Control Room Operator
had to reinput the details from OFFICER A’s recollection, in order
to create a log. The inquiry has discovered that this has not been
an isolated incident with the HERMES system. I propose a number
of practical recommendations arising from this.
Recommendation:
(a) Head of IT examine the resilience of the system and the
incidence of it failing; providing users with suitable back up
systems for the quick recovery of lost data;
(b) Head of IT look into some form of contingency plan to be
in place as a back up if the HERMES system crashed and was
unavailable. This should have been and adopted from their
Millennium Contingency Planning;
(c) the Force should at their earliest opportunity introduce
standardised business rules for the use of HERMES. Whilst it
is a new system being introduced in Wiltshire Constabulary
as a tool to manage resources and to bring technology and
investigation together, rules are needed to ensure that all
BCUs use and update the system in a consistent way and
avoiding area differences.
To perform effectively, officers and staff need ready and
uncomplicated access to force policies, guidance and information
databases, such as the Domestic Violence policy and the
Interpreters Database. In Wiltshire Constabulary this is provided via
the TROVE intranet system. We heard from a number of witnesses
who remarked on the difficulties commonly experienced in viewing
such documents on the TROVE system and its general user
unfriendliness. The search facility is too restrictive for the general
user so that key documents take unnecessary time and trouble to
locate.
Recommendation: Head of IT consider, on the basis of user
views, how TROVE intranet can be adapted to provide more
ready access to force policies, guidance and data.
IPCC investigators heard many witnesses express their perception
that within its BCU (‘C’ Division) the Trowbridge area got a poor
share of the resources available when compared with its workload.
The impression was that there was disproportionate level of activity
compared with other areas. Since 1998 ‘C’ Division has based its
resources allocation on a formula comprising crime reports,
incidents, population, area and road traffic collisions. This formula is
updated every six months, taking into consideration if a particular
station is suffering from short term abstractions for training, sickness
83
or to staff incident rooms.
In June 2005, the appropriate number of police constables were in
post in Trowbridge in accordance with the formula. However, during
this period, three officers were absent through sickness and four
were on restricted duty. Annual leave would also have an impact on
resources available. We noted that Trowbridge has a high number of
young in service officers, as well as being a tutor station.
I will not make any formal recommendation relating to the share of
resources available to the Trowbridge Area within the Division and
the impact of its resources on capability and resilience. My inquiry
has gathered significant witness evidence on this subject and the
BCU commander and his area managers may gain much from a
reading of it.
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTICE AND
ORGANISATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
84
Recommendation: There appears to be some doubt whether
Wiltshire Constabulary has formally adopted current ACPO
policy and guidance on investigating reports of domestic
violence and identifying and managing risks associated with
this type of crime. Chief Officers should remove this as soon as
possible by fully endorsing such policy and guidance for the
force and committing the force to work on its effective
implementation.
Recommendation: Building on work already undertaken by
their coordinator, Chief Officers (with other agency partners
where appropriate) should review the resources available to,
policy for and working practices of the Domestic Violence Units
to ensure fitness for purpose and to raise performance in
responding to all referrals. In particular, the review should (i)
define in what circumstances an “immediate” response will be
provided and what this will be; (ii) define the role that Domestic
Violence Liaison Officers will in future play in assessing and
managing risk; and (iii) identify what core administrative
resources are required for the Units to be able to function
effectively.
Recommendation: Specialist Domestic Violence Liaison
Officers should not in future be expected to devote time to
inputting data for Home Office statistical purposes, but should
focus on communications with crime victims.
Recommendation: Chief Officers should review changes to
handover arrangements implemented since June 2005 with the
use of a yellow “Priority” cover for domestic violence arrest
files, to test compliance with them and their impact. If the
procedure has resulted in effective continuity in such
investigations, it should be retained. If not, Wiltshire
Constabulary must develop an alternative means of ensuring
arrest files for such cases are passed from shift to shift without
discontinuity.
Recommendation: Chief Officers should commission a force
wide Domestic Violence training needs review leading to an
action plan with timescales to provide officers and staff with
the expert training it identifies they need.
Recommendation: The Hermes Tasker log template and
operating guidelines should be modified to ensure that detailed
risk information and current risk status are recorded by the
OIC.
Recommendation: A fully promoted area patrol sergeant should
always be required to undergo structured training and
induction prior to serving in this role.
85
Recommendation: Chief Officers should review the adequacy of
current arrangements for briefing BCU traffic officers as to
“persons wanted” etc., when they work across more than one
area, and devise a suitable means of ensuring officers are
notified of priority arrest cases.
Recommendation: Melksham BCU commander to assess
performance of Criminal Justice Unit in taking action on
failures to produce following receipt of HO/RT1 in comparison
with other BCUs. If Unit failing to meet force standard, seek
improvements to ensure timely and effective action to reduce
or end illegal driving.
Recommendation: Chief Officers should review new
procedures for CSI tasking administration introduced since
June 2005, to test compliance with them and their impact,
particularly in the absence of a supervisor. If these have
resulted in effective monitoring of job allocation and
outstanding tasks, they should be retained. If not, Wiltshire
Constabulary must urgently develop and introduce an
alternative method for delivering clear, recorded decisions on
job allocation and the monitoring of outstanding work.
Recommendation:
(a) BCU commanders raise general awareness of all officers
and staff on the functions of the Interpreters Database and
how to use it.
(b) Chief officers consider providing more officers and staff
with access to the Interpreters Database.
(c) That some form of service level agreement be drawn up
between Wiltshire Constabulary and the IT Helpdesk so that
set standards of accessibility and reliability of the Interpreters
Database can be formally addressed. All staff should have
access to the database.
(d) BCU commanders remind officers and staff, particularly
those working in custody areas, of the need to notify the IT
Helpdesk when they move departments via the Form 248
which notifies the Helpdesk that their profile needs to be
changed, thus ensuring timely access to the Interpreters
Database, when required.
(e) BCU commanders review the location of the terminals
having the Interpreters Database software loaded onto them.
Although a priority for use in Custody areas, their use can
lead to congestion and disruption when Custody is busy.
86
(f) BCU commanders consider increasing the number of
terminals which contain the Interpreter Database software. ,
which means that the service can be accessed by the screen
icon and that they make officers/staff aware of the terminals
to use.
(g) Chief officers consider the force subscribe to the National
Register of Public Service Interpreters. This is advocated by
the Interpreter Working Group, who regulate the service of
interpreters and work to ensure that supply meets demand for
suitable interpreters.
Recommendation:
(a) Head of IT examine the resilience of the system and the
incidence of it failing; providing users with suitable back up
systems for the quick recovery of lost data.
(b) Head of IT look into some form of contingency plan to be
in place as a back up if the HERMES system crashed and was
unavailable. This should have been and adopted from their
Millennium Contingency Planning.
(c) the Force should at their earliest opportunity introduce
standardised business rules for the use of HERMES. Whilst it
is a new system being introduced in Wiltshire Constabulary
as a tool to manage resources and to bring technology and
investigation together, rules are needed to ensure that all
BCUs use and update the system in a consistent way and
avoiding area differences.
Recommendation: Head of IT consider, on the basis of user
views, how TROVE intranet can be adapted to provide more
ready access to force policies, guidance and data.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
87
Our investigation has found that certain elements of the
investigation by Wiltshire Constabulary into the domestic assault
upon Hayley were conducted thoroughly and with consideration to
Hayley, as the victim. However, other aspects of its response were
not as effective as they should have been.
Of the seven principal complaints made by Mrs Christine
RICHARDS, representing Hayley’s family, four have been found to
be Unsubstantiated, two have been Substantiated, and the
remaining one complaint is Partially Substantiated.
An effective police response to a report of Domestic Violence is all
about dealing personally and effectively with the victim whose
confidence will obviously be low. To tackle such violence
effectively so as to help to protect them from future assault, early
communication with a skilled and knowledgeable contact is
imperative to show that there is support for them and to bolster
their dented confidence. To show a positive police response and to
provide a focal point for these victims is crucial to winning their
confidence in the police and their support to help convict offenders
and protect victims from further harm.
In this respect, it is essential that the promised police responses
made to Domestic Violence victims are not only made, but are also
completed within promised timescales.
The last contact Hayley initiated with the police was on Tuesday 7
June 2005 when she was proactive in trying to ensure that Mr
QUINTAS was arrested when passing on information about his
whereabouts to the police.
That afternoon, QUINTAS was not arrested and no-one came from
CSI to take her photograph for the investigation. After seeing
OFFICER A to supply her with photographs of QUINTAS, Hayley
did not contact Wiltshire Constabulary again.
On Friday 10 June 2005, when Hayley was informed that
QUINTAS was in a club, her reaction was completely different.
She did not pass on the whereabouts of Mr QUINTAS to police
when she was told this. The Key Events Chronology above shows
other occasions when QUINTAS was outside her house or with
her. On these occasions, also, she did not call the police to have
him arrested.
88
One of several alternative explanations - or a combination of them
- may account for this. Only Hayley would have been able to tell us
where the truth lay, since I do not rely on anything which QUINTAS
said at his trial concerning his contact with Hayley in the last week
of her life.
She may have lost faith in what she saw (or did not see) of the
police response or simply given in to the huge pressure exerted
upon her by a man which his trial showed to be a harassing, lying
and manipulative killer. The resumed contact with QUINTAS
during the week following the assault, may inevitably have
softened her initial reaction to involve the police and seek his
arrest and prosecution.
It is possible to speculate, but only to speculate, on what might
have happened if a more proactive organisational approach had
led to QUINTAS being arrested and charged. Would this have
prevented Hayley’s killing? An early arrest could well have led to
an ABH charge and thus the consideration of bail. I anticipate that
bail would have been given from the police station but subject to
conditions. An application to court for a remand into custody would
have been unlikely in this case. Bail conditions could have
restricted QUINTAS’ freedom to go to Hayley’s home or to the
street outside it and a condition breach could itself prompt a further
arrest and a court appearance to account for it. Then a remand
into custody might have been possible.
However, further speculation takes us into areas of ever more
uncertainty. What is definite is that no-one predicted the
murderous attack QUINTAS planned and carried out on his former
girlfriend and our inquiry has found that no-one in Wiltshire
Constabulary could and should have done so. I have described
above how the force could have responded differently to Hayley’s
report but what we can never know is the effect this may have had
on the tragic course of events which led so rapidly to her death.
21 April 2006
……………………………………..
Richard REYNOLDS
INVESTIGATING OFFICER
Independent Police Complaints Commission
89