FUNCTIONAL ISM,
DEFINITION, A N D T H E PROBLEM O F CO NTE X TUA L
A MB IGUITY
Sa m u e l M ER M I N
No w and then ju d icia l opinions re ve a l th e phenomenon o f
contradictory o r opposite meanings b e in g g ive n t o th e same
legal term in different situations, o r in the same situation posing
different le g a l issues, wit h o u t a n y suggestion th a t precedent
is being o ve rru le d o r th a t te rmin o lo g y is being abused. Th is
has disturbed a n d e ve n outraged so me judges. M y p re se n t
purpose is to explore this situation in an attempt to illu min a te
the p ro p e rly functional n a tu re o f ju d icia l reasoning. I sh a ll
analyze t h e phenomenon i n question a n d th e n b rie f ly c o n sider it s re la tio n t o lo g ica l th e o ry — p a rt icu la rly t o a n a p propriate th e o ry o f legal meaning o r d e fin itio n f o r the te rms
(statutory, co mmo n -la w, o r constitutional) t h a t a re u se d i n
judicial reasoning.
I.
As an illu stra tio n o f the phenomenon, in clu d in g the ju d icia l
outrage, consider the 1953 case o f Gra n t y. McA u lif f e (1. A n
auto accident between t wo Ca lifo rn ia residents had occurred
in A rizo n a . A f t e r th e alleged tortfeasor's death, t h e in ju re d
party started a to rt action in California. I f the issue of su rviva l
of th e cause o f action we re treated as "substantive" (i n a ccordance wit h the Conflicts o f Law Restatement) th e Ca lifo rn ia
court would have had to apply the Arizona law, archaic though
it was, under wh ich a t o rt action could not be va lid ly started
after t h e tortfeasor's death. Th e ma jo rit y chose t o c a ll t h e
su rviva l issue "procedural" and hence governed b y Ca lifo rn ia
law. On e o f the obstacles to this conclusion had been the fact
that a p rio r Ca lifo rn ia case had h e ld th e Ca lifo rn ia su rviva l
320
S
.
M E RM I N
statute "substantive" (in determining th a t the statute d id n o t
apply retroactively). Justice Tra yn o r fo r the ma jo rit y disposed
of th is obstacle b y saying:
The problem in the present proceeding, however, is n o t
whether th e su rviva l statutes a p p ly re tro a ctive ly, b u t
whether they are substantive o r procedural fo r conflicts
of l a w purposes. " 'Substance' a n d 'procedure' a re n o t
legal concepts o f in va ria n t co n te n t"
A
statute o r
other ru le o f la w will be characterized as substantive o r
procedural according t o th e nature o f the p ro b le m f o r
which a characterization mu st b e made (
The 2
authorities cited were the noted conflicts of la w scholar,
Wa lte r).Wh e e e r Co o k, a n d some cases t h a t h a d recognized
the va ria b ilit y o f th e "substance" a n d "procedure" concepts.
Justice Schauer's impassioned dissent declared the ma jo rity's
approach suggested
that the co u rt w i l l no longer be bound to consistent enforcement o r u n ifo rm application o f " a statute o r other
rule of law", but will instead apply one " ru le " o r another
as th e untrammeled wh imsy o f the ma jo rit y ma y f ro m
time t o t ime d icta te " a cco rd in g t o t h e n a tu re o f t h e
problem" as th e y vie w it in a given case. Th is concept
of th e ma jo rit y strike s d e e p ly a t wh a t h a s been o u r
proud boast that ours was a government o f laws ra th e r
than o f me n (
What3 is the basis o f Justice Schauer's outrage ? One element
).
is the thought
that a sh ift in wo rd meaning can have an u n fa ir
impact o n expectations b a se d u p o n t h e me a n in g i n i t i a l l y
established. But one thinks o f the greater unfairness o f not adjusting meanings to the ultimate purpose of effectuating justice.
Moreover, h o w tru e is it that expectations a re established on
the basis o f an assumption o f constancy o f wo rd meanings in
all contexts — p a rticu la rly in lig h t o f th e fa ct th a t so mu ch
human conduct occurs with o u t reference to the precise wo rd s
of legal rules ? A t any rate, should not people be made aware
that meanings v a ry wit h co n te xt in th e l a w ju st as t h e y d o
outside th e la w ?
Another stra n d i n Ju stice Schauer's re a ctio n seems t o b e
FUNCTI O NALI SM, DEFI NI TI O N, CO NTE X TUA L A MB I G UI TY 3 2 1
based o n misrepresentation o f Ju st ice Tra yn o r' s p o sit io n .
I refer to the accusation that Justice Traynor's approach would
allow judges to indulge in that "untrammeled wh imsy" wh ich
marks a government of men rather than of laws. Justice Tra ynor had argued as had Wa lte r Wheeler Cook, fo r concentration
upon the purpose o r p o licy in vo lve d in characterizing a statute
in such a wa y that it mig h t o r mig h t not a p p ly re tro a ctive ly,
and the purpose o r p o licy in vo lve d in characterizing a statute
in such a wa y that domestic rather than foreign la w mig h t be
applied. A n analysis in terms o f purpose o r p o licy in this context i s n o t a n e xe rcise i n u n tra mme le d d iscre tio n ; i t i s a s
amenable to testing by considerations o f fact, logic, and values
as a n y other area o f the l a w in wh ich purpose o r p o licy o f
statutes, common la w rules o r constitutional provisions are under in q u iry.
The other suggestion in Justice Schauer's opinion is that the
Traynor tolerance o f va ria b ilit y in meanings o f terms violates
the logical requirement of "consistency" and " u n ifo rmity" . This
parallels t h e statement o f t h e Su p re me Co u rt min o rit y i n
Civil Aeronautics Board v. De lt a A i r Lines (1 t h a t f ro m th e
decisions it cited on ju d icia l re vie w (holding that with a reconsideration p e titio n pending, a n a d min istra tive d e te rmin a tio n
was not ye t fin a l so as t o start the period fo r ju d icia l re vie w
running), " it necessarily follows that if a t ime ly motion fo r reconsideration is pending before the Board," the Board's decision
"has 'n o t become fin a l i n the sense that it (is) n o longer subject to change [without hearing] upon reconsideration' ..." (emphasis added) ('). Th is is also a kin to the crit icism in terms o f
"logical a b su rd ity" ma d e b y t h e B rit ish Co u rt o f Ap p e a ls'
judge, A t kin , L . J. in Lake v. Simmons wh e n he rejected the
notion that the meaning of "consent" in larceny was not necessa rily embodied in the concept o f "entrusting" as used in an
insurance p o licy:
that at one and the same time she could both take the
goods with o u t the consent of the owner and be entrusted
with the goods by the true owner is to my mind a logical
absurdity wh ich I do not fin d it necessary to a d mit into
our l a w (°).
322
S
.
ME RMI N
The logical characteristic of legal terms that these judges are
either asserting o r assuming is single meaning. Ho w can they
do so in the face of common experience that words have mu ltiple meanings ? Th e y wo u ld h a ve n o d if f icu lt y, f o r instance,
in distinguishing the meanings of " strike " in the fields o f baseball, b o wlin g , mining, fishing, o r la b o r relations. The explanation seems t o be th a t in these la tte r fields t h e meanings a re
more o b vio u sly distinguishable because t h e b ro a d f ie ld a n d
specific situation in wh ich one meaning functions is o b vio u sly
different f ro m the broad f ie ld and specific situ a tio n in wh ich
the o t h e r meanings fu n ctio n ; s o t h a t we re t h e ju d g e faced
with a p ro b le m o f in te rp re tin g " st rike " i n a la b o r re la tio n s
dispute i t wo u ld n o t even o ccu r t o h im th a t th e meaning o f
"strike" as used in baseball was relevant to the purpose o f his
inquiry.
But in o u r cases, it can be said that the broad fields are the
same, and even the specific situations are in most respects the
same. I n the Delta A irlin e s case, referred to earlier, f o r example, where the court was being asked to determine the meaning
of a (speaking somewhat loosely) " f in a l" C.A.B. certification,
in o rd e r to determine whether a p a rticu la r ce rtifica tio n co u ld
be mo d ifie d wit h o u t another hearing, t h e min o rit y wa s n o t
arguing that it should seek guidance f ro m the meaning o f the
word as applied to school examinations o r newspaper editions.
Rather it looked to the same broad field, n a me ly the la w, and
even the same n a rro we r field, n a me ly administrative la w, and
to the same specific situation of a C.A.B. ce rtifica tio n fo llo we d
by a reconsideration p e titio n . I n t h e e ye s o f t h e min o rit y
justices th is sameness o f the situation overshadowed the d if ference f ro m t h e precedents o n f in a lit y f o r ju d ic ia l re v ie w
purposes, i.e., obscured th e d iffe re n t purposes f o r wh ich th e
definitional q u e stio n wa s b e in g a ske d i n t h e t w o se ts o f
cases (
7 Some judges a re sophisticated enough to see the fa lla cy o f
a). single meaning assumption, b u t refuse to go all the wa y with
a functional vie w. Th e y may, f o r instance, concede its imp o rtance f o r the handling o f ke y words in conflicts o f la w cases
(largely because o f Co o k's wo rk ) a n d some o th e r areas, b u t
FUNCTI O NALI SM, DEFI NI TI O N, CO NTE X TUA L A MB I G UI TY 3 2 3
not f o r o th e r wo rd s a n d areas. A s t h e Wisco n sin Supreme
Court once said: S o me words and phrases are subject to more
than one meaning, depending upon the context in wh ich used.
The te rm 'p u b lic o ffice r' f a lls wit h in th is category' (Emphasis
added) (
8 Similarly, some wo u ld argue that even if the functional p rin ).
ciple
is p ro p e rly applied to a ll words, there a re limit s to the
principle: o n ly in the unusual, borderline case should the p rin ciple be applied and the central o r "core" meaning of the wo rd
be overridden. Perhaps th is wa s H. L. A. Ha rt's v ie w wh e n in
his 1958 debate on p o sitivism wit h Lon Fu lle r he argued th a t
there " mu st be a core o f settled meaning", and that there w i l l
be " a penumbra of debatable cases in wh ich words are neither
obviously applicable n o r o b vio u sly ruled out". He imp lie d his
belief that there is a "central element of actual la w to be seen
in th e co re o f ce n tra l meaning wh ich ru le s h a ve " ; a n d th a t
there is something " in the nature o f a legal ru le inconsistent
with a ll questions b e in g open t o reconsideration in the lig h t
of so cia l p o lic y " CI. Th e t h ru st o f Fu lle r's p o sitio n , o n t h e
other hand, was different. He denied that a wo rd will o r should
be g ive n it s standard o r ce n tra l meaning " in a n y le g a l ru le ,
whatever its purpose"; he denied " th a t problems of interpretation t yp ica lly t u rn o n the meaning o f the in d ivid u a l wo rd s" ;
he asserted that the "easy" cases are easy not because o f the
core meaning o f in d ivid u a l wo rd s b u t because " w e ca n see
clearly enough wh a t the ru le 'is a imin g a t in general' ..."; he
declared th a t " a ru le o r statute has a structural o r systematic
quality th a t reflects it se lf in some measure in to th e meaning
of e ve ry p rin cip a l t e rm i n it " (
1
propriate
ra tio n a le f o r t h e phenomenon w e h a ve been co n 1. F u l l e r ' s
sidering.
v
i
e
w
o
f
f
e
r
s
a
n
a
p
turn n o w t o a b rie f statement o f th e b e a rin g o f lo g ica l
theory on the functional approach to ju d icia l handling of wo rd
meanings. The lo g ica l p rin cip le kn o wn as the " la w o f contra-
324
S
.
M E RM I N
diction" (n o th in g ca n be b o th A a n d n o t -A ), wh e n applied
to a definition seems to lend some support to the single-meaning
attitude. However, this principle, though usually stated with o u t
express qualification, mu s t b e vie we d a s su b je ct t o imp lie d
qualifications o f t ime , p la ce a n d o t h e r contexts. T h is w a s
Aristotle's vie w. A s p u t b y the lo g icia n Schiller:
If [fo rma l logic] f ra n kly admitted into its statement o f the
principle [ o f contradiction] a l l t h e q u a lifica tio n s w h i c h
may be relevant in its actual use w e should have to say,
e.g., " A cannot be A and n o t -A a t the same time, in the
same place, i n th e same respect, i n th e same reference,
in the same context, fo r the same persons — in short, under
precisely t h e same circumstances" (").
Thus o u r "common-sense" o r in tu itive , in it ia l reaction th a t
the meaning of, say, " p ro ce d u re " o r "consent" o r " f in a l" o r
" d o micil" o r a n y other k e y le g a l t e rm cannot as a ma tte r o f
logical p rin cip le both include and exclude a particular situation
is seen to be a t fault in fa ilin g to consider the imp lie d q u a lifications surrounding the lo g ica l p rin cip le involved.
No r is the theory of definition violated b y our functional approach. Wh a t e ve r ma y b e t ru e o f o th e r kin d s o f d e fin itio n
recognized b y logicians, ju d icia l definition is necessarily geared
to a social purpose. I.e., ju d icia l definition is n o t a process o f
discovery (through intuition, o r empirical survey, o r "analysis"
or " e xp lica tio n " ) o f a " t ru e " o r " v a lid " o r " cu sto ma ry" o r
"real" o r "essential" meaning, but one of prescribing or assigning a meaning i n o rd e r to f u lf ill a so cia l purpose. Since th e
legal ru le itse lf has been established f o r a purpose, i t makes
sense t h a t th e ve rb a l constituents o f t h e ru le b e construed
in h a rmo n y w i t h t h e ru le ' s p u rp o se — e ve n th o u g h th o se
constituents ma y get different constructions wh e n p a rt o f d ifferent ru le s. Such a meaning, assigned f o r it s desired so cia l
consequences, mig h t be vie we d as a f o rm o f " stip u la tive " definition. Y e t the typ ica l stip u la tive d e fin itio n assigns a meaning f o r th e simp le purpose o f shorthand convenience (o fte n
when a new term is being coined), o r perhaps fo r "fruitfulness"
as Kantorowicz would put it (
different.
T h e d e sire d consequences a re so cia l a ct io n co n 12
). T h e
j u d i c i a l
d e f i n i t i o
n
i
s
q
u
i
t
e
FUNCTI O NALI SM, DEFI NI TI O N, CO NTE X TUA L A MB I G UI TY 3 2 5
sequences (e.g. recovery or non-recovery of the re lie f requested
by p la in t if f — because o f the consequences i n tu rn , o f such
recovery o r non-recovery). Charles Stevenson's concept o f a
"persuasive d e fin itio n " i s pertinen t here. He thought ju d icia l
definitions "resemble persuasive definitions o r constitute special so rts o f t h e m" (
13
Ladd's
concept of the "practical definition" (
) .4 E va ep ranctica l decision as t o wh a t should be done (
1
making
)m5 —
1
o r te o
b
e
o fd Wisco
n sini L a w nSchool
cUn
)u
. ive
ls rsity
ee a
r
l y
a
p
r
o
p
o
s
NOTES
i
s
J (i) 41 Ca l.o2d 859, 264 P. 2d 944 (1953).
h (2) 41 Cal.n2d 859, 865, 264 P. 2 d 944, 948 (1953).
(
(3
(4)
)(4
5
from
)38
1 larc eny la w was als o the approac h tak en b y f our of the fiv e l a w lords
when
6)C they reversed the Court of Appeal decision. [1927] A.C. 487, 96 L.J.K.B.
3
621.
7[a Th e opinions a re discussed i n HANCOCK, Fallac y o f t h e Trans plant ed
6
Category,
37 Canadian B a r Rev iew 535, 562-7 (1959).
U
7
lI
(U
9
..
certification.
7
Th e purpos e o f t e Court's as k ing whet her t he f inalit y c onc ept
2
.S
should
c ov er t h e c ert if ic at ion w a s i n o r d e r t o dec ide wh e t h e r i t b a rre d
6
.)d
S
the.3I]8 s ummary modific ation, i.e. required a n e w f u ll hearing. But in t he ot her
cases
2
1n
3
5 look ed t o b y t he Court , t here had been s ome dif f erent happenings :
after
6tK
1
9 a d e n ia l o f t h e rec ons iderat ion pet it ion, ju d ic ia l r e v ie w h a d b e e n
sought
a t a t ime wh ic h was wit h in t he s tatutory p e rio d f ix ed f o r s eek ing
B
,h
6
,
rev
iew
i f t he period we re assumed t o r u n f ro m t he t ime o f denial — b u t
e
,8.8
ouside
t he period i f i t we re assumed t o ru n f ro m t he t ime o f c ertific ation.
c
5
16
3
Soah e re t h e purpos e o f as k ing wh e t h e r t h e f in a lit y c onc ept c ov ered t h e
1
S
4
8
c ertific
ation was in order to dec ide whet her the appeal was t imely .
.s,
0
(
e
7
,C
2
(b8
0
t
8
6
Rev.
g) 593, 607 (1958).
,4
.e
1
)f(M
1
S
P
6699
H
1 not e 40.
a
5
.6o
a
ques t ion o f whet her t h e f unc t ional p rin c ip le applies o n ly t o "b a r A
0
tThe
1rL
C
d
)ec
R
t1.9
TF
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.(tJ4
,hU
a
1.4
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1
(iP
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v,o
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26
9
326
S
.
M E RM I N
derline" o r "p e n u mb ra " meanings is als o rais ed i n t his c omment attac hed
to § 11 o f the Restatement of t he L a w (Second), Conf lic t o f Laws, Propos ed
Offic ial Dra f t , P t . 1 (1967) ( w h i c h s ec t ion s tates t h a t " a t le a s t f o r t h e
same purpos e, n o pers on has m o r e t h a n o n e d o mic il a t a t ime "): " T h e
core o f t he d o mic il c onc ept remains c ons tant i n a l l s ituations . W i t h ra re
exceptions, t h e c ourts as s ume t h a t t h e rules o f d o mic il a re t he s ame f o r
all purpos es , a n d i t i s c us t omary f o r t h e m t o c it e in d is c rimin a t e ly i n
their o p in io n s c as es d e a lin g w i t h d o m ic il f o r purpos es o t h e r t h a n t h e
one imme d ia t e ly in v o lv e d . _ T o reit erat e, t h e c o re o f d o mic il i s e v e ry where t he same. B ut i n c los e cases dec is ion o f a ques tion o f d o mic il ma y
sometimes depend u p o n t h e purpos e f o r w h i c h t h e d o m ic il c onc ept i s
used i n t h e part ic ular case."
Cook hims elf onc e us ed ra t h e r s imila r language i n dis c us s ing t h e f irs t
Conflicts Res t at ement ( 3 Proc eedings o f t h e A l i . 2 2 7 (1925)): " T h e r e
is n o doubt t hat wh a t y ou mig h t c a ll t he c ore o f t he c onc ept is t he s ame
in a l l t hes e s ituations ; b u t a s y o u g e t o u t t owards wh a t I l i k e t o c a ll
the t wilig h t zone o f t he s ubjec t, I don't believ e t he scope remains ex ac t ly
the s ame f o r a l l purpos es ". Y e t Cook 's language i s n o t s ubjec t t o t h e
same c rit ic is m a s t h e Res tatement's language. I t does n o t as s ume t h a t
only i n c los e cases, o r o n ly "s omet imes " i n c los e cases, s hould dec is ion
"depend u p o n t h e purpos e f o r wh ic h t h e d o mic il c onc ept is us ed i n t h e
part ic ular c as e". H e wo u ld say, I t hink , as wo u ld Fu lle r, t h a t t his dependence was t rue in a ll cases; and t hat t he res ult o f so apply ing a purpos iv e
or func tional tes t would y ield t he same meaning f o r the t erm in mos t s ituations, t h u s e n a b lin g u s t o s peak o f a "c o r e " meaning; t h a t o n l y i n a
"t wilig h t z one" min o rit y o f cases wo u ld applic at ion o f t he f unc t ional tes t
result i n a dif f erent meaning. Cf . o n t his point , HANCOCK, s upra not e 6 a t
550, not e 41.
(It) SCHILLER, Fo rma l Logic , 121-2 (1912).
(
(1
2
definition"
1
a s a imin g a t a "re d ire c t io n o f people's at t it udes " b y t a k in g a
)3
f amiliar
t e r m h a v i n g a "d e s c rip t iv e a n d s t r o n g ly e m o t iv e me a n in g , "
fas)Khioning a modif ied d e s c rip t iv e me a n in g f o r i t , a n d a llo win g t h e o l d
emotiv
A e meaning t o c a rry ov er t o t h e n e w meaning. I bid. , 210. I n ju d ic ia l
S
reasoning,
h e s aid, " t h e f u n c t io n o f e mo t iv e me a n in g i s re p la c e d b y
N
T
something
m
o r e elaborat e — b y t h e f u l l mec hanis m o f t h e l a w . Th e y
T
E
[i.e.,
O ju d ic ia l definitions ) w e d n e w o r mo re def init e des c ript iv e meanings
V
to R
t h e t erms t h a t c a ll thes e mec hanis ms in t o p la y a n d s o d ire c t t h e me E
chanisms
t o t his o r t hat range o f applic ation. W h ic h range o f applic at ion
O
N
will
depend
o n wh ic h o n e i s ju d g e d b y t hos e w h o def ine t h e t erm, t o
N
S
beO
Vjus t , I n muc h t h e s ame way , pers uas iv e def init ions w e d n e w o r mo re
definite
meanings t o t erms wh ic h b rin g emot iv e effects in t o play . Emot iv e
I
N
effects
d
o not hav e t he mat erial sanctions t hat lie behind t he legal mec ha,C
nisms;
b
u
t t he t wo a re s imila r i n mak ing any wo r d associated w i t h t hem
Z
E
t,
T
h
ih
e
c
sD
e
a
f
n
id
n
L
i
a
FUNCTI O NALI SM, DEFI NI TI O N, CO NTE X TUA L A MB I G UI TY 3 2 7
an imp o rt a n t et hic al ins t rument , o n wh o s e d e f in it io n a g re a t d e a l m a y
depend." I bid. , 295.
(
rich,
1 ed. , Co mmu n it y (Nomos I I ), 269-277-288 (1959).
(4
pose
) o f t h e p a rt ic u la r r u le o f wh ic h i t is a p a rt bears a ro u g h analogy
1
to 5
Lt h e dependenc e in v o lv e d i n t h e "d e f in it io n i n u s e " p ro p o u n d e d b y
FLEA.
Ha rt , b u ild in g o n Bent ham — wh e re in t h e meaning o f (s ome a b )A
stract)
le g a l t erms is made dependent o n a s pec ial k in d o f "t r u t h " o f t he
ID
partic
D ular sentences o f whic h t hey are a part. HART, Def init ion a n d Theory
n
in a
,J uris prudenc e, 7 0 L C)
, d
is
oRn ley vr o u g h3 i s 7
t h e g re a t dif f erenc e b e t we e n a s o c ia l p o lic y purpos e
T
n e 4h a n) d . a n d a lo g ic a l t r u t h ( i n t h e sense o f a v a lid deduc t ion
(ond
h1t h e9 o 5
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