Terrorism as Theater: Analysis and Policy Implications
Author(s): Tyler Cowen
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Public Choice, Vol. 128, No. 1/2, The Political Economy of Terrorism (Jul., 2006), pp.
233-244
Published by: Springer
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Public Choice (2006) 128:233-244
DOI 10.1007/s11127-006-9051-y
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Terrorism as theater: Analysis and policy implications
Tyler Cowen
C SpringerScience + Business Media B.V. 2006
Abstract In some regardsthe productionof terrorismresemblesthe productionof culture,
is a spectacleproducedforviewers,manyof whom
especiallytelevisionandtheater.Terrorism
live apartfromthe violent stagedevents.Spectaculartheaterandthe telling of memorable
storiesareinputsfor fundraisingandmotivatingsubsequentterrorists.Thisunderstanding
of
terroristmotivationhas concretepolicy implications.
Keywords Terrorism
.
Public goods - Focality - Spectacle
1. Introduction
GermanmodernistcomposerKarlheinzStockhausensuggestedthat the 9/11 attackswere
"the greatestwork of art of all time"(Harris,2004, p. 4). Not surprisingly,Stockhausen
receivedintense criticismfor this apparentlypositive aestheticjudgment.We might find
Stockhausen'sviews repugnant,butthatshouldnot blindus to his potentialinsight.Wecan
view the attacksas an aestheticspectacle.Perhapsthe attackswere intendedas a thrilling
performanceartto raisefundsandinspirefutureactsof terrorism.Earlier,BrianJenkinshad
coinedthe phrase"terrorism
as theater"(see Coll, 2004, p.138).
will
consider
an
aesthetic
I
perspectiveon terrorismin moredetail.I will examineterrorism in a rationalchoice framework(Gambetta,2005), butborrowinginsightsfromcultural
economics.More specifically,I will try to flesh out some of the specificsof a "production
function"for terrorism.Aestheticspectaclewill be an importantinputfor motivatingterrorists. They mustbe excited aboutthe prospectof committingbothmurderand suicide,and
this excitementcan be very costly to produce.Along these lines, currentterroristsmay be
tryingto createaestheticspectaclesto maintainterrorist"firms"as a going concern.
We can thinkof terroristspectaclesas a non-rivalandnon-excludablepublicgood (bad
for manycitizens,of course,but a good fromthe point of view of the terrorists).Theater,
T. Cowen
Departmentof Economics, George Mason University,Fairfax,VA 22030, USA
e-mail: [email protected]
Springer
234
Public Choice (2006) 128:233-244
a commonformof privatespectacle,is non-rivalrousin consumptionat some marginsbut
usuallyallows for exclusion.Only a limitednumberof people see a given play or sports
performance,typicallythose who havepaid.Terroristshaveno incentiveto developmeans
of exclusionfor theirspectacles;in fact they often preferas muchpublicityas possible.It
was neverthe goal to sell footage of the 9/11 attacks.Rather,the mediadisseminatedthe
relevantstoriesandimagesandthe terroristsreveledin the freeadvertisingtheyreceivedfor
theirdeedsandgoals.
For this same reason,terroristsoften seek out donorsfor theirprojects.Since terrorist
outputsare not intendedto be a privategood, terroristscannotand do not wish to levy a
directchargeon theircustomers.Likemanyproducersof publicgoods (bads),terroristswill
seek out those who believein the underlyingmissionandarewillingto fundit.
Therestof thispaperproceedsas follows.Section2 outlinessomegeneralusesfor culture
in creatingspectacles.Thismaterialis well-knownin some of the humanitiesliteratures,but
it framesourdiscussionin a broadercontext.Section3 discussesthemotivationandtraining
of terrorists.This discussionalso asks whether,in the frameworkat hand,terroristsshould
be thoughtof as rationalin the economicsense.Section4 considerswhy large-scaleterrorist
attackson the United States have been rare since 9/11. Section 5 presentssome policy
implications.
2. The purposesof culture
Cultureas spectacleand motivatoris a commonthemein culturalstudies,history,anthropology,andrelatedfields of the humanitiesandsocial sciences.Most prominently,Debord
(1995) treatsspectacleas a fundamentalorganizingprincipleof modem society. Kellner
andmodemculture.
(2003) writesof the growingimportanceof spectaclein entertainment
visual
and
sometimes
treats
toward
vision,
(1994)
spectacle,as a centralfeature
Jay
suspicion
of twentiethcenturycriticalFrenchideology.Moregenerally,a largeportionof contemporary
culturalstudiesdealswith the productionof spectaclesthroughsportsandviolentmovies.
Spectaclealso plays a criticalrole in politics. For instancethe UnitedStateshas taken
great care to produceaccompanyingspectaclesfor its nationalideology. The Fourthof
July involves fireworks,large flags are displayedthroughoutthe country,and tales of the
RevolutionandtheFoundingFathersarea stapleof gradeschooleducation.Warvictoriesare
markedby monuments,holidays,andcelebrations.PresidentBush,afterthe initialmilitary
fall of Saddam'sforces, strodeconfidentlyon an aircraftcarrier,boastingof his victoryto
havebecomeincreasinglyornate,multi-day
the Americanpublic.Presidentialinaugurations
events.
public
Otherexamples- both benevolentand malevolent- are legion. Arguablythe Roman
Empireused "breadandcircuses"to pacifythe masses(Veyne,1990).These spectaclessatisfiedthe populace'sdesirefor bloodlustandprovidedsteadyentertainment.
Manyartworks
of the ItalianRenaissancewere intendedas monumentsto the prestigeandpoliticalpower
of theirpatrons.Florentinenoblesfrequentlycommissionedqualityworksto advancetheir
politicalstatus.A look at Leni Riefenstahl'sfilm Triumphof the Willshows the Nazi emphasison charismaticspectacle;Sorel(1999) notedthe importanceof suchmythsto fascism
moregenerally.Dictatorshipsoften stagepublicexecutionsto providetheircitizenrieswith
a memorablestoryandsome accompanyingvisualimages.Onepointof thispaperis simply
thatterroristsmustresortto similarmeasures.
These mechanismsarenot limitedto politics.In a commercialcontext,advertisersseek
to be associatedwith the SuperBowl and othersportsand entertainmentspectacles.It is
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PublicChoice(2006)128:233-244
235
well known that a large percentage of advertising, especially on television, is not especially
informative. Instead it positions the company to have a more memorable product or story
line, thereby channeling consumer attention in the desired direction. In cinema, movies with
special effects use marketing campaigns to position themselves as "the movie to see," or
"the summer movie of the year,"etc. In other words, movies and other public events garner
attention by positioning themselves as "focal spectacles" in our culture (Chwe, 2003).
The relevant notion of spectacle must involve a performance or event which is out of
the ordinary along some dimensions. A fireworks display will try to be bigger and better
and try to use more brilliant colors than its competitors. Nazi marches used torches, lengthy
excited speeches, and thousands marching and shouting in lockstep, all to create the desired
effect. The Romans would have large animals, such as bears and tigers, fight to the death,
or fight with humans. The Super Bowl is held only once a year and receives an extensive
build-up and marketing campaign. All of these events try to be memorable and to create
appeal along some primal or visceral direction. A very good chess game does not usually
count as a spectacle. Instead a good spectacle should involve bright colors, high volume,
thrills, and perhaps violent destruction or some simulation thereof.
The notion of cultural spectacle is typically ignored in economics, but the microfoundations of its impact are easily understood. Economists have a well-developed account of
focal points (Schelling, 1960; Young, 1996), but they have devoted less attention to which
particularevents or situations become focal. "Spectacle" can be thought of as an investment
in focality.
Terrorist spectacles fit all the major criteria for focality. A focal place, person, or event
must be highly visible, must possess some unique features, and must be associated with
an easy-to-remember story line. Media coverage of terroristevents will support all of these
qualities. We find also that "firstmovers" have focality advantages. Al Qaeda has become a
focal group through its ability to pull off the first large-scale terrorattack on American soil.
In democratic politics focality is of critical importance. A candidate must first be considered credible to have any chance of winning. Furthermorefocality helps define the political
spectrum, which in turn determines the dimensions of political competition. Most people
choose political views that are relatively simple and straightforward.The political science
literature suggests that over 90 percent of the political spectrum can be placed along a single
dimension (Poole & Rosenthal, 1996). A successful political ideology therefore must be focal. An ideology that is too difficult to explain, or does not involve memorable heuristics and
stories, is likely to fail. Spectacles, performances, and stories all help create this focal quality.
Political marketersalong all parts of the political spectrum understandthese principles, even
if they do not articulate them in a systematic theoretical framework. Spectacles and stories
are a critical part of marketing.
Terrorists may have at least four reasons to wish to make their ideologies focal. First,
they may value propagation of the ideology per se. Second, propagation of the ideology may
enhance their control over material resources. In particularbeing focal may ease fundraising.
Third, holding or creating a focal ideology may cement political power. Fourth, spectacles
may make it easier to motivate subsequent terrorists.
2.1. Motivating subsequent terrorists
Being a terroristis a scary undertaking.The most highly publicized forms of terrorismtoday
typically involve suicide attacks. Even if the attack is halted, the perpetratormay face a long
jail sentence, or possibly execution or torture. Many perpetratorsmay be maimed or injured
if the act does not go as planned. Before any attacks take place, a terrorist usually spends
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Public Choice (2006) 128:233-244
time in training.While harddata are difficultto come by, terroristtrainingcampscan be
dangerousplaces.The terroristsoftenaresubjectto "trialby fire"to test theirmettle(as are
U.S. Marines),or the campmay be the victim of an attackor bombingraid.Manyof the
othercampmembersare would-beterrorists,andmanyof themarenot normalpersonality
types.The campsarenot generallyin comfortablelocationswithfull hotelfacilities.
donottypicallyreceive
Motivatingwould-beterroriststhereforeis a majorissue.Terrorists
highmonetarywages, so psychologicalperksareof paramountimportance.Some terrorists
are motivatedby political or religious ideology, but ideology alone does not serve as a
completeexplanatoryvariable.Many people agree with terroristworldviewsyet most of
themdo not becomekillers.
Some terroristsaremotivatedin cell or smallgroupsettings.Typicallya smallgroupof
young men are trainedtogetherover an extendedperiodof time. The men areencouraged
to feel specialandto formespeciallystrongemotionalbondsof loyaltyandfriendship.The
men also are encouragedto believe thatthey reapspecialbenefitsfrombelongingto these
elite units.In returnfor suchbenefits,they aretold thatthey mustbe preparedto give their
lives for theircomrades.Whenthetimecomes,andtheseindividualsare"called,"theyfeel a
strongsense of obligation.Obedienceis morelikely thandesertion.Similarbondingtactics
arecommonin standardgovernmental
militaries,whetherit be U.S. forcesortheNazitroops
in WWII.
of context.U.S.
Theseloyalties,however,aredevelopedthrougha broaderunderstanding
soldiersarefed a steadystreamof informationaboutthe importanceof the conflictat hand,
andaboutthe evils of the opposingforces.Theyaretold storiesaboutthe enemyandshown
filmedspectaclesof successfulcombator attacks.Moraleandcohesionaretypicallyhigh.
Otherfightingforces takegreatcareto inculcatesimilarimpressions,againto inducetheir
troopsto fight and possibly sacrificetheirlives. The small grouployalty is paramountin
the momentof sacrifice,but thatloyaltycan only be producedwhen the soldiersbelieve it
is towardsome worthypoliticalend. Whensuch a broaderpatrioticcontextis unavailable,
the small grouployaltiestypicallyare very weak. Most of the Iraqiforces underSaddam,
for instance,did not believe in the legitimacyof his regime.It is no accidentthatmost of
themrefusedto fight.Saddam'sSunniallies,however,continueto mountdangerousterrorist
attacks,at least through2005. They rely on Iraqinationalism,anti-Americansentiment,
Moregenerally,
andanti-Shiiteandanti-Kurdideologiesto motivatethe attackperpetrators.
terrorismleads to demonstrationand copycateffects, especiallyamonggiven peer groups
(Alexander& Pluchinsky,1992).Thishelpsexplainwhy PalestiniansandSriLankanTamils
- two small groupsrelativeto global population- accountfor about80 percentof known
(recent)suicideattacks(Ricolfi,2005).
In othercases would-beterroristsareworkedup intoexcitedandpartiallyirrationalstates
of mind,possiblyon a temporarybasis only.Considerthe extreme(andnot easily verified)
view of McDougall(2004):
"Completeisolationanda radicallyshorttime lapsebetweenthe momenta bomberis
tappedand when he carriesout the attackare essentialto successfulsuicide attacks.
"Studiesof Hamassuicidebombersindicatethere'sonly a 24-hourwindowbetween
findingthecandidateandcarryingoutthemission,"saysSwetnam."Itsoundsincredible,
butHamasdoestheentireprocesswithinone day."Hamasrecruitersdon'tselectsuicide
bombersfromwithintheirowncadres;instead,theypullin a dogmaticanddisillusioned
young male outsidetheiroperation.It takes a deep pool of disaffectedmales to find
the one willing to carryout a suicidemission."Throughoutthe night,they'll keep the
candidatein a closedroomandbombardhim withdogmaabouthis missionas a soldier
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Public Choice (2006) 128:233-244
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of Allahand"revhimupaboutbeinga hero,"as Swetnamputsit. "Theytell him, 'Allah
only asks once, andhe's askingyou now."'Only in extremelyrarecases has a suicide
bomberbeen knownto back out of a mission, Swetnamsays; one of the few that is
knownaboutoccurredwhen his isolationbufferbrokedown."He is said to have run
into his brotheron the way to his assignment,and that was enoughto cause second
thoughts.""
This accountis anecdotalratherthandefinitive,andit contradictssome othersourcesin
the literature(Ricolfi,2005). Nonetheless,it remainsa usefulpolarcase, as evenherecontext
is all-important.
Even with a very shortrecruitmenttime window,terroristsmust findtheir
candidate"employees"withina broaderpool of candidates.Those candidates,if they are
even willingto considerhelpingout,mustview the terroristorganizersas a focal alternative
to the statusquo. Furthermore
the candidatesmustconsiderviolentdestructionandmurder
as moralactsvalidatedby some of theirpeers.
It is possible to generatesuicide bombersonly in light of a broaderpolitical context.
The futureterroristsalreadyhave particularfocal storiesin theirminds, such as how the
Americansor Israeliswish to takeoverthe MiddleEast,stealAraboil, humiliateMuslims,
or convertthemto Christianity.
The would-beterroristsalso havebackgroundknowledgeof
otherterroristattacks.Forinstancethey(might)view Hamasas a providerof publicgoods,a
formidablecombatant,andcommittedto a "gloriousstruggle"againstthe Israelis.Whenthe
time comes to snatchandmotivatethe terrorist,the organizersarenot startingfromscratch.
The would-bebomberalreadyhas the requisitestoriesin his mind, andthe recruitersneed
only to pusha few mentalandemotionalbuttonsto activatea violentresponse.
Terroristleadersmay have differingmotivationsthanthe lower-leveltroops.Oftenthey
organizeattacksbutdo not conductthempersonally,as with Zarqawior Osamabin Laden.
They runthe risk of retaliationbutdo not face certaindeathor capture.These individuals
may be motivatedby the prospectsof glory,recognitionas global leaders,the excitement
of planningandexecution,andperhapsby the prospectof politicalrentsas well. Whether
rationallyornot, arguablyOsamabin Ladenexpectssomedayto be therulerof SaudiArabia
or perhapsa broaderIslamiccaliphate.
Thatbeing said,the terroristleadersalso rely on storiesandspectacles.First,the leaders
maythemselvesbe motivatedby the storiesandspectacles,just as terroristoperativesareso
motivatedin part.Second,we needonly assumethattheleadersdesirepoweror controlover
the operatives,for whateverreason.The storiesandspectacleswill makesuchcontroleasier,
as discussedabove.Thatbeing the case, the returnsto becominga terroristleaderarenow
higher,whetheror not the storiesandspectaclesdirectlymotivatethe leaderas well.
As mentionedabove,focal storiesmayrequiresome degreeof isolation.Theverynotion
of focalityrequiresthatattentionbe directedto or centralizedupona smallnumberof events
andstories.If too manyinformationsourcesarecompetingforattention,andon equalterms,
it can be harderfor focalityto evolve. To provideone example,it is easierto developfocal
TV shows fromthreemajornetworksthanfromfive hundredcable channels.In a political
context,a relativelyisolatedsociety alreadypresentssome obviousfocal points.Thereare
fewerinformationsourcesandfewermajorconcerns.
This may help explainwhy terrorismis relativelyeasy to producein the WestBank or
partsof Gaza.While terroristattackshave declinedwith the buildingof walls, the supply
of potentialterroristsfromthese areashas been significant.Both the WestBankand Gaza
arerelativelyisolatedenclaves.The costs of bravingcheckpointsandmovinginto Israelare
significant.Furthermore
manyPalestiniansfeel like outsiderson Israeliterritory.Nor arethe
Arab
countries
neighboring
especiallyamenablelocales for refugeePalestinians.
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Public Choice (2006) 128:233-244
At the sametime,the WestBankandGazaarerelativelypoor.Theydo not attractmuch
globalorU.S. popularculture.Manypeoplehaveaccessto satellitetelevision,yet theprimary
sourcesof Arabic-languageprogrammingare incendiaryand promoteanti-U.S.and antiIsraelpointsof view. At the sametime, the Palestinianslive out a daily (or at leastregular)
theaterof conflict.HostileencounterswithIsraelitroopsarecommon;theenclavesarestruck
withmissilesor helicopterattacks,andthe Palestiniansfightamongstthemselves.
In economiclanguage,a greatdealof theateris beingproduced"forfree"(fromthepoint
of view of any terroristorganizer),simplyby the courseof daily events.Givenhow much
theaterandspectacleis alreadyin place, a criticalinputfor terroristproductionis available
essentiallyfree of charge.We shouldnot be surprisedif the supplyof terroristsor potential
terroristsis especiallylarge.
At the same time, thereis a (somewhat)positiveside to this story.Terroristsareeasiest
to producein areaswhereterroristinfluencesareconsiderable.Yeton these sameterritories
terroristsaremorelikelyto moderatetheirattacks.PerhapssomeMiddleEastterroristgroups
Buttheymightthinktwiceabout
wouldliketo ignitea nucleardevicein mid-townManhattan.
in
The
latter
act
the
same
bomb
Jerusalem.
probablywouldbe easierto pull off, but
planting
it also wouldkill a largenumberof Palestinians.Theresultingfall-outcouldplaguetheArab
worldmorethanIsrael.Thefrequencyof attacksthereforemaybe negativelycorrelatedwith
theirscope and scale. Preciselywhereterrorismis frequent,it becomesmoreimportantto
targetor pinpointthe resultsof the violence.
Thismay also helpexplainwhy sponsorsdo not financesuccessivelylargerspectaclesto
promoteterrorism.Largespectaclesin the UnitedStatesarehardto pull off; even if terrorist
groupsareseekingweaponsof mass destruction,theydo not appearto havesucceededyet.
Furthermore
they mustimportthe weaponsto the UnitedStatesandtrainandorganizethe
appropriate
group.Inthoseareaswhereterroristgroupsarestronger(e.g., partsof theMiddle
the
East), optimalattacksaresmallerscale in nature.NukingBaghdadwouldnot obviously
be a good propagandamovefor al Qaeda,even if it werepossible.
2.2. Are terroristsrational?
It is commonlydebatedwhetherterroristsare rationalin the economicsense. Economists
use the rationalityconceptin differingways, but typicallythey referto the use of means
demandcurve and will
to achieveends. A rationalpersonwill have a downward-sloping
Under
a Beckerianview,
fashion.
in
a
more
or
less
to
incentives
straightforward
respond
rationalterroristscan be deterredjust like anyoneelse (see Bermanand Laitin(n.d.) and
Landes(1978). The terroristshavegoals theywish to achieve.Whenthe pricesof achieving
those goals go up, the terroristswill substituteinto otherends. Alternatively,changesin
relativeprices can deflectterroristsfrom one set of meansto another.We thereforehave
policy leversagainstterrorists.
Undera secondview,terroristsarenotrationalin thisordinaryeconomicsense.Typically
partisansof this claim cite religiousbelief or extremedevotionto some ideal. Perhapsthe
terroristshope to achieveinfinitebliss in heaven.If thatis the case, andthey areoperating
with infiniteexpectedvalues, secularincentivesmightbe impotent.We do, of course,see
manysuicidebombersandterrorists.If loss of life does not deterthem,whatcan?
The perspectiveof this papersuggestsan intermediatestanceon these questions.Given
how terroristsperceivethe world,they arerational.Yetthe underlyingperceptionsmay not
fitmostmodelsof epistemic(non-economic)rationality,namelywhetherbeliefsmakesense.
Considerfirstthecase forrationality.It does not appearthatmostknownterroristspursue
the infinitebliss of heavenat all prices. Most suicidebombers,for instance,have sinned
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Public Choice (2006) 128:233-244
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duringtheirlives. Theyfrequentlydrink,smoke,treattheirfamiliesbadly,andcommitother
examplesof misconduct.One of the 9/11 terrorists,is a classic case in point.Beforegoing
off to "diefor Allah,"he spenthis last nightwith a prostitute.
In othercases terroristsreinterpret
religiousdoctrineto suittheirends.ForinstanceIslam
but
this
kind
of
prohibitsbeheadings,
killing has become a mainstayof terroriststrategy.
The purveyorsandtheirdefendershave since attemptedto reinterpretreligiousdoctrineto
allowforbeheadings.Whetherornotthisattemptis "sincere"is besidethepoint.Eitherway,
establishedIslamicdoctrinedoes not bind strictlywhen terroristsperceivesome benefitto
but againdoctrinehas
actingin a particularway. Suicideitself is arguably"anti-Islamic,"
been interpretedto allow andindeedencouragethe practice.1
Theseexamples,however,do not implythatwe can applystandardtheoriesof economic
rationalitywithoutamendment.Terroristsmay treatperceivedmeans and ends as subject
to laws of rationalchoice, but the real questionis whatkind of perceptionsthey hold. An
individualwill becomea terroristin the firstplace only if he or she buys into some extreme
storiesabouthow the worldworks.Theseincludestoriesof U.S. imperialism,Zionistworld
domination,anti-Arabconspiracies,andothers.These storiesarevery differentfromthose
held by most mainstreameconomists.Most economiststhereforewould not be very good
predictorsof how Muslim terroristswill behave. In other words, we are operatingwith
differentbackgroundassumptions.The terroristshavegrownup with a differenttheater,so
to speak.
These delusionsof terroristsneed not be linkedto religionin any directway. (In Iraq
many of the suicide bombersare Sunnisand would appearto be relativelysecular,as in
the cases of Sri Lankaand Japanesekamikazepilots as well.) For instancethe relatively
secularSaddamHusseinapparentlybelievedthathe mightsurvivea U.S. onslaughtagainst
Iraq(Johnson,2004, chaptereight). ArguablySaddamthoughthe could stall for time and
negotiatea peacesettlement,muchas he did in the firstGulfWar.In contrast,few observers
of Americanpolitics found such a view plausible,given the rhetoric,views, and plans of
the Bush Administration.
Both pro-warand anti-warcommentatorsrejectedthis outcome
as feasible.Whenthe reportscameout aboutSaddam'sstrategy,his stancewas considered
shockingin light of the obviousrealityon the U.S. side of the equation.
The tendencyto misperceiverealityis common.We havegeneralreasonsto believe that
individuals,especiallyyoungmales, will overestimatetheirchancesof success andengage
in excessive risk-taking.These overestimationstend to be especiallypronouncedin areas
of conflict,statuscompetition,andviolentstruggle(Johnson,2004). Furthermore
leadersof
terroristgroupsandautocratsareprobablyself-selectedfor overconfidenceandrisk-taking
abilities,giventhe dangersinherentin thosepursuits.
Delusionsoccurat boththe level of operativesas well as leaders.Forinstanceinterrogations at GuantanamoBay reputedlyyieldedtalkof the followingplot. A groupof Muslims
would hijacka plane and land it at an Americanairport.The women and childrenwould
be released,but the men would be held and then slaughtered.The hijackerswould then
deliver a speech about the evil consequencesof U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. business
communitywould then (supposedly)realize thatthey were pursuinga disastrousand unprofitablecourseof action.Theywoulddemand,andreceive,a changein Americanforeign
policy.
Virtuallyany American,of course, would dismiss this scenarioas nonsense.The demandsmadeby suchhijackerswouldimmediatelybecomepoliticallyunacceptable,if only
1
The 9/11 CommissionReport. (2004): W.W.Norton:New York.
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Public Choice (2006) 128:233-244
becausethe hijackerswantedthem.A backlashwouldresult,ratherthana changein U.S.
foreignpolicy.(9/11, for instance,probablymadepossiblethe invasionof Iraq,ratherthan
softeningU.S. policy in the MiddleEast.) The would-beterrorists,in contrast,appeared
to believe thatU.S. foreignpolicy was drivenpredominantlyby commercialinterestsand
in a very directfashion,akin to some of the old 1960s economisticconspiracytheories.
The point is not whetheral Qaedawas ever planningsuch an operation;ratheral Qaeda
membersconsideredsuch an operationto be a viable possibilityand perhapsan effective
strategy.
We can now see how rationalitydoes and does not play a role. The would-beterrorists
mightbe rationalin the sense of respondingto perceivedincentives.If theyarepaidmoreto
if the attackis harderto
pull of an attack,the attackwill be morelikely. Correspondingly,
implement,theymayrefrainor postponetheirplans.Thatbeing said,theperceivedbenefits
of the attackareillusoryandindeedthe realresultswouldbe the oppositeof whata better
informedAmericanknowsto be true.The benefit-costcalculusof the hijackerswouldnot
be close to the realbenefitsandcosts.
Thesepointsstrikeat a weaklinkin theeconomist'sconceptionof rationality.Economics
hasmuchto say aboutmeans-endsrelationships,butrelativelylittleto say aboutbeliefs.The
rationalexpectationsapproachsuggeststhatindividualsholdthetruemodelof theeconomy,
or some reasonableapproximation
thereof,in theirheads.Suchassumptionswouldruleout
the hijackscenariodiscussedabove.But the rationalexpectationsassumptionis not a good
descriptionof the world,even if it is usefulfor somemodelingpurposes.Of courseonce we
rejectrationalexpectations,we havelittle guidanceon whichbeliefs arerationalandwhich
arenot, froman economicpointof view. Thatis why an economictheoryof terrorismis so
problematic,andwhy it mightlook to the culturaldimension.Withthisframeworkin mind,
let us now turnto some impliedpredictionsandpolicy conclusions.
3. Why so few subsequentterroristattacks in the United States?
It is a fundamentalpuzzle why therehave not been more majorterroristattackson U.S.
soil. Since 9/11 and the anthraxattacks,no majorattackshave occurredon U.S. soil up
throughApril of 2005. To be sure, it is risky to write aboutwhy somethinghas not happened.Givenpublicationlags, the statedeventmay well have happenedbetweenthe time
of writingand publication.Nonethelessit would remaina puzzle why the next set of attacks- even if they havealreadyhappenedby the time you readthis- took so long to pull
off.
Surely anotherattackwould appeareasy. The attackneed not be as elaborateas that
stagedon 9/11. A simplemurderof a few people,in MiddleAmerica,wouldsufficeto bring
nationalpanic.Imaginea single terroristshowingup at a crowdedPeoriahigh school with
an automaticweaponor smallbomb.It is easy to imaginedozens of schoolchildrenbeing
killedat low cost. Orimaginea singleunarmedhealthyyoungmanshowingup at a nursing
home, determinedto kill a few people with his barehands.Therearefew if anybarriersto
suchan attack.Evenif U.S. immigrationdoes its job in screeninglegal immigrants,it is not
difficultto slip an illegalmigrantthroughthe Mexicanborder.
We see at leastfourhypothesesas to why therehas notbeen anotherterroristattack:
* Theory1. Al Qaeda(andothergroups?)is verypatientandinvestsmuchtime in planning
its attacks.9/11, afterall, was manyyearsin the making.
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Public Choice (2006) 128:233-244
241
* Theory2. The U.S. is betterguarded.This may includeeitherbettersafeguardson the
ground,the arrestof would-beterrorists,or betterintelligenceinformationaboutforthcomingattacks.Some attackswerein the works,butwe havestoppedthem.
* Theory3. Al Qaeda(andothergroups?)is interestedonlyin large,veryspectacularattacks.
Theyview such smallerscale attacksas loweringratherthanincreasingtheirprestigeand
profile.
* Theory4. Al Qaeda(andothergroups?)considersthe currentstrugglein Iraqto be the
toppriority.Theywouldratherdevotetheirresourcesto defeatingAmericaon their"home
territory."
All of these hypothesesmay containelementsof truth,andmorethanone of themmay
apply.I wouldlike, however,to suggesta fifthcontender:
* Theory5. Giventhecostsof producingstoriesandspectacles,thecost of producinganother
terroristattackin the UnitedStatesis muchhigherthanwe commonlythink.
Once we conceptualizeterrorismas theater,it is easy to see why the costs of mounting
a terroristattackare higherthanthey might at first seem. The relevantcosts are not just
the materialsor the organizingof resources.Insteadthe highestcost mightbe stagingand
thatconvincesthe operativesto "doGod'swill."
maintainingthe "theater"
We alreadyhave mentionedthat motivationis easiest to producewhen the would-be
terroristsareoperatingin a relativelyisolatedenvironment.In factif theoperativescannotbe
thiscost mightbe prohibitive.TheUnited
keptin a veryfriendlyandcontrolledenvironment,
Statesoffersa largenumberof temptations,not the least of which includesan ongoinglife
in a wealthyandfree society.Furthermore
therearefew majorsocialor commercialstigmas
associatedwith the practiceof the Islamicreligion.Arab-Americans
in the United States
haveveryhighlevels of incomeandhighratesof education.Evenif a givenArab-American
is poor,he or she can aspireto a relativelyhigh level of social acceptance,whetherhe is
Christianor Muslim.
Competingspectaclesand "theaters"are staged in the United States all the time, and
with greateffectiveness.Americanpopularculturehas a very strongexportpresencearound
the world,in largepartbecause of its universalor generalappeal.A residentin America
is inundatedwith an unprecedented
andviolentaction.But
degreeof sports,entertainment,
unliketerroristspectacle,theseimagesareintendedto be fun. Perhapsit is hardto motivate
terroristsin theUnitedStatesbecausecompetingideologiesof entertainment
areso powerful.
WesternEurope,in contrast,has a greaterexpertisein elite high culturethan in popular
culture.
This may help explainwhy we have seen numerousattacksin Europe,the MiddleEast,
and Asia over the last few years. Muslimcommunitiesin those regionsare far less integratedthanis the Muslimcommunityin the UnitedStates.Unlike the 9/11 strikes,many
of those attackswere plannedand carriedout by long-termresidentsof the countryin
question.
Underthis hypothesis,9/11 requireda veryunusualconcatenationof events.Most of the
terroristscame over from Europe,wherethey lived in relativelytightlyknit communities.
They remainlong enoughin the U.S. to trainandplan the attacks,but not long enoughto
the mastermind,Atta, possessed an unusualblend of fanaticism
"go native."Furthermore
and organizationalability.Obviouslythe attacksdid happen,so it cannotbe arguedthat
Americanculture,or the difficultyof motivatingthe terrorists,forestalledthem.Nonetheless
this questionof motivationmay remaincritical;it is no accidentthatnone of the terrorists
grewup in the UnitedStates.
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242
Public Choice (2006) 128:233-244
4. Policy implications
The aboveanalyseshavesomeimplicationsforhow to best combatterrorism.Someof these
hold for internalpolicy,othersfor foreignpolicy.
4.1. Havean open societythatembracesimmigrants
An open society makesit harderto have a sleepercell implantedin the UnitedStatesfor
manyyears.Those individualswill tend to lose theirterroristloyalties.Unlikemanyparts
of WesternEurope,it is hardto findisolated"Muslimghettoes"in this country.Evenwhere
Muslimsaremostprominent,such as in Michiganor alongthe coasts,theydo not typically
formisolated,closed, or self-sufficientcommunities.
We shouldcontinueto be strictin tryingto keep would-beterroristsout of the country.
But once individualsare let in, our attitudesandpolicies shouldbe welcomingratherthan
hostile.We shouldemphasizeintegrationratherthansubsidizingseparateethnicor religious
enclaves.Themoreintegratedthe Islamicimmigrantcommunityis withbroadersociety,the
more difficultisolationwill prove.Towardthis end we mightease the burdenson starting
small businesses,or otherwiseremaincommittedto flexiblelabormarkets
entrepreneurial
with upwardmobility.And while ethnicprofilingmay soundlike it makeseconomicsense,
it may in fact provecounterproductive.
4.2. Allow Americanpopularcultureto spreadin yourterritory
Many WestEuropeangovernments,most notablyFrance,are nervousaboutthe spreadof
Americanpopularculture.Yet Americanpopularculturemay ease assimilationof nonEuropeanresidents.Most of WesternEuropeis not doing an adequatejob of assimilating
its Muslimimmigrants.This suggestssome kindof culturalfailure;one obvioussolutionis
to look to culturesthathavehadmoresuccess in encouragingintegration.Frenchmenmay
not like the idea of cedingso muchinfluenceto U.S. popularculture.Yet comparedto the
relevantalternatives,the net effect may be to strengthenFrenchcultureratherthanweaken
it. ArguablyAlgeriansarea greaterthreatto theFrenchpolitythanareAmericans.If nothing
else, the spreadof Americanpopularculturewill, throughforce of competition,encourage
Frenchcultureto becomemorepopularandmoreinvitingto foreigners.
4.3. Statesponsorsof terrorismmaybe especiallyimportant
The case for targetingstate sponsorsof terrorismis strongerthan is often believed.If an
entirestatelendsits supportto terrorism,the oddsrise substantiallythatit will be possibleto
A statehas substantialresourcesat its command,
motivateterroristswithinthatenvironment.
the
to
allow
terrorists
to trainand segregateoperativesin unmolested
the
including ability
fashion.Censorshipcan be usedto keep out foreignor liberalideas.The terrorists,through
theiraffiliationswith nationalleaders,mightfindit easy to rise in status,aidingrecruiting.
Ontopof thiswe mustaddtheabilityof statesto financeterroristsusingthenationaltreasury,
or accumulatedstocksof weapons.
Al Qaeda,of course,has done its greatestdamageunderthe patronageof the Talibanin
Afghanistan.Even if we see subsequentattacks,the operativesmay well havebeen trained
duringthe Talibanera,underTalibanpatronage.
The typical argumentagainsttargetingstate sponsorsnotes that decentralizedterrorist
networkscan in any case mountattacks.Terroristsdo not need the physicalresourcesof a
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Public Choice (2006) 128:233-244
243
state to succeed.It is truethatthe materialcosts of the 9/11 attacksare estimatedat well
underone milliondollars.But againthe morerelevantcosts may be those of organizingthe
motivatingpoliticaltheater.Forthatendeavorstatesponsorshipmaybe critical.
That being said, the act of targetingstate sponsorsbrings a correspondingrisk. The
resultingwar may itself createrelevant"theaters"to motivateterrorists.This is a frequent
criticismof thecurrentwarin Iraq.JustasthestruggleagainsttheSovietUnionin Afghanistan
createdone generationof terrorists,so may the Iraqwar createanothergeneration.War
trainin theuse of explosives,learnhowto organizeattacks,anddevelopcohesive
participants
innercircleswithhighmorale.Statesponsorsmaybe important,butfailedstatesmaybe the
greatestdangerof all. If interventionsbringfailedstatesratherthansuccessfulreforms,that
is all the morereasonto be waryof activistpolicy.
4.4. Mediaissues
For constitutionaland moralreasons,I do not favorrestrictionson freedomof the press.
Nonethelessthe argumentsof this papermay suggest some utilitarianbenefitsfrom such
restrictions.Terroristattacksare,of course,a publicbad for manyindividuals,most of all
the immediatevictimsandtheirfamilies.Terrorismalso erodesthe legalorderandfreedoms
of the moreprosperousandsuccessfulnations.Wethereforewouldlike to restrictterrorism.
Sinceterroristswish to receivepublicity,limitedpresscoverageof terroristattacksmaylimit
the motivesfor suchattacksandthusdiscourageterrorism.
Whilethis argumentcan in principlework,I am skepticalof its relevancefor thepresent
day.First,restrictionson mediacoveragewouldencourageterroriststo maketheiractsmore
publicandwiderin scope.It maybe possibleto limitmediacoverageof a suicidebomberin
Iraq.It wouldbe impossibleto limit mediacoverageof 9/11 or a chemicalweaponsattack
on a majorsportsstadium.Second,effective censorshiphas provenincreasinglydifficult,
especiallyin the age of the Internet.Even if the mainstreammediadid not covera terrorist
attack,othersourceswould.Thisincludesbothblogs andforeignnewspaperswithwebsites.
Theendresultwouldbe morerumor,moremisinformation,
moreexaggeration,andperhaps
morepanic. The mainstreammedia,for all theirviews, are a relativelynon-sensationalist
sourceof information.Theirnet influenceis probablymorecalmingthaninflammatory.
For these reasons,I rejectmediacensorshipfor utilitarianreasonsas well. Nonetheless
how themediapresentandframeterroristattackscanbe of criticalimportance.This suggests
a majorrolefor voluntaryaction- in the formof non-profits,blogs, letterwriters,andmedia
watchdogs- in influencinghow the mediaportrayterrorists.On the supplyside, arguablyit
is best if the mediaportrayterroristsas feeble andimpotentcreatures,ratherthanas potent
monstersand worthyopponentsof the UnitedStatesgovernment.This will tend to make
thoseterroristsless focal. Of coursesuchimagesmay conflictwith optimalpolicy vis-a-vis
U.S. voters.If we view terroristsas soft, we mayunderestimate
the terroristthreat.Optimal
effortsto influencethe mediathereforeinvolvebalancingthese two concerns.
TheauthorwishestothankBryanCaplan,RobinHanson,andespeciallyCharles
Acknowledgements
Rowley
forusefulcomments.
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