Investigation into Greater Manchester
Police contact with Ms ****** ***********
and Ms Katherine Cullen
Independent Investigation
Final Report
IPCC Reference: 2012/015272
IPCC Final Report
Ms ********** and Ms Cullen
Contents
Commissioner's Foreword - Rachel Cerfontyne ............................................................... 3
Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 7
Terms of reference ............................................................................................................ 8
Subjects to the investigation .............................................................................................. 9
Chronological summary of events ................................................................................... 10
Ms Katherine Cullen ........................................................................................................ 21
Policies and procedures .................................................................................................. 42
Conclusions..................................................................................................................... 48
GMP contact with ****** ********** in August and September 2007 ............................. 48
The decision not to inform Ms Cullen of previous police contact with Mr Ghafelipour . 51
The decision not to include the circumstances of the alleged offences in 2007 in the
IPCC managed investigation. ...................................................................................... 56
Learning Report .............................................................................................................. 57
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Commissioner’s foreword
1.
Katie Cullen was brutally murdered by Iman Saeed Ghafelipour in October
2009, leaving her family devastated. The IPCC has conducted an
independent investigation into Greater Manchester Police (GMP) actions
and decisions concerning Mr Ghafelipour and Katie prior to her death and
has found serious failings.
2.
In August 2007, Ms ****** **********contacted GMP to report that her exboyfriend, Mr Ghafelipour was harassing her and had made threats to kill
her. She stated that he persisted in contacting her after the relationship
had ended. When she told him to cease contact and that she was in a new
relationship he threatened to kill her.
3.
Shortly afterwards, two serious arson attacks were made on Ms ************
car and home. These crimes were investigated by the police but in our
view, the investigations were inadequate and no charges were brought,
although the police had little doubt that Mr Ghafelipour was responsible for
both attacks.
4.
Katie began a relationship with Mr Ghafelipour in March 2008, which
lasted approximately six months. During that time Katie reported to the
police that Mr Ghafelipour had stolen a substantial amount of money from
her bank account, but she withdrew this allegation in September 2008 as
it appears that she hoped to recover the money through direct agreement
with him.
5.
The following May (2009), Katie began a new relationship and in June,
she and her boyfriend encountered Mr Ghafelipour in a McDonalds fast
food restaurant. He approached the couple, physically assaulted Katie and
made threats to kill them both. Later that day, Katie attended Reddish
Police Station to report the incident, where she was apparently advised to
attend Cheadle Heath Police Station.
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6.
Ms ********** and Ms Cullen
She did this the following day, detailing Mr Ghafelipour’s threatening
behaviour in McDonalds and the intimidating texts and calls that she had
received from him. At both Reddish and Cheadle Heath Police Stations,
Katie was seen by an Enquiry Counter Officer. At Cheadle Heath the
information was relayed to the communications room, where it was graded
as a ‘priority’ incident and as such, required a response within the hour..
7.
In spite of this, follow up action was delayed 26 times, before Katie was
eventually seen by police officers when she attended Cheadle Heath
Police Station again on the evening of 22 June. She gave the officers
details of the incident at McDonalds, including the fact that Mr Ghafelipour
had threatened to kill her and her boyfriend. The police officers decided
that they would make contact with Mr Ghafelipour, tell him to leave Katie
alone and that a referral would be made to the Domestic Violence Unit.
They did not consider that Mr Ghafelipour posed any threat to Katie at that
time.
8.
This assessment was largely based on Katie’s demeanour, described as
calm and her expressed view that Mr Ghafelipour’s threats were made in
the ‘heat of the moment’. Having checked the Police National Computer,
one of the officers advised Katie that there were no ‘warning’ markers
against Mr Ghafelipour on the system.
9.
After Katie’s departure from the police station, the officers checked the
internal intelligence system and discovered Mr Ghafelipour’s history with
Ms **********. However they decided not to contact Katie and pass on any
of this information. This decision was made on the basis that they were
not required to do so by policy or procedure, because he had not actually
been charged or convicted of the suspected offences and also because of
Katie’s own attitude and views.
10.
They do not seem to have considered that Katie’s attitude and views may
have been influenced by the information about the lack of warning
markers they had shared with her. In addition she was a nurse,
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accustomed to dealing with highly stressful situations whilst remaining
calm and professional in her demeanour.
11.
The referral to the Domestic Violence Unit resulted in a standard letter and
information booklet being sent to Katie. Due to the misspelling of Katie’s
first name and Mr Ghafelipour’s surname, no trace of either was found on
the intelligence system, so no connection was made by the Domestic
Violence Unit with Mr Ghafelipour’s history.
12.
Katie was murdered by Mr Ghafelipour at her home in October 2009 and
he later received a life sentence.
13.
In my view, Katie was badly let down by Greater Manchester Police. Our
investigation has exposed a catalogue of inaction and missed
opportunities. Had the arson offences against Ms ********** been
adequately investigated, it is possible that Mr Ghafelipour would have
been convicted and not at liberty to murder Katie. When Katie reported the
threats made by Mr Ghafelipour to the police, she was passed from pillar
to post and did not receive the priority attention the situation demanded.
14.
The obvious connection between Ms ********** and Katie’s allegations and
experiences does not appear to have been made or taken into
consideration in any risk assessments undertaken. The police officers
placed far too much reliance on Katie’s demeanour and wishes, whilst at
the same time withholding their knowledge of her assailant from her, which
would have enabled her to better understand the dangerous situation she
was in.
15.
They agreed to her request to contact Mr Ghafelipour and ask him to
deliver money he owed Katie when she was not at home. This was entirely
inappropriate and the officers clearly failed to understand the significance
of this theft of the money. It gave Mr Ghafelipour power and control over
Katie, who needed her money returned. This provided him with the
opportunity for continued contact and ongoing harassment.
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16.
Ms ********** and Ms Cullen
The areas of poor performance and failure to take proactive steps to
protect Katie set out in this report mirror some of the experiences of other
cases involving domestic abuse we have investigated both in this force
and nationally. Since these tragic events the force has told us that it has
learned lessons and has improved working practice across the force.
17.
It is therefore very disturbing that the HMIC report ‘Everyone’s BusinessImproving police response to domestic abuse’, published on 27 March
2014, identified GMP as one of the four forces giving cause for very
serious concern. The other three were much smaller forces- Bedfordshire,
Cambridgeshire and Gloucestershire. The report states that ‘immediate
remedial action is required by the force to address the risks if victims of
domestic abuse in Greater Manchester are to be properly safeguarded’
18.
HMIC found that insufficient attention was paid to safeguarding victims
who were assessed as medium to low risk, with serious weaknesses in the
understanding of staff about their roles and responsibilities in managing
risk to victims. HMIC have made nine recommendations to the force to
improve the service to domestic abuse victims. We will test the
implementation of these recommendations in any further domestic
violence related referrals we receive from the force.
19.
Katie’s family have endured unimaginable trauma because of what
happened to their beloved daughter and sister. We cannot know what the
outcome would have been if Katie had been given all the relevant
information about Mr Ghafelipour, but it is hard to believe that it would not
have influenced her attitude towards him or her assessment of the risks
she was facing. Not only did she leave the police station without any
protection plan in place, she left without knowledge of vital information
which might have enabled her to protect herself. Instead she was told that
Mr Ghafelipour had no ‘warning’ markers against him, which may well
have given her false assurance. In addition, the officers active support of
the plan for Mr Ghafelipour to deliver money to Katie’s home exacerbated
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the dangers when they should have been doing all they could to reduce
them.
20.
Katie and her family deserved better.
Rachel Cerfontyne
IPCC Deputy Chair
Introduction
21.
In August and September 2007, Greater Manchester Police (GMP)
investigated two arson attacks and a harassment allegation made by Ms
****** ********** against her ex-boyfriend Mr Iman Saeed Ghafelipour.
22.
Mr Ghafelipour was arrested and interviewed under caution on suspicion
of the arson attacks and making threats to kill Ms **********, but he was
later released from police custody on the grounds of insufficient evidence.
He was not charged with these offences.
23.
The investigation into the alleged harassment of Ms ********** continued
and In February 2008, Ms ********** informed GMP that she no longer
wished to pursue her complaint of harassment against Mr Ghafelipour.
24.
In March 2008, Ms Katherine Cullen began a relationship with Mr
Ghafelipour and subsequently reported that an amount of money had
been taken from her bank account. In September of that year Ms Cullen
withdrew her allegations in relation to the loss of money, stating that there
had been a ‘misunderstanding’.
25.
This relationship ended shortly after this and on 20 June 2009 Ms Cullen
contacted GMP stating that Mr Ghafelipour had threatened to kill her and
her new boyfriend when he saw them together in a McDonald’s restaurant.
Ms Cullen reported the incident to GMP but she declined to make a formal
statement against Mr Ghafelipour or to make a written statement.
26.
PS Arkwright and PC Bagnall interviewed Ms Cullen regarding this
incident on 22 June 2009 and made a decision not to make Ms Cullen
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aware of the police intelligence concerning Mr Ghafelipour and his arrest
in 2007.
27.
One of these officers later spoke to Mr Ghafelipour and informally warned
him not to contact Ms Cullen again, but other than this no further action
was taken against Mr Ghafelipour.
28.
In October 2009, Iman Saeed Ghafelipour murdered Ms Cullen at her
home address in Manchester and he was later convicted of her murder
and sentenced to life imprisonment.
29.
The circumstances surrounding the GMP contact with Ms Cullen were
later made the subject of a formal referral to the IPCC in November 2009
and a managed investigation was carried out by that force. That
investigation was completed in November 2010 and the investigation
concluded that there was no evidence of misconduct on the part of PS
Arkwright or PC Bagnall.
30.
Subsequently members of Ms Cullen’s family made further complaints
about the terms of reference for that managed investigation and the
manner in which the investigation was conducted.
31.
On 11 September 2012, the IPCC decided that these complaints would be
addressed by way of an independent investigation.
Terms of reference
D1
32.
The terms of reference for the independent investigation are:
1. To investigate the circumstances of Greater Manchester Police
contact with Ms ****** ********** in August and September 2007 and
in particular;
a) The overall handling by Greater Manchester Police of Ms
************ allegations of harassment by Iman Saeed
Ghafelipour.
b) The investigation by Greater Manchester Police of the offences
of arson reported by Ms ********** to that force.
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2. To consider if the failure to include the above circumstances in the
Terms of Reference for the IPCC managed investigation in
November 2009 impacted adversely on that investigation in any
way and if so to identify any further matters that need to be
investigated or re-investigated.
3. To consider if the decision not to inform Ms Cullen of previous
police contact with Iman Saeed Ghafelipour was in accordance with
accepted policy and practice and made at the appropriate level.
4. To identify whether any subject of the investigation may have
committed a criminal offence and if appropriate make early contact
with the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). On receipt of the
final report the Commissioner shall determine whether the report
should be sent to the DPP.
5. To identify whether any subject of the investigation in the
investigators opinion has a case to answer for misconduct or gross
misconduct, or no case to answer.
6. To consider and report on whether there is organisational learning,
including;

Whether any change in policy or practice would help to prevent
a recurrence of the event, incident or conduct investigated;

Whether the incident highlights any good practice that should be
shared.
Subjects to the investigation
33.
Following consideration of all the available evidence in this investigation
there was no indication that any police officer or member of police staff
had committed a criminal offence.
34.
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Similarly there was no evidence to suggest that any police officer had
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breached the Police Standards of Professional Behaviour.
35.
All the police officers and members of staff of GMP involved in this
investigation were treated as witnesses.
Chronological summary of events
36.
Mr Iman Saeed Ghafelipour claimed asylum in the United Kingdom from
the Islamic Republic of Iran on 5 June 2002.
37.
Ms ****** ********** met Mr Ghafelipour in a nightclub in Manchester in
2006 and she had a brief relationship with him which lasted only a matter
of weeks.
38.
On 20 August 2007, a motor vehicle belonging to Ms ********** was set on
fire outside her home address in the early hours of the morning.
39.
The incident was reported by a member of the public.
40.
Police Sergeant (then Police Constable) Roberts visited the scene of the
vehicle fire in Northmoor Road, Longsight, at which the local Fire Service
also attended.
D47
41.
The Fire service log for the incident states that the fire was caused
‘deliberately by persons unknown’
42.
PS Roberts requested vehicle keeper enquiries and arranged for the
vehicle to be recovered.
S41
43.
In his statement made to the IPCC dated 2 April 2013, PS Roberts stated
that he remembered that a colleague had conducted house to house
enquiries in the vicinity of the fire and he (PS Roberts) informed the police
communications room that those enquiries had proved negative.
44.
PS Roberts added that he had not submitted a crime report in respect of
this incident at the time, because the details of the owner had not been
confirmed and because he could not be sure that a crime had in fact been
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committed.
45.
On 21 August 2007, Ms ********** contacted GMP to report that she was
being subjected to harassment by Mr Ghafelipour.
D21
46.
The allegation of harassment was recorded as a crime by GMP and given
the Crime Report number 208481M/07. PC 12383 Christopher Forrester
was the officer allocated to investigate the matter.
S5
47.
PC Forrester saw Ms ********** at Longsight Police Station on 21 August
2007 when she made a formal statement outlining the incidents.
48.
No separate crime report was submitted in respect of the vehicle fire, but
crime report number 208481M/07 shows an entry by PC Forrester on 24
August 2007 as follows;
49.
‘…Her car has then been set on fire outside her house on the Monday
night (200807)…’
D20
50.
On 9 September 2007, a second arson attack took place at Ms ************
home address when a relatively small amount of damage was caused to
the front door of the premises. This incident was recorded as an arson
with intent to endanger life. (Crime report number 2237707/07)
51.
PC Forrester was again allocated to investigate this crime.
52.
Mr Ghafelipour was suspected of involvement in these offences and he
was arrested on 9 September 2007.
53.
The following day he was interviewed at Longsight Police Station by Police
Constable Baldwin and Detective Sergeant Clitherow (then Detective
Constable Knott)
D27
54.
A transcript of the interview later prepared by PC Forrester shows that
during the course of the interview Mr Ghafelipour was questioned about
the two incidents of arson and the allegations of harassment made by Ms
**********.
55.
This interview was recorded on audio tape and a transcript of the interview
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was later prepared by PC Forrester.
56.
During this interview Mr Ghafelipour continuously denied making
threatening comments to Ms **********and he stated that at the time of the
arson incidents he had been at home in his flat.
57.
He was asked by DS Clitherow if there were any other persons who might
be able to confirm if he had in fact been at home and he provided the
name of a friend by the name of ‘REZA’.
58.
Mr Ghafelipour also informed the officers that ‘REZA’ lived in Rochdale
Road and that his telephone number was stored in his, (Mr Ghafelipour’s)
mobile telephone.
S43
59.
In her statement to the IPCC dated 20 August 2013, DS Clitherow stated
that at the material time she was working as a Detective Constable in the
Criminal Investigation Department (CID) at Longsight Police Station as
part of the Area Policing Team. She accepted that she did conduct the
interview with Mr Ghafelipour, but prior to the interview she had had no
connection with the investigation. She explained that it was common
practice for CID officers to assist with interviews if resources were
available, or on request from other supervisors or members of the
Evidence Review Team.
60.
She acknowledged that the transcript of the interview conducted with Mr
Ghafelipour shows her asking him a series of questions designed to elicit
an alibi from him, as he had said previously in the interview that he was at
home at the time of the arson offences.
61.
DS Clitherow further stated that due to the passage of time, she could not
remember if she or any other person passed on details of the potential
alibi to any other officer. She added that at that particular time there was
no specific procedure to deal with alibi’s provided by accused persons.
Alibis would, she stated, be dealt with as part of the ongoing investigation.
S25
62.
S25A
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In two statements made to the IPCC on 12 November 2012 and17 May
2013,PC Baldwin stated that at the time of the arrest of Mr Ghafelipour he
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was serving in an Area Policing Team in the Longsight area and that PC
Forrester and DS Clitherow were also part of that team.
63.
During the course of the interview he made reference to CCTV cameras
which he knew were situated in Northmoor Road, Longsight, in various
locations and he asked Mr Ghafelipour if he could have been seen on any
of these cameras at the relevant time.
64.
The officer stated that at the conclusion of the interview he issued an
official warning under the Harassment Act to Mr Ghafelipour stating that
neither he nor anyone on his behalf should contact Ms ****** ********** or
her mother.
65.
Mr Ghafelipour was later released on police bail for further enquiries to be
made and the investigation continued.
66.
Crime report numbers 208481M/07 and 2237707/07 detail the lines of
enquiry which PC Forrester followed, and the instructions which were
passed on to him by supervisors asking him to complete certain actions.
67.
At various times throughout the course of the investigation he was asked
to carry out a number of instructions by a variety of colleagues and
supervisors. Among these instructions were;

To submit a crime report.

To carry out house to house enquiries in the vicinity.

To liaise with the complainant (Ms **********) and establish if Iman
Ghafelipour had made any further contact with her.

To contact the Fire Service to conduct a fire safety check at the
complainant’s home.

To establish if there was any CCTV in the area at the time of the
offences.
S40
68.
S40A
In two statements made to the IPCC dated 17 April 2013 and 31 May
2013PC Forrester stated that at the time of these offences in August 2007
he was working as a Neighbourhood Beat officer in the South Manchester
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division of GMP.
69.
He explained that at that time he had approximately 10 months service
and it was common for officers with his level of service to investigate
offences of this gravity.
70.
He outlined the enquiries he did make which included house-to-house
enquiries when he established that a flat in the same complex appeared to
have a CCTV system fitted which might have recorded evidence of the
offender.
71.
He states that he made ‘numerous’ attempts to locate the owner of the flat
by leaving his contact details at the address and by speaking to
neighbours, but without success.
S36
72.
S36a
This potentially vital line of enquiry was not completed by PC Forrester
although it was subsequently highlighted by PC Forrester’s supervising
officer, Police Sergeant Paul Coburn.
73.
PC Forrester further stated that he completed a number of other tasks in
relation to the investigation.
74.
He drew up an investigation plan which included having a fire alarm
installed by the Fire Service at the address and the installation of a home
alarm link to a local police station; he also submitted a ‘locate / trace’
message with the relevant crime reports which subsequently led to the
arrest of Mr Ghafelipour and he arranged for Ms ********** to be taken to a
place of safety at one point.
75.
The officer stated that he inspected the damage to the front door of the flat
in Northmoor Road, Longsight and ‘satisfied ‘himself that there were no
forensic opportunities.
76.
He could not remember submitting a crime report in respect of the alleged
vehicle fire, and no crime report was submitted.
D27
77.
PC Forrester also stated that he completed a full transcription of the
interview with Mr Ghafelipour ‘in order to expedite the investigation’.
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78.
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He acknowledged when shown a copy of the transcription that reference
was made by the interviewing officer PC Baldwin to council CCTV
cameras in Northmoor Road, Longsight.
79.
PC Forrester stated that he was not aware that there were council CCTV
cameras in Northmoor Road and he did not make any further enquiries
following the interview in that respect.
80.
Similarly he acknowledged that the transcript detailed a series of questions
from DS Clitherow involving a possible alibi for Mr Ghafelipour suggesting
that his friend was with him in his flat at the time of the arson offences.
81.
The officer accepted that he did not make any enquiries about this
potential alibi and he did not make it known to any other officer. He was
not aware of any other officer reading the transcript of the interview or
listening to the interview audio tapes.
82.
He went on to describe how two mobile telephones belonging to Mr
Ghafelipour were seized from him at the time of his arrest.
83.
PC Forrester sent these mobile telephones for forensic examination to
discover potential evidence of the harassment allegations.
84.
However, during this period he was attending various training courses and
he made no other enquiries during this time. No results were received
from the forensic examination of the telephones.
85.
The officer explained further that at one stage Mr Ghafelipour did make
contact with Ms ********** thereby breaching the conditions of his bail and
PC Forrester made ‘a number of efforts to arrest him’ without success.
86.
There is no indication that PC Forrester circulated Mr Ghafelipour as
wanted in connection with this breach of bail.
87.
He added that Mr Ghafelipour was eventually arrested in connection with
another offence and a further investigation plan was put in place which
considered a house search of Mr Ghafelipour’s premises for further mobile
telephones and a further arrest of him for harassing Ms **********.
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88.
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PC Forrester stated that on 6 February 2008 he made an entry on the
investigation action board of the crime report stating that Ms ********** had
withdrawn her complaint against Mr Ghafelipour and that she would not
support a police prosecution.( In a statement she made to GMP on 4
S5B
February 2008)
89.
He then submitted a Crown Prosecution Service advice file for the
information of his supervisor PS Coburn and he added to it the withdrawal
statement made by Ms **********.
90.
He explained that PS Coburn made the decision that the evidence
gathered did not meet the threshold for submission to the CPS and Mr
Ghafelipour was eventually released from bail.
91.
PC Forrester stated that when he saw Mr Ghafelipour personally to
release him from bail he warned him not to make any contact with Ms
********** or her mother or to visit any premises where they might be. He
added that he issued this warning under the provisions of the Harassment
Act 1997.
92.
The officer concluded by stating that he believed he had conducted
enquiries into these offences diligently and fully according to his
experience at the time and in accordance with advice and instruction from
supervisory officers. He stated that he had done everything he could to
investigate these allegations and help Ms **********.
S36
93.
S36A
In two statements he made to the IPCC dated 24 April 2013 and 26 April
2013, Police Sergeant Paul Coburn stated that during the period between
2005 and 2012 he worked as a Police Sergeant in the Longsight and
Ardwick Area Policing Team based at Longsight Police Station.
94.
Included among his roles was the management of a team of up to 10
police constables and community support officers. This involved general
supervision of the staff and allocating such work as crime investigations to
them.
95.
He stated that around 4 September 2007 he recalled being made aware of
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Crime Report number 208481M/07 which related to an offence of
harassment being investigated by PC 12383 Forrester.
96.
He read through the crime to familiarise himself with the circumstances
and then tasked PC Forrester with contacting Ms ********** to provide her
with personal security advice and also to establish if there had been
further incidents.
97.
He added that he was also aware that a further incident had occurred on
19 August 2007 when a vehicle belonging to Ms ********** had been set on
fire and PC Forrester told him that he would also investigate this crime.
98.
This was an error by the officer in his statement. This offence actually
occurred on 20 August 2007.
99.
PS Coburn stated that he also tasked PC Forrester with speaking to an
Evidence Review Officer to discuss what further action was required.
100. Evidence Review Officers were he explained, a team of experienced
detectives and other officers who were specially trained to provide
guidance to colleagues and they assisted by reviewing crime
investigations, by developing investigation strategies and by setting action
plans for officers to progress enquiries.
101. PS Coburn stated that on 9 September 2007 he became aware of a
serious escalation of the investigation when a flammable liquid was used
to set fire to the front door of a flat in Northmoor Road, Longsight where
Ms ********** was living. Crime Report number 2237707/07 was generated
as result.
102. PS Coburn reviewed the crime and prioritised some immediate tasks to be
actioned directed towards safeguarding the victim, gathering further
evidence and making efforts to arrest Mr Ghafelipour as a suspect.
103. Subsequent to the arrest of Mr Ghafelipour, a further review of the
investigation was overseen by a Prisoner Assistance and Support Team
and an action was highlighted to make mobile telephone enquiries and
further enquiries into the arson attacks.
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104. PS Coburn stated that following the release of Mr Ghafelipour he had no
further involvement in the investigation until 9 October 2007 when he
again reviewed it together with PC Forrester.
105. The officers discussed the outstanding enquiries particularly the
examination of a mobile telephone seized from Mr Ghafelipour to establish
if there had been telephone calls between Ms ********** and Mr
Ghafelipour and a potential CCTV enquiry at an address close to her flat.
106. Divisional policy at that time meant that mobile telephone examinations
took a considerable time but PS Coburn advised PC Forrester to continue
with this line of enquiry.
107. He stated that PC Forrester had told him that he had tried on a number of
occasions to contact the owner of the flat where the CCTV camera was
placed but without success and he had also spoken to neighbouring
occupants with the same result.
108. PS Coburn stated that in view of the amount of time lapsed since the
offences were committed he advised PC Forrester to discontinue this line
of enquiry until further information came to light.
109. He added that on or around 20 October 2007 PC Forrester told him that
Ms ********** was alleging that Mr Ghafelipour had contacted her via
another mobile telephone and he tasked PC Forrester with taking a further
statement from her. PC Forrester was advised that should further evidence
of harassment be disclosed then he should make efforts to arrest Mr
Ghafelipour and seize any other mobile telephones.
110. Around 13 November 2007 PS Coburn held a further review meeting with
PC Forrester to discuss the strength of evidence in the case.
111. In relation to the alleged arson offences PS Coburn decided that there was
very limited evidence available to link Mr Ghafelipour with the crimes and
there was little ‘realistic prospect of progressing the investigation further.’
112. PS Coburn explained that as a trained Custody Sergeant he was
authorised to recommend the filing of crimes which did not meet the
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evidential threshold test for forwarding to CPS.
113. He added that he still believed that Mr Ghafelipour was linked in some way
to the offence but he decided to recommend that the investigation be filed
pending any further information which came to light and he added this
recommendation to the Crime report.
114. The investigation was eventually filed by the Divisional Crime Evaluators.
115. PS Coburn stated that, in summary, his decision was based on the lack of
evidence in the case.
116. Despite extensive enquiries in the immediate area, no witnesses had been
uncovered; there was no forensic evidence linking the suspect to the
scene of the fire and there was no CCTV recovered linking anyone to the
scene.
117. In addition he further stated, positive action had been taken against Mr
Ghafelipour, when he had been arrested, interviewed at length by
experienced officers and had totally denied the offence.
118. PS Coburn instructed PC Forrester to update the intelligence on Mr
Ghafelipour on the police ‘OPUS’ intelligence system in order to highlight
the concerns that despite not being charged with any offences he believed
him to be involved in some degree with the offences.
119. He explained that this information would thus be readily available to any
officer checking the system.
120. ‘OPUS’ (Operational Unit Policing System’) is an internal intelligence
system used by Greater Manchester Police which provides operational
information to police personnel and which improves an officer’s ability to
search for a wide variety of information helping to investigate and detect
crime.
121. PS Coburn stated that in respect of the harassment offence there was
stronger evidence available. PC Forrester had informed him that the only
enquiry outstanding was the mobile telephone enquiry but this had still not
been finalised at that stage and there was no firm date when the enquiry
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would be finalised.
122. His ‘plan’ with PC Forrester was to finalise this telephone enquiry and then
submit the file to CPS requesting a decision on possible charges.
123. The officer stated that on 23 November 2007 Mr Ghafelipour attended at
Longsight Police Station in relation to his breach of bail arrest. A further
decision was taken that there was still insufficient evidence to justify the
evidential threshold test and he was re-bailed until 8 January 2008
pending the result of the telephone analysis in connection with the original
harassment offence.
S5B
124. Over the next few weeks the officer had little involvement with the matter
until in February 2008 PC Forrester contacted him to say that Ms **********
had decided not to support a prosecution against Mr Ghafelipour and she
had made a statement to this effect.
125. PS Coburn explained that this left the officers with two options; either to
continue with the investigation and submit the evidence file to CPS for a
decision regardless of Ms ************ wishes, or to recommend filing the
investigation without liaising with the CPS.
126. After careful consideration of the options he decided to respect the wishes
of Ms ********** and recommend the filing of the investigation.
127. He stated that his rationale for this was that without the evidence of Ms
********** and the telephone analysis there was little evidence to link Mr
Ghafelipour to the crime.
128. The officer added that he believed that Mr Ghafelipour was more likely
than not to be linked to the offence but he advised PC Forrester to inform
Ms ********** of the decision not to proceed.
129. Although PC Forrester had not succeeded in contacting the owner of the
flat where the CCTV camera had been seen, the IPCC investigation did
manage to identify the occupier of that particular flat. In a statement to the
S39
IPCC dated 18 April 2013, they stated that at the relevant time in August
2007 they lived in a flat on the ground floor of the complex at 13A
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Northmoor Road, Longsight, Manchester.
130. They added that they had fitted two CCTV cameras in the window of the
flat which looked out onto Northmoor Road. They had fitted the cameras
as a deterrent to criminals as they had been burgled twice before.
However, the cameras were not connected to any electrical supply and
there was no film in the cameras.
131. The camera owner also stated that they did remember a police officer
visiting the flat asking questions about the cameras and they informed the
officer what he had done with them. They were unable to remember that
officer’s name and the IPCC investigation has failed to establish the
identity of that officer.
132. The IPCC investigation has failed to establish who that police officer was
and there is no information on the Crime Reports or the Action Board
reports to identify the officer.
133. Similarly, the IPCC investigation did subsequently identify a number of
CCTV cameras fitted to both public and private premises in Northmoor
Road.
134. Although these cameras were not situated close enough to have enabled
identification of persons actually committing the arson arracks they may
have identified any suspects in the area at the relevant time and thus
negated any possible alibis.
Ms Katherine Cullen
135. Ms Cullen met Mr Ghafelipour in the same nightclub as ****** ********** in
March 2008, and began a relationship with him.
136. The relationship ended in September 2008.
137. In May 2009, Ms Cullen began a relationship with ********* ******, a student
working at a local petrol station which Ms Cullen used.
S16
138. In statements made to GMP on 29 October 2009 and to the IPCC dated
S16A
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17 January 2013, Mr ****** stated that on the first date with Ms Cullen she
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Ms ********** and Ms Cullen
told him about her previous relationship with Mr Ghafelipour and that he
had used her credit card to take money from her account .
Ms Cullen said that £3,000 to £4,000 had been taken and that Mr
Ghafelipour had repaid about £1,000.
139.
She told Mr ****** that the reason she still maintained contact with Mr
Ghafelipour was, he believed, in order to get the full amount of money
back from him.
140. Mr ****** stated that Mr Ghafelipour was supposed to drop the money
through Ms Cullen’s letter box but he did not always do so when it had
been agreed.
141. On 20 June 2009, Ms Cullen was in a McDonalds restaurant in Reddish
together with Mr ******, when Mr Ghafelipour came into the same
restaurant and saw them.
142. An argument ensued and Mr Ghafelipour started swearing and shouting at
Mr ******.
143. Ms Cullen ‘dragged’ Mr Ghafelipour out of the restaurant and into the car
park to calm him down.
144. Mr ****** stayed inside and when Ms Cullen came back inside the
restaurant she was upset and stated that she did not want to go home as
she believed that Mr Ghafelipour would be waiting for her. Consequently
Ms Cullen and Mr ****** went back to his house.
145. Mr ****** stated that all of the comments made by Mr Ghafelipour in the
restaurant were directed at him and not at Ms Cullen, but Mr ****** told her
that she should report the incident to the police. He did not believe that
she wanted to tell the police what had happened but he told her that it was
something she should do.
146. He added that Ms Cullen left his house shortly after and he believed that
she went to the police to report what had happened.
147. Mr ****** stated that he and Ms Cullen did not discuss in detail what she
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had said to the police but he believed that she did not want to prosecute
Mr Ghafelipour. He had rung her to apologise for his behaviour after the
police had contacted him and warned him.
148.
Mr ****** stated that Ms Cullen was ‘satisfied’ with that and returned to live
at her home. She was ‘fine’ knowing that Mr Ghafelipour knew the matter
was with the police and after that it was just about the money he owed her.
S35
149. In a statement made to GMP on 1 December 2009 a relative of Ms Cullen
stated that on 21 June 2009, Ms Cullen telephoned her and told her of the
incident in McDonald’s when Mr Ghafelipour had seen her with Mr ******.
150. Ms Cullen told the relative Mr Ghafelipour had put his fist under her chin,
threw her head back and threatened to kill her. Ms Cullen was alarmed at
his actions and very frightened so the relative advised her to stay with her
and she would take her to a police station .
151. Later that day the relative took Ms Cullen to Reddish Police Station and
waited in a car while she reported the incident to the police.
152. They stated that Ms Cullen was only in the police station a short time and
Ms Cullen said she had been advised that her complaint against Mr
Ghafelipour should be made at Cheadle Heath Police Station. The relative
believed that this was because the person Ms Cullen had seen at Reddish
Police Station was not in fact a police officer.
153. The relative recalled that at some stage during the following week Ms
Cullen received a message on her mobile phone from Mr Ghafelipour
which was very threatening, although they could not recall the contents of
the call. Ms Cullen said the police had put some sort of ‘restraining order’
on Mr Ghafelipour but she did not mention any further details and the
relative became frustrated as she was responding to text messages from
Mr Ghafelipour and even spoke to him.
S35B
154. In a further statement made to the IPCC on 31 May 2013, the relative
stated that the correct date on which she accompanied her daughter to
Reddish Police Station was 20 June 2009, the day on which the incident
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Ms ********** and Ms Cullen
had occurred in the McDonalds restaurant in Reddish.
S44
155. ****** ******* was employed by Greater Manchester Police as an Enquiry
Counter Officer when Ms Cullen went in to Reddish Police Station on 20
June 2009 to report the incident.
156. In a statement made to the IPCC dated 17 June 2013,Ms ******* recalled
seeing Ms Cullen. She stated that Ms Cullen related the incident which
had occurred in McDonalds, telling Ms ******* of the harassment and the
argument which had taken place.
157. Ms ******* stated that she told Ms Cullen that this incident should be
reported as a crime, but Ms Cullen wanted to speak to her then current
boyfriend ( ********* ******) who was actually the victim of the threats by Mr
Ghafelipour .
158. Ms ******* added that she spoke to Ms Cullen for some considerable time
and she explained the different options which were open to her including
using the Harassment Act.
159. Ms ******* could not remember what Ms Cullen’s state of mind was but she
believed that she would have remembered if Ms Cullen had been
hysterical or crying.
160. She explained that her normal course of action following this conversation
would be to create either a message pad or a FWIN (Force Wide Incident
Number- a computerised incident log) adding that message pads were
retained for a period of two years and the FWIN’s for a longer period. She
could not remember which of these documents she created.
161. It is known that no FWIN was in fact created for this incident following this
visit by Ms Cullen, and no message pad relating to the reported incident
has been recovered.
162. At 12.40pm on 21 June 2009, Ms Cullen went into Cheadle Heath Police
Station and again saw another Enquiry Counter Officer, ***** ****. She
recounted the incident in McDonalds to him.
S6
163. In a statement made to the IPCC dated 7 November 2012,Mr **** stated
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Ms ********** and Ms Cullen
that Ms Cullen told him she had also received numerous texts and
telephone calls of a threatening nature from Iman Ghafelipour and he
began to take the necessary details from her.
164. He remembered that at some stage Ms Cullen became quite emotional
and she started crying although he did not think she was hysterical. Mr ****
explained that at that time in his career he had had considerable
experience in dealing with distressed persons at the front counter and he
did not mean to suggest that this was not a serious allegation or that Ms
Cullen was not upset as she clearly was.
D51
165. Mr **** passed the relevant information by telephone to the police
communications room and an incident number was subsequently created.
Mr **** gave Ms Cullen the police incident number of the recorded
allegation (FWIN 1395 of 21/6/09)
166. The incident was graded as a ‘Priority’ incident meaning that a response
was required within one hour.
167. The FWIN created at this time shows an incorrect spelling of Mr
Ghafelipour’s name as Iman Guafelipour .
168. Mr **** could not recall if he gave Ms Cullen a leaflet on how to deal with
domestic violence or indeed if any were available at that time, neither
could he recall if he passed on relevant emergency and non-emergency
telephone numbers to her.
169. Similarly he could not remember why Ms Cullen went to Cheadle Heath
Police Station rather than a police station nearer her home or if he took
any further action. Nor could he remember why Ms Cullen was not seen
at the time by a police officer but she then left the police station. The FWIN
log was endorsed to say that Ms Cullen was ‘heading home’ at 12.40pm.
170. Mr **** concluded by stating that when he joined GMP in June 2004, the
main training programme for enquiry desk officers was mainly shadowing
an experience colleague with a minimal amount of classroom training. He
could not recall receiving any specific training at the time in how to
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Ms ********** and Ms Cullen
recognise and deal with domestic violence.
D51
171. FWIN 1395 of 21/06/09 then details a lengthy series of delays in allocating
this matter to a police officer for resolution, and a number of attempts to
contact Ms Cullen by her personal mobile telephone.
172. However, Ms Cullen later explained that she had been advised by a
member of GMP not to answer her mobile telephone as this was the
method by which Mr Ghafelipour was attempting to contact her.
173. At 2.25pm Acting Police Sergeant Maginiss was made aware of the
incident and that it required ‘allocation’, meaning that it required passing to
an officer to deal with.
S23
174. In a statement made to the IPCC dated 27 November 2012, A/PS
Maginiss stated that this entry on the FWIN means that he would have
been made aware of the incident by the police communications room
either by radio or by telephone.
175. A/PS Maginiss was unable to remember if he attempted to find a
‘resource’ at that time but the next entry on FWIN 1395 of 21/06/09 shows
the commitments of at least four of the officers on duty at that time
suggesting that the communications room had been asked for officers
commitments. At 2.57pm A/PS Maginiss was again made aware of the
incident.
176. At 3.03pm Inspector Peter Jackson the senior patrol officer on duty at the
relevant time, was made aware of the incident ‘for escalation policy’.
S24
177. Peter Jackson has since retired from the police service and in his
statement made to the IPCC on 3 December 2012, he stated that he now
had no recollection of the incident.
178. Mr Jackson explained however that ‘escalation policy’ meant simply that
the incident had been brought to the attention of an Inspector for review. It
did not mean that the priority rating of the incident had been escalated at
that point.
179. He added that it was likely that he would either have read the FWIN
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Ms ********** and Ms Cullen
entries at that point or that he would have been made aware of its content
by a radio operator. Given that he appears not to have made a FWIN entry
personally it would appear that he was made aware by radio of the
incident.
180. At 3.20pm Ms Cullen contacted GMP again seeking information and she
was spoken to by a call handler ****** ********, who has since left the police
service.
S27
181. In a statement to the IPCC dated 11 January 2013,Ms ******** stated that
she was unable to recall dealing with the incident but from viewing the
FWIN 1395 of 21/06/09 she acknowledges that she spoke to Ms Cullen
and then ‘switched’ the call to a radio operator at the relevant police district
advising them of Ms Cullen’s call.
D27
182. A transcript of the conversation between Ms ******** and Ms Cullen shows
that Ms ******** told Ms Cullen that the police district dealing with the
incident were waiting for some free patrols, and that a member of the
communications room had left a message for her on her mobile telephone.
183. Ms Cullen told Ms ******** that Mr Ghafelipour had rung her ‘about eight
times’ in the past three hours, but she was advised that the police would
send an officer when a patrol was free.
184. At 5.49pm PC Bernard Taylor was deputed to attend the scene.
D48
185. PC Taylor later submitted a duty report showing that he attended Ms
Cullen’s address in Harcourt Road, Reddish at 5.52pm and having
received no reply to his knocking he posted a note through the door on a
GMP message pad asking Ms Cullen to contact GMP regarding the
incident. He did not leave his own details on the pad to prevent further
delay if Ms Cullen responded by asking to speak to the officer who might
then be off duty. The officer also reported that he did not make his way to
the rear of the property as this house was a mid terrace type.
186. Further formal delays are recorded on the FWIN until at 11.03pm PS
19228 Lowe was made aware of the incident.
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S26
Ms ********** and Ms Cullen
187. In his statement made to the IPCC on 11 December 2012 PS Lowe stated
that he could not recall having any dealing with the incident subject of
FWIN 1395 of 21/06/09.
188. However, from having sight of a copy of the relevant FWIN he could say
that on that date he was working a 9.00pm to 7.00am night shift.
189. He stated that although the entry on the FWIN shows that he was aware of
all the delays this did not necessarily mean that he was ‘literally aware’ but
that the police communications room had made him aware of outstanding
incidents.
190. The FWIN at this stage also shows a number of other officers being
unavailable to attend due to dealing with other incidents.
191. PS Lowe stated that these officers shown on the FWIN would be the
normal number of officers available for patrol in that particular half of the
police division.
192. The FWIN shows further delays in resourcing the incident and further
telephone calls from Ms Cullen in which she states that Iman Ghafelipour
was still trying to contact her.
193. At 1.39pm on the following day (22 June 2009) the FWIN shows an entry
stating that the incident should be brought to the attention of the ‘pm Sgt’,
to ensure that the matter was resourced at 6.00pm.
194. Further delays are recorded on the FWIN and Ms Cullen contacted the
police communications room again at 6.40pm to say that she was then on
her way to Cheadle Heath Police Station which had been alerted of her
attendance.
195. GMP did pass on a number of updates to Ms Cullen explaining the delays.
S33
196. Police Sergeant Jacqueline Bass was a patrol sergeant at Cheadle Heath
Police Station and on 21 June 2009 she was working a 1.00pm to 9.30pm
duty.
197. In her statement to the IPCC dated 30 January 2013,PS Bass stated that
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Ms ********** and Ms Cullen
as is her normal practice she kept records of what staff were on duty on a
particular day.
198. On this day and during this shift there were eight police officers including
one police sergeant covering the north side of the district and 10 officers
including PS Bass covering the south side.
199. She added that as FWIN 1395 occurred in the north side of the police
division then it would have been her sergeant colleague who would find a
resource.
200. However if an incident required resourcing then both sides of the police
division would be considered.
201. Thus a total of 18 officers were on duty during that duty period.
D52
202. The IPCC has produced sequence of three events charts which describes
the police activity around FWIN 1395 of 21/06/09.
203. The charts show that from the time Ms Cullen reported the incident to
Cheadle Heath Police Station on 21 June until she was seen by PS
Arkwright and PC Bagnall there were 26 occasions when the incident was
delayed by police staff.
204. The shortest delay was of 10 minutes and the longest was an overnight
delay from 11.52pm on 21 June to 8.31am on 22 June.
205. The charts show that there was a diverse range of incidents reported in
the period before Ms Cullen attended at Cheadle Heath Police Station and
10 FWIN incidents created in the hour following her visit.
206. The peak number of incidents open during the ‘life’ of FWIN 1395 was at
1.10pm on 21 June when there were 14 ‘live’ incidents.
207. Eventually Ms Cullen was seen at Cheadle Heath Police Station on 22
June 2009 by Police Sergeant (then Police Constable) James Arkwright
and Police Constable Tom Bagnall.
208. At this time PC Bagnall was a probationary police officer with only eight
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Ms ********** and Ms Cullen
months service and PC Arkwright was his tutor constable.
S1c
209. In his statement made to the IPCC on 20 February 2013, PS Arkwright,
stated that at the material time in 2009 he was an officer with almost 13
years of service and that he had dealt with many cases of domestic
violence, harassment, violence and public order etc. He added that he was
familiar with the Data Protection Act and the Harassment Act. He was
confident of which police policies were in place in respect of domestic
violence and how to interpret them.
210. He first saw Ms Cullen on the evening of 22 June with PC Bagnall.
211. At that time he said, Ms Cullen was calm when explaining what had
occurred on the previous Saturday morning. She did not cry at any time to
his recollection and she was able to describe fully what had happened.
212. In his opinion she did not appear upset about the incident and he did not
recall her telling him that she had been to the police station the day before
or that she had had any prior police contact.
213. PS Arkwright stated that Ms Cullen described what he believed was ‘a
serious incident’ as at one stage, Mr Ghafelipour had allegedly used the
words “ I’ll kill you” towards her and her boyfriend. PS Arkwright was
aware that in respect of the offence of making a threat to kill someone, it
was necessary to prove that the alleged offender must have the specific
intent of making the victim believe that the threat would be carried out.
214. Because of this he and PC Bagnall questioned Ms Cullen further and she
was ‘quite sure that the comment was made in the heat of the moment’
S1A
215. PS Arkwright commented on a previous statement made to GMP on 16
June 2010, in which he stated that Ms Cullen had mentioned that her
parents had told her to go to a police station. He believed this to be the
case, and remembered Ms Cullen stating that Mr Ghafelipour had
borrowed some money from her. She described what had happened in
relation to the numerous telephone calls about the repayment of the
money and that some of the messages from Mr Ghafelipour were possibly
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Ms ********** and Ms Cullen
of a harassing nature. PS Arkwright stated that Ms Cullen was quite calm
and ‘collected’ whilst she was describing this.
D28
216. PS Arkwright left the room at this stage to make the necessary checks on
the Police National Computer, and in doing so he was looking for warnings
on Mr Ghafelipour in relation to violence, drugs, weapons etc.
217. He did not recall seeing any such warnings, and stated that had there
been such warnings he would have recognised that Mr Ghafelipour posed
a ‘potential risk’ to Ms Cullen.
218. PS Arkwright stated that Ms Cullen told him that Mr Ghafelipour had never
been violent towards her or threatened her in any way prior to the incident
in McDonalds.
219. He added that she did not show any indications of being frightened of Mr
Ghafelipour.
220. He stated that he asked Ms Cullen ‘specifically’ what she wanted from the
police and she told him that she wanted Mr Ghafelipour to ‘leave her
alone’.
221. PS Arkwright told Ms Cullen that the matter could be dealt with by using
the Harassment Act which would require a statement of complaint from
her. This would enable the police to issue a warning to Mr Ghafelipour
under this act known as a ‘first course of conduct warning’ to stay away
from her and not to contact her in any way.
222. PS Arkwright repeated a word he had previously used in his statement of
16 June 2010 when he used the word ‘adamant’ in describing Ms Cullen’s
opinion about this. He was happy, he stated, to use the word again. Ms
Cullen was ‘adamant’ that she did not wish to make a statement and that
she did not want to make a formal complaint. She wanted Mr Ghafelipour
‘spoken to’, rather than being officially warned.
223. He formed the impression that Ms Cullen wanted Mr Ghafelipour to stop
contacting her, that she was not seeking punishment or retribution but she
just wanted him to leave her alone. He thought that Ms Cullen just wanted
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to get on with her life.
224. PS Arkwright stated that on his return to the room he told Ms Cullen that
although Mr Ghafelipour was known to the police, he did not have any
‘warnings’ which caused him concern in relation to her safety. He added
that he did not tell her what the PNC check had revealed.
225. In view of the PNC record, Ms Cullen’s insistence that she did not want to
make a complaint, her apparent calmness at this stage and her ‘adamant’
opinion that she did not want the police to warn him officially in relation to
the Harassment Act, he made the decision to speak to Mr Ghafelipour on
Ms Cullen’s behalf.
226. PS Arkwright states that had he any concerns for her safety he would have
encouraged Ms Cullen to take more positive action in relation to the
Harassment Act, as he had done many times before.
227. He was fully aware that speaking to Mr Ghafelipour on such an occasion
was not normal police practice. However, he believed it was fully justified
as he wanted to take some positive action on her behalf. He also decided
that there was insufficient evidence to support an allegation of threats to
kill as Ms Cullen herself had stated that the words were used ‘in the heat
of the moment’.
228. PS Arkwright added that at no time did he tell Ms Cullen that Mr
Ghafelipour was not known to the police and neither in his presence did
PC Bagnall, who was not aware at that time of what the PNC check had
revealed.
229. PS Arkwright told Ms Cullen what he proposed to do, that was to contact
Mr Ghafelipour, ask him to repay the money and leave her alone. Ms
Cullen acknowledged that course of action was ‘okay’. In fact she used
words to the effect “ That’s fine let’s do that”.
230. The officer gave Ms Cullen his telephone number and that of PC Bagnall
and told her to contact them personally if she had any further problems.
He also told her that as he was warning Mr Ghafelipour not to contact her,
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Ms ********** and Ms Cullen
she should equally not contact him in order to avoid further incident or
interpretation by him that things between them were now okay.
231. Ms Cullen then left the police station.
232. PS Arkwright stated that he was satisfied that there was nothing more he
or PC Bagnall could do. He was quite satisfied that Mr Ghafelipour did not
pose a threat to Ms Cullen.
D18
233. Together with PC Bagnall he then checked the internal intelligence system
(known as OPUS) and confirmed that Mr Ghafelipour had been a suspect
in allegations of harassment and arson in 2007. Further checks revealed
that these allegations of harassment had been retracted by the
complainant, who stated that she was no longer in fear of Mr Ghafelipour
and there were no reports of him coming to the attention of the police after
that time.
234. He stated that he and PC Bagnall discussed the options open to them
which were, to contact Ms Cullen and tell her of Mr Ghafelipour’s
background or not to tell her. These options were open to them under the
Data Protection Act, with which he was familiar.
235. The officers agreed that in view of the circumstances there was no
requirement or necessity to inform her.
236. PS Arkwright added that had Mr Ghafelipour been charged or convicted of
the 2007 allegations, and had that information come to his attention at the
time, then he would have given serious consideration to telling Ms Cullen
of those facts. He was also aware that he was making this decision at that
time to assess Ms Cullen’s immediate risk within the next 24 hours or so
before the Domestic Violence Unit of GMP could be alerted to the incident
and review the risk.
237. PS Arkwright stated that he did alert the Domestic Violence Unit to the
incident and he was perfectly satisfied at that time, that Mr Ghafelipour
posed no threat Ms Cullen based on the information he had to hand and
her own attitude.
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Ms ********** and Ms Cullen
238. Following this he did contact Mr Ghafelipour by telephone and he warned
him about his behaviour. PS Arkwright stated that he contacted Ms Cullen
again to tell her what he had done and to remind her that she should
contact him or PC Bagnall if she had any other problems with Mr
Ghafelipour. He further stated that he made a number of calls to Ms Cullen
and Mr Ghafelipour in an effort to resolve the money issue.
239. The officer stated that he believed he had gone further than he would
normally do in contacting Mr Ghafelipour as he believed that the money
issue was the only reason Mr Ghafelipour might have for contacting Ms
Cullen.
240. PS Arkwright concluded his statement by adding that Ms Cullen had
previously asked him to tell Mr Ghafelipour to put the money for the loan
repayment through her letter box whilst she was at work, and Mr
Ghafelipour agreed to do this.
S2C
241. In his statement to the IPCC dated 28 February 2013,PC Bagnall stated
that on 22 June 2009 he was probationer constable with only eight months
service in the police and that PS Arkwright (then a police constable) was
his tutor.
242. He describes seeing Ms Cullen at Cheadle Heath Police Station with PS
Arkwright and at that time she was he said, not in any way distraught and
she appeared calm, although clearly annoyed at what had taken place in
the McDonalds incident two days earlier.
243. He added that he was aware even at that early stage in his career of what
constituted the offence of making threats to kill someone and Ms Cullen
had made it quite clear that she did not believe that the threats made by
Mr Ghafelipour outside McDonalds were meant to cause her any fear.
Rather she said, they were said in the heat of the moment following a loud
and very angry argument at least on the part of Mr Ghafelipour.
244. The officer explained that this version of her belief was a very important
constituent part of the offence and Ms Cullen said that she did not believe
that Mr Ghafelipour would hurt her. He had not been violent towards her
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during the relationship and she was not in fear of him.
245. PC Bagnall stated that the interview with Ms Cullen then moved on to
discussion about the issue of the loan of money she had made to Mr
Ghafelipour. She stated that this was a considerable sum and she wanted
it paid back. She told the officers that the issue of the money was a way in
which Iman Ghafelipour may have wanted to keep some kind of hold over
her .
246. PC Bagnall stated that PS Arkwright left the room at that stage to check
the PNC computer and he listened to some voicemail which had been left
on Ms Cullen’s phone by whom Ms Cullen assumed to be Mr Ghafelipour.
The voicemail consisted of heavy breathing and garbled speech and there
were no specific threats made, but PC Bagnall assumed it to be Mr
Ghafelipour.
247. On PS Arkwright’s return the officers questioned Ms Cullen about her
expectations of what she wanted from the police. She said words to the
effect that she wanted to be rid of Mr Ghafelipour. She wanted him to stop
trying to get back with her and to pay back the money.
248. The officers then explained to Ms Cullen that the telephone calls
constituted an offence of harassment under the Harassment Act and that
the officers could issue a warning to Mr Ghafelipour to stop his harassing
behaviour. They told her quite clearly, PC Bagnall stated, that this would
require a statement of complaint from her. If she then reported any
further harassment then Mr Ghafelipour would be arrested.
249. The officers further explained that as, in her own words, the money had
been a loan, this constituted a civil debt and was not a crime. Ms Cullen
accepted this and understood what the officers were saying. She was
very clear that she did not want to make a statement in respect of the
harassment and that she would not back any police action.
250. PC Bagnall added that he explained to Ms Cullen what the consequences
of making a statement were, that there was a possibility of going to court
as a witness, but Ms Cullen stated that she did not want to do that. He
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remembered that at some stage she used the words “I don’t want to get
him in any trouble”.
251. PC Bagnall stated that PS Arkwright told Ms Cullen that without a formal
statement from her there was no formal way of warning Mr Ghafelipour,
because there was nothing officially in place to back up the warning.
252. However PS Arkwright agreed to speak to Mr Ghafelipour to ask him to
pay back the money and stop the harassment. He also told Ms Cullen that
there was nothing that she needed to worry about on his PNC record.
253. PC Bagnall was quite certain that neither he nor PS Arkwright told Ms
Cullen that Mr Ghafelipour was not known to the police, because he was
in fact known to the police.
254. Ms Cullen agreed with what PS Arkwright had suggested regarding him
trying to persuade Mr Ghafelipour to pay back the money and stop the
harassment. She thanked the officers and said that she appreciated that
PS Arkwright was going to try and resolve the situation. She appeared
quite glad that although she was not supporting some kind of formal
action at least the officers were doing something positive.
255. PC Bagnall added that earlier in the interview Ms Cullen mentioned that
she had reported the matter to the police because her parents had told her
that she should. He also remembered clearly that she told the officers that
she did not want to get Mr Ghafelipour into trouble and that she believed
he was going to leave the country soon. She added that she did not
believe that she would have any problems from him in the long term.
256. PC Bagnall stated that throughout the interview Ms Cullen was calm and
she answered every question in a ‘considered’ manner. He described her
manner as ‘astute’. She had a good grasp of what was going on and she
was more frustrated about the issue of the money. Ms Cullen was aware
he stated, that she needed to cut all contact with Mr Ghafelipour but she
could not because of the money.
257. After Ms Cullen left the station, PC Bagnall checked the internal
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intelligence system (OPUS) and discovered that Mr Ghafelipour was linked
to GMP by his previous arrest in 2007, for arson and harassment.
258. He confirmed that he and PS Arkwright discussed whether or not to
disclose this information to Ms Cullen.
259. PC Bagnall acknowledged that at that time he was vaguely aware of the
Data Protection Act. They discussed the risk to Ms Cullen and decided
that there was a ‘standard’ risk to her, meaning that there were no
indicators of significant harm to her. They also discussed the fact that Ms
Cullen was clearly not in fear of Mr Ghafelipour and the officers decided
that there was no reason to disclose what little information they had.
260. PC Bagnall stated that he and his colleague decided that the course of
action agreed with Ms Cullen was sufficient and that a positive action
arrest was not necessary. He added that had Mr Ghafelipour been
convicted of the offences of arson and harassment in 2007, then he also
would have at least given serious consideration to informing Ms Cullen.
261. PC Bagnall then updated the FWIN (1395 of 21/06/09) and he heard PS
Arkwright speaking to Mr Ghafelipour and warning him about his
behaviour, stating that he would be liable to be arrested if that behaviour
continued. He concluded his statement by stating that when Ms Cullen
said that she did not want to take action against Mr Ghafelipour, she also
asked the officers if they would ask him to drop off the money at her house
when she was not present.
S1a
262. In a previous statement made to GMP on 16 June 2010, PS Arkwright
stated that following his conversation with Mr Ghafelipour he contacted Ms
Cullen by telephone and outlined to her the conversation he had had with
him.
263. A short time later he contacted Ms Cullen, again to obtain some personal
details from her and he finally contacted her again on 24 June 2009 to
check if she had had any further problems with Mr Ghafelipour. She told
the officer that she had not received any money from him.
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264. A short time later on that same date PS Arkwright again contacted Mr
Ghafelipour. He told the officer that he would make payment as soon as
possible and PS Arkwright did not hear from either person after this date.
S38
265. In accordance with normal practice the details of the incident were passed
S38a
on to the Public Protection Investigation Unit of GMP by PS Arkwright and
were received by Police Constable Deborah Buchanan, a Domestic Abuse
Officer, on 24 June 2009
266. PC Buchanan stated that the information she received was mistaken in
that Ms Cullen’s first name was spelled incorrectly (as Catherine not
Katherine) and Mr Ghafelipour’s name was spelled incorrectly as Ghafelipor. There was no date of birth given for Ms Cullen.
267. The information passed on to PC Buchanan contained only scant
information regarding the incident which had taken place in the McDonalds
restaurant as follows;
268. “Following seeing Catherine with new partner last Saturday Iman has
made several calls to her of a harassing nature but no specific threats
were made. Catherine has been advised re Harassment Act which at this
time she does not wish to proceed with and just wanted him speaking to
which has been done accordingly”
269. Due to the incorrect information PC Buchanan could find no trace of Ms
Cullen or Mr Ghafelipour on the GMP intelligence system and
consequently she created records for both parties.
270. She stated that she attempted to contact Ms Cullen by mobile telephone to
offer her advice and support, but without success. She did however send
a system generated letter and an information booklet to Ms Cullen’s
address as another form of contact. This booklet contained personal
protection advice, together with advice on what agencies to contact for
help and support.
271. PC Buchanan also stated that had she been provided with the correct
information concerning Mr Ghafelipour, then she would also have had
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access to the intelligence reports on him concerning his arrest in 2007.
272. She added that this in turn would have given her greater concern and that
she may have dealt with the referral in a different way. She stated that
she may have attempted to contact Ms Cullen on further occasions.
However she was ‘content’ that she had dealt with the referral in the
standard way by attempting to contact Ms Cullen and by sending out the
standard letter and information booklet.
273. *********** ******* is an audit and compliance officer employed by GMP, in
the Information Management Branch.
274. Part of his role was to provide advice to the police on data protection and
disclosure of information.
S8A
275. In his statement made to GMP on 19 March 2010 in connection with the
IPCC managed investigation, he stated that the Data Protection Act 1998
provides a framework within which personal information can be lawfully
processed in the interests of preventing and detecting crime.
276. Mr ******* further explained that the term ‘processed’ in this context
includes the disclosure of information.
277. He added that another important restriction on the disclosure of personal
information is Schedule 1 Article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998 which
grants persons the right to respect for their private life free from
interference from public authorities.
278. Mr ******* stated that GMP had an important common law duty to disclose
personal information where it was believed to be necessary and
proportionate.
279. If officers on checking GMP computer systems and viewing information
believed that a sufficient level of risk to someone’s safety was posed by
another person and that by making a disclosure, steps could be taken to
protect their potential victim, then a disclosure of information could have
been made in the interests of preventing a crime and protecting that
person.
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280. Similarly if the risk posed was not judged to have been sufficient to take
action or if the potential victim could have been better protected through
some other means, then a disclosure would not have been necessary and
proportionate and therefore not compliant with the relevant legislation.
281. Mr ******* concluded his statement by stating that these decisions are not
easy and are based on the information available at the time. He would
have expected such decisions to have been taken by an officer of the rank
of Inspector, ideally with advice from the Information Management Branch.
S8
282. Mr ******* made a further statement to the IPCC on 9 November 2012, and
made it clear that his opinion on matters being referred to an Inspector,
was based on experience and management support to junior officers.
283. He added that there was nothing in GMP Force policy or procedures to
state that this must be done and he was not aware of any national
guidance, training or legislation to state that these decisions were rank
specific.
284. He stated that an Inspector might not add much value to such decisions if
that officer had limited experience in this area.
285. In a ideal situation he stated, it would be appropriate for a discussion to
take place between front line officers and supervisors and then for liaison
to take place with the Information Management Branch who deal with
these types of queries on a regular basis.
286. However he explained that this was not a requirement which must be
undertaken.
S37
287. In a statement to the IPCC dated 30 April 2013,*********** ***, an
Investigating Officer for the United Kingdom Border Agency (UKBA) stated
that Mr Ghafelipour’s asylum was granted on 12 July 2002, when he was
granted Indefinite Leave to Remain in the United Kingdom.
288. Mr *** stated that on 1 March 2008 the UKBA were informed by Cheshire
Police that Mr Ghafelipour had had his vehicle seized after being stopped
for driving without insurance or a driving licence. On this date it was also
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recorded that he was on bail in connection with an alleged offence of
arson with intent to endanger life. No further action was recorded at that
time.
289. Mr *** also stated that the legal requirement for all Foreign National
Offenders (FNO) receiving a custodial sentence in excess of one year to
be referred for automatic deportation came into force on 1 August 2008.
Prior to this it was a matter for the Courts to decide if deportation action
was appropriate as being conducive to the public good.
290. Mr *** added that in relation to Mr Ghafelipour, deportation could have
been pursued under the provisions of the Immigration Act 1971, if he had
been convicted of a serious enough offence. Arson with intent to endanger
life was such an offence.
291. He further stated that deportation could also have been pursued under the
provisions of the Immigration Act 1971, on the basis of the intelligence
rather than on convictions, for example in the national security context.
292. Mr *** stated that a qualifying conviction followed by a Deportation Order
would not necessarily mean that the FNO would be removed from the UK,
as someone subject to a Deportation Order would still have the right of
appeal against the removal itself on various grounds.
S20
293. Police Sergeant Michael Bilsbury was employed by the GMP as a Trainer
and Supervisor within the Uniform Training Unit, at Sedgley Park training
centre.
294. In a statement to the IPCC dated 21 December 2012,PS Bilsbury stated
that Enquiry Counter Officers (ECO’s) receive training as an introduction to
the GMP. Originally this training was delivered at Sedgley Park, but more
recently it is delivered by way of a distance training package over the force
intranet.
295. This is a generic package given to all new members of police staff and it
does not have a law based element.
296. Following this, the majority of training is delivered in the workplace and
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overseen by senior ECO’s. The training is delivered by way of a distance
learning workbook and has been in place since 2005.
297. The workbook contains numerous items for the ECO to work through and
also acts as a guide when faced with a specific type of incident. There is
no specific reference to Domestic Abuse within the workbook, however it
gives an overview of Civil Orders and Injunctions and what to do when
presented with a Civil Order at an enquiry desk.
298. In addition to this workbook in 2010, ECO’s have been directed to
complete an on line E-Learning package. The aim of this package is to
provide the learner with an understanding of when a Public Protection
Investigation report is to be completed and this package deals primarily
with the GMP computer system that records information surrounding
Domestic Abuse reports.
299. In addition a small number of ECO’s have received a three day basic law
training package. This covers basic law in relation to some Theft Act
offences, some Offences against the Person Act offences, and an
overview of the Harassment Act 1997.
S42
300. In a further statement to the IPCC dated 23 September 2013,PS Bilsbury
further explained that as part of a review and options considered for the
additional training of Enquiry Desk Officers, the training department was
considering the development of a training package known as Hydra.
301. This is an interactive training exercise where students are placed in
realistic working scenarios and handle incidents via video links and
telephone messages.
302. The Hydra exercise is intended to have a specific element of dealing with
the reporting of domestic violence and harassment/stalking issues.
303. A decision on this training has yet to be made at force command level.
Policies and procedures
D53
304. GMP policy template entitled ‘Tackling Domestic Abuse’ which was in
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force in June 2009 defines domestic abuse as ‘Any incident of threatening
behaviour, violence or abuse; psychological, physical, sexual, financial, or
emotional between adults who are or who have been intimate partners or
family members regardless of gender or sexual orientation’
305. The policy also explains the role of Public enquiry counter staff and states
that where possible staff should consider the following;

Offer the complainant the opportunity to speak in private

Determine whether it requires high priority response

Consider whether others are at risk

Establish if an emergency response is required

Inform the relevant OCB. If appropriate create a FWIN

Make an accurate record of the information or incident reported

Inform the Relevant Public Protection Investigation Unit
306. The same document details the actions of officers dealing with reported
incidents of domestic abuse and includes the following actions:

Secure the safety of the victim in their home.

Confirm the identity of the suspect.

Make accurate records of everything that is said by the suspect, victim
and any witnesses, including children.

Record the demeanour of the suspect, victim and any other witnesses
including children.

Obtain an overview of what has happened

Where the suspect has left the scene a description should be circulated
and every effort made to locate him or her.

If this is not possible, consider with the victims involvement and consent
consider relocating to a place of safety
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Undertake a risk assessment
307. The document goes on to explain that the Human Rights Act 1998
imposes obligations on police officers to take reasonable action, within
their powers to safeguard the rights of victims and children. These are;

Right to life- Article 2.

Right not to be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment-Article 3.

Right to private and family life-Article 8.
308. It further states that a failure to exercise a power of arrest may leave a
victim at risk from further offences and leave a police force vulnerable to
legal challenge under the Human Rights Act 1998 and the law relating to
negligence.
309. The document also advises officers that the police response should
ensure the effective protection of victims and children, while allowing the
criminal justice system to hold the offender to account.
310. It adds that it is the decision of the police officer whether or not to arrest a
suspect and that victims should not be asked whether they require an
arrest to be made or what they want the officer to do.
311. The document states that if a power of arrest exists, but the officer
believes that an arrest is not necessary, then the officer should take
specific action including;

Give consideration to proceeding by summons or issuing a warning
under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.

Offer help and protection to the victim.

Gather evidence to support future criminal prosecutions.

Refer the victim to relevant agencies for support and assistance.
312. The document goes on to say that the arrest of an alleged offender acts as
a powerful deterrent against their re-offending and that a complaint from a
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victim is not a prerequisite for making an arrest or bringing about a
successful prosecution.
D54
313. The provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998 and the GMP policy in
respect of this legislation were contained in a Chief Constables Order,
reference number 2003/06 and was current on 22 June 2009 when PS
Arkwright and PC Bagnall interviewed Ms Cullen.
314. The Order states that the purpose of the Data Protection Act 1998 was to;

Make new provision for the regulation of the processing of information
relating to individuals including the obtaining, holding, use or disclosure
of such information.

Protect individuals from the use of incorrect information held about them,
whether that information is automatically processed or held manually in a
relevant filing system.

Protect individuals from the improper use of correct information held
about them.

Provide individuals with the right to know of and correct such information
held about them and to claim compensation in situations where they
suffer damage or distress a result of the loss, destruction or unauthorised
disclosure of the loss.

Ensure UK compliance with the European Directive on the protection of
individuals in regard to the processing of their personal data.
315. The Order further explains that the Data Protection Act applies when
personal data is processed or is to be processed by a computer or other
automated means.
316. It also states that the term ‘processing’ covers any operation that may be
performed on personal information or any use made of personal
information.
317. Examples of this are given as, ‘obtaining, storing, retrieving, altering,
disclosing and erasing.
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318. The Order goes on to list the Data Protection Principles and the first of
these is that;

Personal data should be processed fairly and lawfully and may not
be processed unless the data controller can satisfy one of the
conditions for processing set out in the Act
319. The Order explains that before any processing can take place it has to be
‘justified’.
320. This means that under the first Data Protection Principle data controllers
must establish legitimate grounds on which to base their processing.
Therefore, for each of the data collections processed by GMP one of the
conditions set out in Schedule 2 of the Act must be met.
321. Additionally if the information being processed falls under the definition of
sensitive personal data, further legitimising criteria must be met.
322. Sensitive personal data is defined in the Act as including;

The commission or alleged commission by him of any offence, or

Any proceedings for any offence committed or alleged to have been
committed by him, the disposal of such proceedings, or the
sentence of any court in such proceedings.
323. Section 29(3) of the Data Protection Act 1998 provides an exemption from
non-disclosure when the disclosure is for a policing purpose, that is;

Prevention or detection of crime or

The apprehension and prosecution of offenders.
324. Article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998 states as follows;
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as in accordance with the law,
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
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security, public safety or the economic well being of the country for
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
D55
325. The Terms of Reference for the IPCC managed investigation in 2009
included;
1. To investigate the circumstances surrounding the police contact
with Katherine Cullen on 21 and 22 June 2009 prior to her death on
22 October 2009. The investigation to review;
(a) The actions of the officers involved in the initial
contact with Ms Cullen on 21 June 2009
(b) The actions of the officers who saw Ms Cullen when
she presented herself at the front desk at Cheadle
Heath Police Station on 22 June 2009, in particular
the actions of PC Bagnall and PS Arkwright.
(c) The overall handling by Greater Manchester Police of
the allegations made by Ms Cullen on 21 and 22 June
2009.
326. The report acknowledged that there had been initial delays in responding
to Ms Cullen’s report of crime due to a lack of free patrols and concluded
by stating that the officers had acted appropriately by not telling Ms Cullen
about Mr Ghafelipour’s background with the police and the details of his
arrest in 2007.
327. The rationale for this decision was that the officers did not perceive that a
threat existed to her at that time, on the facts that were outlined to them
and they were not lawfully obliged under the Data Protection Act 1998 and
the Human Rights Act 1998 to disclose the information.
328. The final recommendation was that the allegation of breach of the code of
conduct in relation to ‘Performance of Duties-failing to act’ and ‘Disclosure
of Information’ against the officers was not proven.
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Conclusions
GMP contact with ****** **********in August and September 2007
329. Ms ****** **********first contacted GMP on 21 August 2007 to report that
Mr Iman Ghafelipour her previous boyfriend, had made threats to kill her
and that he was harassing her.
330. Subsequently two further extremely serious offences of arson were
committed in which Mr Ghafelipour was implicated, and in which Ms
**********was the victim.
331. These crimes were allocated for investigation by PC Christopher Forrester,
who at that time had only ten months service with GMP.
332. No separate crime report was submitted in respect of the arson attack on
Ms ************ car but other documents recording these crimes and the
investigations which followed show that a number of lines of enquiry and
actions were implemented. These included safeguarding measures for and
regular contact with Ms **********, the arrest and interview of Mr
Ghafelipour, reviews of investigations strategy decisions by supervisory
officers, and intervention and oversight of the investigation by those
supervisors.
333. However the IPCC investigation has revealed that important lines of
enquiry were not completed.
334. PC Forrester conducted house to house enquiries in the vicinity of the
arson attacks and identified a premises containing what appeared to be a
CCTV camera situated in such a position that it may have either recorded
images of the person or persons responsible for the arson attacks, or
alternatively it may have disproved an alibi by suspected persons.
335. It is difficult to overestimate how vital this evidence, if available, was to the
investigation.
336. PC Forrester explained that he visited the premises on four occasions,
leaving contact details etc in an attempt to identify the owner and recover
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possible evidence.
337. He was not able to make that contact on these four occasions, but such is
the importance of this possible evidence that further more strenuous
efforts should have been made by him and or other officers to trace the
owner of the CCTV camera and examine it.
338. His supervisory officer PS Coburn made a decision to discontinue this
possible line of enquiry due to the amount of time which had passed since
the offence and the negative response of the owner of the address
339. However the occupier of the premises and owner of the CCTV camera
was located by another still unknown GMP officer and the occupier
informed that officer that the camera was not working at the time of the
offences.
340. There is no evidence to show that the investigation was updated to show
that this information had been passed to this unknown officer.
341. This witness was also located by the IPCC investigation team almost six
years after the incident.
342. PC Forrester stated that he personally examined the scene of the arson on
the flat in Northmoor Road, but he made a decision not to have the
premises forensically examined by trained Scenes of Crime officers and
this decision, from an officer with no relevant expertise was accepted by
his supervisors.
343. Other important lines of enquiry were completely overlooked.
344. Mr Ghafelipour was interviewed following his arrest on 9 September 2007
by two experienced police officers one being a detective constable.
345. Specific questions were put to Mr Ghafelipour concerning his whereabouts
at the relevant times and to ascertain if there were any persons who could
verify his whereabouts.
346. Mr Ghafelipour provided an alibi and the name of a witness who could
verify his whereabouts and questions were also put to him concerning the
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presence of CCTV cameras in Northmoor Road.
347. PC Forrester himself produced a full typed transcript of the interview but
he did not make any enquiries concerning the potential alibi, or bring it to
the attention of any other officer, and neither did he make any enquiries
concerning the CCTV cameras in Northfield Road.
348. Finally Mr Ghafelipour was in possession of a mobile telephone on his
arrest. This telephone may have contained important evidence supporting
the allegations made by Ms ********** in respect of the threats to kill her
and the alleged harassment of her by him.
349. Once again this line of enquiry was vital to the investigation but because of
delays in having the telephone examined no evidence was forthcoming
before Ms ********** withdrew her complaint in February 2008.
350. The IPCC believes that the overall handling by GMP of Ms ************
allegations of harassment by Iman Ghafelipour and the investigation by
the same force into the offences of arson reported by her was poorly
conducted.
351. The alleged offences were serious and an officer with relatively short
service was deputed to conduct the investigations.
352. A significant number of enquiries and actions were undertaken but these
could be regarded as standard procedure for this level of offence.
353. Other extremely important lines of enquiry were either overlooked entirely
or not concluded properly albeit that some of these enquiries may have
proved fruitless.
354. The investigation was subsequently filed with these enquiries still
outstanding.
355. The IPCC believes that the manner in which these investigations were
conducted by PC Forrester points to unsatisfactory performance on his
part and this should be addressed by Greater Manchester Police.
356. Had Mr Ghafelipour been convicted of these serious offences then he
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could have been considered for deportation under the provisions of the
Immigration Act 1971. He may also have been considered for deportation
on the basis of intelligence rather than on convictions but he would have
had the right of appeal against any deportation order and this was not an
automatic decision.
The decision not to inform Ms Cullen of previous police contact
with Mr Ghafelipour
357. Prior to reporting the incident in McDonalds to PS Arkwright and PC
Bagnall on 22 June 2009 at Cheadle Heath Police Station, Ms Cullen
reported the same incident to Reddish Police Station on 20 June 2009.
358. Despite the serious nature of her allegations she was allowed to leave the
police station without seeing a police officer and no record of the visit was
made on a FWIN.
359. ****** *******, the Enquiry Counter Officer on duty at the time who saw Ms
Cullen states that she gave her appropriate advice on how to proceed with
her complaint and that Ms Cullen decided to discuss further action with her
boyfriend who had also been threatened by Mr Ghafelipour.
360. Ms ******* states that she may have made notes of the visit on a message
pad but that message pad has not been found.
361. Ms Cullen later went to Cheadle Heath Police Station on the following day
to report the same incident and once again she left the police station
without seeing a police officer although on this occasion a FWIN was
created by the Enquiry Counter Officer ***** ****.
362. There is no indication that she was offered any personal protection advice
by Mr ****, who stated that he had not at that stage been trained to deal
specifically with persons presenting at police station enquiry desks
reporting domestic violence issues.
363.
FWIN 1395 of 21 June 2009 and other documents outline what the IPCC
considers to be unacceptable delays in finding a police resource to see
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Ms Cullen and to begin to investigate her serious allegations.
364. 26 occasions of delays before she was eventually seen and interviewed on
22 June, point to a distinct lack of urgency on the part of a number of
members of staff in GMP, and many missed opportunities to offer her
suitable advice on how to proceed and how to protect herself.
365. As many as 18 police officers were on patrol duty at times during the
period before she was seen, and although there were considerable
periods of time when Ms Cullen was unavailable, the nature of her
complaints should have prompted a more urgent response.
366. In original statements made to GMP in 2010 and subsequently to the IPCC
in 2013, both Police Sergeant Arkwright and Police Constable Bagnall
accepted following their interview with Ms Cullen on 22 June 2009, that
they were both aware of the intelligence concerning the previous arrest of
Mr Ghafelipour in 2007.
367. This intelligence made it clear what the alleged offences were and the
outcome of his arrest and interview. It was very obvious that there were
distinct similarities in the circumstances of the two incidents. There were
allegations that Mr Ghafelipour had allegedly made threats to kill two ex
girlfriends with whom he had had brief relationships and that following the
break up of each relationship he had allegedly harassed each of the
women involved. On each occasion the women had made conscious
decisions not to proceed with complaints against him.
368. The officers were then faced with two choices; either to disclose the
information on the basis that it was necessary to do so for Ms Cullen’s well
being or not to disclose it on the basis that there was not sufficient risk of
harm to her to justify the disclosure.
369. The Data Protection Act 1998 makes regulations for the processing of
information held on individuals and protects them from the improper use of
correct information known about them.
370. Section 29(3) of the Act allows the disclosure of information for policing
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purposes in order to prevent or detect crime or to apprehend or prosecute
offenders.
371. Similarly the Human Rights Act 1998 respects the rights of individuals in
their private and family life, but public authorities can interfere with that
right in the interest of public safety, or the prevention of crime or for the
protection of health.
372. Consequently, the officers would be entitled to disclose the intelligence
held about Mr Ghafelipour to Ms Cullen if they believed it was necessary in
order to protect her safety and there in nothing in GMP policy or in the
Data Protection Act, which determines the rank or role of the person who
makes the decision on the issue.
373. However, before making that decision the officers state that they took into
account a number of factors including;

Ms Cullen’s demeanour on reporting the matter to them.

Her statement that Mr Ghafelipour’s comments were made ‘in the heat of
the moment’

Her apparent and declared determination not to support a prosecution
against Mr Ghafelipour and her view that she simply wanted him to leave
her alone.

The content of the PNC check of Mr Ghafelipour’s police record and the
absence of any warning markers for violence, or weapons.

Ms Cullen’s statement that he had never used or threatened violence
towards her.

The action they proposed to take including contacting Mr Ghafelipour to
warn him not to contact Ms Cullen and her agreement with this course of
action.
374. In view of these factors the officers decided not to inform her of Mr
Ghafelipour’s arrest in 2007 and the intelligence surrounding it.
375. Shortly after this, when Ms Cullen had left the police station the officers
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Ms ********** and Ms Cullen
then checked the GMP internal intelligence system (OPUS) and this
confirmed the details of the arrest in 2007.
376. Once again they decided not to disclose the circumstances of the 2007
allegations, this time taking into some additional factors;

The fact that Mr Ghafelipour had not been charged with or convicted of
the offences and that the complainant in these offences, Ms **********,
had withdrawn her complaint on the basis that he no longer posed a
threat to her.

That Mr Ghafelipour had not come to the attention of the police since
2007.
377. Indeed PS Arkwright stated that he was ‘perfectly satisfied’ that Mr
Ghafelipour posed no threat to Ms Cullen based on the information he
hand to hand and Ms Cullen’s own attitude.
378. However, in later statements both officers also stated that had Mr
Ghafelipour been convicted of the alleged offences in 2007 then they
would have given ‘serious consideration’ to informing Ms Cullen of these
facts.
379. The IPCC concludes that the subsequent terrible events which took place
in October 2009 when Ms Cullen died could not of themselves , be
regarded as direct evidence that the decision taken by PS Arkwright and
PC Bagnall was correct or not, as to do so relies on the benefit of
hindsight. Our role has been to examine the quality of the decision
making.
380. The officers subsequently provided reasonable rationale for making that
decision, which was made on a subjective basis and on the information
they had to hand, but it is also reasonable to suggest that given similar
circumstances and with access to the same information, other officers
might have made a different decision.
381. The IPCC believes that it would be inappropriate to speculate on what the
outcome of Ms Cullen’s relationship with Mr Ghafelipour would have been,
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had she known of his background with the police.
382. However, the fact that Ms Cullen was not made aware of Mr Ghafelipour’s
background and was therefore denied the chance to make appropriate
and more informed decisions in respect of her contact with him, points
clearly to a missed opportunity.
383. The IPCC finds that on the balance of probabilities PS Arkwright and PC
Bagnall acted in accordance with accepted practice and legislation in
making this decision and that consequently they have no case to answer.
384. The IPCC also finds, however, that the overall handling of Ms Cullen’s
allegations by PS Arkwright and PC Bagnall was questionable.
385. The advice to officers in the GMP policy template on ‘Tackling Domestic
Abuse’ was quite specific in respect of positive action, the risk of failing to
exercise a power of arrest, the police response which should ensure
effective protection and allow the alleged offender to be held to account,
and not asking the victim what they wanted the police to do.
386. Similarly the document advises that the arrest of an alleged offender acts
as a ‘powerful deterrent’ against re-offending and that a complaint from a
victim is not a pre-requisite for making an arrest.
387. The IPCC believes that the officers allowed Ms Cullen to
disproportionately dictate their actions by declaring that she did not want
any action taken against Mr Ghafelipour.
388. Bearing in mind the intelligence the officers had on Mr Ghafelipour
regarding his previous arrest in 2007 and the distinct similarities with the
allegation they were dealing with, coupled with the entries on the relevant
crime report stating that Mr Ghafelipour was probably responsible for the
previous offences, the IPCC believes that more positive action should
have ensued.
389. However, the IPCC also believes that it cannot speculate on the possible
outcome of the relationship between Ms Cullen and Mr Ghafelipour, if an
arrest had taken place.
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Ms ********** and Ms Cullen
390. The information provided to the Public Protection Investigation Unit by PS
Arkwright was both incorrect and incomplete. Had the correct and
complete information been passed on then that unit may have taken more
appropriate action in dealing with the incident.
391. There is evidence that the officers did take some action. PS Arkwright
contacted Mr Ghafelipour and warned him about his future behaviour and
told him not to contact Ms Cullen and the officer later contacted Ms Cullen
herself to check on her welfare.
392. Consequently, the IPCC believes that the conduct of the officers on this
occasion does not amount to misconduct but rather to poor performance
on their behalf.
393. The IPCC notes that both officers received management advice following
the previous managed investigation in relation to the information which
was inputted onto the incident log (1395 of 21/06/09) following the
interview with Ms Cullen.
The decision not to include the circumstances of the alleged
offences in 2007 in the IPCC managed investigation.
394. There were significant shortcomings in the manner in which GMP
conducted their investigation into the allegations made by Ms **********in
2007.
395. An officer with short service and still in his probation was allowed to
investigate serious offences and important sources of evidence were
overlooked or abandoned.
396. Although on this occasion Mr Ghafelipour was arrested and interviewed at
length, the IPCC believes that a more thorough and robust investigation
should have been undertaken.
397. It cannot be overlooked that there was at least a possibility that Mr
Ghafelipour might have been prosecuted had such an investigation taken
place and subsequently there was at least a possibility that he would then
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have been deported.
398. The circumstances of those allegations were very similar in many respects
to the allegations made by Ms Cullen and similar shortcomings in the
manner in which her own allegations were handled by GMP have been
identified.
399. On this occasion Mr Ghafelipour was not arrested despite a GMP policy
stating that arrest in these circumstances was a ‘powerful deterrent’
against re-offending.
400. On both occasions disproportionate emphasis was placed on the decision
of victims not to proceed with the investigations despite contrary force
policy advice.
401. Consequently the IPCC believes that in failing to investigate the
allegations made by Ms **********in 2007, the managed investigation in
2009 missed an opportunity to highlight two occasions on which GMP had
failed to deal adequately with victims of domestic violence.
402. However, the IPCC believes that these collective failures on the part of
individuals, do not amount to misconduct but rather to poor performance
on the part of these individuals.
403. Greater Manchester Police has taken steps to ensure that training in
dealing with reports of domestic violence and harassment are dealt with in
a more professional manner at police station enquiry desks and similarly it
should ensure that future reports of domestic violence are treated with the
appropriate urgency by all police officers and police staff assigned to deal
with them.
Learning Report
404. There is no learning report following this investigation
John Brennan
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Ms ********** and Ms Cullen
Lead Investigator, IPCC
Deputy Senior Investigator IPCC
15 October 2013
15 October 2013.
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