ARMYHISTORY
Winter 2012
PB 20-12-1 (No. 82) Washington, D.C.
In This Issue
Tethered Eagle: Lt. Gen. James A.
Van Fleet and the Quest for Military
Victory in the Korean War
April–June 1951
By Robert B. Bruce
6
Freedom, Equality, and Justice
for All? The U.S. Army and
the Reassessment of Race
Relations in World War II
By James N. Leiker
30
The Professional Bulletin of Army Histor y
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the classroom and referring students
to it for starting their assignments.
Dr. Grant T. Weller is an Air Force
lieutenant colonel and is deputy chief
of the Air Force Watch in the Pentagon.
He is a former associate professor of
history at the United States Air Force
Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado,
and is coeditor of Harnessing the Heavens: National Defense Through Space
(Chicago, Ill., 2008).
Beetle: The Life of General Walter
Bedell Smith
By D. K. R. Crosswell
University of Kentucky Press, 2010
Pp. xvii, 1070. $39.95
Review by Pang Yang Huei
This is a judicious biographical
treatment of General Walter Bedell
Smith’s life and career. Two decades
in the making, Dan Crosswell charts
the entire life of “Beetle” with aplomb
and vigor. The “unorthodox” approach of presenting Smith’s important but overlooked Cold War career
first (United States ambassador to
Soviet Union, Central Intelligence
Agency director, and under secretary of state) is particularly apt as
one realizes belatedly in Chapter 6
that Smith started off as a private in
the National Guard in 1911. Not a
West Point graduate, Smith worked
doubly hard to prove himself. Smith
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Army History Winter 2012
was fortunate to have enlightened
mentors such as Maj. Gen. George
Van Horn Moseley and Army Chief
of Staff General George C. Marshall.
By the time Smith became secretary of
the War Department General Staff in
August 1941, he had already proved
himself in the eyes of Marshall and
established a reputation for getting
the job done. Smith played a vital
role as architect of the American
joint and allied combined chiefs of
staff structures; small wonder that
once confirmed as the commander of
the European Theater of Operations
in 1942 Maj. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower specifically requested Smith as
his chief of staff.
No treatment of Smith is possible
without examining Eisenhower’s
command style. Scholars of the
Eisenhower presidency would be
enlightened by Crosswell’s incisive
analysis of the wartime general.
“The exterior calm, geniality, and
constant buoyancy,” concludes
Crosswell, “cloaked an unsentimental operator who manipulated people
in pursuit of his own ends” (p. 316).
Eisenhower’s “passive-negative”
leadership style meant the general
liked to have numerous avenues of
action explored and exhausted. This
invariably evoked the charge that
“indecisive Ike” could not make
up his mind. Eisenhower balked at
issuing “unequivocal orders” that
would upset people, yet stubbornly
defended his command prerogatives,
all the while busy building a consensus. In fact, Eisenhower proved
decisive only when he made up his
mind not to do something.
One matter Eisenhower recoiled
from was running his headquarters.
Smith was superbly equipped to
handle this chore. Having obtained
carte blanche from Eisenhower in
managing the staff, Smith proved
a tough taskmaster. Subordinates
conformed to Smith’s exacting standards or got shipped out. When staff
officers complained about the remote
location of the new Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force
(SHAEF), Smith curtly recommended
more work as a cure for boredom. To
achieve results, Smith had no qualms
about busting heads and making enemies of obstinate senior commanders. Yet with British officers, he was
all charm. Ever a practical man, Smith
knew that the British staff system had
its advantages and how the American
staff system suffered in comparison.
If Smith was to hammer out a workable headquarters, he had to watch
and adapt.
The most critical contribution
made by Crosswell is in the area of
operational logistics. A subject too
often neglected (Eisenhower himself left most of the mess to Smith),
Crosswell plunges into the morass
of logistical confusion and explains
various causes for the ambivalence
manifested by the U.S. Army about
supply. For example, the supply
debacle of Operation Torch is revealing. Competent logistical officers
were in short supply. “Officers and
men learned their jobs through trial
and error, and there were plenty of
both” (p. 294). Troops often arrived
in Britain far ahead of their supplies.
When supplies did arrive, they did
not correspond to Services of Supply (SOS) demands, were unloaded
haphazardly at different ports, and
crucial materials disappeared “in the
labyrinth of SOS installations” (p.
295). As a result, U.S. troops had to
borrow equipment from the British
to carry out training. Smith did much
to resolve the logistical nightmare
by impinging on British stocks and
goodwill, which was fostered by his
aforementioned charm.
The logistical imbroglio persisted,
though not for the lack of plans for
an organizational shakeup. Smith
repeatedly tried to persuade Eisenhower to do so but the supreme commander insisted on only superficial
changes. Eisenhower’s inability to fix
the bifurcated supply and administrative structures and firmly establish
responsibilities between the various
headquarters and the operational
commands hindered operations from
Torch to later campaigns in France;
often with dire consequences. Eisenhower strongly believed that “personalities” would resolve organizational
impasses. This line of thought formed
the leitmotif of the Allied logistical
problems. Crosswell gives a masterful
account of such failings when the Allied advance floundered in late summer 1944. Consumed by the desire to
push ahead without the vital Brittany
ports and associated supply lines, the
Communications Zone never created
essential installations such as supply depots, regulating stations, and
proper accounting procedures. As a
result, vast amounts of ammunition
remained in Normandy, and ships
could not unload their cargoes. Characteristically, Eisenhower resorted to
an ad hoc solution by having his personal friend Brig. Gen. Lucius D. Clay
work out the Cherbourg bottleneck.
In hindsight, Smith’s reorganization
attempts, which would have provoked
a maelstrom of controversy, were
doomed from the start. Perhaps the
best quote, revealing Eisenhower’s
habitual avoidance of dealing with
organizational problems, is when he
concluded that “the only point of friction is in parts of the machine where
friction should be of no particular
moment” (p. 438), a statement that
left Smith befuddled.
A related problem that plagued U.S.
forces was manpower. Crosswell underscores the role played by General
Marshall in authoring the shortage.
Although SHAEF under Smith was
tasked to resolve the problem (and
the negative publicity arising from
the manpower crunch), Crosswell
demonstrates just how much of it
was systemic all the way up the chain
to the War Department. Marshall
remained trapped by the lessons of
World War I when he witnessed
problems caused by excessive expansions and rapid demobilizations. The
solution rested in maintaining a manageable ninety divisions with rolling
manpower replacements according
to a system of automatic resupply.
American replacement troops were
treated like widgets. But unexpected
casualty rates and flawed assumptions
amplified the manpower issue. Compounding the quandary, Eisenhower
resisted investing in a manpower
command just as he obstructed a
logistical reorganization.
The firestorm produced by the Darlan deal (1942), in which the French
retained administrative control of
North Africa, taught Eisenhower a
crucial lesson. After being badly stung
by the criticisms, he resolved always
to have a buffer or someone to act as
a lightning rod. Smith turned out to
be the perfect choice. Eisenhower’s
“passive-negative” (p. 59) approach invited attempts by the British to replace
him as ground commander in Europe.
Field Marshal Alan F. Brooke’s machinations in October 1944 were a good
example. For this reviewer, Smith’s
most significant act was his steady
hand when Eisenhower was on the
verge of recommending the sacking of
Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery
in December 1944. Despite sharing in
Eisenhower’s “towering rage” (p. 825)
over Montgomery’s imperiousness,
Smith obliged Eisenhower to wait it
out. Crosswell rightly points out that
the repercussions from Montgomery’s
relief “might fissure the alliance” (p.
828).
Despite being the number two man,
Beetle never enjoyed a close personal
relationship with Eisenhower. The
taciturn chief of staff was not the type
who would lend his superior “a warm
shoulder to cry on” (p. 317). Even
their wives were not friends. Crosswell carefully details that as early as
December 1942 Milton Eisenhower
advised his older brother to dump
Smith. A minor quarrel in December 1943 over Smith’s reluctance to
partake in a dinner party organized
by Eisenhower signaled a growing
personal strain between the general and his chief of staff. By 1944,
Eisenhower and Smith were “socially
estranged” (p. 570). When Eisenhower was appointed North Atlantic
Treaty Organization head in 1952,
Lt. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther was
his preferred choice as deputy. This
speaks volumes as to why Smith only
received the post of under secretary
of state during the Eisenhower presidency; Smith wanted and thought
he deserved the chairmanship of the
Joint Chiefs and bitterly resented being “Ike’s prat boy” (p. 105).
One surprising revelation is Crosswell’s measured acknowledgment of
Montgomery’s contributions. For example, Montgomery could justly lay a
proprietary claim on the Overlord
plan. Crucial input such as expanding the landing zone, increasing the
number of divisions participating,
and inserting more transport assets
all bore Montgomery’s hallmarks.
More importantly, the breakout
from Normandy also conformed to
Montgomery’s strategy of pinning the
Germans at Caen while allowing the
Americans to breakout at St. Lô. Yet
Montgomery’s obnoxious personality
is also readily flagged. As Crosswell
wryly points out, “he even managed
to transform his virtues—dogged
self-assuredness, high-minded professionalism, and undaunted daring—into vices” (p. 389).
Crosswell’s masterfully researched
volume adds an important dimension
to biographical writing and significantly contributes to the literature on
the U.S. involvement in the European
Theater of Operations during World
War II and the Cold War. By deftly
incorporating a difficult subject such
as military logistics into an accessible
biography, Crosswell’s work cautions
that future scholars of World War II
should not neglect this vital aspect of
military operations.
Dr. Pang Yang Huei is the editor of
Pointer: The Journal of the Singapore
Armed Forces. He has a Ph.D. in history from the National University of
Singapore and has published articles in
Small Wars & Insurgencies, Journal of
Contemporary Asia, and Critique. Currently, he is working on a monograph
that deals with the Taiwan Strait crises
in the 1950s and an annotated volume
of speeches on national defense by Singapore’s second deputy prime minister,
Goh Keng Swee.
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