What is Art? Gombrowicz, Eco, and Barthes
on Art and Literature
Marta A. Guzy
Graduate Program
Comparative Literature
Submitted in partial fulfilment
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Master of A r t s
Faculty of Graduate Studies
the University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario
May 1999
OMarta A. Guzy 1999
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Abstract
What is Art? Barthes, Eco. and Gombrowfczon art ond Literature by Marta Guzy
focuses on various theoretical and fictionalworks by Roland Barthes, Umberto Eco, and
Witold Gombrowicz. The main point of interest of the present thesis is an analysis and
comparative study of art as a socia1phenomenon through the writings ofthese authorsThe issues analyzed range ftom (1) the detection - and the comparative description - of
the conditions of art according to Eco, Barthes and Gombrowicz, to (2) the anatomy and
importance of interpretation of art, to (3) the analysis of various forms of social impact on
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Eco's "Intention" constitute the leading concepts of my approach. Due to the vast
panorama in which Barthes and Gombrowicz place art, the presentation of some of these
issues takes place in large social, political, and religious contexts.
Key words: Barthes RoIand, Eco Umberto, Gombrowicz Witold, art, society,
intepretation, myth, form,intention (intentio auctoris, intentio lectoris, intentio operrk,
intentio societatid, appropriating art, art's self defense, the condition of art, kitsch.
iii
I would like to express m y special thanks to professor CaIin Mihailescu
for his kind help, guidance and most precious advice and suggestions he offered to me
during my studies at the UWO and the preparation of this thesis.
Marta Guzy
Table of contents
Certificate of examination
Abstract
Acknowledgments
Table of contents
Introduction
Part I, Art and its Definition(s)
1.1 Creator, receiver, object, and three intentions
1-2Intentio auctorr's
1 -3 Intentio lectans and intentio open's
1 -4 In tentio societatis
1.5 Art as Myth
1 -6 Form
Pat? II. Interpretation
2.1 Gombrowicz against Bee interpretation
2.2 Interpretation liberated
2.3 Interpretation by Eco
2-4 Eco's Open Work
Part ID.Appropriating Art, and Art's SeLfaefense
3.1 Economy and Art
3 -2 Common Identity
3 -3 The Original
Conclusion
Bibliography
Vita
Introduction
Ths work is an attempt to describe and analyze three different theories of art in
modern society-The authors that I have decided to take into consideration are Umberto Eco,
Roland Barthes and Witold Gombrow-cz. Eco is regarded here as a representative of the
classical approach to art and aesthetics, Gombrowicz - as one of the most controversial
authors and literary critics of this century, and Baahes
- as an author whose theories will
play the role of a platform on which some reconciliation between Eco and Gombrowicz
seems possible. As the three authors have a wide interest in art, I intend to focus on only
some aspects of this kind of human activity. My main point of interest is to detect the
interdependencies of art and society and the influence of social reception on the process of
creating work f
%
&
~ S Q C SY_O& ac
interrpeta~onand the prh!em_of cnn_&nKngart, not
only take considerable dimensions in the works of Eco, Barthes and Gombrowicz, but,
according to their writings, are also fimdamentai to the existence of art. A good part of this
work will touch upon these issues.
I would like to underline that the works of Eco, Barthes, and Gombrowicz, though
in general dealing with the same or similar questions, use various forms of expression, Eco
and Barthes authored purely theoretical works. However, as I consider that Eco's essays of
a more literary character published under the title Diario Minimo (English translation:
Misreadines), as well as his most famous novel The Name of the Rose, are implicit
illustration of his theories, I took them into consideration, Gombrowicz' ideas on art are
available to us through his Diaries (that he claims to be notes about his Me), and his literary
works and introductions to some of his texts (Ferdvdurke and Marriage). However, as his
theories are explicitly present in both fiction and more 'theoretical' works, a l l of them will
be given equal credit-
I would also Like to stress that, although this work is mostly focused on art in general
and on literature in particular, in some cases a wider approach incIuding "purely" social
elements was found necessary to give an accurate andjust picture of the ideas of the authors.
This is especially true in the case of Barthes and Gombrowicz, who place art in a vast
panorama and on many occasions deal with it in the same way they deal with other social
phenomena such as religion, historicity, fashion, sports, etc.
Finally,this work is not meant to be an exhaustive presentation of all these authors'
ideas on art, or their works of literary fiction. Rather, my goal is to find points where their
theories converge, as well as detect their conflicting attitudes with respect to art and society
For these reasons, some contributions of Barthes or Eco, although undeniably important for
semiotics of literary criticism, being of only marginal interest to this work, will be omitted.
PART I
Art and its
4
Before touching upon the most important question of this thesis, that is to say, the
social perception of art and the interdependencebetween art and society, I would like to deal
with some attempts to define art Due to the fact that the more pronouncedly classical image
of art and aesthetics is presented in Eco's work, I shall begin with his theory. His traditional
point of view will be used as a reference to appreciate the novelty of the attitudes
represented by Barthes and Gombrowicz.
Creator, receiver, object, and the three intentions.
In Eco's writings, the most important definitory characteristics of art, besides the
aesthetic value attributed to it by the creator and the "receiver," are the human will behind
the piece of art and the field that the work opens to interpretation. Without these two, Eco
claims that art degenerates into a mere artifact (in the modem sense of the word) or kitsch-
' The will that calls art to life is called intention,and together with the aesthetic value, they
open the field to multiple interpretations.
Eco emphasizes that art is an essentially human creation: in his opinion there must
be a creator behind the object, so that we attn'bute to it an aesthetic value. In other words,
a piece of art is based on intentions: first, of its creator - that, after Eco, I will call intentio
auctoris) - then, of the person who finds himself in front of the mentioned work of art
On kitsch in Eco, see Gritti 18
The use of masculine pronouns is, in all cases of this work, generic.
5
(intentio lecto~ts)~.
Eco mentions also a third kind of intention, intentio operis, which is
comected with the process of interpretation. The intention of the work has a different
characterthan the inention ofthe authoror the inention of the receiver. It is independent f?om
the material object or composition, however, it is crucial for the creator and the receiver. It
is through the intention (a human will) of the author and of the receiver that they attribute
some special value to the object The intention, according to Eco is attributed by an entity
(society) or a person but is essentially undetectable in the physical form of the work The
Latin etymology of the term indicates the character of the art-permitting will; intention is
'inside' and enclosed within the work and, as such, invisibly but ceaselessly accompanies
it. Similarly the verb 'intendere' (to intend), indicates the particuiar character of the
intention that indicates a drive towards the inside and calls attention upon itself. Thus,
'intention' should be construed as independent of the public or critics; otherwise, only a
unanimous agreement to the aesthetic value of a text or a sculpture would give it the
-
privileged name and the status - of an artistic creation. In opposition to intentio, another
concept, never mentioned by Eco, should be introduced: extentio. The tern, itself dubiously
grounded in the Latin extensio, denotes everything that is not expected to 'belong' to the
object of art, what comes fkom the 'outer world' and adds to its aura- Thus, extension
contains opinions, both positive and negative, the history of the work, the context in which
it was created and is displayed, and so forth.
Eco arrests his theoreticalreflectionsafter approachingthe intention of the authorand
See The Limits 45-63
6
its necessityin establishingthe artistic status of the work. Thus, the delicate problem of the
status of an anonymous text or a painting, is not tackled by the Italian critic. However,
inferring fiomEco7sexplicit statements, one could argue that his view is that, in the "absence
of the author", the author's intention might be substituted for by the judgment of a critic or
the reader. It is also important to keep in mind that Eco's understanding of intention could
be compared with the traditional notion of aesthetic value or beauty (which he does not
define) and that, especially in the case of the intention of the work, is close to what has been
traditionally called "content". After reading Eco in co~ectionwith Gombrowicz and
Barthes, I will present the need to introduce a forth kind of intention: intentio societatis.
Intentio auctoris
According to Eco, art is art only ifcertainconditions are fulfilled. First of all, artistic
creativity or its product must be considered art by the creator of a given work (object, text).
Eco calls this will intentio auctoris (The &en Work 131). Ifthere is no author, there is no
intention, thus, there is no art. Eco avoids the question of the "impenetrability of intention".
Indeed, the will of the author is in some cases impossible to ascertain, case in which this
intention is substituted for by the intention of the group that desires the given work to have
some artistic value. The intentio auctoriF is, for Eco, asine qua non condition which implies
that not all forms aestheticallypleasing to the human eye or ear are artistic. Indeed, almost
everyone would agree that an accidentallyor involuntarily createdobject to which one could
attniute some of the characteristics of a piece of art, is not yet considered to be a work of art.
7
A bird singing in the woods is not an artist, nor are bees, though they "dance," and their
movements are meaningfid. Eco exemplifies this theory by invoking natural beauty.
Keeping in mind the importance of the intentio auctorik, it is not surprising that in order to
see natural beauty as a fine scene, consciously or not, man perceives it as if it were a
purposely created spectacle, which in turn implies the presence of a creator behind the
"spectacle". That creator might be God, a personification of Nature, or even chaos that, all,
are anthropomorphized entities. Eco writes:
comprendiamo dunque come sia importante, davanti a un ogetto da
interpretare come opera d'arte, pensare dietro ad esso
- dentro di
esso, un'intenzione, la presenza di un autore. Senza questa
presunzione iniziale l'ogetto rimanerebbe qualcosa di morto, di
muto: in altri termini, (...) si puo parlare di arte solo come fatto
umano. (Definizione 195)4
The necessary character of the intentio auctoris implies aIso that the artist, the
creator of a work, has some kind of dominance over his creation. This does not concern the
physical life of the object after it has been finished, nor the public reception (these would
belong to the extension). This is to say that he has the power of calling to Life something that
"We understand how important it is to think of an intention, of the presence of an author
behind-inside an object that is to be interpreted as art. Without this initial presumption, the
object would remain dead, mute. In other words (.. .) we can speak of art as a uniquely
human fact" (All translations, unless indicated otherwise, are mine, M.G.). On the
Definizione, see Schiffer 102-3.
8
would not exist without his shaping will and its physical result. Eco emphasizes this issue,
attracting our attention to thephysical part of the piece of art: "In order to dominate matter,
the artist must first. understand it; ifhe has to understand it, he cannot be its prisoner, no
matter how severely he has judged it" (The men Work 156)- Thus, according to Eco, the
artist, like a god, creates out o f a chaos, introducing into it his own rules, shaping the
physical f o m ofhis work and, most important, breathes life (or will, or intention) into it.
Here I need to argue with Eco's idea of well ordered and structured matter as a necessary
condition of creativity. This attitude and understanding of art leaves Little space for
spontaneity and presupposes that every work of art must be planned or designed by the artist
before it is created. This is not true of modern art (e.g the famous method to paint images
inspired by dreams used by D&i; nor is it necessarily true for the traditional ways of artistic
expression. In fact, such a process composed of three phases (mental imagining, the choice
of the matter and mastering of it, the h a l breathing in of the intention) might fit only purely
mimetic artTo deal with the will of the creator-artist means also to deal with all the more
ambiguous situations and problems which arise when works that could be considered to be
& (i-e., it isjudged
to be aestheticallypleasing), are purposelycreated as objects of everyday
use, or objects created with the intention of not being art. In the first case, Eco mentions the
question of the trowaiIZe, and objects which are aesthetically pleasing but created
accidentally instead of purposely by human hands or nature. He assumes that when a branch
found in a forest is attributed an interpretation ("it is a snake"); then it enters the world of
interpretationand, subsequently, it opens up to otherpossible interpretations. Onlythen does
9
it become an object of art However, these are somewhat rnargind problems and I would
like to focus on the realm of definable human activityWhen we deal with a photograph that could be evidence for the police, or a
documentary shot of a .industrial wasteland taken, say, at the request of the Green Party in
order to be used in a campaign, these artifacts might become works of art if they, as Eco
says, "possess aesthetic value". Furthennore, a picture created by a photographer, who
fiom now on is also considered to be an artist, is not only a 2D representation of a landscape
but by manipulating techniques in order to achieve an interesting perspective or visual
effect, the photography in question becomes an object of art. The question of attributing or
denying artistic and aesthetic values to what happens to be a purely documentary shot
depends primarily on the way the photographer evaluates his production- Later, we will see
that this is not the only condition.
There is yet another case in which the ambiguous status of the object is defined by
its being located between art and amfact: the object that, although presenting aesthetic
features, is designed for non artistic, everyday use. Eco does not give his clearly verbalized
opinion on that subject, but reminds us that the opposition ofart and craft was unknown to
European cultures for a long period of time: "Modem aesthetics frequently forgot that the
classical theory of art, fkom Ancient Greece to the Middle Ages, was not eager to stress a
distinction between arts and crafts" (The Limits 83)?
That was in the past Modern times, however, create their own problems, and so does
See "Interpreting Serials, " 83-100 in Limits of Interpretation
10
Eco. The question of how to detectthe blurred limits ofart is never explicitly asked in Eco's
theoretical writings; it is rather his fiction (especially Misreadinns) that provokes such an
inquiry. Thus, a reader needs to reflect upon the status of a work which possesses all the
qualities of a piece of art except theintentio auctoris, which is clearly not a 'We-giving ' one?
That is to say, what happens to a text ifhis author does not want it to be considered as a work
of art? Eco himself wrote a number of jokelike short stories in which he follows a
convention while playing with it, but makes it clear that this is not "serious" literature and
that he does not wish it to be read as such As it is accepted that the noweau roman is a
l l l y recognized literary sub-genre, "Esquisse d'un nouveau chat" (Misreadins 47-52)
should be considered as avant-garde literature at its best.
It possesses all of the
characteristics of the genre; in fact, it could be an extract of any novel by Robbe Grillet.
However, Eco makes it clear that it was written purposely as a pastiche. Due to the fact that
its author did not aspire to create a memorable piece of literature, we get the impression that
he tries to downplay it. This lack of will beyond the text, according to the words of the very
author expressed in his theoretical works, disqualifies the "Esquisse..." as a truly Literary
piece of art. Had it been written not as a joke, would it have been more valuable? What
happens then in the case of a bad literary text that aspires to be great? There is an answer to
the last question: we come to a point where we face the unmistakable conditions of art. Yet,
for the time being, it is apparent that the intentio auctoTis is a necessary but not sufficient a
criterion to qualify an object as work of art
Intentio lectoris and intentio operis
Let us recall that, for Eco, intentio auctoris is the creative force that gives life to a
dead form, fiom the chaos of the raw material calling to life an esthetically pleasing object
of art, rather than a mere piece of marble or skillfully painted wood. However, this will,
though it is necessary, is not sufEcient to establish what is art and what is not- Next to the
intentio auctoris, in Eco's view, stand intentio lectoris and intentio operis. As they are
closely connected with the question of multiple readings and interpretations, they will be
dealt with in more detail in the chapter on interpretation-
Although ziztentio operis
represents the meaning of the work to a certain point, it is also independent of both creator
and receiver (at least according to Eco). In this sense, it is different fkom the intentions of
active interpretants, be they creative (the author interpreting the world and converting his
interpretation into a work of art), or more passive (the reader or receiver of the work who
tries to find or attribute meanings to the object he is facing).
Eco touches upon the interesting conflict of the artistic intention between the work
and the intention of the receiver also in a different context- The question concerns a
particular case of reproduction and display of works of art In "Travels in Hyperreaiity,"
Eco describes, as an American phenomenon, the numerous museums of wax figures that
display reproductions of the masterpieces of Western art such as Leonardo's "Last Supper",
Michelangelo's "David," etc. Here we are dealing with objects that
- we trust - were
originally created as pieces of art. Fortunately, they exist in the original version, and the
viewer has to presume that the required intentio nuctorzk is "living within them". Such an
12
intention, along with the aura of uniqueness and distance that makes such works paradigms
of Western artistic pride, is what is lost in their many reproductions, Eco notes that the
exhibitions are made in a way that clearly does not offer an aesthetic experience to the
visitor; however, the main god is to impose upon the visitor the perfection of human
craftsmanship. In this case, it does not even involve the Cfaftsmanship of the authors of the
copies, but the reproduction is meant to represent and "improve" the models that could have
served the artists. The copies that Eco discusses in detail are supposed to be more a
representation of real life than one that is f a i W to the original (that is, imitating Life rather
than art).
3D displays of painted scenes are not unusual, yet, he claims, their artistic
intention is nil. The museum's show and telos puts on display a scene inspired by a piece
of art, a copy that does not even pretend to be a perfect imitation but stands for something
outside the realm of beauty and creativity where we no longer ded with art.
Should this be qualified as kitsch? Apparently, the answer should be negative, for
kitsch, because of its "being-a-reproduction" status, occurs in the absence of the author's
intention. Yet, as the kitsch object is meant to awaken some aesthetic feelings in the
receiver, it tricks the latter, and carries it with itseffin the very realm of kitsch. The issue has
a complexitythat would need a whole different discourse- Let it suffice for now to say that
the receiver could, in principle, tell the reproductionof a beautifid sculpture or painting fiom
a worthless and ugly object. In the case of the wax reproduction, certainly we have to deal
with the same process of multiplication of an original, unique object that lends itself to the
arcanes of kitsch,
Both the originators of the museums and the visitors seem to be more interested in
the precision of the copy than in anything else. The experience is planned by the owners of
these museums in a way thatoften emphasizes on the bad state of the original. Thus,a visit
to such a museum can have educationalpurpose: you can see it here, so why go all the way
to Europe to see it" Though the particular goal of this kind of exhibition
- to show
somethingthat is otherwise inaccessible - does not yet exclude the intention of showing art.
Atter all, the Piet5 in Rome is also a copy, while the original is kept elsewhere. The desire
to reproduce a piece of art so that it looks better than it does aims rather at the perfection of
recreation and not of the actual creation itself. The intentio open's is eliminated or replaced
by the perfection of reproduction and the lector (receiver) is given more information than he
needs and in such a way that he will not seek anything else in the work shown, because he
will have no time for it. Moreover, the way the modxed copies are displayed does not
welcome any interpretation (the second condition of art). In other words, the great number
of wax reproductions is collected in a small area 6, the visit is strictly regulated by time
limits, and the main purpose is to supply the maximum of information on the artist, his
social, historical and cultural background (an impoverished version of the extension), with
no time and possibility left to enjoy the piece of work copied fkom the original (thus,
eventually, reaching its intention). Eco emphasizes that the copies are meant to be a perfect
imitation of the natural models that could have served to the artists than of the paining ofthe
sculpture rather than an imitation of the work itself. This point is the main difference
The same accusation against museums was advanced also by Gombrowicz who found
that the quantity of works of art does not allow full enjoyment of their quality (cf.
Gombrowicz VIII 100-1).
I4
between the way copies are displayed in museum that have some more respect towards art,
in which the visitor is left one to one with the copy, with the freedom to choose how much
time he wishes to spend with the object, without any,or at least, very discrete information
about the original piece of art (usually the name of author and the time of his We). There
is no invading extra artistic reality such as 'continuation' of the work: a reconstruction of
the painter's studio, with the model not only depicted in the original, but also 'in the flesh'.
Finally,in the case of the display of a copy where some respect to art lets itselfbe glimpsed,
the emphasis is on the perfection of the copy, 'rather than on its mimetic qualities.
In the museum described by Eco, the lack of intentio lecton's and intentio opens
devastate the artistic value of something that perhaps could be art- We shodd keep in mind
that the example briefly analyzed above is a particular case of a reproduction for-specific
commercial purposes. However, there are other situations in which if there is no
destruction of the artistic or aesthetic value of the object, but undeniably a shift of what is
considered to be 'artistic value' occurs. Here is another example of what can possibly
happen when these two factors do not coincide.
Eco himself, in a short story - or is it a short essay? -, "Fragments," purposefblly
misreads Western civilization fiom the point of view of a scientist present at a "IV
Intergalactic Congress of Archeological Studies" (to be held in the far future). Lf, in some
cases, both the intentio auctoris and the original intentio operis (connected with the context
of a given culture) are inaccessible, a work is transported fiom one context into another.
'
Quite often, the copy pretends to be the original, without pointing at its secondary
character and the exactitude of the imitation
15
This "carry over" reduces, sometimes drastically, the means to interpret the work The
intention of the authorbeing unclear, the intentio lectoris remains to be only validjudgment
as to the reading of such a piece of art and attributing (or refusing) to it an aesthetic value.
Ifall that we perceive as art is art indeed, then the misread lines, "I'm singing in the rain,"
or "Ciao, ciao bambina," might indeed be of great value, including all the philosophical
meaning attributed to them in "Fragments". The naive reading of the mentioned lines as
well as a critique of other texts is justiiied in the short story, simply because it clears them
out of the cultural context of the twentieth century' and thus of all the extentio known and
available to us. For the reader who is familiar with the most common interpretations of the
above quoted texts, his own interpretation is probably similar to what could be called the
'meaning in the society'; it is just an example of misinterpretation. However, if the same
reader goes one step further, he will have the chance to see that this situation casts a light or
rather a shade at our understanding of ancient civilizations: perhaps we too misread them?
If the numerous f?apents of anonymous writings in medieval manuscripts we consider
representative for court poetry or chanson de gat@,were just an equivalent of a pop song
(canzone.. .), then we are plainly mistaken. Nevertheless, the value and, to a certain extent,
also the interpretation of these pieces of art are being approved by society, and thus the
rirtentio operis is forever endowed with the new meaning. In regards to the importance of
secondary information in most cases, it is at least u s e l l to interpret a work of art; Eco asks
an important question: do we love art or the way it is explained to us? Do we appreciate the
This is quite possible in the case of the 'miraculously rediscovered' anonymous Chanson
de Guillaume
16
actual object in a museum (that certainIy cannot be admired in acrowd of other works of art)
or the whole history we know that is behind it? Eco considers that we like the actual objects
of art because we are socially prepared to enjoy their aesthetic form and the meaning that a
social group wants us to find. Thus, the connection between of a work of art and its
explanation presented together, implies that any object evaluated as art is a work of art (on
that subject later). The individual's role is to interpret it and to attribute to it a personal
aesthetic evaluation. The foremost institution "called upon" to evaluate art is, no doubt,
society itself. For this reason 1will allow myself introduce the fouah type of intention,
intentio societatis.
Intentio societatis
The person that interprets a work of art (lector) has the power to acknowledge the
object displayed in £tomof him or to reject it. However, an individual does not possess the
power of such a non-negotiable decision: only a group is qualified to acknowledge an object
as artistic or not. An individual's act of considering a drawing red square on a green
background(which might be qualified a child's creation or a paining millions if the author
was Kandinsky) is the first step to an "official" approval or rejection of the work as artistic.
However, only under the condition that the same intention is attributed by a considerable
number of receivers, the object gains the status of art. The process may take "commercial"
character (buyingthe original at an auction or buying its reproduction, say, a CD with avantgarde music) or, it may occur via common agreement in a circle of critics or in academia.
17
What are the criteria that commonly guidereceivers so that they agree in most cases
as to what possesses artistic values and what does not? Eco, Barthes, and Gombrowicz agree
that it is social convention. Art is created by people, but also for people, and only a
community labels a certain object "masterpiece," and others "kitsch," or "artifact1'- The
above mentioned intention of the artist is not uniquely of an individuaIyswill, but it is
strongly bound by social norms, Some pieces of art, after all, are considered to be
aesthetic/artisticin someperiods and rejected in others: "aestheticity'kshifts historically. Had
Fauvism or expressionism emerged earlier, they very probably would have found a place on
neither a castle's walls nor an abbey's nor in the collection of an eighteenth-century
connoisseur. Objects are considered to be art only if they are perceived as such: "L'idea
dell'arte continuamente muta a seconda delle epoche e dei popoli, e cib che per una date
tradizione culturale era arte, pare dissolversi di fionte a nuovi modi di operare e di li-uire"
(Definizione 143)?
Art would not exist without society. I mentionedbefore the question of the intention
of a group, that permits the consideration of some objects as art while it depriving others of
that status. Art is a social phenomenon and it has also a social value. The social code that
rules the perception of art changes. In touching upon this question, Eco invokes music:
Questo significa che la musica non e un linguaggio universale, ma
che la tendenza a certe soluzioni piuttosto che ad &re i: fkutto di
"The idea of art changes constantly from period to period and from nation to nation,
seems to disappear in front of new trends of functioning and development. "
I8
un'educazione di una c i d t 5 musicale 5 storicamente detenninata
Eventi sonori che per una cultura musicale sono elernenti di crisi, per
un'altra possono essere esempi di legalit&che rassenta la monotonia
La percezione di un tutto non k immediata e passiva: i: un fatto di
organizzazione che sf apprende, e lo si apprende in un contest0
socio-culturale; in tale ambito le Ieggi deUe aprcezione non smo fatti
di pura naturalit&ma si formano entro determinati rnodeili di cultura
(Definizione 178-9).'O
Firstly, Eco's statement implies that art is a conditioned behavior, secondly, that art
is not universal. Art, because it must be approved by a group, is limited to that group - even
if the group is as sizeable as an oecumenically conceived "Western civilization". Art exists
in a given historical and socio-economical circumstances- On the one hand, there must be
a wide common agreement on what is beautifid and worthy to be displayed in a museum; on
the other hand, the content of the agreement is bound to change. On this process, Eco
comments:
The perception of totality is neither immediate nor passive: it is an act
"Thismeans that music is not a universal language, but that it tends to some rather than
some other solutions are historically determined. The sound event which for one musical
culture expresses crisis, may be for another one an example of tradition that hides
monotony. Perception is not instantaneous and passive at all, it is a fact of organization that
one learn in a socio-culturai context. Thus, the rules of valuation are not purely natural,
but are formed witbin determined cultural models."
lo
19
of organization that has to be learned within a sociocult-ad context.
The laws of perception are not natural and innate; rather, they are the
reff ection of cultura[ pdtems
or, as a transactional psychologist
would say, they are acquired forms, fostered in us by the natural,
social and historical context we inhabit (The h e n Work 76).
The dynamic side of both learning and interpreting art is a necessary element in the
particular process of reception and eventually, artistic creation. Since society, via aesthetic
codes and sets of canons acceptable at a certain time and place, agrees on what will be
considered as art, in a sense even before the piece of art is created, it defines what fits all
social structures. The same or very similar mutual influences also take place when society
deals with religion and the domain of sacrosanct. It is not by chance that, in the West,
artistic creativity has been under the control of the Church and it has played - still plays -
such a prominent role in the religious Life. That was the case in the Middle Ages, and Eco
offers interesting insights into the period in The Name ofthe Rose. Collecting art, exhibiting
some works and denying the existence of others, is certainly a procedure acceptable in the
abbey visited by Master William of Baskerville and Adso of Melk."
However, as Eco
stresses, the same practices are to be found in any institution that tries to control art. The
explanation is at hand: being a largely uncontrollable activity, art might serve as a vehicle
of ideologies. The Church, at first unsure of how to deal with the pagan tradition that
" For critical considerations on Eco's meditations and quips on art and religion in The
Name of the Rose, see SchiEer 249-51-
20
allowed worshiping idols, and facing the necessityto stop that practice, came up with its o m
solution: by officially allowing the faitbfixl to venerate images of saints, the same old pagan
rituais have been cast in a new h e w o r k with a new significance. Then, it was not the
painting, but rather the saint depicted who became the object of the adoration: the icon
displaced the idol. Furthermore, even the depiction of demons finds a place in the holy
places. As any medieval Christian, AdsoE, knows that the only role of the gargoyles is to
indicate the ugliness of Evil and eventually, to lead to the worshiping of God. However,
in the case of rites or works which cannot be integrated into the system, the only way the
Church could deal with them was: destruction (either by putting the text on the index, or
physical annihilation, or by the denial of the very existence of the work as exempLified in
the quest of the "On Comedy" by Aristotle).
However, an absolute destruction of a work of art is not the only visible sign of
social intervention into the realm of art. As art for Eco is a sacrosanct domain, any
activity having another purpose than to create or preserve art, is somewhat threatening.
However, as art is rooted in social structures, it cannot avoid being influenced by them.
Art no longer enjoys privileges of an elite, and the increasing demand for works of art has
resulted in massive reproductions of artistic objects. The problem of reproduction is
always close to the question of at what point we deal with kitsch andlor with artifact.
However, the very multiplication of objects labeled "artn and the marketing of their
numerous copies, contains in itself some kind of social agreement to the aestheticvalue and
I am referring to the scene in which Adso observes the sculptures at the door of the
abbey church and the pictures he finds in the manuscripts in the library.
l2
21
to the mentio of the original work of art This question however concerns modes of
controlling art and it will be dealt with in the last chapter.
Let me illustrate the function of the intentio socieratls with yet another example:
Ferdydurke by Gombrowicz. Generally speaking, the novel, which was meant to break
all barriers and liierate its author (and readers) fkom the structures of form, has been
incorporated into the same kames it previously tried to destroy. The a d o
of the text
is an illustration of society's drives to impose its order: with one exception. when, during
the 1957 "thaw, " Ferdvdurke was reprinted in Poland, the novel was banned under
communism because its depiction of the "disorder" and "immaturity" of the "authentic
man" did not fit the official patterning of socialist realism. On the other hand, the positive
criticism it received is clearly mother attempt to arrange it: as Gombrowicz would say,
'to put a mug on the distorted face' of the Gombrowiczean hero. The qualification of
Gombrowicz as either a rebellious writer or a great avant-garde thinker, or silencing his
very existence - which he experienced in both communist Poland and the kmigre press -
should be attributed to the intentio societmis. The latter proves not the power of a
community over an individual by publishing or not publishing his texts, but the intention
is visible in the ways in which it imposes certain attitudes on readers? Someone who
keeps the insubordinate Gombrowicz on his bookshelf is also rebellious; if the same novel
is authored by Gombrowicz, it is qualified as an excellent representative of contemporary
literature; the novel fits into the categories described in the history of literature; therefore,
The subject of the official interpretations of Gombrowicz is dealt with more in depth
in Soltysik, Agnieszka. "Gombrowicz's Provocations " , Plonowska Ziarek 245-65
l3
22
the reader or owner of Ferdvdurke is merely a well-read man. Though art is incompatible
with politic^,'^ if the intentio societatis is based on a political choice, a work of art is subject
to interpretations containing ideology and it may be used for non artistic purposes. The
complicated history of Ferdvdurke shows not only the power of society in the Life of a work
of art, but also the similarities between the impact of intentio societatis and form.
According to Eco, from the moment of the creation of a work of art, we deal with
messages sent to a .individual and with the privileged roles of the sender, the crucial role of
the intention of the author.15However, while art allows fiee interpretation and fieedom in
terms of whether or not one would take it seriously, this option is absent @omreligion. As
Eco says, these rigid structures,or non-modified and non-modifiable patterns, become taboo.
Not all taboos are equally strong; like art, they change in time as they depend on the group
that has more or less, respect for them. In any case, we already entered the field of refigion
or religious behaviors:
After all, what most distinguishes western man from those who live in
"primitive" societies is precisely the dynamic,progressive nature ofhis
cultural patterns. What makes a society "primitive" is its inability to
let its cultural patterns evolve, its unwillingness to interpret and
exploit the original assumptions of its culture which thus persists as
empty formulas, rites, taboos (The Open Work 79).
For more interesting comments on that subject see Jannaud, Claude. "Gombrowicz
et l'histoire de la politique",L'Herne 278-80
l5 It is not without good reason that Barthes talks about writers as priests of literame and
of the cult of arts.
l4
Such astatement, categorizing somecultures as 'unable to interpret and exploit7some
values, can be true when applied to only societies (social groups) at a very low inteUectual
level. The only examples that would fit this description are not, as Eco suggests, ancient
African or indigenous American civilizations but modem sects that came to Life in the West.
Another argumentI would like to advance against the above presented theory on art
and society is the fact that in Eco's understanding of art, we would have to d e d with an ideal
unanimous society, in which both aesthetic and other values are well defined and shared by
all members of the group. Such a codortable situation would hardly be found even in small
groups or communities in the Middle Ages (where the term 'society' originated), and the
modem variety offered by multiculturai societies seems to render invalid at least some ofhis
claims.
However, the rigid social structures that Eco finds necessary to guarantee a social
agreement in regards to art, take a special significance also in the works of Barthes and
Gornbrowicz. As Gornbrowicz and Barthes, in their respective theoretical pronouncements,
go beyond reflection on pure art, the following chapters will deal with society to a wider
extent than it was necessary in the chapters that focused on Eco's writings.
Art as Myth
According to Eco, society seems very ordered, unanimous and easy to describe. Art,
in his understanding, is an aesthetic activity, quite definable according to the classical canons
of beauty. The members of society are divided into three groups: artists, receivers and
critics-l6Even ifsome of them occasionally M
U two or even three of the mentioned roles,
that is the one of sender, receiver and/or critic, they still serve each role only one at a time;
thus the harmony in world (according to Eco) is preserved.
To Barthes, society is more complicated; it is more dynamic. Similarly, according
to the theory of Gombrowicz, art and thus,also Literature have essentially the same character
as other, non-artistic activities.". In Barthes' WLitings, essays dealing with Literature are
usually next to discussing not only music or theater but also mass media, football, fashion,
food and social conventions. Art thus, as Long as it corresponds to a pattern that allows its
explanation is no more sacrosanct than less 'intellectual' or elitist activities.
Starting fiom such a point of view, Barthes has no prejudices as to the privileged role
of art and the artist. If eventually he comes to the conclusion that writers are attributed a
special task, the conclusion does not come ftom the respect for art and tradition. According
to Barthes, art and artists (he deals mostly with literature and his favorite terms are 'writing'
On the Jakobson scheme of communication in Eco see Gritti 52-3
L7 Though in a different context and with somewhat ironical tone, also Gombrowicz often
compared concerts to horse-racing and Literature to football, especially when he
commented on sending the best Argentinean writer ( football player) oversees to represent
the country in Europe (meeting of artists and intellectuals being compared to Olympics).
I6
25
/kcriture/ and 'writers' levant/) are in a particular situation, because they are mythified'?
However, they are imposed upon the samekind of myth as writers focused on, for example,
politics,
Myth, in Barthes' understanding, is not uniquely a social convention, such a
presentation would be too simplif/ing, but a code of communication. As it operates within
society, society uses it, and one rok of myth, among many others, is to impose some form
of control over art, as well as other forms of human activity.
In order to enjoy an Adam-like control, one needs to have the power to name.
Applying the quip to "society,"Barthes claims that the latter needs an even stronger control:
to be able to impose categories and values. As these belong to the domain of language, a
manifestation of categorizationis expressed in the language, especially in its bourgeois (that
is traditional, conventional, and rigid) use. Myth has essentially the same origin as the
multiple problems connected to the obsession of accurate naming that he calls 'science
policikre'. (Barthes I 657)19
Barthes knows that the need comes fiom the desire to
control. Language certainly is ameans of communication, but it is often evoked by Barthes
as a of way of qualifying,and thus,also imposing values and limits. Language is not only
an expression of reality, but to some extent it also shapes it; its greatest strength being in the
potential to encode a myth. Baahes writes:
As myth is a word, anything justifiable in discourse can become
See Moriarty 105-7
The essay "LaLitterature selon Minou Drouet," (Barthes I 657-60) is an example of
Banhe's analysis of how exact labeling is unnecessary for literature .
IS
26
myth. Myth is not defined by the object of its message, but via the
way it is manifested: there are fonnal but not substantial
(thematically) limits to myth, (..,) Any object in the world may
change its enclosed, silent existence to oral existence, open to be
appropriatedby the society, for no law prohibits to speak about things
(Barthes I 683)-
According to this conception, myth, entirely belonging to a language that serves to
indicate virtually anything, is indeed able to absorb anything. It "steals" words, emptying
them of their previous values and giving them a second meaning. Myth, as the language
ftom which it derives directly, is a code of communication, a "second semiotic system"
(Barthes I 688). Composed of a signifier and a concept, it is able to contain all values and
convey them via numerous means. The most important part of the myth is the concept,
which is the equivalent of the signXed in the Saussurean understanding of language. The
signifier, on the other hand is the means of communicating the message: an image, a
statement (usually fixed and stereotyped), a typical behavior. As one message can be
conveyed in many ways, the signXer is simultaneously empty (as it can take the form of
anything, provided it clearly conveys the message) and filled (myth exists only in a very
concrete representation, the image or slogan is the 'body' of the myth).'O. Thus myth, using
elements &om everyday Me, and invading it at the same time, is omnipresent. Indeed, in
" See:
"Le mythe, aujourd'huin, Barthes I 681-719
27
Barthes' understanding, myth is part of social reality. In the Mytholoeies, nothing is safe
-
fkom the operation of mythologization, and, thus, everything can acquire an extra meaning:
wrestling "as a genuine manifestation of popular culture" (Moriarty 20),wine "which has an
obvious symbolic status, as a sign of Frenchness and virilitytt(ibid 21), milk and food (as
referents of nationai identity), a strip-tease show, (having an absolutely different meaning
than the one a literal reading would suggest, i-e., sex o r exhibitionism)- Myth also invades
theater and cinema with some rituals, such as photographs of famous actors taken by a
specific group of photographers in specific places (on the streets of Paris). Also literature,
language, specific aesthetic taste, etc., being markers of a social group become myths and
can serve as vehicles to convey ideology or some specsc values. In Escal's words, Barthes
"wanted to present the mystification which transforms the petit bourgeois culture into
universal nature" (Textuel66). However, myth, by its omnipresence also d e s . Culler
states that "bypresenting the human diversityit celebrates as family variations offeature and
physiognomy, this myth masks the radically different social conditions under which people
are born, work and die" (Culler 33-4).
As myth not only takes origin in reality, it also has some influence on it, society feels
a naturai need for myths. Myth invades human life but it also traces limits and imposes
barriers of taboo. Unlike in Eco 's theory, taboo is not a dead form, rendering impossible all
creativity?characteristic of 'primitive cultures'. Barthes finds the interconnections between
taboo and myth (thus, also art) much more complex and in a sense, beneficial for the
semiotic structures of the mythical code:
28
Thus, every day and everywhere, man is stopped by myths, referred
by them to this motionless prototype which Iives in his place, stifles
him in the manner of a huge internal parasite and assigns to his
activity the narrow b i t s which he is allowed to suffer without
upsetting the world.... Myths are nothing but this ceaseless, untiring
solicitation, this insidious and inflexible demand that all men
recognize themselves in this image, eternal yet bearing a date, which
was built of them one day as if for all time- (Barthes I 687)
In other words, myth is imposed by society and its role is to present patterns of behavior
that replace a true understanding of the world. Myth itself derives its force f?om social
approval, therefore it has some characteristics of a cultural heritage.
However, as a "fixed value" independent from the individual, it cannot be used.
Myth exists as a form created in some specific socio-historic situation. "Myth, as we know,
is a value: it is enough to modify its circumstances, the generaI (and precarious) system in
which it occurs, in order to regulate its scope with great accuracy" (Barthes I 134). Not
only is changing myth impossible, but its understandingis also unattainable. Such a process
would be destructive; thus, myth can be accepted or rejected as such, but any exegesis is,
ex definitione, forbidden.
Barthes expresses this phenomenon and its consequences in the
following words:
The fact that we cannot manage to achieve anything more than an
29
unstable grasp of reality doubtless gives the measure of our present
alienation: we constantly drift between the object and its
demystification, powerless to render its wholeness. For if we
penetrate the object, we hierate it but we destroy i t (Barthes I 149)
It is impossibIe to grasp the content without destroying it- Demystification is then
the self-defensivetool of myth. An individual is condemned to float between the object, its
deep significance, and its hctioning in culture. Myth, a kind of supreme and invariable
achievement of society, is a system of encoded norms and practices. Gombrowiczean form,
which is less rigid, leads us to the same values, nonns, behaviors or messages as encoded
by "myth's" society.
To give an example of a myth destroyed, I would like to refer to Eco's The Name of
the Rose. A mythi£ied object par excellence is the manuscript of the second book of
Aristotle's Poetics, Lost and found, only to be lost again. The extra meaning it brings with
itself is the knowledge that no one has access to the manuscript but everyone knows it is out
there. Another "extra meaning" of the book is the role of Aristotie in the Middle Ages in
general, but also in the plot the novel and importance of Aristotle's ideas for the character
of the nominalist William ofBaske~Ue,shaped after RogerBacon. The second book of the
Poetics is unique, and though the library contains many precious volumes, this is the o d y
priceless one. Moreover, accordingto the structure of the myth, Aristotle's text with all the
implications for Western civilization and the two monks (the content of the myth) exists in
many forms and one of them is the lost manuscript (signifiant). Also, the second book of
30
Poetics as a myth reveals itselfonly in its absence, even in its denied existence, for like any
myth, the moment the manuscript and thus the text is available, and therefore exposed to
reading and analysis, it is no longer the object of the quest. Just as the comedy (in Aristotle)
and novel (in Barthes' "Degre zero..."), the myth reveals itself to our eyes, onIy to point at
its mask ('I do not exist', it seems to say: 'you cannot have me').
21
The second book of
Poetics, being a myth is self destructive and, as it is supposedly priceless, as the closest
notion to 'priceless' is 'expensive', the destruction of the book occurs in a fire that consumes
the whole Library- A significant waste of many "innocent" volumes, but necessary as that
book was also a taboo and touching upon it must be severely punished. The book ends up
in flames exactly Like Sodom and Gomorrah, for the debauchery (i.e., the sin comedy
presents with some tolerance and laughter's indulgence) it could bring to Light must meet the
same fateAccording to Barthes, myth depoliticizes speech Parthes I 132), which means that
it actually depoliticizes concepts and lends them some kind of superhuman value- Culler
understands Barthes's statement very literally stating that "Barthes'sMvthologies stands at
the beginning of a tradition of demystification, which he hopes would have political results"
(Culler 40).
However, such a depoliticized concept might be also the fatherland or a
national language, both of which are extremely important in most European cultures. Thus,
it belongs entirely to the one and only linguistic code which is for Barthes no other than
French; therefore, myth is a b b to convey national values as universal. Both French
''Inmany cases,
(...)
'myth' means a delusion to be exposed. " Culler 33
literature* and its ways of writing become the literature one should read and the way one
should mite (authentically French).
The preference for French does not indicate any
"natural superiority1*
of French over German, English, et al. For Barthes, myth is so closely
connected to the society that what is not vital to the latter, simply cannot exist in the former.
The situation doubtlessly paradoxical: languages and literatures other than French 'do not
exist' because they are not myths, and they are not myths because they are not mythified.
On the other h
a myth does not have the function of a philter which eliminates some
phenomena and exposes others. Barthes states that: "Myth does not deny things, o n the
contrary, its function is to talk about them; simply, it purifies them, it makes them innocent,
it gives them natural justification, it gives them a clarity which is not that of an explanation
but of statement of fact" (Barthes I 132).
As myth contains values important to the society, art and writing (thus also literature)
become mythified. Barthes statesthat the process not is based on myth's immediate meaning
but on what the signifier brings with itself: a much richer message. Thus,the simple action
of reading text is is regarded as an expression of some kind of identification with some
cultural heritage. Reading itself equals cultivating certain values, which include respect for
the sacred 'priestly' function of the writer. Reading and writing as simple actions engage
into sharing a culture and by doing so, one perpetuates the myth. The myth Barthes finds
Thus, Barthes insists on the division between 'i5crivainsYand '6crivants'- "the '6crivain'
is one who diverts the language of literature to political ends, whereas the writer's object
is language in itself. (.. .) The '6crivantYwants to communicate, the writer does not: but
the second finally does communicate by the strength of his refusal to attempt to do so"
(Moriarty 1056)22
32
usem to explain the functioning of the novel in its bourgeois ~ersicg;besides aesthetic
pleasure, it is a way to "convince oneself that one's own (that is, bourgeois) values are
universal". As reading in this context is enriched with other functions, it becomes mythified.
Barthes continueshis remarks: "This is exactly the mechanism of myth. (...) the Romanesque
writing consists of putting on a mask and pointing at it at the same time" (Barthes I 157).
One ofthe ways to indicate the mask of the myth is the French narative of the novel
is the tense passe! simpI?, other indicators are the extra meanings of the novel:
NoveI is Death. It changes life into destiny, makes remembering a
usefbl act, and the time of the plot is ordered and significant. But this
transformation may happen only before the eyes of society. It is (the
same) society that imposes Novel, that is a system of signs.(...) It is
thus the intention visible through the signs of the novel that we see
the pact that binds with the solemn character of art, the writer with
the society (Barthes 1 159).
Thus, mythified writing creates inevitably amyth of the writer- Writing cannot exist
without a person who could create it and, as the writing is mythified, it needs a mythified
origin (some kind of an immaculate - mythified conception). The special role of the writer
has also other sources. He is the master and official supervisor of another (mythified) value
23
See: "LeDegr6 zero..."in: Barthes I 137-87
33
which is of the language, usually in the understanding that we deal with a national language,
in most cases with French. As language is (according to Barthes) essential in conveying
some values (cf "Le mythe, a gauche"), and sometimes it takes place in a very subtie way
so that the public does not notice it and is prompt to accept it- The same phenomenon takes
place in writing; the writer, as an aware user of language must be and is 'appropriated' and
thus the expression of his sensitivity,stolen f?om him (we have to keep in mind that myth
is a thief of words and concepts), becomes some kind of public property. No longer private,
writing (literature) is being used as a national treasure, and consequently the writer becomes
its priest. In consequence, reading some authors is equal to identifLing oneselfwith their
ideology (the same logic that gave birth to thehdex of the Catholic Church which believed
that just be reading a book one is accepts's its author's ideas), respecting the national
heritage and belonging to a spec& group with all the consequences that follow. According
to Barthes, myth exists in society; thus, the only relation between writer and society is some
kind of an interdependence: "The Writer gives to society decIared art, visible to everyone
with its norms, society in return can accept the writer" (E3arthes I 173)-
Myth, however, with all the power it has in society, has no influence on the essence
of art, or, as Gombrowicz would say, on its authenticity. No matter if the writer writes to
please the public, promote some ideology, of if he simply creates out of pure need to express
hirnseLf in art; his work has been mythified by the 'sacred' charcter of the language before
the concrete text was created. The aura of the myth does not belong to the work of art, it is
rather on its exterior, it happens beyond art and it does not kill it. Coming back to the idea
of Eco's intentio societatis, the relationship between art and society does not correspond to
34
the pattern of society, creating the myth and art beingjust one of them. Myth is neither Life-
giving, like intentions are, nor destructive like form.
Before passing to the next structure created by society, Gombrowiczean form, I
would like to comment in advanceon the connectionsof Gombrowicz' form and of the myth
as it is presented in Barthes' writings- It seems that one myth perpetuates the other and there
is no escape from such a situation, for both the act of writing and the writer asejustifiable
as carriers of some kind of values. Even art for art's sake becomes contaminated and used
by external forces over which it has no influence. This 'no way out7situation leads us to yet
another, more radical vision of society and of art. For the third attempt to explain how art
exists and is dependent on society, I would like to present a concept by Gombrowicz and
how it concerns his form. Form and myth, being convergent in many aspects, however are
not the same, even though the conception of myth and form (to be described below) are
applicable to the same social phenomenon. They are similar when they point at a subtle
deprivation of private 'intellectual' property (which is the personal expression of one's
emotions and sensibility) and the ways and official goals of the myth and form, because both
are in one way or another used and even misused by the public and 'for the public's sake'.
On the other hand, as myth and form interact with society, another similaritybetween them
is the impact on social life. Both myth and form teach, or rather impose certain preestablished reactions. However, while form offers a sense of what seems devoid of
significance or logic, myth justifies some human activities by imposing a taboo on their
analysis due to the threat of destroying myth itseK Transgressing the taboo established by
form is a selfdestructive act. Form is not fixed; it is constantly created, like a theater play,
35
a show in which everybodyparticipates Ifthe circumstanceschange, unlike in myth, which
becomes destroyed and at best, a new one arises in its place in a new situation; form does not
only persist, but it revives under a new, modified form.
Society creates myth because it
needs some point of reference. Gombrowicz' form, though it is also a social construction,
allows active participating in creating society. Form and myth add some "deeper," (i-e.
traditionallyassigned)signification to certain concepts. Both encode, but only form shows
a way to encode some messages- Both are imposed on the individual since existence in a
society means to accept its rules (and transcend them in categorizable ways).
It is possible that the Gombrowiczean 'form' could be derived fiom Barthes' myth.
24
It possesses the same characteristics, and its impact on the perception of art and other
social phenomena is similar. However, form seems to be more developed in structure than
the rnyth. The understanding of form allows elements excluded by myth and, as a result,
form becomes dynamic while myth, when compared to form, is a static force imposed on
a society. Myth does not explain any elements of human existent, on the opposite, it defies
all rational description and justification. Gombrowicz had a more dynamic vision of society
than the one that Barthes believed in. What is surprising is that both conceptions are not
only convergent, but they fill in the blanks of each other.
Though certainly, 'form' is not a modification of myth, for Gombrowicz had an
elaborate theory on form already in the 1930s when he was working on Ferd~durke;both
in the Diary and his fiction, Gombrowicz does not declare any special interest in Barthes'
writings.
24
Form
"SinceI do not need form for mysell;
I need it only so another person can see,
feel and experience me." (Gombrowicz WI 10)
Social agreement, according to Gombrowicz, rules not only art but, in the same way,
all other aspects of human life- This idea is to be found also in Eco and Barthes; however,
in the Gombrowiczean version it is very radical, and it is so because not only form imposes
certain norms: form is everywhere and everything is form. Thus, everything people
participate in derives fkom an imposed model of behavior, fiom social norms. However,
form is not a rigid pattern or a written code, it is rather a dynamic force. According to this
theory, man adopts a certain attitude in a given situation in order to respond appropriately
to the circumstances. As every situation is unique and human relationships depend on many
diverse elements, form represents the ability of "tuningin". This "tuning in" is bilateral:
people surrounding an individual also react in a certain manner as if provoked by him and
thus, the circle is closed. Nevertheless, form requires some knowledge of the "rigid"norms.
Because form implies the constant struggle of an individual who, as Gombrowicz says is in
love with immaturity and liberty, education and maturity are among form's most important
components. As examples, one could quote The Marria~e,inwhich Henry and his fiend (in
Polish: Wladzio, in the English translation: Johnny) find themselves in a dream populated
by people who behave in some grotesque way. In order to continue the game they cannot
escape, they adopt an attitudethat makes them behave as ifin "normal"circumstances, which
37
finally Leads them to the point at which they takethings seriously. Similar examples could
be found in Ferdvdurke. Trans-Atlantic, and Princess Ivona
The omnipresence of form, in any aspect of human existence, especially those that
make the individual a social being, leads to a specific situation governed and controlled by
it, and this is crucial to the human attitude towards art and in particular, its social reception.
According to Gombrowkz, human nature, that is, the isoIated individual, is unable to
appreciate art as
Only a special "preparation"enables proper aestheticjudgment. This
accounts for the fact that in European culture, feelings traditionally associated with beauty
and art, such as admiration or even ecstasy were conditionalon a pre-established pattern that
made (and makes) man feel "moved, enchanted by beauty". Artistic creation taken as a
particular activity is no different fiom many others and aU its value comes uniquely fiom a
special prestige granted to it by ~ociety.'~This is why respect for art must be instructed,
successively and continuously implanted in human minds, Otherwise, the individual is
unabIe to recognize and appreciatethe superiority of a masterpiece over an average product
of artistic creativity. Gombrowicz goes against the traditional understanding of art. In
Ferdykke, he reflects on the very essence of art:
Is not everyone an artist? Does mankind create art only when seated
Gombrowicz somerimes contradicts himself. He also insists,both in Ferdydurke and
Diary that only an authentic experience of art must be liberated from the limits imposed
by form.
26 See Wittlin, Jozef. "Prkfaceh la premihe &Stiondu Trans Adantique"in L'Herne 199'5
204
38
at a desk in fkont of a sheet paper? Is not art continually being
created in the course of everyday We? When a girI puts a rose in her
hair, when we make a good joke in the course of an agreeable
conversation, when we exchange confidences at dusk,is not that art?
(Gombrowicz I 82-3)
Unfortunately for Gombrowin, the social understanding of art differs from his own.
According to what Gombrowicz claims, art, for most of its audience, is not based on its deep
aesthetic value."
Rather, its importance derives fkom social "stamping," a common
agreement that stands for a guarantee of high quality. Thus art is formal not in the sense that
it is a mere reproduction of a given model (say, mimesis of nature, attempts to depict an
ideally beautifir1man, etc.) but, because of its specific role and status in social life. It is not
a test of human sensibility but of one's maturity, of human capability to adjust to the role
of connoisseurs or admirers of beauty according to society's expectations, Because human
life (social realities) and form are inseparable, art also exists only within form. Plonowska
Ziarek suggests that "if Gombrowicz resolutely rehses to confine the problematic of form
(sic) to the realm of aesthetics alone, or reduce it to the talk of "literature about literature,"
it is because he poses it at the fimdarnental level of language and the social form of
signification" (Plooowska Ziarek 11). This close connection of form to language is
Here, Iwould argue with the simplifyingunderstanding of Gombrowiczean theory on
form presented by Murat accordingto which form is uniquely a struggle, art is beauty. see
"La Nuit du Reitro"in L'Herne 222-5,
27
39
undeniably a common characteristicwith Barthes' myth. Thus, in both structures, myth and
form, language and form, coexist very closely, to the point that they merge into one.
According to Eco, form (the physicaVexterior shape of the work) is opposed to content (the
intention it conveys, the significance one can find through the process of interpretation), In
the case of the Gombrowiczean understanding of form, such an opposition does not exist.
Form is omnipresent and dynamic; it is a force that makes man act in a conventional way.
Its dynamism comes fiom one notable characteristic: every negation or variation of form is
already inscriied into the original form- But form is unavoidabIe not only because of its
omnipresence; it is an expression of social "common sense",justifling, and explaining what
an individual does not understand or cannot grasp intellectuaily. In fact, form is often used
to justify things that rationality could not explain for the lack of logical arguments (likethe
"obligatory " admiration forcertain artists) or dead traditions cultivated in the name ofsocial
interest.
As I mentioned before, contentpractically does not exist. Any informationconveyed
to others is inscribed in social reality and must be read as such. Content, if understood as the
message which is the signified that needs to be phrased via a signifiant, is, at least for
Gombrowicz, one and inseparable unit. Thus, the perception of any message necessarily
takes place in the h
e of a pre-established social convention, therefore via form. Form
takes over the message just as it appropriates its subsequent reception. The content is
emptied by the form that itself becomes the content, the inside and the outside, the
40
information and all its possible interpretation^.^
It should also be noted that form, though omnipresent and Inevitable in society, is
perceived as a nuisance. Gombrowicz' texts focus on the struggle of an individual with
form, and form invariably turns out to have a destructive force. In the plays, we find
characters constantly changing roles, according to the development of the situation on the
stage-
The characters that populate his pIays are conscious of acting,if not forthe spectators,
at least in front of other characters. It is not only the scenic character of his plays that makes
everyone act some role(s), it is the presence of form- The same is equally characteristic of
the protagonists ofhis novels. Everyone observes and feels constantly observed; voyeurism
plays such an important role that in some situations, the only motive of what is often
(ab)norrnal behavior are someone else's eyes or ears- Thus, Prince Philip (Princess Ivona)
is unable to kill his fiancee because he is being observed by his companion (and spectators);
Zuta and her parents are constantly spied on b y Johnny (Ferdvdurke). In their case, even
when they are fieed fkom Johnny's observation, they are still watched by other members of
the family and that makes them behave according to the rules of the "modem" style. Every
word, gesture and even thought is "programmed" by others. Thus, even solitude does not
fkee them fiom the virtual presence of others; they can never be isolated in the "interhuman
chwch". Characters take part in a massive common spectacle, created by themselves, one
in which they are the only spectators.
Barthes implies a similar supposition: "Itcan be seen that we deal in no way with a
harmony between content and form, but with an elegant absorption of one form into
another" "Myth Today", Selected Writings. 120,note 10
"
41
This constant acting that is necessary in socia1relations is also the origin of human
drama 'Tuning in' to the expectations of others necessitates an individual playing more
than one role at the same time- This task is, ifnot impossible, at least extremely difficult.
The number of imposed roles at any given time is equal to the number of inter-reacting
individuals and that is the main source of conflict. This is why Henry in (the Marriage) is
lost in his simultaneous roles as the son, and then as the Prince, the enemy of the Father
King. His situation is still more complicated because he is constanly co&onted by his
£iiend Johnny (the last to give up his "normal self') who knew him in his "normal Life".
There are other roles Henry has to play simultaneously,one o f them being that of the Prince.
The "official" Henry is the object of a conspiracy against his Father, fkom now on King. Let
us recall that Henry practically creates his Father: he dreams about him and other characters
of the play as well as the entire situation is a dream, a situation that cofises him and
temporariiy prevents him fkom taking any decisions). Thus, because the Father exists only
in Heruy's mind, the circumstances in a sense grant to the dreamer an absolute power over
everyone in the dream. Thus, in this play as in the other texts, the multiple roles, (like Mugs
or Faces in Ferdvdurke) of one individual are not the expression of a split personality, but
the splitting imposition of society. Man must be seen in some context, as someone who can
be categorized, producing the need for form. Pmcipio a t essere,but perception is always
influenced by form. Form becomes an ontological principle.
Interestingly, every attempt to escape form leads back to it- However, this does not
mean that absolutely everything is acceptable. There are margins of the inappropriate,taboos
that should not be transgressed Perversion, as long as it can be categorized as the inversion
42
(negation or modification) of the socially acceptablemodel, is still embraced by form. There
are but few aspects of human Life not marked by society's didapproval, which are therefore
hardly controIlabIe by form, and could not be judged socially. Nevertheless, as form
develops with its users, its absence is sometimes nothing more than a temporary
imperfection. It is interesting that the sexual relations between Zuta and either Professor
Pimko, or a Eend from her class, or even the homosexual "hterniziflg" between Mien-
and Bert (in Polish: Wolek) are acceptable. In Zuta's case, the motivation and justification
for her behavior lie in going against old rules, while the latter case is acceptable thanks to
the ancient "justi-g"
tradition of homosexual love (see the conversation of Johnny and
his uncle). Nevertheless, fraternizing with the lower classes transgresses organized social
order and the result is dangerous (Ferdvdurke, Operett* Princess Ivona). But form is
impervious to such a danger, for the form simplydoes not exist yet in that particular sphere
of human We. A lack of form, or the danger of being outside form
- which is almost
impossible - constitutes the difficult situation in which an individual is confronted with the
wholly unknown. The danger is serious because, according to Gombrowicz, humans need
formulated, ready-to-use patterns in order to feel and to be perceived by others. Man cannot
exist outside (or beyond) form; form enslaves man, tracing limits to his mind and fieedom;
however, any tentative escape fiom it turns out to be self-destructive. Being outside of form
is equivalentto the termination ofbeing itself. Still,Gombrowicz depicts characters that are
in a constant struggle with form. The same is valid of course for form in art, especially
because form imposes limits not only on active creativity, but also on reception which,
according to him is limited to the point that fiee interpretation becomes practically
43
impossible. Gombrowiczcame back to the problem of interpretation on many occasions and
he himself contributed to the uneasiness with imposed forms. DeaIing with art, especially
with his own writings, Gombrowin was a very stubborn writer and critic.
PART I1
Interpretation
45
From the Gombrowiczean idea on society's role in the creative process of a work of
art, we move on to the second and no less important aspect of art: interpretation.
Gombrowicz claims that k einterpretation is impossiblebecause of form; Barthes presents
a radical negation of this statement. This time, Eco seems to reconcile these opposed
opinions.
Gombrowicz Against Free Interpretation
Gombrowicz, author of novels and plays (the most famous being Ferd~durkeor The
Marriage respectively) a somewhat more critical text, Diary. Here, he often refers to his
novels and plays. In both his fiction and his works which could be qualified as Literary
criticism, we evidence his obsessive explaining ofhis own works. According to him, nobody
could understand them correctly and he went as fa.as to explain certain aspects of them. For
example, he gave two introductions to two independent stories within Ferdvdurke:
"Introduction to Philimor Honeycombed with Childishness" and "Introduction to Philifor
Honeycombed with CMdishnessV.In one of them, Gombrowicz confesses: "I must provide
a preface, a preface is required of me, without a preface I cannot possibly go on"
(Gombrowicz I 193). He adds his explanation, nearly exegesis not only because of the law
of symmetry he mentions latex, but the same reason makes him complain that his texts are
published with no introduction, therefore they will certainly be (in his opinion)
misunderstood. This particular attitude of mistrust of the reader's intellect and capability to
discover the message of the text unaided is somewhat interesting if we consider that
46
Gombrowicz on many occasions criticized the educational system as forcing the individual
to certain narrow interpretations of literary texts and art in general (the famous lesson in
Ferdvdurke)- Thus, his texts constitute a mixture oftwo styles, a blend of a "pure literature"
and critical notes. His critical statements ones often had a especially provocative character,
for Gombrowicz went as far as to deny esthetic value to generally accepted works of art (the
classic examplewould be here Slowacki's poetry, to whom he adds Byron, Pushkin, Goethe,
etc.). The opposite pole of his style is easily detectable as the romantic tradition of the
inspired text, which is inaccessible to an average reader- In this way, most of his texts
confkont the reader with more than one style, and with two simdtaneous voices. However,
no matter if it is Johnny fkom Ferdydwke or the narrator's voice in the introductions of the
above mentioned interpolated stories (Philzfir...and Philirnor) or some of the plays, that
voice imposes certain interpretations on us. All the voices areobsessed with Form, explicitIy
articulating Gombrowinean theory on that subject- We could also ignore the fact that these
theories are surprisingly similar to those exposed in the D i m but it is still undeniable that
no text written by Gombrowicz is absolutely fkee of some kind of opinion or at least
arguments presented by the author taking the role of a literary critic.
ForG o m b r ~ ~ citzwas
, form that imposed respect and admirationof certain authors.
An individual is prepared to appreciate art, but that respect is born more fiom a sense of duty
rather than a true admiration for a given kind of art, say for literature. Gombrowicz used to
call it the 'interhuman church of admiration for the genius'.
29
29
Mentioned in the foreword by Gombrowicz to the Polish edition of The Madape
47
Gombrowicz believed that he should teach. He never gave up explaining his own
theories, indicating what he did not like in society and in art He does not hesitate to oppose
this conception to his own theory which states that anything is art- If anything is art then
everyone is an artist ("Is not anyone a bit of an artist? Is it not true that humankind creates
art not o d y on paper or on canvas, but at any moment of everyday Me?" Gombrowicz 1 82-
3) and "artistic" writing stops being the privilege of a chosen group. h the case of
Gombrowicz, a reading fiee of imposed interpretations seems to be hardy possible. Even
if, as a critic or author, Gombrowicz could be excluded Erom his literature (as Barthes
suggest), still the absolutely Liberated interpretation is still unavailable. In theory, a reader
has the option not to take into consideration the Diary, or Gombrowicz' introductions and
commentaries, published in literary reviews (mostly of Ferdvdurke). All the abovementioned texts are very important for Literary critics but they may be omitted as to not
influence our interpretation-
The insurmountable obstaclesof fkeeing oneselffiom extra-textual influences during
a reading arid in the process of interpretation are typically Gombrowiczean theoretical
passage incorporated into his novels or plays. They cannot be left apart for they are not
simply extra-textual; they constitute inseparable parts of the text in which Gombrowicz
explicitly communicates his theories on art and literature and gives "the only correct1'one,
as he considers it to be an interpretation of a text. To illustrate the described interferences
of the author,one could return to the introductions to Philzyor and P h i h o r in Ferdydurke.
These fragments cannot be omitted and ignored for they constitute a part of the Literary text
and thus the ideas expressed must have some influence on the process of individual
48
interpretation of the whole text. Of course, we do not have to take into consideration the
opinions on art presented in his introductions. However, the same ideas in expressed in
exactIy the same way are to be found in the k
e of literary texts such as Ferdvdurke or
Trans-Atlantic. These hgments within Literary texts oblige us to a certain understanding
of Form as such and as a consequence, they impose a specific - form centered- interpretation
of say, Johnny's adventures. In this particular situation, Gombrowicz the author puts the
reader in a troublesome position: the elimination of extratextual analysis or explanations of
a given text no longer makes sense because the suggestedunderstanding of a text is the same
the reader will £ind in the text itself. Moreover, once the extra and inter-textual theories are
found to be identical, the reader is tempted to iden*
the narrative voice, often which often
belongs to the main character (especially in the case of Trans-Atlanticl with Gornbrowicz
the author and accept his theories a s explained in the foreword or introduction and look for
them in the textO3O
A s we see, for a modem reader ready to adopt alI modem attitudes as to how to enjoy
Literature, reading Gombrowicz is a puzzling experience. First, as if his publishers desired
to impose upon readers a form indicating how to read Gombrowicz, his works are usually
published with some introduction on his role in Polish literature and his conception of the
omnipresence of form.
However, in this case it is important to keep in mind that
Gombrowicz, unconvinced by the idea of a personal perception of art, himself insisted on
adding introductions to his texts, both in the Polish version and translations? Would there
"Dela solitude avec lyckenne".L'Herne 285-89, especially p. 286
31 "Ferd~durke
appeared in Germany without commentary to explain briefly "what it is
aboutw-thussome critics and readers did not know where to begin. I immediately wrote to
30
See Bernard, Michd.
49
be any purpose in his putting us into his own form by offering us his own interpretation?
Thus, before we get to the very text of The Marriee, we find, as an integral part of
the play, an introduction entitled "Idea of the drama," in which Gornbrowicz literally
explains "whatthe play is about," and he proceeds to his theory of form and its influence on
the process of creativity and reception as well as everyday We. 32 After this exegesis in which
the author writes:
All this happens via form; that is to say that people joining
themselves force themselves to one or another way of living,
speaking, acting... and everyone defonns others being at the same
time deformed by them. This is why this drama is first of all a drama
of f0m.3~
This passage, similar to many others in both novels and the plays, is clear evidence
of the presence of a voice that goes beyond the simple presentation of events or even
commentary on them. This is almost an exegesis on and in the text, which compares with
the English publisher to have him add a brief explanation to the preface. All naught! the
English Ferdydurke also appeared without the few sentences it needed so badly. Diarv
v01.U 215"
32 Unfortunately, this part was omitted i
n most translations. Only recent publications of
Gombrowicz in Poland based on his various manuscripts present the whole of t h i s play.
33 Absent in the English version, the translation is mine.
50
some medieval texts?
However, Gombrowicz found an advocate who couId defend his
position. Dorota Glowacka states that the artist, being important within the text, does not
occupy the central place (a statement somewhat d E i t fiom Gombrowicz' own words),
neither as the artist nor later, as a commentator- She points at the textual internal coherence
and independence (we shall see the same argument in the chapter on Barthes): "the artist
bends pmtectiveIy over the work of art he is creating' but the text never lets itself be
assimilated in the commentary, despite the author's renewed efforts to provide an accurate
explanation of his own texts" ( Plonowska Ziarek 85)- Not even the author can tell what is
the "true meaning"of the text.
34 An example of such a medieval text is an Old French twelfth century mystical version
of the Sone of songs in which biblical passages were widely commented upon and, in case
where "needed"simplified or referred to the actual situation.
Interpretation Liberated
Unlike Gombrowicz, Barthes (who did not write novels) believes in free
interpretation and has more faith in the reader. He rejects Gombrowicz's model of the writer
as being in between inattentive readers and criticswho read too much and always backwards.
r " ~ ~ in 1968 calls
Barthes, in one of his most famous essays "TheDeath of the A ~ ~ t h owritten
to a revolution: to read fieely. The duty of studying literature, literary criticism, philosophy,
etc. in order to have the necessary background for understanding and interpretation, is no
longer required of the reader. A reader should enjoy the text without supplementary data on
its author (Gombrowicz claims the author is important, but for other reasons than detecting
the intention he put in the text). The new times, Barthes proclaims, are the age of the readerOnly a personal experience with a text gives I
l
l
pleasure. The text is ready for the reader
and the reader is able to experience what he calls 'jouissance' without being aided. Barthes
also accuses the
(including those practicing modern criticism) of falsifLing the
reading and in turn, falsifying the interpretation by imposing on a text an element that does
not belong to it. For Barthes, the author in the text does not exist (Eco would say: there is no
place for the author within the internal structure of the work), and as he states at the end of
the essay, that the author should die. This bold claim is advanced so as to not facilitate
reading by eliminating the necessity of 'preparation' for the text; this usually consisted of
Barthes Il 491-5
36 In this regards, Barthes was criticizing himself because as Culler comments, "Despite
his many unorthodox activities, Barthes devotedconsiderabIe time to the critic's traditional
task of interpreting and evaluating writers' achievements" (Culler 42).
3'
52
the study of various comments, introduction on the literary period in which it was created,
the author's biographies, etc. The main shift operated in the elimination of the author's
personality is the emphasis put on the 'I', expressing himself within the text and through it.
The same idea is to be found already in an essay fiom 1953, "Le Degre zero de
176criture". The 'Iy, whoever that is, is not identical with the writer, but is derived straight
&om the impersonal or rather, emptied of the person of the author writing (6criture). The
author or, as Barthes prefers to call him, the 'writer', depends on the external, that is social
situation, but he does not write for society or even for 'literature'. Literature, that is the
national heritage, should be disregarded by the writer who is Like Orpheus. Looking at
literature with another purpose than reading it, say with the intention to add something
lasting to it is, as Barthes says, the forbidden gesture of looking back and it inevitably
destroys the beloved object (i-e. literature). Writing is for writing's sake; it is "a way to think
about literatureff(Barthes I 148)- Writing as such is " an ambiguous reality, (...) it is
undeniably born fiom confrontationof the writer with the society"(Barthes I 148). No doubt
for Barthes, writing has social origins (for it is mythified), but he opposes the reception of
art as corning back to the point in which literature took its Life. Once a text is written, it is
liberated from the social conditions that gave birth to i t Author, together *th society with
which he "struggles," must be rejected. Only when literature becomes the expression of a
purely literary 'I' for a reader, a proper reading can take place. The correctness of the
reading consists not in discovering the intention of the author (that, once the writer is
eliminated, is unavailable and no longer necessary), but in the carefbl analysis of internal
structures present within the text.
Interpretation by Eco
The more effectively a man is able to speak,
the more successfixlly he is misunderstood-
Walter Benjamin, "Dream Kitsch"
After the presentation of Gombrowicz' theoretical considerations in terms of fTee
interpretation (or rather its impossibility), and the very radical statement made by Barthes,
Eco 's writings can perform the role of a platform on which both fkeedorn in the process of
reading and various non-literary factors coexist.
For Eco, creating a piece of art is just one part of the entire life of a piece of art. In
the chapter on the intention of the author, I presented briefly what role Eco attributes to the
creator. We will come back to this question in this chapter. After the work takes shape, it
is no longer under its creator's control. This is where the intention of the receiver begins to
play a crucial role. The most significant of the receiver's role is not to find the meaning
encoded by the author but rather one that is independent fiom his will (intentio operis),
and/or to attribute new meaning to the artistic text or object. In one word, the task is:
interpretation?'
37 An interesting analysis of the topic,
in Schiffer 165-74-
though firom a different point of view is to be found
54
According to Eco, the artist insm'besin his creation some intention ormeaning-That
meaning might be multiple, and in fact, the history of art and in particdar, Literature shows
that a variety of readings is possible in just one piece of art. Even when we deal with
sacrosanct texts in which the significance is supposedly fixed by a divine, inspiring entity,
the encoded and "correct" way of reading for example the Bible, is not Limited to just one
interpretation because,
The "fourfold reading of the Bible or other texts in the Middle Ages
involved more than one sense included in a given text, however, this
was a definitenumber of predictable and unambiguous interpretations
imposed by a widely known and well established code: far removed
from meaning
'indefiniteness'
of communication, infinite
possibilities of form, and complete fkeedom of reception, (The *en
Work 5-6).
From such a particular case where extraliterary realities impose a strict number of
possible and admissible meanings, we move to the fiee interpretation of a modern text (or
other piece of art). The author breathes life into it; in other words, he gives it meaning. The
role of the receiver is to find it. Obviously, we have no access to the mind of the artist in
order to guess what exactly he had intended to express, and we do not need it: "We can say
that a text can be interpreted independently of the intentionof its utterer, but we cannot deny
that any text is uttered by somebody accordingto hidher actualintention" (TheLimits 38-9).
55
Thus,the author is, in a sense, present in his work as its creator and because his intention is
a guarantee of the work's artistic character; the reader, if he desires, may try to detect the
authorial thought, but a work of art has its own, independent life and meaning (intenrio
operis). The meaning which is inseparable &om the work of art, is accessible to us through
the form and content it was given,and the context in which we see the object or read/hear
the text (composition). More importantfy, the work of art welcomes the receiver to End
more meanings in it than the author intended to, even if some of them have to be rejected as
and some "conect" or admissible interpretations go beyond the author's intention.
To emphasize its dynamic structure, Eco calls the work mobile and the process of
assimilating new meanings, a metamorphosis:
Infine un mobile s i metamorfozza nei limiti - e previsti - dalla sua
struttura; ed un'opera letteraria come il Finnegans non esaurisce
certo tutti i possibili, (...) ma solo una rete complessa di possibilita
non interamente previste dal suo autore: il "campo" di reazioni
possibili che gli stimoli permettono e vasto, ma si tratta sempre di un
"campo" i
cui limiti sono detenninati dalla natura e
38 At this point, the ideas of Eco and Barthes differ most: while Eco acknowledges the
necessity to eIiminate some interpretations as absolutely unacceptable because they are in
conflict with the spirit of the period in which it was created or contrary to the ideas of the
author (as we can guess them), Barthes puts an emphasis on an absolutely free reading and
rejection of the traditional means "helping to find the meaningw-other works of the same
author, some knowledge on the period, on the author's life, etc.
The next problem raised by this short quote concerns the external stimuli that
determine the lixnits of the works? According to Eco, these are the internaI structures
(developed later) and the social context in which art is deeply rooted. To read a text and to
take the role of the receiver of any piece of art, we need a special preparation. In other
words, we need to learn how to interpret a set of symbols; because they are conventional,
they need a conventional approach to convey a message. Furthermore, we need information
as to the historic background of a given form or the knowledge of where to place a text or
a sculpture in an appropriate historical context. When this background of data is necessary
to decipher, a piece of art is missing; man finds himself before an object that still has a
meaning but there is no access to i t By illustratingthis situation, Eco presupposes that (1)
there is a meaning encoded once for all, and (2) it should be read according to the code that
was h o w n to the author or at least the way the first social group used to read it. As this is
not always possible, and because Eco strongly favors fiee interpretation, he mentions the
option of substituting the unknown by something accessible. Though the example beIow
concerns architecture, the same statement is valid for any kind of art:
metamorphosizes within limits, predicted by its structure; a literary
work such as Finneeam Wake does not exhaust aU the possibilities, (...) but only a
complex net of possibilities, not entirely foreseen by the author. The fieId of possible
realizations that is allowed by the stimuli is vast, but we deal with only a "field" in which
the limits are determined by the nature of the stimuli."
39 "Finally, the mobiIe
57
With its voracious vitality, history robs architecture of its meaning
and endows it with new meaning. Somemassive forms that have lost
such as statues in Easter
their original capacity to co~~mulzicate,
Island or the stones of Stonhenge, now appear to be enormous
messages, overcomplex in relation to theactual information they can
communicate to us. But they may spur us to find new meanings
instead, just a s Chateaubriand, who could not understand tlie original
h c t i o n of the Gothic cathedrals, interpreted them in new ways
(Travels... 298-9)-
Although the original significance is lost, considering the openness of art to new
interpretations, a new significance is equallyjustified as the traditional one. Such a shift of
"official" or acceptable meaning occurs also in some situations where the possibility of
rediscovering of the primary meaning is s t i l l possible; however, a new approach of literary
criticism encourages one to see things fiom a fresh point of view. An example of such a
situation could be the Freudian reading of medieval literature. Though the presence of
Freudian themes is absent in the middle ages, or at least it was far fiom having the
significance they are attributed today, various medieval texts are interpreted as if it they
were written especially for the use of a psychoanalyst. A similar approach occurs in reading
the same text with the idea to find them politically correct or through the prism of feminist
criticism. Thus, elements &own
to the period are added to the criticism and because
academia allows it, new meanings are officially attributed to the troubadours' poetry, or to
58
chansons de geste.
Interpretation is therefore not a passive process. To interpret, according to Eco, is
to read a text in order to guess its meaning, and that happens by following a system of one's
own expectations. Thus, the reader, using his previous experience in the domain of art
(knowledge of genres, the artistic epoch the work comes fiom, perhaps even other texts by
the same author, etc-), builds a structure of possible solutions to problems posed by the text,
all corresponding to the elements he is already familiar with. As each single reader has a
presumably different experience of art, expectations are bound to differ from reader to reader.
Obviously, some of the expectations will be rejected later on as the reading proceeds and the
text reveals more and more of its intentions. Nevertheless, a variety of possibilities is never
limited to just one meaning- The interpretation is limited not only by the text itself (by its
internal structures), but sometimes also by other factors, such as social convention.
"Heretical" interpretations of the Bible quite often did not exceed the limits of possible
meanings one could find in the New and Old Testaments; however, as they contradicted
other texts considered to be complementary (theological writings), unorthodox
interpretations were rejected (not without consequences to their inventors).
Eco illustrates such a case in the Name of the Rose, not only through the example of
the FratelZi Minori, who went astray in a too Literal reading of a few verses of the Gospel,
but especially through the theological dispute ofwhether or not the garment Christ allegedly
wore belonged to him (both answers can be argued and supported with other biblical
passages and both responses to this apparently futile question could have significant
consequences in the politics of the Church and the Papacy). There is also the possible and
59
acceptable interpretation of the prophecies of the Book of Revelation as a prediction of the
events happening in the abbey!"
Another example of interpretations that seem incorrect (this time the author does not
need to fear to be burned at the stake), due to the meaning approved by society, is Eco's
short story "Regretfully, We Are Returning Your..."in Misreadings. This essay described
by Bondanella as 'the most enjoyable one' (Bondanella36), o f f m " an insider's insight into
the kind of jargon editors might use in rejecting some of the world's great classics"
(Bondanella 36). However, Bondanella stops at this aspect of the text and not only does he
misread it by suggesting that the editor, commenting on Dante, is an 'imaginary medievaI
reader,' (Bondanella 37) but he also does not seem to notice that the most important point
of the short descriptions of a dozen well-known texts is to show how any reading is very
influenced by the official interpretations; in most cases, it involves second-hand experience
and interpretation of a book. Thus, the Bible is not supposed to be a book about sex, just as
Kafka's or Proust's noveIs are supposed to have more to say than just being mysterious and
boring stories. Such a f?ee interpretation opens a very important question: a reading of the
Bible, of the Divine Comedy, Kafka, or Proust or other texts the way Eco does, that is to say
as a joke:'
is certainly one way ofinterpreting them. However, does such a way of reading
the text make the text Lose its value? Some interpretations, nota bene those circulating in
academic circles, show that the texts criticized by the invented publisher are different fkom
the majority of popular paperback romances or detective stories (though, as Eco shows, they
40
41
O n that subjeq see: Bondanella 113-6
"Regretfully,w e are returning Y our..." in Misreadinw 33-46
60
can be read as such)- It seems that we have come hll circle, and back to the point of intentio
societatis,
For the time being, we have been concentrating mostly on the social limits of
interpretation; however, these change with the society that imposes them. No matter if an
official interpretation is acceptable42or required, Eco says that any text, as well as any work
of art, possesses in itseLfan independent meaning which is the afready mentioned mtentio
operis. It is a system combining aesthetic values with some kind of message. Though the
possible interpretationsadmissible are multiple, the very structure will exclude some that the
reader created according to his expectations. To make his own words more credible, he finds
support in St. Augusdne:
Any interpretation given of a certain text can be accepted if it is
con6rms and must be rejected if it is challenged by another portion
of the same text- In this sense the internal coherence controls the
otherwise uncontrollable drives of the reader (The Limits 59)-
However, the internal structures concern a d limit only one text at a timeIntertextuality, of course, exists, but it involves the content of external structures, never
internal. Going beyond the internal structures of a given text in order to find support for an
case of socially acceptable interpretationwas obligatory in communist
countries Marxist reading of a l l kinds of Literatures, to begin with ancient and medieval
love poetry to end with modem writings.
" Such a particular
61
interpretation, for example in the author's life (or another text) is, according to Eco, using
the text Especially ifthe process is bilateral and a literarytext serves as a sourceof evidence
of extra Literary facts? This use of a text, though it occurs in order to prove something, for
instaxe, to h d elements supporting an interpretation of another text by the same author,
to explain events fiom his Life, does not respect the autonomy of the text, and may bring
interesting results:
sometimes to use texts means to free them fiom
previous
interpretation, to discover new aspects of them, to realize that before
they had been illicitly interpreted, to find out a new and more
exploitative intmrio open's, that too many uncontrolIed intentions of
the readers (perhaps disguised as faithfd quest for the intention of the
author) had polluted and obscured (The Limits 62).
Thus,accordingto Eco,the text defends itself. Even charged with meanings intended
by the author and/or by the internal structures, it not only does not Lose its primary value, but
takes new meanings and assimilates new values.
Eco's Open Work
" Eco gives an example ofMarie Bonaparte's
and interpreting texts see Limits 58-9
artide on Poe's stories (1952).O n using
62
On many occasions, Eco emphasizes the importance of the h i t s of interpretation:
some readings must be excluded as going beyondthe structureof the work. The more loose
the structure?the more meaning the text encbses or permits- Such a particuIar kind of work
which leaves a lot of space for the receiver's active interpretation is called an open work.
The open work, according to Eco, is not complete, so the structurebeing more loose than in
the case of a "close" work, imposes some restrictions:
A work of art (...) is complete and closed form in its uniqueness as a
balanced organic whole, while at the same time constituting an open
product on account of its susceptibility to countless different
interpretations which do not impinge on its unalterable specificity.
Hence, every reception of a work of both an interpretation and a
performance of it, because in every reception the work takes on a
fiesh perspective for itself (The ODen Work 4).
These kind of works invites cooperation: reception and further interpretation is
impossible unless it involves some activity on the part of the artists performing (a musical
composition) or reader (of a literary text) and of the receiver. An open work requires an
attempt to Linish the work, to "complete" the task left by the author. A reader or musician
has to make decisions as to the form he wishes to give the work: just one definite shape for
one reading or performance. Still, because of the character of the composition of an open
work, we have to keep in mind that it exists as well as a set of virtual combinations as a
63
number of concrete realizations. Thus, the number of interpretations is greater than in the
case of any work, not intended to be open. Eco counts:
(1) "Open"works, insofar as they are in movement,are characterized
by the invitation to make the work together with the author and that
(2) on a wider level (as a subgenus of the species "work in
movement") there exist works in which, though organically
completed, are "open" to a continuous generation of intemal relations
which the addressee must uncover and select in his act of perceiving
the totality of incoming stimuli- (3) Every work of art, even though
it is produced by following an explicit poetics of necessity, is
effectively open to a virtually unlimited range of possible readings,
each of which causes the work to acquire new vitality in terms of
particular taste, or perspective, or personalpefomance (The %en
Work 21).
The possibilities are only virtually unlimited, for the physical dimensionsof the open
work that impose some limits. The same could be said about any work, however only some
involve the receiver to such an extent that without him, the text practically would not exist.
An open work is open also because it allows not only multiple readings but it demands an
open mind that would be able to experience multiplicity offered by the work while its
internal structures differ from the internal structure of any work in the sense that "the kind
64
of expectation aroused by a message with an open structure is less of prediction of the
expected than an expectation of the unpredictable" (The Open Work 80).
However, Eco underlines a number of times that the freedom offered by the open
work is limited. Any work is Limited by its structures, and boundaries that are more or less
rigid. (see chapter on interpretation) Ln this case, these boundaries seem to be of even more
importance: first, because they are less perceptible than m a traditional work, and second,
because they determine not only the aesthetic value (with such consequences as going into
kitsch or improper interpretation), but the very existence of the work. Transgressing certain
Limits annihilates the possibility of interpretation, and thus, also a condition of art: "A work
of art can be open only insofar as it remains a work; beyond a certain boundary, it becomes
a mere noise" ('The Ooen Work 100). This noise, being a lack of order, is destructive
because, in its damaging lack of redundancy, it borders on meaninglessness. This statement
employs an important premise: human thought is structured- Structure is necessary not for
an individual, but for society, in which an absolute chaos (or a dose of it that exceeds certain
limits) would invalidate communication and also communication via a work of art, Though
the distorted structure of a work is simultaneously beneficial4 it may be destructive to the
work if pushed too far. The open work is open but not unlimited-
"Eco stresses the fact that both avant-garde literature in general, and the open work in
particular, employ disorder to increase information" (Bondanella 29).
44
PART I11
Appropriating Art,
and Art's
Self-defense
66
The interdependencies of art and society appear as we have seen on a few levels: the
interpretation, the social role in determining what is considered to be art and, on the last
level, the status of the work of art or the artist- Another topic connected to the controlling
of art is the problem concerning the access to art that society allows an individual, the
various forms and reasons of controlling the artistic creativity and then, the reception of a
work of art. Throughout history, political, aesthetic and ideological reasons were considered
to be a justification of society's use of power over an individual in order to control art. On
the other hand, the same society is a collective force which imposes art on man as a value
and vehicle of aesthetic expression of uncontrolled creativity and emotions. Furthermore,
the domination of art by political forces may result in its degeneration into a kind of
creativity to which the same society or group that desires to control the art, would no longer
attributethe privileged status of a work of art. Thus, art and society coexist within the frame
of the dynamic balance: the struggle for 'pure' art and the maintaining of its value on the
one hand, and the attempts to escape intervention and arbitrary character of the aesthetic
judgment on the other. Due to the fact that art is a phenomenon that exists within the frames
of a given society (times change, as does society and the conception of art with them), it is
in fact the same group that, for its own good, should try to maintain the purity of art. The
situation described above, which is truly a paradox, is found in both the writings of
Gombrowicz and Barthes. Both of these writers perceive these interdependencies as a
vicious circle. Eco explains this same phenomenon of controlling art via the economic
structures of the society. The present chapter will deal with the various ways that society
uses to subdue art and artists. As a topic connected to the struggle for pure art on the side
67
of the artist, we shall see the counteraction ofother artists - For Gombrowicz, it is mostly
the problem of common identity, which is a car Zimite problem of artists, unconsciousIy
falling into the traps of society in an attempt to elevate art and its status.
Economy and Art
Eco suggests that in order to keep art alive, society must enable its interpretation. He
insists on the specid status of art, including the so-called popdar culture. The fact that he
was one of the first theoreticians to emphasize the domain, usually neglected by others," is
not necessarily an expression ofhis revolutionary view of art; on the contrary, it emphasizes
his traditional attitudetowards art, which is inevitably built on some kind of aesthetic. Thus,
aesthetics and interpretation are two columns that can be considered indicators of art. We
remember the case of the American museum of wax figures in which a series of factors are
present in the way the exhibits are displayed which
eliminates any possibility of
interpretation; thus, it eliminates the 'artistic' side of the objects in the collection. Ifthe
statement which implies that art depends on society (intentiosoaetatis shows itselfin yet
another form) is true, it should also be valid for the works of art that do not fit into the
socially accepted aesthetic boundaries. Eco's silencing of this question may have two
reasons: (1) he mentioned the unrealistic nature of Eco's vision of a homogenous society
"The fact that Eco strongly believed in the existence of an aesthetic of popular culture
and that it "shouldbe analyzed seriously (an even more scandalous belief), set his writings
apart from traditional literary criticism ofthe periodw@ondanella 41). O n Eco's writings
on pop culture, see also Gritti 15-29.
45
68
that unanimously accepts the same aesthetic values and, (2) his nanow, classical
understanding of aesthetics. If, accordingto his theory, the intention of the authorand/or the
reader is attributed to an object of art as a necessary condition, then the depiction of Eco's
image of society is not accurate, for it is sufficientthat such a validation occurs in a restricted
group. There is never a common agreement among all members of the same society on a
given topic because society is made up of a group of people sharing the experience of the
same political/administrativesystem, the same codes ofcommunication, both Iingui-sticand
extra linguistic, etc. Society as a notion in the criticism of art is too large and using this term
simplifies or even falsifies the definition. The only group whose presence seems justified
in this kind of approach to art is a community which shares the same values and experiences
that come fkom the inside, rather than imposed fiom above. In such a case, no matter how
insignificant such a group is, it has the same power to 'validate' art (that is to have a
common experience of it) as the judgment of the critics representing the 'oEcial' norm.
That was the case of the new aesthetic convention at the turn of the twentieth century:
dadaism, fauvism, expressionism, etc. As a defense movement against a novelty, the
bourgeois mind rejected these works as not being artistic, though they were an expression
of a different aesthetic code than what was known and accepted at the h e e History has
shown that the limits of what is acceptable changes and what was shocking a century ago is
perfectly acceptable now. This interesting phenomenon is referred to by Eco as a means of
dealing with art, in the way of controlling it. According to him, ifunknown elements invade
a field that has well established rules, they must be either llly accepted or completely
rejected. I already mentioned the lost second book of Aristotle's Poetics. There could be no
69
place for such a work in the framework of the rules of the abbey; thus, even its very
existence had to be denied (and finally the book has to be physically annihilated). It is
sigd5cant that the birary contains other books, also hidden fiorn readers who were too
curious, but for other reasons than the manuscript 'on comedy'. The non-appearance of
other vofumes comes fiom other sources: they are rare, precious and too difhcult to be
understood by an non-initiated mind. However, they are there and the only way one is able
see them is a special permission fiom the abbot. The accepted and accessible, though
supervised manuscripts are very unlike Aristotle's book whose absence is so strong that it
becomes taboo and the mentioning alone of the title infuriates the Reverend Jorge.
According to Eco, both in The Name of the Rose and in his theoretical work, art is
understood as an aesthetic code or its expression in a work of art; it is either accepted or
rejected and tertia non datur. There is no space left for undefined cases or for inquiktude
of any kind. Certainly, such an attitude either significantly narrows the canon of what is
acceptable, tracing only a few models to be imitated (as it happened with the social realist
style) or pushes the boundaries of the official norms to a point where they contain practically
anything (the attitude of modem Western civilization). In the second case, as long as any
kind of creativity claims to be artistic, following some canon of aesthetics, society is ready
to incorporates the new style and by doing so, puts it on the same level as other aesthetic
systems. Eco does not continue this reflection on the subject any further, but it seems that
the process consists of society's taking of some of the 'originality' of the new style and
scnrpulously h d i n g periods in which one can indicate d o g i e s , precursors and all kinds
of extra artistic factors by which it tries to explain the 'unknown' and yet unbridled.
70
Innovations no longer become impossible to grasp and categorize;
once they are
incorporated into the old system of art, they become controllable through active
commercialization. Through vulgarization, the originally shocking aesthetic statement is
neutralized and incorporated into the official canon.46 In the case of modem art, the process
consisted of using an 'artistic' style for common objects not directly c o ~ e c t e dto art:
buildings decorated in the art nouveau style, relatively afEordable furniture replicating the
same aesthetic model, etc.. Considering the range of accessibility of the original novelty,
such an unusual style becomes increasinglypopular among artists and thus, loses its unique
character; however, the public gets used to the novelty and consequently, the innovation is
incorporated into the already existing canon.
Multiplication and vulgarization through commercial activity are effective means of
depriving an artistic object of its particular status:
for example, the special aura of
privileged and unique works of art. As a unique object, a work of art is accessible to a
limited number of receivers; as only one in a series of replicas, it is not attributed the
intentio auctoris and therefore, looses its special character.
However, Eco underlines that art is supposedto go beyond what is socially explained
and acceptable. Modem art in particularemphasizesthe individual experience, and demands
some independence tiom the social canons on the part of the author or creator of the work
of art. This logic had inevitably led to the theory on the death of art: we get into a vicious
circle in which art is supposed to go agzimt socially accepted rules while society does its
46
See chapter "Spiritualismoet Avanguardia" in Dehzione 237-58
71
best to incorporate alI kinds of artistic activities with the variety of aesthetic norms, In this
situation, Eco says that art 'defends itself' by one of the two following options: either an
absolute rejection of the established canons and order ("art of disorder" being the same kind
of reaction as society's exclusion of the unknown) or its opposite, in which creativity is ruled
perfectly by official norms (again, being an equivalent to everything fiom the wide opening
of aesthetic norms to all kinds of innovations and modifications). Both attitudes come fkom
the same source because negation is undeniably rooted in the socially acknowledged canon
of art.
Common Identity
We remember that for Gombrowicz, negation and modifications are inscribed in the
original form and in a sense, generated by it; thus, no escape fiom it is ever possible and
nothing exists outside of it because there is no outside. However, unlike Eco, Gombrowicz
does not focus his reflection on art's struggle with society at the moment of social reactions
and commercialization. Certainly, he is aware of the importance of economic concerns in
society and of the pitfalls with which the modem world tempts artists: its privileges, prizes,
even money. Therefore, he points at the danger of writing or creating in general in order to
please critics which is an attitude he straightfowardly calls 'prostitution'.
This kind of 'prostitution' for Gombrowicz takes various forms: writing in order to
convey some ideology, to win an international prize so that unknown canons of literature
become world famous (the Polish and Argentinean literary circles that he was familiarwith
72
were somewhat provincial). Such a 'secondary' goaloften replaces the authentic expression
of the author and ultimately, destroys true art. The main problem with engaged writing is
not the extra message sent by the artist; it is first losing one's authenticity. To be truly equal
with Gombrowicz is to be independent in alI senses of the word, for art is an expression of
the individual rather than the collective identity for him. Ifthe author looks for some sort
of collective support, i-e.,ifhe identifies himselfwith his nation, social class or any kind of
group (for example, if he identifies himselfas 'an impressionist painter' rather than an "I",
who happens to paint in the style of what other critics call impressionists') he is, according
to Gornbrowicz, no longer authentic. Certainlyt the chances increase that such an artist will
be accepted and respected as an artist among a group, for a group will use him in order to
exalt its status. For Gombrowicz, such an attitude is no different than praising the military
potential or the industrial performance of a state.
This way of thinking has no other name for Gornbrowicz than the exploitation of an
individual's membership to a particdar group; he hated the Polish attitude of being proud
of 'having given to the world Chopin and Curie-Sklodowska7(today Poles also add: Milosz
and Szymborska). This type of behavior is not only unjustifiable because it appropriates
one's thought and Iife-story without permission and for the sake of a group, but it is also
arrogant, like showing off with one's rich or gifted relatives. If an artist willingly accepts
the role of a 'representative' for a group, fiom that moment on, his only creative 'I' is
silenced by national values and traditions; he is consumed by the structures of the form."
O n the importance of 'I in the struggle with form, see Pardinelle, Eric. "Nudith
invisible contre form visible", L'Herne 2646
47
73
As he, himselfwas strongly conscious ofhis Polish and aristocratic origidSand because he
experienced some pressure h m the Polish emigrants, he felt oppressed by thenational form
even far away fiom his homeland. Thus, in Glowacka's words, he " wields his pen mightier
than the sword against the Polish national form, with every stroke announces himselfas 'I'
(who am terribly Polish and terribly rebellious of Poland)" (Plonowska Ziarek 71-2).
Gombrowicz not only criticized authors such as Sienkiewiczor Wyspianski but also readers,
both Poles and Argentineans, for seeing art fiom the perspective of "we". In his opinion, art
is individual, and only a truly Liberated "I"is able to create art. Not a single domain of art,
including literature, should be in the senice of any kind of ideology; this is a situation in
which Polish art found itself since the late seventeenth century because of the political
situation. No matter if it is 'lifting up the Polish spirit' as it was with Sienkiewicz, or
glorifying communism (as many writers did who, having a chance whether or not to Leave
the country7 stayed in Poland), or finally7 the Argentinean desire to create their own
'national' literaturewhich would be comparable to the French world famous heritage, a work
created with no other intention than to express oneselfas a craftsmanship. Art is essentially
an expression of the artist, and the author; this is why Gombrowicz, unlike Barthes, does not
agree to eliminate the author from the work. He writes:
I do not ask to interpret a piece of art by the biography of its author.
(...) work of art must be for me source of infomation about its
480nthat subject more in: S z - o w i c z ,Jerzy. "Mon fi&e Witold et nos origines",
1'Herne 19-38
74
creator- The personality of the author shaU facilitate and open the
interpretation of a work binding it for ever with someone, with
someone's concrete existence- What is after alI a work of art? Is it a
'piece of art', 'cultural phenomenon', 'translation of changes in the
society', 'source of aesthetic emotions'- or maybe after dl it is
someone's work, being a part of someone's Me, someone's
expression? Who doubts that Hamlet, though an invented character,
is so authentic that had he been alive, he would have invented
Shakespeare" (Gombrowicz VII 2 51).
Thus, the originality and individuality of the author are necessary, both throughout the
process of creation and the interpretation.
Because the author is in the center of his creativity, he is necessary for the
understanding of his writings. Thus, Gombrowicz was, in the words of Plonowska Ziarek,
"so willing to indulge in autobiographical confessions (...), not to mention the many
autobiographical intrusions into his literary work"(Plonowska Ziarek 6-7). Plonowska
Ziarek states finthennore that the 'I', so omnipresent in all of Gombrowicz' texts, is his way
of achieving what may be the essence of art and a 'reenactment of his cultural and social
positions' (Plonowska Ziarek 7)P9which leads us back to the structures of form. Here, we
are back at the point stated by Gombrowicz himself, that art is inevitably a struggle with
- -- .- - -
49
More on that subject in Plonowska Ziarek M O .
75
fonn, and it may be a means to overcome it. Both processes (the author's attempt to express
his authentic self and its detection during the interpretation of works of art) are intensely
interconnectedand any shift at any point during the me of the author or a text has destroying
effects. There is no authenticity in writing on a subject suggested by the Party or at the
service of an oppressed social group or country. The imposition of any rules or topics on
an artist is a way controlling art, It does not matter if these tendencies come fkom an
institution (church or Party) or are inscribed as 'national hadition,' they constitute a very
efficient influence, though less subtle than Eco's commercial neutralization of aesthetic
shock. Moreover, as the extra artistic factors of their existence force the artist to accept an
attitude towards them, they invade the domain of the art. They are, in fact, institutionalized
forces of the omnipresent form. As there is no escape fkom form, the only possibility is the
exchange of 'Mugs', the artist can opt for the mug of authenticity. Thus, Gombrowicz is
trapped in his own pitfall on the one hand and loses as a writer (for being absolutely
independent for him means to write for the sake of writing, thus there is no sense to publish
the text); on the other hand, he wins as an author. His victory is possible because the author,
being the only guarantee of authenticity of the expression of the pure 'I,' must be in the
center of the work of a~ The more personal of the artist's creation is less dependent from
the external form, for the artist creating for himselfmoves within the h e t s of the form that
he, himselfcreates for his own use. In such a case, even if the fonn, whether it is national
or of another tradition and/or institution, have some kind of censorship and power over the
officially accepted art; they have no influence over the artist because the artist's 'I' remains
authentic,
The Original
Barthes seems to have simifar ideas as to the form of society's attempts to control art.
Also in his writings, there is the obsession of institutionsand institutionalization; this might
be so because it is reality of a French nature and Barthes speaks of society in general, it
always refers to French society. However, some of his theories are undeniably universal.
For example, the myth is an institutionalization of a communal value or an aspect of social
life. However, as myth is an external phenomenon that does not touch the essence of art (at
least in my opinion), it does not influence its originality or in Gombrowiczean terms, the
author's authenticity, For Barthes, art is a myth that belongs neither to the artist nor to the
reader; rather, it belongs to the society (as a vague concept protected by the myth's self
destructive defense system) and to itself Therefore, the only danger is the absolute
destruction of the myth of art, but as myth takes various forms, theonly true damage possible
is the one done to the signisant, i.e., to a concrete text or piece of art.
relatively safe;
Art as such is
again, in this theory lies the main difference between Barthes and
Gombrowicz. In the Gornbrowiczean understanding, the only defense of art is the person
(not the institution of the myth) or the author; he and only he lets us be sure of the work's
authenticity.
As it has been said, institutionalization is not necessarily h
d to art, it just shift
the relationship art has with society (the way it is discussed in the second part of the work).
However, as appropriating art might also take the form of finding its meaning; thus,
interpreting it results in what Barthes insists on calling the 'killing' of the author. Thus,
77
unlike for Gombrowicz, his presence is not only unwelcome but also limiting because it
impoverishes the text. According to Gombrowicz, the author is necessary as a guarantee of
authenticity; Barthes claims that art is the personal experience of an individual -receiver
confkonted with an object of art. This significant shift fiom the sender to the receiver opens
up the experience of art to the contemplation of the works of art, reproduced mechanically
and in multiple copies. Such an approach does not takeplace in the theories of Gombrowicz
and Eco. Barthes often underlines the need ofpersonal contact with the object of art without
any extensions and intentions. Probably his most clear expression of understanding what
art should be is in his essay on photography "La Chambre la ire"?^
A photograph is a particular kind of artistic expression because unlike literature or
painting, it is on the border between technology and art. By its nature, there is no original
photograph; thus, Eco's intention of the author which is placed only with the first and
original creation, is no longer applicable. The obsession of the original, having its roots in
the desire to distinguish true art from craftsmanship is rendered useless, for a photograph can
easily be reproduced in many absolutely identical copies, which would be considered as
'originals' among paintings. Photography, which is a child of science and human ability,
arranges or observes life thus, it cannot be discussed as a 'traditional' component of visual
arts. Barthes knows it and he finds his own explanation of the relatively new phenomenon.
First of all, photography is not a mimetic art in the sense that it does not try to reach
perfect similarity between the object and its image. This is no longer necessary, for the
Barthes III 1105-202. See also the anaiysis of this essay in Moriarty 195-210.
78
technological side of photography imposes some conditions (reflecting everything that is
in fkont of the camera being one of them). However, unlike other arts, photography
absolutely needs a concrete object so that is can immortalize it in its two dimensional form,
This object becomes the center of attentionwhen dealingwith the art ofphotography. Thus,
the photograph, is not a copy of reality; it shows people and objects in a deformed way and
allows a confkontation between an image of fife and the M e of an object is apost mortem
state (Barthes 1163). The particularity of the photograph is that the interpretation of it,
according to Barthes, is given with the image; for itseIf, it is an interpretation. However,
Barthes also seems to overlook that any other kind of art is an expression of one's o m vision
of reality; in this respect, photography is no different than sculpture or literature. This
interpretation lets Barthes save the originally 'mechanical' depiction of the world (the same
way he 'saves' literature): only a personal contact with the object of art is a guarantee of the
artistic experience?' There is nothing beyond photography even though the people in the
photograph were red and not invented, which is not the case of paining. The subject
reflected in the photograph is long dead and no longer exists; there is no history or author
or critic beyond Literary text.
Art in Bathes' theories is sometimes surprisingly close to what seems to be regular,
every day activities: the photograph which can be displayed in a .exhibition or published
in a newspaper is just one example. In the complex world in which reality invades art, it
O n B d e s ' very particular attitude towards photography and to see interesting
remarks on the essay "LaChambre Clairen,see Grojnowski, Daniel. "Le Mystiire de la
Chambre CIaireWin Textuel 9 1-6.
79
also feeds it, for the novelty is not always hannfirI,
The question of photography as a mechanically reproducible art leads us to the last
point in this reflection on art: the importance of the origin& and its superiority to a
reproduction. It has no place in the form of expression based on modern technology;
however, it still remains a means self-defense for art.
The cruciai role of the original, absent fiom Barthes' Wtitings, is not to be neglected
by Eco. The original, being some kind of guarantee of art, remains the onIy work that is
attributed the required intentions. Sometimes, the intention of the society is based primarily
on the particular status of the original, while a perfiect copy is deprived of it. Gombrowicz
notes that it is amazing how some works of art inspire admiration and excitement in the
spectator but only as long as they believe the work to be the original. Without diminishing
the significance of the first creation, he indicates a hypocritical attitude: a fear of being
ridiculed by a homage paid to a secondary work, fkom an uncertain source. If Gombrowicz
had used Eco's terms, he would emphasize the role of the intention of the author that, once
taken away, also takes with it, the aesthetic value which cannot be deprived, for it is the
same beauty that is to be found in the original. This obsession for the original shows its
external influences on a work of art and, in Gombrowicz' opinion, it reveals the immaturity
of the public to deal with art individually. This particular situation in which esteem for a
piece of art (sanctified because of the name of its author) is based only on an obligation,
which brings us back to Barthes, for whom the only true experience of art for an individual
is a personal, undisturbed and unguided contemplation of the work of art.
The question of the original shows how Barthes, Gombrowicz and Eco's attitudes
80
exclude one another. Also, the way they treat the original may be considered a test of
cohesion of the whole theory or even its abbreviated version.
Conclusion
In this work I tried to present and compare the theoretical works of Eco, Barthes, and
Gombrowicz, as found in their nonfictional and fictional writings. Gombrowicz, the most
controversial of the three authors, sometimes showed himself to be d a i W to his own
theories; to a certain extent, Barthes can aiso be accused of not following his own advice after all,as he had suggested the elimination of the critic, he should not have been writing
on texts by other authors. Eco is an exception because he is the only author whose Literary
texts exempm his own theories. On the other hand, the inconsistencies in the attitudes and,
also, writings of Gombrowicz and Barthes illustrate the complexity of the relationships
between the artist, art7and society. Whether the coexistence between the individual and
creativity is described as form, myth, or a structure of intentions, one is dealing with a
system more complicatedthan the clearJakobson-likedivision into sender-receiver-messagechannel as communication roles.
According to Eco, the essence of art lies in the human will's attniution to the work
of art. What exactly is the essence of art? A carefid reading of his texts suggests that the
essence of art is precisely that which one cannot see.
Gombrowicz also insists on the
presence of an element which he 4 ! s 'authenticity', and that adds the artistic character to
a mere object.
Finally Barthes, having mythitied art, claims to have saved it &om
destruction.
However, there is one important comment to be added: the essence of art, so crucial
to all three authors discussed here, is not really defined by them. As undefined, impossible
82
to detect or describe, one may suspect that such an essence might not exist at all- We have
to come to terms that this essence's importance is based on the assumption of its existence.
It is believed to be a given, to exist in one way or another, yet the very impossiiility of
defining it gives a special aura to the work of art. Eco puts particular emphasis on the
aesthetic, thoughhe does not insist on the term 'beauty' -because he would have to attn'bute
a very wide sense to it. The evolution of his theories, £iom his work on Thomas Aquinas
to modem popular culture, have one element in common: the particular status of art. In his
theories, no matter if they focus on semiotics or aesthetics, the difference between art and
other fields of the humanities is significant. Although Gombrowicz's approach towards art
is less conventional, it also seems to support the belief that the essence, in a particular subtle
element which adds extra value to creativity, is always dominated by form. In his highly
non-conventional fashion, Barthes also seems unable to abandon this leading idea that we
have found in Eco and Gombrowicz- The concept of myth and mythified art is a way to
escape the trap of devaluating the latter. However, myth can also be mythified and if we
apply Barthes' theoretical description to the essence of art; we see that not only art is
mythified, but also its essence. Thus, as a value whose existence cannot be verified, the
essence of art may not exist as well. The essence of art is attributed traditionally to creativity
which claims to have to do with either the aesthetic or the expression of the self, Due to its
mysterious character, the social phenomenon called art borders on religion. The
interdependencies of the Church and art have been mentioned; however, there are other,
more interesting aspects that connect these two domains. One of them is the concept of
inspiration which has been associated with art and the artist's life throughout the history.
83
It is interesting that, even in a contemporary art which has rejected the traditional ways of
expression, the idea of inspiration as a complementary element of the artist's technique did
not disappear. However, the inspiration is another belief, myth,a vahe or state taken for
granted. Because it is not society that innuences the inspiration, or even the author, himself,
art is said to touch upon the sacrosanct,
On the opposite side of the religious attitude towards art, another attitude d e h e s the
structure within which art exists as a social phenomenon: the presupposition that artistic
creativity has many characteristics in common with non-artistic activities. Barthes places
art among sports and food while Gombrowicz extends the d e f i t i o n of art to practically
anythug that an individual does. The religious and the all-embracing, desacralizing art
approaches place it in the complex structures of society without explaining the difference
between art and non-art,without specifLing the definition of its essence.
This work touches upon mother question: what is the purpose of art? This issue
is also closely connected to the essence of art, mentioned already in various contexts.
Due to space limitationsyit was not possible to analyzethis problem in depth. However,
I believe that,together with other topics that have been tackled briefly in the preceding
pages, it deserves an in-depth analysis. Briefly, I will present the two most interesting
remarks I came upon while working on this thesis: Barthes claims that "art is not meant,
to erpress the tinexpressible but "rather, 'to mexpress the expressible '," and to
problematize the meanings we automatically confer to assume" (Culler 57). This
statement reminds one of Gombrowicz's already quoted claim that art is not meant to
solve problems but to pose them. This comment relativizes the plain view of the
84
correlationbetween art and society: it is not only societythat imposes itselfupon art and
literature, but also art and literature impose themselves upon the social-
There are many other topics that, though extremely interesting, were not
discussed here, Due to the specific angle h r n which 1 decided to andyze the problem,
I did not touch upon the indirect influence of politics on art.
I only mentioned the
dependence of the artist and society or the relationship between art and religion or the
'religious' status of art, Also, the attitude of an individual co&onted with art remains
to be examined.
I, thus, conclude my work by pointing at these factors, fully aware that another
approach to the subject by taloing into serious consideration a vaster account of the
neglected aspects, could enrich my work.
However, I trust that the crucial element in any analysis of art is the experience
of art itself. According to Barthes, art is a myth and the act of comprehension of a myth
equals to its death; we cannot possibly destroy art and perhaps we should even think
this destruction at all*Maybe this impossibility, togetherwith its somewhat categorical,
moral corollary, points to the negative character of the essence of art, of that the
mythical essence that makes art art, that essence that has never been de£i.ned, and that
will never allow (any)oneto ever comprehend its nature.
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