BRIDGING THE MILLENNIA
VASCO DA GAMA BRIDGE - THE PORTUGUESE CONNECTION
by Andrew Carruthers
BIOGRAPHY
Andrew Carruthers has seventeen years
experience in the design and construction of
major civil engineering projects, with a
particular emphasis on bridges (he has designed
several hundred) and railways. He has lived
and worked in Australia, the United Kingdom,
Portugal and Malaysia, but his designs have
been constructed in many more countries
including Turkey, Hong Kong and Kuwait.
Andrew has been heavily involved in some of
the world's major bridges, including the
Second Bosporus Highway Crossing in
Turkey, the Elmali Viaduct in Turkey and the
18 kilometre long New Road Crossing of the
River Tagus in Portugal.
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BRIDGING THE MILLENNIA
INTRODUCTION
1. The aim of this paper is to present a very human side to the design and
construction of the Vasco da Gama Bridge. The bridge had engineering innovation and
complex engineering problems had to be solved, maybe those are for another paper.
This paper concentrates on project management, in other words how do you design and
build 18 kilometres of road including 12 kilometres of bridge over an estuary of
significant environmental importance in a little over 3 years. The designers are based in
Portugal, France and the United Kingdom and the contractor appears to consist of staff
from more countries than are in the United Nations. On top of that, every detail must be
checked and approved by representatives of the Portuguese Government, their advisors,
the concessionaire and their advisors and, also , an independent design team.
SETTING THE SCENE
2.
The Vasco da Gama Bridge is a monumental undertaking. The value of the project
is in the order of AUS$1.5 billion. The bridge forms a much needed and long awaited
alternative route across the Tagus Estuary linking Lisbon on the north bank and the
rapidly growing residential and industrial areas to the south (see Figure I).
3.
The Tagus Estuary was first bridged in 1966 , with the opening of the 25 de Abril
suspension bridge. This bridge, with a main span of 1013 metres, currently carries
140,000 vehicles per day. In addition to the construction of the new Vasco da Gama
Bridge, the existing 25 de Abril Bridge is to be strengthened to accommodate additional
traffic lanes and two railway tracks.
4.
The Portuguese Government approved the new project in July 1991. In late 1992,
the selected route was announced. The announcement was greeted with a barrage of
protests from environmental lobbyists, who were concerned about bird breeding
grounds on the south side.
5.
In April 1994, the successful tenderer for the bridge concession, Lusoponte, was
announced. However, the Portuguese Government were unable to complete their
environmental impact assessment until early 1995. The final concession agreement was
signed in March 1995. The opening of the bridge is to be in March 1998. Speed of
construction was a major issue from Day One.
THE CONCESSION AGREEMENT
6.
The concession agreement allows for Lusoponte to collect tolls from the existing
25 de Abril Bridge from 1 January 1996 and from the Vasco da Gama Bridge from its
opening fro a period of 33 years or until 2.25 billion vehicles have used the bridge.
7.
Tolls on the 25 de Abril Bridge were raised in June 1994 from 100 to 150 Escudos
(about AUS$0.90 to $1.30). This prompted riots that left one person dead. The
Government pegged toll levels on the 25 de Abril Bridge to 150 Escudos until the
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BRIDGING THE MILLENNIA
opening of the railway in the middle of 1999 and declared that the bridge would be toll
free during the month of August. The Government has yet to decide on toll levels for the
new bridge, but Lusoponte maintains that it is entitled under the agreement to 340
Escudos for each vehicle using the bridge.
THE BRIDGE
In engineering terms the Vasco de Gama Bridge can be described as an 18
8.
kilometre long bridge that crosses the Tagus Estuary. The bridge will carry six lanes of
traffic, three in each direction. This will be increased to dual four lanes, when the
average traffic volume reaches 52,000 vehicles per day.
The bridge can be further divided into seven components (see Figures 2 and 3).
9.
These being.
(a) Two new interchanges will be built on the north side to link to the existing NorthSouth Motorway and the proposed New North - South Motorway
(b) Travelling south, the road will be carried by the 560 metre long North Viaduct,
which crosses a main railway line and several local roads. Typical spans are 45 metres
and are of concrete beam and slab construction.
(c) The next section is the 672 metre long Expo Viaduct, which is of post-tensioned cast
in-situ concrete box girder construction. The viaduct has twelve spans with a maximum
length of 62 metres.
(d) The Main Bridge is a cable-stayed structure with a 420 metre main span and two 205
metre side spans. This bridge spans the Tagus Estuary's main navigation span, the Cala
do Norte.
(e) The 6531 metre long Central Viaduct has typical spans of 79 metres and is of posttensioned concrete box girder construction. Two navigation channels, the Cala das
Barcas and Calas de Samora, are crossed with 130 metre span balanced cantilever
precast segmental boxes with the deck rising to a height of 50 metres above water level.
(f) The South Viaduct is 3825 metres long with spans being 45 metres long. The viaduct
is of similar construction to the North Viaduct.
(g) The Southern Interchange consists of 4672 long approach roads connecting to the
new Al2 motorway and includes the toll plaza.
THE DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION TEAM
10. The construction is being carried out by Novaponte, which means 'New Bridge'.
Novaponte consists of eight contractors which are Kvaerner Construction (formerly
Trafalgar House Construction) from the United Kingdom, Campenon Bernard from
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BRIDGING THE MILLENNIA
France and Bento Pedroso ConstrucOes, Mota e Companhia, Somague, Teixeira Duarte,
H Hagen and Edifer, all from Portugal.
11. Design of the structure is being carried out by four design companies, Kvaerner
Technology and Europe Etudes Gecti (EEG), which are the in house design consultants
of Kvaerner Construction and Campenon Bernard respectively, and Consultores para
Obras, Barragens e Planeamento (COBA) and Projectos de Pontes e Estruturas
Especiais (Proponte), who are independent Portuguese consulting practices.
THE CLIENT TEAM
12. This is where life starts to get confusing. Construction of the bridge is being
funded through private finance through the Lusoponte Consortium. Lusoponte means
something like 'bridge over a watery valley'. Shareholders of the consortium include the
eight contractors described in paragraph 4, the European Union, the European
Investment Bank, with guarantees provided by five Portuguese and four international
banks.
13. However, the Portuguese Department of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications established a sub-Department specifically to oversee the construction
of the bridge, which they would inherit after the 33 year concession period. This
organisation was called Gattel and construction of any item cannot proceed without the
approval of Gattel.
THE CHECKERS AND THE ADVISORS
14. A project of this size must be checked and the checkers were called Tejo Ponte
Control. Tejo Ponte meaning 'bridge over the Tagus River'. This consortium consisted
of Hyder, Tudor, Provia and A2P.
15. And then come the advisors. Lusoponte had Jean Muller Internationale and Gattel
selected experts from both France and Portugal.
THE COORDINATION TEAM
16. It was recognised very early on that coordination of the designers, Novaponte,
Gattel and their advisors, Lusoponte and their advisors and the independent checking
team was a major issue. The team set up to do this was called Tejoprojecto, this
meaning 'Tagus Project. This team had, in theory, total independence and was led by
three engineers, one from Portugal, one from the United Kingdom and one from France.
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BRIDGING THE MILLENNIA
PROJECT MANAGEMENT
17. This project highlighted that project management on a massive multinational
scheme is not only about logistics. In fact, the greatest challenge is to get individuals
with totally different work practices, design and construction knowledge and national
etiquette to work, to communicate and to cooperate.
THE DIFFERENCES
18. To understand how the multinational make-up of the project proponents affects
the project management approach, it is worthwhile describing the different approaches
taken by engineers from different countries. Whilst highlighting the differences, it is
worth remembering that the French and British were visitors and guests of the
Portuguese. The onus was on the guests to understand and adapt to the methods of the
host nation.
Etiquette
19. Etiquette is very important in Portuguese business. One should always be polite
and address individuals in the correct manner. Best friends may refer to each other by
first names out of work time, but at work it must be '0 senhor ....' or '0 engheineiro....'.
The French have traditionally been an informal nation and the British are becoming less
formal by the minute.
Hierarchy
20. In Portuguese business, rank is important. It must be respected and obeyed without
question and immediately. It is, also, difficult for a highly ranked person to be seen to
change his mind or position, especially in a public arena.
Working Hours
21. This surprisingly was one of the largest problems. Portuguese engineers tend to
start work late in the morning, have a very long lunch, but work to late in the evening. It
is common to be asked to a meeting that starts at 7:00 p.m. and will carry on to 10:00
p.m. French engineers believe that every hour of the day must be worked and staff are
judged by the number of hours worked. British engineers sit somewhere between the
Portuguese and the French.
22. It is also very common in Portugal for meetings to be called at very short notice,
as it is for meetings to be postponed, cancelled or delayed. A client will think nothing of
keeping you waiting four hours for a meeting.
Bureaucracy
23. Portugal has a well defined engineering methodology, much of which is statutory.
Any design has to follow this process exactly and must follow a rigorous approval
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BRIDGING THE MILLENNIA
procedure. However, the exact tasks within the process are not formally defined, but are
based on accepted practice.
Engineering practice
24. The main proponents of the project, the Portuguese, the French and the British, all
have high levels of expertise in engineering. However, the way in which engineering is
taught in universities and practiced by both consultants and contractors varies
significantly from country to country.
25. In consultancy, Portuguese engineers have a very academic approach to
engineering, everything must be defined to perfection. Construction experience on major
projects is limited.
26. French consultants are truly designers with flair and contractors have an amazing
grasp of engineering. Project management tends to take a back seat.
27. British consultants are pragmatic in design, but somewhat traditional. British
contractors have exceptionally strong project management skills.
28.
So what impact did these differences have on the project?
THE PROBLEMS
The problems with Gattel
29. Early meetings between Lusponte and Novaponte, represented by French and
British engineers, with the Portuguese Government's Gattel were frosty and
unproductive. Was it because we referred to 0 Senhor Carvalho as plain Sergio?
30. Proposed designs and construction methodologies were being rejected out of hand,
because submissions did not adhere to the Portuguese accepted standards. The reason
for the rejection could quite simply be that the document covers did not conform to
accepted practice or a word was incorrectly translated! 'Concrete blisters' were once
translated as 'concrete warts'.
31. Technical debates frequently turned into financial debates, clouding already
difficult and detailed discussions.
32. Very quickly frustration and resentment between Gattel and the Lusoponte and
Novaponte team became common-place.
The problems with the Novaponte
33. The project was split into distinct packages for design and construction. The
Portuguese contractors within Novaponte were to handle the northern approaches, the
North Viaduct, the South Viaduct and the southern approaches. The French contractors
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BRIDGING THE MILLENNIA
were to handle the Expo Viaduct and the Main Bridge and all marine works. The British
contractors within Novaponte were to handle the Central Viaduct and casting yard.
34. Progress at first was non-existent, bickering and allocation of blame became
commonplace within the Novaponte. It was clear that the differences in engineering
practice were having a profound effect on progress. For instance, it was clear that the
Central Viaduct team needed detailed input into the construction methodology,
experience that the French engineers had.
35. Staff were working ridiculously long hours, to cater for the wide range of hours
worked and to attend the late and impromptu meetings. Tiredness did not assist in
developing a unified team approach.
The problems with the designer
36. The French and British designers were remote from the project and designed in
accordance with their normal practice. Practices that were totally unacceptable to Gattel.
Due to their remoteness from their Portuguese counterparts, the normal interaction
between designers was lost.
37. This remoteness also led to a loss of urgency from the French and British
designers, definitely a case of 'out of sight and out of mind'. Additionally, the designers
were remote from the Novaponte's thinking on construction methodology, the use of
material and so on. The issues raised by Gattel or Lusoponte were relayed to the
designers long after the event and in a third hand way.
38.
Novaponte very quickly lost patience with the designers.
THE ANSWERS
39. These problems raised their head in late 1994 and were fundamentally resolved
prior to the signing of the Final Concession Agreement.
Gattel
40. Maybe this is one area where the answer was never truly found. However, very
early on both Lusoponte and Novaponte agreed that it was essential to present Gattel
with little opportunity to delay approval for minor issues, such as presentation or errors
in translation. Additional resources and the emphasis of existing staff were targetted
towards addressing the presentation of material. The cost of additional resources far
outweighed the cost of delays.
41. Lusoponte appointed a Technical Director to liaise directly with Gattel and he
directed his advisors to pore over submissions to find the smallest errors. The separating
of financial and technical issues was a major step forward. Novaponte appointed a
similar team, which gave additional support to the coordination team of Tejoprojecto.
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BRIDGING THE MILLENNIA
42. Agreement was reached to liaise directly with Gattel's advisors, previously this
had been denied. Reasons of speed, convenience and efficiency were cited, but the aim
was to obtain the agreement of advisors prior to presentation of proposals.
43. Lusoponte, Novaponte and Tejoprojecto made considerable effort in learning
Portuguese etiquette and the language.
Novaponte
44. Novaponte's technical team and Tejoprojecto proposed to the board directors of
Novaponte, that the allocation of work packages be changed. They proposed that staff
be allocated to the appropriate position, irrespective of their nationality or home
company. Initially this met with opposition as it totally changed the agreement between
the individual contractors within Novaponte. However, after much persistence, the
proposal was agreed to.
45. The effect on the project was immediate, construction issues were addressed and
resolved. Lost time was made up and consistent progress achieved. This is illustrated by
the fact that the project started late and will probably finish on time. Early staff
resistance soon disappeared and was replaced by mutual respect.
46. The problem of working hours was never really resolved and there were too many
working too long. However, the peer pressure to work ridiculous hours disappeared due
to the new found respect and camaraderie.
The designers
47. Tejoprojecto requested that the design teams be brought to Portugal, however this
was rejected. It was apparent that to avoid delays to the project, that Tejoprojecto's role
would have to concentrate more on the designers than on Gattel and Lusoponte. With
the appointment of Lusoponte's technical director and Novaponte's technical team,
Tejoprojecto were able to turn their emphasis towards the designers.
48. The role undertaken by Tejoprojecto became more of a control of the designers as
opposed to coordination. Tejoprojecto became the eyes and ears of the designers.
Tejoprojecto spent much time educating the designers in the particular requirements of
Portuguese design.
49. Designers progress and understanding of the project improved and, although not
as successful as having the design teams based in Lisbon, design managed to stay ahead
of construction. However, the designers must have become very tired of the coercing,
cajoling and sometimes raw aggression of the Tejoprojecto team.
SAFETY
50. On 10 April 1997, six people died and several more were seriously injured , when
a section of travelling formwork collapsed on the Main Bridge. It appears that the
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BRIDGING THE MILLENNIA
accident was a result of human error. This accident brings the overall death toll on the
project to 12 people.
51. This accident highlights one the major difficulties resulting from a multi-national
construction team. There has been suggestion that on the project, safety has been
compromised for speed. This is totally wrong and Novaponte's Project Manager and his
team have shown tremendous dedication to improve safety and awareness on the
scheme.
52. The problem is to overcome the 'macho' image, that is still prevalent in certain
parts of Europe. The attitude that hard hats and protective boots are not worn by real
men, that horseplay is acceptable and that drinking at lunch in 40°C temperatures is
traditional.
53. The level of effort to overcome these long standing attitudes is immense and
Novaponte have made that effort. However, that effort must be supported by all parties,
subcontractors, clients, designers and so on
DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION STANDARDISATION
THE NEED
54. On design and construct projects, the call of 'standardise, standardise' is
frequently heard. On this project considerable effort was put into asking 'why
standardise'. The major need for standardising on the Vasco da Gama Bridge was to
save time - time was always the crucial factor. The cost implications on opening the
project late are immense. However, the project is also a fixed fee contract, time could
not be saved at all cost.
55. The longest section of the bridge is the 6531 metre long Central Viaduct and the
design and construction of the deck illustrates well the need for standardisation. A basic
description of the Central Viaduct deck is 80 spans of twin precast deck. However, each
span is more or less different. The Central Viaduct has both a vertical and horizontal
curve, there are expansion joints every nine spans, the vertical earthquake component
varies from span to span, lay-by spans and so on. Every minor change to construction
details, such as formwork, reinforcement or prestressing would lead to both time and
cost penalties, with time penalties being a major problem. The common approach to
standardisation is to over-specify. In other words allow one extra duct for the prestress,
but only use it when required, however in this instance , the cost of any overspecification would be factored 160 times for the Central Viaduct alone.
THE ANSWER
56. The real answer to solving these problems was to have a genuine design and
construct team. Engineers from all parties sitting down and resolving the problems. The
Tejoprojecto team often being a substitute for the designers. The solution was to not
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BRIDGING THE MILLENNIA
treat the beams as 80 metre beams, but to consider each beam as a series of segments.
Segment standardisation was addressed as opposed to beam standardisation.
57. Each beam was constructed from 8 segments of 4 different types, these being the
End Segment, the Load Out Segment, the Deviator Segment and the Centre Segment.
Between each segment, there is a 750 mm in situ joint. All variations for horizontal and
vertical curves are made within the in-situ stitch.
58. The Centre and Deviator Segments were standard for all beams except those
incorporating lay-by spans. The Load Out Segment was only varied for the back spans
with the addition of anchorage points. The End Segment was varied for the end spans to
accommodate the expansion joints.
59. The process to develop such standardisation took several months, explored
numerous options and there was much frustration. However, the process was incredibly
successful and led to the development of a highly efficient and productive casting yard
that exceeded all expectations.
THE CASTING YARD
60. During the protracted pre-contract period, the area intended for the casting yard at
the north end of the bridge, became earmarked as the site for the EXPO 98. Many
alternatives were investigated, the final position being at the far from suitable Seixal site
located 22 km from the bridge site. The aim was to produce one segment per day, and at
its peak, production was 58,000 cubic metres per month.
61. The rapid turnaround times required the development of a high early concrete
strength. The cement content was 440 kg/m3 with 30% pulverised fuel ash replacement.
Stripping was carried out after 14 hours, at which point the concrete strength was
20N/mm2. The ultimate design strength was 45N/mm2, although strengths up to
100N/mm2 were achieved. A super plasticiser was used to assist workability.
62. There were two assembly beds with a system of computer controlled jacks to bring
the segments into alignment prior to casting of the -in-situ stitches. The completed
beams were loaded onto a purpose built floating crane, the Rambiz. All other ancillary
items were placed on the deck prior to floating out, such as parapets and prestress
strand.
DESIGN DETAILS, DURABILITY, MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL USE
THE ISSUE
63. To the Portuguese, the project is more than a bridge. It is a national issue, a
flagship and a key for urban regeneration. Design details, material use, durability and
maintenance become highly significant and contentious issues. What appears on the
surface as relatively minor issues , resulted in fierce debate and stand-offs. Some
examples are selected below, which also describe how a balance between Gattel's
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BRIDGING THE MILLENNIA
requirements and those of Lusoponte and Novaponte was achieved. The examples are
described in chronological order in order to illustrate that Lusoponte, Novaponte and
Tejoprojecto learnt from experience.
DESIGN DETAILS
64. Gattel requested that each pier on the Central Viaduct have a vertical groove, 400
mm wide by 200 mm deep on each face normal to the bridge centreline. and were
probably somewhat disturbed by the reaction.
65. The total length of formwork required for this minor detail was over 5000 metres
and the number of additional reinforcement bars over 50 000. On top of this were the
problems associated with time. This was a major additional complication.
66. How do you resolve such an issue as this? At first, the Lusoponte and Novaponte
team highlighted the fact that the Central Viaduct was so far away from land, the detail
could not be seen. Gattel did not agree and wanted the detail. Meanwhile, approval for
pier construction was still awaited.
67. Lusoponte and Novaponte responded by proposing a compromise. As only the
outer faces of the pier can be seen, it was proposed to provide the detail on these faces
only. Gattel did not agree and wanted the detail on both the inner and outer faces. More
valuable construction time was being lost.
68. Lusoponte and Novaponte then got tough - the detail was unreasonable and
refused to do it. The response was that the detail was shown on the tender drawings and
therefore must be included. On close examination, it did appear to be shown on the
tender drawings, an architectural whim, but an expensive one. This one had to be
conceded. The lesson, be very careful what you show on your tender drawings and be
absolutely sure of your position before facing your client.
DURABILITY
69. Durability becomes an interesting area on a concession contract. The
concessionaire has to maintain the bridge for 33 years, after that it is not his problem.
The future owner of the bridge, Gattel, are fully aware of Lusoponte's position, but
obviously want to adopt a bridge that requires the minimum long term maintenance.
70. An example is the assumed corrosion rates for steel. Piles to the structures in the
water have a structural steel casing up to 32 mm in thickness. No corrosion protection
coating or other special measures were applied to the steel casings. Additional section
thickness being provided to allow for the corrosion likely over the 120 year design life.
71. The actual level of corrosion assumed was stated in the tender documentation
submitted by Novaponte. However, Gattel considered that in the tidal zone, the assumed
rate was insufficient and proposed a revised rate, such that the casing would be
completely lost in this zone. Unless Gattel's rate was assumed, there would be no
approval for construction
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BRIDGING THE MILLENNIA
72. Lusoponte and Novaponte refused to accept Gattel's rate, but the cost of delays
was becoming a major issue. Novaponte needed a solution urgently, but Novaponte
knew Gattel could not be seen to publicly change their position. There was little option,
but to propose a solution that would satisfy Gattel's requiremnts, but the proposal
carefully made no reference to Gattel's proposed corrosion rates. This allowed approval
by Gattel, but left the door open for a none too public claim. The contractual arguments
relating to this are still going on and is one of the major claims on the project.
MAINTENANCE
73. Maintenance of such a massive structure clearly has major cost implications. The
tender showed the need for inspection gantries to be underslung for the inspection of all
viaducts and the external faces of all piers, access into all piers including full height
ladders and access into all concrete box girders.
74. Although, these details were shown at tender, it was decided to investigate
whether there were more suitable inspection methods and whether there were significant
cost savings. However, as these items were defined in the tender, Lusoponte, Novaponte
and Tejoprojecto were unsure as to whether any variations, that were cheaper, would be
accepted by Gattel.
75. Learning from previous experience, the approach was to develop a very
comprehensive maintenance inspection procedure, highlighting the strengths in the
proposal and weaknesses of the tender proposal. Additionally, it was decided to get the
detailed involvement of Gattel's advisors early on in the process.
Viaduct superstructures
76. The tender proposal allowed for one inspection gantry for each of the North
Viaduct, Expo Viaduct, Main Bridge and South Viaduct and two for the Central
Viaduct. Due to the length of the viaducts, actually moving the inspection gantry to the
appropriate location could take up to 2 hours. The use of lorry mounted underbridge
inspection units, modified to allow a platform to be lowered for inspection down piers,
was proposed. Additionally, these units could be used on other structures within the
project or even outside of the project. The disadvantage was that road closures are
necessary for their use, however our detailed schedule of closures indicated that the
impact on traffic was minor. The speed and other potential areas of operation of the
units appealed to Gattel and the proposal was accepted. Significant cost savings for the
supply of five gantries and more importantly 48 000 metres of gantry rail were made.
Inside piers
77. Again the provision of man access covers to over 160 piers and landings and
ladders, all in aluminium presented both a cost and time problem. The client brief stated
that provision for inspection must be provided and that man access must be provided.
There was no mention that the inspection must be carried out by a man.
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BRIDGING THE MILLENNIA
78. Therefore it was proposed that inspections be carried out by camera. The camera
would be lowered through a small opening in the manhole cover (approximately 200 by
250mm), small enough to prevent a man falling through. If man access was required,
then the manhole could be fully removed and access gained. It was proposed that man
access was only required for carrying out repairs. The requirement for this was likely to
be rare and did not justify the initial capital cost. Access down the pier could be
obtained by abseiling or scaffold. Tie points for abseiling were provided. Obviously
without a system of ladders and ladders, there was potential for a man to fall through an
open manhole. A fail-safe system was therefore developed, whereby when the manhole
was fully removed, a safety net would fall into position.
79.
Gattel agreed totally to the proposals - everyone was learning.
MATERIAL USE
80. Obviously for a project of this size, much of the material had to be imported. It
was not known at tender that Portugal generally does not accept materials approved by
the standards of other countries. Materials have to be approved by the Government
controlled LNEC, a process that can take several years.
81. However, the ways of Portugal were, by this stage, being learnt. Many of Gattel's
advisors, also, worked for LNEC. The relationships, that were so carefully being
developed with the advisors, assisted in speeding up the approval process. LNEC was,
also, more than happy to be commissioned to undertake lucrative material testing
contracts on behalf of Lusoponte and Novaponte. There were never any problems in
material approval.
CONCLUSION
82. A paper such as this can only scratch the surface on such a massive project. Many
lessons were learnt and the project is a major success. The overriding lesson is, perhaps,
that the engineering is simplest part of a major project in a foreign country. The difficult
part is the diplomacy and relationship skills that are not taught to engineers.
83. Everybody in Lusoponte, Novaponte and Tejoprojecto never forgot that they were
visitors in a foreign country and made every effort to learn their ways. The team showed
incredible flexibility to adapt to these ways and was totally focused, after the initial
hiccup, on the end result. Through this approach, most obstacles were overcome.
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BRIDGING THE MILLENNIA
FIGURES
orth Motorway
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ew North
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Fig.2 - Bridge components - north end
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BRIDGING THE MILLENNIA
Fig.3 - Bridge components - south end
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BRIDGING THE MILLENNIA
82