TheEuropeananswertoworldflowsofmigrants:amigrationgap
CatherineWIHTOLdeWENDEN
CNRS(CERI,Paris)
Introduction:
Duringtheselasttwentyyears,Europehasbecomeoneofthefirstdestinationsformigrationinthe
worldduetoseveralfactorsexplainingthisturningpoint.Itisacontinentofimmigrationwhichdid
notwantedtobeso.AfirstreasonofchangeisthatsomeformeremigrationcountriesinSouthern
and Eastern Europe have become immigration countries. It is the case of Italy, Spain, Portugal,
Greece but also Malta, Cyprus, and, to some extent, Poland and Romania. Other factors are the
strengthening of transnational networks, namely family and ethnic ones, the generalisation of the
righttoholdapassportgivenbythecountriesoforiginwhichdonottograntitasaprivilegeallover
theworld,theroleofinformationwhichcrossestheborders,therefugeecrisiswhichhasbroughtto
Europealotofapplicants,theattractionofEuropeforlegalandillegalnewcomerswhowatchthe
TV,thedemandofqualifiedandunqualifiedlabourforceandthedemographicdecreaseinEuropean
countriesattheEastandattheSouth.Inthiscontext,southernrimcountriesoftheMediterranean
area are developing emigration and diaspora policies towards Europe which has signed with them
many bilateral or multilateral agreements, added to the European immigration and asylum policy.
But,attheEuropeanaswellasthenationallevel,thepoliciesofcontrol,influencedbytheevolution
ofrightistpublicopinionsandStatepopulisms,arethemainanswertothisnewconstellation.They
includebordercontrolswithretentionpracticesandviolationofhumanrights,thedevelopmentof
dissuasiontoolsforillegalimmigrantsandselectivepoliciesoflabourforce.Finally,Europeaimsat
controllingitsbordersintherespectofhumanrightsandatprovidingthenewcomersrequiredfor
demographicandeconomicneedsbutfailstodoso,forpoliticalreasons.Somenewissuesarealso
asked to Europe, such as its place in the global governance of migrations, the relations between
migration and the development of Euro-Mediterranean policies and the features of mobility in a
globalisedandregionalmigrationsystemandinacontextofeconomiccrisis.
I–Europe,itsbordersanditsmigration
Apolicyturnedtowardsborders
Europeismorethaneverapoliticalspacewithavariablegeometry.Itisalsoincontradictionwithits
Euro-Mediterranean migration space because the Mediterranean sea has become a border instead
of being a place of mobility and exchanges. Most migration flows to Europe are presently coming
fromthesouthrimofMediterranean(Turkey,Maghreb),framinginthisregionamigrationsystem
made of geographical, historical links but also complementarities of offers and demands of
migration.Itsbordershavemoved,withitsenlargementattheeast,itsbilateralagreementsateast
andsouth,butalsowithitsinternalandexternalclosures.Thebordersaresimultaneouslycontact,
network,barrier,resourceandtheMediterraneanseaisbecominganewRioGrandebetweenNorth
and South. While Europe defines with its flows a migration regional system with the south rim of
Mediterranean,itsbordershavebeenpoliticallybutalsoeconomically,socially,demographicallyand
culturally closed at the south and opened to the east. They are also institutional: new internal
borders have been built around visas, between non Europeans who must have visas and those
exempted and who can circulate, settle and work in the European space. For the formers, it has
created an internal border between residents and non residents (commuters, asylum seekers and
illegal).Otherborders,socialandgeographic,haveappearedininnercities,withanethnicisationof
poor urban areas. But these various borders are also a resource, challenging nations States. New
comers form the East and double nationals and long term residents in Europe from the South are
livingfromthem,settledintomobilityasawayoflifewhilebuildingtransnationalnetworks,while
others have built an economy around the borders, due to illegal exchanges linked with border
controls:visasandpassportstrafficking,travelagenciesforillegal,orgreyeconomicnetworksplaying
withimportandexporttaxes(“trabendo”),drugandprostitution.Theborderasaplaceofpassage
and of control as well, also generates various forms of mobility: pendular migration, border
migration, forced migration, migration of settlement. Some strategic places illustrate the
phenomenon at the borders of Europe: Gibraltar, Sangatte, Brindisi, Lampedusa… with dreams,
dramas and deaths. Other bridges have disappeared, such as those between eastern and western
Germany,betweenPECOandotherEuropeanStates,makingnewregionalidentities(MittelEuropa,
the Rhenan space between Belgium, Luxemburg, France, Germany), with daily migrations. These
bordersarealsocontributingtobuildthebasisofaEuropeanidentity.
The borders are the symbol of national sovereignty through control in spite of europeanised
immigration and asylum policies. These borders are more and more drawn at distance: with
consulates delivering visas in the countries of origin but also inside countries of arrival (police
controls in the streets, readmission agreements), and using countries neighbour to the external
borders of the European Union as border guards for buffer zones. The border also provokes
criminalityandtransgressions,campsandretentioncentres.Atlast,thebordersendsbacktothe
sanctionsforhavingtrespassedthesymbolsofsovereigntywithrepatriationsandexpulsions.Butthe
border moves with the shift from internal to external borders of the European Union while new
borders, founded on race, colour, religion, language, religion, allegiances, and ethnicity are being
built. The border leads many European States to struggle for more border control. It is basically
challengedbytwocontradictorytrends:theglobalisationofmigratoryflowsandtheidentitytrends
insidetheStates.GlobalisationrevealstheendoftheformerWorldorder,butalsothegrowinggap
betweenrichandpoorcountrieswherethegeographicproximityismadeeasierbytheinformation
facilities due to technology crossing borders and states, received in countries of origin and by the
free circulation of goods and by remittances. In such turmoil, borders seem to be artificially
reinforcedbyEuropeasemblemsoftheEuropeanpolicyofimmigrationandasylum.
Profilesofmigrationflows
A population of 500 million of inhabitants is living in Europe, with 30 million foreigners including
Europeans living in another state than their own. Immigration is unequally shared between the 27
States,withGermanyatfirstasforthenumberofitsforeigners(6,7million),Spain(5,7million),the
United Kingdom (4, 3 million), Italy (4, 2 million), France (3, 7 million), Belgium (1 million) and ,
outsidetheEU,Switzerland(1,6million).Somecountrieshaveveryfewforeigners,suchasNordic
andEasternEuropeancountries.Butothersmallcountrieshavehighproportionsofforeigners,such
as Luxemburg (40%) and Switzerland (30%). At the south, new immigration countries, passed from
emigrationtoimmigrationonesinthe1980’s(Italy,Spain,Portugal,Greece)havehadarapidgrowth
of foreign presence. The proportion of Europeans inside Europe remains rather low (3%), while
foreignersfromthirdcountrieshaveincreasedaswellasmigrationfromEasternEuropetoWestern
Europe(Polish,Romanians).AtthebordersofEurope,neweasternneighbouringcountries(Turkey,
Moldavia,Ukraine),aswellasthesouthrimoftheMediterraneanarebecomingimmigrationzones
(Morocco,Tunisia),duetotheattractivenessofcrossingthebordertoEurope.
Thisnewsituationisduetoseveralfactorswhichoccurredduringtheselasttwentyyears:theshift
from emigration to immigration or transit countries in Eastern and Southern Europe, the general
access to passports, which created a general right of exit, while the entrance was becoming more
andmoredifficultinwesternrichcountries,theexplosionofasylumseekinginthe1990’s(Balkans,
NearandMiddleeast,WestIndiesinAmerica,Africa),reachingto500000applicationsayearinthe
1990’s before a rapid decrease in the 2000’s, the activism of transnational networks, generating
chainmigrations,oftenduetodiasporas,thedevelopmentofpendulummigrations,thefacilitiesof
transportation and the visibility of Europe on TV, internet, cell phones and remittances. Migrant’s
profileshavestronglychangedduringtheselastyears:thosewholeave,exceptforforcedmigration,
are those who have resources (networks, education, money, information, family abroad). The
demographicandpovertygapsarelessapushfactorthanEuropeisapullfactor.Formigrantswho
havefacilitiesofmobilityduetolongtermresidencecards,doublecitizenshiporexemptionofvisas,
thebordersareblurred:allthemoretheyareopen,allthemoremigrantsaremobile,allthemore
theyareclosed,allthemoremigrantssettleinEuropebecausetheycannotgobackhomeandcome
backtoEurope.ThebordersareoneofthelastparcelsofsovereigntyinacontextwheretheState
appearsasthemainvictimofimmigrationchallengedbyillegalmigrationandplaysthisgameamong
itspublicopinion.Theyareconsideredbothasasymbolofasuccessfulspaceofinternalmobilityfor
European citizens at regional scale and as an experience of sophisticated closure for external
mobility, opposing Sates and markets, security and human rights, competition for elites and
protectionofworkers,solidarityandpower.
AlthoughEuropehasbecomeanimmigrationcontinentithardlyacceptsit,consideringmigrationas
astrategicchallengequestioningnationalidentitiesandsocialcohesion.Europegoesontocloseits
bordersinspiteofitsdemographyandofitslacksoflabourforceinsomesectors.Thisclosurehas
been strengthened at the turn of the 1990’s : Schengen agreements in 1985, Dublin agreements if
1990 and 2003 –Dublin II -, visa system in 1986, sanctions against illegals and carriers sanctions in
1990, Europeanization of immigration and asylum policies in 1997 –Amsterdam treaty -, with
computerised tools such as SIS (Schengen Information System), Eurodac (digital prints of asylum
seekers)in2000andFrontex(commonEuropeanpoliceatexternalborders)in2004.Inspiteofsuch
border policies, the dynamism of flows is stronger than the strength of controls, challenged by
humanrights,bymarketLawsandbythedesireofEuropeamongnewcomers.Onecannotforget
that border control has a cost, not only financial(the budget of Frontex was brought to 88 million
eurosin2011),butalsopolitical,culturalanddiplomatic.Itcreatesperverseeffects.Attheeastof
Europe,thebirthofnewbordershasgivenbirthtonewtransnationalnetworksreplacingtheintense
mobilityofpopulationexistingbefore,whileatthesouth,thousandsofdeadpeoplearefoundonthe
rimsoftheMediterraneansea(14000between1998and2008).
Apart from physical borders which are an obstacle to the circulation of people across the external
limitsoftheEuropeanUnion,otherborders,moresymbolicareintheminds.Thesemifailureofthe
Barcelona agreements (1995-2005) between the neighbour countries of the Mediterranean region
andthefailureoftheUnionforMediterranean(Euro-meddialogue)illustratesthatthisseabecomes
one of the most important borders in the world, dividing two areas between its northern and
southern rim which are however very close. In 2025, the population of Europe will have hardly
increased,whilethepopulationofthesouthernrimwillhavegrownof70%(400millioninhabitants).
Inthesouth50%ofthepopulationhaslessthan25years,facingwithasouthernEuropebecoming
olderandamedianageof40yearsold.Thisgapwillhaveanimpactifthemaingateisstillclosedfor
mostpeople,thebackdoorbenefitingtothemostdetermined.
European security is framing new borders at the periphery of Europe. Border cities are appearing:
MelillaandCeutaintheSpanishenclaveoftheMoroccancoastfacingwithGibraltararethreatened
bysmugglinglinkedwithbordertrafficking,VloreinAlbania,soclosetoGreeceandItaly,Sangatte
and Calais, considered as another door to British paradise, Lampedusa and Malta too. The river
Evros,betweenGreeceandTurkeyhasbecomeanotherthemeofdissent.Thebordersaremoving,
accompanying new migratory flows. Reciprocal imaginaries are built on a dream of Europe on one
sideandonsecurityfeelingsontheotherside.FormeremigrationcountriesalikeMorocco,Algeria,
Turkey are becoming immigration and transit countries while remaining immigration ones because
thosewhodonotsucceedtopassarelivinginaprovisionalwayoflife,helpingillegalstocrossand
providing them the goods they need. Most borders are linked with imaginaries : Europe does not
considersitselfasanimmigrationcontinent,becauseitwasforalongtermanemigrationcontinent
fordiscoveries,tradeandcolonisationandforworkandsettlementintheNewWorld,beforebeing
animmigrationregion.Inspiteofitseffortstodefineacommonimmigrationpolicy,sovereigntyand
publicopinionbringthenationallevelbackin.Soitgoesonconsideringimmigrationasatemporary
solutiontoshortagesoflabourforceandaburdenandremainsreluctanttofacewiththechallenge
oflivingtogether.
Inthemeanwhile,manynewprofilesofmigrantshaveappeared,veryfarfromthestereotypeofthe
migrantworkerofthesixtiesandtheseventies:firstthecategoriesofmigrantshavebeenblurredby
modernity,theasylumseekerbeingsociologicallyveryclosetotheworkerorthememberoffamily
reunification,secondthereisanewmobilitylinkedwithnewneedsandwaysoflife:womeninvolved
in care and domestic works due to the old age of European populations (Philippines, Polish and
Romanians to Italy), seniors settling in the sun (British in France, Germans in Spain, French in
Morocco),menattractedbyconstructionindustryandcomputersskills(PolishintheUnitedKingdom
andIreland).Agriculture,textile,restoration,hotelsandstreettradearerecurringtoMoroccans,sub
Saharan Africans and Chinese. But each country has its immigrants, while Europe is also attracting
students, mostly in Spain, the United Kingdom and France. It creates transnational families and
settlementforEuropeansfromEasttoWestbutalsogeneratesalotofillegalsatthesouth,dueto
thescarceaccesstoworkforextraEuropeannewcomers.
Butinspiteoftheglobalisationofmigrations,someEuropeancountriesarebeingconfrontedwith
nationalitiesthattheywerenotusedtomeet(PakistanisinFrance,EgyptiansandLatinAmericansin
Italy,UkrainiansinSpainandPortugal,SubSaharanAfricansinGreece),eachEuropeancountryhas
itsforeigners:mostAlgeriansinEuropeareinFrance(90%ofthem),mostTurkishareinGermany
(70%), most Indians and Pakistanis are in the United Kingdom, due to historical links which have
defined “migration couples”, whereas other nationalities are spread between various European
countries,definingquasidiasporas(Turkish–exceptforGermany-,Moroccans,Chinese)linkedwith
transnationaltiesbuiltbetweenthem.Othergroupsaremoresporadic,alikerefugees.Whilemost
Latin Americans are in Spain, Greece has received most of its eastern neighbours (Albanians,
Bulgarians,Georgians,Russians)becauseithadnoborderswiththeEuropeanUnionbefore2004.
II-ThebuildingofEuropeanpolicy,aseriesofsuccessivestages
ThecontroversialstakesofEuropeanimmigrationandasylumpolicy
TheEuropeanUniondefinestheframeofpoliciesofflows,whileintegrationisdefinedatlowerlevel
(nationalorlocal),accordingtotheruleofsubsidiarity,inspiredformtheGermanfederalsystemof
sharedcompetences:thedecisionmakingprocessfollowsthelevelwherethedecisioncanbetaken
at best. But we can observe inverse trends between the management of immigration and
integrationpolicies:arisingsovereigndefinitionofbordercontrolsandnationalpoliciesofflows,as
wehavewitnessedinspring2011duringtheArabrevolutionswhereFranceandItalytriedtoshow
to their voters the importance of the State to stop the Tunisian and Libyans flows , while the
integration policy is more and more framed at European level, thanks to indexes of good practices
defined in Brussels by comparative approaches of living together experiences (anti-discrimination
tools and practices, local political participation, associative life, fight against exclusion, policies
towards unaccompanied children, equality between men and women in migration…). Another
paradox lies in the fact that political controversies on migration in many European countries are
arising more on borders controls dilemmas (decided in Brussels) than on integration (decided at
nationallevel).
European immigration and asylum policy has been progressively put at Community level but in
disorder, due the story of the making of Europe (entrance date of each country), to agreements
whichwerenotsignedorimplementedbyallcountriestogether(“optingout“systemsuchasforthe
Schengen agreements), to the will of the nation States to maintain their sovereignty on asylum,
residence and nationality rights, and sometimes borders controls (France 2011 after the Arab
revolutions), and to the progressive entrance of new countries in Europe with selective rights and
dutiesduringthisprocess(witharighttoworkandsettlementdelayedincomparisonwiththedate
ofentranceofthecountryintheEUsuchasGreece,SpainandPortugalin1992,andthentheeight
easternEuropeancountrieswhoareprogressivelyaccessingtoworkandsettlementrightsbetween
2004to2014).SincethesignatureofTheRomeTreatyof1957andtheprogressiveimplementation
of the freedom of circulation of workers in 1968, a decisive step was crossed in 1985 with the so
called “Acte Unique européen” which defined a common space without borders for Europeans ,
thankstothefreedomofcirculationofallpeopleandnotonlyforworkersandtheadoptionofthe
Schengen agreements of 1985 which were considered as the laboratory of the “Acte Unique”. Its
maintoolswere:
-theadoptionofauniquevisaforlessthanthreemonths,compulsoryforthenonEuropeanswanting
toenterastouristsintheSchengenspace,theSchengenvisa,
-the freedom of circulation inside the European borders for Europeans and holders of a Schengen
visaandthereinforcementofexternalbordersthankstotheadoptionoftheSchengensystembyall
countriesnewlyenteredintheEuropeanUnion,
-theadoptionofacomputerisedcontrolsystem(SIS)tocollectdataonillegalsandrefusedasylum
seekersbindingallEuropeanstatestorefusetherighttostayandtoexpelthem,
-acommonasylumpolicy,definedin1990bytheDublinagreementforthe15Europeancountries
and progressively extended to all new comers, with reinforced restrictions to the access to the
refugeestatus:notionofsafecountryandthirdsafecountry,fromwhereasylumcannotberequired,
of manifestly unfounded demands, carriers sanctions and solidarity between European states to
avoid multiple demands (fight against asylum shopping). The Aznar protocol decides that it is no
more possible to ask for asylum in Europe if you come from another European country of the EU
(1997). The agreements of Dublin II of 2003 are adding that asylum seekers must ask for refugee
statusinthefirstEuropeancountrywheretheyhaveentered(“onestop,oneshop”).
-the fight against illegal immigration. Common rules are defined at European level to fight against
illegal stay (1990), to harmonize family reunification rules and define a European preference to
employment (1994), which protects nationals and Europeans’ employment against non EU new
comersonthelabourmarket.OnDecember2000,aConventiononasylum(Eurodac)wasadoptedto
control asylum seekers’digital prints with computers. The reinforced border control is also
implementedbySIVE(Systèmeintegrédevigilanceexterne)onAfricancoastsofMediterraneansea.
InSevilla(2002),inThessaloniki(2003),inTheHague(2004),theEuropeansummitswerefocussed
mostlyonbordercontrolsagainstillegalmigration,whilerepatriationagreementsweresignedwith
many Eastern and Southern non European neighbours. The Frontex agency, born in 2004 to
introducecommonpoliceforcesattheEuropeanexternalbordershasgotmoresubsidiesin2010(88
millioneuros),
-Europeancitizenship,definedbytheMaastrichtTreatyin1992,initsarticle8,isdefinedmostlyby
freedomofcirculation,settlementandworkandpoliticalrightsofEuropeansatlocallevelandatthe
EuropeanParliament,
-thepassagefromtheThirdpillar(JusticeandinternalAffairs)totheFirstpillar(Commondecisions
such as Agriculture and Economy) as for immigration and asylum, according to the Amsterdam
treatyof1997,whichinsertsthe“Schengenacquis”intheEuropeantreaty.Itwasfinalisedinthe
Lisbontreatyof2007.
However,abalancebetweensecurityandlabourmigrationneedshasbeenintroducedinthedebate
since 1999 with the Tampere summit and the abandon of former objectives of zero immigration,
defined in mid 1990s. On 2000, the United Nations report of the department of Population alerts
Europe about its demographic decrease, its decline of the labour force proportion compared to
retiredanditsneedsofnewcomersandadvicestoopenagainmigration.Thebordershadbeen,for
labourforce,closedbyEuropeancountriessince1973and1974accordingtothevariousEuropean
countries of the period. In Laeken (2001), a “necessary equilibrium” is introduced as a scope for
EuropeancountriesbetweenlabourshortagesandcapacitiesofintegrationofmemberStates.Inan
address to the European Parliament in 2004, Kofi Annan, General Secretary of the United Nations,
declaresthatEuropehastoconsideritselfasanimmigrationland.In2007,theideaofa“bluecard”
islaunchedbytheEuropeanCommissionertoImmigrationFrattiniasasymboloftheendofthestop
of work immigration. But many member States go on to manage migration thanks to bilateral
agreements with departure countries, sub-contracting and black market. In the meanwhile the
“Lisbonstrategy”triestolaunchaneconomyofknowledgeformorecompetitionatworldlevelby
theattractionofstudentstoEurope.Butthecrisisof2008hasstoppedmanyopenprocessessuchas
intheUK,IrelandandSpain.Nationalpoliciesareoftencombininghiddenagendasofrecruitmentof
labourforcewithsecuritypoliciesofbordercontrolsopenlydisplayedforthepublicopinion.
ThecomplexityoftheEuropeansystemreinforcesbordercontrolsinacontextofpopulismallover
Europe. The coexistence of several levels of reference partially implemented at the European one
framesa“Europeàlacarte”,differentlyruledaccordingtoeachEuropeancountry:UKandIreland
as well as Denmark do not belong to the Schengen regime; Island and Norway are included in the
EuropeanNordicMarketwhiletheyarenotmembersoftheEU;SwitzerlandhadadoptedSchengen
whileitdoesnotbelongtotheEuropeanUnion;EasternEuropeancountrieshavebeenprogressively
includedintheEuropeansystemsince2004,butwithaccesstothefreedomofsettlementandof
workdependingoneachofthem(RomaniaandBulgariahavebeendelayeduntil2014).
So, the gaps between polity (normative and value-related dimension of immigration) and policies
(implementation and bargaining practices) are many , according to contradictory factors:
demographic and labour force needs, competition to attract the most qualified on one hand,
preservation of the welfare states, security, integration challenges on the other hand, and human
rights,onanotherhand.MarketrulesandStateslogicsareconflictingtogether.WhileEuropecloses
itsborderstotheSouthandhasopenedthemattheEast,aregionalmigrationsystemgoesontobe
framedbymigrationflowsacrosstheMediterraneanseaandthedissuasionpolicyiscostlyandnot
efficient.In2008,theFrenchPresidencyoftheEuropeanUniontriedtodefinebetweenthe27States
a “European Pact for immigration and Asylum”. The pact is a non binding decision on five points :
opening the borders to migration according to labour market needs an capacities of integration of
eachcountry,reinforcingthefightagainstillegalmigration,reinforcingthetoolsofbordercontrols,
building a common European asylum policy, concluding bilateral agreements of repatriation with
extra European countries in exchange of development policies. But the reality has trespassed the
intentions of this Pact which was a moderate position giving however more room to sovereign
decisions than Europeanization : the nation State has been on the scene during all the 2008-2012
periodinseveralcountries,withanincreaseofsovereigntiesinthisfield.
Satespolicies
ThewaytomoreEuropeislimitedbytherevivalofsovereignpositionsinmostnationStates,dueto
theirdependencytowardspublicopinionandthespecificityofnationallabourmarkets,demographic
trends, and neighbourhood with various extra- European countries, national diplomacies, and
composition of nationalities in each of them. Most European countries have answered to the
volatilityandliquidityofmigrationpressurewithflexibilityintheirpolicies,shiftinglawsonentrance
and stay and nationality codes and sometimes legalising the illegals during these last ten years. In
spiteofthepresentchoiceforaselectivemigrationpolicy,labourmigrationalikeinthesixtiesand
seventiesgoesontobeconsideredasanhistoricexceptionandthelegitimacyofmigrationishardly
accepted, in spite of the settlement of most former foreign guest workers with their families. A
pressureisto-daybroughtonintegrationcriteriaandonanIslamrespectfulofcivicrules,aswellas
onasylumandfamilyreunificationrules.SouthernEuropeanimmigrationcountriesalikeItaly,Spain,
Portugal and Greece have mostly legalised the illegals and signed bilateral agreements of labour
force with their extra European neighbours, Nordic countries and Germany have opened their
nationalitycodestotherightofthesoiltograntcitizenshiptothesonsofimmigrants,others(18out
of 27) have implemented local political rights to all foreigners settled on their territory. Some
Europeancountrieshavealsohadtofacewithethnicmigrationflows,duetothedisentanglementof
the former eastern bloc: Germany has welcome two million Aussiedler mostly from Russia since
1989, Greece has received 350000 Greeks form the eastern part of the Black Sea, exchanges of
populations have occurred between the Check and Slovakia, Hungary and Romania while half a
million Bulgarians decided to settle in Turkey when they had Turkish origin. Other specificities lie
withnationalitycodesinspiteofthetrendtowardsanequilibriumbetweenjussoliandjussanguinis
ineachcountryandmanyadjustmentshavebeenmadetoprovidelabourforce,preferringtheback
door to the front gate. Asylum, in spite of the will to harmonise its policy is also specific in the
answers given to the applicants in each European country (point 4 of the European Pact on
ImmigrationandAsylumof2008),duetothevariousflowsreceivedandthediplomaciesledallover
theworld.
OtherdiscrepanciescomefromthedistributionofnationalitiesineachEuropeancountrywhich“give
thetune”inthedebateonintegration,accordingtothevolumeandtheconcentrationofthemand
their historical and geographical linkage. While Turkish and Moroccans are profiling diasporic
presencebetweenseveralEuropeancountrieswheretheyaremakingtransnationallinkshelpedby
their countries of origin, claiming for recognition, Algerians in France who look like a “migration
couple”because90%ofthemarelivingtherepreferablytootherEuropeancountriesaredebating
aroundcitizenshipandinequalitiesintotheFrenchmodel.OtherformsofpresencearemetinItaly
or Spain, characterised by a sporadic presence of various origins, in a more cosmopolitan dialogue
mostlyruledbyassociations.Thetreatmentofthenewnationalsfromimmigrationbackground(the
so called “second generations”) also differs according to traditions of anti-discrimination policies,
segregationpracticesorpoliciesofequalityoftreatmentbasedonsocialorethniccriteria.To-day,
European countries seem to hesitate between the model of immigration of settlement and the
modelofguestworkers(withthefocusputoncircularmigration),asreferredtointheEuropeanPact
on Immigration and asylum of 2008. But European rules are often blurred by the bilateral
agreements,bythescenariosofsovereigndecisionsmademoreforthepublicopinionthanforthe
efficiencyandrationalityoftheircontent(suchasinFranceandItalyafterthearrivalofTunisiansand
LibyansinLampedusainspring2011orwiththerepatriationbyFranceofRomatoRomaniain2010
andin2009withthecleaningoffofthesocalled“jungle”ofSangatteandCalaisagainstAfghans)
Conclusion
New challenges introduced in the security consensus of European immigration policy are bringing
more disorder in the European compromise between Common European policy making and
sovereigntiesrevivals:thedemographictrendofEuropeleadingtonewneedsoflabourforce(care
jobs),todisequilibriumbetweenactiveandinactivepopulation(withneedsofmanualworkersas
well as of high qualified ones) and to competition to attract the elites between Europe, North
America and Asia; the progressive urbanisation of the planet which increases the aspiration to
westernwaysoflifeanddesiresofEuropeinalargerpartofsouthernpopulationswhohavenohope
in their country, the environmentally displaced people (although they will not be many in Europe
exceptinsomeplacesaliketheHälligenislandsandthepoldersoftheNetherlands…),thedefinition
of a world governance of migration imposing its rules to all sovereign states in order to substitute
rationalandethicvaluestothefarwesternmethodofmanagementofmigrationto-day,imposingto
definemigrationandmobilityasaworldpublicgoodinawin-win-winapproach.Othercontroversies
are introduced by research about the paradoxical relations between settlement or mobility and
closed or open borders (with closure leading to more settlement and opening borders leading to
morecircularity)andbetweenmigrationanddevelopment(developmentintroducesmoremobility
instead of stopping it at short term and migration is a factor of development in many emigration
countries,duestoremittances).Butimmigrationpoliciesarelatetounderstandtherapidchangesof
migrationswhichhaveoccurredandmainlygoontothinkthemwiththeschemesofmassmigration
ofthelastthirtyyears.
Facing with such realities, European mechanisms of management of migration flows seem to be
more performing tools than State policies. For Europe, the challenge consists in finding a
compromisebetweenopeningorclosingtheborders,securityandliberaleconomy,intherespectof
humanrightsandofanharmonizedlivingtogetherofpopulations.Thequestionofbuildingamore
openspacewithsouthernMediterraneanregionisstillraised,duetothemigrationsystembuiltwith
flows tendencies, in a context of extended right to mobility and of democratisation of border
crossing, supported by the United Nations with the attempts to define a world governance of
migration.Takingmoreintoaccountthesestakesisapre-conditiontoreducethegapbetweenpolity
and policies: the reality of flows, the objectives defined and migration policies in order to bring
morerationalanswersinafieldofpassions.SomeactorsfromNGOsareaddressingmoreandmore
their claims to European institutions and protest against policies answering to populist votes
preferablytohumanrightsinthefieldsoffamilyreunificationasylum,repatriations,borders,while
definingnewcontentsofEuropeancitizenship.
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