Jiye Kim, JNU
ISA-HK 2016
China’s Diplomacy towards the South China Sea Disputes
Abstract
This paper delves into China’s diplomatic patterns observed throughout the course of
becoming a major regional actor by analysing the case of its diplomacy in the South
China Sea dispute. The significance of diplomacy has been strengthened in the
transforming security situation of the Indo-Pacific. The complex background of the
South China Sea dispute further required China to establish various platforms of
diplomacy to communicate with claimants. Over the bilateral, trilateral and
multilateral dialogues for the last decade, China’s position has provided observers
with clearer cases that answer important questions: When China can negotiate? And
for which it would even go for severe conflict? There are two main parts of this paper.
At first, this paper presents a discussion on China’s expectation on diplomacy. With
the expectation, distinctive patterns – bilateral, trilateral and multilateral – have
created spaces for China to advocate agenda with different attributes. The analysis on
the meetings between China and important claimants and regional institutions is
conducted. In the latter part of this paper, China’s claim as the bottom line and the
underlying interests that China strategically pursued are defined in the correlations
with its diplomatic attempts during the given period.
Introduction
This paper analyses the patterns of China’s diplomacy to maintain its claims and protect interests in the South
China Sea (SCS) dispute. China’s activities could be explained through an interpretation of China’s establishment
and management of diplomacy. The research on the SCS has significance in that the SCS dispute has created
cycles in Asian maritime tensions since the 1970s (as has the dispute over the East China Sea).1 The SCS dispute
provides various combinations of negotiation among one regional power, China, and small and medium-sized
Southeast Asian states that gives an understanding on China’s manoeuvres in different diplomatic settings.
The time period after 2000 places a couple of analytic points in this paper. In this period, the Chinese foreign
policy is symbolised by “harmony with difference” advocated by Jiang Zemin, which was followed by the wider
concept of “harmonious world” in the last decade.2 China followed exemplary multilateral approaches around
the year of 2000 towards the SCS dispute, however, it displayed a strategic shift into stubborn behaviour in the
late 2000s.3 The period is pertinent to observe China’s immediate diplomatic changes before and after it became
1
Ji You, “A Test Case for China’s Defence and Foreign Policies,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 16, no. 4 (March 1995).
Zongze Ruan, “Hexie Shijie Yinling Zhongguo Waijiao Xinshidai” (Harmonious world is leading a new era in Chinese
diplomacy), Liaowang, January 9, 2006, 3.
3
Jian Zhang, “China’s South China Sea Policy: Evolution, Claims and Challenges,” in The South China Sea Maritime
Dispute: Political, Legal, and Regional Perspectives, eds. Leszek Buszynski and Christopher B. Roberts (New York:
Routledge, 2015), 61.
2
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Jiye Kim, JNU
ISA-HK 2016
the second largest economy in the world in 2010. The research period, therefore, is appropriate to focus on the
dynamics in the given research theme.
China’s diplomacy in the SCS dispute has been analysed from various theoretical points of view. From the
realist point of view, the dispute in the SCS and difficulties in diplomatic resolution are predictable outcomes as
China has become a rising power.4 In liberalism, researchers are interested on how China’s diplomacy in the SCS
has responded to intensified interdependency in the regional order and complicated structure of agenda.5 Research
on constructivism theory is not as popular as liberalism and realism among Chinese researchers.6 Qin Yaqing, as
one of few scholars in the realm of constructivism, argues that any achievements in the multilateral cooperation
in the SCS is positively assessed in the Chinese view point.7 Lanteigne similarly argues that China is much more
sensitive to the manner in which its identity and its foreign policies are perceived abroad.8 In regards to internal
process of decision making, Scobell and Nathan provide comprehensive description, and Jakobson focuses on the
fractured decision making system in Chinese authority with regard to its unpredictable actions in the SCS.9
This paper attempts to contribute to current discourse on the SCS by suggesting the close connection between
claims, underlying interests, and patterns of diplomacy from the Chinese point of view. This paper focuses on the
continuities found in China’s utilisation of various sets of diplomacy. It argues that China has been involved in
bilateral, trilateral and multilateral diplomacy in the SCS dispute. Meanwhile China continuously maintained its
territorial claim throughout its engagement. This paper approaches the bottom line of the claim and observes the
maximisation of claim as the diplomatic platform changes and the expected negotiating effects are varied.
4
Xuetong Yan, Analysis of China’s National Interests, Translated by the East Asia Nonproliferation Program (EANP) at the
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2002); Zemin Zheng, Asia
and the Pacific under the South China Sea Dispute Pattern, PhD Thesis (Beijing: Central Party School, 2004); Bernard D.
Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China's Navy in the Twenty-First Century (Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2012); Huaqing
Liu, Memoirs of Liu Huaqing (Beijing: PLA Press, 2004).
5 Xiaofeng Yu, “The Emergence of Non-Traditional Security Issues in China and Corresponding Strategies,” in
Transformation of Foreign Affairs and International Relations in China, 1978-2008, ed. Yizhou Wang (Brill: Leiden, 2011);
Jianwei Wang, “China’s Multilateral Diplomacy in the New Millennium,” in China Rising: Power and Motivation in
Chinese Foreign Policy, eds. Yong Deng and Feiling Wang (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005); Shicun Wu and
Huaifeng Ren, “More Than a Declaration: A Commentary on the Background and the Significance of the Declaration on the
Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea,” Chinese Journal of International Law 2, no. 1 (2003): 311-319; Guoqiang
Luo, “Multilateral Approach in the South China Sea Dispute Settlement: Effects and Its Constructions - With Respect to the
Declarataion on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,” Faxie Luntan 4, no. 25 (2010): 93-99.
6 Qin Yaqing, “Development of International Relations Theory in China: Progress and Problems,” in Transformation of
Foreign Affairs and International Relations in China, 1978-2008, ed. Yizhou Wang (Brill: Leiden, 2011)
7 B. Creutzfeldt, “Theory Talk #45: Qin Yaqing on Rules vs Relations, Drinking Coffee and Tea, and a Chinese Approach to
Global Governance”, Theory Talks, November 30, 2011, http://www.theory-talks.org/2011/11/theory-talk-45.html.
8
Marc Lanteigne, Chinese Foreign Policy - An Introduction (London and New York: Routledge, 2009).
9 Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China’s Search for Security (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 2013); Linda
Jakobson, “Report: China’s unpredictable maritime security actors,” December 2014, Lowy Institute.
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ISA-HK 2016
China’s Expectations on Diplomacy
Since the 2000s, the Chinese government has attempted to defuse tensions over the SCS and externalise its
diplomatic efforts. Dai Bingguo, the State Councilor in 2010, has moved to prevent Chinese policy from being
hijacked by aggressive nationalism in China.10 It is possible for China to rise peacefully in near future only when
it makes other states acknowledge China’s rise and advocate the phenomenon, and when it is appreciated as a
reasonable leader of the world.11 China’s diplomatic initiatives have been pursued through various diplomatic
channels and soothed the criticisms against its assertiveness: bilateral (foreign aid, trade), trilateral (joint
exploration), medium multilateral (China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement), and large multilateral (ASEAN
Regional Forum, ADMM-Plus), and track two diplomacy (establishing Confucius Institutes and exchanging
civilians).12 In this section, China’s utilitarian view on diplomacy and its practice in diplomacy with different
actors in different size of negotiations will be discussed.
Agenda setting is given a lot of weight in China’s diplomacy and leads the discussion with the principles that
China promotes. Yan has envisaged that China would prepare principles to manage a territorial dispute and avoid
obstacles in its cooperation with ASEAN, and his assumption was proved to some extent when the Chinese
Foreign Minister Wang Yi introduced the “Four Respects”.13 The Four Respects indicate that China suggests and
positions the agenda in the dispute in such a way to lead negotiations in its favour. Among the four principles,
China’s advocacy of UNCLOS came as the second statement. As the third and fourth principles, Wang emphasised
that direct dialogue and consultation between the countries involved should be respected, and the efforts China
and ASEAN have made to maintain peace and stability should be endorsed.14 If Wang Yi listed the four principles
in order of priority, then it indicates that the China’s diplomatic focus has moved the gravity at least in its public
statement.
China’s approach towards international norms or other types of institutions has derived from rational utilitarian
calculations, as observed in other cases that showcase China’s recognition of international norms. 15 These
utilitarian calculations are built upon mainly three priority blocks. At firstly, sovereignty should be respected.
Secondly, China should be able to make state-centric decisions. Lastly the advantages should be guaranteed for
Chinese national interests.
The utilitarian view is useful to analyse China’s behaviour as a party of UNCLOS. China’s intention to be a
10
Leszek Buszynski, “The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S.–China Strategic Rivalry,” The Washington
Quarterly 35, no. 2 (2012): 150.
11 Xuetong Yan, Lishide Guanxing: Weilai Shiniande Zhongguo Yu Shijie (Inertia of History: China and the World in the
Next Years), trans. Sanghee Go (Beijing: Zhongxin Chubanshe, 2013), 55.
12 Michael Hsiao and Alan Yang, “Soft Power Politics in the Asia Pacific: Chinese and Japanese Quests for Regional
Leadership,” The Asia-Pacific Journal (February 17, 2009).
13 Xuetong Yan, Lishide Guanxing, 120; “Chinese FM calls for respecting 4 principles on South China Sea issue,” China
Central Television, September 8, 2014, accessed September 9, 2014,
http://english.cntv.cn/2014/09/08/VIDE1410150001707535.shtml.
14 “Chinese FM calls for respecting 4 principles,” China Central Television.
15 Lai-ha Chan, China Engages Global Health Governance: Responsible Stakeholder or System-Transformer? (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 124.
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ISA-HK 2016
member of UNCLOS is indicated in its statement made upon ratification of UNCLOS in 1996.16 According to
the statement China wants to “enjoy sovereign rights and jurisdiction” over the land territory in the SCS and their
EEZ and continental shelf. China further articulates that it will conduct consultations on the “delimitation of the
boundary of the maritime jurisdiction” if issues occur over overlapping maritime areas. China’s view reflected in
the 1996 statement reappeared in various sources since then. China’s declaration in 2006 (see Table 1) further
clarified what China wanted to obtain by accepting in the international norms, and what consequent compulsory
engagements expected to a member China wanted to avoid.
Sources Year “The People’s Republic of China will effect, through consultations, the delimitation of the Statement on ratification of 1996 UNCLOS the South China Sea China respectively on the basis of international law and in accordance with the principle “The Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes
2002 … through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.”18 (DoC) “The Government of the People’s Republic of China does not accept any of the
Declaration under article 298 of boundary of the maritime jurisdiction with the States with coasts opposite or adjacent to of equitability.”17 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in China’s Expectations on Diplomacy [italics added] 2006 UNCLOS procedures provided for in Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention with respect to all the categories of disputes referred to in paragraph 1 (a) (b) and (c) of Article 298 of the Convention.”19 “China insists on upholding the international laws on territorial disputes and the UN Four Principles 2014 Convention on the Law of the Sea. … direct dialogue and consultation between the countries involved should be respected. It has proven to be the most effective way to solve the dispute.”20 Table 1. China’s stance in diplomacy presented in various sources
16
Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Oceans & Law of the Sea, United Nations, “United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea: Declarations made upon signature, ratification, accession or succession or anytime
thereafter,” http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm#China Upon ratification.
17 Ibid.
18 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, the Governments of the Member States of ASEAN and the
Government of the People’s Republic of China, done on 4 November 2002, Phnom Penh, the Kingdom of Cambodia, URL:
http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/china/item/declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea.
19 Other 36 members of UNCLOS also declared for the same. This declaration means that a member does not accept certain
compulsory dispute resolution procedures including disputes with respect to (a) territorial sea, (b) EEZ, (c) continental shelf,
and further historic bays or titles. Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Oceans & Law of the Sea, United
Nations, “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”.
20 “Chinese FM calls for respecting 4 principles,” China Central Television.
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ISA-HK 2016
Patterns: Bilateral, Trilateral, Multilateral Diplomacy
Bilateral negotiation has become a practical and effective platform in which China pursues sensitive issues
directly relevant to territorial and delimitation issues in the disputed waters. Wu Shicun, the President of The
National Institute for South China Sea Studies, states that the solution for the SCS dispute is bilateral negotiations
because only some individual countries from ASEAN hold maritime disputes with China and their arguments and
attitudes are different from each other.21 China has insisted that the SCS dispute can only be resolved through
direct talks after the Philippines filed a case to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2013. According to the
Chinese perspective, international judicial mechanisms will not necessarily help mediate or resolve the tension.22
The China–Vietnam relationship is an exemplary case that shows variability and stability among other cases
of China’s bilateral relations. China and Vietnam have restored their relationship in a short time by conducting
direct communication between high-level officials right after nationalism and tensions arose in the two countries
due to a Chinese maritime surveillance vessel cutting the cable of a Vietnamese seismic vessel in May 2011.23
They agreed to continue “the long-term and steady growth of bilateral relations” and strive for a peaceful
resolution to the SCS dispute even after China’s oil rig installation in the Paracel this year, which conveys that
the deepened understanding is built on their bilateral relationship.24 A broader context, however, can be found in
the argument that the SCS conflict is confined to only one part of the whole Sino-Southeast Asian relationship.
Therefore, the relevant countries would be able to focus on the business of strengthening relations with China in
other sectors such as the economy, military cooperation and political stability, without constantly worrying about
the looming China threat.25
As a trilateral cooperation, the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) was the most prominent case in the
SCS dispute. JMSU was the tripartite cooperation between China, the Philippines and Vietnam that promoted
joint exploration of marine resources in the SCS and agreed to put aside sovereignty dispute among claimants.
The background and rationale of this unusual cooperation between three major competitors in the disputed waters
have not been widely analysed except few works.26 The text of the agreement signed in 2004 between China and
21
Zaiqian Wang, “Wu Shicun: Nanhaiwenti Bushi Zhongguoyu Dongmengjiande Wenti” (Wu Shicun: The South China
Sea Dispute Is Not A Problem Between China and ASEAN), Zhongguo Xinwenwang, May 20, 2014, accessed on 20
September 2014, http://news.china.com.cn/2014-05/20/content_32440431.htm.
22 Guoxiu Wu, “Chinese Scholars Say South China Sea Dispute Negatively Impacts Maritime Security,” CCTV America,
August 23, 2014, accessed on August 26, 2014, http://www.cctv-america.com/2014/08/23/chinese-scholars-speak-about-thechina-philippines-dispute.
23 Ramses Amer and Jianwei Li, “Recent Developments in the South China Sea - an Assessment of the Core Bilateral
Relationship between China and Vietnam,” in Maritime Security Issues in the South China Sea and the Arctic: Sharpened
Competition or Collaboration?, eds. Gordon Houlden and Nong Hong (Beijing: China Democracy and Legal System
Publishing House, 2012); Chen Hu, “Motives behind US talk of ‘freedom of navigation’,” People’s Daily Online, June 30,
2011, accessed on October 17, 2014, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90780/91342/7425457.html.
24 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Wang Yi Met with Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister
and Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh,” August 9, 2014, accessed on November 7, 2014,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1181545.shtml.
25 Kheng Swe Lim, “China-ASEAN Relations: Hamstrung Soft Power in South China Sea?,” RSIS Commentary, no. 174,
September 3, 2014.
26 Barry Wain, “Manila’s Bungle in the South China Sea,” Far Eastern Economic Review, January/February 2008; Ernest Z.
Bower, “The JMSU: A Tale of Bilateralism and Secrecy in the South China Sea,” CSIS, July 27, 2010.
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the Philippines was not opened to public.27
On the 1st of September, 2004, China and the Philippines reached an agreement to conduct pre-exploration
studies in the Spratlys to identify areas for oil and gas exploration. Both governments granted the approval and
their heads witnessed the signing of the agreement between two bodies: China National Offshore Oil Corporation
(CNOOC) and the Philippines National Oil Corporation (PNOC).28 Vietnam initially opposed the plan but later
it participated in the cooperation with the representatives from the Vietnam Oil and Gas Corporation (Petrol
Vietnam). On the 14th of March, 2005, China, the Philippines and Vietnam signed JMSU at Manila. The official
name of the agreement was “The Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in the Agreement
Area in the South China Sea”. Despite of the JMSU’s non-state participants JMSU deserves further attention
chiefly for two reasons: firstly, it is the exemplary case that shows the trilateral cooperation in the SCS. Secondly,
the all participating actors in JMSU are state-owned corporates that were commissioned in the given cooperation
on behalf of their own state.
China–ASEAN relations are centred in the multilateral diplomacy in the SCS. China and ASEAN appeared to
embrace their relationship in the context of community spirit. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in the China–
ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting stated that “China and ASEAN share a common destiny,” and ASEAN
foreign ministers stated that “ASEAN and China have built a high level of mutual trust and deepened their
partnership” in the past decade.29 With regard to ASEAN members’ such attitude, a scholar even emphasises that
the ASEAN countries in direct dispute with China are being pathologically patient though China prolongs talks
on a maritime code of conduct.30 If they are truly showing their exceptional patience, it is necessary to delve into
China’s diplomatic skills, as well as its indisputable power in the region. For example, China–Vietnam and China–
Philippines relations have been in turmoil, but these problems were not directly highlighted in meetings between
China and ASEAN.
China’s multilateral cooperation in the SCS dispute has been found in various cases, although since the late
2000s this platform has been limited to a role of encouraging the status-quo in the region without effective power.
The most prominent case was the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC) signed in
2002. There was a backlash after the 1995 Mischief Reef incident and ASEAN members expressed their “serious
concern” over China’s behaviour that intimidated the then regime in the SCS exemplified by the ASEAN
Declaration on the South China Sea, signed in 1992.31 In the unfavourable circumstances, the former Foreign
27
Barry Wain, “Manila’s Bungle in the South China Sea”. The full text of JMSU draft is available at the East Sea Studies
(Vietnam), www.nghiencuubiendong.vn/trung-tam-du-lieu-bien-dong/doc_download/138-a-tripartite-agreement-for-jointmarine-scientific-research-in-certain-areas-in-the-south-china-sea, accessed on May 1, 2016.
28 Hua Zhang, “China’s Position on the Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea between China and the Philippines,”
Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of the Philippines, April 3, 2014.
29 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Minister Wang Yi: Build an Even Closer ChinaASEAN Community of Common Destiny,” August 9, 2014, accessed on November 1, 2014,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1181521.shtml.
30 Rory Medcalf, “China’s Premature Power Play Goes Very Wrong,” The National Interest, June 3, 2014, accessed
November 9, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-premature-power-play-goes-very-wrong-10587.
31 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, “Statement by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on the Recent Development in the
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Minister Qian Qichen declared that China was prepared to hold multilateral discussions on the Spratly Islands and
it would not limit its diplomacy to only bilateral talks.32 It is viewed that China signed the DoC in 2002 and
currently engages with ASEAN in line with the Code of Conduct negotiations to prevent isolation from the SCS
community and accept multilateralism as a mechanism for crisis management.33
Internally, within China, there was also a motivation to stabilise the neighbouring regions as one of the top
priorities by a more pragmatic and friendly foreign policy.34 China’s participation in multilateral cooperation in
the SCS appeared on successive platforms after the DoC.35 The participation supported China’s White Paper
stating that China has made a constructive proposal to “shelve disputes and seek joint development”, and to uphold
stability in the SCS, and other surrounding areas.36
Still, there is a doubt over the effectiveness of those platforms. The DoC, for example, is a merely political
document without any legal binding force, thus affecting its effectiveness in practice.37 Some scholars, even from
China, treat the DoC as an empty paper. But the Chinese government cannot simply discard it owing to the benefits
that are still effective. China publicly holds a Joint Working Group on the implementation of the DoC and steadily
pushes forward consultations on a CoC.38 The DoC has more practically emerged in the non-traditional issues. In
a recent international seminar on the DoC, delegations from each country discussed what specific cooperation
should be done in the SCS, such as technological devices against threats of piracy and transnational crime, the
engineering maintenance of the shipping channel, etc.39
South China Sea, Singapore, March 18, 1995,” in ASEAN Documents Series 1994-1995 (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 14
November 1995).
32 Sheldon W. Simon, “ASEAN Regional Forum,” in Asian Security Handbook: An Assessment of Political-Security Issues
in the Asia-Pacific Region, eds. William M. Carpenter and David G. Wiencek (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 47.
33 Ji You, “Chinese Response to the A la Carte Maritime Disorder in the Indo-Pacific Region” (paper presented to workshop
16th Asian Security Conference, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, February 19-21, 2014)
34 Keyuan Zou, “Can China Respect the Law of the Seas?: An Assessment of Maritime Agreements between China and Its
Neighbors,” Harvard Asia Quarterly (Winter 2010): 41.
35 For example, the Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues
(November 2002), the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (October 2003), the Memorandum of Understanding between
ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues (January 2004) and the Joint Marine
Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) (March 2005). However, JMSU, the tripartite joint program among China, the Philippines, and
Vietnam, was suspended after the completion of the first stage of activities.
36 Information Office of the State Council, China’s Peaceful Development (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council,
2011).
37 Shicun Wu and Keyuan Zou, “Maritime Security in the South China Sea: Cooperation and Implications,” in Maritime
Security in the South China Sea: Regional Implications and International Cooperation, ed. Shicun Wu and Keyuan Zou,
Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies Series (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009), 9-10. In a counterintuitive manner, Qin
Yaqing stresses the lesser-known Chinese ways of forming regional integration or cooperation: informal relations, processes,
and non-binding consensus. Many Western scholars might think this type of regional process is not a regional integration. In
fact, China and ASEAN reduced the binding force to increase the flexibility in cooperation. B. Creutzfeldt, “Theory Talk
#45: Qin Yaqing on Rules vs Relations, Drinking Coffee and Tea, and a Chinese Approach to Global Governance,” Theory
Talks, November 30, 2011, accessed July 22, 2013, http://www.theory-talks.org/2011/11/theory-talk-45.html.
38 The 11th joint working group meeting between China and ASEAN on the implementation of the DoC was held from 24 to
25, June, 2014 in Bali. Jianfeng Zhang, “China, ASEAN to have South China Sea talks,” Xinhua, June 19, 2014, accessed
August 26, 2014, http://english.cntv.cn/2014/06/19/ARTI1403178103223306.shtml.
39 Chun Yao, “China Vows to Make South China Sea Safe,” Xinhua, December 15, 2011, accessed October 17, 2014,
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90786/7678366.html.
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Year 1995 Parties Negotiation Involved Size China, Philippines Official Document Name Total Article No. of Specific Articles No. of Articles with Principle Joint Statement, Republic of the Philippines‐PRC Bilateral Consultations on the South China Sea and on other Areas of 8 4 4 11 9 2 29 26 3 10 3 7 Cooperation Agreement on the Delimitation of the Territorial Seas, 2000 China, Vietnam Bilateral Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental Shelves in the Beibu Gulf between the People's Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam A Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Scientific Research in China, 2005 Philippines, Trilateral Certain Areas in the South China Sea By and Among China National Offshore Oil Corporation Vietnam Oil and Gas Vietnam 2002 Corporation Philippine National Oil Company China, Medium ASEAN Multilateral Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea Table 2. Specificity in Chinese negotiations with the SCS claimants
Patterns: Coercive Diplomacy
Meanwhile, similar criticism was levelled against China in 1974, 1995 and is even today. After the occupation
of the Paracel Islands by China in 1974, a report condemned China saying that the occupation was not “the
behaviour of a country which insists that it will never behave like a super power”, and in 1995, China was criticised
due to its “occupying of Mischief reef, renewing anxieties and fears of conflict in the South China Sea”.40 These
criticisms are similar to the uproar against China at this moment.
China’s diplomacy is supported and strengthened by its economic and physical power in the region. One of
cases where China utilised its economic leverage in the SCS resulted in the Philippines. The Philippines had to
suffer a drastic financial decrease in its tourism and export businesses when the conflict between China worsened
surrounding the Scarborough Shoal in 2012.41 China is further militarily willing to show its power against small
forces of littoral states, and even to the US as shown in its confrontation against a US survey ship in 2001, an EP3 surveillance plane incident in the same year and the Impeccable incident in 2009. In order to nullify China’s
island reclamation and support the freedom of navigation principle, the US naval ships entered the 12 nm of
territorial sea of Chinese claimed islands in the SCS three times since October 2015. The spiral of troubles has
40 John Gittings, “South China Seizure,” The Guardian, January 21, 1974, 11; Nicholas Cumming-Bruce, “Beijing Makes
More Mischief.”
41 Suisheng Zhao, “Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: The Strident Turn,” Journal of
Contemporary China (2013), 15.
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further increased the possibility of risky face-off in the disputed waters with Chinese forces’ full attention.42
A careful diplomatic decision, however, is required before China exerts any type of physical leverage, and a
study on China’s “one-plus strategy” suggests China’s principles considered before it shows forceful behaviour.
You Ji holds the view that China has been conducting a one-plus strategy as an effective crisis management
strategy in the East China Sea and SCS since Xi Jinping came into power. He further argues that the one-plus
strategy limits its physical power to a reactive and passive one and allows limited military power that would not
cause further armed conflict.43 The interdependent economy in Southeast Asia also contains the danger of forceful
behaviour, as Assistant Secretary of the US Department of State Daniel Russel pointed out, because the regional
economy is too important and too fragile for any country or any claimant to use the threat of military force or
paramilitary force in retaliation, for intimidation, or as a coercive effort.44 Interestingly, the Singapore Prime
Minister Lee Hsien Loong shows his belief in China as a peaceful power avoiding the use of might,45 though
there was not such belief in Singapore when the former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong stated right after the
Mischief incident that it was important to express an underlying sense of discomfort, even insecurity, about the
political and military ambitions of China.46
China continues to pursue a long-term, comprehensive military modernisation programme, meanwhile it
remains committed to stable relationships with neighbours to strengthen a favourable external environment.47
China is conducting the annual military training of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) “Maneuver 5”
exercise to test open-sea mobile combat tactics, command and control capabilities and combat effectiveness of
equipment. Three major fleets of the PLAN participate in this exercise in the West Pacific.48 According to the
US Department of Defense Annual Report, the exercise is carried in the Philippine Sea and it is the largest PLAN
open-ocean exercise seen to date. Further, China conducted the three-part Mission Action series of joint military
exercises in 2013. These exercises combined PLA ground, navy and air forces in large-scale manoeuvres along
China’s southern and southeastern coasts.49 Chinese submarines, among other weapon systems, are expected soon
to be a larger undersea force than that of the US, and their diesel design could be used to create mobile minefields
in the SCS. The SCS has uneven depths, high levels of background noise, strong currents and shifting thermal
42
Ben Blanchard, “China says it followed rules in U.S. aircraft intercept,” Reuters, May 26, 2016.
Ji You, “Deciphering Beijing’s Maritime Security Policy.”
44 Mr Russel said in a news briefing on the 4th of August 2014. It was ahead of his trip to the ASEAN Regional Forum.
David Brunnstrom, “US to Press for South China Sea Freeze despite China Rejection,” The Sydney Morning Herald, August
5, 2014, accessed on 5 August 2014, http://www.smh.com.au/world/us-to-press-for-south-china-sea-freeze-despite-chinarejection-20140805-100gva.html.
45 Victor Beattie, “Will Regional Ties Prevent South China Sea
Conflict?,” Voice of America, June 25, 2014, accessed June 28, 2014, http://www.voanews.com/content/singapore-pmregional-ties-will-prevent-south-china-sea-conflict/1944515.html.
46 Nicholas Cumming-Bruce, “Beijing Makes More Mischief.”
47 TRADOC, The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World 2020-2040, United States Army Training and
Doctrine Command, October 7, 2014, 10.
48 Yan Meng and Liang Jun, “Maneuver 5 Exercise Enters Stage of Actual-Troop Confrontation,” People’s Daily Online
and China Military Online, October 29, 2013, accessed on November 7, 2014,
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90786/8439923.html.
49 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, i.
43
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layers, which would make detecting Chinese submarines very difficult.50
China’s all-out effort expanding its resources and supplies in defence of the SCS could be found when Xi
Jinping made a visit to a fishing village in Hainan to assure fishermen that the government would do more to
protect them when they were in disputed waters.51 An integrated strategy has key elements of diplomatic and
psychological warfare, and throughout its history of communist victories, Chinese political thought internalised
those elements.52
China’s Claim in the South China Sea: The Bottom Line
Few sources indicate China’s bottom line, in other words, the minimum claim that China would accept in the
SCS dispute. According to the deputy director of the China Institute for Marine Affairs, regardless of the type of
maritime features in the SCS, China’s sovereignty over these features should be foremost recognised.53 The
question on the definition of these features, for example if they are island, reef or low-tide elevation, is following
afterwards when the sovereignty issue is agreed upon clearly. His opinion shows that China’s most significant
concern and interest are neither sort of waters such as territorial sea and EEZ, nor maritime resources in the form
of continental shelf and subsoil but the sovereignty issue. Further it is supported that in 1994 the then Chinese
President Jiang Zemin stated that China only claimed the islets and their adjacent waters (12 nm) within the dotted
lines, not all the waters in the lines.54
China’s official delineation of its claim, of course, does not adhere to the bottom line. As stated in the Note
Verbale submitted to the UN in 2009 (italics added):
China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters,
and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil
thereof.55
50
Robert D. Kaplan, “How We Would Fight China,” The Atlantic, June 1, 2005, accessed April 11, 2014,
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/06/how-we-would-fight-china/303959. There is an interesting war
simulation written by a US officer that presupposed that PLA won the US forces in a battle occurred in the SCS by its
submarine capability. Frank Borik, “Sub Tzu and the Art of Submarine Warfare” (war simulation essay submitted to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition in 1995). Vietnam is also upgrading its submarine
capability at Cam Ranh Bay base and educating its officers in Russia and India. Greg Torode, “Insight - Vietnam Building
Deterrent against China in Disputed Seas with Submarines,” Reuters, September 7, 2014, accessed September 9, 2014,
http://uk.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=UKKBN0H20T720140907.
51 John Ruwitch, “Satellites and Seafood: China Keeps Fishing Fleet Connected in Disputed Waters,” Reuters US Edition,
July 27, 2014, accessed August 22, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/28/us-southchinasea-china-fishing-insightidUSKBN0FW0QP20140728.
52 Ashok Kapur, China’s Changing Approach to Strategy and Negotiations: Past and Present, Sapru House Paper (New
Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs, January, 2013), 9.
53 Jia Yu, “Arbitral tribunal abusing its power,” China Daily, June 3, 2016.
54 Ji You, “Deciphering Beijing’s Maritime Security Policy and Strategy in Managing Sovereignty Disputes in the China
Seas,” Policy Brief, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (October, 2013).
55 Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China, Notes Verbales CML/17/2009 and CML/18/2009, May 7, 2009,
available from the UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS) at:
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In 1950s, before the concept of EEZ and continental shelf was introduced, China claimed its sovereignty over
only “islands” and did not claim the maritime area within the dashed line.56 However, in 2009 Note Verbales,
China claims its sovereignty and jurisdiction over not only the islands, but also the “adjacent waters”, the “relevant
waters” and the “seabed and subsoil thereof”. A report from the US Government suggests that the “adjacent waters”
be the 12-nm territorial sea, and the “relevant waters” be the EEZ and the “seabed and subsoil thereof” refer the
continental shelf.57 It is not clear why China does not proactively borrow the terminology from UNCLOS. From
Chinese perspective, UNCLOS (or any other international norms) is not expected to tell China “what to do”. On
contrary, Chinese intention is to utilise the law in order to justify and support its activities when those activities
have international effects.
The ambiguity in the Chinese claim in the SCS increases when it comes to the so-called nine-dashed line. The
US report answers this question by arguing that “China has not actually made a cognizable claim to either ‘historic
waters’ or ‘historic rights’ to the waters of the South China Sea within the dashed line.”58 The ambiguity of the
interpretation on the SCS has been further pointed out by Chinese scholars including Xue Li from Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences. Xue argues that China should clarify the meaning of nine-dash line in order to draw
a favourable effect on the tribunal initiated by the Philippines in 2013.59 Xue’s argument is very different from
that of other Chinese scholars’. For instance, Guifang argues that the whole waters within the line are neither
international waters, nor territorial waters, nor high seas, but waters with an historical attachment that UNCLOS
does not define.60 As Xue Li proves, however, not all Chinese scholars would agree with the idea that the ninedashed line is completely beyond UNCLOS and its application.
However, the bottom line of its claim could be different from the ‘underlying interests’. In the following
section of the paper, the hypothetically grouped analyses on China’s underlying interests in the SCS are discussed.
China’s Interests in the South China Sea: The Underlying Causes
A news report issued after the Mischief Reef incident in 1995 stated that “analysts wonder whether China’s
main interest is the vast oil resources beneath the shoals or control of a strategic regional nerve centre. Neither,
they conclude, is reassuring.”61 The genuine concern of China over the SCS was in doubt and controversial,
though it is a significant variable in analysing China’s behaviour in the region.
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf.
56 Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, United States Department of State, Limits in the
Seas - China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea, No. 143, December 5, 2014.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Xue Li, “How China Views the South China Sea Arbitration Case,” The Diplomat, July 14, 2015.
60 Guifang Xue, “Deep Danger: Intensified Competition in the South China Sea and Implications for China,” in Maritime
Security Issues in the South China Sea and the Arctic: Sharpened Competition or Collaboration?, eds. Gordon Houlden and
Nong Hong (Beijing: China Democracy and Legal System Publishing House, 2012): 262.
61 Nicholas Cumming-Bruce, “Beijing Makes More Mischief in South China Sea,” The Guardian, May 22, 1995, 12.
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In this section, China’s strategic interests in the SCS are elaborated in a consideration of each important
element: economic interest, historic rights, regional supremacy, core interest discourse and non-traditional
security.
Economic Interests
The economic value of the SCS is divided into buried natural energy resources, trading and sea lines of
communications (SLOC), tourism, the fishing industry and other economic activities. Possession of the islands is
the precondition to obtain benefits from them. An island where human life cannot be sustained can still have a
territorial sea, while a big island that can maintain economic life can obtain an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).62
The islands have only negligible physical value in themselves; however, countries owning those islands will be
entitled to enormous wealth from the sea,63 and the islands could be the basis for claiming a large sea area as
either territorial sea or EEZ, including the seabed beneath.64
There is no doubt that oil is one of the significant economic resources in the SCS, but their clout with regards
to China’s strategic interest needs to be critically reviewed. China’s oil consumption will continue growing
through 2014 to approximately 11.1 million barrels per day, and the oil production in domestic land and offshore
oil fields was 4.5 million barrels per day in 2013. As of January 2014, China holds 24.4 billion barrels of proven
oil reserves,65 and China’s yearly consumption will reach 4 billion barrels.66 China imported 6.2 million barrels
per day in 2013 because of the limited oil exploitation and supply, and the import has been increasing after China
became a net importer in 1993.67 Therefore, oil is considered to be a potential strategic vulnerability as China’s
dependence on imports is growing.68 Meanwhile, oil makes up 20 percent of the country’s energy requirements,
62
Haiqing Li, “Woguo Dongyahai Diqu Haiyang Fazhanzhuanluede Sikao” (Reflections on Our Strategy for Ocean
Development in East Asian Seas), Haiyang Fazhan Yu Guanli 1 (2005): 10. According to UNCLOS Article 121 Paragragh
3, “Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or
continental shelf.” This paragraph could be interpreted that while an inhabitable rock does not have EEZ and continental
shelf but may still have a 12-nm territorial sea. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, opened for
signature December 10, 1982, came into force on November 16, 1994, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397,
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.
63 Choon‐ho Park, “The South China Sea Disputes: Who Owns the Islands and the Natural Resources?,” Ocean
Development & International Law 5, no. 1 (1978): 28.
64 Hungdah Chiu, “South China Sea Islands: Implications for Delimiting the Seabed and Future Shipping Routes,” China
Quarterly 72 (December 1977); Keyuan Zou, “Can China Respect the Law of the Seas?: An Assessment of Maritime
Agreements between China and Its Neighbors,” Harvard Asia Quarterly (Winter 2010): 40.
65 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “China,” last updated February 4, 2014, accessed October 18, 2014,
http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/China/china.pdf.
66 Interestingly, according to the United States Geological Survey, the SCS contains about 11 billion barrels of oil and 145
trillion cubic feet of natural gas that have yet to be discovered. U.S. Geological Survey, “World Petroleum Resources
Assessment Project: Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of Southeast Asia, 2010,” Fact Sheet 2010–3015,
June 2010.
67 U.S. EIA, “China.”
68
John Lee, “China’s Geostrategic Search for Oil,” The Washington Quarterly 35, no. 3 (2012): 76. China – US cooperation
on the Strategic Petroleum Reserves also strengthens this argument. Judy Hua and Aizhu Chen, “China, US to Cooperate on
Strategic Oil Reserves,” Reuters UK Edition, July 11, 2014, accessed October 18, 2014,
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when coal is the major energy source in China, taking 69 percent of total consumption. China has been a net coal
importer since 2009, but coal imports do not constitute a significant portion of the whole coal consumption.69
The Chinese have hoped for an oil boom for long time since economic development became the national goal
in the Reform and Opening Up era, so it is not a new phenomenon that China has focused on exploiting maritime
energy resources. 70 According to Chinese law, domestic companies have a right to cooperate with foreign
enterprises in offshore petroleum exploration and exploitation, further, the China National Offshore Oil
Corporation (CNOOC), for example, is under which the subsidiary has to bear all the exploration risks.71 When
it has not had suitable technology, China has cooperated with overseas corporations since the 1980s.72 By May
2006, CNOOC had signed 172 contracts with 75 oil companies worldwide to build 23 gas and oil fields, which
accounted for 65 percent of the country’s total oil and gas production.73 China has also developed an independent
oil field in which CNOOC holds a 100 percent interest as a sole operator.74 The major concern regarding the oil
resources in the SCS is the profitability of the possible oil fields in the SCS other than the Pearl River Mouth
Basin. The same concern could also apply to other types of natural resources buried in the overall disputed waters
in the SCS.
There are counterarguments from some scholars who question the economic motives generated by energy
resources behind China’s diplomacy. You Ji dismisses the belief that the East China Sea and SCS resources have
motivated Beijing to up the ante in the dispute, due to the extraction and transportation costs as well as the low
commercial value.75 Further, Beijing inherited the ‘nine-dotted line’ in the SCS from the pre-PRC regimes long
before potential energy reserves in the region attracted local and foreign oil companies.76 Yan Xuetong also
argues that the value of natural resources have decreased greatly as a catalyst for creating national prosperity,
whereas science and technology have appreciated more. 77 Their arguments raise a question regarding the
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/07/11/china-usa-oil-idUKL4N0PM3IE20140711.
69 U.S. EIA, “China.”
70 Rod Chapman, “BP Abandons First South China Well,” The Guardian, January 11, 1984, 18.
71 “CNOOC to Kick off Bidding for Untapped Oil and Gas Resources in South China Sea,” Xinhua, March 7, 2007,
accessed October 19, 2014, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200703/07/eng20070307_355170.html.
72 Rod Chapman, “Cluff Oil Signs for South China Sea,” The Guardian, September 6, 1983, 25. However, not all of
cooperative explorations were successful. In January 1984, BP abandoned its exploration well in the SCS after finding only
limited amounts of oil which indicated less possibility of a commercial discovery. See Rod Chapman, “BP Abandons.”
China, at that time, conducted geophysical survey at the SCS together with the US and obtained samples from the seabed
and produced data on geological conditions in the SCS. Beijing Xinhua, “PRC Begin Geophysical Surveys in South China
Sea,” September 21, 1980 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service–China (FBIS-China), September 26, 1980.
73 “CNOOC to Kick off,” Xinhua.
74 “CNOOC starts up oil field in Pearl River Mouth basin,” Oil & Gas Journal, August 25, 2014, accessed October 18,
2014, http://www.ogj.com/articles/2014/08/cnooc-starts-up-oil-field-in-pearl-river-mouth-basin.html.
75 Ji You, “Deciphering Beijing’s Maritime Security Policy”. The ‘nine-dotted line’ is referred to by other similar names,
including the “nine-dash line,” “dotted line,” “cow’s tongue,” and “U-shaped line.” A recent report issued by the US
Department of State points out the inconsistency between the dashed line maps published by Chinese authorities in different
years. According the report, the dashes also became closer to the coasts of littoral states in recent years. Bureau of Oceans
and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, United States Department of State, Limits in the Seas - China:
Maritime Claims in the South China Sea, No. 143, December 5, 2014.
76 Ji You, “Deciphering Beijing’s Maritime Security Policy.”
77 Xuetong Yan, Lishide Guanxing, 117.
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understanding of maritime disputes from the economic point of view. Bill Hayton, further, argues that the SCS is
not particularly rich in oil and gas resources, while other frequently cited beliefs surrounding the SCS dispute are
also controversial. 78 It would make better sense to buy the crude oil from the international market, if the
exploitable resources buried under the Spratly Islands are not profitable in terms of exploration, exploitation,
transport, and even diplomatic costs.79
Historic Rights
The historical argument is currently considered the ultimate rationale in China’s claim over its sovereignty of
the islands and waters in the SCS. Many Chinese scholars argue for China’s thorough sovereignty in the SCS with
various evidences such as legal and historical explanation.80 The Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi suggested
the “Four Respects” to guide the SCS dispute in September 2014 which gave the top priority to historical
perception, followed by international laws, direct dialogue and the role of external actors. He said the dispute is a
matter left over by history.81 The actual function of history, for the Chinese, lies in its offerings to myth-making,
and the Chinese are particularly noted for their use of traditions in the present.82 As far as China’s history explains
some of its ancestors’ activities in the SCS, the region is deemed to be the descendants “arms and legs” that they
never want to cut off, as Chinese Admiral Wu Shengli metaphorically mentioned.83
The nine-dotted line constitutes the central part of the historical argument. China has endorsed the line through
un/official routes. The original line first appeared on a Chinese map in 1914 by the Chinese cartographer Hu
Jinjie.84 The map published by the national government in 1947 was composed of 11 dashes entitled “Locations
of the South China Sea Islands.”85 In 1948, the government declared its sovereignty and rights of maritime
resources over the islands and reefs within the line. The line was recognised by the PRC after its establishment in
1949.86 Later, in 1953, the PRC government took out two dashes in the Gulf of Tonkin,87 and the current ninedotted line was set down. The littoral states and international community, according to the Chinese point of view,
were in a tacit understanding before the 1970s that China had sovereignty over the SCS and they did not raise any
78
Bill Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014), xvi.
Ji You, “Deciphering Beijing’s Maritime Security Policy,” 2.
80 Keyuan Zou, “China’s U-Shaped Line in the South China Sea Revisited”, Ocean Development & International Law 43,
no. 1 (2012): 18-34; Law of the Sea in East Asia: Issues and Prospects (London and New York: Routledge, 2005); Nong
Hong, UNCLOS and Ocean Dispute Settlement: Law and Politics in the South China Sea (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012).
81 “Chinese FM calls for respecting 4 principles on South China Sea issue,” China Central Television.
82 Gungwu Wang, To Act Is to Know: Chinese Dilemmas. (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2003), vi.
83 Whilliam Choong, “Mistrust Hurts Naval Cooperation in Region,” The Straits Times, 27 May 2011.
84 Keyuan Zou, “The Chinese Traditional Maritime Boundary Line in the South China Sea and Its Legal Consequences for
the Resolution of the Dispute over the Spratly Islands,” The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 14, no. 1
(1999): 32.
85 Jinming Li and Dexia Li, “The Dotted Line on the Chinese Map of the South China Sea: A Note,” Ocean Development
&International Law 34, no. 3-4 (2003): 290.
86
“Vietnam Severely Violates China’s Sovereignty by Insisting Paracel and Spratly Islands in Its Legislation,” China
Ocean News, June 22, 2012, accessed May 16, 2014, http://www.oceanol.com/redian/shiping/19614.html.
87 Jinming Li, South China Sea Dispute and International Law of the Sea (Beijing: Ocean Press, 2003): 50-52.
79
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objections.88
The Chinese argument based on the historical point of view is not acceptable in the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) paradigm89; meanwhile, the root of the argument could be found in its irredentist
policy pursued at the moment of the establishment of the PRC. China’s first Premier, Zhou Enlai, argued in his
1951 statement on the US-British draft peace treaty with Japan and the San Francisco Conference that the Pratas,
Paracel, and Spratly islands were originally Chinese territory for which China’s inviolable sovereignty applied,
and that even though they had been occupied by Japanese imperialists, China had regained them when Japan
surrendered.90 The Chinese claim in the SCS was visualised as the nine-dotted line; however, this line had been
legally questioned after the formation of UNCLOS and attracted discussion on its legal status. Xue, on the contrary,
argues that the waters within the nine-dotted line are neither international waters, nor territorial waters, nor high
seas, but waters with an historical attachment that UNCLOS does not define in its articles.91 The Chinese attitude
towards UNCLOS could be seen as Chinese exceptionalism to some extent. The use of history, according to Feng
Zhang, is an example of Chinese exceptionalism to discursively counter structural pressures from the international
system.92
Domestic support is well mobilised towards the historical argument in China. The Chinese government did
not do enough to rein in China’s nationalists until it seemed to harm Beijing’s larger goals.93 China basically
controlled on/offline nationalistic demonstrations to prevent the strong public sentiment from encroaching on the
realm of decision makers and worsening the relationships with neighbouring countries. However, this perception
towards the nationalistic opinion changed as the Chinese, “who are realists in essence”,94 felt the elevation of its
status and China’s relative power in the world during the 2008–2009 global financial crisis.95 Previously, Chinese
leaders had sought a two-pronged policy that supported top-down patriotic nationalism and prevented bottom-up
nationalism, but popular nationalism has enjoyed more generosity from the Chinese government from the late
88
“Vietnam Severely Violates China’s Sovereignty,” China Ocean News.
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, United States Department of State, Limits in the
Seas - China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea, No. 143, December 5, 2014.
90 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Zhou Enlai Waijiao Wenxuan (Selected Diplomatic
Documents of Zhou Enlai) (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1990).
91 Guifang Xue, “Deep Danger: Intensified Competition in the South China Sea and Implications for China,” in Maritime
Security Issues in the South China Sea and the Arctic: Sharpened Competition or Collaboration?, eds. Gordon Houlden and
Nong Hong (Beijing: China Democracy and Legal System Publishing House, 2012): 262. UNCLOS Article 15 states that if
“it is necessary by reason of historic title”, either of the two neighbouring/opposite states can “extend its territorial sea
beyond the median line” “equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines”. However, this article is only applied to the
territorial sea and cannot support China’s historic claim beyond its territorial sea which extends 12-nm from the baseline.
92 Feng Zhang, “The Rise of Chinese Exceptionalism in International Relations,” European Journal of International
Relations (October 27, 2011): 317.
93 Dingding Chen and Jianwei Wang, “Lying Low No More?: China’s New Thinking on the Tao Guang Yang Hui
Strategy,” China: An International Journal 9, no. 2 (September 2011): 215-16.
94 Suisheng Zhao, “Shaping the Regional Context of China’s Rise: How the Obama Administration Brought back
Hedge in Its Engagement with China,” Journal of Contemporary China 21, no. 75 (2012): 377.
95 Aaron Friedberg, “The New Era of U.S.-China Rivalry,” Washington Street Journal, January 17, 2011, accessed
November 1, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704323204576085013620618774.html.
89
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2000s.96
The Chinese historical argument is well confronted by many scholars. Bill Hayton, for example, argues that
China traditionally governed men, not a space, and suggests the existence of maritime nomad (Nusantao) and an
anthropological research on the formation of the SCS culture, writing that “there’s no archaeological evidence
that any Chinese ships made trading voyages across the SCS until the tenth century CE”.97 The research on the
history of other littoral states also challenges China’s position.98 In response to these counterarguments, Chinese
governmental bodies conducted underwater archaeological surveys to salvage relics and draw a map pointing out
sites.99 China’s geographical survey and mapping also aims to clarify the specific locations of the nine-dotted
line by setting their longitudes and latitudes.100
Core Interests
The core interests were mentioned by the then Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo in China – US Strategic
and Economic Dialogue in July 2009. He stated the necessity of the core interests as a principle of China–US
relations, saying that “ensuring the long-term healthy and stable development of Sino-US relations, it is important
to (pursue) a mutual understanding, respect each other support, to protect their core interests.”101 He implied that
the US must have its critical interests as China does, and China–US relations would be enhanced if the parties
recognise and respect each other’s core interests. Later on, China’s core interests were perceived as a political
justification allowing its aggressiveness towards neighbouring countries, and the expectation on China’s amicable
diplomacy in the SCS drastically decreased as China associated its core interest to the SCS in the late 2000s.102
An analysis divides China’s approach towards the border and maritime territorial disputes into three different
phases based on the transformation in China’s strategic interests: China prioritised “security” considerations
before the 1970s, then “regional stability” in the era of Reform and Opening Up. China, after 2009, demonstrated
“core interest” as its priority in the border and maritime disputes while still protecting “regional stability” in a
96
97
Suisheng Zhao, “Foreign Policy Implications”.
Bill Hayton, The South China Sea, 11; “The South China Sea has been shared, never owned by one power,”
South China Morning Post, June 7, 2016.
98
Huu Tuc Nguyen, “Vietnam’s Position on South China Sea,” RSIS Commentary, no. 170, August 27, 2014.
Kaihao Wang, “Into the Deep for Relics,” China Daily USA, September 16, 2014, 8.
100 Le Zou, “South China Sea Mapping Underway,” Global Times, March 27, 2012, accessed October 17, 2014,
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/702256.shtml.
101 “Shoulun Zhongmei Jingli Duihua” (First Round of China – US Strategic and Economic Dialogue), Chine News, July 29,
2009, accessed May 16, 2014, http://www.chinanews.com/gn/news/2009/07-29/1794984.shtml. China’s core interests have
been described in its white paper as the state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and national reunification,
political system and the overall social stability, and the basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social
development. Information Office of the State Council, China’s Peaceful Development (Beijing: Information Office of the
State Council, 2011).
102
Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, “Can China Defend a ‘Core Interest’ in the South China Sea?,” The Washington
Quarterly 34, no. 2 (Spring 2011); David L. Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (Oxford; New York:
Oxford University Press, 2013).
99
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balanced diplomacy.103 A tautological error, however, could occur in the argument that the SCS is important to
China because it is a core interest. An elaboration on the actual value in the SCS could support the argument by
providing the linkage and correlation between the interest and its significance to the core interests of China.
Regional Supremacy
The perspective from regional supremacy suggests that the SCS possesses a strategic value that China should
protect as a rising power in the current order. This perspective views the competition between China and the US
as the major variable worsening the SCS dispute, and the SCS issue has gone beyond territorial claims and access
to energy resources because the region has become a focal point for China-US rivalry in the Western Pacific.104
Xi Jinping has accordingly mentioned that the US should let Asia’s security be handled by Asians at the
Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), a security forum initiated by
China. 105 The Chinese University of International Relations has published a report pointing out that the US
advocated the reinforcement of the “China Threat” theory and military build-up in Japan, the Philippines and
Vietnam. The report claims, in the same context, that an external power has strengthened its intervention in
maritime and territorial disputes in the East China Sea and SCS.106
The US publicly recognises that it does not have a direct interest in the SCS and maintains its principal position
of freedom of navigation. Similarly, Chinese also support the idea that each country’s navigational and flight
freedom in the SCS under the international law should be fully guaranteed as freedom of navigation in the SCS is
already closely associated with robust economic growth in the Asia-Pacific region.107 The main concern for the
Chinese is that the US has a different purpose in promoting the freedom of the navigation principle. In the Chinese
perspective, what the US wants to highlight is its leading position by making an excuse.108
Yan Xuetong adds to the literature by writing that what China pursues in the SCS is the initiative in the region.
He analyses that the international security environment became unfavourable to China when the then US Secretary
of State, Hillary Clinton, declared America’s return to Asia in the 2009 ASEAN Regional Forum, which realised
the US strategic rebalance. The change is one of the considerations redirecting Chinese foreign policy, and China
has started scrambling for the leadership in the region.109 Yan’s interpretation explains the motivation behind
China’s aggressive attitude in the SCS since 2009. In this rivalry game, China’s rise cannot mutually exist with
103
Changhee Park, “China’s Policy on the Border Disputes” (paper presented at the 13th Future Northeast Forum, Seoul,
April 30, 2014).
104 Leszek Buszynski, “The South China Sea,” 139.
105 Teddy Ng, “Deng Xiaoping’s Guiding Principles Are Still in Play Today,” South China Morning Post, August 22, 2014.
106 International Strategy and Security Research Center, Zhongguo Guojia Anquan Yanjiu Baogao (2014) (the National
Security Blue Paper: The Research Report on National Security of China) (Beijing: The University of International
Relations of China, May 6, 2014).
107 Chun Yao, “China Vows to Make South China Sea Safe,” Xinhua.
108
Gang Ding, “Why Does Speculation Grow in South China Sea,” People’s Daily Online, August 03, 2011, accessed
October 17, 2014, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90780/91342/7458582.html.
109 Xuetong Yan, Lishide Guanxing, 58-59.
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the long-established American positions throughout Asia, as Robert Jervis has identified in the security
dilemma.110
The geographical feature of the SCS can support this point of view. According to Yoshihara and Holmes the
SCS is equipped with geographical elements that other historical powers enjoyed in their most prosperous times.
The US, for example, aimed at securing strategically important waters, for example, the Caribbean Sea and
Panama Canal, from the maritime hegemony of Europe to consolidate a dominant position. However, the US did
not have any other goals than this strategic purpose. If China is trying to achieve a dominant position over the
SCS and Strait of Malacca for a strategic reason, then the current disturbance in the SCS could be viewed as a
natural process as similarly observed when the hegemony moved from Western Europe to the US.111 However,
the SCS still has its peculiar geographical features of various straits which could be used to enter into it. This
feature creates an environment where monopoly on transportation control and management is difficult, which
could affect China’s strategy in the SCS. 112 A Chinese scholar also suggested that China need to explore
alternative transportation routes through the Sunda and Lombok straits.113
Non-Traditional Security
Chinese concerns on non-traditional security are another factor that brings its footprint in the SCS. Addressing
non-traditional security issues is relevant to regional economies, and non-traditional threats will cause serious
damage to the global trade if they cannot be resolved in a timely manner. The US Defense Department report
recognises that China’s military modernisation has become increasingly focused on a range of missions beyond
China’s coast, including sea lane security, counterpiracy, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief.
The idea of multilateral cooperation is perceived among scholars because such non-traditional threats are
vulnerable but have a far-reaching influence on all relevant parties. China, therefore, needs to embrace multilateral
dialogues with the concerned parties to counter piracy incidents, and in order to overcome misunderstandings on
the security issues. Non-traditional security is an important part of China’s interest in the SCS, but it is mainly
discussed in cooperative and multilateral interactions while other sensitive issues such as historic rights and
regional supremacy bring difficult tasks in diplomacy.
110
Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China’s Search for Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), xvii.
Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, “Can China Defend a ‘Core Interest’ in the South China Sea?,” The Washington
Quarterly 34, no. 2 (Spring 2011).
112 James R. Holmes, “Strategic Features of the South China Sea: A Tough Neighborhood for Hegemons,” Naval War
College Review 67, no. 2 (Spring 2014); Robert D. Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable
Pacific (New York: Random House, 2014).
113 Hongtu Zhao, “Maliujia Kunju Yu Zhongguo Nengyuan Anquan Zaisikao” (Malacca Dilemma and Rethinking on
China’s Energy Security), Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 6 (2007): 36-42.
111
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Jiye Kim, JNU
ISA-HK 2016
Conclusion
This paper suggests that China’s diplomacy towards the SCS dispute be analysed from the perspective on
Chinese expectation on diplomacy and also the diplomatic records found in the bilateral, trilateral and multilateral
negotiations between China and other claimants. The bottom line of Chinese claim in the SCS and the maximum
goal of negotiation have been presented without clear differentiation in negotiations where China was involved.
The effective negotiation requires better understanding on an actor’s negotiating behaviour and claim, however,
the situation in the SCS dispute does not seem to contain positive conditions for effective negotiation through
diplomatic interactions.
China’s strategic interests, in other words the underlying interests of China in the SCS, are not clearly ordered
in priority and seemingly changing over time. Summing up the findings, the interest for which China aims at
achieving in the SCS is rhetorically wrapped with historical concerns that it inherited nationalistic justification
from its founding fathers’ irredentist policy. Furthermore, the SCS holds strategic significance as a battle ground
for the regional supremacy as well as a touchstone of testing China’s capability in maintaining the regional
stability. This paper also delineates that China has sought multi-pronged diplomacy, stretching extremes in various
platforms to prevent any encroachment into the SCS. China’s overwhelming capability in economic and military
power compared to that of other coastal states has facilitated it to expand its diplomatic manoeuvers.
In conclusion, China has maintained its territorial claim throughout its engagement in various diplomatic
interactions, meanwhile participated in bilateral, trilateral and multilateral negotiations for specific interests when
required. At this moment, the discussion on the size of negotiation – bilateral or multilateral – in the SCS has been
deeply associated with the issue of Chinese preference.114 It is repetitively proved in official Chinese sources that
China endorses discussion between ‘parties directly concerned in the bilateral manner’. This paper has attempted
to approach the issue of ‘bilateralism or multilateralism’ from the negotiating agenda and the specificity of
agreement. Future research can extend this discussion by answering the following questions: Does the size of
negotiation matter in terms of effectiveness? If the level of effectiveness can be quantified, what other variables
could be measured? Answering these questions by maintaining neutrality in methodology will further enhance
our objective understanding on China’s diplomacy.
(6,713 words)
114 Keyuan Zou, “Can China Respect the Law of the Seas- An Assessment of Maritime Agreements, The Role of China in
Maritime Security,” Harvard Asia Quarterly (2010), 42.
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