Rethinking Presidentialism: Challenges and Presidential Falls in South America
Author(s): Kathryn Hochstetler
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Comparative Politics, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Jul., 2006), pp. 401-418
Published by: Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York
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RethinkingPresidentialism
Challenges and Presidential Falls in SouthAmerica
Kathryn Hochstetler
Since the South American
countries returned to civilian government
in the 1970s and
1980s, twenty-three
percentof theirelectedpresidentshave been forced to leaveoffice
before the end of their terms. This striking rate of early presidential exits has received
little systematic attention, although it should be central in debates about the quality of
democracy
and possible
instability
in presidential
systems. Why
and how do South
Americans demand theirpresidents leave office early?Since 1978 themost serious
challenges
have come from civilian actors, in the legislature, on the streets, or both
together.The challengedpresidentswere more likely to be personally implicated in
scandal, to pursue neoliberal policies, and to lack a congressional majority than their
unchallenged counterparts. The presence or absence of street protests then played a cen
tral role in determining which presidents actually fell.
Presidentialismand Presidential Fails
The contrast between presidential
and parliamentary
regimes is one of the fundamental
dichotomiesof comparativedemocraticpolitics,with perennialdebates aboutwhich is
stable or more democratic.' This article looks only at presidential regimes, since
its central dilemma of early ends to executive terms is only possible in presidentialism.
It departs from Sartori's classic definition that a regime is presidential "if and only if the
head of state i) results from popular election, ii) during his or her pre-established tenure
cannot be discharged by a parliamentary vote, and iii) heads or otherwise directs the
governments that he or she appoints."2 Linz points out two features that are common to
more
all presidential systems: a directly elected president enjoys individual democratic legiti
macy and is elected for a rigidly fixed term.3 These definitions form the consensual
foundation formost ensuing investigations of presidentialism and its effects.
Incontradictionto theseexpectations,the regularemergenceof challengersdemand
ing that presidents
leave office early suggests that direct elections
not consistently give presidents
in South America
do
legitimacy that lasts as long as it should. This study con
siders only presidents who were selected by a popular vote of their populations and thus
at one time possessed evidence of their individual electoral legitimacy to be the head of
401
Comparative
July 2006
Politics
state and government. Of the forty such presidents whose
terms were over by the end of
2003, sixteenof them (fortypercent) faced challenges to theirremainingin office for
theirfull terms,andnine (twenty-threepercent)of their"fixed" termsended early (see
Table 1). Presidents
inVenezuela
Chavez
in Ecuador and Bolivia
have also fallen since 2003, and President
has narrowly survived challenges
it is obvious that South American
developments,
hold a given and fixed term of office.
The term "presidential
to his government. Given these
can not assume they will
presidents
fall" is used here to identify all the times elected presidents
leftoffice before theirtermswere completed,whether they resignedorwere impeached
forced out of office. "Challenges" involve concrete action to convince the
to
president
resign or to force him out early. The various challenges and falls are consid
or otherwise
ered together on the theoretical ground
that they are all equally deviations
from the
expectedfixed termof presidentialism.
All
these cases resulted in new civilian presidents
discussed here are changes within
in short order. Presidential
falls as
the regime, not regime breakdowns. Uniformly,
vice
presidentsand legislativeleaderstookconstitutionaltermsas presidentsafterpresiden
tial falls. Two challenges
Venezuela
in 2002
did include military protagonists
Ecuador in 2000 and
but they also quickly resulted in civilian regimes. The civilian
natureof presidentialfalls is especiallynotable sincenoncivilianactorsalso ineffective
ly threatened presidents during this time. Linz's expectation
in as a moderating
power to handle conflicts between
that themilitary would
the executive
step
and legislature
is
ratherdramaticallydisproved.4
Consequently, the focus is on challenges to presidents from civilian actors, in the leg
islature or in civil society. Many studies of presidential falls in South America have
focused on elite negotiations that bring down presidents in one country, treating street
protests as background pressure on elites.5 Others, however, give central place to the
role of mass protest in a specific presidential fall.6While these articles provide valuable
information about the unfolding of crisis moments, the study of presidential falls needs
in South
to be advanced in two ways in order to understand the general phenomenon
America
and perhaps beyond.
error of selecting on the
First, all of these studies suffer from the methodological
from
causes
variable
the
of
the
of presidential falls.
dependent
standpoint
understanding
cases
because the presidents fell and lack corresponding cases where presi
They select
terms despite efforts to throw them out. This article uses a
tool from studies of social movements, protest event analysis, to correct this method
dents remain in office whole
ological problem. Protest event analysis uses media sources to document the occurrence
forms of collective action as a first step in assessing the causes or
consequences of that action.7 This technique is used to document all of the sixteen times
since 1978 that South American mass publics or congressional elites have moved to
demand early ends to presidential terms (see Table 2). Most of the failed efforts are
of unconventional
largely forgotten since they did not succeed, but they are as crucial
402
in understanding
KathrynHochstetler
Table
1 Fates of Popularly Elected
Country President
Argentina Alfonsin
Menem I
MenemII
De laRia
PazEstenssoro
Bolivia
PazZamora
SanchezdeLozada
SanchezdeLozada
CollordeMello
Brazil
CardosoI
CardosoII
Chile
Aylwin
Frei
Colombia Turbay
Betancur
Barco
Gaviria
Samper
Pastrana
Ecuador FebresCordero
Borja
DurdnBallen
Bucaram
Mahuad
Paraguay Rodriguez
Wasmosy
Cubas
Peru
Belainde
Garcia
FujimoriI
FujimoriII
FujimoriIII
I
Uruguay Sanguinetti
Lacalle
II
Sanguinetti
Venezuela Herrera
Campins
Lusinchi
Perez
Caldera
Chavez
South American
Presidents,
1978-2003
Term
Minority Scandal Neoliberal Outcome
No
No
Resigned
1983-1989 Yes
No
Yes
1989-1995 Yes
Completed
Yes
Yes
1995-1999 Yes
Completed
Yes
No
1999-2001 Yes
Resigned
No
Yes
1985-1989 Yes
Completed
Yes
Yes
1989-1993 Yes
Completed
1993-1997 Yes
Yes
Yes
Completed
No
Yes
2002-2003 Yes
Resigned
convicted
Yes
Yes
1990-1992 Yes
resigned;
Impeached;
1995-1998 Yes
No
Yes
Challenged;
completed
No
Yes
Challenged;
completed
1999-2002 Yes
No
Yes
Completed
1990-1994 Yes
Yes
No
1994-2000 Yes
Completed
No
No
Completed
1979-1982 No
Yes
No
1982-1986 Yes
Completed
No
No
1986-1990 Yes
Completed
No
Yes
1990-1994 No
Completed
Yes
No
1994-1998 No
Challenged;
completed
Yes
Yes
1998-2002 Yes
Completed
Yes
1984-1988 Yes
No
Challenged;
completed
No
Yes
Challenged;
completed
1988-1992 Yes
Yes
Yes
1992-1996 Yes
Completed
Yes
Yes
Voted"incapable"
1996-1997 Yes
1998-2000 Yes
Yes
Yes
Civil/military
coup;voted
"desertion"
1989-1993 No
No
Yes
Completed
Yes
Yes
1993-1998 Yes
Challenged;
completed
Yes
Yes
1998-1999 No
Resignedfacingimpeachment
No
Yes
1980-1985 No
Completed
Yes
No
1985-1990 No
Completed
Yes
No
1990-1995 Yes
Impeached;
completed
Yes
No
1995-2000 No
Completed
Yes
Yes
2000-2000 Yes
Resigned,voted"incapable"
1985-1990 Yes
No
No
Completed
No
Yes
1990-1995 Yes
Completed
No
Yes
1995-2000 Yes
Completed
1979-1984 Yes
No
No
Completed
No
No
1984-1989 No
Completed
voted"desertion"
Yes
Yes
1989-1993 Yes
Impeached;
Yes
No
1994-1999 Yes
Completed
No
No
1999-2000 Yes
Completed
of illnessordeath,norpresidents
Note:This listdoesnot include
presidents
whosetermsendedearlyforreasons
areChallenged"
whosetermshadnotendedby2003. The textandnotesinthesection"WhyPresidents
explains
how thecaseswerecoded.
ones. There are three inductively identified reasons
for challenges: the president's neoliberal economic policies, his personal involvement in
scandal, and his minority status. In all forty presidencies, each of these is a risk factor
presidential
falls as the successful
for presidents who want to complete their terms, as challenged and fallen presidents dis
proportionately shared these characteristics compared to the full set of presidents.
Second, the presence or absence of street protests is central for the challenge out
comes. While both political elites and mass publics have tried to remove presidents
for presidential falls have included civil society actors
early, all successful mobilizations
demanding in the streets that presidents go.8 As Table 2 shows with its empty quadrant,
all five efforts to remove presidents that took place exclusively in the legislature failed.
These observations suggest that street protest is decisive at least in the final stages of
presidential falls. Street protests by civil society actors, with or without parallel legisla
tive action, appear to be the poder moderador (moderating power) of the new civilian
regimes. They mark a reversal of earlier patterns, when the military played this role in
the region, with its interventions often triggered by mass street protests.
403
Comparative
July 2006
Politics
Table 2 Civilian Challenges to Popularly Elected South American Presidents,
1978-2003
Location of action
Outcome
President fell
President remained
in office
Street
1989 Argentina
1999-2000 Ecuador
2001 Argentina
2003 Bolivia
1995 Brazil
Street and
legislature
1992 Brazil
1992-93 Venezuela
1997 Ecuador
1998-99 Paraguay
2000 Peru
1987 Ecuador
1991-92 Peru
1992 Ecuador
1994 Paraguay
1995-96 Colombia
1999 Brazil
The central role of mass protest in presidential
Legislature
falls suggests a need for further reflec
tionon the roleof thepublic inpresidentialism.Studiesof democraticconsolidationgen
erally have been too quick to turn to institutions rather than state-society
explain political outcomes.9 Studies of presidentialism
that one of the core features of presidential
relations to
have been as well, despite the fact
systems is themandate
the president receives
from thepopulationin electoralform.10
Discussions of presidentalismhave overlooked
the ways
that populations
evidently
can remove their mandate,
a phenomenon
that is
becomingmore ratherthanless common furtherintodemocraticconsolidation.
Most
studies of presidentialism
have departed from Juan Linz's classic work compar
ing presidentialismand parliamnentarism.
When Linz helped launchcomparativestudy
of these systems in the 1980s, he was right to argue that institutions had been understud
ied and needed to be given careful weight. 1 The ensuing institutional studies brought
many insights. Elite institutional factors are clearly central in routine politics (seventy
seven percent of recent presidents in South America did not fall) and numerous articles
continue tomap out interesting areas of inquiry for this kind of politics. 12For nonroutine
politics, however, institutionalanalyses are less helpful.l3Society-basedchallenges to
presidentspresenta dilemma for routineinstitutionalanalysis,playinghavocwith what
Barbara Geddes
identifies as the two standard simplifying
assumptions
for understand
ingpolitics indemocraticregimes:"first,thatofficialswant to remainin office; second,
that the best strategy for doing so is to give constituents what they want." 14The explana
tions for extraordinarypolitical outcomes such as presidential fallsmust include the
public as an active participant, especially
Protest Event Analysis
of Challenges
in resolving this contradiction.
to Presidents
Challenges are identified here through protest event analysis, which uses print media
sources to track protest event occurrences, using standardized coding procedures.15 The
challenge data presented here are based on twenty-five years of the newsletter Latin
404
KathrynHochstetler
AmericanWeeklyReport (LAWR).
The WeeklyReport bills itself as providing"timely
and concise risk-oriented briefing."'6 Thus, LAWR is very alert to protest events as well
as to unusual elite activities such as impeachment processes. Because of its weekly for
mat, it reports only the most important events, creating the usual event dataset biases
toward more dramatic events. Since the topic of interest here is efforts to overturn presi
dents, LAWR catches the relevant events.
One
issue in protest event analysis
is determination
of what counts as protest or,
here, challenge.For civil society actors, this study focuseson reportedmass mobiliza
tions that put crowds in the street. 17For congressional
actions, it draws on reports of the
schedulingof formal impeachmentproceedings or other concrete efforts to remove
presidents.To determinewhether a given protestor congressionalactionactuallyaimed
to eject a president, the reported aim in LAWR is taken. LAWR always stated straightfor
wardly what
the aim was, whether
interest here, the president's
agrarian reform, higher wages,
fall. Observers
of protest marches
or, the demand of
of thousands of people
inevitably brush over the different reasons
will understand
that such characterizations
why
take to the streets, but there is usually a preponderance
individuals
of evidence
about what brings the group together.
Why PresidentsAre Challenged
What
characteristics
parts? An
separate the challenged
inductive assessment
presidents
of the actual challenges
vated virtually all of the campaigns
from their regional counter
shows that three themes moti
to remove presidents early. For civil society actors,
dissatisfaction with economic policies was themost common reason to challenge presi
dents. Accusations of corruption, when linked to the figure of the president himself,
were important to both sets of actors. Legislators who faced minority presidents also
used challenges to fight out interbranch relations following the many formal changes in
constitutions during this period. Predicted probabilities resulting from a logit model of
the dependent variables show that the presence or absence of scandal has the largest
impact on the probability of both a challenge
Economic Policies
period generated
neoliberal policies,
to a president and a fall.
The regionalspreadof market-orientedpolicies during this time
intense political
and economic
conflicts.'8 While
some welcomed
protests against them filled the streets of South American
capitals
repeatedly. Most of these protests did not become protests against presidents remaining
in power. In all but two of the street-based challenging
coalitions
(Paraguay in 1998-99
and Peru in 2000) protest against the presidents' economic policies followed a charac
teristic pattern inwhich months of antieconomic protests suddenly exploded into insis
tence that the president must go. Thus seven months of continuous protests against De
405
Comparative
Politics
la Rua's economic
July 2006
policies
in Argentina
culminated
in two weeks
of calls for him to
leavebefore he resigned.Ten presidentsfollowingneoliberalpolicieswere targetedby
street-basedchallenges,while only one nonneoliberalpresident in thedataset (Alfonsin
inArgentina in 1989) faced streetchallenges.
In these challenges,
the scale of the demand
appears
to be related to the actors
involved.The street-basedmovements againstpresidentson economic groundswere
most commonlyorganizedby existing civil society organizations.Unions and students
formed a core of all these mobilizations,
with peak union organizations
repeatedly
in
the forefront.
When protests involvedonly unions and students,they focusedonmore
specific economic demands.Broadermobilizations that actually insistedpresidents
leave early always had additional participants,
moved
to join. Additional
pants were peasants,
Bolivia
including
individual citizens who were
varied by country, but other common partici
church organizations, and neighborhood groups. In Ecuador and
organizations
indigenous groups have been central players, while Brazil and Venezuela
times had professional
associations. Business
they have only been a part of the challenges
presidents were
Challenged
in 1997; since then
up to and including the effort to remove Bucaram
ety mobilizations
far more
some
groups also supported all of the civil soci
to Chavez
inVenezuela.
likely to follow neoliberal
economic
policies
than securityor populist policies by ten versus one.19This disproportionateresult is
somewhat
ameliorated by inclusion of
the full set of presidents
after 1978, as many
more presidentsfollowedsuchpolicies.Of the thirty-oneneoliberalpresidents,fourteen
were challenged(forty-fivepercent),and eight fell (thirty-onepercent).These numbers
are higher
than the thirty-three percent of security-oriented
(three of nine)
presidents
who were challenged and the eleven percent (one) who fell, but many presidents sur
vived this risk factor. To complete the picture, there have also been antipresident
protests in the one country of the region that has most clearly broken with neoliberal
ism,Venezuela.
Corruption
challenge
and Other
presidents
Scandals
when
Congresses
there was
and civil society actors often joined to
good evidence
of corruption
or scandal
that
involved the presidenthimself. Congresses initiatednumerous investigationsin such
cases, using the resources and procedures of their branch of government.
part, legislators
limited themselves
to legal processes
dents for corruption, and citizens supported their efforts.
The formal impeachment process was the most common,
eleven legislative challenges
procedures
initiated in nine of the
to presidents and threatened many more
legislatures have and eventually used a variety of more
in these cases. Only
For the most
in their efforts to remove presi
times.20 Yet most
or less constitutional
the near-textbook Brazilian
impeachment
removal
in 1992 actu
ally went through all of the legal steps of impeachment, from investigation to impeach
ment by one body to a final judgment by another. In several cases, congresses eventual
406
KathrynHochstetler
ly chose removal processes
that did not require the supermajorities
of impeachment,
removingpresidentsfor desertion (Venezuelain 1993,Ecuador in 2000),mental inca
pacity (Ecuador in 1997), and moral incapacity (Peru in 2000). The use of these kinds
of procedures may seem quite removed from impeachment, which is often considered a
specialnonpartisanlegalremovalprocess for specialpresidentialwrongdoing.However,
impeachment
has always been "fundamentally
end," making
the distinctions
a political
process
from beginning
to
among these kinds of removal less central.21 The Spanish
translationof impeachment,juicio politico (literally,political judgment),makes the
word's double meaning clear. Juicio politico can mean either the constitutional instruc
tion that a political body, the legislature, judge the extraordinary case of legal removal
of a political figure or judgments that are politically motivated.
Bothmeanings are relevantto the recentlegislativechallenges topresidentsinSouth
America. The Brazilian
constitutional
impeachment of Collor
in 1992 is the best example of a fully
process. The removal of Venezuela's
Perez illustrates both meanings:
impeached and removed from office for his shady use of a
slush fund, this impeachment was simply the last of five attempts made by a
while he was appropriately
$17 million
hostile congress to removehim over an eighteen-monthperiod. In addition,afterPerez
stepped down to wait for his trial, congress removed him permanently
on the questionable ground that he had abandoned his office.22
before it began,
Citizens often staged demonstrationsin supportof these congressionalefforts on
corruption grounds. In the largest, millions of Brazilians insisted that Collor go. On the
basis of unsystematic evidence from the Weekly Reports, evidence of personal corrup
tion also seems to be related to low public opinion approval ratings, which contributed
to streetprotests.Only eightpercentof BraziliansconsideredCollor's regime tobe good
as he began his year of decline, while theVenezuelan Perez dropped to the historic low
of six percent approval.23 Ecuador's Mahaud holds the bottom, with just two percent
approval ratings as he was being challenged.24 The quick impact of corruption on public
opinion can be seen in Peru, where Fujimori's approval rating dropped from forty-three
to sixteen percent after a video showed clear corruption in his administration, despite
to accept his abuses of power.25
the Peruvian public's long willingness
It is challenging for analysts and for South American citizens to assess the overall
incidence of corruption and scandal among the region's presidents. Accusations
are
nearly constant, and court action against a president is neither necessary nor sufficient
to prove wrongdoing.
The research strategy used here, which marks a president as per
sonally corrupt when the charges are credible enough to appear as themajor news story
of theweek in LMAWR,approximates the domestic level of belief that the president is cor
rupt.26
This belief, whether trueor not, is the possible foundationof challenges.The
absence of reported corruption does seem to shield presidents. Only eight of twenty-six
such presidents (thirty-one percent) were challenged, and only three presumably non
corrupt presidents actually fell.27 Conversely, while action against corrupt presidents is
sometimes swift, the larger set of cases shows thatmany presidents survive serious alle
407
Comparative
Politics
July 2006
gationsof personalcorruption.Six of fourteen(forty-threepercent)were not challenged
at all during their terms, and only six were removed from office early.
Minority Presidents In legislatures,challengeswere largelydirectedatminority pres
idents.Fourteenminority and twomajoritypresidentswere challenged.Opposition leg
islatorswere eager to bring corruptionchargesagainstpresidentswho were personally
implicated, as just discussed.
In the absence of such reports, they usually invoked some
kind of claim aboutunconstitutionalpresidentialbehaviorwith respect to congress or
other institutions of government
(Ecuador in 1987 and 1992; Peru in 1991-92;
Paraguay
in 1998-99). Many of these challenges tominority presidentswere clearlypolitically
motivated. Ecuador provided severalnotable examples.An impeachmentattempt in
1992,
for example, was justified
reform and on Borja's
reference
by congressional
to members
objections
of Congress
to a bill on monetary
as "layabouts."28 Ecuador's
presidents were also notably unrestrained in their dealings with congress. Febres
Cordero, who
faced down a removal effort in 1987, had his congress
tear-gassed and
brought tanks to the court building to block several congressionally appointed judges.29
Publics were often indifferent to this kind of congressional challenge. A sharp rise in
public approval after Fujimori's coup in 1992 was the most
banded congress' vote to impeach him was completely
agree that Cubas had overstepped
striking example.30 The dis
ignored. Paraguayans
the boundaries of constitutional
in 1999 did
behavior, especially
after the assassination of his vice president, and gathered "to protect the Congress
build
ing".3'
Overall, presidents whose
parties held a minority of congressional seats were more
likely both to be challenged by civilian actors and to fall.32 This relationship holds even
if themuch larger number of minority presidents in the region is considered. Of the thir
ty-oneminority presidents in this study, fourteen(forty-fivepercent)were challenged
percent) fell. Of the rarer nine majority presidents, only two
(twenty-two percent) were challenged, and only one (eleven-percent) fell. Fallen presi
dent Cubas in Paraguay was the only president challenged by his own party's legislators
and eight (twenty-six
from the outset, but the Colorado Party is so dominant
party against itself.33 The other challenge was
there that politics often pits the
to Samper
in Colombia
in 1995-96; his
party's majority control of congress and especially the investigative committee was cru
cial in his remaining in office.34 In addition, three ex-presidents who were eventually
and Fujimori in Peru and
tried for crimes committed during their presidencies-Garcia
inVenezuela-may
have been able to avoid formal challenges while in office
Lusinchi
because theyhad congressionalmajorities.These experiencessuggest thatpresidential
challenge and fall are related to themajority or minority position of the president's party
in the legislature and support arguments about the problematic and unstable intersection
it is not the only factor, as
between presidential and multiparty systems.35 Nevertheless,
some majority presidents were challenged,
408
and many minority
presidents were not. The
KathrynHochstetler
only two countries that had no challenges
to presidents, Uruguay
and Chile, also had no
majoritypresidents.
Summary Neoliberal economicpolicies, personalcorruption,andminority statusall
representrisk factorsfor SouthAmericanpresidentswho want to complete theirterms
inoffice. Table 3 summarizesthepredictedprobabilitiesresultingfroma logitmodel of
the dependentvariables,challenge and presidentialfall,which were calculatedusing
CLARIFY36
Table 3 reports first differences
variables, which
are calculated by varying
in predicted probability on the dependent
the variables of interest from zero to one
while holding the other independent variables at their modal values. The modal presi
dent in the region during these years was a minority president who followed neoliberal
economic policies and was not personally implicated in scandal. Such a president faced
a 38.6 percent predicted probability of being challenged and a 16.5 percent predicted
probability of falling.37 Presidents with a legislative majority or who did not follow
could count on a small reduction in their risk of being challenged.
neoliberal policies
Forpresidentspersonally implicatedin scandal,in contrast,thepredictedprobabilityof
facing a challenge jumped to 63 percent (38.6 plus 24.4). Scandal also greatly increased
the predicted probability that a president would actually fall early, with the probability
climbing
to 48.4 percent (16.5 plus 31.9). The other independent variables vary in the
predicted direction but do not have a large impact on the predicted probability of falls.
From Challenge
to Fall: The Roles of Street Protest
As Table 2 indicates, the presence of a mobilized population demanding in the streets
that the president leave appears to be a crucial determinant of the success of challenges.
Legislators
acting on their own were unable or unwilling to remove presidents. Street
legislative action and, increasingly, was a phenomenon on its own
protest accompanied
inpresidentialfalls.
Street Protests and Legislative Challenges
Mass protest played a central role in the
outcomes of congressional challenges to presidents after 1978 in South America. As
these challengesunfolded, legislatorsappearedto calculatewhether populationswere
more
likely to punish them for action or inaction against presidents who at one point
enough popular support to be elected to the highest office in the land.
commanded
Large-scalestreetprotestsclamoringfor the removalof presidentspersuadedlegislators
to act against them. Most
important, they could move
erstwhile supporters of the presi
dent into the opposition. The driving force of the fear of punishment from voters was
especially evident in Collor's impeachment in Brazil, where looming subnational elec
tions sealed his fate. Members of congress not only voted to impeach, but hurried to do
so before theelection.38
409
Comparative
Politics
July 2006
Institutional action or inaction can also shape whether or not the public moves. In the
case, a key supreme court vote required votes be made public, reducing
same Brazilian
Collor'sability to buy secretsupport,and congressionalinvestigations
uncoveredimpor
tant information that helped mobilize
citizens.39 Other actors, such as themedia,
can play
the investigativerole,but institutionsretainkey controlover theirown internalprocesses.
In several other cases
Venezuela
and Peru in 2000-street
in 1992-93,
Ecuador
in 1997, Paraguay in 1998-99,
mobilizations
also pushed legislatures to take action against
presidents who had fairly clearly violated laws on the scale of theUnited States' language
of high crimes and misdemeanors.
These examples illustrate the rise of meaningful politi
cal accountability that can restrain South America's historically over-strong presidents.
At the same time, some of the developments of this time period have primarily spot
lightedtheongoingweaknesses of democraticnorms,constitutionallanguage,and judi
cial and investigative systems. In several cases where challenges failed Ecuador in
1987, Peru in 1991-92, and Paraguay in 1994-civil
society failed to join the call to
remove presidents who had almost certainly engaged in illegal behavior. More than fifty
Colombian
nongovernmental organizations put together a respected civil commission to
accompany the attempted impeachment of Samper in 1995-1996, and business leaders
tried to organize opposition, but they were unable to move people to the streets.40 In
this case, Samper's majority party was able to stifle a congressional investigation, and
the population never heard much of the evidence against him.4'
The final image that emerges from these challenges is of a dialectical interaction
between the challenges of legislatures and populations. This process could spiral into
mutually reinforcing collaborative action that frequently was able to push presidents out
of power, especially in response to scandal. When legislative action found no popular
reaction, the challenge failed. In contrast, when popular outrage at presidents met no
institutionalsupport,street-basedchallenges to presidentscould continueon theirown
and often did so successfully.
A second kind of challenge to presidents has
to Presidents
Challenges
taken place largely in the streets, although itmay include party allies in noninstitutional
roles. This kind of challenge shows little attention to constitutional procedures and is
Street-based
settled throughdirectmediation between presidents and citizens. These challenges
come from societies
that are polarized against the state and result in academic
Table 3 Predicted Probabilities
of Challenges
and Falls
Predicted probability of modal case
First differences in probability of a challenge varying:
Neoliberal
Scandal
Minority
410
Challenge
38.6
-11.3
24.4
-15.7
Fall
16.5
-1.0
31.9
-5.0
studies
KathrynHochstetler
in part because these protests have been
that do not clearly rise to the standard of
that are similarly polarized. They are polarized
driven largely by demands
and accusations
impeachableoffenses.Unpopularand ineffectivepolicies arenot illegal.
Street challenges to presidents provide some of the most striking images in recent
South American politics. Television channels have shown continuous coverage of large
crowds camped outside presidentialpalaces, demanding the president's resignation.
Civil society challenges
thousands of participants,
that were
large enough to warrant notice
and no president
fell in response
in LAWR had at least
to street mobilizations
of
less than 10,000. Yet some quite largemobilizations failed to remove presidents,
although the largest failed protests were against Chaivez inVenezuela and may yet suc
ceed.42 The more consistent requirement was persistence. No single day's outburst of
protest persuaded a president to leave. Instead, protesters needed the conviction and
organization to press presidents for days in a row, or sometimes at intervals formonths.
All
the challenged presidents had time to respond by offering policy concessions
or by
hardeningtheirstances.
Numerous presidentschose to defend theirpresidenciesfromwhat they considered
the blackmail of protesters. After minimal
negotiations,
they sent in police or even mili
tary forces to clear the streets. The prevalence of violence on both sides is an important
feature of these challenges and appears related to their success, negatively for presidents
andpositively forprotesters.
of street protesters over the decades marched peacefully.
incivility has been a regular part of civil society mobilizations, with most
including violent acts. Leaders of all kinds lost control of most of the protests at some
point. The Brazilian impeachment process stands out again as unusual, as itwas the
Most
of the millions
Nonetheless,
only one of nine successful challenges to presidents that did not involve violence of any
kind. Riots, looting, and arson marred nearly all the others. Roadblocks, not usually
legal but not inherently violent, were also regular parts of protest mobilizations
in
Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador. In several cases, violence went much further, as in the
use of nail bombs in Bolivia in 2003 that killed several soldiers.43 The short-lived coups
in Ecuador in 2000 and Venezuela in 2002 also were obvious peaks of unconstitutionali
to jettison civility
ty,with some actors in civil society showing a worrisome willingness
altogether and to enlist military allies to push presidents out.
The violence of protesters does not exist in a vacuum. Incivility was inflamed by state
violence
and repression. The levels of protester violence and the number of protesters
killed by security forces clearly were associated. So far, Brazil and Ecuador have had
unusually nonviolent challenges on the part of both protesters and security forces. During
fivemobilizations forpresidentialfalls in the twocountries,streetprotesterswere violent
only in Ecuador
in 1997, and that challenge also involved the only protester death. The
forces in determining
levels of violence
can be seen in the
Ecuadorian coup in 2000. Itwas bloodless in large part because soldiers actually encour
key role of security
aged protesters to occupy the congressional
building.44 At the other end of the spectrum,
411
Comparative
Argentina
Politics
July 2006
and Venezuela
period, with
have had themost consistently deadly repression over this time
twenty-five killed in the Argentine mobilizations
against De
la Rula and up
to forty-sixreporteddead followingtheVenezuelancivil/militarycoup attemptin2002.45
Earlier streetchallenges in 1989 (Argentina)and 1992-93 (Venezuela)also involved
numerous
injuries to protesters and sixteen deaths inVenezuela. Venezuela
and Paraguay
sharetheunhappydistinctionof being the two locationswhere presidents'supportersand
challengers clashed in the street, raising levels of violence
ety's challenge
to Cubas
in 1999 would
largest number of deaths reported was
otherwise
in Bolivia
in both. Paraguayan civil soci
have probably been peaceful. The
in 2003, with as many as one hundred
killed.46Only Chavez inVenezuela has surviveda challenge inwhich security forces
respondedtoprotesterswith significantuse of forceandnumerousdeaths.
Presidents'other option is to negotiate and offer policy concessions.Such negotia
tionswere difficult.Because of the amorphousnatureof the streetprotests,presidents
rarely found interlocutors
who could guaranteetheir followers'response to particular
offers. Consequently,
successful. Cardoso
negotiations
often proceeded
lent protests against him and waited
"negotiation" with
by trial and error and were
in Brazil successfully made very minimal
responses
for them to fizzle. The most
the street came after De
rarely
to the nonvio
striking instance of
la Rua fell in Argentina, when
protesters
Saa. In subsequent months,
many an economic policy was "openly assessed by the politicians in terms of its poten
also were able to reject his first real successor, Rodriguez
tial to provoke a caceroleo [peaceful protest of banging pots and pans]."47
Parties and legislatures play one of two roles in these scenarios. Many traditional
parties seem to have concluded that their open support for street protests will under
In 2002 Paraguayan Colorado politicians
mine the challenges.
trying to remove
Cubas'
protests that were purported to be by civil society
those organizations
expose the protesters as fakes.48
in Argentina openly took credit for neigh
Peronist party members
replacement
organizations,
only
Similarly, while
borhood
orchestrated
to have
food riots, the Peronist leadership only secretly supported national chal
la Rua and found itself also under attack from the streets after replacing
lenges to De
him.49Nonetheless, street-basedprotestsby civil society often cruciallydepended on
legislative
Sanchez
inaction for success,
de Lozada
in his governing
as was
also true in Argentina.50
In Bolivia,
as well,
resigned only after his vice president and then parties
indicated that they could not support him.5'
reluctantly
coalition
Street protesters often worked closely with new parties towhich they had strong ties.
The earliest prototypes were the 1995 and 1999 challenges to Cardoso in Brazil, led by
theWorkers'
Party (PT) and Democratic
Labor Party (PDT). Both of these parties have
and the PT has also had strong relationships with social movements.
These mobilizations with their strong party orientation were able tomobilize less than a
ties to unions,
tenth of the participants of the cross-party mobilizations
of 1992, however, and were
in their aim of presidential fall. Similarly, there are now parties or party
unsuccessful
412
KathrynHochstetler
equivalents
in Ecuador and Bolivia
that are linked to indigenous, union, and other civil
They havebeenmore successful.Despite thepresenceof politi
societyorganizations.52
cal parties and even some congressional representatives, party and electoral logics are
inmost of these protests. None of the challenges took place in the final
not dominant
year of a president's term. It is also worth noting that only three protest leaders
became presi
Gutierrez in Ecuador, Lula in Brazil, and Toledo in Peru-eventually
in
elections.
dents, and all did so by standing
Street challenges
for democracy
are problematic
because of the levels of protester
and the rare targeting of impeachable behaviors. Thus, Roberto Laserna, writ
ing on the protest movements that removed Sanchez de Lozada in Bolivia in 2003, criti
violence
cizes "a populist conservative movement
that articulates communitarian
talgias" and laments that democratic citizenship
ties.53 Valenzuela
also worries
and statist nos
is seen as all rights and no responsibili
that protests against presidents
can lead to crises that
threatenthewhole constitutionalorder.54
arise
Most authors, including Valenzuela, emphasize that such protest movements
out of the frustrations of what are now several decades of problematic and incomplete
democracy.55 Also writing about Bolivia, but before the fall of Sanchez de Lozada,
summarizes a litany of concerns
tions of this new round of challenges to presidents.
Laurence Whitehead
that lie behind many
interpreta
Behind thewhole movement lay the conviction thata generationof liberalizingreformshad failed to
deliver
tangible benefits
to the majority
of the people;
that political
parties of all stripes had become
self-servingcliques incapableof solvingnationalproblems;thatonly directaction indefiance of pub
lic authoritycould deliver anyworthwhile changes in governmentpolicy; thatall institutionalproce
dures were devices
this logic would
to delay and frustrate public demands;
lose out to those who
and that any who held back from following
acted first.56
that it is politicians who think
To paraphrase Laverna, protesters have concluded
democracy is all rights and no responsibilities. Seen in this light, the protests are democ
ratic processes, with civil society seeking to have a voice where it has been roughly
excluded or, as Lucero argues for the indigenous movements of Ecuador, simply engag
ing in the historic process of constructing rights throughpolitical contestation.57
Whether
America
are literally true in all the countries of South
Whitehead's
observations
in the first years of the twenty-first century, a question that is beyond the scope
of this article, it is an undeniable
ments
that share these convictions
fact thatmost South American
countries have move
and are acting on them.
Conclusion: Presidents,Legislatures, Publics, and Presidentialism
Challenged presidents share a set of probabilistic risk factors: personal implication in
scandal, neoliberal policies, and minority status. At the same time, the dynamics of
413
Comparative
Politics
recent challenges
July 2006
to presidents
and their outcomes
appear to be closely
related to the
complicatedand less studiedphenomenonof streetprotest.The patternsof interaction
among presidents, legislatures,and publics, as they have appeared in recent South
American
politics,
require new attention to presidentialism
and to possible variations
in
it indifferentregionsof theworld.
In a presidential
system presidents
inevitably stand apart and above other political
actors because of their special powers and special sources of legitimacy.58 Since 1978
the shape of these powers has been on the political agenda in South American countries
nearly constantly. The huge amount of time and energy that went
into challenges
to
is yet another demonstration of the centrality of presidents. At the same time,
the regular challenges to presidents show how vulnerable they are to the withdrawal of
presidents
their special legitimacy. Populations evidently can and do withdraw their mandates for
to rule them, and few presidents have survived large and violent mobiliza
presidents
tionsagainstthem.
The phenomenonof SouthAmerican presidentialfall suggests severalobservations
and their relationships to both presidents and publics. In extreme
like removal from office, legislatures emerge as stronger in practice
in more normal politics.
be expected from their comparative weakness
about legislatures
political
events,
than would
Legislaturestookpart inbringingdown five presidents,often cuttingconstitutionalcor
ners in the process.
In contrast, only Peruvian president Fujimori managed
to close a
legislature,despite regularrumorsof "anotherFujimorazo."Mass publics have not
turned against legislators in the same way that they have pushed out presidents. There
were only two cases of mass protests against congresses, the "que se vayan todos" (get
inArgentina after the fall of De la Rua and similar fury in
them all out) mobilizations
the Ecuadorian streets in 2000 after the civil society/military coup failed. There may be
some difference in the nature of the mandate given to presidents as opposed to that of
legislatures, perhaps related to their separation of purpose.59 Alternatively, itmay simply
be too complicated to take down a group of diverse actors like a congress.
Legislators also can exercise their power against presidents only with allies in civil
society. Political scientists need to return some attention to state-society relations to
understand political outcomes and the quality of democracy. It seems clear that South
American politicians and parties are steadily less able to channel a significant portion of
into existing political institutions. This conclusion is supported by quite
different evidence on party affiliations and elections as well.60 Whether civil society,
political society, or both are responsible for this breakdown in representation, they must
social demands
be engaged for the sake of both the quality and stability of regional democracy. Further
research in this direction could look not just at street protests, but also at other data
related to the population at large, such as public opinion, unemployment
figures, and
the sustained presence or absence of street actors who can effectively veto policy as well
as challenge presidents.
Overall, the evidence
414
on presidential
falls supports the arguments
that at least in
KathrynHochstetler
SouthAmerica presidentialism is a political system with special vulnerabilities.
However, they are not necessarilyquite like those identifiedto date.Not only do the
dual democraticlegitimaciesof presidentsand legislaturespush them towardcompeti
tion,but because of the unanticipatedcapacityof publics towithdraw theirmandates
from presidents, the public remains an active player in the development of
presidencies.6' It can be a crucial support to either side in the ongoing struggles
between executivesand legislaturesand deserves furtherstudyas such.Moreover, the
fortypercent of SouthAmerican presidentswho were challenged by legislaturesor
protestmovements and the twenty-threepercentwho were forcedout of office early
confirm
that presidential
terms are not as rigidly defined
in practice as the theoretical
discussion suggests.These twoobservationssupporttheargumentthatSouthAmerican
presidentialismisprone tobreakdown.
Yet theversionof breakdownis not thedescent intoauthoritarianism
thatmost fear.
violent,
uncertain
challenges
to
South
American
presidents
after
1978 result
Awkward,
ed innew civiliangovernments.Schamiscreditsthe survivalof democracyinArgentina
to specialquasi-parliamentary
institutions,but all of thecountrieswhere presidentsfell
producedsimilarresultswith a varietyof procedures.62
While thedetails vary, they too
passed
mentary
through a period of "high-level bargaining of the kind that is typical of parlia
systems after an election has been held or a government
has collapsed"
and
came out with a new president and some kind of term and went on.63 The parliamentary
phrase of lost confidence
draw itsmandate
is also helpfully evocative of the ways
for a president to rule. Thus, the often-lamented
institutional flexibility
its own hybrid of parliamentalism
countries may be producing
of South American
the electorate can with
and
presidentialisminpractice thathas helped create theunexpectedstabilityof basic elec
toraldemocracy in the region,even as individualpresidentsfell.This hybridbehavior
may also appear in routine decision making.64
Challenges to presidents and presidential falls are not limited to South America, as
shown by the experiences of Philippine president Estrada, President Clinton in the
United States, and others. One obvious next step for research is to catalogue challenges
to presidentialism
of
outside South America and their causes and outcomes. This analysis
experiences can not make conclusions about the worldwide phe
South American
nomenon.Certainly,SouthAmerica isunusual in theextremeflexibilityof itspresiden
tial terms, especially
in contrast with the classic case of U.S. presidentialism
and its con
tinuinghighly rigid terms.Which, if either, is a better startingpoint forunderstanding
the general phenomenaof presidentialismand presidential fall is an open question.
Whether themore specificmotivations for challengeshold andwhether streetprotests
too, although it is worth noting that
also failed to mobilize
support in the
are equally decisive elsewhere are open questions
the failed congressional
challenge
streets. In any case, the phenomenon
appears more
to Clinton
of presidential
important for current presidentialism
fall deserves additional research and
than outright regime breakdown.
415
Comparative
July 2006
Politics
NOTES
I would
like to acknowledge
helpful suggestions from Javier Auyero, Elisabeth Jay Friedman, Dawn King,
Steven Levitsky, Fiona Macaulay, Vicky Murillo, David Samuels, Kurt Weyland,
and the anonymous reviewers.
Special thanks to Kyle Saunders for assisting with the statistical analysis and its interpretation. Finally, the
librarians of the Latin American Centre, Oxford University, were very helpful in facilitating my need to read
of issues of Latin American Weekly Report.
Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela,
eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy
(Baltimore: The Johns
and Matthew
and
Press, 1994); Scott Mainwaring
Soberg Shugart, eds., Presidentialism
Hopkins University
in Latin America
Press, 1997); Adam Przeworski, Michael
(Cambridge: Cambridge University
Democracy
and Development:
Political Institutions
Jos? Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, Democracy
Alvarez,
hundreds
1.
and Economic
2.
Press,
3.
1950-1999
Performance,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
2nd ed. (New York: New York University
Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional
Engineering,
1994), p. 84.
Juan J. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary
eds., p. 6.
Valenzuela,
4.
Linz, p. 7.
5.
John M. Carey, "Transparency vs. Collective
Democracy:
Does
ItMake
a Difference?,"
in Linz
and
Action: Fujimori's Legacy and the Peruvian Congress,"
Hector E. Schamis, "Argentina: Crisis and
Comparative Political Studies, 36 (November 2003), 983-1006;
13 (April 2002), 81-94. Carey's review of a series of recent
Democratic Consolidation," Journal of Democracy,
cases also presumes
that executive-legislative
relations are central. John M. Carey, "Presidentialism
and
Institutions,"
Representative
in Latin America,
Governance
6.
Ernesto
in Jorge I. Dom?nguez
and Michael
2nd ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
Shifter,
eds., Constructing
Democratic
Press, 2003), pp. 22-25.
10 (July 1999), 93-100;
'"People Power' in Paraguay," Journal of Democracy,
in the Andes: Peru's Decade
of Living Dangerously,"
Journal of
"High Anxiety
Diego Abente-Brun,
Garc?a Calder?n,
12 (April 2001), 46-58;
Journal of Democracy,
University
in the Andes: Crisis and Contention
Lucero, "High Anxiety
12 (April 2001), 59-73; Kurt Weyland,
"The Rise and Fall of President
Collor and Its Impact on Brazilian Democracy," Journal oflnteramerican
Studies and World Affairs, 35 (1993),
to his comparative
1-37. In the conclusion
the
P?rez-Li??n
study of a new presidentialism,
acknowledges
Democracy,
in Ecuador"
Jos? Antonio
apparent role of popular protest but does not analyze
Gobernabilidad:
?Hacia un Nuevo Presidencialismo?,"
149-64.
7.
1999),
8.
Ruud Koopmans
123-30.
and Dieter Rucht,
it. An?bal
P?rez-Li??n,
"Pugna de Poderes y Crisis de
Latin American Research Review, 38 (October 2003),
"Protest Event Analysis?Where
to Now?," Mobilization,
I use the term civil society in a narrowly descriptive way here, to indicate nonstate
assumptions that they are necessarily civil or democratic.
4 (Fall
actors. I do not make
normative
9.
Deborah
J. Yashar, "Democracy,
Indigenous Movements,
America," World Politics, 52 (October 1999), 76-106.
Susan C. Stokes, Mandates
and Democracy: Neoliberalism
10.
Cambridge University Press, 2001).
11. Linz, pp. 3-5.
For example, Octavio Amorim
12.
Formation
in the Americas,"
Neto,
"The Presidential
Political
and the Post Liberal
by Surprise
Challenge
in Latin America
in Latin
(Cambridge:
Executive Policy-Making
and Cabinet
39 (forthcoming, August 2006); Jos? Antonio
and the Survival of Presidential
Democracies,"
David J. Samuels and Matthew
Soberg Shugart,
Studies,
Calculus:
Comparative
Deadlock
Situations,
"Minority Governments,
Political Studies, 35 (April 2002), 284?312;
Comparative
15 (January 2003), 33-60.
"Presidentialism, Elections, and Representation," Journal of Theoretical Politics,
of Rational-Choice
for the Study of Latin American
"Limitations
Institutionalism
13. Kurt Weyland,
37 (January 2002), 57-85.
Politics," Studies in Comparative International Development,
Cheibub,
416
KathrynHochstetler
14.
Politics
15.
Barbara Geddes, Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003).
and Rucht.
Koopmans
and Research
Design
in Comparative
.asp. Citations to specific issues follow the Report's format:
Hrtp://www.latinnews.com/lwr_/LWR_2315
WR-00-03
is the third issue of the Weekly Report in 2000.
17. This type of action contrasts with the more institutionalized kinds of activity that have emerged inmany
sectors since the return to civilian rule. See Elisabeth Jay Friedman and Kathryn Hochstetler,
social movements
16.
in Latin American Democratization:
and Civil
the Third Transition
Representational
Regimes
"Assessing
Society in Brazil and Argentina," Comparative Politics, 35 (October 2002), 21-42.
in Latin America:
Politics
18. Carol Wise and Riordan Roett, eds., with Guadalupe Paz, Post-Stabilization
Institution Press, 2003).
Competition, Transition, Collapse
(Washington, DC: Brookings
19.
policy
20.
are from Stokes, pp. 14-15. Data for other years are from the Economist. This col
"yes" for presidents whose policy orientation in government was neoliberal, "no" for
that the Economist
calls "populist."
Data for 1982-1995
umn in Table
1 ismarked
orientations
See also Jody C
and Naoko
in Jody C
"Introduction:
Presidential
Comparative
Impeachment,"
in Comparative
eds., Checking Executive Power: Presidential
Impeachment
Perspective
(Westport: Praeger, 2003); An?bal P?rez-Li??n, "Presidential Crises and Democratic Accountability
in Latin America,
in Susan E. Eckstein and Timothy P.Wickham-Crowley,
1990-1999,"
eds., What Justice?
Baumgartner,
Kada,
Baumgartner
Whose Justice? Fighting for Fairness
21.
Baumgartner, p. 5.
22.
23.
(Berkeley: University
of California
Press, 2003).
WR-93-36.
See WR-92-01;
the Deck Chairs
Romero,
"Rearranging
Latin American Research Review, 32 (1997), 15.
Anibal
inVenezuela,"
Democracy
24. WR-00-02.
25.
in Latin America
on the Titanic:
The Agony
of
WR-00-40.
This estimate of the level of corruption is very conservative, as LAWR frequently does not report cor
ruption charged in other sources. In addition, it should be noted that a president is labeled corrupt only if the
report ismade during the term when he might have been challenged. In this column of Table 1, "yes" indicates
that the president was personally implicated in charges of impeachable offenses, normally financial corruption.
26.
27.
They were Alfonsin,
ed in his first term.
28.
WR-92-17.
29.
Catherine
M.
Politics of Neoliberalism
De
laRua, and Sanchez
de Lozada
II in Bolivia,
for whom
corruption was
report
James M. Malloy,
and Luis A. Abugattas,
"Business and the 'Boys': The
Conaghan,
in the Central Andes," Latin American Research Review, 25 (1990), 3-30; Anita Isaacs,
in Ecuador," Bulletin of Latin American Research,
Consolidation
10 (1991), 221-38.
John Crabtree, "The Collapse
of Fujimorismo:
Authoritarianism
and Its Limits," Bulletin of Latin
American Research, 20 (July 2001), 295.
Peter Lambert, "A Decade
of Electoral Democracy:
in Paraguay,"
31.
Continuity, Change and Crisis
19 (July 2000), 392; Abente-Brun.
Bulletin of Latin American Research,
"Problems of Democratic
30.
are from Charles D. Kenney, Fujimori's Coup and the Breakdown of Democracy
in
For presidents after 1997,
of Notre Dame Press, 2004), pp. 264-66.
is considered to
data are from www.observatorioelectoral.org,
using Kenney's methodology
("[a] presidency
32.
Data for 1978-1997
Latin America
(Notre Dame: University
in each legislative chamber
if the president enjoyed the support of a majority
have had a legislative majority
throughout his or her term in office). Kenney, p. 333, note 3. It should be noted that this definition is stringent.
33.
Lambert.
John C Dugas, "Drugs, Lies, and Audiotape: The Samper Crisis in Colombia
(Review Essay)," Latin
Research Review, 36 (2001), 157-74; Naoko Kada, "The Role of Investigative Committees
in the
in Brazil and Colombia," Legislative
Presidential
Studies Quarterly,
28 (February
Impeachment Processes
34.
American
2003),
29-54.
417
Comparative
July 2006
Politics
35.
Scott Mainwaring,
and Democracy:
The Difficult
"Presidentialism,
Combination,"
Multipartism,
Comparative Political Studies, 26 (July 1993), 198-228.
and Gary King, CLARIFY: Software for Interpreting and Presenting
36. Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg,
Statistical Results, Version 2.1, Stanford University, University
of Wisconsin,
and Harvard University,
January
Also see Gary King, Michael
5, 2003. available at http://gking.harvard.edu/.
Tomz, and Jason Wittenberg,
"Making the Most of Statistical Analyses:
Improving Interpretation and Presentation," American Journal of
Political
Science, 44 (April 2000), 347-61.
Since this set is a population rather than a sample, the probabilities are the most important indicator of
the relationships in the data. A table of the coefficients and results are available from the author upon request.
Peter Flynn, "Collor, Corruption and Crisis: Time for Reflection," Journal of Latin American Studies,
38.
37.
25 (May 1993), 351-71; Weyland, "The Rise and Fall of President Collor."
39.
See Flynn, p. 364; Marcos Nobre, "Pensando o Impeachment," Novos
1992), 15-19.
40.
Comisi?n
42.
Inmost
inVenezuela
43.
cases there is no reliable
in 2002-3
information
show the broadest
45.
46
WR-03^14.
47.
WR-02-02,p.
WR-02-29.
48.
34 (November
al Presidente
de
la
Samper Pizano
WR-02-15;
p. 63.
WR-02-15.
WR-02-01;
44.
CEBRAP,
e Indignidad: El Juicio
de Seguimiento,
Poder, Justicia
1996).
(Bogot?: Comisi?n Ciudadana de Seguimiento,
Ciudadana
Rep?blica Ernesto
41.
Kada.
Estudos
WR-03-07;
about the exact size of mobilizations.
range, from tens of thousands
Estimates
for those
to amillion. WR-02-28.
WR-02-50.
Lucero,
14.
of Collective Violence: Dissecting
Javier Auyero and Timothy Patrick Moran,
"The Dynamics
Food
in Contemporary
in
"Civic Engagement
Enrique Peruzzotti,
Argentina"
(unpublished manuscript);
to the 'Cacerolazos'"
p. 1.
Argentina: From the Human Rights Movement
(unpublished manuscript),
50.
Schamis, p. 85.
49.
Riots
51.
WR-03^1.
52.
Yashar.
53.
Roberto
Laserna,
2003), 4-14.
Arturo Valenzuela,
"Bolivia:
Entre
y Democracia,"
Populismo
Nueva
188 (November
Sociedad,
December
54.
2004),
55.
"Latin American
Presidencies
Crabtree; Lucero; Valenzuela; Wise and Roett.
in the Andes:
Laurence Whitehead,
"High Anxiety
12 (April 2001), 13.
Democracy,
56.
57.
58.
Interrupted," Journal
15 (October
of Democracy,
5-19.
Bolivia
and the Viability
of Democracy,"
Journal
of
Lucero, p. 70.
Valenzuela.
59.
Samuels and Shugart.
Kenneth M. Roberts and Erik Wibbels,
"Party Systems and Electoral Volatility
"
of Economic,
American Political Science
Institutional, and Structural Explanations
60.
in Latin America:
Review,
A Test
93 (September
1999), 575-90.
61.
Linz; Valenzuela.
62.
Schamis, pp. 90-91.
63.
Ibid., p. 91.
Bolivar Lamounier,
Shifter, eds., pp. 269-91.
64.
418
"Brazil:
An Assessment
of the Cardoso
Administration,"
in Dom?nguez
and