Peaceful Power Politics: The Influence of Political Culture
on Japan’s China Policy
By Anthony Kleibergen
B.A International Relations/International Organization
University of Groningen, 2014
Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of MSc Political Science – International Relations
University of Amsterdam
Supervisor: Dr. Julia Bader, PhD.
June 2015
1
Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 3
Chapter 2 Literature Review ................................................................................................................... 6
Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework ........................................................................................................ 11
Chapter 4 Methodology and Data ......................................................................................................... 17
Chapter 5 Theoretical Expectations ...................................................................................................... 19
Chapter 6 Empirical Analysis: Diplomatic Blue Books ....................................................................... 28
Chapter 7 Empirical Analysis: The National Security Strategy............................................................ 33
Chapter 8 Conclusion and Discussion .................................................................................................. 39
Bibliography ......................................................................................................................................... 42
Annex 1 Empirical Results Diplomatic Blue Books ............................................................................. 44
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Chapter 1 Introduction
One of the great empirical puzzles in IR is the discrepancy between the economic and political power
of certain large countries, and their relatively passive foreign policy. Despite their wealth, large
populations, and political stature, Japan and Germany, for instance, have taken a backseat position in
international politics ever since 1945. Although they joined multilateral institutions, contribute to
global governance and provide development aid, they have been passive actors in the realm of
security and peace enforcement. Japan has a small military relative to its economic weight, and is
constitutionally barred from conducting war operations except for self-defense. Indeed, its military is
referred to as Japan’s Self Defense Forces, and not perceived to be a military like those of other states.
Japan has only partaken in peacekeeping operations, but played relatively minor roles by not
participating in combative tasks. 1 In addition, Japan has ruled out the development of nuclear
weapons, prohibited arms exports, and limited defense spending to 1% of GDP. By the same token,
Germany limited the size of its military and has been very reluctant to participate in peace
enforcement and security operations. After much internal debate, Germany decided to play a role in
the 1999 Kosovo and 2001 Afghanistan campaigns, but refused to join operations in the 2003 war in
Iraq, and 2011 air campaign against Libya’s Muammar Ghaddafi. Large countries like the United
Kingdom, France, and Russia, on the other hand, developed sophisticated militaries and frequently
engaged in combat tasks and the maintenance of security. Therefore it seems not all powerful and
economically advanced states pursue the same foreign policies, or seek a prominent role on the world
stage.
These restrained policies challenge mainstream theoretical assumptions about the role of
powerful states on the world stage. Neorealism, for instance, assumes that great powers with
hegemonic ambitions seek to expand their militaries and play a dominant political role. This
framework, however, is insufficient to explain the cases of Germany and Japan. John Duffield, for
instance, showed that Germany’s policy behavior did not match the Realist expectations associated
with Germany’s power position in Europe because it has a anti-militaristic domestic political culture
which highly shapes its foreign policy. 2 Other authors, like Peter Katzenstein and Thomas Berger
have argued that a similar culture exists in modern Japan. Thus, it seems that other, non-systemic
factors like culture can provide important explanations for the foreign policy directions of certain
countries. To further examine this possibility, this thesis investigates the foreign policy motives of
Japan in a particular area; namely its China strategy. The economic and political rise of China would
have profound effects on the distribution of power in Asia, and according to Neorealism, leads
1
Akitoshi Miyashita, ‘’Where Do Norms Come From? Foundations of Japan’s Postwar Pacifism’’, pp. 99-102.
John Duffield, ‘‘Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism’’, International
Organization, vol.53(4), 1999, pp. 774-775.
2
3
neighboring countries like Japan to follow policies to counter its ascendance. These could include the
building of a strong military, development of nuclear weapons, alliance formation or bandwagoning.
This has not happened, however, as Japan pursued a seemingly anti-militaristic course and relied on
the US for its security. It seems that political cultures that are anti-militaristic and passive by nature
could lead to a very different strategy that defies Realist expectations. To solve the empirical puzzle
of the importance of political culture this thesis will try to answer the question whether this factor is a
crucial explanatory factor in Japan’s China policy.
To demonstrate the relevance of political culture, I juxtapose the domestic explanation against
Realism, an IR theory that focuses on structural factors in the international system that drive state
behavior. I have chosen Realism, and Neorealism in particular, because it is a dominant theory in
academic discussions and discourse on IR in Asia and the rise of China, and focus on the external
systemic factors. Essentially, in my research I attempt to compare the role of internal cultural factors
with Neorealism, and weigh the relative importance. In this domestic explanation I focus on the
political culture of Japan’s government. In order to apply political culture to the foreign policy
domain, I have used a framework developed by John Duffield, consisting of several important
dimensions of political culture in the foreign policy domain. These dimensions indicate which aspects
of foreign policymaking are determined by political culture. Duffield identified these as 1) world
views, 2) definitions of the national interest, 3) perception of national role, 4) identity and emotional
attachment, 5) norms and values regarding policy making. To subsequently test the values for these
measures, I examined secondary literature that describes the features for each of these dimensions in
Japan. That way, I generated expectations and predictions regarding political culture that are suitable
for testing in empirical materials. In order to identify whether these variables are indeed present in
Japan’s government, and how important they are relative to Neorealist interpretations, I have analyzed
Japan’s Diplomatic Blue Books from 2005 until 2014, and the 2013 National Security Strategy. These
documents provide a wide overview of Japan’s foreign and security strategies, with both general
outlines of world politics, assessments of regional developments, Japan’s approach to global
governance and development, as well as Japan’s foreign policy goals, interests and strategies. The
2013 NSS, on the other hand, specifically focuses on elements of security, which deepens the
understanding of Japan’s regional strategy, and opens up possibilities for identifying the presence of
possible Realist considerations. In these documents, Duffield’s dimensions were readily identifiable,
and in the empirical chapter, I gave an overview of the findings for each of them, and compared them
to the expectations generated by secondary literature.
My findings have indicated that political culture forms an important factor guiding Japan’s
China policy, and that in the case of Japan, anti-militarism has been the main enduring factor
inhibiting its military buildup and strategic posturing associated with Neorealism. However, this
research also concludes that political culture cannot explain all foreign policy strategies, and that
4
structural elements still guide Japan’s China policy. Political culture, and its main feature of antimilitarism, in the case of Japan, partly explain its strategies. Japan has ascribed to a Neorealist
perception of China’s rise, and has been concerned about its military buildup, territorial claims, and
political prowess. Tensions have risen significantly, but economic relations have developed strongly,
and Japan has emphasized its willingness to resolve disputes and establish a cooperative relationship
in many fields. Most importantly, Japan has not responded in kind to China’s vast increases in defense
spending, and has not significantly altered its diplomatic strategy. Although it has strengthened its
alliance with the US and formed partnerships, evidence of balancing or bandwagoning against China
is meagre, and it has not initiated a comparable program of rearming. This has become evident in the
domains of world views, national role and emotional attachment, where Japan’s culture is applied
most, whereas it is more difficult to find associated policy predictions in the domains of norms and
values and the national interest. With regards to some policies, Japan has taken a stance that is better
explained through Neorealism. Japan’s anti-militarism, amongst other cultural elements, forms an
important explanation for its ambivalent China policy, and thus proves to be a complementary
variable in analyzing foreign policy.
The organization of this thesis will systematically follow the research approach. Chapter 2
covers existing literature examining theoretical explanations for Japan’s foreign and China strategies,
with a focus on the limitations of Neorealist explanations, and possible alternative frameworks. It will
also, however, expose the gaps in these theories, and point to the importance of analyzing normative
and cultural factors. In Chapter 3, I expand on the concept of political culture and examine Duffield’s
cultural framework in the foreign policy field. In this chapter, I examine and explain the
aforementioned five cultural dimensions. In order to prepare the reader for the empirical parts, chapter
4 includes a methodological review. In the fifth chapter, I surveyed secondary literature providing the
values for each dimension, and subsequently predicts what Japan’s China policy, based on political
culture, will look like. In the sixth and seventh chapter, I test these predictions by closely examining
the policy documents. Finally, I conclude by giving an overview of the results, theoretical
implications, limitations to this research, and implications for further research.
5
Chapter 2 Literature Review
The essential question underlying this thesis is whether cultural explanations can serve to explain
Japan’s China policy, and how important they are compared to those of Realism. The difference
between the two approaches lays in the view of the international system or the domestic context as the
source for foreign policy behavior. Of all IR theories, Realism focuses on systemic factors the most,
and is therefore a useful framework of comparison. Moreover, Realism has a rigid and law-like view
on the international system, and treats the circumstances defining the conduct of international
relations as a given. The anarchic structure of the world, the lack of trust and cooperation amongst
states and the resulting quest for power and security are thought to be inherent in the system.
Regarding this quest, it focuses on the material factors of politics, and argues that material
differences, in wealth and military prowess, are important drivers of particular behavior. Within
Realism, there is little space for the domestic context of politics, whether it differs per country,
culture, or whether it is constructed by human agency. Therefore, Realism can only explain patterns
in international relations that conform with the basic structure of the system, and the according
behavior. Forms of conduct that do not fit the eternal competition for power and security are not well
explained by Realism, and thus other explanations need to be found. This behavior can take many
alternative forms, and different theories provide different explanations for them.
Neorealism
As this thesis aims to juxtapose Realism with political culture, it is useful to examine the
strengths and limitations of Realism, and how well it fits regarding Japan’s foreign policy. Realist
theory is based on the premise that a fixed international structure determines state behavior. It carries
five important assumptions about state behavior in the conduct of international relations. First, the
state system is anarchic, meaning there is a lack of a global government which regulates state
behavior. Second, in the absence of a global ‘regulator’, states cannot be restrained from above, and
therefore cannot trust the intentions of other states. Third, the prime objective of a state is to survive,
and fourth, states will develop strategies to achieve this goal. Finally, as part of this strategy, states
will develop military capabilities to protect themselves or deter possible enemies. 3 Within Realism,
two major schools of thought can be distinguished that: offensive and defensive realism. The
distinction between these two forms a more general type within Realism, namely Neorealism. This
distinction has important implications for the interpretation of Japan’s foreign policy, because it
produces different expected strategies. The difference between offensive and defensive realism
3
John J. Mearsheimer, ‘’The False Promise of International Institutions’’, International Security, vol. 19(3),
1994
6
revolves around the expected strategy of states to achieve security, and fundamentally, how strongly a
state should maximize its strength and power to realize this. The crucial difference between offensive
and defensive realism is the expected power needed to achieve security. Offensive realists hold that
states need to maximize power, whereas defensive realists assert that states rather seek security by
joining coalitions with the aim of balancing other ones. Offensive realism, as Mearsheimer puts it,
holds that in order to self-preserve, the ultimate goal of each state is to achieve hegemony. 4
Hegemony is of crucial importance to states because threats to security will usually arise from other
states challenging the position of the aspiring hegemon. 5 In order to achieve hegemony, states will
develop military capabilities to deter or challenge rival states. These capabilities are aggressive by
nature, because the state will do anything it can to avoid challenges from rival powers. Mearsheimer
recognizes that it is very difficult to achieve worldwide hegemony, but predicts that states will seek to
become the dominant power in their region. The dark prediction of this theory holds that powermaximizing states, in their competition for hegemony, will eventually clash, and (violent) conflict
will emerge.
Defensive realism holds a less pessimistic outlook, as it does not believe that states will seek
to achieve hegemony or power maximization per se. They acknowledge the paramount need for
security but do not believe that hegemony is the tool with which to achieve it. Rather, defensive
realism asserts that states will be more cautious and adopt a balancing strategy, rather than arming
oneself or seeking the help from a strong state. Kenneth Waltz, the seminal author on defensive
realism, did not believe that states will always pursue aggressive strategies to either reach hegemony
or deter others. He stated that the cost of aggression and expansion is often too high, and that conflict
therefore is undesirable. This holds especially since conflict is caused by adopting aggressive
strategies. Instead, managing a coalition to balance others is deemed more effective, and less
destructive. 6
Offensive and defensive realism offer differing expected strategies. Defensive realism will
lead states to join coalitions to balance their rivals, whereas offensive realism usually predicts states
will aim for hegemony. If they are not able to, they will bandwagon and join a coalition. A second
option, according to Mearsheimer involves both balancing and ‘buck-passing’, a strategy which
alleviates the burden of defense to another state. This is an attractive scenario because it saves costs of
armaments, leaves the risk to another state, and could be wise in case the adversary is strong.
Conflicting states separated by water seem to prefer buck-passing, especially when both are roughly
equally strong in terms of military prowess. 7 Jennifer Lind states that buck-passing is attractive to
4
Mearsheimer, ‘’The Tragedy of Great Power Politics’’, New York: Norton, 2001 pp. 34-35.
Mearsheimer, ‘’The Tragedy of Great Power Politics’’, pp. 35.
6
Kenneth Waltz, ‘’A Theory of International Politics’’, New York: McGraw Hill, 1979, pp. 126.
7
Glenn Snyder, Mearsheimer’s World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security, International Security,
vol. 27(1), 2002, pp. 162.
5
7
countries that are militarily advanced, relatively safe, and have strong allies. She believes Japan
largely fits these aspects and concluded that Japan has followed a buck-passing strategy associated
with Realism, because it had to make security arrangements in the face of the Cold War in Asia, and
did so through its alliance with the US, relieving it from pressures of rearmament.
Mearsheimer argued that China’s rise will be accompanied by a search for hegemony which is
ultimately a threat to its neighbors in the region. He states that China, like the US in 19th century, will
proclaim its own ‘Monroe’ doctrine, thereby dominating East Asia and excluding influence from
outside powers like the United States. 8 Although he does not expect China to conquer countries, he
believes it would try to deter the US navy. This way, China would come to dominate Asia
strategically, and set regional rules. He predicts that China’s neighbors, including Japan, will form a
balancing coalition to contain China and maintain the status quo. This balancing coalition will be led
by the US, as this country has a network of security alliances in the region, and forms the most
credible deterrent to Chinese power. As a result, the US and China’s neighbors will share the similar
goal of trying to contain China by forging political alliances and bundling their military forces. Japan
will perceive China as a threat, and join this balancing coalition.
Indeed, China’s increasing military capabilities, especially its naval buildup, have already
caused significant concern in Japan. China’s submarine forces are able to deny foreign navies access
to the Taiwan straits, and its launch of an aircraft carrier has fueled the belief China seeks to build a
‘blue water navy’, ensuring Chinese access to the greater Pacific Ocean. In addition, its claims to the
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are perceived to be part of a larger pattern of aggressive and hegemonic
behavior.9 Gronning argues that, in response, Japan is aiming to balance China by improving its own
naval capacities, and enhancing its military cooperation with the US since 1996, when US President
Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto established new defense guidelines. Jennifer Lind corroborates
this by arguing that Japan has indeed joined a balancing coalition by passing the buck to the US, and
built a formidable and technologically advanced Self-Defense Force, with the world’s sixth largest
budget. Although Japan has periodically pursued an accommodating policy which, especially under
the DPJ administration from 2009-2010, Atanassova- Cornelis argues that Japan’s policy was highly
subject to changes in the security environment. Collisions with China near the Senkaku/Diaoyu
revealed a deeply rooted fear of Chinese aggression, and even the moderate DPJ government went
ahead to strengthen the SDF, and enhance the alliance with the US, as well as regional partnerships. 10
This analysis based, focusing on external threats and buck passing would strengthen the offensive
Neorealist analysis.
8
Mearsheimer, ‘’Can China Rise Peacefully?’’, National Interest, 2014.
Bjorn Gronning, ‘’Japan’s Shifting Military Priorities: Counterbalancing China’s Rise’’, Asian Security, vol.
10(1), 2014, pp. 14-15.
10
Elena Atanassova-Cornelis ‘’Shifting Domestic Politics and Security Policy in Japan and Taiwan: The Search
for a Balancing Strategy Between China and the US’’, Asia Pacific Review, vol. 20(1), 2013, pp. 74-75.
9
8
Limits to Neorealism
Although Neorealism provides clear and rigid answers regarding Japan’s foreign policy there
are clear limitations to these interpretations of foreign policy making, and existing Realist literature
does not adequately address them. This section will address two major observations: Japan’s
engagement with China and its anti-militarist course. First of all, it can be doubted whether Japan has
consistently viewed China as a rival and potential adversary. Hughes argued that Japan has sought a
dual China policy aiming to both engage the country and hedge against its rise. For decades, Japan has
enjoyed strong economic relations with China, provided development aid, and cooperated in regional
institutions.11 It does not deny China’s political and military rise has been a source of concern, and
Japan has diplomatically sought to counter Chinese influence, but a mixed picture emerges. Jerden
and Hagstrom went even further, by stating that Japan has fully facilitated China’s rise and did not
pursue policies to counter it. After analyzing Japan’s policies regarding China’s core interests, they
concluded that Japan adhered to the One-China policy, did not support Tibetan independence
movements, and refrained from undermining the regime’s legitimacy via human rights diplomacy.12
Moreover, Japan has fully supported China’s integration into the global trade system, WTO, and
regional economic institutions like APEC. In addition, it became one of China’s largest trading
partners and investors. In the military and security realm, Jerden and Hagstrom argue that Japan has
never expressly criticized China’s military buildup, but mainly expressed concern about its lack of
transparency. On the basis of these findings, they deny that Tokyo tries to contain China, or adhere to
a balancing strategy. 13 They discard the Neorealist predictions, and argue that Japan has consistently
engaged and supported China’s rise.
The second argument problematizing Neorealist assertions seems to be Japan’s reluctance to
apply its military in foreign relations. Neorealist authors have described Japan’s hedging strategy that
includes enhanced military capabilities and increased cooperation with the US. This observation
creates the image that Japan is becoming an increasingly militarized and assertive country in response
to external threats. The image is misleading, however, because Japan’s policy strategies have not
significantly altered in recent years. A far stronger signal than Japan’s mild response to China’s
military buildup, has been its own hesitation to build a stronger military. The most fundamental
challenge to Neorealist expectations is Japan’s commitment to keep military spending under 1% of its
GDP. 14 In fact, throughout the 1990s, when according to Yahuda relations rapidly worsened, Japan
11
Christopher Hughes, ‘’Japan’s Response to China’s Rise: Regional Engagement, Global Containment, Dangers
of Collision’’, International Affairs, vol. 85(4), 2009, pp. 854-856.
12
Bjorn Jerden and Linus Hagstrom, ‘’Rethinking Japan’s China Policy: Japan as an Accommodator in the Rise of
China’’, Journal of East Asian Studies, vol. 12(2), 2012, pp. 223-231.
13
Jerden and Hagstrom, ‘’Rethinking Japan’s China Policy: Japan as an Accommodator in the Rise of China’’,
pp. 239-241.
14
Ibid, pp. 239-241.
9
froze its defense budget and reduced arms procurements. 15 In addition, Article 9 of the Japanese
constitution states that war will be renounced as a means for settling disputes in international affairs.
Japan thus seems to be influenced by an antimilitaristic tradition which has hitherto prevented it from
responding assertively to balance China’s rise. Singh has argued that this passive role emerged
because Japan adopted a post-war identity as a ‘peace state’, and avoided military involvement in
regional and global security matters. 16 Oros stated that Japan developed an approach towards security
that is rooted in an anti-militaristic identity, leading it to abandon a regular military as well as the
possibility of waging foreign wars. 17 This literature indicates one should look beyond conventional
paradigms in explaining policy behavior.
The inadequacy of Neorealism, but the literature that points out the limitations to Neorealism
as well is not only confusing and contradictory in terms of predictions, but also often fails to explain
this behavior. Mochizuki and Jerden and Hagstrom have argued that China has engaged China instead
of containing it, but inadequately explain the exact reasons for this. 18 Kang argued that in the face of
strategic challenges posed by China, Japan failed to rearm itself, or join a coalition aiming to contain
it. In addition, he concludes that Asian states may not conform well to the Westphalian logic of
balance-of-power politics because of their different history, religion, culture politics and geography.19
While this may be true, Kang does not specify or elaborate the reasons for this deviant behavior.20 In
this thesis I will build on the anti-militarist findings and argue that cultural premises often left out of
literature dealing with mainstream IR theories could fill this gap. Oros and Singh have pointed to
Japan’s post-war identity as a ‘peace state’ or anti-militarist sentiment and provide directions about
the normative and identity aspects of Japan’s policies. It can be said that Japan has been worried about
the strategic implications of China’s rise and its behavior in the East Asia, but has consistently
engaged China while hedging against its rise. To achieve this, it has deepened its alliance with the US,
but failed to significantly remilitarize. This would fit Lind’s buck-passing hypothesis, but Japan’s
acquiescence in China’s rise and cooperative stance still poses challenges. In light of these puzzles, I
further examine possible identity and culture-based explanations in the next chapter.
15
Hartwig Hummel, ‘’Japan’s Military Expenditures after the Cold War: The Realism of the Peace Dividend’’,
Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 50(2), 1996, pp. 140-147.
16
Bhubhindar Singh, ‘’Japan’s Security Policy: From a Peace State to an International State’’, Pacific Review,
vol. 21(3), 2008, pp. 311-312.
17
Andrew Oros, ‘’Japan’s Strategic Culture: Security Identity in a Fourth Modern Incarnation?’’, Contemporary
Security Policy, vol. 35(2), 2014, pp. 230-234.
18
Mochizuki, Mike, ‘’Japan’s Shifting Strategy Towards the Rise of China’’, Journal of Strategic Studies,
vol.30(4-5), 2007.
19
David Kang, ‘’Getting Asia Wrong, the Need for New Analytical Frameworks’’, International Security,
Vol.27(4), 2003, pp. 73-79.
20
Mochizuki, , ‘’Japan’s Shifting Strategy Towards the Rise of China’’.
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Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework
This explanatory gap may be filled by a cultural approach. Cultural variables are difficult to translate
into these frameworks, and are a different way of looking at IR altogether. These variables concern
the social characteristics of a particular group, and are therefore a non-systemic, focusing on
intangible aspects of statecraft. Culture provides the social and ideational component of behavior, and
can therefore provide insights into the origins and imperatives of certain policy objectives. They can
give an ‘inside-out’ explanation for international politics, because it involves social beliefs, attitudes
and norms towards politics; in other words, the views of the population. When it comes to particular
state policies, the foreign and security policies of Germany and Japan have proven to be key
conundrums to Realist theory, and important cases for applying cultural variables. Duffield has
identified political culture to be an important factor in explaining Germany’s post-World War 2
security policy. The reason for his interest in cultural factors has been the inadequacy of Neorealism
to explain Germany’s reluctant foreign policy compared to its status as a great power in Europe, with
the world’s third largest economy. The fact that Germany never sought to expand influence or rebuild
its military pointed to inhibiting domestic factors. Germany had been highly reluctant to participate in
international interventions, and preferred to take action via international organizations. He identified
that German politicians have had a broadly shared political culture that was strongly anti-militarist
and in favor of multilateralism, leading him to conclude that this cultural component could not be
neglected when researching foreign policy. Thomas Berger drew a similar conclusion in his work
‘Cultures of anti-militarism: National Security in Germany and Japan’. Like Germany, Japan pursued
a low-key foreign policy and resisted building up its military commensurate with its economic
growth.
These cases provide evidence there are phenomena that not only cannot be explained by
Realism, but point to the importance of political culture. Duffield, in his book ‘World Power
Forsaken’, has listed a number of aspects of political culture one can measure to analyze national
security policy, and I am aiming to apply those to Japan’s policy regarding China. These aspects are
worldviews and the interpretation of the global environment, definitions of the national interest that
shape policy objectives, identity and emotional attachment, the identification of policy options, and
how these options are weighed against each other, and norms and values regarding the policy conduct.
21
The sub-categories I will further research are the sub-elements of these aspects explained by
Duffield. These are the aforementioned views on the international structure and the role of the country
in it, perceptions of conflict and that of other countries, in this case China.
The concept of political culture is quite elusive, and difficult to grasp. It is a term that consists of two
21
John Duffield, ‘’World Power Forsaken’’, Stanford University Press, 1998, pp. 26-27.
11
separate terms, both of which are very broad, and therefore hard to define. Politics, for instance, could
refer to governance, power relationships, or the way certain actors influence others. Culture, on the
other hand, could refer to habits or predispositions about the world as a whole. In the early 20th
century, anthropological insights were used to describe national predispositions of countries,
culminating in the publishing of Ruth Benedict’s 1946 ‘The Chrysanthemum and the Sword’, the first
comprehensive account on Japan’s national character and several studies on Russia’s national culture.
22
These studies, however, lacked scientific rigor because they were insufficiently measured or
surveyed. The first researchers to formally investigate cultural attitudes regarding the constellation of
the domestic political system were Almond and Verba’s 1963 ‘The Civic Culture’. In this work, they
conducted a survey research to uncover the relationship between cultural attitudes and the emergence
of a democratic polity. Not only did they find a rigorous way to operationalize culture, but also found
a direct link between them, with civic culture as a necessary condition for democracy. 23 Thus, the
outcome of a political process; the formation of a democracy, was connected with cultural attitudes
regarding political life. These group attitudes seemed to play a role regarding nature of political life.
As a result, the term political culture became much more common, and new methodologies to
operationalize the concept were developed.
According to Duffield, political culture pertains to ‘’the subjective orientations toward and
assumptions about the political world that characterize the members of a particular society’’.24 The
International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences defines it as "the set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments
that give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and
rules that govern behavior in the political system". 25 In other words, attitudes, beliefs and sentiments
can be considered a ‘mind set’ that shapes or predisposes towards a particular worldview. This mind
set of a community forms assumptions about the world that eventually predispose a community
towards certain courses of action. These outcomes are shaped in a particular way because these
attitudes define the realm of the possible and impossible regarding policy choices. 26
Political culture influences whether and how certain problems are identified, and determines
the range of choices. It limits this set of options to the socially acceptable, and will not consider
alternative options because they are inherently inappropriate or deviant. 27 This concerns both the
22
Lucian Pye, ‘’Political Culture Revisited’’, Political Psychology, vol. 12(3), 1991, pp. 495-496.
Lucian Pye, ‘’Political Culture Revisited’’, pp. 499.
24
Duffield, ‘’Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism’’, pp. 795-796.
25
Smelser and Baltes, ‘’International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences’’, Elsevier, 2001.
26
David J. Elkins and Richard E. B. Simeon, ‘’A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture
Explain?’’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 11, No. 2, Jan 1979, pp. 127-128.
23
27
David J. Elkins and Richard E. B. Simeon, ‘’A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture
Explain?’’, pp .128
12
overall aims of a community, and particular policy choices. 28 Political culture, for instance,
influences both the general interest (or national interest) of a certain group, and specific courses of
action that aim to advance this interest. In addition, political culture shapes the view of the political
environment. Acting as a lens, political culture conditions the way this environment is interpreted, and
which characteristics or events are noticed or investigated. Culture causes people to be selective
regarding issue salience, and therefore it affects which issues are considered important, and how they
should be understood. 29 This interpretive effect also shapes goal and policy formulation, as these are
often based on an interpretation of a certain event or phenomenon.
There are three important mechanisms that undergird political culture. First, it has a cognitive
component that consists of the way people form a belief, empirically and causally. Second, it has an
evaluative part which comprises norms and values, and third, it has an affective part that describes a
degree of emotional attachment. This has to do with the way people feel about a certain issue, and
whether they care deeply, feel antipathy, or indifference. 30 As political culture pertains to the nature
of politics in the eyes of a particular community, the issues and questions related to political culture
closely reflect these mechanisms. Although inexhaustible, Elkins and Simeon listed several general
types of beliefs that form political culture. First, related to the cognitive component, the way a
community looks at world events can be based on human agency or randomness and fate. Whether a
group of people believes destiny is in their own hands or in that of nature already separates some
political communities from others, as some communities may attribute certain occurrences to nature,
or to be explained by religion, rather than human ones. 31 Second they identify overall political aims
to be another element, which reflects the evaluative part, as political aims could reflect norms, values
and beliefs. Another type of assumption would relate to the membership of the political community.
Who is in, and who is out of the group is related to the affective component of political culture. In
order to be accepted as a member, the community has to feel some sort of attachment to the persons or
entities wanting to join the community. 32This also closely relates to the perception of non-members in
general. The view towards other people(s) or (political) communities and the sense of ‘Self’ and
‘Other’ is a part of political culture. As will be shown later, this can be considered an issue of identity,
which in itself is an important aspect of political culture.
Political culture has three other characteristics; First, it is the property of a community rather
than an individual. The reason for this is the intersubjective nature of culture, as norms and values are
shared amongst more than one human, and thus a community. Second, it is highly unique to a
particular community. Few, if any, are completely similar to that of another political culture. This has
28 28
Duffield, ‘Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism’, pp. 771-772.
Ibid.
30
John Duffield, ‘’World Power Forsaken’’, pp. 23.
31
Elkins and Simeon, pp.132
32
Ibid.
29
13
an important implication for state behavior, as states that are in similar (material) geopolitical
positions may still have differing foreign policy strategies. Third, political cultures do not change
quickly. 33 They are persistent over time, and if they change, they do so gradually. This is because
political culture reflects common beliefs, and tautologically, deviant views are simply rare or nonexistent. These common beliefs also represent deeper underlying social values and norms that hardly
change. Finally, the process of cognitive dissonance ensures that deviant views are simply rarely, if at
all, considered, and most information merely reflects or acknowledges the existing culture. The lack
of deviant views, in turn, ensures that very little information is produced which defies common
beliefs. 34 As a result of these processes, cultures tend to be very ‘sticky’, and hence may exert
influence on policy for extended periods of time.
Political Culture and Foreign Policy
Culture in general, and political culture in particular affects national security policy and
strategic behavior. Peter Katzenstein and Thomas Berger are two influential IR scholars that have
examined the role of culture and norms on national security strategies. Katzenstein and others, in the
book ‘The Culture of National Security’ argued that cultural factors play an important role in politics
because structural (Realist) factors alone could not explain the formulation of a ‘national interest’ .35
Berger, a researcher with a particular focus on Japan, stated that Japan’s cultural anti-militarism is an
essential factor in explaining its long standing policy of refusing to remilitarize. In short, political
culture shapes policy strategies and cannot be disregarded as an explanatory element.
Duffield’s categorizations of political culture
Duffield devised a framework which identified how political culture affects foreign policy. These
dimensions are worldviews and the interpretation of the global environment, identity and emotional
attachment, definitions of the national interest, the identification of policy options and how these
options are weighed against each other, and norms and ethics regarding the conduct of policy. 36 He
further categorizes these elements by explaining the most important sub-elements they consist of, as
summarized below:
1) Worldviews
-
Interpretation of international environment (Is it anarchic or cooperative?)
-
What are the chances of conflict and cooperation?
-
View of role the country plays on the world stage
-
View of other states as enemies or allies
33
Duffield, ‘’Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism’’, pp. 771-772.
Ibid, pp. 770-771.
35
Katzenstein, ‘’The Culture of National Security’’, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, pp. 461.
36
John Duffield ‘’World Power Forsaken’’, pp. 24-26.
34
14
2) Identity and emotional attachment
-
Are there other countries one’s own country is particularly attached to?
-
What is the national identity and self-image?
3) Definitions of national interest (Does it fit into the country’s self-perception?)
4) Identification and weighing of policy options
-
Why are some issues considered more important than others?
-
Why are some issues identified as problems that need to be solved with a certain policy?
-
How are policy options selected, and what are the reasons for it?
5) Norms and values regarding policy conduct
-
What constitutes ethical policy?
-
Does it reflect national norms and values?
First, world views refer to the way the international structure is perceived, and what role a
particular country plays. The international structure is constituted by theoretical visions on how world
politics works, what the most important actors are, and how the chances of cooperation and conflict
are estimated. Visions on the international structure are closely related to IR theories regarding
conflict and cooperation, and thus whether conflict is inevitable (Neorealism) or whether cooperation
is possible (Liberalism). Whether a country sees conflict as evitable or inevitable is an important
measure of the chance of cooperation. The perception of other countries as foes or allies is another
measurable expression of this view towards conflict. Naturally, reflecting the variety of IR theories
and models for world politics, there are other visions on the world structure that transcend the
aforementioned frameworks. Communist states, for instance, have adhered to ideas of world politics
reflecting Structuralism. Finally, the country’s perception of its own role on the world stage is highly
important as well, because it says a lot about its vision on the international structure. If a state is
concerned about the inevitability of conflict, it might seek defense arrangements or armaments,
whereas states that believe in the prospect of cooperation may focus less on security matters, and on
economic cooperation, institutionalism and integration instead.
Second, identity and emotional attachment affects foreign policy as identity shapes the selfimage and perceived role of the country on the world stage. Identity refers to the characterization of
one’s self, and the features attributed to the self. According to James Fearon, identity is a social
category, meaning it represents the parameters of membership of the group, and the characteristics
associated with members of that group. 37 Thus identity would be unique to a particular group, the
nation, and reflect its characteristics. Regarding the perception of other states or institutions,
emotional attachment is highly important because it may determine how strongly the state feels about
other entities. If there are strong feelings of enmity, resentment or mistrust, then this may cause
37
James Fearon, ‘’What is Identity’’, Stanford University Draft Paper, 1999, pp. 7-14.
15
strained relations or even conflict. On the other hand, a sense of affection, camaraderie, or friendship
towards another entity and may lead a country to actively search for good relations, partnerships, or
even alliances and security communities. In other words, identity and feelings towards other entities
influence and shape foreign policies.
Third, the formulation of overarching political goals, or the national interest is another
expression of political culture in the foreign policy domain. Political goals, whether they be domestic
or international, are eventually the product of political culture. Fundamentally, these goals reflect
values and norms regarding the nature of politics in a country. These political norms and values shape
preferences for particular policy outcomes, and the articulation of a particular national interest. This in
turn influences foreign policy strategies. This may be an explanatory factor, as national interests are
not the same for all polities.
Fourth, political culture affects the way policy options are explored and considered. As
mentioned before, the identification of certain problems, and the importance and salience of certain
issues is influenced by political culture. Thus, before a policy is examined at all, the problem
identification underlying it is already subject to a political attitude. When an issue has been identified,
and considered a problem in the first place, the policymaking process is also affected, as, according to
Duffield, the weighing of policy options and cost-benefit analysis is subject to political culture as
well. The value attached to certain political outcomes may differ across political cultures. This is the
same for the means and methods of policymaking, as these are different across cultural spectrums.
These means and methods are closely related to the final aspect of political cultural in the
foreign policy realm; namely the norms and values concerning policy conduct. What constitutes as
legitimate, ethical, humane or otherwise appropriate policy varies across political cultures, and is
unique to the political system of each polity or country. What is considered appropriate handling of
policy in one polity, may not necessarily be accepted as such in another.
38
Therefore, differing norms
and values highly shape political outcomes in different polities.
Strengths and Limitations
One should be careful, however, not to use political culture as a deterministic explanation. It
is only one explanation, out of many, and therefore it can only be one piece of the puzzle of explain
policy behavior. Duffield, has identified several other factors that determine certain policy actions,
distinguishing between the international and domestic realms. With regards to the international, he
states that international structure and international institutions are highly influential, and regarding the
domestic he considers material factors and national predispositions to be highly important, with
38
Ibid.
16
predispositions mainly determined by political culture. 39 Therefore, Duffield does not rule out
systemic factors, or IR theories, as he recognizes the importance of systemic factors. He
acknowledges that IR theories such as Realism are still important explanatory factors. However, he
points to the limited availability of research on culture as an explanatory factor. Nevertheless, the
frameworks of Duffield, Katzenstein and Berger all point to its importance.
Chapter 4 Methodology and data
In order to investigate how political culture affects Japan’s foreign policy, I relied on a two-step
methodological approach which examines secondary literature and primary sources. First, I used
secondary literature to identify the expected attitude of Japan’s foreign policy making elites toward
these measures of political culture. This way I can get an overview of the role of political culture in
Japan, with which I can devise expectations for the values for the dimensions of political culture in
Japan’s foreign policy making. Second, I tested these predictions by applying it to its China policy
through examining primary sources, and researching whether the predictions generated by secondary
literature can be observed in the data. This ensures there is no tautological bias in the research,
avoiding the trap of merely drawing conclusions from official policy positions derived from available
documents. Thus, when examining Japan’s foreign policy, it is important to see whether this in fact
reflects the tenets of its governments’ political culture, as categorized by Duffield. Empirically, this
means that I will delve into the specific China policies of this country, and check whether these reflect
cultural norms or systemic factors associated with Realism. In order to draw conclusions about the
role of culture, it is important to investigate whether the parameters for political culture identified
above and deduced preferences can be identified, and research whether the China policy of these
states actually reflects these preferences, or rather other Realist systemic factors.
Secondary Literature
To generate theoretical expectations for Japan’s political culture in the foreign policy domain
that I could subsequently test, I relied on secondary literature focusing on these cultural factors. To
gather information on the cultural factors as outlined in Duffield’s model, the overview focuses on
literature that concerns the aspects and their sub-categories for political culture relevant in the foreign
policy realm. In the review, I listed the relevant predictions for Japan’s actual policies regarding the
dimensions for political culture, for each of Duffield’s aspects. This way, I attempted to generate a
complete as possible list of values generating a comprehensive outline of Japan’s political culture in
the foreign policy realm. First, I described the origins and general features of this culture, and
subsequently examine each theme, aiming to outline the scholarly consensus on that particular
39
John Duffield ‘’World Power Forsaken’’, pp. 13-32.
17
dimension. After listing the values, I interpreted them to generate expected foreign policy strategies
that correspond best with the cultural traits. For instance, when identifying a particular cultural norm
of anti-militarism, it can be expected that this country would be hesitant to deploy its military.
Moreover, I apply these values to the Sino-Japanese relationship in particular, and list the
consequences for its China policy of each variable. That way, I formulated hypotheses that can be
tested in the empirical section.
Empirics
In order to investigate how strongly political culture affects foreign policy, I relied on a
qualitative analysis of Japan’s China policy. To that end, I collected policy documents to gain an
understanding of these policies and uncover its foundations. This is crucial, because this information
may reflect the political attitudes of policy making elites as theorized by Duffield, and examined by
secondary literature on Japan’s political culture. Based on methodology outlined above, notably the
importance of policymaking elites, I used primary sources originating from the Japanese government.
Regarding foreign policy, one has to focus on the institutions occupied with foreign policy making.
Thus, when researching political culture, it is useful to investigate the beliefs, norms and attitudes of
policy elites. In the domain of foreign policy making, one has to focus on the beliefs and attitudes of
diplomats in order to identify the basic tenets behind foreign policy. These beliefs and approaches
often reflect national experiences and history, or other cultural traits, so when explaining why the
government considers these approaches important, it is important to look at national history, cultural,
or other factors that explain these policy preferences, and see whether this is reflected in actual policy
documents.
These documents are officially published foreign policy strategies aimed at informing the
public on Japan’s overall foreign and security strategies, as well as regional, topical issues, and SinoJapanese relations. In this research, I have analyzed the annual Diplomatic Blue Books and 2013
National Security Strategy, because these are readily accessible, and more specific documents are
very difficult to obtain or classified. Nevertheless, these documents contain much information on
Japan’s China policies, and are thus very useful for my analysis. Furthermore, because these
documents cover a broad number of areas and strategies, they include the motivations and background
of different policy strategies, enabling a researcher to gain insights about the cultural or structural
elements.
In order to research this I coded the content of the primary data into distinct themes and
subthemes that reflect the nature of the policy. These themes broadly reflect cultural and structural
factors. This qualitative coding method means that I identified these themes and checked if policy
documents and interviews fit particular themes. At the same time, I analyzed certain quotes in the
texts, and marked them in order to see whether it matched a particular theme. This means I paid
18
attention to, for instance, certain assumptions made, domestic references, normative statements, or
political goals. By doing that, I can get a clear overview which text fits which theme, and which
themes or subthemes within a theme seem most relevant across a number of documents and files. This
method clearly demarcates the focus of analysis for each document. After analyzing all available
information within each theme, I compared the information between themes and gain insights about
all available information altogether. Comparing these themes allows to make a statement whether the
values for domestic political culture as identified in secondary literature is reflected in these
documents, and if yes, if it fits the predictions of the literature and theory on Japan’s political culture,
and how important it is relative to Realism. As the cultural and structural themes cannot easily be
distilled from the material, I have analyzed all texts and searched for the presence of these themes, as
well as the specific values. To that end, I focused on the aspects most relevant to Duffield’s
dimensions, as well as Sino-Japanese relations. These sections included the overall evaluation of
international affairs in that year, analyses of regional developments, Sino-Japanese relations, and
security and defense policies. After uncovering these themes, I focused on Japan’s China strategy in
particular to examine this in light of these findings, and check whether these policy strategies matched
the predictions I generated based on secondary literature.
Chapter 5 Expectations regarding Japan’s political culture
In order to find out whether political culture affects Japan’s China policy, it is necessary to examine
what the existing literature tells. In this chapter, I apply Duffield’s framework and find the values for
each dimension in secondary literature. I gathered expectations for each dimensions and subsequently
tested these in the empirical part. Thus following Duffield’s dimensions, this section will start with an
analysis of Japan’s world views and views on the international structure, and accordingly, its attitude
toward conflict and cooperation, its role on the world stage, and its perception of other states. As this
research is geared towards Japan’s China policy, I will investigate Japan’s perceptions of China. In
the subsequent paragraphs, Duffield’s other aspects will be examined. It is important to note that not
every aspect can be evaluated on the basis of secondary literature, or sometimes only partly. However,
a general picture, reflecting most of the categorizations is possible to obtain.
The observations below suggest a number of findings. First, following the experience of
militarism until 1945, Japan has favored a low key foreign policy under the Yoshida doctrine, and
eschewed a brand of anti-militarism that does not match its status as economic superpower and
political actor very well. Despite its position as the world’s 3rd largest economy, and stakeholder in the
G8 and G20 forums, Japan has played a minor role on the world stage. It has favored a foreign policy
that left defense matters to the US, and focused on trade and the provision of development aid. Japan
preferred to lay low in matters of security, but regarding development, it has seen itself as an
19
important provider of aid and economic security. In terms of national interest, it has quite consistently
views peace and prosperity as the core national aims. In recent years, however, there has been a shift
from a low key foreign policy, to a more active role on the world stage to protect global commons
such as security and development.
Japan’s general view on World War 2
Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the origins of Japanese militarism in
the 20th century, a word on the context of Japan’s attitude towards the war is imperative. This is
necessary because Japan’s war experience has caused a deeply engrained sense of anti-militarism, and
a tendency to lay low in foreign affairs. Its sense of victimhood led it to refocus on economic
development, and also provide aid to other developing countries.
The defining moment shaping Japan’s foreign and security policy since 1945 has been its
defeat in the Second World War. The crushing defeat of the Japanese army, and the devastation of
Japan’s cities by US bombing raids and the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki have
profoundly shaped Japan’s views on the world as well as foreign policy. Paradoxically, and unlike
Germans, however, most Japanese have felt a sense of victimhood, rather than guilt over causing the
war. Berger argues that this sense of victimhood originates from the context of Western imperialism
in Asia, the military regime in Japan, and the Imperial army, which used Japanese patriotism as a
pretext for a destructive process of conquest. 40 He states it was commonly believed that Japan, acting
as a ‘vanguard’ for the oppressed nations of Asia, sought to expel Western influence from the
continent and create a more independent Asia; an ideology referred to as Asianism. In addition, the
Western oil and resource embargo leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor was seen as a humiliation
in the face of ‘legitimate’ Japanese interests.
More important, however, was the development of Japan’s military dictatorship ever since the
1868 Meiji restoration. Unlike Germany, the Japanese military leadership gained power gradually
through intrigues, coups, political murders, and usurpation. Berger described this as a process which
took several decades, and unlike Germany, did not result from a large popular front or civil
discontent. In Germany, the sense of guilt about the origins of the Second World War is caused by a
fundamental belief that all German people had a share in bringing the Nazi leadership to power. 41 It is
broadly recognized that Adolf Hitler was a democratically elected leader with a popular mandate.
Japanese, however, have felt less responsible for their leadership because they did not directly put this
regime in charge, or have as much influence on it as the Germans did. After the Second World War,
40
Berger, ‘’From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Anti-Militarism’’, International Security,
Vol.17(4), 1993, pp. 131-136.
41
Berger, ’’From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Anti-Militarism’’, pp. 131-137.
20
much of the civilian leadership and bureaucracy remained in place, and it was difficult to investigate
which elements of the government were particularly aggressive. Thus, it has been hard to identify
individual officials and bureaucrats that were particularly responsible for the conduct of the war, apart
from those indicted at the Tokyo tribunal. Finally, the distinctive role of the Japanese army has also
been considered a factor mitigating guilt from the Japanese people. The military was considered to be
an oppressive institution in itself, responsible for many atrocities, and eventually ruining the country.
Japanese people often felt their patriotism was abused by the military to unleash a war beyond their
control. Germans have identified nationalism to be a root cause of the war, whereas the Japanese have
not shared this conclusion. Rather, military rule and doctrine was blamed for the war.
This interpretation of Japan’s role in the Second World War, and the sense of victimhood has
created a political culture that has determined Japan’s foreign and security policy ever since. The
memory of oppressive military leadership has led to a national consensus that favored an antimilitarist foreign policy. According to Oros, the shock of the devastation resulting from the war and
the leadership changed Japan’s identity into that of an anti-militaristic state. 42 This eventually
determined Japan’s opposition to the buildup of a military, and the use of force in international affairs.
As Japan developed as a democracy after 1945, a consensus was forged amongst different political
groups with differing visions on Japan’s role in the world. These factions could be broadly
distinguished in three categories, representing the left, center and right of the political spectrum. They
had differing views towards the role of military, but it is important to note that this spectrum does not
represent a scale of pacifism and militarism, but rather the appreciation of Japan’s past. This debate
represents two differing views on the past: traditionalism and anti-traditionalism. 43
Traditionalism refers to the view that Japan is a unique civilization, with a particular form of
political culture, and specific values like subservience, a focus on community, and a willingness to
sacrifice oneself for their country, that should be preserved. It holds that the Western style democracy
imposed on Japan in 1945 contradicts these values, and that these democratic values ought to be
limited. It carries a positive view towards Japan’s pre-war system, and believes there was nothing
‘wrong’ with these values. This view on Japan’s values has important implications for the perception
of Japan’s role in the war. Fundamentally, concerning the cause of the war, traditionalists believe that
Japan’s cultural and political values have been an important and positive part of Japan’s history, and
that the war itself was caused by the military institutions.
Anti-traditionalists, on the other hand, feel that Japan’s political and cultural values
themselves have caused the war, and carry a negative view towards these values. Masao Maruyama
has argued that the subservient nature of Japan’s cultural values has enabled the rise of Japan’s
42
Oros, ‘’Japan’s Strategic Culture’’, pp. 230-232.
Yashuhiro Izumikawa, ‘‘Explaining Japanese Antimilitarism: Normative and Realist Constraints on Japan's
Security Policy’’, International Security, vol.35(2), 2010, pp. 130-131.
43
21
military dictatorship. 44 After all, the Japanese did very little to protest or criticize their government.
Anti-traditionalists believe that Western democracy, through a system of checks and balances, is the
way to prevent cultural values from causing the rise of militarism. It favors a profound change in
Japanese society away from traditional values, towards Western ones. It should be noted, however,
that anti-traditionalism does not necessarily equal anti-militarism. Anti-traditionalism refers to a
particular view on Japanese society, and the analysis that cultural values caused militarism. Therefore,
they do not seek to disarm or arm the military, but rather seek social change through establishing
Western democracy.45 By the same token, traditionalism and its lack of self-recrimination and sense
of victimhood does not necessarily means it opposes disarmament. The distinction serves to
underscore the importance of the traditionalism debate alongside the militarism debate, as a
determinant of Japan’s view of its role in the world, and resulting security policies.
The political factions had differences over both the role of pacifism or militarism in society
and traditionalism or anti-traditionalism. The Japanese Left, consisting of the Socialist Party of Japan
(JSP) and the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), has been the most vocal proponent of a pacifist and
anti-militarist foreign policy. The Left had the most negative view of Japan’s role in the Second
World War, strongly recognized and condemned Japanese atrocities and favored complete
disarmament. In addition, it leans more towards the anti-traditionalist view on Japanese society. The
Right, reflecting a more traditionalist attitude, is more positive of Japan’s past and does not feel the
sense of shame of the Left regarding Japan’s pre-war cultural values. It feels these values should be
maintained, and that not all aspects of the Western political model are desirable. More so than the
Left, it has a positive view towards patriotism and believes that Japan should not be ashamed of its
past. Most importantly, regarding the anti-militarism debate, the Right opposes article 9 of the
Japanese constitution stating that Japan will never use force to resolve international disputes, and
outlaws the possession of offensive military forces. The Right strongly feels that Japan should once
again be seen as an ordinary nation that like all other nations possesses the right to have a credible
military force, rather than a Self-Defense Force. It is thus in favor of rearming and changing the
mandate of its armed forces. Current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, a more right leaning leader, for
instance, announced in 2014 the Japanese government would interpret article 9 differently to allow for
Japanese armed operations abroad.46 The Centre parties in Japan have traditionally favored a middle
ground between the two. According to Berger, these parties have been enthusiastic about Western
economic policy and a free market economy, but relatively silent regarding security and defense
policy. It generally favored a low profile foreign policy, leaving the responsibility of Japan’s defense
Izumikawa, ‘‘Explaining Japanese Antimilitarism: Normative and Realist Constraints on Japan's Security
Policy’’pp. 131-132.
45
Ibid.
46
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/07/02/editorials/abe-guts-article-9/#.VY0kN_mqpHw,accessed
May 9
44
22
largely to the US. Regarding traditionalism, they have found that some aspects of Japan’s past were
valuable enough to keep, whereas others were detrimental to Japan’s stability, and favored safeguards
against them. 47 Eventually, the Centre parties prevailed and the compromise between all traditions
has greatly influenced Japan’s post-war foreign policy. Although the dominant LDP Party reflected
both right wing and centrist elements, it came to embrace the centrist policies, rather than right wing
ones.
Japan’s world views
Japan’s world view, and view of the international system was strongly determined by the
Yoshida doctrine, which emerged in the early 1950s as the foundation of Japan’s post-war foreign
policy. The Yoshida doctrine was remarkable, in that it emerged as a product of early Cold War
tensions in Asia, and persisted over time, even long after the end of the Cold War. Crucially, the
Yoshida doctrine was a Centrist foreign policy doctrine which emerged as a result of a compromise
between the competing political factions. The doctrine was a strategy which allied Japan with the
United States to ensure Japan’s security. This allowed for Japan’s economic reconstruction, while
upholding Article 9 of the constitution. Economic development became the most important domestic
goal, and this meant Japan needed a protector and sound economic relations with other states. 48
Japan’s foreign policy was highly based on trade and Official Development Assistance (ODA) to
build economies ties and repair Japan’s global image. Trade policy became the most important aspect
of Japan’s security policy, besides the alliance with the US, as the government in 1980 stated that
economic ties and development aid were crucial to global stability. 49 In addition, the Yoshida
doctrine attached great importance to a low key foreign policy, avoiding antagonistic foreign policies.
David Potter argues that this strategy, in fact, served to improve Japan’s reputation, as it meant Japan
would become one of the top donors to the UN. The commitment to multilateralism served to build a
reputation of Japan as a country committed to international stability and cooperation.
The Yoshida doctrine had roots in Japan’s world views, but these views have been
remarkably weakly articulated. Ed Bergstrom argues that Japan’s leaders have mostly been silent
regarding their evaluation of the rules of international politics. 50 The international system is perceived
to be complex, unclear, and therefore Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo declared in 1999 that an observant
and calm approach to international politics was needed. Nevertheless, Bergstrom found that during the
first decades of the Cold War, Japanese leaders perceived the world to be bipolar, divided between
two ideological superpowers. The balance of power structure was perceived to be conducive to peace,
47
Berger, ‘’From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Anti-Militarism’’, pp. 139.
David M. Potter, in Rubio Diaz Leal, Laura, ed. China y Japon: Modernizacion Economica, Cambios
Politicos y Posicionamiento Mundial, Mexico City: Editorial Castillo, 2008.
49
Potter, ibid.
50
Ed Bergstrom, ‘’The Yoshida Doctrine and the Unipolar World’’ in Hood (ed), ‘’The Politics of Modern Japan’’,
New York: Routledge, 2010, pp. 68.
48
23
and Japan felt it was difficult to change this situation, but rather adapt to it. After the Cold War, Japan
recognized the world structure was no longer divided, and accepted that in the face of new
uncertainties, Japan should play a more active role on the world stage. 51 Prime Minister Hashimoto
stated that Japan should not take the post-Cold War ‘Pax Americana’ for granted, but actively aim to
strengthen it and contribute to global peace and stability. This outlook points to the next sub-element
of world views, namely the perceived role of the country in the world
National Role
Bergstrom stated that Japan, from the early Cold War until the mid-1990s, had a stable and
clearly defined role on the world stage. This role was that Japan viewed itself as contributing to peace
and prosperity. In addition, it saw itself as a stabilizing force and a partner in development. Berger
accordingly identified Japan’s role as that of a trading nation that focuses on the economy. 52 During
the 1990s, however, this focus shifted, and Japan started to attach relatively more importance to peace
than global prosperity. Bergstrom argues this is due to the onset of Japan’s economic stagnation,
beginning in the 1990s. As a consequence, Japan could not afford to spend the same amount of
resources to foreign development aid and cooperation, and rather focused on the domestic economy.
A second change in the 1990s was the shift towards a more active role on the world stage regarding
peace and stability. Japan increasingly identified itself as a ‘leader’, and focused on contributing to the
UN and multilateral organizations, with the continuing aim of contributing to international peace and
stability. 53 Nevertheless, the ways in which Japan seeks to achieve this have been ill-defined and
vague.
In the face of an uncertain and complex world, in which Japan has to closely monitor for
threats and contingencies, these developments would imply that Japan would currently be pursuing a
more activist foreign policy aimed at providing global commons. Although prosperity is still an
important part of Japan’s overall aims, it has an increasingly global focus towards ensuring peace.
Therefore, an increased role in defense and security matters, as well as discussions on global
commons in multilateral organizations would be a logical outcome. This also means that Japan, faced
with the uncertain implications of China’s rise, would pursue a more active or assertive foreign policy
regarding China. The aim of this more active foreign policy would be enhanced stability in the region.
National Interest
These developments also closely relate to the perception of the national interest. Like the
national role, the articulation of the national interest experienced a shift after the Cold War. Until the
51
Bergstrom, ‘’The Yoshida Doctrine and the Unipolar World’’, pp. 69-71.
Thomas Berger, ’’Unsheathing the Sword: Germany’s and Japan’s Fractured Political-Military Cultures and
the Problem of Burden Sharing’, World Affairs, vol.158(4), 1996, pp.187.
53
Bergstrom, ‘’The Yoshida Doctrine and the Unipolar World’’ pp. 73-75.
52
24
mid-1990s, the national interest was predominantly defined as the achievement of ‘peace, security,
recognition, and prosperity’. 54 These four elements were roughly equally important, and Bergstrom
concluded that Japan did not value any one of them above the others. This changed slightly during the
1990s, when Japan considered prosperity to be increasingly important relative to peace. As mentioned
before, this was largely due to the economic crisis, and uncertainties about Japan’s future prosperity.
Economic wellbeing became the new overarching national interest, articulated by several Prime
Ministers. This does not mean, however, that these aims have changed fundamentally. Bergstrom
argues that rather than a change in interest perception, there has been a shift in accents and relative
importance of each interest. Japan’s perceived roles, and national interests have endured over time,
and did not experience a change in content. This finding points to the endurance of political culture,
and its resistance to change. This would explain why the Yoshida doctrine has formed the basis for its
foreign policy over decades since the end of the war.
Identity and emotional attachment
As this thesis centers around Sino-Japanese relations, this section will elaborate on Japan’s
view of China, and the degree of friendliness and camaraderie between the two states. Japan’s
relationship with China has been influenced strongly by the development in favorability views in the
past three decades. The most important trend has been a steady but consistent worsening in Japan’s
view of China since the end of the Cold War. In the 1980s, these sentiments were positive, as a result
of the leadership change, opening up of China to foreign investment, and development towards a
market economy. Polls conducted by the Japanese government pointed to a 70-75% favorability rating
of China amongst the Japanese public. 55 This positive era in bilateral relations ended quite abruptly
however, after the end of the Cold War, when the 1989 Tiananmen square crackdown by the Chinese
government became a cause of severe concern in Japan. The violent suppression of protests strongly
damaged Japan’s view of China, and polls conducted in the aftermath of the incident indicated that
now only 50% of Japanese had a positive view of China. 56 Throughout the 1990s, several incidents
caused an even further decline, and eventually had the effect of altering Japan’s foreign policy, as
public opinion became more important. First, the 1994 launch of several missiles over the Sea of
Japan by North Korea sowed doubt about China’s good intentions, as China had been a consistent
supporter of North Korea’s communist regime. Second, contrary to earlier promises, China tested
nuclear devices in 1995, which resulted in street protests in Japan. Third, when China launched
missiles over the Taiwan Straits in 1996, in an attempt to deter a possible Taiwanese secession, Japan
also became concerned about China’s territorial ambitions. These occurrences deeply fueled distrust
54
Ibid, pp. 71-73.
Michael Yahuda, ‘’Sino-Japanese Relations after the Cold War’’, Routledge, 2014 pp. 30-31.
56
Mochizuki, ‘’Japan’s Shifting Strategy Towards the Rise of China’’.
55
25
of China in Japan, and eventually had policy implications, as the US and Japan strengthened defense
cooperation in late 1996.
Despite temporary thaws in relations, these favorability ratings never rebounded, and in fact worsened
even more. According to Michael Yahuda, sentiments worsened even further in the early 2000s as a
result of Prime Minister Koizumi’s visits to the controversial Yasukuni shrine, as well as Japan’s
revisionism regarding its war time past, represented by the issuing of educational textbooks
downplaying Japanese war crimes. 57 The Chinese government responded strongly to this, and has
demanded apologies and cessation of the Yasukuni visits, which in turn irritated the Japanese public.
Surveys conducted by The Genro NPO and China Daily, showed a favorability rating of 33% in 2007,
which steadily decreased to a mere 6.8% in 2014. 58 Pew Research showed a similar image, with a
29% rating in 2007, down to just 5% in 2013. 59 According to Genro NPO and China Daily, these
poor ratings were highly influenced, amongst others, by the territorial dispute surrounding the
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, and as a result, China’s perceived lack of respect for international law
regarding this matter. 58% of respondents believed the territorial disputes to be the most important
source of mistrust. Furthermore, China’s criticism of Japan’s attitude towards war crimes during the
Second World war has been badly received as well, providing another major cause for negative
sentiments. More specifically, 56% of respondents believed that ‘’China’s anti-Japanese education
and criticism of Japan’s past acts, as well as Chinese media coverage’’ are the most important sources
of friction regarding this issue.60
In other words, Japan has a very low sense of emotional attachment regarding China, and has
been harboring deeply negative views of China since the 1989 Tiananmen incident. As indicated
before, this worsened perception has eventually influenced policy, and it can be expected that Japan’s
unfavorable views cause a more confrontational stance towards China.
Norms and values in policy conduct
To examine Japan’s norms and values regarding foreign policy, it is important to distinguish
between issue areas such as security, economics and foreign aid. This is necessary, because different
norms govern the policies in each realm. In the security and foreign realm, a culture of antimilitarism
has been deeply ingrained in Japan since the Second World War. This feature has defined Japan’s
security policies and has had profound effects on its world view. Besides anti-militarism, however,
opinion polls have indicated that most Japanese favor a generally low-key foreign policy. Going
further, Peter Katzenstein stated that the Japanese people were in favor of a foreign policy in which
57
Yahuda, ‘’Sino-Japanese Relations after the Cold War’’, pp. 44-45.
http://www.genron-npo.net/en/pp/docs/10th_Japan-China_poll.pdf, accessed May 18
59
http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/07/18/chapter-3-attitudes-toward-china/, accessed May 18
60
http://www.genron-npo.net/en/pp/docs/10th_Japan-China_poll.pdf, pp. 26, accessed May 18
58
26
Japan was dependent on the US, rather than autonomous, and preferred passivity over assertiveness. 61
In addition, a diplomatic approach to world politics was desired, and there has generally not been
much appetite for the buildup of a strong military. Strikingly, most Japanese have indicated that even
in the case of invasion, they would not use military force. 62
In the economic realm, Japan has preferred economic autonomy through technological
development since the Meiji restoration. First, it wished to modernize and equal or outcompete the
West economically, and second it desired to reduce its dependence on foreign imports. To that end, it
has developed domestic industries and joined the global trade system. To scale back oil and gas
imports, for instance, Japan has developed nuclear facilities for its energy consumption.63 Katzenstein
argues that these two desires stem from an old concern about isolation pertaining to Japan’s position
as an island state. Japanese policymakers have always considered Japan vulnerable, and the outside
world hostile to their interests. This vision reinforces a sense of victimhood, as Japan cannot trust
foreign powers, and may fall victim to malicious intentions. As a result, Japan wants to rely as little as
possible on other countries for its economic wellbeing. The concept of security is not merely related
to military matters, but to its ability to develop technologies that achieve it.
Expected Policy Strategies
Generally, Japan's foreign policy culture can be described as traditionally anti-militaristic and
low-key, albeit with a shift towards a more proactive stance on contributing to global commons such
as peace, security and human development in recent years. The expected values for the dimensions
listed above provide a number of predictions regarding Japan's China policy:
1) Japan's uncertain world views, and its vision of the world as complex with many security threats,
especially in the Asia-Pacific, will cause it to play a more active role on the world stage, and bring
much sough stability. This implies more contributions to peace and security, global threats such as
terrorism, human security and climate change, and a more assertive stance on matters of regional
security. This would mean that, if China is perceived to challenge regional security, Japan would take
a tough stance and oppose China’s behavior..
2) Japan's perceived national role involves both anti-militarism and contributions to peace and
prosperity. In the policy realm, this would imply that Japan seeks to become a global stakeholder
without applying military means. Thus, Japan can be expected to politically support efforts to achieve
peace and prosperity by others, use diplomatic means, and contribute via development aid and
financial contributions to multilateral organizations.
61
Peter Katzenstein, and Nobuo Okawara, ‘’Japan’s National Security: Structures, Norms and Policies’’,
International Security, vol.17(4), 1993, pp. 100-102.
62
Katzenstein, and Okawara, ‘’Japan’s National Security: Structures, Norms and Policies’’, pp. 100-102.
63
Ibid, pp. 98-100.
27
3) As regards the national interest, peace and prosperity will like continue to guide Japan´s foreign
policy strategies. Contributions to global security, and the improvement of economic and trade
relationships are likely policy outcomes. When applied to China, Japan will conduct relations with the
aim of achieving peace and stronger economic ties. This could forebode a China strategy that seeks
peaceful relations and resolution of existing problems, while increasing trade and economic
agreements.
4) As mentioned before, Japan´s identity as a peaceful nation is expected to cause an anti-militaristic
policy. Regarding emotional attachment, Japan´s attachment to China is very low, and perceptions of
China have been increasingly negative over the past decades. Feelings of affinity are very poor, and a
sense of hostility has emerged. This would imply that Japan would not follow a friendly policy
towards China, but always follow a peaceful path. This seems contradictory to the previous
expectation concerning the national interest, however, the overarching search for peace and
willingness to solve problems does not mean relations are subsequently friendly per se. A cold peace,
or simple coexistence does not imply outright hostility or conflict, as Neorealism would predict.
5) In the domain of norms and values, Japan has developed norms of opposition to militarism and low
key diplomacy in the foreign and security realm, and economic security and technological
independence in the economic realm. For its China policy, this would imply that Japan would not
conduct an assertive strategy, nor consider military means to be a viable option in solving potential
conflicts with China. In addition, it would prefer not to become too dependent on China for its
economic wellbeing and technological development.
Chapter 6 Empirical Analysis: The Diplomatic Blue Books
To test whether Japan’s China policy is influenced by its political culture, the next part will examine a
selection of Japan’s policy strategies towards China, examine the presence of cultural factors and
most importantly, test whether the predictions listed above will hold,. These documents consist of the
yearly ‘Diplomatic Blue Books’ issued by the Japanese government and the 2013 National Security
Strategy. 64 The Diplomatic Blue Books are annual reports on Japan’s foreign relations with regards to
the world’s regions, issue areas such as international development aid, security policy, and economic
relations. In this chapter, and the following chapter on the NSS, I first give a general overview and
analysis of the documents in light of Duffield’s dimensions, subsequently test the expectations
generated in the previous chapter, and list the results.
64
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/, Diplomatic Blue Books 2005-2014, accessed June 2015
28
Diplomatic Blue Books 2005-2014
The Diplomatic Blue Books provide interesting insights with regards to China. The single
most remarkable feature, drawn from comparisons of the Blue Books since 2005 is the increased
focus on China, and concerns about security relations with that country. In the earlier years, until
2009-2010, the documents emphasized peaceful cooperation, economic relations, and mutual
interests. After that time, however, the Blue Books go into much detail about collisions and political
tensions surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. The more recent reports also include strong
language about China’s unacceptable behavior. From approximately 2006 until 2010, the Japanese
government expressed confidence in China’s role as a global stakeholder, whereas since 2010 the
Japanese government has sharply condemned Chinese behavior, and has considered it a risk to peace
and stability in the region.
In addition, the documents continue to announce a more proactive role of Japan on the world
stage to protect its national interests and contribute to peace and stability, while enhancing the alliance
with the United States and building better relationships with countries in the region and multilateral
organizations. Based on the documents, I have identified a trend towards a more active foreign and
defense policy, and a clearer ‘role’ for Japan. Although Japan views itself as a peaceful nation, it
increasingly deploys the SDF to stabilize conflict areas, and considers itself a global stakeholder
responsible for contributing to global commons like security. This is legitimized by the experience of
the war, which the 2007 Blue Book has described as a source of humility which drives Japanese
efforts towards achieving world peace. Finally, on several occasions, the Blue Books have referred to
peaceful, as well as universal norms and values undergirding Japan’s foreign policy. In the 2007, and
2012 Books, for instance, the government stated that stability and prosperity should be based on
universal values, such as freedom, democracy, human rights, capitalism, and the rule of law. The
precise findings for each segment in each year examined are listed in annex 1.
Analysis
Although the structure and outline of the Blue Books has varied over the past 10 years,
several aspects have remained constant, and most measures of political culture can be clearly
distinguished in each of them. All documents contain a general section with an overview of the
general situation in international affairs that year, and contains world views as stipulated by Duffield.
The national interest and the perceived national role are not defined or reiterated every year, but are
nevertheless recurrent over an extended period of time. However, this could be the result of constant
nature of these measures, and perhaps the government does not feel the need to reiterate it every year,
as it is perceived to be a given. Policy behavior is recurrent, and linked very closely to the national
interest or the stated goal of Japanese diplomacy in that year. The focus on norms, however, is
29
relatively small, and only occurred in 2007, 2010, and 2012, notably under the Abe administrations.
This indicates that Japan’s focus on norms is still new, and not ingrained in the bureaucracy yet.
World views
Japan’s world view over the past 10 years has evolved slightly. In this regard, I will use the
distinctions used in all Books between the view on global affairs, and the Asia-Pacific region
specifically. In the early years of the Blue Books, attention was focused on terrorism and threats
regarding nuclear proliferation. The Books expressed support for the US war on terror and concern
about the proliferation of WMD. After that time, the documents did not focus on the global
environment until 2008, when the global financial crisis, climate change, food prices and other nontraditional issues became of salience. In addition, especially, in the years following the outbreak of the
crisis, all documents mentioned the rise of emerging powers and non-state actors, affecting the global
distribution of power and altering the nature of security threats. The latter refers to new issues, such as
(cyber)terrorism, and threats to global commons such as piracy and infringement on territorial rights.
Finally, more emphasis was placed on regionalism and the prospect of global governance to deal with
non-traditional cross-boundary issues.
The documents devoted more attention to developments in the Asia-Pacific region,
particularly the rise of China. In this regard, some very interesting and clear developments can be
observed. In 2005, concerns were expressed about territorial disputes, but in later years, until 2010, a
remarkably positive attitude arose over the course of relations with China. Much confidence was
expressed in the prospect of conflict resolution, and Japan expected China to behave as a responsible
player on the world stage. It was emphasized that cooperation in many issue areas was possible, and
that Sino-Japanese relations reached an historic high in 2008 with the celebration of 30 years of
diplomatic relations. In 2010, however, tensions around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands escalated, and
Japan insisted that Chinese vessels violated Japan’s territorial space. The security environment was
characterized as increasingly ‘harsh’ and uncertain, and especially since 2012 Japan became much
more critical of China, called its presence in Japan’s territorial waters illegal, and insisted it would
react firmly to new transgressions. In addition, concerns about China’s military buildup were
emphasized. Thus in recent years, Japan has become more concerned about its security, and China
plays a major role in this. This uncertain environment and worries about the military buildup of a
regional power would be typical of Neorealism as well, because it reflects the anarchic nature of
international politics, and fears of a rising power.
This characterization of the security environment is in accordance with Bergstrom’s
observation that Japan views the world as complex and uncertain, and is aware of rising security
threats. Nevertheless, it can be doubted whether Japan is not outspoken regarding the nature and rules
of international relations, because Japan has consistently identified the world to have become more
30
complex, with more actors, but at the same time emphasized the importance of international law, open
seas, peace, stability and the crucial role of multilateral organizations like the UN. Multilateralism,
security regimes, alliances and international law have always featured prominently in Japan’s foreign
policy, and in the past 20 years Japan wished to contribute more to global issues. Thus Japan has
considered these international rules very important, and it seems hard to argue it has not, as Bergstrom
stated, evaluated these rules. Its focus on rules would also pose challenges to Realist interpretations,
because under this framework international law, if adhered to at all, would be superseded by national
interests.
National role and interests
Japan’s perceived role and national interests were not articulated every year, but remained
relatively constant over the years they were mentioned. From 2005 until 2008, the classical interests
peace and prosperity were named yearly. In 2009, however, the focus shifted to territorial integrity in
particular, as well as the security of Japanese abroad. In recent years, however, the national interest
has not been expressly defined in the Blue Books. The national perception was mentioned less often,
but its self-evaluation as a peaceful nation has recurred over the years. In 2014, Japan stated it did not
only see itself as a peaceful nation, but also a contributor to peace, indicating that its national role has
expanded to include a role as actor and stakeholder in issues of global security.
Testing expectations
In the face of an uncertain environment, it was expected that Japan would play a more active
role on the world stage and respond to threats by contributing to peace and security. If China were to
threaten regional security, Japan would take an active and stalwart stance. The findings in the Blue
Books thus not only match the foreseen worldview, but also policy implications. As predicted, Japan
would play a more prominent role on the world stage and contribute to multilateral organizations. As
a result of the perceived insecurity, it has sought to strengthen its alliance with the US, participated in
security forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, and sought to partake in UN peacekeeping
operations. Its language on China has toughened remarkably in recent years, following a period of
optimism and faith in cooperating to achieve ‘peace and stability’. Tensions increased during 2009
and 2010, and Japan vowed to respond vigorously to the maritime presence of China in its territorial
waters. This development would fit Neorealist predictions about the changing balance of power, and
China aiming to dominate the East China Sea, but the observation that relations were good between
2005 and 2009 indicates that China’s rise and military buildup alone was not sufficient reason for
deteriorating relations. Despite recent tensions, Japan has shown a commitment to build stable and
peaceful relations, which fits the theoretical predictions.
31
Regarding Japan’s perceived national role, its peaceful nature and zeal to contribute to peace
and global security has been reiterated throughout the years. This matches expectations that Japan
would seek to contribute to global commons in a peaceful manner. It should be noted, however, that
Japan has not clearly elaborated under which circumstances military force would be applied in order
to achieve these goals. Therefore, the overall strategy of peaceful contributions is seen in empirics,
but the specifics are not clearly visible. Nevertheless, in the spirit of this peaceful role, Japan has
contributed to UN peacekeeping operations, but did not engage in combat operations. Thus, it could
be stated that this approach would epitomize the concept of ‘peaceful contributions’.
In the realm of the national interest, the policy outcomes of the aims of peace and prosperity
are recognizable as well, but results are more mixed. In addition to the desire to contribute to security,
Japan has stated numerous times that economic diplomacy and the forging of new trade partnerships
is a core foreign policy. In its relationship with China, Japan has praised the economic opportunities
accompanying its rise, and always sought to develop economic ties. This would, however, not match
Japan’s predicted aim of trying to reduce its economic dependence on foreign partners, including
China. Regarding security relations with China, it was expected that Japan would always conduct
these in a peaceful manner and be willing to resolve outstanding disputes. Indeed, in 2008 the Blue
Book stated that Japan and China would aim to achieve peace and stability, however, in recent years
this language changed considerably, and Japan condemned Chinese policy regarding the
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. The documents did not clearly mention the use of force by Japan’s SDF in
this manner, nor specify the conditions under which Japan would defend its sovereignty by force.
Japan’s response is referred to as ‘firm but calm’, but does not condone violent means. Japan prefers
not to use the threat of force, but the language of the documents does not expressly reject it either. It
can be stated that Japan does not prefer the use of force, and therefore puts effort into resolving this
dispute peacefully. As the possibility is not ruled out, this expectation is not as strongly met by
empirics as the previous dimensions.
Japan’s weak emotional attachment to China, combined with its peaceful identity would
predict a deterioration of relations, but a similar proclivity to peace. Indeed, relations have worsened
in recent years, and the Japanese government has not resorted to a militarized policy approach. The
limitation of this analysis, however, is that the deterioration took place within the context of the
Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. The deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations in recent years cannot be
readily attributed to a negative view of China in Japan. Instead the territorial dispute and perceived
assertive Chinese challenges to Japan’s territory seem to be a major catalyst, as the language towards
China was much friendlier in the years before the escalation of the dispute in 2010. Therefore, the
explanation for the worsening of relations is more systemic in nature, and would reflect Neorealist
predictions because China and Japan are embroiled in a dispute over territorial possessions and
dominance in strategic waters. In this case, political culture is a relevant variable insofar as the policy
32
strategy towards this dispute is not expressly militaristic. Therefore, the explanation for severe
Japanese concerns about China are not rooted in political culture, but an external conflict.
In the realm of norms and values of policy conduct, political culture seems to be partially
relevant, particularly in the strategic domain. In its conduct of foreign relations, Japan was expected to
pursue an anti-militaristic and low-key foreign policy, while pursuing economic independence.
Regarding China, these expectations have been met because Japan has responded vigorously in its
territorial disputes, but refrained from escalating the situation and applying military means. It also
developed an unprecedented degree of interdependence in the economic sphere, which contradicts
Japan’s aim of relying less on possibly hostile foreign powers, including China. In recent years, Japan
has attached value to universal values guiding its foreign policy, which adds a new element to existing
theory about its foreign policy norms. These universal values are not directly applied in relations with
China, but seem to increasingly guide its overall foreign policy directions.
To summarize, the Diplomatic Blue Books indicate that cultural predictions regarding its
national role, norms and values have been correct, and observed in the material, whereas evidence
regarding its emotional attachment, national interest and world views has been more ambivalent,
because external factors, such as territorial conflicts and China’s military prowess play a role as well.
Regarding these dimensions, Japan’s anti-militarism and peaceful conduct of international relations
have been key policy priorities, and are visible in the domain of norms and values, national role, and
the national interest. In addition, its national role combining peaceful nature and a willingness to be a
responsible global partner, especially in the realm of peacekeeping are completely visible in the Blue
Books. In the realm of world views, the results are ambivalent because Japan is worried about
Chinese behavior, and seeks to contribute to global security. Regarding national interest, the results
are not as clear cut, but anti-militarist approaches nevertheless dominate, as Japan has been unwilling
to rearm or show force in its disputes with China.
Chapter 7 Empirical Analysis: The 2013 National Security Strategy
In this section, I summarize the content of 2013 National Security Strategy in light of Duffield’s
dimensions, and test the expectations regarding China policy in light of these findings. In 2013, the
Abe government for the first time adopted a comprehensive National Security Strategy, and erected a
National Security Council. 65 This move was unprecedented, and signaled a new commitment towards
enhancing threat assessment, creating a framework for meeting security challenges, and concrete
measures towards enhancing Japan's defense capabilities. It is an important document because it
65
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf, 2013 Japan National Security Strategy,
accessed June 2015
33
transcends the domains of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense, and calls for a
broader government strategy towards dealing with security threats. Indeed, the National Security
Council is a centralized organ, consisting of the PM, the PM chief secretary, Minister of Foreign
Affairs, and Minister of Defense. 66 The timing of the publication of the NSS has led to speculation
about its 'true' target or direct cause. Many observers have concluded that this document is a direct
response to increased tensions with China, starting in 2010, about the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.
Berkshire Miller, on the other hand, argued that the strategy is broader one, dealing with other threats
as well, including but not limited to North Korea, WMD, piracy, and climate change. 67It is clear
however, that this document does indeed refer to security questions about China, and that the
territorial dispute has become a source of great concern.
Japan’s Role and Interests
The 2013 NSS starts off with a description of Japan’s role and national interests. It defines
Japan as a ‘peace-loving’ nation and one with a ‘rich culture, traditions, and universal values such as
human rights, democracy and freedom’. It describes Japan as a major player on the world stage, both
economically and politically. It also states that ‘’At the same time, surrounded by an increasingly
severe security environment and confronted by complex and grave national security challenges, it has
become indispensable for Japan to make more proactive efforts in line with the principle of
international cooperation’’. To carry out these proactive efforts, Japan has expressly dubbed itself a
‘Proactive Contributor to Peace’ under the current Abe administration. This is an important move,
because it shows that Japan wants to uphold its identity as a peaceful nation, and strive towards peace,
whereas at the same time, it feels it should commit and contribute more to this goal, implying it saw
its previous role as too passive. Its national interests are defined as the maintenance of Japan’s
territorial integrity and sovereignty, as well as its prosperity. This is similar to those articulated in the
Diplomatic Blue Books in previous years, however, the NSS also considers an ‘international order
based on liberal values’ to be a core interest. This is a change from previous years.
The global and regional security situation
As mentioned, the NSS expressed concern about the global environment, and called it ‘severe’, a
relatively strong term that indicates Japan is more worried than in the past. Generally, it considers the
world to be full of unstable factors and risks to the status quo. First, it acknowledges that the world is
increasingly multipolar, with states like China and India altering the balance of power that used to be
in favor of the United States. Second, it mentions the rise of non-state actors, both NGOs but also
transnational crime and terrorist organizations which are a threat to security. Third, Japan is concerned
about threats to global commons, such as open seas and access to international waterways. This is a
66
67
http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/how-will-japans-new-nsc-work/, accessed June 4, 2015
Ibid, accessed June 4, 2015
34
reference to both piracy and criminal activity, but also actions by states that hamper access to waters
or infringe on territories. The final concern seems to be a veiled concern about Chinese assertiveness
and maritime presence in the East and South China Seas.
According to the NSS, the security environment in the Asia-Pacific is particularly volatile. It
expresses concern over so called ‘gray zones’, areas with territorial disputes, in which it is not clear to
whom it belongs. These gray zones are referred as zones where there is neither ‘peace’ nor ‘conflict’.
These zones refer to the East and South China Seas, where China has territorial disputes with
neighboring states. The strategy then explicitly names China as a source of concern, and condemns
actions taken by the Chinese government. It considers the presence of Chinese naval and fishing
vessels to be ‘intrusions’ in Japanese territorial waters, and judges Chinese trespassing to be contrary
to international law. In addition, it finds Chinese military expenditure ‘not transparent’, and believes
the combination of unilateral action and China’s military buildup to be worrying.
Norms
Nevertheless, these policies, and the strategy as a whole, also seem to be influenced by
normative considerations that in previous years were not very strongly articulated. Japan has strongly
emphasized both the importance of peace and responsibilities to contribute to global stability, security
and development. Like the Diplomatic Blue Books, universal values are also figuring more
prominently in Japan’s foreign policy, and therefore it seems that Japan’s strategy is not solely based
on security concerns or national interests. The NSS devotes considerable attention to these issues, and
it seems Japanese foreign policy is more than self-serving. As stated, Japan seeks to proactively
contribute to peace, but it seeks to do so on the basis of ‘universal values and international
cooperation’. In addition, Japan seeks to strengthen the rule of law, and states:
‘’Japan will continue to faithfully comply with international law as a guardian of the rule of law. In
addition, in order to establish the rule of law in the international community, Japan will participate
proactively in international rule making from the planning stage, so that Japans principles and
positions based on fairness, transparency and reciprocity are duly reflected.’’
‘’Strengthening cooperation based on universal values to resolve global issues. Japan will endeavor
to share universal value s and reinforce an open international economic system, which form the basis
of peace, stability and prosperity of the international community. At the same time, Japan will
advance the following measures towards the resolution of development issues and global issues that
could hinder peace and stability of the international community, such as poverty, energy issues,
widening disparity, climate change, natural disasters, and food related issues through the active and
strategic utilization of ODA.’’
‘’Through a partnership with countries with which Japan shares universal values, such as freedom,
democracy, respect for fundamental human rights including women’s rights, and the rule of law,
Japan will conduct diplomacy that contributes to addressing global issues.’’
35
It becomes clear that Japan has a new focus on universal norms and values and sees
international law as a prime instrument to maintain the preferred global order and rule of law. In
addition, it is also notable that in a document relating to security, Japan pays attention to development,
and considers it a value to contribute to this. Nevertheless, it also recognizes that global problems
such as climate change, hunger, poverty and development issues, often referred to as questions of
human security, could be threats to global security as well. Finally, it is emphasized that Japan will
seek partners based on common values to address these issues. This is a very remarkable aspect,
because it means that Japan is not prepared to engage with simply any country, or any state that
provides cool benefits, but is actively concerned with their norms and values. This is also reflected in
the assessment of Japan’s most partners, as the NSS lists the US, South Korea and Australia and
Europe as Japan’s most important partners based on shared values and strategic interests.
Testing Expectations
The 2013 NSS contains a remarkable number of measures of political culture as identified by
Duffield. The document very clearly outlines Japan’s perceived role, its national interests, world view,
policy selection and a strong focus on normative aspects. The outline is sorted in a way that is easy to
identify categories, and the values for each one of them. To weigh the importance of political culture
and Realism in the NSS, it is important to examine the findings listed above, and compare it with the
expectations raised by secondary literature.
Like the Diplomatic Blue Book, the NSS describes the security environment as severe, and is
concerned about Chinese actions in the East and South China Seas. In addition, it expresses concern
about China’s intransparent military buildup. Based on this characterization, it can be said that
Bergstrom correctly noted Japan’s view of the world as uncertain, complex, and full of threats,
especially on the regional level. However, the NSS has not been silent about the importance of
international law and global rules, and considers these to be the cornerstone of international politics.
Japanese leaders have become more outspoken regarding the salience of these issues, especially as
concerns about incursions into Japanese territories have increased the salience of international rules
regarding these issues. As a result, Japan seeks to contribute more to the maintenance of these rules.
Moreover, the NSS states that Japan would welcome and cooperate with a China that is committed to
the maintenance of these rules. Therefore, Bergstrom is only partly right, and underestimated Japan’s
commitment to this order. These security concerns lead to the articulation of three key policies that
form the security strategy of Japan, and that directly relate to Japan’s analysis of the global and
regional security situation, and maintenance of the national interests. First, Japan seeks to ‘strengthen
its deterrence to deal with maintaining its sovereignty and territorial integrity’. Second, it seeks to’
strengthen the US-Japan alliance and partnerships in the region’. Third, it aims to improve global
security environment by strengthening the order and play leading role in settling disputes’. From these
36
policy goals, it becomes clear that Japan seeks to expand its SDF, and seek more security through its
alliance with the US and contributing to a stable world order. In other words, Japan is concerned and
seeks to protect itself against contingencies resulting from an uncertain security environment. This
finding is in line with the prediction that Japan would play a more assertive role as a global
stakeholder in peace and security, but could also reflect a Neorealist response to the anarchic world
system and possible threats.
Regarding Japan’s national role, the 2013 NSS, as expected, clearly views Japan as a nation
with potential to shape its environment and become an important stakeholder in global affairs. Yet it
is also considered a peaceful nation, and the strategy combines the two in a policy strategy dubbed
‘proactive contributor to peace’. In other words, Japan will seek to contribute to security, but will not
revert to militarism to ensure this. However, it should be mentioned that the NSS calls for a strong
increase in defense spending to ensure Japan’s security in an uncertain environment. This poses
challenges to both the culturalist and Realist explanation regarding peace, because Japan’s emphasis
on its peaceful nature, and contributions to peacekeeping missions and multilateral organizations are
contrary to the Realist worldview, whereas increased defense spending runs counter to its antimilitaristic culture. The policies to ‘proactively contribute to peace’ are defined as strengthening
Japan’s defense capability, the alliance with the US, and international order. The first two are
relatively concrete, as defense spending and the development of more advanced weapons systems,
some jointly with the US are prioritized. It is not quite clear, however, how Japan seeks to strengthen
the international order, and the NSS strategy does not clearly define in what instances Japan will
contribute to global commons. From a Neorealist perspective, these findings are highly ambivalent,
because proactive contributions to peace, and leaving security responsibilities to the US would match
Neorealism, but the aim of strengthening the international order and global commons is less fitting, as
this involves international rules and law.
Japan’s national interest is centered around the preservation of its territorial integrity and
sovereignty, as well as the strive towards prosperity. These definitions only partly match Bergstrom’s
findings, as he indicated that Japan’s national interests concern ‘peace, security, recognition, and
prosperity’. The NSS does not expressly refer to peace, security and recognition, and only contains
prosperity. It can be said that peace and security are broad terms that still capture Japan’s goals, and
are highly related to territorial integrity and sovereignty, because the goal of any nation is to ensure
security, avoid war and protect its border. The wording in the NSS, however, is markedly different
because the references to territorial integrity point to concerns about intrusions into Japanese territory
and violation of its borders. This means that according to the strategy, real threats have materialized,
overshadowing broad principles like peace and security. The identification of peace and prosperity as
core national interests would also match Neorealism, because its focus on security and accumulation
of wealth are the most important goals of any state according to that theory. The concerns about
37
territorial integrity, however, have not put to rest its peaceful approach regarding China, as Japan still
aimed at achieving ‘’peace, stability and prosperity’’ in the region. This would fit the earlier
predictions.
Japan’s expected unfriendly policy towards China, based on low emotional attachment is
partly visible, as the documents indicate a clear sense of mistrust towards China’s intentions, while on
the other hand, the NSS calls for a stable working relationship. The NSS states Japan will take a firm
stance regarding the territorial dispute with China. At the same time, this tough stance is somewhat
mediated by proposals to continue working on a Mutually Beneficial Relationship, defense
cooperation, and encouragement of China to play a ‘responsible role’. Thus Japan’s attitude is
somewhat unfriendly, but also constructive, matching the prediction that Japan nevertheless seeks
stable and peaceful relations. As stated before, it is difficult to translate the ‘firm but calm’ approach
towards the territorial dispute into an aggressive or militarized strategy.
When examining the norms concerning economic autonomy and an anti-militarist and passive
foreign policy, it is clear these norms are only partly visible. As this document focuses on security and
defense, it neglects economic issues, and therefore the autonomy aspect is not identifiable. In the
security realm, however, the strategy questions the norms mentioned above because it proclaimed
several new policies that marked Japan’s desire to be a proactive contributor to peace, which is
contrary to the expectations of a passive and low key foreign policy. More specifically, its
proclamation of policies to enhance the military cooperation with the US, increased defense spending,
strengthened security cooperation with countries like South Korea and Australia, and more
contributions to security under UN auspices mark a decidedly more assertive foreign policy.
Moreover, these strategies seem to be directly related to China, as its buildup and behavior in the East
China Sea are considered to be part of a larger set of security threats to Japan. The aforementioned
policies are thus for a large part related to its evaluation of China, and much more assertive than
predicted. Although it is unclear whether these enhanced military options would be directly used in its
dispute with China, it certainly is part of a broader strategy to gain leverage over potential adversaries.
Finally, it should be noted that the NSS includes a large section on norms not predicted by secondary
literature, but nevertheless manifested in both the NSS and Diplomatic Blue Books. The NSS states
that Japan seeks to contribute to peace by following the principles of universal values and
international cooperation. The rule of law in the international system is considered crucial to stability,
and to that end, Japan views international law as the most important way to achieve this. It is
noteworthy that Japan has adopted Western norms and values as basic principles undergirding its
foreign policy. Although not predicted, this result indicates new norms continue to emerge and affect
Japan’s political culture in the foreign policy domain.
38
Summarized, the expectations regarding political culture are reflected in Japan’s antimilitarist and internationalist national role and self-perception, and identity and emotional attachment.
With regards to emotional attachment, Japan has demonstrated a cold attitude towards China, but
refrained from applying military means to respond to its rise. In addition, within the domain of the
national interest, Japan showed significant concerns about its territorial integrity as a result of China’s
actions, but largely maintained its emphasis on peaceful relations and stable interactions with China,
fitting the policy predictions. In the realm of norms and values, the evidence is more mixed, because
Japan’s emphasis on its peaceful nature does not rhyme with its recent increases in defense spending,
although Japan’s defense expenditure over the past two decades has been stable. In addition, Japan
has increasingly valued universal norms, such as democracy, human rights and rule of law. These do
not reflect Neorealist assertions, resulting in mixed findings. Regarding Japan’s world views, it views
the regional environment as insecure and unstable, partly as a result of China’s behavior. This would
match a Neorealist vision, but Japan has also emphasized the important of international rules, and
stated it would welcome and encourage China to maintain them. Apparently Japan has normative
concerns about international rules, that do not match with Neorealist predictions.
Chapter 8 Conclusion and discussion
In this thesis, I have attempted to answer the question whether political culture is a significant
determinant of Japan’s foreign policy towards China. In order to measure this concept in the realm of
foreign policy, I applied a framework devised by Duffield to identify the main dimensions of the way
political culture affects foreign policy. These can be summarized as world views, the national role and
self-perception, identity and emotional attachment, the formulation of the national interest, policy
conduct, and the norms and values undergirding it. By using secondary literature, I examined the
values for each category in Japan’s foreign policy, and subsequently generated policy predictions that
can be expected based on the findings. In the interest of comprehensiveness I formulated predictions
for most categories to grasp the importance of all aspects of political culture. Finally, I used empirical
material consisting of Japanese foreign policy documents to test the predictions and conclude whether
political culture indeed highly shapes Japan’s China policy, or whether Neorealist elements are more
relevant.
The empirical materials examined in this thesis indicate that political culture guides Japan’s
foreign strategies, because I often observed the policy implications of Duffield’s variables in the
documents. However, political culture by itself does not explain all policies, and instead I posit that
both political culture and Neorealism have determined Japan’s China strategies. Broadly speaking, the
policy implications of Japan’s national role and perception, identity, and low emotional attachment to
China strongly reflect cultural values that deviate from Neorealist predictions. In the dimensions of
39
norms, world views, and the national interest the evidence is more mixed, indicating that both cultural
and structural dimensions are at play. With regards to some aspects, notably Japan’s policies to
strengthen its defense, enhance the alliance with the US and seek strategic and military cooperation
with regional partners, political culture seems to be of smaller influence than Neorealism. It seems
difficult to argue political culture is an all determining factor in explaining foreign policy, but it is
nonetheless a present factor that explains significant aspects of Japan’s China policy, and security
policy more general.
Japan’s China policy is ambivalent, and reflects strategic concerns about China’s growing
might, as well as anti-militarist norms preventing it from taking a militarized approach to prevent
China from dominating the region. Japan has been outspoken in condemning China’s actions, but
refused to indicate where it would draw the line and apply military means to resolve conflicts. In
addition, Japan has been much more cooperative than Realism would expect. Not only have economic
and trade ties blossomed in the past few decades, Japan has actively encouraged China to be involved
in regional institutions and rule making. Despite cold relations, Japan has indicated to China it would
be prepared to work on a ‘Mutually Beneficial Relationship’. In other words, Neorealism can explain
to a large degree how the changing balance of power has created strategic tensions between the two
countries, but fails to explain several key aspects of Japan’s policy. To be sure, Japan has adopted a
tough stance towards China’s territorials claims and adopted a change in thinking regarding security
by adopting a National Security Strategy, ending the spending freeze on defense, and enhancing the
alliance with the US. However, Japan’s continuing emphasis on its peaceful role, and failure to
significantly rearm, abolish Article 9, challenge China militarily or seek alliances in the region
indicate Japan has not followed Neorealist policy predictions, and are better explained through
political culture.
Limitations and implications for further research
As mentioned earlier, political culture is an important explanation, but nevertheless only one,
and this thesis certainly does not argue that mainstream IR theories or other frameworks derived from
social sciences or other fields are irrelevant. Analytically, Duffield’s framework merely focuses on the
domain of foreign and security strategies. The domestic, local, or individual levels of analysis are left
out, while these may provide important insights on the process of policy making in general.
Furthermore, Constructivist scholars would point out that realist foreign policy may be the result of
cultural attitudes towards the world, indicating that certain visions of the world are socially
constructed within the context of certain cultures. It is also possible that there is an interaction
between cultural beliefs and Realist aspects, implying that structural factors may shape cultures and
vice versa. This research takes Neorealism and political culture as separate domains, whereas some
foreign policy cultures may be Neorealist in nature. Instead of examining this combination, I argued
40
how Japan’s political culture is different from Neorealism, and focused on explaining how, amongst
other factors, anti-militarism defied numerous Neorealist expectations.
These concerns could prompt a research agenda which focuses on Constructivism, and
investigates how norms and (perceived) structural factors are interconnected. An example of this
could be an investigation of the role of nationalism and Realism, and how Realist concerns exacerbate
nationalist sentiments, which in turns leads to changes in structural factors. Nevertheless, like
Duffield’s conclusion in his research on Germany, this thesis shows that Japan’s political culture is
influential, and poses challenges to mainstream IR theories. It is imperative to transcend classical
theoretical paradigms, and look at factors beyond the scope of the IR field that shape politics and
foreign strategies. The aspect of political culture deserves more attention in IR research, and provides
answers to questions that have been neglected in most of the literature.
41
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Annex 1: Empirical Results Diplomatic Blue Books
Blue Book
World view
National Interest
National
Policy
Norms
Perception
2005
Destabilizing factors, but
Pursue peace and
also prospects for regional
prosperity for Japan’s
cooperation and East Asian
citizens
Community. North Korea
poses threat. China
sometimes infringes on
Japan’s territorial rights
2006
Japan and China have
Peace and prosperity
Nation
Defense
differences, but they
striving for
policy and US
should not stand in the way
peace.
alliance,
of cooperation. The East
‘Thought’
cooperation
China Sea should be a ‘Sea
leader
for world
of Cooperation’ instead of
thinking
prosperity,
a ‘Sea of Confrontation’.
about
construction
solving
of an
common
internationally
problems
peaceful
environment
2007
No clear world view,
Arch of
except emphasizing threat
freedom and
North Korea, but proposal
prosperity
of ‘Arc of Freedom’
based on
concept
universal
values
2008
Cooperation with China
Welfare of Japanese
possible in many new
people, peace and
fields, and joint efforts
prosperity
toward peace and stability.
30 years of diplomatic
relations celebrated
2009
Numerous global
Territorial integrity,
Ensure
challenges, including
protect lives of
Japan’s
terrorism, climate change,
Japanese citizens,
national
WMD, food prices, and the
prosperity and
interests, but
global financial crisis.
development
Japan’s policy
Regarding China, a historic
should also
year with many state visits,
serve the
44
2010
relations progressed
honor and
steadily. Some concerns
prestige of the
about military transparency
nation, and
and accordance with
instill pride in
international rules.
the people.
Global issues have led to
More active
the emergence of global
foreign
governance like the G8 and
policy,
G20. In addition, BRICS
deepening of
change balance of power.
US-Japan
There are new frameworks
alliance.
for cooperation but at the
Proactive
same time diversified
diplomacy,
threats to security. China’s
goal of East
development is an
Asian
opportunity for all and
Community.
Japan expects more
More UN
responsible role of China.
PKO
Japan wishes to resolve
participation.
outstanding issues.
Stimulate
Multilateralism
understanding
of Japan
abroad.
2011
2012
Shift in balance of power
Deepen US-
by rise of emerging
Japan alliance
countries and non-state
and
actors. Security
partnerships
environment in East Asia
in the region.
‘harsh and uncertain’, both
Advance
traditional and non-
economic
traditional threats.
diplomacy,
Tensions over collisions
address global
with Chinese vessels that
issues and
intruded in Japanese
contribute to
waters, but improvement
international
after a summit.
rule-making.
Increasing globalization
Japan
Minimize
and interdependence, and
should
risks,
diversification of actors.
overcome
maximize
inward-
opportunities
looking
for growth,
tendency
stability and
prosperity
based on
democratic
values and
human security
45
2013
Security environment
Japan will
surrounding Japan
pursue
becoming more severe, and
policies that
strained in the Asia-Pacific
will protect
due to increased military
Japan from
spending by all states and
crises and
tensions over maritime
threats to
issues. It is important to
peace and
seek a Mutually Beneficial
stability to the
Relationship with China,
world and
but good relations are
Japan, as well
impaired by Chinese
as peace and
intrusions in Japanese
prosperity. 3
territorial waters, and the
pillars:
Airspace Identification
Strengthen
Zone. Senkaku Islands are
alliance with
indisputable part of Japan.
US, deepen
cooperative
partnerships,
and enhance
economic
diplomacy
2014
Change in balance of
Japan is a
Policies in
Japan followed
power due to economic
peace-
light of
path of a
growth of emerging
loving
‘proactive
peaceful
countries. Greater diversity
nation and a
contributor to
nation. Itwants
and complexity of risks,
proactive
peace’
to uphold
risks to global commons
contributor
perception. 3
universal
and human security. Severe
to peace
pillars remain
values such as
security environment in
based on the
the same, but
freedom,
Asia as a result of North
principle of
Japan pursues
democracy,
Korea’s missile
international
a ‘strategic
human rights,
development and China’s
cooperation.
foreign
rule of law,
military buildup and
policy’ that
and pursuing
attempts to change the
takes a
world peace
territorial status quo.
‘panoramic
and prosperity.
perspective’,
upholding
universal
values such as
freedom,
democracy,
human rights,
rule of law
and
capitalism.
46
47