Global Food Security ] (]]]]) ]]]–]]]
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Global Food Security
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/gfs
Hidden dimensions of the Somalia famine
Nisar Majid a,n,2, Stephen McDowell b,1,2
a
b
71 Chelsea Park, Bristol, BS5 6AH, UK
Woodlands Road, P.O. Box 41275-00100, Nairobi, Kenya
a r t i c l e i n f o
Keywords:
Somalia
Famine
Political-economy
Risk analysis
abstract
This article adopts a socio-political lens in order to better understand the Somalia famine. As a result it
draws out important continuities with the famine of the early 1990s as well as specific food security
and vulnerability characteristics within Somalia which have largely been absent in discussions of the
famine to date. ‘Minority’ populations were most affected in both famines and this identity overlaps
with specific geographic areas and more sedentary, rural and agriculturally based livelihoods, distinct
from other population groups. We argue that these dimensions, important in understanding long-term
marginalization processes and outcomes, also help to understand the differential levels of risk and
other complicating factors in the 2011 famine.
& 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The dominant explanatory narrative of the 2011 Somalia famine
has been based on drought and crop failure combined with
restricted humanitarian access ascribed to the extremist group,
Al-Shabaab. Certain ethnic, livelihood and wealth groups were
disproportionately affected by the 2011 famine in Somalia. These
were predominantly drawn from historically minority and marginalized populations that were also by far the biggest ‘victims’ in the
1991/92 famine; the Reewin and Bantu (De Waal, 1994; Cassanelli,
1995). This socio-political dimension has not been evident in the
discussion and analysis of the famine to date. Understanding why
only certain populations groups were reduced to catastrophic
humanitarian levels within a widespread humanitarian crisis across
south/central Somalia, since 2006, is the central aim of this article.
Of particular interest is that the areas and people identified as being
in the worst humanitarian conditions prior to the famine were
generally not those who fell into ‘famine’, according to the Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) categorization system used in
Somalia (see explanation of the IPC in Box 1).
The following analysis reveals a unique convergence of risk
factors facing the poor wealth groups of the agro-pastoral Reewin
and riverine Bantu within a broader context of narrowing livelihoods and diminishing resilience. This understanding has implications for food security and livelihoods analysis, early warning and
n
Corresponding author. Tel.: þ44 117 9029014; fax: þ44 7970943782.
E-mail addresses: [email protected] (N. Majid),
[email protected] (S. McDowell).
1
Tel.:þ 254 732 510 617; fax: þ 254 735 590 670.
2
The authors are recognized as equal contributors to this article.
programmatic responses. The authors have drawn upon available
technical information from international agencies, particularly the
United Nations Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU)
and the High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), and other available literature and complemented this with interviews and exchanges with a number of Somali and non-Somali scholars and ‘experts’.
2. Who were the famine affected population?
By October 2011, 750,000 people were classified as being
‘in Famine conditions’ (FSNAU and FEWS NET, 2011), which
translated into approximately 17% of the population of south/
central Somalia. Of this population roughly 65% were from rural
areas and 35% were Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) residing
in the IDP camps in Mogadishu and the Afgooye Corridor. Of the
490,000 people from rural areas, they were all identified in the
‘poor’ or ‘very poor’ wealth categories, the majority (81%) from
the inter-riverine agro-pastoral areas of Bay and Bakool, and the
remainder divided between the riverine, farming areas of Middle
Shabelle and Lower Shabelle (15%) and ‘poor’ pastoralists (4%)
(FSNAU, 2011: 2–3). See Somali livelihood groups in the map on
page 5 The agricultural populations — the riverine farmers and
agro-pastoralists — are the focus of this article, and considered
‘minority’ groups (Cassanelli, 1995).
The vast majority of agro-pastoralists residing in the famine
affected areas are also identifiable as the Reewin clan. They are
part of the Somali segmentary lineage system, but considered
distinct from the ‘noble’ or major clans (ibid). This broad clanfamily is more sedentary than the major, and historically pastoral,
clans, growing rain-fed sorghum and keeping cattle and small
ruminants. The poorer populations within this livelihood group
2211-9124/$ - see front matter & 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gfs.2012.07.003
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Box 1–The IPC.
This article refers to the Integrated Phase Classification
framework (IPC), originally developed by the FSNAU in
Somalia and since extended to other countries. The framework is used to facilitate analysis of food security conditions
based on available indicators, information and local knowledge. The major output of the IPC is a scale of food security
and humanitarian status ostensibly used to target humanitarian resources, and based on the following five categories
(in descending order): Generally Food Secure; Chronically
Food Insecure; Acute Food and Livelihoods Crisis; Humanitarian Emergency; and Famine/Humanitarian Catastrophe.
We refer to the Humanitarian Emergency (HE) and ‘famine’/
‘in famine conditions’ in the text below.
rely on agricultural and/or urban-based labor in particular to
supplement their own crop production, small livestock holdings
and other minor food/income sources.
The second largest rural population ‘in famine conditions’
were riverine farmers. This group is primarily composed of the
Somalis of Bantu origin, not part of the Somali clan system, and
considered a ‘minority’ group (ibid). They primarily live along the
Shabelle and Juba rivers, farming a variety of cereal and cash
crops, including maize, in irrigated and rainfed conditions, keeping few livestock. The poorer wealth groups here, with no or small
landholdings, also rely heavily on agricultural and/or urban-based
labor for access to food/income. The Reewin and Bantu reside in
and constitute the ‘breadbasket’ of Somalia.
The IDP population, an estimated 260,000 people, were classified by the IPC system as ‘in famine conditions’. Although not
studied in detail, key informant interviews and occasional agency
reports suggest that a significant proportion of this population are
Reewin and Bantu, originating from the Shabelle regions, Bay and
Bakool (geographical proximity and historical movements suggest
these ‘minority’ populations are predominant in the IDP camps in
Mogadishu and the Afgooye Corridor). In Mogadishu and the
Afgooye Corridor IDPs relied on daily labor (urban and agricultural) and petty trading activities for access to food and income as
well as various forms of assistance from different local and
international actors (FSNAU, 2010: 37).
3. Livelihoods, clan and politics
Social and political factors are often critical yet under appreciated areas of food security and livelihoods analysis, particularly
in situations of conflict and instability (Collinson et al., 2002).
In Somalia, the major clans have historically dominated political and
economic structures and resources (competing between and within
themselves) (Cassanelli, 1995). Pastoral society became the dominant
culture following the formation of the state in the early 1960s and
nomadic tradition was glorified (Bradbury, 2008: 11). In an African
(and global) context in which pastoralism is itself often marginalized,
this is an interesting phenomenon, however in Somalia it occurred
where ‘minority’ communities and their livelihood systems were
marginalized.
In this light, consider the last major famine in Somalia, in
1991/92, where 200,000–300,000 people died predominantly
from the Reewin and Bantu (De Waal, 1994; Hansch et al.,
1994). These population groups were the target of looting and
violence by the more powerful major clan militias. Livestock and
food stores were targeted. There was an important spatial
dimension to this famine, resonant again in 2011, with Cassanelli
describing the Reewin as ‘landlocked’ (1995), bordered by the two
rivers, more powerful clans and relatively distant from the
borders of Ethiopia and Kenya (Kenya has always been the more
important safe haven given the much greater presence of humanitarian actors in comparison to the more restrictive context in
Ethiopia). The famine was exacerbated by the large-scale diversion of humanitarian aid. De Waal credits the early relief response
to the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement, and some international
and national NGOs, with the United Nations arriving much later
(de Waal, 1994; Bradbury, 2008).
The complexity of vulnerability in the Somali context is
succinctly explained by Devereux, in his description of the
neighboring Somali populated area of Ethiopia. He states that
the ‘economy of Somali Region is a complex, interconnected
system of social networks and political negotiations, where the
sustainability or vulnerability of each livelihood depends as much
on the individual’s interpersonal relationships, and on international geopolitics, as on his or her assets and income at any point
in time. In this context, livelihood vulnerability is affected by
processes of social change, and by political instability. Drought
triggers livelihood crises but underlying causes of vulnerability in
Somali region are social and political, not natural.’ (2006: 11).
Although there are significant differences in context, there are
also many similarities and these principles are applicable across
the Somali populated regions (see LeSage and Majid, 2002).
This interplay of livelihoods, clan and politics is fundamental to
an informed understanding of the 2011 Somalia famine, reflecting
the reality of social and political life but also dimensions that are
complex and fluid and therefore difficult to understand. Although
we argue that these dynamics are not sufficiently integrated into
food security and livelihoods analysis in relation to the famine,
recent political volatility, the difficulties of field access, and the
sensitivities of these subjects have complicated matters further.
4. Fluctuating humanitarian conditions and obscured
levels of risk
The FSNAU information, analysis and early warning system in
Somalia has been a pioneer in the field and is recognized for its
quality and the critical role it played prior to and during the
famine. Fig. 1 below highlights the seasonal and annual fluctuations of population in ‘humanitarian emergency’ (HE), the level
before ‘famine’, by region, since 2006. Involving several hundred
thousand people each year, these figures do not include the
400,000
300,000
200,000
100,000
0
2006 2006 2007 2007 2008 2008 2009 2009 2010 2010
Gu Deyr Gu Deyr Gu Deyr Gu Deyr Gu Deyr
Bay
Shabelle Hoose (Lower) Bakool
Shabelle Dhexe (middle) Juba Hoose (Lower)
Hiraan
Gedo
Juba Dhexe (Middle)
Juba Hoose (Lower)
Fig. 1. Population in Humanitarian Emergency.
Please cite this article as: Majid, N., McDowell, S., Hidden dimensions of the Somalia famine. Global Food Security (2012), http://dx.do
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hundreds of thousands of IDPs, who are not categorized within
the IPC scale, but for whom food security and nutritional conditions have also been dire (see FSNAU post-gu and post-deyr
reports 2006–2011). As well as capturing the scale of human
suffering, of additional interest is the fact that only Middle
Shabelle was prominent in HE as well as in the eventual famine.
Middle Shabelle is the area within which most of the IDP
population also reside putting additional strain on local resources.
However Bay, Bakool and Lower Shabelle, known for their Reewin
and Bantu populations and from which 76% of the non-IDP famine
populations were drawn, were not prominent in HE in prior years.
While the populations of Bay, Bakool and Lower Shabelle may
have been (relatively speaking) more insulated from the acute
events of 2006–2010, the authors argue that increasing levels of
less noticeable covariate risk (a situation where an entire population is at risk due to the same factor) were developing for the
Reewin and Bantu poor. Their main food, income and coping
sources were strongly connected (their main sources of income
and coping were derived by laboring on the farms which produced the food they purchased) creating high levels of vulnerability to a production shock, which in turn would diminish their
principal source of coping. Subsequent sections of this article will
further explore the underlying factors that contributed to this
situation and how they interacted with proximate and complicating factors to cause famine predominantly in these communities
and not others.
5. Historical context—a brief note
The Somalia famine of 2011 took place within a deeply
politicized and militarized context for which the US-backed
Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006 provides a useful starting
point (see Bradbury, 2010). From this point onwards humanitarian indicators dramatically worsened, most obviously reflected in
the hundreds of thousands of IDPs generated in and around
Mogadishu (many also moved northwards and to neighboring
countries), and exacerbated by spatially and temporally variable
rainfall, global food and fuel price rises and the uncontrolled
printing of money. For those unfamiliar with Somalia, and given
its widespread depiction as a ‘failed state’, associated with
terrorism, piracy, drought and famine, it is important to acknowledge that the 10 years previous to 2006 were notable for the
relatively benign security environment (Menkhaus et al., 2010).
In fact, this period has been characterized for its political innovation and economic dynamism (Menkhaus et al., 2010; UNDP,
2001; Marchal, 2002; Hagmann, 2005). In Little’s seminal work,
focused on the pastoral-trade dynamics in the lower Somalia–
Kenya border region, he points out that ‘some sectors of Somali
economy and society are doing quite fine — as well — if not
better than the pre-war years’ (2003: 2). In addition, Marchal
highlights the dynamism of Mogadishu and Bakaara market —
the ‘mother of all markets’ — and the economic hub linking global
trade with Somalia and its neighbors, through which a wide range
of commodities flowed (2002: 63). That said, these benefits were
highly unequally distributed, social and development indicators
remained extremely poor and urban–rural inequality was marked
(UNDP, 2001).
However, the relative stability of the post-war decade was
ended abruptly in late 2006 when U.S. backed Ethiopian troops
invaded Somalia. Since then, Mogadishu has been the focus of
insecurity and violence, as an alliance of the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG), African Union AMISOM forces and Western
donors have fought with different militant Islamic groups
(Bradbury, 2010). Menkhaus (2009) argues that in 2007 and
2008 Western and UN policies helped to inflame armed conflict
3
and insecurity contributing to decreasing humanitarian space for
emergency relief. He describes this two year period as a ‘calamity of
enormous proportions for the country, arguably as bad as the
disastrous civil war and famine of 1991–92’ (Menkhaus, 2009: 224).
6. Underlying factors and limited livelihoods
6.1. Agricultural stagnation?
The agricultural sector provides the key livelihood base of the
Reewin and Bantu. The Bantu have a long history of forced removal
from the most productive land by successive political authorities
and exploitative relations with politically or militarily dominant
groups (Besteman and Cassanelli, 2000). Large numbers became
landless wage laborers under the Siad Barre regime. An estimated
100,000 jobs on the banana plantations were lost to this population group following El Nino generated flood damage and the loss
of preferential access to EU markets in 1997/98 (IUCN, 2006;
UNDP, 2001). Much of the irrigation infrastructure was looted and
fell into disrepair during the civil war (although since then there
has been some investment by international donors). However the
greater variety of crops possible, under a range of irrigated
conditions, and resultant increasing reliability of water buffered
these areas from the worst impact of climatic variability and food
security related shocks. There has also been some diversification
within this sector over the years as a result of demand from the
Gulf States since the mid-1990s (UNDP, 2001; Longley et al.,
2001). Under rainfed conditions for the Reewin arguably little has
changed other than asset losses during the civil war. Insecurity
may also have contributed to reduced use of large underground
grain stores. There is less possibility of crop diversification under
semi-arid rainfed conditions and market stimulation is limited for
sorghum (Longley et al., 2001). Livestock provides a level of
diversification and risk reduction for agro-pastoralists, less so
for the poorer groups who have few animals. For the poor, the
agricultural sector is also important for its labor opportunities
and migration occurs across these areas as well as to the riverine
and urban areas.
In contrast to the cropping sector, with its fixed assets, the
pastoral/livestock economy is reported to have been less affected
by the war (IUCN, 2006). Little (2003) suggests that the livestock
trading system is relatively flexible and adaptable. The livestock
sector does remain vulnerable to the wider political and policy
environment, evident in the Gulf States’ livestock bans, but major
growth markets in Kenya and the Gulf States, the ability to bypass
trade bans and the utility of clan-based trade networks mitigate
these constraints to a significant extent (see Mahmoud, 2010;
Majid, 2010). Some diversification is also evident in this sector
through the commodification of milk (Nori, 2006).
Increasing human population alongside environmental degradation in an unregulated and insecure environment is clearly a
problematic and under-explored phenomenon in the Somali setting
(IUCN, 2006). Population growth in the absence of economic and
technological innovation and improvement can lead to greater
chance of negative outcomes, particularly in poor segments of the
population in the Horn and East Africa (HPG, 2009). In the absence
of other economic opportunities, the poorest segments of society are
often those who collect ‘bush products’ for construction materials
and firewood, and produce charcoal (UNDP, 2001). While evidence
is not available in Somalia, comparable areas of Eastern Africa have
seen increasing risk and vulnerability due to rapidly increasing
populations, traditional production systems, and lack of diversification (Heady, 2011; Hamza and Iyela, 2012) as well as in pastoral
areas of Ethiopia (Catley and Iyasu, 2010; Aklilu and Catley, 2010).
Settled populations of the region, despite better proximity to
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services, have poorer growth and morbidity indicators than mobile
pastoral populations (REGLAP and ODI, 2010: 19; Nathan et al.,
1996). Minority populations may also be further disadvantaged in a
context such as Somalia (see below).
6.2. Rural—urban links
Livelihood diversification and risk mitigation takes place in
part through the permanent or seasonal movement of whole
families or family members to urban centers. Mogadishu, the
Somalia capital, provided such a hub for many people from the
surrounding rural areas. Marchal estimated that Bakaara
market alone directly contributed to 10–15,000 jobs in the late
1990s (2002: 76). There were many other markets generating
many jobs in the form of daily labor. The Ethiopian invasion of
Somalia in 2006 marked an exodus of many economic actors and
financial capital from Mogadishu (and its markets), primarily to
Kenya. The knock-on impact on small business, trade, social
support networks, and employment has not been studied in detail
but interviews suggest this should be considered a highly significant economic shock. While economic opportunities have
diminished, those looking for such work have increased as a
result of the hundreds of thousands of IDPs who had lost their
normal livelihood activities.
6.3. Social support and international remittances
Social support mechanisms are renowned for the Somali and
are an important livelihood and coping strategy. The extended
families of the major Somali clans have been described for their
embeddedness in multiple sources of income and occupation,
linking rural, urban and international contexts, where ‘within this
web of livelihoods income or resources in-kind are transferred or
negotiated between family members so as to support and maintain
the whole’ (Gardner and El Bushra, 2004: 100). International
remittances are by far, the largest contributor to GDP and are
said to ‘float’ the economy (UNDP, 2001; Lindley, 2010;
Menkhaus, 2008). While social support networks amongst the
Reewin are considered strong (UNDP, 2001: 68–69; Narbeth,
2003; Gundel, 2002), estimated at contributing 25–60% of the
household economy in difficult times (UNDP, 2001: 68–69), those
networks for both the Reewin and Bantu are thought to be,
historically at least, much less internationalized, in comparison
to the major clans (Gundel, 2002; Casanelli, 1995). The Reewin
and Bantu as a whole are therefore thought to be less embedded
in well established international remittance networks. However,
while this appears to reflect general and known patterns the
authors acknowledge that much is not well understood in Somali
migration and ’remittance dynamics, in particular in terms of
more recent migration trends (including to Asia, the Middle East
and within Africa) as well as clan/identity-based patterns.
of circulation of money. These negative effects appear to have
outweighed improved security also associated with their territorial
authority.
Al-Shabaab also represents to some extent a political voice of
the minority populations mentioned above. The rank and file of
the organization come from these populations and they have had
‘significant’ support from them (personal communication with
Roland Marchal). This relationship has also been evident in
Al-Shabaab policy; land has reportedly been given to farmers,
the group claimed a role in the bumper harvest of 2010 and they
voiced their disapproval of food aid during the harvest periods
(Al Jazeera, 2010b, 2010a). It is also widely reported that they
have promoted specific cash crops across areas of the south,
including sesame, in relation to increased demand for different
products in the Gulf States, but potentially undermining cereal
production (Abdi, 2011; supported in additional interviews).
In summary, Al-Shabaab played a number of contradictory roles
in relation to the people and land/territory of the Reewin and Bantu,
possibly influencing agricultural production, embodying the political
aspirations of marginalized populations but ultimately restricting
movement and assistance during the 2011 famine. These dynamics
are not well understood and require further research. In very recent
years in fact, the nature of ‘minority’ itself requires further research,
particularly in the case of the Reewin, in light of prominent positions
held by Reewin clan members within the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) and Al-Shabaab.
8. Convergence of risk factors
While higher levels of risk were likely emerging across south/
central Somalia in the years leading up to the famine, a special set
of conditions was developing amongst the poor of the Bantu and
Reewin, described below.
8.1. Agricultural production and labor market failure
One of the major triggers for the Somalia famine was consecutive poor seasonal rains, the collapse of cereal production and
with it the collapse of the agricultural labor market, contributing
to increased prices of local cereals, the main staple of the poor,
from the Deyr of 2010 to the Gu of 2011 (see Maxwell and
Fitzpatrick, in this issue). Poor Reewin and Bantu populations were
heavily dependent on the agricultural economy where increasing
numbers were looking for such work (as the drought deepened
and where IDPs had already significantly increased the labor
supply) and within an economic context that had been affected by
the conflict. There were few options remaining with the widespread and severe drought from late 2010. Distress migration,
social support networks and humanitarian assistance (local and
international) would be crucial.
8.2. Population movements
7. The multiple roles of Al-Shabaab
Al-Shabaab was one of the most important actors in the famine
but in more complex ways than reported and with specific
salience for ‘minority’ populations. The ‘organization’ was in
power across large swathes of territory in southern Somalia from
2009 to 2011. A general economic decline has already been
highlighted following the Ethiopian invasion and ongoing conflict
centered on Mogadishu. However, Abdi (2011) and other informants have also suggested that Al-Shabaab’s presence had an
additional ‘claustrophobic’ economic impact. This is attributed to
various factors including the withdrawal of existing traders who
moved out when Al-Shabaab took new areas, taxation and a lack
Migration and mobility is a normal livelihood strategy across
Somalia in pastoral and agricultural contexts (see Maxwell and
Fitzpatrick, in this issue). However, conflict and the restrictions on
population movement imposed by Al-Shabaab in 2011 limited this
option and undoubtedly contributed to increased mortality levels
(Bryden, 2011). The spatial location of the Reewin and Bantu
worsened this as their ‘landlocked’ position meant they were
furthest from (late) humanitarian resources in Kenya and, to a
lesser extent, Ethiopia. In the Afgooye Corridor, much closer to
these populations, such resources were already limited due to
restrictions imposed by Al-Shabaab. Distress migration was therefore mainly aimed at Mogadishu where resources were more
Please cite this article as: Majid, N., McDowell, S., Hidden dimensions of the Somalia famine. Global Food Security (2012), http://dx.do
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available under the TFG, although much diversion was taking
place there (Bryden, 2011).
However, prior to these restrictions, UNHCR had already
reported approximately 5500 new arrivals per month to the
Dadaab camp, in Kenya, from southern Somalia, throughout
2010 (UNHCR, 2010: 91). This movement was happening in spite
of good Gu rains and a bumper harvest in early to mid 2010 and
continued consistently with the very poor Deyr rains and harvest
later in the year. Many reasons are attributed to this, including
Al-Shabaab taxation and increased recruitment, ‘opportunities’ drying up in Somalia and considered better in Kenya, conflict and the
5
absence of food aid (interviews with Somalia Red Crescent and
Kenya Red Cross staff). Informants also suggest that the population
movements in 2010 included many wealthier households who
foresaw trouble ahead and had the means to move early, but with
potentially negative consequences for those left behind.
8.3. Social support
As already explained the ‘minority’ populations have strong but
more limited social support mechanisms compared to many other
groups, due to their limited international reach. The widespread and
Fig. A1
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N. Majid, S. McDowell / Global Food Security ] (]]]]) ]]]–]]]
severe nature of the drought, combined with existing economic
conditions, will inevitably have further stretched social support
coping mechanisms that clearly have limits on their effectiveness
with large-scale shocks. The reduced numbers of wealthier households may also have contributed to a reduction in the strength of
social support networks which draw heavily on those with more
resources. According to respondents Al-Shabaab itself is reported to
have organized some early redistributions to the poor but was
overwhelmed by (and under-estimated) the scale of the crisis.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to express their sincere thanks and
appreciation for the time and contributions of the following
people: Mohamed Aw-Dahir, Mark Bradbury, Professor Roland
Marchal, Grainne Maloney, Nigel Nicholson, Abdi Wahab
Mohamed, Suleiman Sheikh Mohamed and Simon Levine. In
addition, the editorial team for this special edition and the two
anonymous reviewers provided further invaluable suggestions
and comments.
9. Concluding remarks
This article has adopted a socio-political lens in order to better
understand the Somalia famine and has drawn out important
continuities with the famine of the early 1990s. Clan and identity
based analysis has long been recognized as crucial in Somalia (see
Luling, 2006), but is extremely sensitive and often absent from
areas such as food security and livelihoods analysis and response
(Collinson et al., 2002). We argue that these dimensions, important in understanding long-term marginalization processes and
outcomes, also help to understand the differential vulnerability to
covariate risk, such as concurrent crop failure and related agricultural labor market collapse.
In terms of early warning, a more socio-politically sensitive
risk analysis could strengthen the predictive capabilities of existing early warning systems. Ideally this would take place through
an improved engagement with populations in order to understand processes of social and economic transformation and
people’s own decision-making processes. Many people decided
to leave Somalia a year before the famine for example. Would
discussions with such people, in Kenya, have been useful? To take
this argument further, is it possible to extend livelihood and early
warning related analysis beyond the territorial boundaries of
Somalia in new and innovative ways, in terms of consultation
with diaspora populations?
Interventions in Somalia would ideally, in the absence of
public social services, focus more on long-term risk reduction
and less on final life saving measures. The Red Cross Red Crescent
movement has lobbied for a ‘no regrets’ approach in this regard,
in the Horn of Africa and globally. No Regrets actions are investments in existing local, private or public sector services, early in
the crisis cycle to extend their coverage or increase access.
Funding such an approach is difficult outside of the highly
politicized Somali environment, let alone within it. However,
the cost of not doing so in such a context may lead to another
famine; the same, or a very similar, risk environment may still be
in place.
Food security, vulnerability and famine are monitored, analyzed
and articulated through mandated organizations which are focused
on proximate causes and humanitarian outcomes expressed through
monthly and seasonal (highly detailed) snapshots. Longitudinal data
and information in some critical areas, as well as wider processes of
social and economic transformation, is more limited. For example,
changes to asset levels over time and the strength of coping
strategies, which may change more quickly in conditions of political
volatility, could probably be better understood. More comprehensive studies such as ‘Risk and Vulnerability in Ethiopia’, (Lautze et al.,
2003) and ‘Vulnerable Livelihoods in Somali Region, Ethiopia’
(Devereux, 2006) would be a step in this direction. The last five
years have been an incredibly volatile period in which significant
political, social and economic transformations have been taking
place in southern Somalia which are a challenge to understand.
However, the Somali environment is information rich and high
quality research is possible, using innovative and flexible approaches
and methods where necessary.
Annex A. Somalia Livelihoods
http://www.fsnau.org/downloads/Somalia-Livelihood-ZonesUpdated-February-2012.pdf
See (Fig. A1).
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