High School
11th Grade
Classroom Based
Assessment
US Foreign Policy CBA
How the United States government interacts with the world affects people across the globe. You will
evaluate a specific U.S. foreign policy based on an analysis of its causes and effects.
A Note on the Implementation of this Classroom-Based Assessment
To comply with state mandates and OSPI recommendations, Vancouver Public Schools is implementing one social studies
Classroom-Based Assessment (CBA) each year from grades three to twelve. This document should be seen as a model of one
way to implement the CBA. Teachers may use it in its entirety if they so choose. However, as long as the students create a
product aligned to the task set forth by OSPI and the task can be evaluated using OSPI’s rubric, teachers may design their
own implementation plans. In other words, everything presented in this document is optional except the task and the rubric.
Task: You Will:
State a position on the effectiveness of a specific U.S. foreign policy that outlines reasons in support
of your position.
Provide reason(s) for your position that include:
o An analysis of why the policy was implemented for national and/or international interests
from two or more of the following social science perspectives:
 Geographic
 Cultural
 Political
 Economic
 Sociological
 Psychological
An analysis of the effects of the policy including a discussion of:
 How the policy affected stakeholders in the United States.
 How the policy imposed costs OR provided benefits for other nations.
 Make explicit references within the paper or presentation to three or more credible sources that
provide relevant information AND cite sources within the paper, presentation, or bibliography.
Skills Required to Perform the Task


Taking and supporting a position with evidence and details from resources.
Analyzing primary and secondary resources.
Citing sources
Content Focus of this CBA Implementation Model
The content focus of this CBA implementation plan is exploring the United States decision to drop Atomic Bombs on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan.
NOTE: As indicated above, teachers may choose other issues than the one supported in this plan. This is a model of one way
to do the Foreign Policy CBA.
Fort Vancouver High School
U.S. History
Classroom Based Assessment
Suggested Unit Design
Historical Question:


Ask students if they feel they have enough information from the text, their background information, and the
information shared by other students to answer the question,
Ask the class to think of further questions they would need answers to adequately address the question above.
Research:

Teachers may supply students with any or all of the primary and secondary resources in this packet or they may
require students to find resources on their own.
 Once students have both primary and secondary resources (documents from this packet, supplied by the teacher,
and/or found by the students) have them read and take notes evaluating the decision to drop Atomic Bombs on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
 At some point, students will need to choose a position and link that position to why we study this event and how it
helps us understand current issues and events. The Resource Analysis Worksheet can help students evaluate
resources and organize and hold their thinking.
NOTE. Talk to your students about the importance of looking for corroborating evidence and bias.
Pre-Writing:



Explain to the class that their task is to write a paper that takes a position and evaluates the dropping of atomic
bombs at Nagasaki and Hiroshima during WWII and support that position with evidence from their research.
Share the Suggested Paper Organization with students.
Explain how students can take information from the Research Analysis Worksheets to create an outline for their
papers.
Writing:



For the purposes of OSPI, teachers may guide and support students up to the point of writing the paper. There are no
mandated time constraints but it is recommended that the writing take place during class.
Students may use any notes, graphic organizers, or resources while writing, but they should not use peers or the
teacher because the finished product should represent a student’s understanding and skills.
Students are allowed to revise their work but the teacher, peers, or parents should not be guiding the revision beyond
indicating on the rubric where the student may want to put more efforts.
NOTE:
 Once teachers have evaluated the paper with the rubric they may offer more guidance to students.
 This CBA is assessing the students’ understanding of social studies concepts and application of social studies
skills. While teachers may choose to evaluate students’ writing skills (such as conventions, organization, style,
etc.) this should be done separately from the evaluation of the CBA task as this is scored for content only.
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U.S. History
 MEETING STANDARD 
 NOT MEETING STANDARD 
4 - Excellent
A- Position
5.4.1:
Evaluates and
interprets other
points of view
on an issue
within a paper or
presentation.
B- Causes
1.31 Analyzes
and evaluates
the causes and
effects of US
foreign policy on
people in the
United States
and across the
world (1890present)
 States a position on
the chosen foreign
policy that outlines
reasons in support of
the position
 AND
 Draws a conclusion
about why studying
this foreign policy
helps us to
understand current
issues and events.
Provides reason(s) for
the position supported
by evidence.
The evidence includes:
An analysis of why the
policy was implemented
for national and/or
international interests
from three or more of
the following social
science perspectives:






Geographic
cultural
political
economic
sociological
psychological
Classroom Based Assessment
3 - Proficient
2 - Partial
1 - Minimal
 States a position on the
effectiveness of the chosen
foreign policy that outlines
reasons in support of the
position
 States a position on the
chosen foeign policy but
does not outline reasons in
support of the position.
 Addresses the
foreign policy
without stating a
position.
Provides reason(s) for the position
supported by evidence.
Provides reason(s) for the
position supported by
evidence.
Provides evidence for
the position
WITHOUT using any
specific social science
perspectives.
The evidence includes:
An analysis of why the policy was
implemented for national and/or
international interests from two or
more of the following social
science perspectives:






Geographic
cultural
political
economic
sociological
psychological
The evidence includes:
An analysis of why the
policy was implemented for
national and/or international
interests from one of the
following social science
perspectives:






Geographic
cultural
political
economic
sociological
psychological
C-EFFECTS
 Provides reason(s) for
the position supported
by evidence:
The evidence includes
an analysis of the
effects of the policy
including a discussion
of:
How the policy affected
stakeholders in the
United States
AND
How the policy imposed
costs AND provided
benefits for other
nations.
 Provides reason(s) for the
position supported by evidence:
The evidence includes an analysis
of the effects of the policy
including a discussion of:
How the policy affected
stakeholders in the United States
AND
How the policy imposed costs OR
provided benefits for other nations.
 Provides reason(s) for the
position supported by
evidence:
The evidence includes an
analysis of the effects of the
policy including a discussion
of:
How the policy affected
stakeholders in the United
States
OR
How the policy imposed
costs AND provided benefits
for other nations.
 States how the
chosen foreign
policy affected
stakeholders in the
United States or
imposed costs on
AND/OR provided
benefits for other
nations without
explicit support from
relevant evidence.
D- Sources
5.4.2: Creates
strategies to avoid
plagiarism and
respects tintellectual
property when
developing a paper
or presentation.
5.2.2 Evaluates the
validity, reliability,
and credibilityof
sources while
researching an
 Makes explicit
references within the
paper or presentation
to four or more
credible sources that
provide relevant
information.
 The credibility of
sources should be
established within the
paper, presentation,
or bibliography.
 Makes explicit references within
the paper or presentation to
three credible sources that
provide relevant information.
 The credibility of sources should
be established within the paper,
presentation, or bibliography.
Makes explicit references
within the paper or
presentation to two sources
that provide relevant
information.
Makes explicit
references within the
paper or presentation
to one source that
provides relevant
information.
 MEETING STANDARD 
 NOT MEETING STANDARD 
issue or event.
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U.S. History
Classroom Based Assessment
Suggested Paper Organization
There are many ways one might organize this paper. Here is one way that has all of the elements in place to
possibly meet the excellent level of the rubric.
Introduction
 Brief background information about the historical question
 Thesis clearly identifying a position on the Foreign Policy Decision
 Connection to current issues and events
Body Paragraphs
 Evidence from Social Science perspective #1
Present and explain evidence from primary and/or secondary sources supports reason #1.
Cite the sources of information
 Evidence from Social Science perspective #2
Present and explain evidence from primary and/or secondary sources supports reason #2.
Cite the sources of information
 Evidence from Social Science perspective #3
Present and explain evidence from primary and/or secondary sources supports reason #3.
Cite the sources of information
 Analysis of how the foreign policy decision affected stake holders in the
United States.
Present and explain evidence from primary and/or secondary sources in support.
 Analysis of how the foreign policy decision imposed costs and provided
benefits for other nations.
Present and explain evidence from primary and/or secondary sources in support.
Conclusion
 Reiteration of the position of the paper
 Summarization the main points of the paper
 Explanation of how studying this historical question helps us to understand current
issues and events
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U.S. History
Classroom Based Assessment
Suggested Paper Organization #2
There are many ways one might organize this paper. Here is one way that has all of the elements in place to
possibly meet the excellent level of the rubric.
Introduction
 Brief background information about the historical question
 Thesis clearly identifying a position on the Foreign Policy Decision
 Connection to current issues and events
Body Paragraphs
Analysis of how the foreign policy decision affected stake holders in the United
States.
Present and explain evidence from primary and/or secondary sources evaluating why the
policy was implemented and how it affected stake holders in the US using at least two
social science perspectives.
 Evidence from social science perspective #1
Use at least one primary and/or secondary source
 Evidence from social science perspective #2
Use at least one primary and/or secondary source
Analysis of how the foreign policy decision imposed costs and provided benefits for
other nations.
Present and explain evidence from primary and/or secondary sources evaluating why the
policy was implemented and how it imposed costs or provided benefits for other nations.
 Evidence from social science perspective #3
Use at least one primary and/or secondary source
 Evidence from social science perspective #4
Use at least one primary and/or secondary source
Conclusion
 Reiteration of the position of the paper
 Summarization the main points of the paper
 Explanation of how studying this historical question helps us to understand current
issues and events
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U.S. History
Classroom Based Assessment
Long-form Outline
I. Introduction:
Thesis Statement: (Take a position on dropping the bombs)
(be sure to include at least one sentence connecting this to a current event)
II. Body Paragraph 1 and 2.
Argument:
Evidence (sources)
1.
2.
How did this affect the U.S. and or Japan:
III. Body Paragraph 3 and 4.
Argument:
Evidence (sources)
1.
2.
How did this affect the U.S. and or Japan:
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Fort Vancouver High School
U.S. History
Classroom Based Assessment
IV. Body Paragraph 5 and 6.
Argument:
Evidence (sources)
1.
2.
How did this affect the U.S. and or Japan:
V. Conclusion
Restatement of thesis and evidence:
(be sure to include at least one sentence connecting this to a current event)
Killer closing thought:
VI. Works Cited Page
Include in alphabetic order and in MLA format each source that you used to
write your paper.
Be sure to also use in text citations to avoid any possible plagiarism.
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U.S. History
Classroom Based Assessment
Resource Analysis Worksheet
Name:
Source #:
Bibliographic Information:
Source Analysis Questions:
1. How would you describe or summarize the source?
2. When was the source created (era, date, before or after an event)?
3. Who created the source?
4. What do you know about the creator of the source? Age? Gender? Ethnicity? Education? Anything?
5. Do you think this is a credible source?
Explain why or why not.
Using Information Obtained from the Source:
This source is:
 Supportive of my position
 Against my position
 Neutral
Does this source relate to any of the following social studies perspectives? Check all that apply.:
 Geographic  Political
 Economic
 Sociological  Psychological
What information did the source have about the item(s) checked above?:
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U.S. History
Classroom Based Assessment
Document Analysis Worksheet
Document Letter or Number _______
Source _________________________________________________________
Author _____________________________________________________________________________________________
Date/Period of Document _______________________
Primary _____
Secondary_____
Main Idea of Document:
Important Facts
How Can I Use This in my essay?
Document Letter or Number _______
Source _________________________________________________________
Author _____________________________________________________________________________________________
Date/Period of Document _______________________
Primary _____
Secondary_____
Main Idea of Document:
Important Facts
How Can I Use This in My Essay?
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Fort Vancouver High School
U.S. History
Classroom Based Assessment
Graphic Organizer for US Foreign Policy CBA
U.S. Foreign Policy
Position
Position on primary factor causing conflict:
Position on primary factor causing conflict:
Reasons for Position
Reason(s) for position:
1st social science perspective:
1st social science perspective:
1st social science perspective:
Reason for implementing the
policy:
Reason for implementing the
policy:
Reason for implementing the
policy:
Connection to national and/or
international interests:
Connection to national and/or
international interests:
Connection to national and/or
international interests:
Connection to the position:
Connection to the position:
Connection to the position:
Effects of policies on stakeholders in the United States:
Effects of policies on stakeholders in the United States:
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U.S. History
Classroom Based Assessment
Dropping the Bomb: PROS
Dropping the Bomb: PROS
1)
1)
SOURCE:
SOURCE:
2)
2)
SOURCE:
SOURCE:
3)
3)
SOURCE:
SOURCE:
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Dropping the Bomb: CONS
U.S. History
Classroom Based Assessment
Dropping the Bomb: CONS
1)
1)
SOURCE:
SOURCE:
2)
2)
SOURCE:
SOURCE:
3)
3)
SOURCE:
SOURCE:
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Fort Vancouver High School
U.S. History
Classroom Based Assessment
A nuclear weapon of the "Fat Man" type, the plutonium implosion type detonated over
Nagasaki. 60 inches in diameter and 128 inches long, the weapon weighed about 10,000
pounds and had a yield approximating 21,000 tons of high explosives (Copy from U.S.
National Archives, RG 77-AEC)
A nuclear weapon of the "Little Boy" type, the uranium gun-type detonated over Hiroshima. It is
28 inches in diameter and 120 inches long. "Little Boy" weighed about 9,000 pounds and had a
yield approximating 15,000 tons of high explosives. (Copy from U.S. National Archives, RG 77AEC)
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U.S. History
Classroom Based Assessment
Pro and Con on Dropping the Bomb
BY BILL DIETRICH
Seattle Times staff reporter
Historians are still divided over whether it was necessary to drop the atomic bomb on Japan to end
World War II. Here is a summary of arguments on both sides:
Why the bomb was needed or justified:






The Japanese had demonstrated near-fanatical resistance, fighting to almost the last man on
Pacific islands, committing mass suicide on Saipan and unleashing kamikaze attacks at Okinawa.
Fire bombing had killed 100,000 in Tokyo with no discernible political effect. Only the atomic
bomb could jolt Japan's leadership to surrender.
With only two bombs ready (and a third on the way by late August 1945) it was too risky to
"waste" one in a demonstration over an unpopulated area.
An invasion of Japan would have caused casualties on both sides that could easily have exceeded
the toll at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The two targeted cities would have been firebombed anyway.
Immediate use of the bomb convinced the world of its horror and prevented future use when
nuclear stockpiles were far larger.
The bomb's use impressed the Soviet Union and halted the war quickly enough that the USSR
did not demand joint occupation of Japan.
Why the bomb was not needed, or unjustified:








Japan was ready to call it quits anyway. More than 60 of its cities had been destroyed by
conventional bombing, the home islands were being blockaded by the American Navy, and the
Soviet Union entered the war by attacking Japanese troops in Manchuria.
American refusal to modify its "unconditional surrender" demand to allow the Japanese to keep
their emperor needlessly prolonged Japan's resistance.
A demonstration explosion over Tokyo harbor would have convinced Japan's leaders to quit
without killing many people.
Even if Hiroshima was necessary, the U.S. did not give enough time for word to filter out of its
devastation before bombing Nagasaki.
The bomb was used partly to justify the $2 billion spent on its development.
The two cities were of limited military value. Civilians outnumbered troops in Hiroshima five or
six to one.
Japanese lives were sacrificed simply for power politics between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
Conventional firebombing would have caused as much significant damage without making the
U.S. the first nation to use nuclear weapons.
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/special/trinity/supplement/procon.html
Date Accessed 3.16.2012
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U.S. History
Classroom Based Assessment
The Hiroshima Rorschach Test
How an American views the bomb says a lot about how he views his country.
August 6, 2009, 6:07 a.m. ET
By WARREN KOZAK
On this day 64 years ago, an American B-29 named the Enola Gay dropped an atomic bomb over the city of
Hiroshima. We know that as many as 80,000 Japanese died instantly. We know the city was pulverized, and we
know that an estimated 100,000 additional people died later from radiation poisoning. We also are aware that the
Hiroshima bomb, and the Nagasaki bomb dropped three days later, ushered in the atomic era.
At the time of the event, 85% of the American public favored dropping the atomic bombs, according to a Gallup
poll (10% disapproved). Over the years, that attitude has changed. By 2005, Gallup found only 57% of Americans
thought the bomb was necessary, while 38% disapproved. Most of those polled were born after the event.
In August 1945, much of the world was exhausted after six long years of total war and tens of millions of deaths.
Most people that summer didn’t quite understand the implications of Hiroshima. All they knew was that the atomic
bomb was some sort of new, extremely powerful device that was the result of a top-secret project. It was a
demonstration of the amazing technical superiority of the United States—not unlike the moon landing 24 years
later.
But even before the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, doubts about its use surfaced within the group of physicists
who created it. Albert Einstein, who first brought the atomic bomb to FDR’s attention, along with Leo Szilard, who
was instrumental in building it, were both opposed to using it against Japanese civilians.
As time has passed, the army of doubters has grown. These critics argue that Japan was all but defeated by
August 1945 and the bombs were unnecessary. The incendiary bombing campaign had already destroyed most
of Japan’s cities, they say, and the mining of the inland waterway brought its war production down to practically
nothing. Its citizens were undernourished and there was practically no fuel or any other raw material left in the
country. Japan, according to this school of thought, was a spent nation just waiting for the best possible deal from
the Allies. Much of this is true.
On the other side, those who believe the bombing was necessary point out that unlike Nazi Germany, which
collapsed during its final days, the Japanese fought more ferociously as the Americans drew closer to the
mainland. Almost all were willing to die for their emperor, having demonstrated this in each island invasion leading
up to what would have been the largest amphibious landing of all time. Americans were growing weary of the
death telegrams that came by the hundreds and thousands to cities and towns across the country. Gen. George
C. Marshall, the Army chief of staff, worried that Americans would not be able to sustain their commitment to the
war if the invasion of Japan proved to be a long, costly battle.
The Japanese were banking on this as well. At the time that the bombs were dropped, battle-hardened G.I.s were
being rotated from Europe back to the U.S. and then sent on to staging areas in the Pacific. The first wave of the
invasion under the command of Gen. Douglas MacArthur was scheduled to land in November 1945, with a
second wave in March 1946. Hospitals were being quickly built in the Mariana Islands to accommodate the
thousands of expected wounded. What Americans eventually found in Japan after the surrender more than
proved that Japan was preparing to repel the invasion, not just with its military but with civilian suicide squads as
well.
The debate over the bomb reached a crescendo 14 years ago when the Smithsonian Institution produced a
retrospective that veteran groups objected to because they believed it focused too much on the victims and not on
the reasons for the bomb’s use. The exhibit was ultimately cancelled. Then, this past spring, comedian Jon
Stewart touched off his own firestorm when he labeled President Harry Truman a “war criminal” for ordering the
bombs to be dropped. Mr. Stewart later apologized.
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Fort Vancouver High School
U.S. History
Classroom Based Assessment
The fact that the quick end to the war allowed the U.S. to avoid a land invasion of the Japanese mainland, thus
saving many more lives, is quickly tossed aside by some critics. They say there is no basis for the estimates of
large numbers of casualties. But then there is the appalling number of Asians who were dying at the hands of the
Japanese. Upwards of a quarter-of-a-million were dying each month. The fact that this orgy of death—17 million
died in all—came to an abrupt halt when the Imperial Army was finally forced to go home is rarely mentioned.
Perhaps the simplest and most compelling argument for the bombs is the main reason President Truman decided
to drop them in the first place: He hoped it would rattle Japan enough to force it to surrender. That is exactly what
happened.
Today, Hiroshima has become a Rorschach test for Americans. We see the same pictures and we hear the same
facts. But based on how we view our country, our government, and the world, we interpret these facts in very
different ways.
A former G.I., now 90, who survived the war in Europe and was about to be sent to the Pacific understands quite
clearly that the bomb saved his life. His grandchildren may see this event in a very different way.
Mr. Kozak is the author of “LeMay: The Life and Wars of General Curtis LeMay” (Regnery, 2009).
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204619004574324373352808620.html
Date accessed 03.16.12
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Fort Vancouver High School
U.S. History
Classroom Based Assessment
A Nation Faces Conflict, 1939-1960 / Dropping the Bomb:
Hiroshima and Nagasaki / Dropping the Bomb Saved Lives
Dropping the atomic bombs on Japan saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of U.S.
soldiers and was the only way to end the war quickly. In the summer of 1945, American
planners hoped that a naval blockade and strategic bombing campaign of the Japanese home
islands would bring the war to an end. The prospects for an actual invasion appeared dim, as
Japanese leaders made major preparations to defend against such an attack. In light of the
heavy casualties sustained by U.S. forces in the invasions of Iwo Jima and Okinawa earlier
that year, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff were reluctant to carry out Operation DOWNFALL, the
planned land invasion of Japan. The Japanese military had a million soldiers, 3,000 Kamikaze
aircraft, and 5,000 suicide boats available to defend its home islands. Civilians were also being
prepared to fight to the death. With the U.S. invasion scheduled for November 1, 1945, and
well aware that the cost of such an enterprise was likely to be high, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
pressed President Franklin D. Roosevelt at the February 1945 Yalta Conference to persuade
the Soviet Union to enter the war against Japan at any cost.
Following the successful test detonation of an atomic bomb at Alamogordo, New Mexico, on
July 16, 1945, sharp debate arose among advisers to U.S. President Harry S. Truman (who
had succeeded Roosevelt as president on the latter's death in April) regarding whether to
employ the new weapon against Japan. The terror threshold had already been passed in the
firebombing of Japanese cities. Indeed, the most destructive single air raid in history was not
the atomic bombing of Hiroshima or Nagasaki, but the firebombing of Tokyo on the night of
March 9–10, 1945. This was total war. It was always assumed that the bomb would be used if
it became available. American planners believed that employing the bomb would, in all
likelihood, bring the war to a speedy end, saving many American lives. It would also mean that
the United States would not have to share occupation of Japan with the Soviet Union, and
hopefully it would deter Soviet leader Joseph Stalin from future aggression. The atomic bomb
was thus essentially a psychological weapon, rather than a purely military tool, the use of
which was designed to influence Japanese political leaders. Dropping it appeared to be the
only way to realize the American goal of unconditional surrender.
Revisionist historians have held that the Japanese government was trying desperately to leave
the war and that employing the bomb was unnecessary. Intercepts of diplomatic messages
indicated, however, that Japan had not yet reached the decision to surrender when the first
bomb was dropped. While Emperor Hirohito and his principal advisers had concluded that
Japan could not win the war, they still held out hope for a negotiated settlement and believed
that a last decisive battle would force the Allies to grant more favorable peace terms.
Postatomic bomb estimates have claimed the possibility of up to a million casualties in a U.S.
invasion of Japan. However, historian Ray Skates concludes in his authoritative study The
Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb (1998) that Operation OLYMPIC, the first phase of
the invasion of Japan (the conquest of the island of Kyushu planned for November 1945),
would alone have taken two months and resulted in 75,000 to 100,000 U.S. casualties. Such
losses, while they would not have affected the outcome of the war, might indeed have brought
about the political goals sought by the Japanese leaders for more favorable surrender terms.
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Fort Vancouver High School
U.S. History
Classroom Based Assessment
Prolonging the war would have meant a significantly higher cost in Japanese lives than those
actually killed in the atomic bombings. During the war, the Japanese lost 323,495 dead on the
home front, the vast majority of them from air attack. With continued strategic bombing this
total would have swelled, and many other Japanese would simply have died of starvation. By
August 1945, Japan's largest cities had been largely burned out. Waterborne transportation
had been interdicted by airborne mining and submarines, and the Japanese nation was close
to starvation. The reduced food supply was highly dependent on railroad distribution, and the
railroads would have been the next major strategic bombing target. In effect, dropping the
bomb resulted in a net saving of both Japanese and American lives.
The first bomb fell on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. On August 8, the Soviet Union declared
war on Japan, Stalin honoring, to the day, his pledge at Yalta to enter the war against Japan
"two or three months after the defeat of Germany," which had occurred on May 8, 1945. On
August 9, a second atomic bomb fell on Nagasaki.
After prolonged meetings with his advisers, Hirohito made the decision for peace. The U.S.
dropping of the atomic bombs enabled him to take this difficult step in the face of a sharply
divided cabinet. Even so, his decision was not without danger, for fanatics determined to fight
on to the end plotted to assassinate the emperor to prevent announcement of the decision. To
forestall this, Hirohito communicated the decision over radio. On the afternoon of August 15,
1945, in a voice never heard before by the Japanese people, Hirohito told his people that
Japan would accept the Potsdam Declaration and surrender. In so doing, he specifically
mentioned the atomic bomb: "Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most
cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is indeed incalculable, taking the toll of many
innocent lives." World War II had come to an end, and the atomic bomb played a major role in
it, saving both Japanese and American lives.
Works Cited
Frank, Richard B. Downfall: The End of the Japanese Empire. New York: Random House, 1999; Mosley,
Leonard. Hirohito, Emperor of Japan. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966; Skates, John Ray. The Invasion
of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998.
Select Citation Style: MLA
About the Author
Spencer C. Tucker
Spence Tucker earned a PhD from the Virginia Military Institute and was a Fulbright scholar in France. He was an army
captain and intelligence analyst in the Pentagon during the Vietnam War, then taught for 30 years at Texas Christian
University before returning to his alma mater for six years as the holder of the John Biggs Chair of Military History. He
retired from teaching in 2003. He is now Senior Fellow of Military History at ABC-CLIO. Dr. Tucker has written or edited
more than 25 books, including ABC-CLIO's encyclopedias of World War I and II and the award-winning Encyclopedia ofthe
Vietnam War.
http://www.humbleisd.net/cms/lib2/TX01001414/Centricity/Domain/3492/http___americanhistory.abcclio.pdf
Date accessed 3.16.2012
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A Nation Faces Conflict, 1939-1960 / Dropping the Bomb:
Hiroshima and Nagasaki / The U.S. Was Justified in Using the
Atomic Bomb
The simple answer to the question "Was the United States justified in dropping the atomic
bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in World War II?" is yes, the United States was justified in
using atomic bombs to end World War II in the Pacific at the earliest possible moment. The
answer to a closely related question—"Was the use of the bomb necessary?"—is more
ambiguous. In my view, the answer to this question is yes, it was necessary in some ways, and
no, it was not necessary in other ways.
By the summer of 1945, after three-and-a-half years of cruel and bloody war, American leaders
knew that Japan was defeated. It was running desperately short of vital supplies and faced the
prospect of mass starvation. But that did not mean that Japan was ready to surrender.
Although its leaders recognized that they could not win the war, they fought on in hopes of
securing surrender terms that they would find acceptable. President Harry S. Truman and his
advisers considered various methods of forcing the Japanese to surrender, including, in the
worst case, an invasion of the Japanese home islands that would claim the lives of large
numbers of U.S. soldiers, sailors, and Marines. The invasion, if it became necessary, was
scheduled to begin around November 1, 1945.
The success of the Manhattan Project in building atomic bombs that became available for the
first time in the summer of 1945 greatly eased the dilemma that Truman faced. Here, he
hoped, was a means to force the Japanese to quit the war without having to confront the
ghastly prospect of an invasion or risk the major drawbacks of the other possible but highly
uncertain alternatives. The alternatives included continuing the firebombing of Japanese cities
that had already caused massive destruction and loss of life, modifying the U.S. demand for
unconditional surrender by allowing the emperor to remain on his throne, and waiting for Soviet
entry into the war against Japan. Those options might have brought about a Japanese
surrender but they ran the risks of prolonging the war in the first two cases and expanding
Soviet influence in East Asia in the third.
Although some Japanese leaders sought to persuade Emperor Hirohito to surrender, he
vacillated while the war continued. Therefore, the use of the atomic bomb was essential, and
justified, to compel Japan to capitulate promptly. The shock of the bombing of Hiroshima,
followed immediately by a Soviet attack on Japanese forces in Manchuria, finally convinced
Hirohito that the war must end quickly. After agonizing deliberations in Tokyo, the Japanese
government surrendered on the sole condition that the institution of the emperor be preserved.
For many years after the end of World War II, Americans embraced the view that the use of
the bomb was necessary because the only alternative was an invasion of Japan that would
have cost hundreds of thousands of American lives. But this categorical position has been
discredited by the opening of new American and Japanese sources. They show that neither
the president nor top military advisers regarded an invasion as inevitable. Further, Truman
was not told by his most trusted advisers that an invasion, if it became necessary, would cost
hundreds of thousands of lives. The idea that Truman had to choose between the bomb and
an invasion to defeat Japan is a myth that took hold in the United States after World War II.
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Truman was committed to ending the war at the earliest possible moment, and he wanted to
save as many American lives as he could. He did not need estimates of potential losses in the
hundreds of thousands to authorize the use of the bomb, and in fact, there is no
contemporaneous evidence that he received projections of such staggering losses. For
Truman, his advisers, and the vast majority of the American people, ending the war and
sparing the lives of a smaller but far from inconsequential number of Americans was ample
reason to drop atomic bombs. The Japanese government could have avoided the terrible
effects of the atomic bombs by electing to surrender sooner than it did, but it was too divided
and too indecisive to take the proper action.
There are many uncertainties and complexities surrounding the end of World War II. But the
answer to the fundamental question of whether the use of the bomb on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki was necessary appears to be: yes . . . and no. Yes, it was necessary to end the war
as quickly as possible. And yes, it was necessary to save the lives of American troops,
perhaps numbering in the several thousands. But no, the bomb probably was not necessary to
end the war within a fairly short time without an invasion because Japan was in such dire
straits. And no, it was not necessary to save the lives of hundreds of thousands of American
troops.
Works Cited
Walker, Samuel J. Prompt and Utter Destruction Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs
Against Japan. 2nd ed.
Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004.
Select Citation Style:
MLA
Walker, Samuel J. "Dropping the Bomb: Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The U.S. Was Justified in
Using the Atomic
Bomb." American History. ABC-CLIO, 2011. Web. 12 Jan. 2011.
MLA
About the Author
Server: WEB1 | Client IP: 205.196.190.199 | Session ID:
0pru3v2vukg3a455ncgme155 | Token: 44CEC0A446EB48D44EBA78ABB7F14B0C
Referer:
J. Samuel Walker
J. Samuel Walker is an historian and author whose research focuses on nuclear energy. He
holds a MA and PhD in history
from the University of Maryland. His most recent works are the books Prompt and Utter
Destruction: Truman and the
Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan (2004) and Three Mile Island: A Nuclear Crisis in
Historical Perspective (2004).
http://www.humbleisd.net/cms/lib2/TX01001414/Centricity/Domain/3492/http___americanhistory.abcclio2.pdf
Date Accessed: 3.16.12
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Harry S. Truman, Diary, July 25, 1945
President Truman told his diary on July 25, 1925 that he had ordered the bomb used.
July 25 1945
We met at 11 A.M. today. That is Stalin, Churchill, and the U.S. President. But I had a most
important session with Lord Mountbatten and General Marshall before that. We have
discovered the most terrible bomb in the history of the world. It may be the fire distruction
[destruction] prophesied in the Euphrates Valley Era, after Noah and his fabulous Ark.
Anyway we think we have found the way to cause a disintegration of the atom. An
experiment in the New Mexican desert was startling--to put it mildly. Thirteen pounds of the
explosive caused the complete disintegration of a steel tower 60 feet high, created a crater 6
feet deep and 1200 feet in diameter, knocked over a steel tower 1/2 mile away and knocked
men down 10,000 yards away. The explosion was visible for more than 200 miles and
audible for 40 miles and more.
This weapon is to be used against Japan between now and August 10th. I have told the Sec.
of War, Mr. Stimson to use it so that military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the
target and not women and children. Even if the Japs are savages, ruthless, merciless and
fanatic, we as the leader of the world for the common welfare cannot drop this terrible bomb
on the old Capitol or the new.
He and I are in accord. The target will be a purely military one and we will issue a warning
statement asking the Japs to surrender and save lives. I'm sure they will not do that, but we
will have given them the chance. It is certainly a good thing for the world that Hitler's crowd
or Stalin's did not discover this atomic bomb. It seems to be the most terrible thing ever
discovered, but it can be made the most useful.
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/fulltext.php?fulltexti
d=15
Date accessed: 03.16.12
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Truman's Reflections on the Atomic Bombings
Below is a letter written by Harry Truman on January 12, 1953 to Prof. James L.
Cate which seems to clearly present his understanding of the necessity of using
the atomic bombs to end World War II.
THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington
January 12, 1953
My Dear Professor Cate;
Your letter of December 6, 1952 has just been delivered to me. When the message came to
Potsdam that a successful atomic explosion had taken place in New Mexico, there was much
excitement and conversation about the effect on the war then in progress with Japan. The next
day I told the Prime Minsiter of Great Britain and Generalissimo Stalin that the explosion had
been a success. The British Prime Minister understood and appreciated what I'd told him.
Premier Stalin smiled and thanked me for reporting the explosion to him, but I'm sure he did
not understand its significance. I called a meeting of the Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, the
Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, General Eisenhower,
Admiral King and some others, to discuss what should be done with this awful weapon.
I asked General Marshall what it would cost in lives to land on the Tokyo plain and other places
in Japan. It was his opinion that such an invasion would cost at a minimum one quarter of a
million casualties, and might cost as much as a million, on the American side alone, with an
equal number of the enemy. The other military and naval men present agreed. I asked
Secretary Stimson which sites in Japan were devoted to war production. He promptly named
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, among others. We sent an ultimatum to Japan. It was rejected.
I ordered atomic bombs dropped on the two cities named on the way back from Potsdam, when
we were in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. In your letter, you raise the fact that the directive
to General Spaatz to prepare for delivering the bomb is dated July twenty-fifth. It was, of
course, necessary to set the military wheels in motion, as these orders did, but the final
decision was in my hands, and was not made until we were returning from Potsdam. Dropping
the bombs ended the war, saved lives, and gave the free nations a chance to face the facts.
When it looked as if Japan would quit, Russia hurried into the fray less than a week before the
surrender, so as to be in at the settlement. No military contribution was made by the Russians
toward victory over Japan. Prisoners were surrendered and Manchuria occupied by the Soviets,
as was Korea, North of the 38th parallel.
Sincerely,
(The letter was signed by Harry Truman.)
http://www.hiroshima-remembered.com/documents/Truman.html
Date accessed: 03.16.12
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Why Truman Dropped the Bomb
From the August 8, 2005 issue: Sixty years after Hiroshima, we now have
the secret intercepts that shaped his decision.
Richard B. Frank
August 8, 2005, Vol. 10, No. 44
The sixtieth anniversary of Hiroshima seems to be shaping up as a subdued affair--though not for any lack of
significance. A survey of news editors in 1999 ranked the dropping of the atomic bomb on August 6, 1945, first
among the top one hundred stories of the twentieth century. And any thoughtful list of controversies in American
history would place it near the top again. It was not always so.
In 1945, an overwhelming majority of Americans regarded as a matter of course that the United States had used
atomic bombs to end the Pacific war. They further believed that those bombs had actually ended the war and
saved countless lives. This set of beliefs is now sometimes labeled by academic historians the "traditionalist" view.
One unkindly dubbed it the "patriotic orthodoxy."
But in the 1960s, what were previously modest and scattered challenges of the decision to use the bombs began
to crystallize into a rival canon. The challengers were branded "revisionists," but this is inapt. Any historian who
gains possession of significant new evidence has a duty to revise his appreciation of the relevant events. These
challengers are better termed critics.
The critics share three fundamental premises. The first is that Japan's situation in 1945 was catastrophically
hopeless. The second is that Japan's leaders recognized that fact and were seeking to surrender in the summer
of 1945. The third is that thanks to decoded Japanese diplomatic messages, American leaders knew that Japan
was about to surrender when they unleashed needless nuclear devastation. The critics divide over what prompted
the decision to drop the bombs in spite of the impending surrender, with the most provocative arguments focusing
on Washington's desire to intimidate the Kremlin. Among an important stratum of American society--and still more
perhaps abroad--the critics' interpretation displaced the traditionalist view.
These rival narratives clashed in a major battle over the exhibition of the Enola Gay, the airplane from which the
bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, at the Smithsonian Institution in 1995. That confrontation froze many people's
understanding of the competing views. Since then, however, a sheaf of new archival discoveries and publications
has expanded our understanding of the events of August 1945. This new evidence requires serious revision of the
terms of the debate. What is perhaps the most interesting feature of the new findings is that they make a case
President Harry S. Truman deliberately chose not to make publicly in defense of his decision to use the bomb.
When scholars began to examine the archival records in the 1960s, some intuited quite correctly that the
accounts of their decision-making that Truman and members of his administration had offered in 1945 were at
least incomplete. And if Truman had refused to disclose fully his thinking, these scholars reasoned, it must be
because the real basis for his choices would undermine or even delegitimize his decisions. It scarcely seemed
plausible to such critics--or to almost anyone else--that there could be any legitimate reason that the U.S.
government would have concealed at the time, and would continue to conceal, powerful evidence that supported
and explained the president's decisions.
But beginning in the 1970s, we have acquired an array of new evidence from Japan and the United States. By far
the most important single body of this new evidence consists of secret radio intelligence material, and what it
highlights is the painful dilemma faced by Truman and his administration. In explaining their decisions to the
public, they deliberately forfeited their best evidence. They did so because under the stringent security restrictions
guarding radio intercepts, recipients of this intelligence up to and including the president were barred from
retaining copies of briefing documents, from making any public reference to them whatsoever at the time or in
their memoirs, and from retaining any record of what they had seen or what they had concluded from it. With a
handful of exceptions, they obeyed these rules, both during the war and thereafter.
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Collectively, the missing information is known as The Ultra Secret of World War II (after the title of a breakthrough
book by Frederick William Winterbotham published in 1974). Ultra was the name given to what became a vast
and enormously efficient Allied radio intelligence organization, which secretly unveiled masses of information for
senior policymakers. Careful listening posts snatched copies of millions of cryptograms from the air. Code
breakers then extracted the true text. The extent of the effort is staggering. By the summer of 1945, Allied radio
intelligence was breaking into a million messages a month from the Japanese Imperial Army alone, and many
thousands from the Imperial Navy and Japanese diplomats.
All of this effort and expertise would be squandered if the raw intercepts were not properly translated and
analyzed and their disclosures distributed to those who needed to know. This is where Pearl Harbor played a role.
In the aftermath of that disastrous surprise attack, Secretary of War Henry Stimson recognized that the fruits of
radio intelligence were not being properly exploited. He set Alfred McCormack, a top-drawer lawyer with
experience in handling complex cases, to the task of formulating a way to manage the distribution of information
from Ultra. The system McCormack devised called for funneling all radio intelligence to a handful of extremely
bright individuals who would evaluate the flood of messages, correlate them with all other sources, and then write
daily summaries for policymakers.
By mid-1942, McCormack's scheme had evolved into a daily ritual that continued to the end of the war--and is in
essence the system still in effect today. Every day, analysts prepared three mimeographed newsletters. Official
couriers toting locked pouches delivered one copy of each summary to a tiny list of authorized recipients around
the Washington area. (They also retrieved the previous day's distribution, which was then destroyed except for a
file copy.) Two copies of each summary went to the White House, for the president and his chief of staff. Other
copies went to a very select group of officers and civilian officials in the War and Navy Departments, the British
Staff Mission, and the State Department. What is almost as interesting is the list of those not entitled to these toplevel summaries: the vice president, any cabinet official outside the select few in the War, Navy, and State
Departments, anyone in the Office of Strategic Services or the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or anyone in the
Manhattan Project building the atomic bomb, from Major General Leslie Groves on down.
The three daily summaries were called the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary, the "Magic" Far East Summary, and the
European Summary. ("Magic" was a code word coined by the U.S. Army's chief signal officer, who called his code
breakers "magicians" and their product "Magic." The term "Ultra" came from the British and has generally
prevailed as the preferred term among historians, but in 1945 "Magic" remained the American designation for
radio intelligence, particularly that concerning the Japanese.) The "Magic" Diplomatic Summary covered
intercepts from foreign diplomats all over the world. The "Magic" Far East Summary presented information on
Japan's military, naval, and air situation. The European Summary paralleled the Far East summary in coverage
and need not detain us. Each summary read like a newsmagazine. There were headlines and brief articles
usually containing extended quotations from intercepts and commentary. The commentary was critical: Since no
recipient retained any back issues, it was up to the editors to explain how each day's developments fitted into the
broader picture.
When a complete set of the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary for the war years was first made public in 1978, the text
contained a large number of redacted (literally whited out) passages. The critics reasonably asked whether the
blanks concealed devastating revelations. Release of a nonredacted complete set in 1995 disclosed that the
redacted areas had indeed contained a devastating revelation--but not about the use of the atomic bombs.
Instead, the redacted areas concealed the embarrassing fact that Allied radio intelligence was reading the codes
not just of the Axis powers, but also of some 30 other governments, including allies like France.
The diplomatic intercepts included, for example, those of neutral diplomats or attachés stationed in Japan. Critics
highlighted a few nuggets from this trove in the 1978 releases, but with the complete release, we learned that
there were only 3 or 4 messages suggesting the possibility of a compromise peace, while no fewer than 13
affirmed that Japan fully intended to fight to the bitter end. Another page in the critics' canon emphasized a squad
of Japanese diplomats in Europe, from Sweden to the Vatican, who attempted to become peace entrepreneurs in
their contacts with American officials. As the editors of the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary correctly made clear to
American policymakers during the war, however, not a single one of these men (save one we will address shortly)
possessed actual authority to act for the Japanese government.
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An inner cabinet in Tokyo authorized Japan's only officially sanctioned diplomatic initiative. The Japanese dubbed
this inner cabinet the Big Six because it comprised just six men: Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki, Foreign Minister
Shigenori Togo, Army Minister Korechika Anami, Navy Minister Mitsumasa Yonai, and the chiefs of staff of the
Imperial Army (General Yoshijiro Umezu) and Imperial Navy (Admiral Soemu Toyoda). In complete secrecy, the
Big Six agreed on an approach to the Soviet Union in June 1945. This was not to ask the Soviets to deliver a "We
surrender" note; rather, it aimed to enlist the Soviets as mediators to negotiate an end to the war satisfactory to
the Big Six--in other words, a peace on terms satisfactory to the dominant militarists. Their minimal goal was not
confined to guaranteed retention of the Imperial Institution; they also insisted on preservation of the old militaristic
order in Japan, the one in which they ruled.
The conduit for this initiative was Japan's ambassador in Moscow, Naotake Sato. He communicated with Foreign
Minister Togo--and, thanks to code breaking, with American policymakers. Ambassador Sato emerges in the
intercepts as a devastating cross-examiner ruthlessly unmasking for history the feebleness of the whole
enterprise. Sato immediately told Togo that the Soviets would never bestir themselves on behalf of Japan. The
foreign minister could only insist that Sato follow his instructions. Sato demanded to know whether the
government and the military supported the overture and what its legal basis was--after all, the official Japanese
position, adopted in an Imperial Conference in June 1945 with the emperor's sanction, was a fight to the finish.
The ambassador also demanded that Japan state concrete terms to end the war, otherwise the effort could not be
taken seriously. Togo responded evasively that the "directing powers" and the government had authorized the
effort--he did not and could not claim that the military in general supported it or that the fight-to-the-end policy had
been replaced. Indeed, Togo added: "Please bear particularly in mind, however, that we are not seeking the
Russians' mediation for anything like an unconditional surrender."
This last comment triggered a fateful exchange. Critics have pointed out correctly that both Under Secretary of
State Joseph Grew (the former U.S. ambassador to Japan and the leading expert on that nation within the
government) and Secretary of War Henry Stimson advised Truman that a guarantee that the Imperial Institution
would not be eliminated could prove essential to obtaining Japan's surrender. The critics further have argued that
if only the United States had made such a guarantee, Japan would have surrendered. But when Foreign Minister
Togo informed Ambassador Sato that Japan was not looking for anything like unconditional surrender, Sato
promptly wired back a cable that the editors of the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary made clear to American
policymakers "advocate[s] unconditional surrender provided the Imperial House is preserved." Togo's reply,
quoted in the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary of July 22, 1945, was adamant: American policymakers could read for
themselves Togo's rejection of Sato's proposal--with not even a hint that a guarantee of the Imperial House would
be a step in the right direction. Any rational person following this exchange would conclude that modifying the
demand for unconditional surrender to include a promise to preserve the Imperial House would not secure
Japan's surrender.
Togo's initial messages--indicating that the emperor himself endorsed the effort to secure Soviet mediation and
was prepared to send his own special envoy--elicited immediate attention from the editors of the "Magic"
Diplomatic Summary, as well as Under Secretary of State Grew. Because of Grew's documented advice to
Truman on the importance of the Imperial Institution, critics feature him in the role of the sage counsel. What the
intercept evidence discloses is that Grew reviewed the Japanese effort and concurred with the U.S. Army's chief
of intelligence, Major General Clayton Bissell, that the effort most likely represented a ploy to play on American
war weariness. They deemed the possibility that it manifested a serious effort by the emperor to end the war
"remote." Lest there be any doubt about Grew's mindset, as late as August 7, the day after Hiroshima, Grew
drafted a memorandum with an oblique reference to radio intelligence again affirming his view that Tokyo still was
not close to peace.
Starting with the publication of excerpts from the diaries of James Forrestal in 1951, the contents of a few of the
diplomatic intercepts were revealed, and for decades the critics focused on these. But the release of the complete
(unredacted) "Magic" Far East Summary, supplementing the Diplomatic Summary, in the 1990s revealed that the
diplomatic messages amounted to a mere trickle by comparison with the torrent of military intercepts. The
intercepts of Japanese Imperial Army and Navy messages disclosed without exception that Japan's armed forces
were determined to fight a final Armageddon battle in the homeland against an Allied invasion. The Japanese
called this strategy Ketsu Go (Operation Decisive). It was founded on the premise that American morale was
brittle and could be shattered by heavy losses in the initial invasion. American politicians would then gladly
negotiate an end to the war far more generous than unconditional surrender.
Ultra was even more alarming in what it revealed about Japanese knowledge of American military plans.
Intercepts demonstrated that the Japanese had correctly anticipated precisely where U.S. forces intended to land
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on Southern Kyushu in November 1945 (Operation Olympic). American planning for the Kyushu assault reflected
adherence to the military rule of thumb that the attacker should outnumber the defender at least three to one to
assure success at a reasonable cost. American estimates projected that on the date of the landings, the
Japanese would have only three of their six field divisions on all of Kyushu in the southern target area where nine
American divisions would push ashore. The estimates allowed that the Japanese would possess just 2,500 to
3,000 planes total throughout Japan to face Olympic. American aerial strength would be over four times greater.
From mid-July onwards, Ultra intercepts exposed a huge military buildup on Kyushu. Japanese ground forces
exceeded prior estimates by a factor of four. Instead of 3 Japanese field divisions deployed in southern Kyushu to
meet the 9 U.S. divisions, there were 10 Imperial Army divisions plus additional brigades. Japanese air forces
exceeded prior estimates by a factor of two to four. Instead of 2,500 to 3,000 Japanese aircraft, estimates varied
between about 6,000 and 10,000. One intelligence officer commented that the Japanese defenses threatened "to
grow to [the] point where we attack on a ratio of one (1) to one (1) which is not the recipe for victory."
Concurrent with the publication of the radio intelligence material, additional papers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
have been released in the last decade. From these, it is clear that there was no true consensus among the Joint
Chiefs of Staff about an invasion of Japan. The Army, led by General George C. Marshall, believed that the
critical factor in achieving American war aims was time. Thus, Marshall and the Army advocated an invasion of
the Home Islands as the fastest way to end the war. But the long-held Navy view was that the critical factor in
achieving American war aims was casualties. The Navy was convinced that an invasion would be far too costly to
sustain the support of the American people, and hence believed that blockade and bombardment were the sound
course.
The picture becomes even more complex than previously understood because it emerged that the Navy chose to
postpone a final showdown over these two strategies. The commander in chief of the U.S. fleet, Admiral Ernest
King, informed his colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff in April 1945 that he did not agree that Japan should be
invaded. He concurred only that the Joint Chiefs must issue an invasion order immediately to create that option
for the fall. But King predicted that the Joint Chiefs would revisit the issue of whether an invasion was wise in
August or September. Meanwhile, two months of horrendous fighting ashore on Okinawa under skies filled with
kamikazes convinced the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Chester Nimitz, that he should
withdraw his prior support for at least the invasion of Kyushu. Nimitz informed King of this change in his views in
strict confidence.
In August, the Ultra revelations propelled the Army and Navy towards a showdown over the invasion. On August
7 (the day after Hiroshima, which no one expected to prompt a quick surrender), General Marshall reacted to
weeks of gathering gloom in the Ultra evidence by asking General Douglas MacArthur, who was to command
what promised to be the greatest invasion in history, whether invading Kyushu in November as planned still
looked sensible. MacArthur replied, amazingly, that he did not believe the radio intelligence! He vehemently urged
the invasion should go forward as planned. (This, incidentally, demolishes later claims that MacArthur thought the
Japanese were about to surrender at the time of Hiroshima.)
On August 9 (the day the second bomb was dropped, on Nagasaki), King gathered the two messages in the
exchange between Marshall and MacArthur and sent them to Nimitz. King told Nimitz to provide his views on the
viability of invading Kyushu, with a copy to MacArthur. Clearly, nothing that had transpired since May would have
altered Nimitz's view that Olympic was unwise. Ultra now made the invasion appear foolhardy to everyone but
MacArthur. But King had not placed a deadline on Nimitz's response, and the Japanese surrender on August 15
allowed Nimitz to avoid starting what was certain to be one of the most tumultuous interservice battles of the
whole war.
What this evidence illuminates is that one central tenet of the traditionalist view is wrong--but with a twist. Even
with the full ration of caution that any historian should apply anytime he ventures comments on paths history did
not take, in this instance it is now clear that the long-held belief that Operation Olympic loomed as a certainty is
mistaken. Truman's reluctant endorsement of the Olympic invasion at a meeting in June 1945 was based in key
part on the fact that the Joint Chiefs had presented it as their unanimous recommendation. (King went along with
Marshall at the meeting, presumably because he deemed it premature to wage a showdown fight. He did
comment to Truman that, of course, any invasion authorized then could be canceled later.) With the Navy's
withdrawal of support, the terrible casualties in Okinawa, and the appalling radio-intelligence picture of the
Japanese buildup on Kyushu, Olympic was not going forward as planned and authorized--period. But this
evidence also shows that the demise of Olympic came not because it was deemed unnecessary, but because it
had become unthinkable. It is hard to imagine anyone who could have been president at the time (a spectrum that
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includes FDR, Henry Wallace, William O. Douglas, Harry Truman, and Thomas Dewey) failing to authorize use of
the atomic bombs in this circumstance. Japanese historians uncovered another key element of the story. After
Hiroshima (August 6), Soviet entry into the war against Japan (August 8), and Nagasaki (August 9), the emperor
intervened to break a deadlock within the government and decide that Japan must surrender in the early hours of
August 10. The Japanese Foreign Ministry dispatched a message to the United States that day stating that Japan
would accept the Potsdam Declaration, "with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any
demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler." This was not, as critics later
asserted, merely a humble request that the emperor retain a modest figurehead role. As Japanese historians
writing decades after the war emphasized, the demand that there be no compromise of the "prerogatives of His
Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler" as a precondition for the surrender was a demand that the United States grant the
emperor veto power over occupation reforms and continue the rule of the old order in Japan. Fortunately, Japan
specialists in the State Department immediately realized the actual purpose of this language and briefed
Secretary of State James Byrnes, who insisted properly that this maneuver must be defeated. The maneuver
further underscores the fact that right to the very end, the Japanese pursued twin goals: not only the preservation
of the imperial system, but also preservation of the old order in Japan that had launched a war of aggression that
killed 17 million.
This brings us to another aspect of history that now very belatedly has entered the controversy. Several American
historians led by Robert Newman have insisted vigorously that any assessment of the end of the Pacific war must
include the horrifying consequences of each continued day of the war for the Asian populations trapped within
Japan's conquests. Newman calculates that between a quarter million and 400,000 Asians, overwhelmingly
noncombatants, were dying each month the war continued. Newman et al. challenge whether an assessment of
Truman's decision can highlight only the deaths of noncombatant civilians in the aggressor nation while ignoring
much larger death tolls among noncombatant civilians in the victim nations.
There are a good many more points that now extend our understanding beyond the debates of 1995. But it is
clear that all three of the critics' central premises are wrong. The Japanese did not see their situation as
catastrophically hopeless. They were not seeking to surrender, but pursuing a negotiated end to the war that
preserved the old order in Japan, not just a figurehead emperor. Finally, thanks to radio intelligence, American
leaders, far from knowing that peace was at hand, understood--as one analytical piece in the "Magic" Far East
Summary stated in July 1945, after a review of both the military and diplomatic intercepts--that "until the Japanese
leaders realize that an invasion can not be repelled, there is little likelihood that they will accept any peace terms
satisfactory to the Allies." This cannot be improved upon as a succinct and accurate summary of the military and
diplomatic realities of the summer of 1945.
The displacement of the so-called traditionalist view within important segments of American opinion took several
decades to accomplish. It will take a similar span of time to displace the critical orthodoxy that arose in the 1960s
and prevailed roughly through the 1980s, and replace it with a richer appreciation for the realities of 1945. But the
clock is ticking.
Richard B. Frank, a historian of World War II, is the author of Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire.
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/894mnyyl.asp?pg=1
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Dropping the Atomic Bomb was Unjustified
The United States was not justified in using atomic bombs against Japanese cities in 1945. United States and
British intelligence had already advised that Japan was likely to surrender when the Soviet Union entered the war
in early August—and on terms which, in fact, would have been very close to those ultimately accepted by the
United States. There are also reasons to believe the decision had as much to do with geopolitics connected with
the Soviet Union as it did with the war against Japan.
The conventional wisdom that the atomic bomb saved a million lives is so widespread that most Americans
haven't paused to ponder something rather striking to anyone seriously concerned with the issue: Most American
military leaders didn't think the bombings were either necessary or justified—and many were morally offended by
the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Here is how Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower reacted when he was told by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson that the
atomic bomb would be used: "During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of
depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already
defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our
country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer
mandatory as a measure to save American lives."
In another public statement the man who later became president was blunt: "It wasn't necessary to hit them with
that awful thing."
Gen. Curtis LeMay, the tough cigar-smoking air force "hawk," was also dismayed. Shortly after the bombings he
stated: "The war would have been over in two weeks. . . . The atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the
war at all."
And Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, went public with this statement: "The
Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace. . . . The atomic bomb played no decisive part, from a purely
military standpoint, in the defeat of Japan."
The reasons these and many, many military leaders felt this way are both clear and instructive: Japan was
essentially defeated, its navy at the bottom of the ocean; its air force limited by fuel, equipment, and other
shortages; its army facing defeat on all fronts; and its cities subjected to bombing that was all but impossible to
challenge. With Germany out of the war, the United States and Britain were about to bring their full power to bear
on what was left of the Japanese military. Moreover, the Soviet Army was getting ready to attack on the Asian
mainland.
American intelligence had broken Japanese codes and had advised as early as April 1945 that although a hardline faction wished to continue the war, when the Soviet Union attacked—expected roughly in the first week of
August—Japan would likely surrender as long as assurances were given concerning the fate of the emperor.
Combined U.S. and British intelligence reaffirmed this advice a month before the bombings. One reason this
option—using the shock of the Soviet attack and giving assurances to the emperor—appeared highly likely to
work was that Japanese leaders feared the political consequences of Soviet power. Moreover, there was also
little to lose: An invasion could not in any event begin until November, three months after the Soviet attack. If the
war didn't end as expected, the bomb could still be used.
Instead, the United States rushed to use two bombs on August 6 and August 9, at almost exactly the time the
Soviet attack was scheduled. Numerous studies suggest this was done in part because they "preferred," as
Pulitzer Prize–winning historian Martin Sherwin has put it, to end the war in this way. Although the available
evidence is not as yet absolutely conclusive, impressing the Soviets also appears to have been a factor.
Many military leaders were offended not only because the bombs were used in these circumstances but because
they were used against Japanese cities—essentially civilian targets. William D. Leahy, President Truman's friend,
his chief of staff, and a five star admiral who presided over meetings of both the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and the
Combined U.S.-British Chiefs of Staff, wrote this after the war: "[T]he use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima
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and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and
ready to surrender. . . . [I]n being the first to use it, we . . . adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians
of the Dark Ages."
President Richard Nixon recalled: "[General Douglas] MacArthur once spoke to me very eloquently about it,
pacing the floor of his apartment in the Waldorf. He thought it a tragedy that the Bomb was ever exploded.
MacArthur believed that the same restrictions ought to apply to atomic weapons as to conventional weapons, that
the military objective should always be limited damage to noncombatants. . . . MacArthur, you see, was a soldier.
He believed in using force only against military targets, and that is why the nuclear thing turned him off."
Works Cited
Alperovitz, Gar. The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb. Knopf, 1995.
About the Author
Gar Alperovitz is the Lionel R. Bauman Professor of Political Economy at the University of Maryland. He received his PhD in
Political-Economy as a Marshall scholar at Cambridge University and is the author of The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb
(1995) and Atomic Diplomacy (1965). He is a former fellow of Kings College, Cambridge University; the Institute of Politics at
Harvard; and the Institute for Policy Studies; and a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution. Alperovitz's most recent book,
dealing with economic issues, is America Beyond Capitalism: Reclaiming Our Wealth, Our Liberty and Our Democracy
(2005).
MLA Citation
Alperovitz, Gar. "Dropping the Bomb: Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Dropping the Atomic Bomb was Unjustified."
American History. ABC-CLIO, 2012. Web. 16 Mar. 2012.
http://americanhistory.abc-clio.com/Analyze/Display/1168028?cid=15&terms=dropping+the+atomic+bomb+was+unjustified
Date Accessed: 03.16.12
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Not Everyone Wanted to Bomb Hiroshima
By Leo Maley III and Uday Mohan
Article originally appeared on History News Service (www.h-net.org)
Paul W. Tibbets Jr., retired brigadier general and former businessman, died on Nov. 1. He'll forever be
remembered for what he unleashed the morning of August 6, 1945.
That day Tibbets's B-29 -- christened the "Enola Gay" after his mother -- dropped an atomic bomb on
the Japanese city of Hiroshima. The blast, fire and radiation killed 140,000 people. Many others were
scarred and injured for life. Most of the bomb's victims were women, children, the elderly and other
civilians not directly involved in the war. Those victims also included American and Allied POWs and
thousands of Koreans forcibly conscripted by the Japanese as wartime labor. Thus began the nuclear age
-- an age that grows ever more dangerous with the continuing spread of nuclear weapons.
Tibbets stridently defended the atomic bombing of Hiroshima for the rest of his life. Like Harry S.
Truman -- the president who made the decision to drop the atomic bomb -- Tibbets, whose job it was to
implement the presidential directive, claimed never to have lost any sleep over the bombing. He went so
far as to reenact the Hiroshima bombing in 1976 at a Texas air show.
Tibbets insisted that the nuclear obliteration of Hiroshima (and Nagasaki, destroyed by a second atomic
bomb just three days later) was absolutely necessary to bring about Japanese surrender before a bloody
American invasion of the Japanese home islands. Many Americans agree.
For Tibbets, history was unambiguous: Unleashing nuclear weapons was justified; all criticism of the
atomic bombing was suspect. For the last twenty years or so of his life, Tibbets repeatedly denounced
"revisionists" for questioning the necessity or morality of the atomic bombing of Japanese cities.
Through his many public statements Tibbets reinforced the widely held notion that only untrustworthy
revisionists or members of the irresponsible 1960s generation have criticized the atomic bombings.
Tibbets was dead wrong.
Contrary to conventional opinion today, many military leaders of the time -- including six out of seven
wartime five-star officers -- criticized the use of the atomic bomb.
Take, for example, Adm. William Leahy, White House chief of staff and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff during the war. Leahy wrote in his 1950 memoirs that "the use of this barbarous weapon at
Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were
already defeated and ready to surrender." Moreover, Leahy continued, "[I]n being the first to use it, we
had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make
war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children."
President Eisenhower, the Allied commander in Europe during World War II, recalled in 1963, as he did
on several other occasions, that he had opposed using the atomic bomb on Japan during a July 1945
meeting with Secretary of War Henry Stimson: "I told him I was against it on two counts. First, the
Japanese were ready to surrender and it wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing. Second, I
hated to see our country be the first to use such a weapon."
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Adm. William "Bull" Halsey, the tough and outspoken commander of the U.S. Third Fleet, which
participated in the American offensive against the Japanese home islands in the final months of the war,
publicly stated in 1946 that "the first atomic bomb was an unnecessary experiment." The Japanese, he
noted, had "put out a lot of peace feelers through Russia long before" the bomb was used.
Nor do all Pacific war veterans agree with Tibbets's defense of the atomic bomb. To give but one
example: Responding to a journalist's question in 1995 about what he would have done had he been in
Truman's shoes, Joseph O'Donnell, a retired Marine Corps sergeant who served in the Pacific, answered
that "we should have went after the military in Japan. They were bad. But to drop a bomb on women and
children and the elderly, I draw a line there, and I still hold it."
These are but a few of the military voices that have been critical of American use of atomic bombs on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Recalling these voices -- those of both influential and ordinary military figures
-- should make us reject Tibbets's insistence that the atomic bombings were militarily and morally
justified. Only by challenging and resisting Tibbets's comfortable view of history will Americans be able
to confront, honestly and critically, one of the most disturbing episodes in the nation's past.
Leo Maley III has taught at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst and the University of Maryland, College Park, and Uday
Mohan is the director of research for the Nuclear Studies Institute, American University.
http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2007/11/06_maley_not_everyone_wanted.php
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A PETITION TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
July 17, 1945
(Drafted by Leo Szilard and signed by 68 members of the Metallurgical
Laboratory in Chicago)
Discoveries of which the people of the United States are not aware may affect the welfare of this
nation in the near future. The liberation of the atomic power which has been achieved places
atomic bombs in the hands of the Army. It places in your hands, as Commander-in-Chief, the
fateful decision whether or not to sanction the use of such bombs in the present phase of the
war against Japan.
We, the undersigned scientists, have been working in the field of atomic power. Until recently
we have had to fear that the United States might be attacked by atomic bombs during this war
and that her only defense might lie in a counterattack by the same means. Today, with the
defeat of Germany, this danger is averted and we feel impelled to say what follows:
The war has to be brought speedily to a successful conclusion and attacks by atomic bombs
may very well be an effective method of warfare. We feel, however, that such attacks on Japan
could not be justified, at least not until the terms which will be imposed after the war on Japan
were made public in detail and Japan were given an opportunity to surrender.
If such, public announcement gave assurance to the Japanese that they could look forward to a
life devoted to peaceful pursuit in their homeland and if Japan still refused to surrender, our
action might then, in certain circumstances, find itself forced to resort to the use of atomic
bombs. Such a step, however, ought not to be made at any time without seriously considering
the moral responsibilities which are involved.
The development of atomic power will provide the nations with new means of destruction. The
atomic bombs at our disposal represent only the first step in this direction, and there is almost
no limit to the destructive power which will become available in the course of their future
development. Thus a nation which sets the precedent of using these newly liberated forces of
natures for purposes of destruction may have to bear the responsibility of opening the door to
an era of devastation on an unimaginable scale.
If after the war a situation is allowed to develop in the world which permits rival powers to be
in uncontrolled possession of these new means of destruction, the cities of the United States as
well as the cities of other nations will be continuous danger of sudden annihilation. All the
resources of the United States, moral and material, may have to be mobilized to prevent the
advent of such a world situation. Its prevention is at present the solemn responsibility of the
United States--singled out by virtue of her lead in the field of atomic power.
The added material strength which this lead gives to the United States brings with it the
obligation of restraint and if we were to violate this obligation our moral position would be
weakened in the eyes of the world and in our own eyes. It would then be more difficult for us to
live up to our responsibility of bringing the unloosened forces of destruction under control.
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In view of the foregoing, we, the undersigned, respectfully petition: first, that you exercise your
power as Commander-in-Chief to rule that the United States shall not resort to the use of
atomic bombs in this war unless the terms which will be imposed upon Japan have been made
public in detail and Japan knowing these terms has refused to surrender; second, that in such
an event the question whether or not to use atomic bombs be decided by you in the light of the
consideration presented in this petition as well as all the other moral responsibilities which are
involved.
http://www.hiroshima-remembered.com/documents/Petition.html
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Memorandum from Vannevar Bush and James B. Conant, Office of Scientific Research and Development, to Secretary of
War, September 30, 1944, Top Secret
Source: Record Group 77, Records of the Army Corps of Engineers (hereinafter RG 77), Manhattan Engineering District
(MED), Harrison-Bundy Files (H-B Files), folder 69
Months before the bomb would be available, key War Department advisers, among others, worried about the political and
military problems and possibilities raised by the project—the possibility of enormously powerful hydrogen bombs, enormous
military potential, the limits of secrecy, the danger of a global arms race, and the need for international exchange of
information and international inspection to stem dangerous nuclear competition. Martin Sherwin and James Hershberg see
this memorandum flowing from Bush and Conant’s concern about President Roosevelt's "cavalier" belief that it would be
possible to maintain an Anglo-American atomic monopoly after World War II. To disabuse senior officials that such a
monopoly was possible, they drafted this memorandum.
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Memorandum from J. R. Oppenheimer to Brigadier General Farrell, May 11, 1945
Source: RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. 5g (copy from microfilm)
Discussing the radiological dangers of a nuclear detonation, Oppenheimer explained to General Farrell,
Groves's deputy, the need for precautions
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Memorandum by J. R. Oppenheimer, "Recommendations on the Immediate Use of
Nuclear Weapons," June 16, 1945, Top Secret
Source: RG 77, MED Records, H-B files, folder no. 76 (copy from microfilm)
In a report to Stimson, Oppenheimer and colleagues on the scientific advisory panel--Arthur Compton, Ernest O. Lawrence,
and Enrico Fermi--tacitly disagreed with the report of the “Met Lab” scientists. The panel argued for early military use but
not before informing key allies about the atomic project to open a dialogue on “how we can cooperate in making this
development contribute to improved international relations.”
Top Secret Found online:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/19.pdf
Recommendations on the Immediate Use of Nuclear Weapons
AH Compton
EO Lawrence
JR Oppenheimer
E Fermi
JR Oppenheimer
For the Panel
June 16, 1945
TOP SECRET
You have asked us to comment on the initial use of the new weapon.
This use, in our opinion, should be such as to promote a satisfactory
adjustment of our international relations. At the same time, we
recognize our obligation to our nation to use the weapons to help
save American lives in the Japanese war.
1. To accomplish these ends we recommend that before the weapons
are used not only Britain, but also Russia, France, and China be
advised that we have made considerable progress in our work on
atomic weapons, that these may be ready to use during the
present war, and that we would welcome suggestions as to how we
can cooperate in making this development contribute to improved
international relations.
2. The opinions of our scientific colleagues on the initial use of
these weapons are not unanimous; they range from the proposal of
a purely technical demonstration to that of the military
application best designed to induce surrender. Those who
advocate a purely technical demonstration would wish to outlaw
the use of atomic weapons, and have feared that if we use the
weapons now our position in future negotiations will be
prejudiced. Others emphasize the opportunity of saving American
lives by immediate military use, and believe that such use will
improve the international prospects, in that they are more
concerned with the prevention of war than with the elimination
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of this specific weapon. We find ourselves closer to these
latter views; we can propose no technical demonstration likely
to bring and end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to
direct military use.
3. With regard to these general aspects of the use of atomic energy,
it is clear that we, as scientific men, have no proprietary
rights. It is true that we are among the few citizens who have
had the occasion to give thoughtful consideration to these
problems during the past few years. We have, however, no claim
to special competence in solving the political, social, and
military problems which are presented by the advent of the
atomic power.
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The mushroom cloud over Nagasaki shortly after the bombing on August 9.
(Photo from U.S. National Archives, RG 77-AEC)
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