November 10, 1975
35717
CONGRESSIONAL RECORO-:SENATE
to protect the abilty of the United States
to trade abroad.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
ORDER TO PLACE H.R. 9915 UNDER
GENERAL ORDERS
Ml. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
afternoon. I see nothing to be gained by
agreeing to it and the possibilty of great
loss.
legal experiments with their antiaircraft
missiles in an ABM mode over an 18-
month period. It is well known that the
. Soviets have over 1,100 reloadable SA-5
ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS SUB- high-altitude. su~face-to-air missile
MITrED ON TREATY ON LITA- la-unchers w~ich. if upgra-ded through
TION OF ABM SYSTEMS the clandestme
ABM
.trogram
Soviets have been
conducting.
couldthe
present
Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, More the United States with the awesome
than 3 years have elapsed since the Con- problem of having to deal with not only
ratified the Treaty on the Limlta- a massive offensive threat many times
to make technical. amendments to the gress
tion of Anti-Ba~listi~ Missile Systems. I larger than our own, but also a large
Federal Rules of Evidence, the Federal
I ask unanimous consent that H.R. 9915,
Rules of Criminal Procedure. and to re-
opposed the ratification of the treaty at scale defensive capabilty as well.
tir.ie, and in my view. the course of The proposed protocol to the existing
lated provisions of title 18 and 28 of that
e:,ents since then have justified that ABM Treaty simply places the United
the Unite States Code. now at the desk.
be considered as having been read the
view. States in greater danger from its Soviet
The strategic arms limitation agree- adversary by placing more stringent limfirst and second time and placed on the ment
J;y the Congress wi~h re- itations on the deployment of ABM sysSenate calendar of business under Gen- spect ratifed
to ()ffensive weapons has failed in tems without in any way mitigating the
eral Orders. I understand this has been its most
widely advertised claim. namely threat posed to the citizens of the United
cleared on both sides.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without that it would slow the arms competition States by Soviet strategic forces. What
objection. it is so ordered.
between the United States and the Soviet is needed is not more stringent controls
Union. Rather the character of the first on ABM deployment, but a fundamental
round SALT accords of 1972 have made shift in the strategy of the United States
it possible for the Soviet Union to en- where the Government wil provide for
hance its quantitative advantage over the common defense by making its fist
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mæ. President, the United States, thereby increasing the priority the defense of noncombatants
EXECUTIVE SESSION
I ask that the senate now go into executive session.
pons rather than diminishing it. of a policy whose failure would necessar-
proceeded to the consideration of execu-
in 1972, the Soviet Union had a 4-to-1 THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY
Under the previous order, the Senate
tive business.
danger Americans face from Soviet wea- rather than making citizens the hostage
. When the COngreSS ratified the accords ily result in milions of fatalities.
advantage in land-based ICBM payload
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. capacity
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, one of
or "throw-weight," and a 3-to-2
advantage in the number of ballistic mis- the most pressing issues facing the
CURTIS). The Senator from Virginia.
sile launching submarines they would be
permitted to deploy.
United States-and the world commu-
nity-is the potential spread of nuclear
TRÈATY TO LIMIT ANTffALLISTIC
Today, 3 years later. the new Soviet weapons around the world. With the inMISSIL SYSTEMS
R. & D. program wil make it possible for creasing emphasis on nuclear power for
, Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT. Mr. Presi- the Soviet advantage in missile payload electricity generation, the problem has
dent. I understand we wil vote in a few capacity to grow from 4-to-1 to 10-00-1 been compounded. until. today, more
minutes to ratify the treaty executed
in Moscow on July 3.1974 with the Soviet
if the United States does not deploy a
than 20 nations have the technical ca-
new ICBM. an event which seems to be
pabilty to build the bomb.
Last May, a conference to review the
Union to limit antiballstic missile sys- unlikely in the near future, The Soviet Nonproliferation
was held in
tems and this vote wil occur without Union has tested five new ICBM's and Geneva, bringing Treaty
together representatime being allocated for debate. It may two submarine-launched ballstic miswell be that an antiballstic missile Sys-
tem is too costly and too ineffectual at
this time to warrant its expansion. I also
understand that in a prior treaty we have
alreadY agreed to limit our antiballstic
siles since the SALT I accords. The new tives of 72 nations to consider the workmissiles have onboard digital computers ings of this important treaty, designed to
and "bus-type" vehicles on the missiles help inhibit the spread of the bomb. I was
to permit MIV warheads to be deployed. privileged to address that conference.
It appears that the SALT a-ccords have
inhibited us from developing new offen-
at the invitation of the U.S. delegation,
and have spoken on the results of the
in the United States and no more than sive systems that would offset the Soviet conference since then.
Clearly, far more has to be done if we
two in the Soviet Union, one site being buildup, while at the sa-me time stopping
the national capital and the other site us from deploying a high qualiy ABM are not in the next few years to see a
missiles to no more than two locations
being the deployment area for ICBM system.
silo launchers, and that the proposed
treaty wil reduce. by mutual agreement,
the right of the United States and the
Soviet Union to
missile site.
It is to ea-sy to forget that the United
States has always had the lead in ABM
technology in all areas that matter; ra-
only one antiballstic dars, data processing, and computers, in-
terceptor missiles, warhead design for
detensive systems, and systems integrathe same as it is today, the information tion.
available indicates that it would not be
Serious advanced work on this techagainst the interest of our country to nology has been virtually brought to a
adopt this treaty. However, history tells halt by this ABM treaty. What then are
us that technology changes and it may we left with? We have succeeded in newell be that sometime in the future. gotiating a set of arms limitation agreewhether it be next year or 20 or 30 years ments which have had the consequence
from now, it may be feasible to protect' of enhancing the offensive power of our
our country from intercontinental ballsadversary while stopping us from buildtic missiles through the use of some type ing defensive weapons which could reIn the event our technology remains
of ABM systems possibly not known at
the present time. To me it is untenable
duce the number of Americans who could
be the victims of the advantages guar-
that. treaty or no treaty, we would not anteed the Soviets by the strategic arms
protect the people of the United States if . limitation agreements.
the resources to do so were available and
We should not overlook the extensive
we were confronted with an atomic at- r,ecord of Soviet violations of the ABM
tack. Therefore, Mr. President, it is my Treaty. now well documentd in the press.
intention to vote "no" on the treaty this The Soviets have conducted over 60 il-
"world of nuclear powers," with decrease in security for everyone. Accord-
ingly. I ask unanimous consent to have
printed in the RECORD a report on the
liT Review Conference, by Mr. Wiliam
Epstein, and published by the Stanley
Foundation, Mr. Epstein is a Special
Fellow at the United Na-tions Institute
for Training and Research, and was for
many years Director of the Disarma-ment
Division of the U.N, Secretariat. He is an
experienced and knowledgeable commen-
tator on arms control.
There being no objection, the report
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD. as follows:
RETROSPECTIVE ON THE NPr REVIE CONFERENCE: PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE
(By W1Iiam Epstein)
CONVENING THE CONFERENCE
When the provisIons of the Treaty on
the Non-Prollferiition of Nuclear Weiipons
(NPr) were being negotiiited in 1967 and
were being asked to give up important ele1968, the non-nuclear states felt that they