Hofstra University
Model United Nations Conference 20115
Falkland Island (Malvinas) Crisis 1982
Historical Crisis Committee
1
Introduction to Committee
This is an emergency special session of the United Nations Security Council. This session
has been called to assess and address the declining relations between The United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) and The Argentine Republic whom are in dispute over
the sovereignty of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands and their surrounding waters. The objectives
of the council are to maintain peace in the South Atlantic region where the Islands are located,
repair relations between the UK and the Argentine Republic from further deterioration, and to
assist resolving the dispute over sovereignty of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands and their
surrounding waters. Currently, there have been numerous diplomatic incidents between the two
states over the past few months that have escalated tensions.
This Committee will conduct itself by the rules of the United Nations Security Council.
Thus, the committee will include fifteen members of the Security Council: the permanent 5 (P-5)
members of the China, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States and ten
rotating members that include Panama, Zaire, Uganda, Spain, Ireland, Guyana, Jordan, Poland,
Togo and Japan. Delegates will be debating a number of situations and crisis involving
diplomatic relations between the UK and Argentina with regard to their respective sovereignty
claims over the Falkland (Malvinas) Island and the surrounding waters.
Maintaining international peace and security is the responsibility of the United Nations
Security Council. Ideally, the Security Council will work together to provide a means to avoid
conflict and violence between nation states. However, on the occasion that a dispute does lead to
hostilities, the Council’s primary concern is to bring an end to said hostilities by the quickest
means possible. The Security Council can pass binding resolutions that all member states must
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follow. For substantive resolutions to pass the Security Council, there must be nine affirmative
votes and no P5 votes in the negative. A resolution may pass without all P5 states voting in the
affirmative, but only if that state abstains from voting. Any actual “no” vote from a P5 member
effectively blocks a resolution. This is the so-called veto power. Given the requirement for nine
positive votes, six non-permanent members of the Security Council can exercise what is
sometimes called the “sixth veto” and block a resolution even if all P5 members vote in the
affirmative. This voting structure at many times will lead to gridlock and prevent the Security
Council from quick decision making. But effective debate combined with a willingness to
cooperate among Security Council members can make it the most effective body in the world to
avoid catastrophe and maintain international peace and security.
Historical Background
In the last century, Argentina has continually appealed to the United Kingdom to
relinquish sovereignty over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands and has also argued for its right to
sovereignty over the Islands in many international forums. The objective of this Background
Guide is to answer the questions: Why is there an ongoing dispute over these islands? What is
the significance of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands conflict in regards to decolonization and selfdetermination? Is this conflict a threat to global security? How do we establish measures to
prevent this threat from developing further into something that disturbs international peace and
security? The objective of this crisis committee will be to examine what world leaders can do to
resolve the problems that were established over a century ago.
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Incidents in the 19th Century over the Islands
Following Argentina's independence from Spain, Colonel Daniel Jewitt was sent to Las
Islas Malvinas in November of 1820 to claim the islands in the name of the Republic of
Argentina.1 He did so under the principle of uti possidetis, or “as you possess”. This was meant
to infer that since former the Spanish empire exercised sovereignty over the islands then so too
shall the new Republic of Argentina exercise sovereignty. Following its 1820 claim, in 1823
Argentina’s government made land concessions to businessmen Louis Vernet and Don Jorge
Pacheco to establish cattle and fishing enterprises and also appointed a Governor in order to
regulate fishing in the waters surrounding the islands. To solidify their claim Argentina presented
Louis Vernet with an exclusive grant of the fisheries six years later.
In 1831, Louis Vernet seized two United States ships that had violated Argentine fishing
rights. The American ships and their captains were taken to Buenos Aires to stand trial. In
response the United States ambassador to Argentina rejected the Argentine claim to exclusive
fishing rights off the island. The U.S. ambassador, George Slacum, then sent the U.S.S
Lexington to the Port of Soledad on the islands. On December 28th, the Lexington sent men
ashore seizing the Argentine settlement’s weapons, razed its buildings, and arrested its
inhabitants. The ship’s captain declared the island res nullius, meaning nobody’s property, and
left the island. After the incident Slacum was replaced by Francis Baylies in Buenos Aires. He
informed the Argentine Republic that the United States laid no claim to the islands. The U.S.
did, however, claim right to fish of its shores.
The years following the Lexington incident did not completely leave the islands in a state
of res nullius. Argentina continued to try to exercise sovereignty over the Islands by appointing
Juan Mestivier as successor to Vernet, but his influence over the island was limited and
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eventually his own forces mutinied. In 1833 the final incident of aggression over the islands until
the late 20th century occurred involving two British vessels. On January 2nd, Commander
Onslow of the British Navy anchored one of his ships, the Clio, off of the islands at Port Louis.
Simultaneously, an Argentine vessel named Sarandi captained by Don Jose Maria Pinedo was in
port. Onslow told Pinedo that he would exercise Britain’s right to sovereignty over the islands by
raising the British flag. Although Pinedo rebuked this claim, seeing that he was overpowered he
acquiesced. On January 3rd Onslow lowered the Argentine flag and raised the British one. Three
days later Pinedo evacuated all Argentine soldiers and settlers.
1833 until the Formation of the United Nations
After the 1833 incident, the dispute over the islands became moot due to a shift in
government in Argentina. Nevertheless, Argentina was not immune to foreign intervention over
its sovereignty. In the 1830’s and 1840’s the French and British both attempted to blockade the
Argentine capital of Buenos Aires in an effort to influence Argentine politics and economic
policies. This eventually gave rise to a military dictatorship under Juan Manuel de Rosas, who
defeated the intervention. Eventually his dictatorship gave way to another democratic republic.
This pattern continued to repeat itself in one form or another until the rise of Juan Peron in the
late 1940’s.
As for the British, after their failed attempts to influence Argentine politics in the early
19th century, their interest shrank from the region during this period in favor of more lucrative
economic prospects in Africa and Asia. Great Britain was also concerned about the increasing
competition of the United States, France and other European colonial powers that were growing
their holdings around the globe during the latter half of the 19th century. As such, the Falklands
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was placed on the figurative back burner of British foreign policy at the time. The British
continued to invest in Argentina and occasionally made loans to the Argentine government, but
private British investment in Argentine business was limited aside from the railroads.
As for the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, a small population of British settlers were left on
the islands in 1833. In the 1840’s the Rosas government attempted to sell Argentine sovereignty
over the islands to Great Britain so as to pay back a previous loan made to Argentina, but Great
Britain ignored the request. On the Falkland/Malvinas Islands themselves, the population
stagnated over time due to the cold climate and small economy centered mostly on sheep herding
and fishing.
In 1933, the Falklands Governor Joseph O’Grady argued that since Great Britain had
been administering to the islands for around a century they could claim the islands. But at the
same time, Argentina had continually registered official protest to the British Foreign Offices in
“1833, 1841, 1849, 1884, 1888, 1908, 1927, 1933, 1946, and yearly thereafter in the United
Nations.”2 British refusal to recognize these protests remained a sore point for Argentina, and
would become the basis of later protests before the United Nations.
The Committee of 24 (the Special Committee on Decolonization)
Following World War II and the formation of the United Nations, the General Assembly
established a committee with the sole purpose of decolonizing the former European colonial
possessions throughout Africa, Asia, and the Americas. This committee, known as the
Committee of 24 (C-24), or Decolonization Committee, was established in 1961 by General
Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of December 14 1960.3 In addition to decolonization, this
committee would also resolve conflicts in sovereignty over specific regions in which there was
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dispute by applying the principle of self-determination. In August 1964, elected representatives
of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands conveyed to the C-24 that they would like to continue their
affiliation with the United Kingdom. Despite GA resolution 1514 (XV) that called for the
elimination of colonialism in all its forms, on September 18, 1964 the C-24 decided Great Britain
and Argentina should enter into negotiations in order to resolve the sovereignty dispute over the
islands.4
Self-Determination
The principle of self-determination was disputed by Argentina and Great Britain ad
nauseum before the C-24 throughout the latter half of the 20th century. The argument in favor of
Argentina – supported by anti-colonial nations in the UN which dominated the C-24 and General
Assembly – held that self-determination should not be applied in this case since the main
purpose of the committee was to decolonize. Furthermore, Britain's claim could not stand since
the Islanders themselves were not entitled to exercise the right since the population of the island
was imported by a colonial power. On the other hand, Great Britain argued that the republican
definition of self-determination held that “the individuals who feel themselves to constitute a
group and who are well established in a territory have the right to determine their political
association by means of a secret ballot.” Moreover, the definition applied by the UN and C-24
considered the modern anticolonial definition held that “the self is defined by political elites and
by borders of colonies.”5 This definition had previously been applied by the C-24 in other cases
of decolonization. But in the case of the Falklands/Malvinas Island, there was enough ambiguity
that this definition may have been difficult to apply. Since the Falklands (Malvinas) Islands
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comprised territory formally claimed by the Spanish Colonial Empire, the Islanders themselves
could be considered part of the larger Argentine “self.”
Controversy Over G.A. Resolution 1514
Although General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) had established the C-24 and called
for an end to colonization, the mechanisms to enforce self determination were not laid out. This
lead to hotly contested debates in the C-24, General Assembly, and Security Council to
determine whether or not force was necessary to remove colonial influence from a disputed
territory. In most instances, such as in the case of many African nations, self determination could
be applied. Although internal or regional conflict may arise, for the most part conflict with
former colonial possessors could be avoided. However, in some instances colonial powers were
not willing to give up their colonies so easily. As a result, the use of force began to seem a viable
option.
One example of force being used to enforce self determination came in December 1961
when India used force to push Portugal out of Goa, Damao, and Diu. This use of force came after
repeated attempts to negotiate a settlement between India and Portugal. The Indian ambassador
justified the invasion by arguing that Goa was a territory taken by Portugal from India prior to it
becoming colonized itself. Furthermore, since the Portuguese invasion of Goa in 1510, the
territory remained in a state of hostile military occupation. India argued the virtue of eliminating
colonialism by force in Goa was permissible under the U.N. Charter revised by Resolution
1514(XV).6
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The Indian interpretation of justifying war as long as the cause advanced an anti-colonial
agenda sent shock waves throughout the U.N. and international community. The U.S.
ambassador protested against the invasion, stating that “Resolution 1514 (XV) does not authorize
the use of force for its implementation.”7 The basis of this argument was the United Nations was
an organization intended to promote peace and should not condone force as a means of resolving
conflict. Most of the Security Council agreed with the U.S. ambassador, but a majority of the
General Assembly as well as the Soviet Union were convinced that anti-colonialism was a “New
Higher Law.”8
The New Just War Doctrine
On December 4, 1974 General Assembly Resolution 3314 was passed. Resolution 3314
was part of a series of resolutions passed in the 1960’s and 1970’s that began developing the idea
that peace was not necessarily a higher virtue than justice. Article 7 of Resolution 3314 stated
that “the right to determination, freedom and independence… of peoples forcibly deprived of
that right… particularly people under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien
domination; nor the right of these people to struggle to that end and seek and receive support.”9
This implied that colonialism, in all its forms, was evil and any means used to eliminate it should
be tolerated. The Committee of 24 and the General Assembly – made up mostly of developing
nations and former colonies – worked together to help shape this new notion of a justified war.
Essentially this resolution and the series of resolutions that came before it vindicated India’s use
of force in the case of Goa.
In respect to the Falklands Crisis, this New Just War Doctrine could be applied by
Argentina in order to gain support amongst nations that champion anti-colonial struggles.
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However, Great Britain could use this same doctrine to justify its use of force if Argentina, in the
case of invasion, would be portrayed as the colonial aggressor. The application of this doctrine, if
at all, will be determined by the debate over self-determination.10
Economic Interests and Sovereignty
The Falkland (Malvinas) dispute between Argentina and Great Britain melded issues of
decolonization, self determination, historical right, and sovereignty make settling this dispute a
daunting task. Nevertheless, from the debate over sovereignty emerged two camps of thought.
One was a hardline stance that advocated for a traditional definition of sovereignty that included
clearly drawn national boundaries in order to maintain a state’s own politics, culture, and
economics without foreign influence. On the other end of the spectrum, some took a softer line
such as Great Britain's Foreign Minister James Callaghan, who advocated for a more open
approach to sovereignty. This approach to addressing the UK-Argentine dispute led with the
assumption that “Nations were institutionalized groups of people, and people can be as good at
cooperating as they are at competing.”11 The goal of this approach was to establish mutual
interests that were non-political in order to diffuse tension and provide for cooperation.
On October 24, 1969, a meeting of the British cabinet began discussing the political
significance of oil around the Falklands. This discussion alarmed the British Foreign Office
since they feared that if any steps were taken by Britain to give license to oil companies in order
to explore and test for oil in the region that this would heighten political tensions with Argentina.
In fact they were right. An Argentine newspaper, La Nacion, corroborated the British Foreign
Offices stance that Argentina would perceive any British concessions of exploration to oil
companies would be seen as encroaching on the negotiations regarding sovereignty.
10
In the Summer of 1969-1970 Argentina issued a license for oil exploration in the
Argentine Sea to Shell Capsa, a subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell. This permitted the oil company
to explore the waters between the Malvinas and the mainland. Argentine hardliners were
disappointed by this. This group had advocated for the Argentine state lead oil company,
Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF), to explore these waters for oil. Argentine moderates,
however, called for compromise citing that YPF did not have the ability to explore the oceans for
oil and that to wait for such capabilities would take a long time.12
By the mid-1970s, the UK was re-evaluating its Falkland Island policies. The so-called
Shackleton Mission was established to gauge the economic prospects of the Falkland Islands.
While seen by many in the UK as a way to create better relations with Argentina, this move was
criticized by Argentines as an “infringement on both its interests and UN resolutions.”13 The
mission was caught between two extremes. Hardliners in Argentina felt it was intended to “foster
unilateral British sovereignty over the Falklands and its resources.” The island’s population,
however, “believed that the [British] Foreign Office was plotting the surrender of all British
rights to the islands.”14 In the end, the mission did little but to increase tensions between the UK
and Argentina.
Increasing Tensions
Even though there were sporadic efforts to negotiate better relations, tensions between
Argentina and the UK continued to grow through the 1970s. The issues of sovereignty over the
Falklands/Malvinas never faded during this period, and issues of national self-determination,
new questions about the acceptable means to push forward decolonization and independence for
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weaker states from historical great powers, and other divisive issues still hung over the
relationship. In addition, both states experienced significant domestic challenges that led, in part
at least, to changes in their foreign policy stances that had the potential to create even more
discord between Argentina and the UK.
Argentina suffered tremendous economic and political instability as the 1970s
progressed. After the 1973 electoral victory of the Peronists – named for Juan Peron who had
risen to power in the 1940s and ruled Argentina until being overthrown in 1955 – the country
experienced a wave of terrorist violence. By 1974, the Peronist President, Hector Campora, was
forced to resign and Juan Peron returned to the presidency. But that same year, Peron died and
his wife assumed the presidency. Considered a weak leader presiding over a state with multiple
competing factions, the new President was unable to control increasing terrorist violence from
both the left and the right. Moreover, Argentina experienced massive strikes and other
demonstrations while at the same time economic inflation rose to three hundred percent by 1975,
creating further economic dislocation.15
In 1976, a military junta led a coup against the Peronist, dissolved parliament, and
instituted a harsh rule in Argentina. Engaging in what was called “The Dirty War”, the military
leaders rounded up any perceived opponents and thousands of people were kidnapped, murdered,
or otherwise “disappeared”. The economic policies of the ruling military junta, under the
leadership of General Leopoldo Galtieri after 1981, did little to improve the situation of
Argentina. The Argentine military government became desperate for some sort of economic and
political victory to solidify its position and gain legitimacy in Argentine society.16 While some
in the military junta favored accommodation with the UK over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas
sovereignty dispute, there were still strong Argentine nationalist feelings regarding the issues
12
stemming from past debates over decolonization, national self determination, and sovereignty of
the Falklands/Malvinas that had long been problematic in the UK-Argentine relationship.
In the UK, the 1970s were a time of economic malaise and waning influence in
international politics. The Labour Party dominated British politics for the most part, but the
1973 oil crisis and massive strikes in 1974 damaged Labour and eventually led to the rise of the
Conservative Party (also known as the Tories). Margaret Thatcher, the rising star in the
Conservative Party, argued strongly for economic liberalization to revitalize the British economy
and also presented a robust defense of the UK’s role in international politics. Thatcher’s strong
defense of Western and UK values led her to heavily criticize opposing states and forces,
including a 1976 speech on the “repressive policies of the Soviet Union” that led a Russian
newspaper to dub her "the Iron Lady," something which “gave her much personal pleasure.”17
After winning the 1979 election for the Tories and becoming the UK’s first woman Prime
Minister, Thatcher muscular leadership set her on the course of restructuring and growing the
British economy and reasserting the UK’s role as a great power in the international system.
The long-simmering dispute over the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands/Malvinas hung
over this context of a faltering military junta in Argentina and re-energized and increasingly selfconfident UK in the early 1980s. Given the long dispute between Argentina and the UK
combined with strong nationalist sentiment on both sides, tensions are high and even small
provocations could lead to a crisis. This is where the UN Security Council must step in to
prevent this potentially volatile mix of historical claims, disputed sovereignty, passions regarding
(de)colonization, and significant economic interests from exploding into a conflict between a
weak military government in Argentina and a newly assertive great power in the UK.
13
1
Gustafson, Lowell S. The Sovereignty Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. New
York: Oxford University Press. 1998.
2
Ibid, 34.
3
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: General
Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), 14 December 1960. Available at:
http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/declaration.shtml
4
Gustafson, 39.
5
Ibid, 55.
6
Michla Pomerance. Self-determinación in Law and Practice: The New Doctrine in the United
Nacions. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 1982.
7
Ibid, 49.
8
Ibid, 50.
9
United Nations, “Resolutions Adopted By the General Assembly During its Twenty-Ninth
Session,” http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/29/ares29.htm.
10
Gustafson, Chapter 3.
11
Ibid, 83.
12
Ibid.
13
Peter J. Beck. The Falkland Islands as an International Problem. New York: Routledge. 2014.
27.
14
Gustafson, 92.
15
Argentina Profile. BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-18712378.
16
Ibid.
17
Obituary: Margaret Thatcher. BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-10364876.