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Tuttman, S. (1988). Psychoanalytic Concepts of “The Self”. J. Amer. Acad. Psychoanal., 16:209-219.
(1988 ). Journal of American Academy of Psychoanalysis , 16 :209 -219
Psychoanalytic Concepts of “The Self”
Saul Tuttman, M.D., Ph.D.
Summary
In this paper, I wish to examine some of the contrasting ideas about “the self” in psychoanalytic theory. The objective is to seek
perspective in approaching the problems and unresolved issues inherent in theoretical and clinical issues regarding the concept of “the
self.”
Why is the notion of “the self” particularly susceptible to confusion and controversy? One factor may be that the self is both
subject and object, and both the observer and the observed. * This oscillation between being, experiencing and that which is
experienced as the subject matter under study leads to serious ambiguities and problems in language and definition. How “real” (that
is, how concrete, measurable, tangible) are these phenomena? Which manifestations of self are meaningful in clarifying the theory of
“the self”? From the viewpoint of theory construction, is “the self” best approached with the assumption that it is a metapsychological
or a superordinate concept? Or, is “the self” more usefully construed as a descriptive term? Is it merely a common-sense word
unworthy of being elevated to the status of a significant, let alone fundamental, variable of personality? Can we study and consider the
stages in development of “the self”? Or is “the self” a formed entity present from birth? Does research indicate an evolving self from
an undifferentiated matrix, or a potential nascent self to be developed in the course of time?
—————————————
*
The “Janus-faced” predicament of man (Modell, 1968).
Dr. Tuttman is Clinical Associate Professor of Psychiatry, New York University, School of Medicine; Adjunct Associate Professor of
Psychiatry, New York Medical College; and Training and Supervising Analyst, New York Medical College.
This paper was presented at the American Academy of Psychoanalysis Annual Meeting, Chicago, May 1987.
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Following a summary of Freud's original contributions in this area, I will survey some of the major theorists on the subject and
focus on the controversies of today.
It was the first psychoanalyst, Sigmund Freud (1950 [1895]), who coined the term das ich. This word, in nontechnical German,
translates as “I,” the first-person singular “the self,” which expressed the person's subjective state. There were many occasions in his
writing when Freud used ich in a manner clearly synonymous with selbst* —the experiencing self; and yet at other times, he used ich
to refer to a particular “agency” of self-hood, namely the organizing, administrating part of the individual's mental apparatus.
Metapsychologically inclined psychoanalysts call this regulating psychic institution the ego. In fact, the editors of the Standard
Edition of Freud's writing (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973; Kernberg, 1982) translated (from German to English) Freud's word ich to
ego. As a consequence, the English translation of Freud's papers is misleading: namely, a “playing down” of the personal sense of self
— the subjective, phenomenological state, which had been implicit often in Freud's German use of ich. Instead, a more “objective”
mechanistic tone prevails.
It is probable that Freud chose the ambiguous broader term ich to reflect his view that the ego-I-self aspects of the human psyche
are multifaceted and related to the uniquely human Janus-faced predicament. Each person's experience and knowledge of “being”
continually oscillates between subjective and objective, between experiencing and observing (Modell, 1968; Laplanche and
Pontalis, 1973; and Tuttman, 1981, 1987).
It is of interest to compare Freud's original term das ich with his term das es (which in English translation became the Id). Das es
(the “it”) is a term originated by Groddeck ** and used by Freud. Thus the impersonal, underlying “out of touch” id, the external “it,”
is contrasted by Freud to the conscious, experienced self — the “I” or ego. Early in his theory construction, Freud considered the ego
to be conscious and known while the instinctual was thought to be unknowable.
In some of his early papers, Freud explored drives in relation to
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—————————————
*
Selbst is rarely used in German although it is the word for “self.”
**
Groddeck (1923) cited Nietzsche, who apparently used the expression for whatever in our nature is impersonal, unknown to us and
regulated by natural law.
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“self.” He emphasized the investment of psychosexual energies in “the self.” In the Schreber paper, Freud (1911) described the
psychotic's mode of dealing with self and objects. These ideas became precursors of the concept of the representational world when
he proposed that there is an inner world of organized self and object images which exist under conditions of normal development. In
1912, Freud examined (in Totem and Taboo) infantile omnipotence fantasies and explored psychosexual stages in which the self is
cathected as the first libidinal object. This was the beginning of his concept of narcissism which he further explored in 1914.
Problems with concepts about “the self” and the theories about narcissism are interrelated.
Analysts since Freud have focused on those areas of psychoanalytic theory that are related to issues of “the self.” I have
examined many of their ideas in a paper on the history of self and object relations concepts in psychoanalysis which appeared as a
chapter in the volume Object and Self: A Developmental Approach (1981). Many theorists since Freud have expressed views on “the
self.” Among them are: Hartmann (1939); Fairbairn (1952, 1954); Federn (1952); Erikson (1956, 1959); Winnicott (1957, 1965);
Jacobson (1964); Guntrip (1969); and Mahler et al. (1975). In addition, culturally oriented psychoanalysts such as Horney (1945),
Sullivan (1953), and other psychotherapists, especially Carl Rogers (1951), have contributed important concepts to an evolving
understanding of the role of “the self” in health and in psychopathology. Most recently, the self-psychology of Heinz Kohut (1977)
deals with these issues.
Federn (1952) wrote about “ego feeling” (erlebnis), the reflective sensing of the inner experience of “self-ness.” Although
revolutionary at the time, his contribution has remained obscure — probably because he formulated his very original ideas utilizing
Freud's terminology about energic concerns rather than coining new language to highlight his own notions about existential, personal
and phenomenologic features.
Hartmann (1950), probably out of a need to systematize and clarify theory building in psychoanalysis, examined the conceptual
issues concerning “the self” in Freud's writings. He suggested restricting the definition of the term ego to one of three intrapsychic
agencies (along with the id and the superego) whereas the self, Hartmann proposed, is a representational term dealing with the person
who is the subject in relation to the “other” or “outside person or “object.” In an effort to clarify the issues, Hartmann
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described the ego as a psychic institution or agency. In contrast, the self is a term which describes a phenomenologic feeling state of
experiencing one's person. Furthermore, Hartmann offered a clarification of Freud's concept of narcissism. In narcissistic conditions,
Hartmann suggested, libido is attached to the self representation not to the ego or the body, as Freud had contended. Following this,
Sandler and Rosenblatt (1962) elaborated their concept of the representational world of objects and the self.
Dynamically related to any concept of “the self” in Freud's system are the identifications which determine the qualities of that
self and the development of the ego-ideal and superego which are very important in self-feeling (e.g., self-esteem regulation). Freud
(1923) proposed that an individual's superego and ego-ideal characteristics are significant consequences of that person's resolution of
oedipal conflicts and early life interactions and experiences. In turn, these psychic structures modulate and influence “self” feelings.
I wish to comment briefly about important differences in some of the psychoanalytic concepts of “the self” that have emerged
since Freud. Those who stress the analyst's empathy in the analytic situation (and the caretaker's empathy in the early life of the
patient) are usually primarily concerned with the self-experience of the patient. On the contemporary scene, Kohut (1977) and
Winnicott (1958, 1965) are prime representatives of this view. Underlying Kohut's assumptions, one can find a deficit model.
Similarly, the “false self” of Winnicott (1965) develops when there was not a facilitating caretaker. As a consequence, it was not
possible for the authentic sense of the self (“the true-self”) to emerge safely and so a “false-self” organization results. In Kohut's
schema (1977), the absence of a mirroring, self-object facilitator interferes with the development of a “cohesive self.” Pathology of
the self results from insufficient support and understanding for the young potential self which requires acceptance and encouragement.
Actually these notions were first expressed by Ferenczi (1909) and his student, Balint (1959), and is reflected in the work of Sullivan
(1953) and Horney (1945) as well as in Winnicott and Kohut.
In contrast, Federn (1952) and Melanie Klein (1932) emphasized hereditary, biological and genetic forces. Erikson (1956)
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combined the biological and sociological-cultural factors in his theory of epigenesis (in terms of “identity” formation). Sullivan's
work on the self-system has parallels to Erikson's.
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In harmony with Freud's later structural theory (1923), several concepts of “the self” have emerged which are based on
metapsychology, ego psychology and a developmental perspective. “The self” theories of Hartmann (1950), Spitz (1965), Schur
(1966), Jacobson (1964), Mahler et al. (1975), Kernberg (1982), and Tuttman (1978, 1981a, 1981b, 1987) fall into this context.
Whereas the cultural-humanistic schools tend to be relationship oriented (Sullivan, 1947, 1956) and often inspirational in tone
(Horney, 1945; Maslow, 1968); the ego psychology-metapsychology theorists focus on complex multifaceted biosocial psychological
developmental aspects (Jacobson, 1964; Mahler et al., 1975). Some are mechanistic in tone (Hartmann, 1958, 1964; Kernberg,
1982). Fairbairn (1952) and Guntrip (1969) stress ego vulnerability and need-fulfilling relationships, which are considered more
primary than drive discharge as motivating behavior.
It is difficult to pinpoint each theorist's focus specifically since all theories overlap. Nevertheless certain contrasts between
theorists of the “self” clearly emerge: Controversy No. 1. The question of the inherent value of the concept of “the self”. Is it accurate
and productive to consider “the self” a central, organizing variable in psychoanalytic theory? Is it useful to consider “the self,” as
does Kohut (1977), to be a superordinate concept? Hartmann (1958, 1964), Jacobson (1964), Kernberg (1982), and others do not find
it desirable to replace ego psychology and metapsychology with a superordinate concept of “self” as does Kohut who believes that
traditional theory is not adequate to provide meaningful and effective treatment, at least for narcissistic pathology. George Klein
(1976) and John Gedo (1979), although not in agreement with Kohut's (1977) proposals, agree that a superordinate self-concept is
important. George Klein (1976) proposed the elimination of metapsychology and the focus on a “self-schema.” Gedo (1979) agrees
that metapsychology is inadequate and focuses on “self-organization” as a means of attempting to enhance the theory and practice of
psychoanalytic therapy. Ticho (1982) parallels Kohut's (1977) self-psychology with the self-psychologies of Adler (1956), Jung
(1954), Horney (1945) and Sullivan (1947, 1956). It is an interesting observation (Richards, 1982) that those proponents of
modification of analytic theory have remained within traditional psychoanalysis whereas those who have advocated changes in
technical procedure of psychoanalytic treatment (proposing major alterations in technique) have not remained in the mainstream!
Controversy No. 2. The timetable of the emergence of “the self” in psychoanalytic theory. Some theorists contend that “the
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self” is an inherent structure of the personality from birth onward. Melanie Klein's (1932) timetable places mental activity (of a
subjective fantasy nature) very early in life (if not prenatally), including a primitive notion of self and objects. Fairbairn (1952, 1954)
considers the person concerned with finding relationships rather than with discharging energy. Implicitly, “the self” functions as a
“pristine ego,” intact from the beginning. In contrast, Jacobson (1964) agreeing with Mahler et al.'s (1975) later timetable, contends
that awareness of self and object only gradually develops along the maturational pathway in the course of experience with caretakers.
An evolving research methodology concerning newer methods in infant research and observation may help us to clarify these
important questions regarding the nature and evolution of “the self.” A body of research data (Stern, 1974, 1983, 1985; Ainsworth,
1978; Emde, 1983; Horner, 1985) on neonates supports the view that infants differentiate themselves almost from birth and then
progress quickly through increasingly complex modes of relatedness. There are good reasons (Stern, 1985) to believe that some sense
of self exists in very early life, long before full-self-awareness and language: “[I]t is the organizing objective experience of whatever
it is that will later be verbally referenced as ‘the self.’” By “sense of self” is meant simple (non-self-reflexive) awareness at the level
of direct experience. Stern's (1985) studies resulted in his noting of the sense of: agency (or ownership of self-action), physical
cohesion, continuity, affectivity, subjective selfness (which can achieve intersubjectivity), creating organization and transmitting
memory. He found evidence for these in very, very young individuals and those senses of self, he states, “make up the foundation for
the subjective experience of social development.” In his opinion, there is evidence to support the following timetable: sense of an
emergent self (2 to 6 months); the sense of a subjective self (7 to 15 months) and a sense of verbal self (beyond that).
Time does not permit me to report the impressive and elaborate findings of: MacFarlane (1975) regarding smell of mother's milk
in 3-day old infants, the work of Fantz (1965), Meltzoff and Borton (1979) and several others, each of whom has devised ingenious
measures of some sense of awareness in neonates and infants.
Such research findings provide an opportunity to begin to study the infant's subjective world from an objective vantage
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point. Furthermore, such data provide an alternate source of information about the evolution of “the self.” So many of our notions
have resulted from the study of pathological populations! Psychoanalysts have had a tendency to rely upon the reconstruction of
developmental events via patient reports as evaluated through theoretical bias. This has been called “pathomorphic” thinking (Klein,
1976; Peterfreund, 1978; and Eagle, 1984). The newer data can be collected from normally developing infants directly.
Recent research findings support the idea that there are neonatal organized perceptual and differential states that challenge the
earlier concepts of many analysts who posited autistic phases, undifferentiated stages from which we emerge and to which individuals
sometimes regress. The new techniques of obtaining information encourages a reevaluation of our ideas; yet, there are cogent
arguments (Kaplan, 1987) that suggest that Stern's interpretations of his data may be somewhat overstated.
As I survey the developments in theory construction regarding “the self,” I come to certain tentative conclusions:
Strachey (1923) as well as Hartmann (1950) focused on Freud's failure to distinguish the “ego” and “the self” and each attempted
to offer clarifications. Although Hartmann's work has encouraged advances in ego psychology, his reformulations have a mechanistic
and dehumanizing aspect and thereby create problems as well as solutions. I agree with those (Kernberg, 1982; Richards, 1982; and
Eagle, 1984) who contend that Freud probably intentionally utilized an overall term ich, which provided him with a more
encompassing less committed view of “the self” so as to include phenomenological experiential considerations as well as
metapsychological structure and drive-oriented aspects. Perhaps Freud's ambiguous position still remains the most useful (albeit
limited) concept up to the present concerning “the self.”
Those efforts to counteract the mechanical and dehumanizing aspects of classical theories about “the self,” have also made
significant contributions. The work of Ferenczi (1909) and his followers (Balint, 1959), the middle group of the British school of
object relations and the formulations of Kohut (1977) do add a humanistic and somewhat optimistic inspirational tone. This is also
clear in the work of the neo-Freudians; however, I do not consider these efforts to avoid the mechanistic and reified hypothetical
structures of Freudian metapsychology to be as successful as would be desired! Aside from not taking into account important
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aspects of drive theory, they also sometimes create reified notions and superordinate concepts of their own that do not adequately deal
with the multidimensional aspects of the human personality. So, again, we find gains and losses which result from efforts to advance
understanding by means of theory construction and therapeutic application.
It seems that when we attempt to understand “the self” psychoanalytically, we either find our constructs to be too ambiguous or
too open to universal questions. The subtleties and complexities are so multifaceted as to make clearly focused utilitarian variables
difficult to formulate in the area of “the self.” Nonetheless, I believe that the currently noted issues about “the self” in psychoanalytic
theory do encompass a vital area on the forefront of many puzzling unresolved questions which we hope will be clarified in the
future.
Like all frontiers, the topology and geography are not as yet clearly “mapped-out” and our early schemas are not precise or
accurate enough to permit a full exploration of a still “too new” yet exciting domain.
Thus far, I am not inclined to accept either a relational (interpersonal) model as superordinate or a drive (intra-psychic) model as
superordinate! I believe each is too limited and constricting to encompass the functional usefulness and the supportive evidence that
the alternative hypothesis has gained! I also believe that there is much to be gleaned by theorists and therapists from each model and
the traditions from which it respectively emerged. Both models need broadening and fresh data. The dynamic tension between
alternate theories makes for productive contemplation and stimulates advance in the field, provided we can tolerate the tentative
nature of our progress and understanding, resisting the temptation to enjoy the comforting reassurance that belonging to a theoretical
“school” can provide.
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Article Citation [Who Cited This?]
Tuttman, S. (1988). Psychoanalytic Concepts of “The Self”. J. Amer. Acad. Psychoanal., 16:209-219
Copyright © 2011, Psychoanalytic Electronic Publishing.
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