COMBATING INTOLERANCE RESOLUTION AND THE PROSPECT
TO REVISE DEFAMATION OF RELIGION REGULATIONS
Zainal Abidin Bagir
Introduction
In 2011 the UN Human Rights Council adopted Resolution 16/18 on “Combating
Intolerance, Negative Stereotyping and Stigmatization of, and Discrimination, Incitement to
Violence, and Violence against Persons Based on Religion or Belief”. That resolution was
then adopted by the UN General Assembly later in 2011 and repeated in the following years
(2012, 2013). It was initially proposed by member countries of the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation (OIC, previously Organization of Islamic Conference), an inter-governmental
organization which has 57 members.1 The resolution intended to, among other things, provide
protection for minority Muslims in non-Muslim countries. However for 12 years before that,
since 1999, a series of OIC-initiated resolutions for that purpose had been tabled and were
quite controversial. The resolutions first titled “Defamation of Islam”, then changed to
“Defamation of Religions”, were approved by almost all OIC members in the UN Human
Rights Council (UNHRC) and in the UN. However it gradually lost support from others,
especially Western countries, until it was abandoned in 2011.
While the new resolution on combating intolerance avoids most important weaknesses
present in versions of defamation of religion resolutions, many authors and activists still
suspect the new version. For some, it is simply not good enough, since any limitation to free
speech, including vilification or insult, is not acceptable beyond what is already in the UDHR
and ICCPR. There is no need to add or even underline these limitations. As such the OIC
attempts, grounded initially on some ideas of “defamation of religion”, immediately became
suspect. Even with the new resolution, the suspicion remained that the Muslim countries had
not abandoned the defamation agenda for good, the change simply a temporary strategic step.
The purpose of this paper is not mostly to address that debate between OIC countries and
others, especially Western countries, but to look at the 15-year evolution of the resolution
from a different angle and for a different purpose. From an international perspective,
juxtaposing it with controversies such as the Danish cartoons, which were regarded as
insulting Muslims through their disrespectful depictions of the Prophet Muhammad, the
resolutions were suspected as attempts to limit freedom of speech and criminalise criticism of
Islam. From the OIC’s standpoint, they were about fighting Islamophobia, and defending
Muslim minorities in countries with non-Muslim majorities.
However in its latest, more inclusive, form the resolution may also be considered from a
viewpoint that, if implemented, also speaks to states with Muslim majorities but non-Muslim
minority populations. Such a resolution may be conceived as constituting an alternative to
domestic religious defamation or blasphemy laws existing in certain Muslim countries. That
is, by shifting the target away from the victimised minority non-conformist religious groups,
which may have become the victims of intolerance through religious defamation laws, to
actors actively intolerant of these groups. This could be the case with, to take an example, the
Indonesian defamation of religion law. This is an old law which has been surprisingly
1 revitalised in the last decade and become a convenient medium for the expression of religious
intolerance toward groups such as the Ahmadiyya, the Shi’a, a number of mystical groups,
and other non-conformist groups. Of interest to this paper is the significance of a shift from
defamation to combating intolerance. Assessing this can contribute to an evaluation of
existing domestic defamation of religion or blasphemy laws, especially those effective in
Muslim countries and, further, the possibilities of revising such laws. My main example is the
Indonesian defamation of religion law. Where moves to combat intolerance are considered
feasible, that would mark significant progress in improving religious freedom in countries
where such defamation laws remain operable. Defamation of religion or blasphemy
constitutes one of two major issues related to religious freedom in these countries, the other
being the inter-related issues of proselytism and conversion.2
Opposition to the defamation of religion resolutions
The resolutions related to defamation of religion constitute one of the most important
engagements by Muslim countries with the international human rights regime. This began in
1999 when Pakistan, on behalf of OIC, proposed a draft resolution entitled “Defamation of
Islam” under the racism agenda of the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR).3 The
drafters were alarmed at the negative stereotyping of Islam and a tendency to associate
human rights violations and terrorism with Islam. The international media was seen as
portraying Islam “as a religion hostile to human rights, threatening to the Western world and
[it is] associated with terrorism and violence, whereas, with the Quran, Islam had given the
world its first human rights charter ... That defamation campaign was reflected in growing
intolerance towards Muslims”. They called upon the Special Rapporteur on religious
intolerance “to continue to devote attention to attacks against Islam and attempts to defame
it”. After objections by some European states, Canada and India, the title was changed into
“Defamation of Religions”. In the revised resolution, Islam is still singled out, yet the
resolution passed without a vote and still bearing the title of “defamation”. The EU, however,
has put a reservation on the meaning of “defamation”, which it does not understand as a legal
term.
In 2000, the resolution again passed without a vote. Starting in 2001 votes were taken until
2005 when it was passed. While speaking about defamation of religions, the language of the
resolution, in the words of the representative of Guatemala in 2005, lacked balance since it
gave more weight to Islam.4 The resolution did emphasise Islam and Muslims, especially
Muslim minorities in non-Muslim countries, noting especially the repercussions that followed
the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States.
Although getting more support in 2006 and 2007, objections to the resolution also
strengthened from 2008 to 2010. In a move to avoid such objections, the resolution was made
more pluralistic. For example, when mentioning instances of intolerance, discrimination and
acts of violence, it added “including cases motivated by Islamophobia, Judeophobia and
Christianophobia”.5 It also replaced “defamation” with “vilification”, although the title
remained the same. But these moves apparently did not succeed.6 What happened in the
UNCHR/UNHRC was mirrored in the General Assembly (GA). The resolution was first
introduced in the GA in 2005 by Yemen on behalf of the OIC. Subsequent resolutions were
adopted until 2010, although support weakened.
There were several main arguments against the resolutions which were formulated with
increasing clarity throughout the years by opposing states, international NGOs, as well as
2 academics.7 First, there was an objection over the analogy used between race and religion
(the resolution itself was at some points tabled under the agenda of rascism). This was seen as
shielding religion, especially Islam, against criticism. Second, it was also seen as trying to
protect religion, rather than individual believers – an approach which does not accord with
the approach of the human rights regime in general. Third, “defamation of religion” is an
ambiguous concept, and as such attempts to restrict it may hinder free speech excessively. It
may result in states regulating what is considered the “correct Islam” against legitimate, wellintentioned criticism or internal Muslim reformist attempts. In general, it may restrict free
speech. When the United States, which does not approve the limitation of speech allowed in
the ICCPR, became more active in the debate in 2008, it advanced this limitation on speech
as a main argument.
A further criticism of the resolutions was directed against the majority Muslim countries
themselves and their versions of defamation of religion/blasphemy laws. There was a
justified concern that endorsement of the notion of “defamation of religion” at the UN level
would entrench the domestic laws of those countries. Another related argument was directed
toward the attempt to connect defamation of religion and the violence that it causes. That is,
the defamation of religion must be stopped because it disturbs public order – a connection
made stronger in the case of the Danish cartoon affair. The fact is, opponents of the
resolutions argued, rather than maintaining harmony, such laws in many Muslim-majority
countries have emboldened conservative groups and states to marginalise minority religious
groups (mostly, although not exclusively, within the same religion) in the name of guarding
what they regard as “orthodoxy”. While there may be some relationship between defamation
and violence, it may go not in the direction argued by the proponents of the resolutions, but in
the reverse.
From combating defamation of religion to combating intolerance
2010 was the last year the defamation of religion resolutions were discussed in both the
UNHCR and the GA. In March 2011, a radical (although not abrupt) change took place at the
UNHCR. Instead of defamation of religion, the OIC proposed a resolution entitled
“Combating Intolerance, Negative Stereotyping and Stigmatization of, and Discrimination,
Incitement to Violence, and Violence against Persons Based on Religion or Belief”.8 This
time the resolution passed without a vote, and this repeated in following years. At the GA, the
combating intolerance resolution also passed in December 2011, and repeated in 2012 and
2013 – all without a vote.
The 2011 HRC resolution actually repeats the main concerns in previous defamation
resolutions. It notes “the instances of intolerance, discrimination and acts of violence in many
parts of the world, including cases motivated by discrimination against persons belonging to
religious minorities, in addition to the negative projection of the followers of religions and
the enforcement of measures that specifically discriminate against persons on the basis of
religion or belief”. It encourages member states to address and combat “any advocacy of
religious hatred against individuals that constitutes incitement or discrimination, hostility or
violence”. But other than that, there was now no specific reference to Islam, Islamophobia or
Muslims. As well, the focus had shifted from protection of religions to the protection of
persons.
Another important point concerns the use of legal or non-legal means. In general, rather than
suggesting legal ways to combat defamation of religions, an important feature of the
3 resolution was its emphasis on non-legal ways to combat intolerance. Legal means was still
suggested, but limited to: “Adopting measures to criminalize incitement to imminent violence
based on religion or belief” (italics added). But it recognised that “working together to
enhance implementation of existing legal regimes that protect individuals against
discrimination and hate crimes, increase interfaith and intercultural efforts, and to expand
human rights education are important first steps in combating incidents of intolerance,
discrimination and violence against individuals on the basis of religion or belief”. It further
suggested “open public debate of ideas, as well as interfaith and intercultural dialogues at the
local, national and international levels” as a way to protect against intolerance. The means to
foster a domestic environment of religious tolerance, peace and respect includes “creation of
collaborative networks to build mutual understanding, promoting dialogue and inspiring
constructive action towards shared policy goals and the pursuit of tangible outcomes, such as
servicing projects in the fields of education, health, conflict prevention, employment,
integration and media education”.
The new resolution was followed more enthusiastically by states as well as international
NGOs. The most significant has been the Istanbul Process, a series of meetings launched in
Istanbul as early as July 2011 by the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the OIC Secretary
General Ekmelledin Ihsanoglu, and EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy Catherine Ashton.9 Since then, there have been four further meetings. However,
Kayaoglu and Petersen question whether the meetings can bridge old divides between the
West and the Muslim world, or simply repeat old animosities apparent in previous
defamation of religion debates.10 At the third meeting in Geneva, while there were
discussions about inter-faith dialogue as a non-legal means of combating intolerance, there
was also the contentious issue of criminalisation of hate speech, “invoking old fault lines
between the Muslim world and the West and raising questions about the future of the
resolution”.11
Indeed, outside these meetings, there has been worry that in the implementation process of
the new resolution OIC countries still entertained the idea of criminalising defamation of
religion and might have not fully abandoned the idea of defamation of religion. Marshall and
Shea maintain that “Blasphemy prohibitions are now being universalised at the UN through a
back door. Traditionally narrow limits on free expression are being interpreted expansively to
accommodate prohibitions against ‘religious hate speech’, which, in turn, is explicitly
interpreted by the OIC as a ban on ‘defamation of religions’”.12 In an opinion article, Shea
saw that the Istanbul Process “offered a transnational venue for the OIC to reintroduce its
anti-defamation push, just as the issue had been laid to rest at the United Nations”.13
Elizabeth Kendall, an Australian religious liberty advocate, goes further, saying that the
combating intolerance resolution was more dangerous than the combating defamation
resoution. Quoting OIC sources, she showed that the intention of OIC with the follow-up
meetings was to formulate “international laws preventing inciting hatred resulting from the
continued defamation of religions”.14 For her, it is clear that the move from defamation to
incitement is “not only totally consistent with OIC strategy since early 2009, but it actually
advances the OIC's primary goal: the criminalisation of criticism of Islam”.15
The OIC was certainly aware of this suspicion. On October 2012, the Secretary General of
the OIC said that the organisation would not try again to table defamation of religion, but
appealed for states to apply hate-speech laws concerning Islam.16 More positive comments
were given more recently (March 2014) in a joint statement by three NGOs: Article 19,
Human Rights First and Freedom House.17 These organisations opposed earlier resolutions on
4 combating defamation of religions, but welcomed the later resolution combating intolerance.
They called on states to implement the combating intolerance resolution. As guidance for
implementation, there was specific mention of the Rabat Plan of Action. This is an initiative
running parallel with the Istanbul Process, starting with four intensive meetings in 2011 and
culminated in 2012 in Rabat.18
The shift from defamation to intolerance: the future of domestic religious
defamation laws
While in the international forums OIC member states have attempted to fight Islamophobia in
places where Muslims constitute a minority, domestically a related but different problem
arises. This is the prevalence of extant versions of blasphemy or defamation of religion laws
in Muslim countries (in some places such laws have been used even more frequently in recent
years).
In this regard, a shift from defamation to intolerance and incitement may prove helpful when
seen as better protecting religious freedom in Muslim countries. The attempt to criminalise
defamation at the international level mostly targets Western countries with an increasing
number of Muslims. Yet debates about these ideas, and an eventual OIC shift from
defamation to intolerance, could be a valuable resource for influencing the domestic situation
within OIC member countries.
According to the Pew Research Center, many countries have blasphemy/defamation laws that
are fully enforced. In others they still exist, but are rarely enforced or have not been done so
for a long time. As of mid-2009, 30% of 198 countries have regulations forbidding
blasphemy, apostasy or defamation and they are still enforced in 44 of those countries.19 The
highest number (80%) of countries with such regulations are in the Middle East or Northern
Africa, followed by Europe with 38%, Asia-Pacific 30%, Sub-Saharan Africa 17% and the
Americas 12%.20 The regulations are still enforced in many countries (14 countries in
Europe, 12 in the Middle East, 12 in Asia-Pacific, three in Sub-Saharan Africa and three in
the Americas).21 Recent developments in Pakistan and Indonesia show that such laws have
been used more frequently recently.22
Regarding Indonesia, the existing defamation of religion law has increasingly been an object
of scrutiny. The law was first enacted in 1965, partly to accommodate the interest of certain
Muslim groups against the syncretic spiritual movements known as aliran kebatinan/
kepercayaan (literally streams of spiritual beliefs). In its vague wording, the law prohibits
every individual from “intentionally, and in public, conveying, endorsing, or soliciting public
support for an interpretation of a certain religion embraced by Indonesian people or
undertaking religious activities that resemble the religious activities of the religion, where
such interpretation and activities deviate from the basic tenets of the religion”.23 It is clear
that the objective of this law was to guard certain claims to orthodoxy and fight syncretic
movements.
During its first 35 years, this law was invoked only rarely. Paradoxically, however, following
the democratisation that began in 1998 it was invoked more frequently – from only 10 cases
in 35 years (1965-2000) to around 40 cases since 2000.24 No less importantly, the target of
the law was widened to include non-conformist or non-mainstream religious, mostly Islamic,
groups. This was not only small groups that could be categorised as new religious
movements, but larger groupings such as the Ahmadiyah and, more recently, even the Shi’a,
5 which is acknowledged as a legitimate Islamic sect by international Islamic organisations. In
these latter cases, the law has become a means to guard narrow (and increasingly narrower)
understandings of Islamic “orthodoxy”. Similar to blasphemy/defamation laws, the vague
wording of the law leaves it open for use in a variety of different cases by either of the more
powerful religious groups or the state. The Indonesian law does not distinguish intentional
defamation (and also “defamation” of teachings, house of worship or religious figures),
deviation (from the mainstream understanding of the religion), or simply difference (in
interpretations).
The recent increase in the use of the law is a paradox; immediately following the 1998
democratisation movement, human rights in general found a much better grounding in the
Indonesian state. Besides enactment of a new law on human rights and ratification of more
human rights conventions, the second of four Constitutional Amendments (2000-2002)
managed to insert wide-ranging articles on human rights. Considering other developments, it
can be said that the defamation of religion law has been revitalised.25
Responding to this revitalisation, advocacy for religious freedom has developed from
responding to specific court cases, to bringing certain laws, including the defamation of
religion law, to the Constitutional Court, an independent body established in 2003 as another
consequence of democratisation.26 The law was brought to court twice (2009-2010 and 2013)
where, on both occasions, the court decided to uphold it. The main argument of petitioners
concerned the discrepancy between the 1965 law and the Constitution, especially its
amendments, which allowed a similar clause of restriction of freedom as in the ICCPR.
Ministries of Religion and Domestic Affairs defended the law as a way of protecting religious
communities from defamation of their religions. The argument ran as follows: defamation of
religion may offend the sensitivities of certain religious groups, which may then incite
violence; to prevent that occurring, and to maintain public order, defamation of religion
should be prevented; and, as such, there are legitimate grounds to restrict that freedom, that
is, to “defame religion”. The problem, however, is that non-mainstream, unorthodox or nonconformist groups, which may have different interpretations from the mainstream groups
within a religion, can face accusations of defaming a religion. This is the case with the
Ahmadiyya and the Shi’a.
While acknowledging the discriminatory potential of the law, the court agreed with that
argument. With regard to evidence of discrimination, it faulted not the law itself, but its
implementation. That was part of the reason why the court recommended a need for revision.
That is, to ensure that the law needed to maintain social order and does not threaten
Indonesian pluralism by becoming discriminatory.27
That suggestion has not been followed up, but the issue of defamation of religion may recur
when a planned law on religious harmony is discussed. Despite recommendations by
domestic and international human rights organisations, as well as by states during the 2012
Universal Periodic Review of the UNHRC, the prospect of annuling the law is slim. The
main consideration, as evident from the proceedings of the 2010 Constitutional Court’s
review, is not just legal; more important is the historical political baggage that the law
carried. The law constituted one of the landmarks of accommodation of certain Muslim
political interests, one that has significantly defined state-religion relations in Indonesia.28
While completely annuling the law is highly unlikely in the near future, what may be done,
following the suggestion of the Constitutional Court, is its revision.
6 The question is how might this law be revised without going against Indonesia’s commitment
to pluralism and religious freedom? Is it even possible to do that? The Constitutional Court
does not provide sufficient clues here; it merely outlines, in passing, some broad constraints.
It is here that insights produced by international debates on defamation of religion can be
helpful. Ideas derived from them, and as discussed, are outlined here.
First, shifting the issue of defamation of religion to intolerance and incitement to hatred or
violence also means shifting the target of the discourse. Victims of defamation of religion in
Indonesia (or other Muslim countries) are usually minorities of religious individuals and
groups (in most cases actually co-religionists) regarded as “defaming” the religion concerned.
They become the object of criminalisation. In contrast, regarding intolerance and incitement
to hatred, the perpetrators are intolerant groups who, for the sake of maintaining their
religious sensitivities, act with criminal intent, marginalise, or incite hatred and violence
toward perceived non-conformists.
Second, while the concept of defamation requires, in some way or another, a determination of
orthodoxy, the concept of intolerance or incitement to violence is more concrete. It does not
require orthodoxy, but identifies perpetrators by more objective and tangible standards, that
is, the act of inciting violence. To be sure, determining what acts constitute incitement to
violence is not straightforward, but internationally there are guidelines and jurisprudence
beyond just “defamation of religion”.29A related point here is the shift from protection of
religion or a religious group to individuals.
Kayaoglu sees those shifts indicating the victory of liberal ideas contra the Muslim
standpoint.30 On a different perspective, however, it is also possible to conceive these shifts
not as a move from Muslim to Western liberal ideals but, following Witte and Green, a shift
toward pragmatism.31 Besides, conceiving too stark a contrast between Western liberalism
and a more communitarian Muslim standpoint risks freezing or essentialising both. In fact,
within the internal Muslim discourse, there is a wide variety of standpoints, some
authoritarian, some democratic, others highly “communitarian”. Yet there are other equally
and traditionally legitimate positions advanced by influential Muslim leaders moving more
closely toward a certain type of liberalism. Relevant to this discussion are recent debates on
the relationship between democracy, secularism, liberalism and multiculturalism; they open
up the possiblity of other, more nuanced positions on this issue.32 In sum, rather than drawing
stark contrasts between Muslim and Western ideals, or simplifying the shifts taken by
countries in international forums, it is more productive to see both as dynamic, evolving and
engaged in dialogues. Furthermore, an analysis which looks at so-called Western-Muslim
fault lines can easily exaggerate their differences and, as such, impede attempted dialogues
and negotiations from a too philosophical plane.
Conclusion
While for some Western countries the resolution concerned was supected of restricting
speech, in majority-Muslim countries like Indonesia, it should be seriously considered in the
attempt at revising the defamation of religion law. Cases in Indonesia show that part of the
reason for violation of the rights of vulnerable religious groups comes from intolerance,
manifest in hate speech or even incitement to violence. “Combating intolerance” tends to
fault the intolerant perpetrators of violation of religious freedom rather than victims, who are
usually members of vulnerable religious groups. It reverses a tendency apparent in the
7 existing defamation of religion law, which is clearly intended to protect the majority or
mainstream religious groups.
Similarly, while these resolutions were initially and primarily intended to protect minority
Muslims in non-Muslim countries, it was now also expected to protect vulnerable minorities,
Muslims or not, in other countries. As such, its main purpose was the protection of minority
religious groups – regardless of the religious affiliation of victims or perpetrators – and from
intolerance, stigmatisation and incitement to violence. As the initator of this resolution, the
OIC is naturally sought to persuade its member countries to protect their own religious
minorities, without which calls to protect Muslim minority populations in Western countries
would not be credible.
Endnotes
1
The official website explains the organization as follows: “The Organization is the collective voice of the
Muslim world and ensuring to safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim world in the spirit of promoting
international peace and harmony among various people of the world. The Organization was established upon a
decision
of the historical summit which took place in Rabat, Kingdom of Morocco on 12th Rajab 1389 Hijra (25
September 1969) as a result of criminal arson of Al-Aqsa Mosque in occupied Jerusalem”. Its current 10th
Secretary General is Iyad Ameen Madani, who assumed the office in January 2014 (http://www.oicoci.org/oicv2/page/?p_id=52&p_ref=26&lan=en last accessed 11 November 2014). See also
http://oichumanrights.wordpress.com/ for more information on OIC’s agenda on human rights.
2
Witte, J and Green, M.C. (2012). Religious Freedom, Democracy, and International Human Rights. In
Timothy Samuel Shah, Alfred Stepan, and Monica Duffy Toft, eds. Rethinking Religion and World Affairs,
Oxford Scholarship (Online). (DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/ 9780199827978.003.0008), 111. For the case of
Indonesia, see cf. Bagir, Z.A. (2015), “Indonesia”. In Keeping the Faith: A Study of Freedom of Thought,
Conscience, and Religion in ASEAN, Human Rights Resource Centre, Jakarta, 139-194. Available at
www.hrrca.org.
3
Defamation of Islam, C.H.R. Draft Res., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/L.40 (29 Apr. 1999).
4
See http://www.un.org/press/en/2005/ga10437.doc.htm. The country did, however, vote in favour, hoping that
future texts would be more inclusive.
5
UN Document A/RES/65/224.
6
Cf. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/25/blasphemy-resolution-pass_n_788305.html.
7
For a recapitulation of the arguments, see Uddin, Asma T (2011). Blasphemy Laws in Muslim Majority
Countries. The Review of Faith and International Affairs, Summer (2011), 1-9; Witte, J. and Green, M.C.
(2012), op. cit.; and Marshall, P. and Shea, N. (2011). Silenced: How Apostasy and Blasphemy Codes are
Choking Freedom Worldwide, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
8
UN Document A/HRC/RES/16/18.
9
See the resulting joint statement at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/168653.htm.
10
Kayaoglu, T. and Petersen, M.J. (2013). Will Istanbul Process Relieve the Tension Between the Muslim
World and the West?, http://www.thewashingtonreview.org/articles/will-istanbul-process-relieve-the-tensionbetween-the-muslim-world-and-the-west.html (last accessed 12 May 2015).
11
Ibid.
12
Marshall, P. and Shea, N. (2011). Silenced: How Apostasy and Blasphemy Codes are Choking Freedom
Worldwide.
13
Shea, N. (2011), “A Perverse ‘Process”, http://nypost.com/2011/12/17/a-perverse-process/, 17 December
2011.
14
The quotation is from an Internationational Islamic News Agency report, quoted by Kendall. See
http://elizabethkendal.blogspot.co.nz/2011/08/hr-resolution-1618.html (July 2011).
15
OIC’s more recent position of June 2013 can be found at:
https://oichumanrights.wordpress.com/tag/resolution-1618/.
16
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/15/us-islam-blasphemy-idUSBRE89E18U20121015. See also
Freedom House’s support: https://freedomhouse.org/article/oic-rebuke-defamation-religions-welcomed.
17
http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/37505/en/human-rights-council:-states-must-implementresolution-16-18-and-rabat-plan-of-action. For the individual organisations’ stands see also
http://www.humanrights.gov/2014/09/04/combating-intolerance-and-discrimination-based-on-religion-orbelief/; https://freedomhouse.org/blog/trouble-blasphemy-laws#.VGt-1_mUdIE.
8 18
The text of Rabat Plan of Action can be found at:
http://www.ohchr.org/documents/issues/opinion/seminarrabat/rabat_draft_outcome.pdf. See also
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/RabatPlanOfAction.aspx.
19
Pew Research Center. (2011). Rising Restrictions on Religion, August 2011 (available from
http://pewforum.org/Government/Rising-Restrictions-on-Religion.aspx), pp. 59, 67.
20
Ibid. p. 71.
21
These figures may not be completely accurate, since the Pew Research Report only gives percentages, but
does not list individual countries. For the numbers, as well as further examples, see Bagir, Zainal Abidin.
(2013). “Defamation of Religion Law in Post-Reformasi Indonesia: Is Revision Possible?”, Australian Journal
of Asian Law, 13:2, pp. 1-16.
22
It is important to note that taking examples from Muslim countries should not assume that the laws in those
countries are similar or even identical. In general, the blasphemy law in Pakistan is much stronger than that
existing in Indonesia regarding scope of what constitutes blasphemy and defamation (in Pakistan it is only to
protect Muslim sensitivities) as well as the punishments (the most severe in Pakistan is the death penalty, while
in Indonesia it is a five-year term of imprisonment).
23
Art. 1 of Law No 1/PNPS/1965 on Prevention of Defamation of Religion.
24
The numbers are inferred from Crouch’s study and religious freedom reports that document cases in recent
few years in Indonesia, and are published by national and international organisations such as the Setara Institute,
the Wahid Institute, the Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies at Gadjah Mada University, Freedom
House, Human Rights Watch, or Amnesty International. It is difficult to obtain exact numbers since there is no
central repository of court cases covering all parts of Indonesia. See Crouch, M. (2012). “Law and Religion in
Indonesia: The Constitutional Court and the Blasphemy Law”. 7(1) Asian Journal of Comparative Law 1.
25
Bagir, Z.A. (2015), “Indonesia”.
26
Bagir, Z.A. (2014). “Advocacy for Religious Freedom in Democratizing Indonesia”, The Review of Faith &
International Affairs, 12:4, 27-39.
27
Constitutional Court Decision No.140/PUU-VII/2009.
28
Bagir, Zainal Abidin (2013), op.cit.
29
An example of such a guideline is that produced by Human Rights First, Confronting Hatred While
Respecting Freedom of Expression. Available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wpcontent/uploads/pdf/Confronting_Hatred_While_Respecting_Freedom_of_Expression.pdf.
30
Kayaoglu, T. (2014). “Giving an Inch Only to Lose a Mile: Muslim States, Liberalism, and Human Rights in
the United Nations”. Human Rights Quarterly, 36:1, 61-89.
31
Witte, J. and Green, M.C. (2012), op. cit.
32
Muslim scholars such as Abdullahi an-Na’im, Khaled Abou el-Fadl, Tariq Ramadan, Abdulaziz Sachedina or
Abdul Karim Soroush have long argued for some kind of non-liberal Muslim democracy. There is also a
growing literature based on empirical research, such as that undertaken by Alfed Stepan and Ahmet Kuru, about
varieties of secularisms, models of democracy, and whether democracy requires strict separatist liberalism. This
literature should not be seen as strengthening the liberal-Muslim divide, but movement towards blurring the
borders of older categories.
9